


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ITALY: AUTONOMIA

POST-
POLITICAL
POLITICS

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EDITORS

Sylvère Lotringer, Christian Marazzi

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522 Philadelphia Hall
Columbia University
New York, N.Y. 10027
212 288-3606

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III: Gramsci Lucio Pozzi, 1977



One day in jail. Two days in jail. Three days in jail. Four days in jail. Christ. Five days in jail. Six days in jail, seven. Today is my eighth day in jail. Nine days in jail. Ten days in jail. Eleven days in jail. Twelve days in jail. The door opens and closes, opens and closes. Thirteen days in jail. Fourteen days in jail. Fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen. A jail is a jail is a jail is a jail, nineteen days in jail. Twenty days in jail. Twenty days already. Twenty-one, twenty-two days in jail. Twenty-three days in jail. Twenty-four days in jail. Twenty-five days in jail. Twenty-six days in jail. Twenty-seven days in jail. Twenty-eight days in jail. Twenty-nine days in jail. One month. Another twenty-nine months in jail and then I'll be free. Thirty-one days in jail. Thirty-two days in jail. Thirty-three days in jail. Thirty-four days in jail. Thirty-five, six, seven, eight, nine, forty days in jail. The walls of the jail. The ceiling of the jail, the jail of the jail. Forty-one days in jail. Forty-two days in jail. Forty-three days in jail. Forty-four — how will people be when I get out? — days in jail. Forty-five days in jail. Forty-six days in jail. Forty-seven days in jail. Forty-eight days in jail. Forty-nine days in jail. Oh fuck . . . this entire jail. Fifty days in this fucking shitty jail. Fifty-one days in jail. Fifty-two days in jail. Fifty-three, fifty-four days in jail. Fifty-five days in jail. Fifty-six days in jail. Fifty-seven days in jail. Fifty-eight days in jail. Fifty-nine days in jail. Fifty-nine days in jail. Today there is no passage of time. Sixty days in jail. Who knows if the others dream of me as much as I dream of them. Sixty-one days in jail. Sixty-two days in jail. Sixty-three days in jail. Sixty-four days in jail. Sixty-five days in jail. Sixty-six days in jail. Sixty-seven days in jail. Sixty-eight days in jail. Sixty-eight . . . sixty-eight . . . In 1968 . . . now I'm really out of date . . . ty-nine days in jail. Seventy days in jail. Seventy-one days in jail. Seventy-two days in jail. Seventy-three days in jail. Seventy-four days in jail. Seventy-five days in jail. Jail has its own smell, I'll never be able to get it off me, all the soap and scent of a detergent factory wouldn't be enough to remove it, and everybody'll know I've been in jail. Seventy-six days in jail. I could explode at any moment. Seventy-nine. Eighty days in jail. In jail you start to reel. Eighty-one days in jail. In jail you start to reel. Eighty-two days in jail. In jail you start to reel. Eighty-three days in jail. Eighty-four days in jail. Eighty-five days in jail. Eighty-six days in jail. Eighty-seven, eighty-eight, eighty-nine days in THIS ETERNAL JAIL. Ninety days in jail. Now I'm busting. Ninety-one days in jail. Ninety-two days in jail. Ninety-three days in jail. Ninety-four days in jail. Ninety-five days in jail. I have diarrhea. Ninety-six days in jail. Ninety-seven days in jail. Ninety-eight days in jail. Ninety-nine. One hundred days in jail. Hurray, let's break out the champagne. Very funny. 101 days in jail. 102 days in jail. 103 days in jail. 104 days in jail. 105 days in jail. 106 days in jail. 107 days in jail. 108 days in jail. 109

Introduction

The Return of Politics

Sylvere Lotringer/
Christian Marazzi

THE IMPOSSIBLE CLASS

The workers in Europe should declare that henceforth as a class they are a human impossibility, and not only, as is customary, a harsh and purposeless establishment. They should introduce an era of vast swarming out from the European beehive, the like of which has never been experienced, and with this act of emigration in the grand manner protest against the machine, against capital, and against the choice with which they are now threatened, of becoming of necessity either slaves of the state or slaves of a revolutionary party. Let Europe relieve itself of the fourth part of its inhabitants! . . . Whet at home began to degenerate into dangerous discontent and criminal tendencies will, once outside, gain a wild and beautiful naturalness and be called heroism. . . .

Nietzsche, *the Dawn* [206]

AUTONOMY AT THE BASE

Sylvere Lotringer Autonomy is the body without organs of politics, anti-hierarchical, anti-dialectic, anti-representative. It is not only a political project, it is a project for existence.

Individuals are never autonomous: they depend on external recognition. The autonomous body is not exclusive or identifiable. It is beyond recognition. A body of workers, it breaks away from labor discipline; a body of militants, it ignores party organization; a body of doctrine, it refuses ready-made classifications.

Autonomy has no frontiers. It is a way of eluding the imperatives of production, the verticality of institutions, the traps of political representation, the virus of power. In biology, an autonomous organism is an element that functions *independently of other parts*. Political autonomy is the desire to allow differences to deepen at the base without trying to synthesize them from above, to stress similar attitudes without imposing a "general line," to allow parts to co-exist side by side, in their singularity.

The body without organs of autonomy has no frontiers, but it does have a history, and this history is Italian. This history is given here without any intermediaries, in the language of its actors. Other experiences and other perspectives are simply

set side by side. Through this Italian history, we can read our own history, our possible history, between the lines.

Historically, Autonomy was born in the large factories of Northern Italy in the early 50's. "Autonomy at the base" was originally devised by emigrant workers from the South in defiance of the union bosses — backed by the Communist Party — who pretended to represent them. Autonomy soon moved beyond claims for higher wages and questioned not only labor relationships, but labor itself. It devised original forms of collective action (autoreduction, sabotage of production, etc.), which entailed numerous confrontations with the State. This whole theme crystallized in 1965 with the refusal of wage labor which still remains directly tied to the struggles of the Italian Autonomy.

Autonomy is a way of acting collectively. It is made up of a number of organs and fluid organizations characterized by the refusal to separate economics from politics, and politics from existence. Autonomy never unified.

Diverse organizations assembled at the national level. They formed "Potere Operaio" (*Worker's Power*), both a group and a magazine gathering together a number of theoreticians such as Mario Tronti, Toni Negri, Sergio Bologna, Franco Piperno and Oreste Scalzone. Their reformulation of Marxism became seminal for the whole of the autonomous movement. In 1973 the militarization of the Movement raised a deep controversy between various currents within "Potere Operaio". The confrontation eventually led to its self-dissolution. (The State today refuses to recognize this dissolution.) Formed in 1970, the Red Brigades were already organizing clandestine actions in order to carry the confrontation "to the heart of the State." On the other hand, various fragments from "Potere Operaio" extended the struggle from the factory to the city (occupation of houses, etc.) to ground it to the daily life of the "socialized worker." This majority constitutes the Italian Autonomy.

The chasm continued to deepen between the clandestine line of the Red Brigades, entrenched in the classic worker position, and the "open" perspectives of Autonomy, eager to account for the profound transformations in the "class composition" of Italian society through forms of "mass" intervention.

Over the last two years, and notably since the April 7 arrests, the Italian State has tried to erase by force the difference between the Red Brigades and Autonomy. It designated "Potere Operaio" as their common source, as their "primal scene." These monstrous matings, these originary embraces are always retroactive fantasies, and convenient "reconstructions" of analysis. They justify repression. Today more than 1,500 intellectuals and militants of the class movement are in prison — indefinitely, it seems — awaiting trial on highly evasive charges. Italy is the only "free society" that can claim to outdo the USSR in the number of political prisoners.

The State repression is deadly — but it is not *serious*. It is not serious because it misses its avowed target (to eliminate the Red Brigades). It eliminates instead what it refuses to acknowledge: the emergence of new forms of conflict linked to a new social stratum. This stratum is supposedly "marginal," but its actual importance, in Italy as elsewhere, can only grow.

Numerous committees against Repression in Italy have formed in Western capitals. International appeals have come from well-known figures, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, Félix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze. Recently, Italian artists and intellectuals close to the Italian Communist Party, whose responsibility in the round-up appears overwhelming, have started to publicly question the State's procedures.

Protests however can be misleading since they fall squarely within the framework set up by the Italian State. The State selected its battleground and carefully weighed its weapons. The State's *blitz* on Autonomy violates Human Rights. It

should be condemned internationally. But this is only part of the story. Its complexity, its contradictions, even its ambiguities remain to be told. To simplify the nature of the Movement, the questions it raises and the danger it now faces ultimately plays into the hands of power.

The scant information from Italy is partly responsible. It is urgent to close the information gap on Italy — to unfold the overall context of these events. Every passing day adds to the list. (October 16: Franco Piperno was finally extradited from France). Our "intervention" is not an "answer" to repression. Rather it uncovers a political experience which took almost 20 years to accumulate. This is what the Italian State wants to put behind bars — along with most of the contributors to the present issue.

A new "social subject" is emerging, conscious of its own history and potential. Its existence incorporates the most advanced aspects of our technological societies. The outcome of the present confrontation is uncertain. Repression has taken its toll. Indifference shouldn't take over. The *actual* reasons for which the Autonomists are imprisoned shouldn't disappear with them, or even with their eventual (and unlikely) release. We should preserve against the Italian State what the State so unwillingly contributed to publicize.

Christian Marazzi This issue is purposely problematic, the choice of materials hardly unified. It is in fact crucial to understand that what is called "autonomous movement" (*movimento autonomo*) is anything but homogeneous. It is comprised of many different and sometimes opposing experiences. It includes organizational and theoretical paths which may be traced back to a single "origin" (the so-called Italian "workerism"), but this doesn't mean that they can be grouped today under the same definition. Gathered here, then, are political contributions from people who have had nothing to do with one another for years; who have chosen different political outlooks and activities. The Italian State, by herding together those it has arrested (and those it still wants to arrest) into the same blind alley, tries to play down the differences and the specific attitudes within the Movement. There is a reason for this: it is exactly these political differences, the internal variety of the autonomous movement, that allowed it to grow.

L In 1977 Autonomy was riding the crest of the wave. The growth of a movement however cannot be linear. Moments of explosive richness and inventiveness, as in Rome and Bologna in 1977, are often followed by dry periods, times of exhaustion, the ebb and flow: *riflusso*, as one now says in Italy. The experience accumulated in action, the power extracted by the intellect freed from production is then recycled at molecular levels. It generates mobility, nomadic work, social fluidity which in turn prepare the ground for renewed political struggles.

We have witnessed in the US a comparable phenomenon since the end of the 60's: the Radical movement suddenly disappeared. Its impact wasn't lost, but, in the absence of any political perspective, it rapidly dissipated at all levels of society. The knowledge derived from experimentations with drugs, with the body, with communal life, was rechanneled throughout the system. Consumer society benefited and profited from these "undisciplined" researches that it indirectly financed. In Italy drugs still serve as a rallying point for the Movement. In the US, far from encouraging social fluidity, they make the serfdom of labor more tolerable.

The rapidity and scope of molecular transformations, the American "softness" evoked by Felix Guattari, goes also hand in hand with the diffusion of infinitely complex forms of "soft control" throughout society. This virtual reversibility of signs of subversion is characteristic of "post-political" societies.

M Perhaps it is true that we are living in a "post-political" society, where the definition of "political" has become a problem in itself. But it is also true that side by side with the crisis of the political, we have an increased politicization of people, a different way of "making politics," this is more concrete, specific, and

tied to local needs (health, housing, schools, education, etc.). In Italy, as in the United States, the party system is obviously in a crisis state, since it does not succeed in channeling demands from the bottom and in transcending these specific demands. Yet, alongside this crisis, people have been able to gain power. The great movements of the 60's are surely far behind us, but so is the hyper-ideology of that period. Today we are nearing molecular forms of power. There is less spectacularity, less "movement" with respect to the 60's. But good for us! The electoral absenteeism, for example, which numbers almost 4 million non-voters, constitutes in Italy a true "party", being more a symptom of estrangement from the great political-institutional deadlines (general and administrative elections, etc.), than a symptom of apathy. This estrangement does not indicate "the end of politics", but rather the opposite: a new way of making politics that addresses specific and concrete needs without delegation.

It is interesting to note the enormous interest in the United States on the part of the Italian class movement. This renewed "Americanism" is exploding right at the time when the Italian movement is going through a growth and/or definition crisis. Why is there in Italy an interest in certain aspects of the US which here are considered the very ones that block revolutionary growth? Perhaps because in Italy, especially in the autonomous movement, there is an interest in everything that *changes*, that moves, that explores. And there is no fear in Italy of treading over old paths that are considered *depassé*. Thus nothing is buried. The struggle knows no chronology, it is something circular. Many Italians, asphyxiated by the ideology of the historical parties, come to the United States in order to study the history of the American worker's struggle, a history without ideological mediation, violent and concrete.

L The nature of social confrontations has changed drastically. Politics up to now was tied to the relationships of production: the conflict between exploiters and exploited. This conferred on the working class an indisputable centrality. In post-industrial societies, whether capitalist or socialist, the opposition between factory and society is slowly disappearing. Factories are no longer the focus for struggles. Consequently political antagonisms can be redefined as a properly *social*, even *micro-social*, conflict. Class struggle has yielded to more subtle confrontations. The main objective, I believe, has become the *production* of subversive singularities out of the equivalences created by the system. By another twist in French philosophy, Jean Baudrillard now wants us to envisage this abrupt change as the "end of politics". To invoke the end of politics from conceptual heights is one thing. It is quite another to speak of it from the depths of prison. Unlike the French, the Italians do not have a quasi-religious respect for the pro-



priety of concepts and the systematicity of theory. Autonomists shamelessly borrow what they can use. It is from this conceptual patchwork that the Movement derives its theoretical soundness and political efficacy.

In Italy, contrary to the US, the impact of '88 has proceeded without interruption. It has even gained momentum so that the "end of politics" today proclaimed by the "creative" wing of the Movement (Bologna), is simultaneously the rebirth of politics. Politics returns, but in the Nietzschean sense: it returns as *other*.

Our decision to step in at once in an explosive, conflict-ridden situation — while everything connected with Autonomy is threatened from all sides — is equally a response to preoccupations that are closer to home: in many respects, the reaction against the 60's in the course of the "me" decade (there is nothing less autonomous than an ego) has meant an impatient refusal of politics. This refusal has gone on long enough. Politics must *return*.

M But what does "political", "the end of politics", etc., mean? If by political we mean a social relationship, a struggle, then surely in Italy there has always been, until now, a formidable continuity of the "political". If "political" is to mean the *direction of social transformation*, in which autonomous decisions are made in order to channel various struggles into a movement capable of delimiting the choices of both capital and the institutional system, then we are faced with a variety of interpretations.

The ICP's choice of moving organically toward the government, or the Red Brigades' armed choice to strike at the "heart of the State" or the internal debate of the autonomy seeking to create organizational forms different from both the party and the "anti-party", all exemplify the complexity of re-defining "political".

If "the end of politics" means the search for new dimensions of antagonism on levels other than the one defined by concrete needs (wage struggles, the "attack on income" as a refusal of poverty, etc.), then within the Italian movement the "end of politics" has a different meaning, not at all psychological, literary or philosophic. For there the "end of politics" involves a search for new *political* areas of struggle, new territories for the massification of the struggle. In Italy, the French theories, like those of Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, and Baudrillard too, are immediately translated into the Movement's language, that is, into concrete struggle.

What can be considered as the most original theoretical contribution to Italian workerism originated *abroad*. For some theoreticians of *Working Class* and the *Red Notebooks* (the first two workerist journals, which appeared at the beginning of the 60's), the *Socialisme ou Barbarie* experience of the 50's in France was a turning point. And, bizarre as it may seem, other important sources of "workerism" are American: James Boggs' *American Revolution*, the writings of Martin Glaberman and of G.P. Rawick, to cite but a few.

In Italy, the American struggles have always been a key point of reference, much more so than certain aspects of the American New Left, which was too engaged in criticizing American capitalism from the standpoint of its external, imperialist contradictions. Still, in the 70's, the books of Fox Piven, Richard Cloward (*Regulating the Poor, Poor People's Movement*), James O' Connor (*The Fiscal Crisis of the State*), and many others, were being read in Italy. These contributions have been seminal in the political formulation of the struggles within the Welfare State.

There is nothing "Italian" about the class warfare in Italy; there is nothing "original" in the Italian theoretical contributions. If any, their specificity resides in the fact that in Italy these theories have been able to bloom and develop thanks to the class struggles and their formidable continuity. We must avoid ghettoizing Italy, thus neutralizing its importance. To understand Italy, one must understand

THE REFUSAL OF WORK

the United States; one must rediscover in the history of American class warfare that political richness which today is attributed to the Italian "intellectuals". To erect a monument to Italy is to play the game of the Italian State: to misrepresent as specific ("the product of certain intellectuals") what is in fact rooted in the worker's history, rooted, above all, in its international dimension.

The ICP's decision to enter the Historical Compromise with the Christian Democrats was more complex than it now seems. The compromise was sought immediately after the Chilean coup and oil crisis of 1973, two events which forced the official Worker's Movement to seek new political strategies capable of expanding the areas of social alliance. The oil crisis was used by the multinational corporations to accelerate the accumulation of capital with labor-saving investments. Thus the political make-up of the class which formed around the mass worker could have been destroyed, and along with it the possibility of generalizing its struggles and aims in the eyes of society. In fact, the period following 1973 witnessed the rise of the chemical and energy sectors as the most important (financially and institutionally) in the system of world capitalism, with the result that the socialization of the mass worker's struggle was further blocked.

On the other hand, the Chilean experience taught that old socialist modes of government were untenable. They were economically backward with respect to the international capitalist initiative, to which the Historical Compromise was an attempted response. It is now common knowledge that this response, on the part of the ICP, was opportunistic and, as it turned out, ineffective. Nonetheless, some response in kind to the international capitalist initiative was necessary.

Within this framework we can probe the debate within Autonomy. From 1973 onward Autonomy has been above all a search for a newly composed political class capable of acting outside the party system. If capital attacked the worker's struggle with mass layoffs, inflation, chronic unemployment, etc., it was then necessary to determine a new political terrain where the most diverse social strata could join their struggles and recompose a front against capital. And surely it wasn't only against capital, but also and perhaps above all, against the State and its party system, since the capitalist initiative could only succeed with the complicity of the parties, ICP included.

L France achieved territorial and linguistic unity nearly two centuries ago. By comparison, Italy remains a young country. Its political unification is recent, its linguistic integration precarious. It is not surprising then that diversified phenomena exist at all levels.



Italian political parties are not as centralized or integrated as French parties. There exists among the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party a degree of interpenetration that explains, for the most part, the possibility of an institutional agreement. The "historic" strategy of the ICP takes into consideration the existence in its midst of a considerable number of Christian militants.

One only has to travel through Italy to realize to what extent regional diversity remains powerful. There is a social, dialectal, political and economic specificity to each city and region. The revolutionary movement itself, in its extreme variety, has obviously adopted modes of existence and forms of identification which are characteristic of Italian society as a whole. The "tribal, communal, pre-capitalist structures" allegedly threatened by any conflict, are in no way an appendage exclusive to the Movement. These structures are found as much in the Worker's Movement as in the "clientelism" practiced by the DC.

Baudrillard is right to assume that the actual effect of confrontation such as the one between the Red Brigades and the State is to eradicate any form of "transversality." But Autonomy is too diverse to be lumped together as mere "pre-capitalist structures." Far from lagging behind, Autonomy has assumed a revolutionary position at the vanguard of capitalism: "inside and against." It challenges capitalism on its own ground, "at the heart" of the system, and not simply as a "marginality" soon to be eradicated. The objective collusion between the Red Brigades and the State, therefore, cannot be taken as a strategy meant to annihilate obsolete structures that fall outside of the reversibility of signs of power and subversion. What is most subversive about Autonomy is precisely that it refutes the inevitability of such a reversion and the ensuing implosion of the system.

Autonomy ought not to be conceived as completely divorced from and opposed to the rest of civil society. The fluidity of its organizational schemes corresponds also to an historical delay in relation to the modes of unification at work in the rest of Europe. The oppositions between North and South, between the underdevelopment of Sicily and the technological advances in the Milan-Turin region, the heterogeneity of languages and cultures, all contribute to ground political diversity (a key-word) in a manner absolutely unknown in post-industrial countries. The persistence of earthly roots and of collective practices in the very heart of an advanced society have kept alive political options which have largely been "passed over" in more unitary countries.

Autonomy is the only political movement today that simultaneously makes use of the most abstract machinery (the technico-scientific intelligence) and of the masses' most traditional, community ties. Left to themselves, territorial groups would eventually be eliminated by power as pockets of archaism; left to itself, abstract labor would conform to the demands of capital. What engenders the originality and force of Autonomy is that economies which in theory exclude one another are allowed to exist side by side in a non-conflictual manner. The "creative" wing of the Movement has nothing to do anymore with the "historic" Autonomy, hardened in its ideological bastion, and devoted to both concrete and symbolic — if not totemic — practices which promote its osmosis with the masses. At all levels, however, provisional conjunctions are being implemented which allow a detachment from territory and a territorialization of the intelligence. More than the spectacular operations of the Red Brigades, this mixture remains virtually the most explosive. The network of free radios, the most extensive in Europe, is a perfect example. *Radio Onda Rossa*, the organ in Rome of the *Volsci* (the hard core of organized Autonomy), on the one hand broadcast deterritorialized signals, thus appropriating technico-scientific knowledge, and on the other establishes roots in the population through a collective self-management of occupied buildings. The political crystallization of this technical intelligence allows it finally to go beyond the "mad hopes" of an autonomist practice always menaced by revolutionary messianism. As a result, Autonomy does not remain content "waiting for something from outside," but instead tries to live through today's capitalism in an alternative way by deflecting the latter's advances to the profit of


the new social subject. Thus it intends to win against capitalism not by force of arms, but by quickness of intelligence, by pushing capital to the utmost of its possibilities. In this respect the experience of Italian Autonomy has a capacity for generalization unknown to the rest of the west.

M The thesis of the "two societies" propounded by a workerist intellectual of the ICP, Alberto Asor Rosa, is quite dangerous. According to this view the "social subjects" who emerged politically from the capitalist transformation of the 70's — women, unemployed youth, those who work off-the-books, etc. — the so-called "marginals", are "something else" with respect not only to the official Worker's Movement and its tradition, but also with respect to society. This thesis implies that these new social vectors should be considered "unproductive workers", their social and cultural attitudes subordinate to those of the factory workers, who are considered the only workers productive of wealth which will subsequently be consumed by others. In short, the struggles of the new "social subjects" are epiphenomena, irrational manifestations which must be brought under the guide of the factory worker. The centrality of the worker means precisely this: the will to impose a worker's direction to the social transformation brought about by the capitalist development.

The strategic position of the Red Brigades may also be characterized in a similar way. Their categorical choice of the factory worker as the decisive political referent is strictly in line with orthodox Marxist tradition. This definition of "productive labor", however, derives more from Adam Smith than from Marx. For Marx, productive labor is the labor which produces surplus value and struggles. Thus his category is not just economic, but also political. Moreover, it is a fact that the new social subject produces surplus knowledge, innovation and intelligence, which capital has a dire need to appropriate.

Asor Rosa's thesis, as the materials included in the present issue repeatedly demonstrate, is wrong not only on the empirical level (today, in Italy, well over one-third of an active population of 21 million work part-time, off-the-books, etc.), but also from a political standpoint. What the Bolognesi call "marginality at the center" is precisely a critique of all attempts to subordinate this *invention-force*, that is, the creativity and productivity of the struggle and of the life-styles developed by the so-called "marginals". These recently formed "social subjects" are productive workers in a double sense: they produce wealth and they produce struggles. Thus they are at the center, or at any rate rightfully belong there.

This brings us back to the central theme of Autonomy: the struggle against work,



the *refusal of work*. Ever since its early formulations, which date back to Mario Tronti's writings of 1964, the Italian revolutionary movement has been moving toward the refusal of work as a positive productive force of capitalist development. Refusal of work, demand for more money and less work, struggle against harmful work (which, after all, characterizes work in all its *capitalist* forms), has always meant forcing capital to develop to the maximum its productive forces. Only when the worker's labor is reduced to the minimum is it possible to go beyond, in the literal sense, the capitalist mode of production. Only when "non-worker's labor" becomes a generalized reality and enjoying life a productive fact in itself, does freedom from exploitation become not only possible but materially achievable.

The "diffused factory" (what in the US is called the "underground economy"), is seen by Autonomy not only as super-exploitative but also as a subjective choice on the part of the young proletarians. The growth of the underground economy is also a consequence of this refusal of factory discipline, and the will to organize working time on the basis of free time. It is precisely this struggle against work that produces the inventiveness and "technical knowledge" typical of the "marginals". "Marginality at the center" means, in this sense, the centrality of the struggle against work, a struggle which goes beyond the factory gates.

The fact still remains that between the new subjects and the factory workers there is a political distance *not* yet organized (mediated) by the extra-parliamentary organizations. Though it may seem paradoxical, capital itself is now closing the gap between the "two societies" by investing high technology in the decentralized production units, and by employing an unskilled work-force (especially women) in the large factories. This restructuring is evident at FIAT's factory in Turin. Yet the recent lay-off of sixty-one FIAT workers, considered "para-terrorists" by the management, clearly shows how this restructuring also necessitates repression.

Since restructuring requires a more flexible labor market, certain behavioral differences among social strata are blurred by capital. In fact, capital cannot act otherwise. Because "marginal" work has potentially the highest rate of productivity, capital must invest technology in the periphery, rather than in the large factories.

L "Marginality" is a massive phenomenon, a true mutation in the field of production, and not a simple malfunction of the system. The absence of a Welfare State in Italy no doubt contributed to a burgeoning awareness of this centrality. In the "diffused social factory" of the post-industrial era, marginality has virtually ceased to be marginal. It has become the very texture of society. At this point the experience of Autonomy transcends Italian frontiers. The marginalization of work is not a phenomenon unknown in the US, as you mentioned, but its actualization through the autonomous movement allow us to rediscover its political dimension.

The events of 1968 fell squarely within traditional political oppositions. Students were rebelling against Imperialism, or Authority. The aftermath of May '68, therefore, was marked by defeat and gloom: the system had prevailed.

The Italian movement avoided, for the most part, these post-May blues. It didn't experience any of the dramatic liquidations of revolutionary hopes and illusions that ensued in most western countries. It went on, unperturbed, on its own trajectory. How can we account for this fact?

Years before May '68, the "strategy of refusal" had opened an entirely new front: the front of wage labor. The refusal of factory discipline advocated by the Movement was bound to set it from the start against the work ethic of the ICP and its hegemony in the Worker's Movement. The present strength of the Italian movement, its steady reinforcement throughout the 70's stem from the fact that its major theme largely *anticipated* the criticism of bureaucratic socialism, of which the most recent—and largely belated—symptom in France has been the marketing by

the media of the brand New Philosophers.

The position of Tronti, "inside and against" the development of capitalism offered early on a positive alternative to the opposition of the ICP and the CD whose increasing obsolescence eventually led to the Historical Compromise. It will take the failure of the Common Program in France before the cleavage between the Right and the Left begins to crumble and political representation starts to implode in the general disarray. At this moment the obsessive, seductive and gloomy theme of the end of politics begins to take credence.

What remains paradoxical, if not mysterious, is why Italy, with its pockets of under-development and rather tardy "economic miracle," should be among the first to propose in political terms, through the bias of Autonomy, the invention of new forms of life relatively or completely detached from the slavery of work.

M It is very doubtful that Italy is still one of Europe's least developed countries. The existence of its underdeveloped regions has always been a function of the rapid growth of other areas of the country. Typical in this regard is the North-South relationship, where we find immigrants from the South working on the FIAT assembly line. Yet the growth of highly advanced struggles in a country that has known periods of economic backwardness remains to be explained.

We must first recall that in the sixties the worker's struggles exploded within an institutional scheme called "center-left" (*centro sinistra*). During the recession in 1964, the Socialist Party joined the Christian Democrats in order to form a government based on a program of economic development. This coalition attempted to make the economic system more dynamic by nationalizing certain corporations in the electrical and chemical sectors, and by improving public services. Even though only a small part of this economic program was actually carried out, no doubt it rendered the Communist opposition, already weakened by its decision to engage only in parliamentary struggle, completely ineffective. In fact, from Togliatti onward, the ICP had been losing strength as it slowly moved away from the working class, leaving to the unions the purely economic regulation of wages. For the Worker's Movement, in short, the center-left meant political weakness.

It was in this context that *Quaderni Rossi* ("Red Notebooks") and *Classe Operaia* ("Working Class") were born. *Quaderni Rossi* tackled the problem of analyzing the new class composition as it emerged from the most recent capitalist transformations at the beginning of the sixties: the mass-worker, the new means of mass production which, by reducing the strategic importance of skilled workers,



weakened the unions in which they figured prominently. *Class Operaia* on the other hand, attempted to formulate a new political strategy, which Tronti called "inside and against": to act on the inside of capitalist development, promoting it through the refusal of work (thus bringing about the introduction of new machines and new technology), but at the same time to remain against capitalism wanting everything from it, all the wealth produced through its reformism.

From their inception, these new political hypotheses aimed at redefining the relationship between workers and organization. Because the ICP had lost its contact with workers, the situation called for a reformulation of the "party" and necessitated a scrutiny of the class composition. Both from the standpoint of capitalist development and from that of the anti-capitalist struggle, a new strategic role for the mass-worker had emerged. Its struggles now created a new terrain to the left of the ICP, thus posing in new terms the question of organization.

L The American system is like a self-regulating machine, not inhibited by illegality — indeed capitalist profit feeds on the invention of illegalities not yet codified as such — but once an illegality is identified (Watergate, Lockheed, etc.), the system rapidly corrects itself. Italy lacks this self-correcting flexibility. In order to expunge illegality, the State must itself adopt illegal measures.

The State initiative required more than public consent: a new reality had to be created to accommodate these institutional illegalities. The co-production with the media of a new reality went also beyond the scope of a classical "ideological" manipulation. Any other reality had simply disappeared.

As one of its celebrated falsifications of the Italian press, *Il Male*, a satiric magazine close to the Movement, reported with photographic evidence the arrest of the well-known actor Ugo Tognazzi as chief of the Red Brigades. The *Il Male* staff then experienced the vertiginous "loss of reality" which has come to constitute Italian life, when the public took this simulation for the literal truth. It must have fulfilled the public's secret desire to see, at long last, a "conspiracy" unveiled and a Supreme Leader denounced. But the simulation also meant that they were ready to believe in anything! *Il Male* had incidentally put its finger on the nerve-center of repression. Reality had become weightless, a gigantic simulacrum.

M The fact that the State itself assumes subversive forms to maintain control over subversive forces is, whether we like it or not, the consequence of an entire cycle of struggles. Today, the delay on the part of those who want to revolt (a theoretical rather than a practical-political delay), forces a complete dislocation of the terrain of social subversion. If it is true, like Bifo claims, that Autonomy has shown itself to be, at times, of a reversible nature, that is easily inverted by the State (the military aspect, for example, is exactly what the State has chosen to fight, with alarmingly positive results), this does not alter the fact that to dislocate the terrain of the rebellion implies finding new forms of violence. The violence of the Red Brigades is to be radically criticized not because it is "violent", but because it isn't violent enough! And it isn't violent enough for the simple reason that it corresponds to the State's violence. The Red Brigades, in their actions, produce State-Power. But what we want today is liberation from the State. It appears that the limitation of the materials here presented (ultimately an objective limit) concerns precisely this blocking of the search for newer forms of destruction of all that is State. Perhaps Autonomy ran ahead of itself: it is not by accident that at the very moment of greatest desire to explore different ways of social subversion, the State steps in massively.


L The lucidity of the State goes way beyond rationality. The "mutating" position adopted by the Italian State to face the challenge of the Autonomists is one of the most astonishing aspects of the current repression. The "Defense Memorandum" of the prisoners clearly shows how far the "legal procedure" defined by the prosecution has departed from democratic legality. It is impossible to confront "speculations" presented as specific accusations, if not as proof, if we

don't understand the rationale of the highly acrobatic maneuvers by which the prosecution is building a case against Autonomy. The evasiveness of the initial accusations, the heterogeneity of materials isolated from their contexts and subsequently pieced together through osmosis, suggest the imposition of an unusual logic. Gilles Deleuze defined such logic as a violation of the principle of identity (A is always A, never B), and of the principle of the excluded middle (Either A is A or non-A). In other words, the State has deliberately jumped out of the magic circle of Aristotelian logic.

Is it not exactly in these terms that *Anti-Oedipus* defined the positive "syntheses" of the "schizo" flux — non-contradictory, non-exclusive, unlimited and multifocal? The logic of the prosecution recognizes identity not on the basis of identical subjects, as is usually the case, but on the basis of identical predicates. The number of subjects (Red Brigades, Autonomy) is limited, but the number of predicates called upon to justify the identity of the two subjects (Red Brigades = Autonomy) is unlimited. This hypertrophy of the sense of identity is enough to provoke what pathologists call an "orgy of identifications." Has there ever been, in the course of history, an openly schizophrenic State?

The Italian State has moved onto its adversary's territory; it has simulated the fluidity characteristic of Autonomy. A "pilot" decision rendered September 21, 1979, in the trial of Luigi Rosati, ex-husband of the Brigadist Adriana Ferranda and ideologue of *Autonomia Operaia*, described Autonomy as "an indefinable mixture of groups and varied tendencies, a veritable mosaic made of different fragments, a gallery of overlapping images, of circles and collectives without any central organization." This definition echoes in every respect the logic deployed by the prosecution against Autonomy . . .

That this may be another dizzying example of the reversal of signs and of the imposition of power is too hasty a conclusion. To be sure, the Italian State has taken a leap at the heart of capital's flux — but only in order to master it. Here ceases the abstract reversibility of signs on which the "end of politics" is founded. The orgy of the accusation's identifications constitutes only the first phase of a strategy which has little to do with schizophrenia. It consists of using Aristotelian thought to support conclusions reached through non-Aristotelian cognitive operations. The identification of "coincidences" established between the Red Brigades and the Autonomists on the basis of identical predicates ("any Left revolutionary literature inevitably has some points of similarity," the Memorandum remarks) and the boundless number of charges become the ground upon which the prosecution builds up "paranoid" systems of regularity centered upon a unique point



of interpretation. The simulation of the State thus becomes the hallucination of a truth which is artificially resuscitated as reality. It suffices that the State substitute its simulacrum for the *autonomous* (non-unified) reality of the Movement in order to justify its campaign of repression.

The distinction is of some importance. It leads us to supplement the inevitable short-comings of a defensive position. It must be recognized that the looseness of Autonomy constitutes a considerable innovation in the history of the revolutionary movement. It confers a flexibility heretofore never attained in the struggle to destabilize power. It is no wonder that the State, confronted with this elusive network whose fluidity permits a virtually total transfer of responsibility, has also proved its inventiveness and forged a mode of accusation just as polymorphously perverse. It is inadmissible, however, that these loose charges were cast *in advance* from a perspective contradicting absolutely everything Autonomy stands for. The logical delirium of the State projects the mosaic of Autonomy upon the rigid screen of the Red Brigades. And so the game goes.

The President of the Court who judged Luigi Rosati went so far as to recognize what separates the Red Brigades from Autonomy: "The Autonomy groups refute in principle every rigid, verticalizing, hierarchical structure"; he distinguished the attack "at the heart of the State" advocated by the Red Brigades from the "capillary penetration" of *Autonomia Organizzata*; he readily admitted that these micropolitical actions are the fruit "not of a coordination among diverse, associated organs but of a spontaneity which has very little in common with the character of professional crimes"; yet he condemned no less severely the intellectuals who, like Luigi Rosati, without personally participating in any criminal activities, "accepted, exalted and advocated them."

The "pilot" sentencing of Rosati to four years' imprisonment confirms the will of power to integrate the wave of criticisms directed against it without departing in the least from its accusations. It is now clear to everyone that the prosecution of Autonomy is a truly *political* trial less interested in condemning its ideas than in annihilating "an entire section of the political movement in Italy." (Memorandum). The real danger to the State comes not from the Red Brigades, who speak the same language and who develop structures which "mirror" and thus reinforce its own. The profound menace to the State comes from the fact that Autonomy speaks a language and develops forms of organization and of subjectivity against which there exists no "classic" response. It is in this innovation — this positivity — with which the present issue is concerned, and not with the defense, in "reactive" or reductive terms, of innocents unjustly accused.

As Franco Piperno here recognizes, the new spontaneity requires the practice of illegality as a necessary condition for its existence. But then so does the State. The whole problem is in knowing whether this illegality is active, inventive, creative of life and values, or, like the somber, embracing couple formed by the Red Brigades and the State apparatus, a bringer of terror and death.

Translated by Peter Caravetta and John Johnston

III/1 *Icarus* Empire State Building, New York, 1930

Lewis W. Hine (1874-1940) Courtesy: The Brooklyn Museum

III/2 NXP1690 38 SPEAKING WITH THE SQUATTERS SANTIAGO, CHILE: President Salvador Allende (left) speaks to squatters who have unlawfully taken over a housing estate in a poor section of Santiago. They are part of a movement which is protesting the bad housing conditions by seizing other people's homes and refusing to move. Allende is expected to decree the establishment of a National Council of Peasants, Dec. 21st. According to the Agriculture Ministry, the council will speed the peasant's participation in the government's land reform program. (UPI) 12/21/70

III/3 19885 FLINT, MICH.—THERE'S PRIVACY, TOO, FOR THE MORE FASTIDIOUS "SITTER". THESE HAVE ESTABLISHED INDIVIDUAL ROOMS IN INCOMPLETED AUTO BODIES. THEY HAVE EVEN INSCRIBED THEIR NAMES AND NUMBERS, ALSO BITS OF HUMOR ON THE DOORS OF THEIR QUARTERS. 2-10-37

III/4 Funeral for the victims of the Everett Massacre, 1916. A scene from the American documentary *The Wobblies*, directed by Stewart Bird and Deborah Shaffer, 1979.

III/5 DAPO70507-7/5/74-HOUSTON, TEX: A jam of over 30,000 new imported automobiles with no place to go because of a decline in foreign sales has turned the port of Houston into an overcrowded parking lot. With 10,000 more expected this month, importers are scrambling to grab what little parking acreage there is left. (UPI)

III/6 XPO12705-1/27/75-Fenton, MO.: Changing of shifts of employees as Chrysler Corp. reopened truck and automobile assembly lines in Fenton 1/27 after a three-week layoff. About 5800 persons on two truck-assembly shifts and one auto-assembly shift went back to work. A second auto-assembly shift was not called back, leaving about 2100 workers laid off. (UPI)



million days in jail. 110 million days in jail.
Millions and trillions and fantastillions of
days in dark jails . . . 111 days in jail, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 days in jail. 120 days in
jail. For a week now I've been jerking off
three times a day, I want to see if I lose my
passion. 121 days in jail. Uh. 122 days in jail.
Uh. 123 days in, 123 days in. Uh. Jail. 124
days, 5, 6 in jail days. Oh. Uh. 127 days in
jail. 128 days in jail. 129 days in jail. 130 days
in jail. And 130 days less to live. Goddammit.
131 days in jail. And a barrel of rum and a
barrel of rum. 132 days in jail. 133 days in
jail. And then, 134 days in jail and 135 days
in jail and my belly aches I feel sick as a dog
and it must be this shitty water or this lethal
wine — the filthy pigs. Uh. 136 days in jail, 6,
7, 6, 9, 140 days in jail. Prison rhymes with
cotillion. Even dancing makes me sick. I
can't think of anything that makes me sicker.
Than dancing. But let's not talk nonsense.
Jail is worse. Worse . . . Uh. 141 days in jail.
142 days in jail. 143 days in jail. 144 days in
jail. 145 days in jail. 146 days in jail. 147 days
in jail. 148 days in jail. 149 days in jail. 150
days — if only I could sleep like Rip Van
Winkle and wake up beneath a tree in two
and a half years — 150 days in jail, I was
saying. 151, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, days in jail (this
week really flew). 158 days in jail. 159 days in
jail. 160 days for doing something wrong for
doing something wrong in jail. 161 days in
jail. 162 days in jail. 163 days in jail. 164 days
in JA/UH/AIL. Ah. 165 days in jail. 16 . . . 1 . . .
Uh. Uh. Uh. 160 DAYS IN JA/UH/AIL. 161
days, 2, 3, 4 in, days, in, jail. This is jail, un-
doubtedly. 165 days in jail. People get stab-
bed in jail. 166 days in jail and 167 days in jail.
168 days in jail. 169 days in jail. So, let's say
that twenty months equal 600 days. 600 days
plus 120 from four more months equal 720.
Let's round it off to 750, and there it is . . .
750 minus the 170 days I've already done in
jail equals . . . 580
days still left to do in this filthy jail. Unless
they pardon me for good behavior. Ah. I've
gotten a hard-on again. Cool out, cock,
there's no point in getting excited . . . 171
days in jail. 172 days in jail. Wait a minute, I
made a mistake the other day. Thirty
months — two and a half years in jail. Not
twenty-four months! ! . . . Thirty months;
900 days minus the 172 days in jail I've
already done equal . . . 728 days in jail. Uh.
Still to do. 173 days in jail. 174 days in jail.
175 days in jail. 176 days in jail. 177 days in
jail. 178 days in jail. 179 days in jail. 180 days
in jail. 181 days in jail. Jail plus jail only
equals jail. 182, 3, 4 days in jail. Yesterday,
today, yesterday, today, yesterday yesterday.
Today. 185 days in jail. 186, 7 days in jail. We
play soccer in the courtyard. I kick the ball
as violently as I can. As if the ball were that
pig, the shitty judge who gave me two and a
half years, two and a half years of JAIL. 188,
9, 90 days in jail. 191 days in jail. 192 days in
jail. 193 days in jail. 194 days in jail. 195 days
in jail. I'm itchy all over. I can't sleep. My
eyes are red. Even though I don't read.

Fiat Has Branded Me

Giampaolo Pansa

Giampaolo Pansa, well-known for his interviews with Italian workers, talks here to a Fiat worker from the Mirafiori plant in Torino who was among the group of 61 workers fired on Tuesday October 9, 1979. This interview appeared in *La Repubblica* 3 days later.

You have heard a foreman from Mirafiori vent himself. Now listen to me. I too come from Mirafiori and I am among the sixty-one workers fired by Fiat. Until Tuesday I worked in the painting department. I was a general worker at the third level. According to Fiat, I was also a violent worker, a quasi-terrorist, one who assists the Red Brigades: this is the mark that Agnelli is trying to brand on my forehead.

I must start at the beginning so you can understand the situation. I shall be 29 in November. I am from the province of Catanzaro, from a small village that offers no opportunities. We emigrate from there in droves. Before leaving, I attended secondary school and then took a technical course. But school was not for me. I subsequently decided to go and look for work in the north, at Turin.

I left my village in January of '69, having just turned 18. I had never been outside it. Turin frightened me — its huge size, its ugliness, the clouds and the snow. I asked myself: where have you come? I found a job in a real hole, a small factory, but I lasted only 10 days there, I couldn't take it much longer. Then I found another job. Things were going better there, yet I thought only of Fiat. I said to myself: Fiat is a big company, you'll be secure there; if you get into Fiat, you'll never wind up out on your ass.

I entered Fiat on 28 May 1969 as an apprentice in the painting department. The apprenticeship was supposed to last 6 months, but it ended much sooner. The trouble in July of '69 had already erupted; Fiat needed people who could start working at once, in order to fill the gaps left by those who were on strike or who sympathized with them. And so I went right on the assembly line immediately after the vacations.

At the beginning the painting department was horrible. I worked as if in the middle of a cloud, amid strange odors and terrible smells of every kind. It was an infernal scenario. Yet after a little while, even with these noxious fumes, I started to like the job. Painting cars is not a monotonous task. What I was learning could help later on. And then I always tried to work with my head too: I tried to do my job well. But also preserve my health. In short, I was rather satisfied.

It was autumn and still hot outside. I didn't pay attention to it. I didn't know anything about what was happening around me and then there was my mother's advice: think about work and keep to yourself. Only in 1970 did I start to get a little involved. No, it wasn't political activity at all, and it didn't even have anything to do with the union. I concerned myself with the problem of the working conditions in the painting department. The situation was disastrous and I even felt the effects of it. I lost eight teeth. And then there was the nausea, the duodenal ulcer, the impaired hearing.

In a word, I was provoked when I saw that I was paying for my job at Fiat with my skin. But it was not an individual rebellion, nor was I interested in raising hell for its own sake. It was a collective rebellion by nearly the entire shop. We asked Fiat to alter the situation and Fiat answered no.

Anyhow, in that year I joined the union and then I had an important encounter — with *Lotta Continua*. I had been fined since I had not completed the assigned work precisely because of the working conditions. I went out through the gates and showed these conditions to some of the people who were always there with newspapers and flyers. They told me: Come with us and we'll talk about it.

Now *Lotta Continua* no longer exists as a group. And I am nostalgic for it, even if I do not feel that I am a former member. For me it was a great experience, political and human. I learned about things, I met exceptional people whom I would have never met otherwise. *Lotta Continua* had one great merit: it made you intellectually open to other people, it let them speak, it let them discuss . . .

I am not a popular leader. I'm a quiet man. You know what they call me in the painting department? "The priest," "the good guy." But from the first moment of my involvement with that political group, Fiat must have classified me as "a *lot-tacontinua*" and that was it. In my opinion, they have put me out because of that label, because of my political activity when the group existed. But this is a chapter to which we shall return later.

Now I want to say that in those first eight to nine months I was a Fiat worker like the others, and I was occasionally better than the others. My absences were few. In short, I have always done my share, as an electrical technician until 1977 and then in preventive overhaul, where the car is prepared for painting. I considered myself good on the job and my foremen have always considered me so.

In the meantime, the working conditions had improved and my duties became less oppressive and repetitive. Nonetheless, I had also grown bored. *Lotta Continua* was no longer there and Turin haunted me. The huge city never pleased me, but now I was really aching and I wanted to leave it. My dream was to go and work for Fiat abroad. And for two months they did send me away, to a branch office in Germany. When I returned, I renewed my request. In fact, I had recently done so with Varetto, the manager shot by the Red Brigades. And when the foreman brought me to the front office on Tuesday, I believed that they had heard my request. Instead they dealt me the letter of dismissal.

That letter brands me as violent. But I deny it! Of course, my strikes for a change in working conditions made them do it. And I have given some trouble to Fiat, but so have many others. Between '74 and '75, I was a union delegate and I did what was within my power. And even if I am not at all an orator, I have never laid back when there was some working method to be discussed with the foremen.

Take note of this: I said working method, not work. I do not refuse work. I am a born worker, and I must work, but not as a slave. And I am also convinced that it is necessary to work well; if you don't do your job well, you make more work for the people who come after you on the chain. I have never swerved from this position with those of my co-workers who act badly. I say: if you do only a little work, at least do it well. And do a little work so it'll all get done. This is one of the Fiat workers' slogans.

What does a little work mean? Today we work for seven and a half hours a day. It's too much. It must be seven hours a day, five days a week, or thirty-five hours. No more. If the working hours are not changed, the unemployed will stay that way. I have always maintained this point of view. I have always tried to put it into practice. I have even discussed it with my foremen, but without ever being reprimanded or quarreling or resorting to violence.

Yes, there is much talk about violence against the foremen. I would like for the newspapers also to speak of the violence of the assembly line, which moves much too quickly. And isn't it violence when certain foremen put their hands on the asses of the newly hired boys? Where, at any rate, are these acts of violence against the foremen? Of course, there have been moments of tension during contract negotiations. And many workers see the foreman as their immediate opponent. Sometimes the men are short-tempered: to be in a factory is hard on everyone.

Still, I have never done any violence. I have always been in the same work group. My foreman thinks highly of me. He gave me a pen as a gift. He has even invited me to his home. Do you invite to your home a violent man who threatens you? Tuesday, he was the first one to be struck with amazement. Ever since *Lotta Continua* dissolved, I have become completely peaceful. Moreover, someone who tries to raise hell for its own sake or who acts as the terrorist's assistant doesn't ask to go abroad: he stays here to threaten and to play the violent man.

Why then have they fired me? This is my answer. Fiat knows everything about its workers — their lives, deaths, miracles. I am a politicized worker. I have always tried to involve my co-workers in labor problems, with working conditions and rhythms. I used to go to contract negotiations, to talk, discuss. In a word, I used to make trouble. So they've pulled out their old lists: there I was on the list for *Lotta Continua* and so they've thrown me out.

I am evidence that Fiat is a terrorist organization. By eliminating people like me, Fiat wants to eliminate those who can speak on behalf of the others, those who do not bow their heads. And then there must be a grander design: once the "ballbreakers" are eliminated, it will be easier to return to the past, to increase production more and more, to make people understand that only Fiat controls Mirafiori and that the workers must give up the idea of getting their rights.

But since the bosses at Fiat cannot say this, they make us pass for para-terrorists. It's a lie. I do not agree with the Red Brigades. They are not the kind of people who can protect our interests. I have never considered delegating my representation to those who use weapons. And I do not believe that in Italy things can be changed by shooting people.

Yet I am also convinced that there is much too little discussion of terrorism among the workers. There is great indifference at Fiat. When they killed Ghiglieno, there was hardly any reaction in the shops. The other incidents have been received in the same way. The workers consider them material for the

newspapers at this point. On the contrary, it is necessary to discuss and ask oneself why the Red Brigades shoot certain people and not others.

Of course, the Red Brigades don't shoot only foremen. You remind me of Rossa, a worker like myself. What do I think of him? Well, I don't know . . . What if I discovered that one of my co-workers was a *brigatista*? That's a difficult question! It's a big problem. No, I wouldn't say anything. I don't want to play spy on anyone's account. . . . In any case, the Red Brigades are inside Fiat, but I don't know them and I'm not one of them. . . .

You say that my answers show it's a little hard for me to talk about terrorism. It will be so, but there's a reason for it. I have always been distrustful. Now that I've been fired by Fiat, I'm even more so. Your questions about terrorism, about denunciations, and so forth, seem to me a little provocative. . . .


However, I'm not the only one who talks about terrorism in this way. It's a thorny problem, too thorny. Everyone has become distrustful. Take a short walk through the streets of Turin, ask people the questions you've asked me, and you'll see whether you get different answers. And then, you see, ever since *Lotta Continua* disbanded, I no longer want to take part in anything. I'm only concerned about my ass. I hoped to go abroad, to decide whether I would marry or not, and instead this thing happened to me. . . .

I'm disheartened and I feel persecuted. And then there's one last thing I want to say to you. Just as I am nostalgic for *Lotta Continua*, so am I nostalgic for Fiat. I'm an emigrant; Fiat was my home for ten years. It seems unjust to me that they should chase me from my home. I have only one hope: that the unions, that all those who call themselves democratic, don't give in.

I don't hope this only to save my job. There is also a political reason for it. If the unions weaken, the Red Brigades and Front Line (*Prima Linea*) will be able to say: Do you see? No one protects the working class any more. The only ones left are we and our guns.

Translated by Lawrence Venuti

11/1 Photo: Seth Tillet



The Strategy of Refusal

Mario Tronti

This article, written in 1965, is part of the "Initial Theses" in Tronti's *Operai e Capitale* ("Workers and Capital"). Tronti's first contributions were the result of a collective political reformulation of revolutionary strategy developed by *Quaderni Rossi* and *Classe Operaia*, together with Toni Negri, Sergio Bologna, etc. Tronti never left the ICP, but his work is widely recognized as seminal to the autonomous movement in Italy.

Adam Smith says — and Marx comments on the accuracy of his observation — that the effective development of the productive power of labour begins when labour is transformed into wage labour, that is, when the *conditions* of labour confront it in the form of capital. One could go further and say that the effective development of the political power of labour really begins from the moment that labourers are transformed into workers, that is, when the whole of the conditions of society confront them as capital. We can see, then, that the political power of workers is intimately connected to the productive power of wage labour. This is in contrast to the power of capital, which is primarily a social power. The power of workers resides in their potential command over production, that is, over a particular aspect of society. Capitalist power, on the other hand, rests on a real domination over society in general. But the nature of capital is such that it requires a *society based on production*. Consequently production, this particular aspect of society, becomes the aim of society in general. Whoever controls and dominates it controls and dominates everything.

Even if factory and society were to become perfectly integrated at the economic level, they would nevertheless forever continue to be in contradiction at a political level. One of the highest and most developed points of the class struggle will be precisely the frontal clash between the *factory, as working class and society, as capital*. When the development of capital's interests in the factory is blocked, then the functioning of society seizes up: the way is then open for overthrowing

and destroying the very basis of capital's power. Those, however, who have the contrary perspective, of taking over the running of the "general interests of society", are committing the error of reducing the factory to capital by means of reducing the working class, that is, a part of society, to society as a whole. Now we know that the productive power of labour makes a leap forward when it is put to use by the individual capitalist. By the same token, it makes a political leap forward when it is organised by social capital. It is possible that this political leap forward does not express itself in terms of organisation, whereupon an outsider may conclude that it has not happened. Yet it still exists as a material reality, and the fact of its spontaneous existence is sufficient for the workers to refuse to fight for old ideals — though it may not yet be sufficient for them to take upon themselves the task of initiating a new plan of struggle, based on new objectives.

So, can we say that we are still living through the long historical period in which Marx saw the workers as a "class against capital", but not yet as a "class for itself"? Or shouldn't we perhaps say the opposite, even if it means confounding a bit the terms of Hegel's dialectic? Namely, that the workers become, from the first, "a class for themselves" — that is, from the first moments of direct confrontation with the individual employer — and that they are recognised as such by the first capitalists. And only afterwards, after a long, terrible, historical travail which is, perhaps, not yet, completed, do the workers arrive at the point of being actively, subjectively, "a class against capital". A prerequisite of this process of transition is political organisation, the party, with its demand for total power. In the intervening period there is the refusal — collective, mass, expressed in passive forms — of the workers to expose themselves as "a class against capital" without that organisation of their own, without that total demand for power. The working class *does* what it is. But it is, at one and the same time, the *articulation* of capital, and its *dissolution*. Capitalist power seeks to use the workers' antagonistic will-to-struggle as a motor of its own development. The workers' party must take this same real mediation by the workers of capital's interests and organise it in an antagonistic form, as the tactical terrain of struggle and as a strategic potential for destruction. Here there is only one reference point — only one orientation — for the opposed world views of the two classes — namely the class of workers. Whether one's aim is to stabilise the development of the system or to destroy it forever, it is the working class that is decisive. Thus the *society of capital* and the *workers' party* find themselves existing as two opposite forms with one and the same content. And in the struggle for that content, the one form excludes the other. They can only exist *together* for the brief period of the revolutionary crisis. The working class cannot constitute itself as a *party* within capitalist society without preventing capitalist society from functioning. As long as capitalist society does continue to function the working class party *cannot* be said to exist.

Remember: "the existence of a class of capitalists is based on the productive power of labour". Productive labour, then, exists not only in relation to capital, but also in relation to the capitalists as a class. It is in this latter relationship that it exists as the working class. The transition is probably a historical one: it is productive labour which produces capital; it is the fact of industrial workers being organised into a class that provokes the capitalists in general to constitute themselves as a class. Thus we see that — at an average level of development — workers are already a social class of producers: industrial producers of capital. At this same level of development the capitalists, themselves, constitute a social class not of entrepreneurs so much as *organisers*: the organisers of workers through the medium of industry. A history of industry cannot be conceived as anything other than a history of the capitalist organisation of productive labour, hence as a working class history of capital. The "industrial revolution" necessarily springs to mind: this must be the starting point of our research if we are to trace the development of the contemporary form of capital's domination over workers, as it increasingly comes to be exercised through the objective mechanisms of industry, and also the development of capital's capacity to prevent these mechanisms being used by workers. This would lead us to see that the development of the relationship between living labour and the constant part of

capital is not a neutral process. Rather, it is determined and often violently so, by the emerging class relationship between the collective worker and the whole of capital, *qua* social relations of production. We would then see that it is the specific moments of the class struggle which have determined every technological change in the mechanisms of industry. Thus we would achieve two things: one, we would break free of the apparent neutrality of the man-machine relationship; and two, we would locate this relationship in the interaction, through history, of working class struggles and capitalist initiative.


It is wrong to define present day society as "industrial civilisation". The "industry" of that definition is, in fact, merely a means. The truth of modern society is that it is the *civilisation of labour*. Furthermore, a capitalist society can never be anything but this. And, in the course of its historical development, it can even take on the form of "socialism". So... not *industrial society* (that is, the society of capital), but the *society of industrial labour*, and thus the society of workers' labour. It is capitalist society seen from this point of view that we must find the courage to fight. What are workers doing when they struggle against their employers? Aren't they, above all else, saying "No" to the transformation of labour power into labour? Are they not, more than anything, refusing to receive work from the capitalist?

Couldn't we say, in fact, that stopping work does *not* signify a refusal to give capital the use of one's labour power, since it has already been given to capital once the contract for this particular commodity has been signed. Nor is it a refusal to allow capital the product of labour, since this is legally already capital's property, and, in any case, the worker does not know what to do with it. Rather, stopping work — the strike, as the classic form of workers' struggle — implies a refusal of the command of capital as the organiser of production: it is a way of saying "No" at a particular point in the process and a refusal of the concrete labour which is being offered; it is a *momentary* blockage of the work-process and it appears as a recurring threat which derives its contents from the process of value creation. The anarcho-sindicalist "general strike", which was supposed to provoke the collapse of capitalist society, is a romantic naïveté from the word go. It already contains within it a demand which it appears to oppose — that is, the Lassallian demand for a "fair share of the fruits of labour" — in other words, fairer "participation" in the profit of capital. In fact, these two perspectives combine in that incorrect "correction" which was imposed on Marx, and which has subsequently enjoyed such success within the practice of the official working class movement — the idea that it is "working people" who are the true "givers of labour", and that it is the concern of workpeople to defend the dignity of this thing which they provide, against all those who would seek to debase it. Untrue... The truth of the matter is that the person who provides labour is the capitalist. The worker is the *provider of capital*. In reality, he is the possessor of that unique, particular commodity which is the condition of all the other conditions of production. Because, as we have seen, all these other conditions of production are, from the start, capital in themselves — a dead capital which, in order to come to life and into play in the social relations of production, needs to subsume under itself labour power, as the subject and activity of capital. But, as we have also seen, this transition into social relations of production cannot occur unless the class relation is introduced into it as its content. And the class relationship is imposed from the very *first* moment and by the very fact that the proletariat is constituted as a class in the face of the capitalist.

Thus, the worker *provides* capital, not only insofar as he sells labour power, but also insofar as he *embodies* the class relation. This, like the inherent social nature of labour power, is another of those things acquired by the capitalist *without payment*, or rather, it is paid for, but at the cost (which is never subject to negotiation) of the workers' struggles which periodically shake the process of production. It's no accident that this terrain is the terrain that is chosen tactically by the workers as the ground on which to attack the employers, and is therefore the terrain on which the employer is forced to respond with continual technological "revolutions" in the organisation of work. In this whole process, the only thing

which does not come from the workers is, precisely, labour. From the outset, the *conditions of labour* are in the hands of the capitalist. And again, from the outset, the only thing in the hands of the worker is the *conditions of capital*. This is the historical paradox which marks the birth of capitalist society, and the abiding condition which will always be attendant upon the "eternal rebirth" of capitalist development. The worker cannot be *labour* other than in relation to the capitalist. The capitalist cannot be *capital* other than in relation to the worker. The question is often asked: "What is a social class?" The answer is: "There are these two classes". The fact that one is dominant does not imply that the other should be subordinate. Rather, it implies struggle, conducted on equal terms, to smash that domination, and to take that domination and turn it, in new forms, against the one that has dominated up till now. As a matter of urgency we must get hold of, and start circulating, a photograph of the worker-proletariat that shows him as he really is — "proud and menacing". It's time to set in motion the contestation — the battle, to be fought out in a new period of history — directly between the working class and capital, the confrontation between what Marx referred to in an analogy as "the huge children's shoes of the proletariat and the dwarfish size of the worn-out political shoes of the bourgeoisie".

If the conditions of capital are in the hands of the workers, if there is no active life in capital without the living activity of labour power, if capital is already, at its birth, a consequence of productive labour, if there is no capitalist society without the workers' articulation, in other words if there is no social relationship without a class relationship, and there is no class relationship without the working class...then one can conclude that the capitalist class, from its birth, is in fact subordinate to the working class. Hence the *necessity* of exploitation. Working class struggles against the iron laws of capitalist exploitation cannot be reduced to the eternal revolt of the oppressed against their oppressors. Similarly, the concept of exploitation cannot be reduced to the desire of the individual employer to enrich himself by extracting the maximum possible amount of surplus labour from the bodies of his workers. As always, the economic explanation has no other weapon against capitalism than moral condemnation of the system. But we are not here to invent some alternative way of seeing this problem. The problem is *already* the other way round, and has been right from the start. Exploitation is born, historically, from the necessity for capital to escape from its *de facto* subordination to the class or worker-producers. It is in this very specific sense that capitalistic exploitation, in turn, provokes workers' insubordination. The increasing organisation of exploitation, its continual reorganisation at the very highest levels of industry and society are then, again, responses by capital to workers' refusal to submit to this process. It is the directly political thrust of the working




class that necessitates economic development on the part of capital, which, starting from the point of production, reaches out to the whole of social relations. But this political vitality on the part of its adversary, on the one hand indispensable to capital, at the same time is the most fearful threat to capital's power. We have already seen the political history of capital as a sequence of attempts by capital to withdraw from the class relationship; at a higher level we can now see it as *the history of the successive attempts of the capitalist class to emancipate itself from the working class*, through the medium of the various forms of capital's political domination over the working class. This is the reason why capitalist exploitation, a continuous form of the extraction of surplus value within the process of production, has been accompanied, throughout the history of capital, by the development of ever more *organic* forms of political dictatorship at the level of the State.

In capitalist society the basis of political power is, in truth, economic necessity: the necessity of using force to make the working class abandon its proper social role as the dominant class. Looked at from this point of view, the present forms of economic planning are nothing more than an attempt to institute this organic form of political dictatorship within *democracy* as the modern political form of class dictatorship. The intellectual consensus as to the future State-of-well-being — of which G. Myrdal speaks — that society which J.S. Mill, K. Marx and T. Jefferson alike would probably approve, might even be realisable. We would find ourselves with a synthesis of liberalism, socialism and democracy. Liberalism and democracy would finally be reconciled, finding an ideal mediator in the shape of the social State — a system commonly known as, quote, "socialism". Yet here too we would find the inexorable necessity of working class mediation, even at the level of political theory. As for the workers, they would find in this "socialism" the ultimate form of automatic — i.e. objective — control; political control in economic guise; control of their movement of insubordination. The surpassing of State capitalism by a capitalist State is not something that belongs to the future: it has already happened. We no longer have a bourgeois State over a capitalist society, but, rather, the State of capitalist society.

At what point does the political State come to manage at least some part of the economic mechanism? When this economic mechanism can begin to use the political State itself as an *instrument of production* — the state as we have come to understand it, that is, as a moment of the *political reproduction* of the working class. The "end of laissez-faire" means, fundamentally, that working class articulation of capitalist development can no longer function on the basis of spontaneous objective mechanisms: it must be subjectively imposed by political initiatives taken by the capitalists themselves, as a *class*. Leaving aside all the post- and neo-Keynesian ideologies, only Keynes has provided the capitalist point of view with a formidable *subjective* leap forward, perhaps comparable in historical importance with the leap which Lenin made possible from the working class point of view. However, this is *not* to concede that this was a "revolution" in capital's mode of thinking. If we look closely, we can see that this was already embodied in the preceding development. The capitalists have not yet invented — and in fact will obviously never be able to invent — a non-institutionalised political power. That type of political power is specifically working class power. The difference between the two classes at the level of political power is precisely this. The capitalist class does not exist independently of the formal political institutions, through which, at different times but in permanent ways, they exercise their political domination; for this very reason, smashing the bourgeois State does mean destroying the power of the capitalists, and by the same token, one could only hope to destroy that power by smashing the State machine. On the other hand, quite the opposite is true of the working class: it exists independently of the institutionalised levels of its organisation. This is why destroying the workers' political party does not mean — and has not meant — dissolving, dismembering, or destroying the class organism of the workers.

The very possibility of workers abolishing the State in society is located within the specific nature of this problem. In order to exist, the class of capitalists needs

the mediation of a formal political level. Precisely because capital is a social power which, as such, claims for itself domination over everything, it needs to articulate this domination in political "forms" which can bring to life its dead essence as an objective mechanism, and provide it with subjective force. In immediate terms, the nature of capital is merely that of an *economic* interest, and, at the beginning of its history, it was nothing more than the egotistical interest of the individual capitalist: in order to defend itself from the threat posed by the working class, it is forced to turn itself into a *political force*, and to subsume under itself the whole of society. It becomes the class of capitalists, or — which amounts to the same thing — it turns itself into a repressive State apparatus. If it is true that the concept of class is a political reality, then no capitalist class exists without a capitalist State. And the so-called bourgeois "revolution" — the conquest of political power by the "bourgeoisie" — amounts to nothing more than the long historical transition through which capital constitutes itself as a class of capitalists in relation to the workers. Once again, the development of the working class displays totally the opposite features: when the working class begins to exist formally at an organised political level, it initiates the revolutionary process directly, and poses nothing but the demand for power: but it has existed as a *class* from the start, from a long time before, and precisely as such, threatens bourgeois order. Precisely because the collective worker is that totally particular commodity which counterposes itself to the whole of the conditions of society, including the social conditions of its labour, so it manifests, as already incorporated within itself, that direct political subjectivity, that partiality which constitutes class antagonism. From the very beginning the proletariat is nothing more than an immediate *political interest* in the abolition of every aspect of the existing order. As far as its internal development is concerned, it has no need of "institutions" in order to bring to life what it is, since what it is is nothing other than the *life-force* of that immediate destruction. It doesn't need institutions, but it does need *organisation*. Why? In order to render the political instance of the antagonism objective in the face of capital; in order to articulate this instance within the present reality of the class relationship, at any given moment; in order to shape it into a rich and aggressive force, in the short term, through the *weapon of tactics*. This, which is necessary for the seizure of power, is also necessary *before* the need to seize power has arisen. Marx discovered the existence of the working class long before there were forms to express it politically: thus, for Marx, there is a *class even in the absence of a party*. On the other hand, the Leninist party, by virtue of having taken shape, gave the real illusion that there was already under way a specific process of working class revolution; for Lenin, in fact, *when the class constitutes itself as a party, it becomes revolution in action*. Here, then, are two complementary theses, just as the figures of Marx and



Lenin are complementary. Basically, what are these two people if not admirable anticipations of the future of the class itself?

If we accept that the class is not identical with the party, nevertheless one can only talk of class on a political level. While it is true that there is class struggle even without party, nevertheless we also have to point out that every class struggle is a political struggle. If, through the party, the class puts into action what it is, if it does so by dissolving *in practice* everything that it must destroy *in theory*, by *leaping* from strategy to tactics, and if only in this way does it *seize* power from the hands of those who hold it, and organise that power in its own hands, in new forms...if all this is true, then one must conclude that the relationship Class-Party-Revolution is far tighter, far more determinate and much more historically specific than the way it is currently being presented, even by Marxists. One cannot split the concept of revolution from the class relationship. But a class relationship is posed for the first time by the working class. Thus, *the concept of revolution and the reality of the working class are one and the same*. Just as there can be no *classes* before the workers begin to exist as a class, so there can be no *revolution* before the destructive will that the working class bears within itself, by the very nature of its existence, takes solid form...The classic model of the bourgeois "revolution" — invented by historical materialism — conceives of a sudden seizing of political power only after the completion of a long, slow, gradual taking-over of economic power. Thus the class, having already dominated society as a whole, then lays claim to the running of the State. Now, if these infantile schemes had only been used to illustrate a history book or two, well and good: after all, one might expect that of a "history book". But in the Marxist camp, errors of theory are paid for in very practical terms: this is a law whose consequences the workers have had to suffer all too often. When the attempt was made to apply the model of the bourgeois revolution to the course of working class revolution, it was at that point (and we have got to understand this), it was at that point that we saw the *strategic collapse* of the movement. The workers were supposed to copy this model: they were supposed to demonstrate, in practice, that they were capable of managing the economy of the society (far more capable, of course, than the capitalists), and on this basis they were to demand the running of the State. Hence, workers' management of capital as the prime way, the "classic" road to socialism. For historical materialism, social democracy is theoretically the most orthodox workers' movement. Basically, all the communist movement has done has been to break and overturn, in some aspects of its practice, the social democratic logic of what has been its own theory.

And yet, at the beginning the dividing line between social democracy and the communist movement was clearly fixed. And if an internal history of the working class is to be reconstructed — alongside that of capital — it will certainly include both of these organisational experiences — although not under the same heading, and not with the same significance accorded to each. There is in fact a difference of quality between different moments of the working class struggle itself. August 9, 1842, when 10,000 workers marched on Manchester, with the Chartist Richard Pilling at their head, to negotiate with the manufacturers at the Manchester Exchange, and also to see how the market was going, is *not* the same as Sunday May 28, 1971 in Paris, when Gallifet called out of the ranks of prisoners those with grey hair and ordered them to be shot immediately, because as well as being present at March 1871, they had also lived the experience of June 1848. And we should not summarise the first case as an offensive action by the workers and the second as an act of repression by the capitalists, because perhaps it is quite the opposite.

It is true that here we see the working class articulation of capitalist development: at first as an initiative that is positive for the functioning of the system, an initiative that only needs to be organised via institutions; in the second instance, as a "No", a refusal to manage the mechanism of the society as it stands, merely to improve it — a "No" which is repressed by pure violence. This is the difference of content which can exist — even within one and the same set of working class demands — between *trade union demands* and *political refusal*.

Translated by Red Notes

III/1 CRO 1700981 ROME: Farmers with their tractors, and placard-carrying demonstrators gather at Colosseum here April 7th as they stage demonstration calling for better benefits from the government. Italy held its first general strike of 1971 April 7th in what turned out to be almost a holiday atmosphere. Some 11 million workers are reported taking part in the strike, protesting alleged inadequacies in a new housing bill. UPI CABLEPHOTO 4/7/71
III/2 DUCE INSPECTS HIS POLICE ROME, ITALY: Standing at attention before their shiny motorcycles, row upon row of Rome policemen were inspected by Benito Mussolini Oct. 18 as he rode down the lines with hand raised in the Fascist salute. It was the tenth anniversary of the founding of the force. (AP) 10/30/35



The Tribe of Moles

Sergio Bologna

This article was written immediately after the explosion of the "Movement of '77" in Rome and Bologna. It is one of the most lucid attempts to analyze the class composition of the "new social subject."

Sergio Bologna's note on terminology: "The categories of class analysis used by the sociology (petty bourgeoisie, middle class, lumpen- or sub-proletariat, lumpen-bourgeoisie, etc.) are used here only in their *conventional historical* usage. We consider the scientific value of these classifications to be doubtful to say the least. The concepts of *capital* and *class composition* are far better suited to define the dynamic of class relations today as *relations of power*. . . These contradictions of language are an expression of the contemporary crisis of the traditional Marxist conceptual apparatus. They underline the need for a creative and political re-evaluation of analytical categories, a "re-discovery" of Marxism in the light of the contemporary class struggle."

This article is a provisional attempt to trace the internal development of the autonomous class movement in Italy, which led to the explosive confrontation around the University occupations in Spring 1977. Such analysis is only meaningful if it allows us to uncover the new composition of the class underlying these struggles, and to indicate the first elements of a programme to advance and further generalise the movement.

Here we analyse the movement primarily in its relation to the Italian political system and the changes it has undergone through the period of crisis since 1968. With the Historic Compromise strategy of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) since 1974, the form of the State has taken a new leap forwards — towards the organisation of a "party system" which no longer aims to mediate or represent conflicts in civil society, but is increasingly compact and counterposed *against* movements in civil society, and against the political programme of the new composition of the class.

The wartime anti-Fascist resistance in Italy laid the basis for a form of the State based on the "party system". The new regime inherited from Fascism fairly powerful instruments for an independent political "interference" in the process of reproduction of classes (normally left to the development of productive relations

and the real subsumption of labour to capital). These instruments were: credit; the State-controlled industries; and public expenditure.

The party system thus came to control the basic sectors of the economy and the important service sectors. Through this control, and within it that of the Christian Democrats (the hegemonic party from the crisis of the Parri Government in November 1945 to the Centre-Left coalitions of the 'sixties) it was able to negotiate with US imperialism and the multinationals, both domestic and foreign, regarding the international division of labour, the rate of increase of the working class, the type of working class to be promoted, in other words, to organise the dynamic of class relations in a way that corresponded to the plans for political stability. In certain regions of the northern "industrial triangle" the reproduction of social classes was left to the classic mechanisms of concentration-massification of labour power in large-scale industry. In this sector it was left to productive capital, private and public, to bring about that "rational demographic composition", the lack of which (for Italy, in contrast to the USA) Gramsci had so lamented in his *Prison Notebooks* (see *Americanism and Fordism*). Here, in other words, a society was to be developed made up entirely of producers, consisting solely of wage labour and capital.

It should be added that this mechanism of advanced capitalist development produced not only factory workers, but also a large proportion of tertiary workers, so that regions like Liguria, Lombardy or Veneto have a higher percentage of employees working in tertiary activities than some regions in the South. In these latter regions, however, the intervention of the "party system" in the mechanism of reshaping and reproducing the classes seemed to take place with greater autonomy from the movements of capital.

THE FORM OF THE STATE — OPEN OR LATENT

The political agreements established with large-scale European industry meanwhile permitted a large number of agricultural proletarians to be transferred abroad; the production of a factory working class was piloted with great care, according to the principle that the command of fixed capital should always be overpowering. At the same time, support was given to all forms of agricultural production that maintained irrational demographic relations; there was a flow of subsidising finance aimed to "congeal" non-productive relations and social strata, and a flow of revenue — "money as money" — acquired through employment in the public administration. All these had the effect of reproducing a disproportionately large small-to-middle bourgeoisie, based on income as revenue, which represented the social base necessary for the stability of the Christian Democrat regime.

In the long term, the effects of this policy for the reproduction of the classes blunted the revolutionary effects of the real subjection of labour to capital, offsetting the growth of the working class with a disproportionate growth of a small-to-middle bourgeoisie, in receipt of revenue; not hostile to the working class, but passive, not anti-Union but "autonomous", not productive but saving, and hence allowing a social recycling of the income received by it. But this class dynamic was shattered and thrown off course, first by the working class offensive at the end of the 1960s, and then, a few years later, by the violent effects of the crisis — which we shall examine later.

The form of the State under the post-war "party system" is a *latent* form: what normally appears on the surface is a method of mediating and representing conflicts. On the one side are the governing parties that dominate the bureaucratic-repressive apparatus of the State, and on the other the opposition parties, which are the receptacles for mediating the drives and contradictions of civil society. The form of the State comes out into the open in certain historical moments, when the crisis of the preceding regime and the development of a new class composition risk escaping from the control of the dialectic between Government and opposition. This happened in 1945-46, after the armed struggle against Fascism. The parties chose to replace their relations with the classes, with the masses, by mutual relations among themselves; and the Communist Party chose to prioritise

its relations with the other parties that backed the constitution of the Republic, rather than its relations with the class and the armed movement. In a similar way, in this latest period, and playing on a similar "state of emergency" in order to overcome the present crisis (as with the post-War "Reconstruction"), ever since it chose the path of the Historic Compromise (and more vigorously since the Elections of June 1976), the Communist Party has privileged the strengthening of its links with the other parties — and in particular with the Christian Democrats. This was in order to "resolve the crisis of the State", to redefine the "party system" in terms of concord rather than conflict. By now, the unity of the parties at a political and programmatic level is being concluded like a steel dome erected over the needs of the working class. The "party system" no longer aims to represent conflicts, nor to mediate or organise them: it delegates them to "economic interests" and poses itself as the specific form of the State, separate from and hostile to movements in society. The political system becomes more rigid, more frontally counterposed to civil society. The party system no longer "receives" the thrusts from the base; it controls and represses them.

THE CONCRETISATION OF THE NEW FORM OF THE STATE

This race among the parties (above all the PCI) to arrive at ever-tighter links, this new edition of the constitutional pact signed during the Resistance and then violated by the Christian Democrats, is happening today under the banner of the *ideology of the crisis* and the *imposition of austerity*. The connective chain which simultaneously blinds the parties within the new constitutional pact, and counterposes them as a machine hostile to civil society, to the society which expresses new needs, to the composition of the class, is represented by the *ideology of the crisis*. The form of the State is now becoming open and explicit through the consolidation of the pact within the "party system". It does not, in other words, depend on the strengthening of the military-repressive apparatus: the latter is subordinate to the level of homogeneity of the "party system".

This process is a complex one, and has met with a thousand obstacles: but by now it is clearly the only way if the present power equilibria are to be maintained. Since the student uprisings in 1977, the movement towards an all-party coalition to confront the crisis has accelerated.

But if the form of the State, which is becoming explicit, cannot be reduced simply to the strengthening of the repressive apparatus, how then is it concretised? So far, at least, it has been concretised through a system of values, of political norms, unwritten rules governing all parties in the democratic arena, which *de facto* decide what is legitimate, what is legal or illegal, what is productive or unproductive, etc. Since the framework for this consensus is provided by a precise ideology of crisis, a certain type of intellectual has assumed major social importance as propagator or exponent of the "collective consciousness" in this period.

TREASON OF THE INTELLECTUALS, LIBERALISATION OF ACCESS TO EDUCATION, AND THE WORLD OF REVENUE


The front-line responsibility for providing the basic arguments behind the ideology of crisis clearly lies with the profession of *economists*. This applies not only to the high priests of the regime. It includes young economists who have taken up university posts, backed by Cambridge or Harvard promotion, and very often open to links with the trade unions. Faced with the alternatives of working class commitment or bourgeois-academic economic science, they have invariably, more or less explicitly, opted for the latter. In certain cases, precisely through a differing interpretation of the dominant ideology of the crisis, they have contributed to it, and have helped to "close the circle". Such can be said, to give just one example, of the "New Left" economists of the Modena faculty: this could have become a centre for rigorous and well-documented counter-information to dismantle the false arguments behind the ideology of the crisis. Instead they preferred to keep quiet, or provided more lessons to the working class on prudence. . . how to be reasonable. . . how to surrender. This is only one example of the more general "treason of the intellectuals" of the 1968 generation, which has been one of the main factors allowing the task of Restoration to take place in the Universities in recent years, and has contributed to creating the radical cultural gap between the movement of '68 and that of '77.

If the Italian political system has been able to interfere autonomously in the pro-

cess of reproduction of classes via various sorts of State provision, one of the most important of these has clearly been the liberalisation of access to Universities since 1969. Some interpret this move as a means of eroding the working class hegemony that matured in the wave of struggles in the late 'sixties, isolating it by promoting upward social mobility. If a project of this sort was ever formulated explicitly, we are not aware of it. Let us examine the mechanism. The liberalisation of access to Universities, at least on paper, favours social promotion. A working class youth can escape the path of the previous generation, can avoid the necessity of factory or manual work. This operation is financed by distribution in the form of *presalari* (grants) — the University of Padua alone accounts for over \$2,000,000 a year: and by an increase of teaching staff and supplementary part-time staff.

At this point the high priests of our economy begin to complain that the criteria for financing this social mobility determine in advance the class that will emerge from the liberalised university system: a lower-middle bourgeoisie which is subsidised and "living off welfare" rather than productive or disposed to work. They complain, in other words, that the prospect of jobs that differ from factory work is not a sufficient incentive to productive labour, but rather acts as a signpost towards receipt of income in the sphere of circulation, towards the world of *revenue* (money as money, removed from the circuit of productive capital). At this point the whole "party system" joins in the great debate on the reproduction of classes in Italy, its distortions, imbalances etc., the general conclusion being that it is not sufficient to reproduce a lower-to-middle bourgeoisie in an anti-working class role, if this then becomes an unproductive class in receipt of revenue!

And so the scapegoat mythology of "Hunt the Parasite" — the lynchpin of the crisis ideology — comes to the fore. Backed by the "scientific" revelations of Sylos Labini, Gorreri, etc, this game now starts in earnest. A sort of vague egalitarianism emerges, which scrutinises the income of the clerical worker, the student and the tertiary worker, and says nothing, for example, about the transformation of capital-which-is-productive to capital-which-is-productive-of-interest: in its most shameful form, this egalitarianism assumes tones of workerist chauvinism. It appears that it is no longer capital that exploits the worker, but the postman, the milkman and the student. These are the first shots in that "class analysis" which will become the official ideology and the preferred argument of the super-paid editorial-writers of the Regime's press. It is a crude and effective ideology. The liberalisation of University access is made to coincide with the crisis, with youth unemployment, with the reduction of the productive base, with the enlargement of the area of State subsidy. But most of all, to it is traced the radical new phase of the political behaviour of the masses. The circle closes:



what was previously defined as a lower-to-middle bourgeoisie in receipt of revenue (ie a privileged class), is now stamped as a frustrated "lumpen-bourgeoisie", as "youth desperation", as "marginality" — in other words, as a perverse effect, created by the crisis, of a mechanism which had been originally created and conceived as a means of stabilising the system and acting (though this is now quietly forgotten) in an anti-worker function!

BLOCKING WORKING CLASS AUTONOMY, OCCUPYING THE POLITICAL SPACES.

It is not easy to untangle the mass of lies and half-truths which are contained in this distorted version of the class dynamic. The best answer is to return to the roots of where it all began — the cycle of working class struggles of 1968-69. The problem for the "party system" at that stage was not only that of blocking and marginalising a working class social hegemony which had shown itself in Italy for the first time since the Second World War. It was the problem, rather, of uprooting the political forms in which this hegemony had manifested itself — *the political form of autonomy*.

One answer lay in the technological-type provisions that were introduced in order to break up the central nucleus of the class (the change in organic composition, etc). But less obvious was the process by which the "party system" began the conquest of the terrain of working class autonomy, presenting itself for the first time in the form of explicit State power.

This occurred *in the factory itself*, with the gradual removal of effective power from the delegates (shop stewards) in the factory Councils, and above all with the manipulation of the Workers' Assemblies, their gradual destruction as organs of independent working class initiative and choice. The factories, which had been free from traditional party politics for more than a decade, and in which the organisation of class autonomy *form* "politics" in the established sense was won in the cycle of mass struggles from the late 'sixties, now once again became a political terrain of manipulation by the "party system". All the forms and instances of class autonomy, through which a real space for *independent class politics* had been conquered, (even those related to trade union mediation, such as shop steward organisation), were taken over and allowed to atrophy — and meanwhile restructuration rooted out and scattered the most homogeneous and militant groups in the plants. The "party system" took control of the organisational forms that remained, such as the Works Councils, turning them into parliamentary talking-shops.

At the same time, the extra-parliamentary groups began their suicidal retreat from the factory, and in general ceased to give much attention to problems of the composition of the class. This has led to a situation where, today, the factory and the working class are almost unknown entities.

The larger the political space conquered by the extra-institutional movements, and the wider the cultural territory and the system of values and behaviour that these impose on decisive sections of the class, the more the form of the State as "party system" become increasingly open and aggressive.

But the form of the State cannot live only as a power that is hostile to extra-institutional movements: it needs a basic legitimation — namely the legitimation of its coincidence with the laws of capitalist accumulation. By making itself the interpreter of the ideology of the crisis, by organising the new constraint-to-work and the policy of austerity and sacrifice, the State-form of the "party system" arrives at the highest point of integration within the system of capital, by a process of gradual abandonment of its autonomy. But what then are we to make of the claim by certain heirs of Togliatti that there exists an "autonomy of the political"? Where is this autonomy? Even where this autonomy had the greatest substance — in the process of reproduction of classes — the violence of the crisis has brought everything under the iron rule of the laws of capital.

Despite all the talk about the effects of public intervention via the growth of public expenditure, all the most recent surveys (for example, the Bank of Italy's

LEVELS AND DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND CLASS COMPOSITION.

Bulletin for Oct-Dec 1976) show that in Italy there has been no change in the distribution of income, nor any substantial alteration in its composition.

Levels of income have not diminished, despite the crisis. Even the level of consumer durables has not fallen (in fact HP forms of payment *have* fallen). To discover how the proletariat, and in particular the working class, *have not allowed themselves to be pushed to the brink of poverty by the crisis but have succeeded in increasing their needs and the means of satisfying them*, would already tell us a great deal about the new composition of the class.

If consumption has not fallen, neither has the level of savings: and this point is significant for analysis of the "petty bourgeoisie" and (as we are led to believe) the hypertrophy of the "tertiary sector". Italian families have one of the highest rates of savings in the world: this would seem to confirm the hypothesis that the propensity to saving in the form of banking liquidity is a symptom of the "tertiary" disproportion of Italian society and its insufficient productive base.

And yet not only does the *Bulletin* show that savings of lower to middle income groups have increased (1973 — ie in a period of savage inflation and devaluations of the lira) in the form of bank deposits, current accounts and post office savings; but also that this is a factor of *equilibrium*, recycling income through credit institutions, invested in the form of money capital in enterprises, public and private, and in Treasury Bonds financing public expenditure, services, etc. The myth of the hypertrophy of the tertiary sector — the common theme of the ideology of the crisis, from the Right to the "New" Left — has no foundation. The OECD figures show that employment in the tertiary sector in Italy is among the lowest among advanced industrial countries: Italy 45%; USA 64%; Canada 62%; UK 54% — only Federal Germany has a lower percentage. Moreover, the ISTAT statistics show tertiary employment to be concentrated mainly in the industrial North.

According to the schema presented by the prevalent propaganda of the crisis, we would expect a flow of credit to promote an unproductive, revenue-based layer of society — the lower-to-middle bourgeoisie, as the prop of political stability — and a disproportionate flow of resources to the tertiary sector. Not so! The special credit institutions (promoted by the State), according to the *Bulletin*, direct more financing towards industry (a three times higher proportion), or to transport and communications (one and a half times higher) than to commerce, services and public administration. Housing alone — a remarkable fact — takes up double the investment of the whole tertiary sector put together!



**THE MONETARY
CRISIS, THE
PROPERTY MARKET,
AND ITS EFFECT
ON CLASS
STRATIFICATIONS**

There is a specific relation between the property market and the monetary crisis. Property is the first refuge for the security of the savings of the "petty bourgeoisie" — but also for the investment of petro-dollars, the basis of the empire of real-estate investment trusts, insurance companies, pension funds, etc., including the most adventurous kinds of speculative activity. According to the US Federal Reserve, at the end of 1975, about a quarter of the credits of US banks were in housing. While between 1971-74 "land and land development loans" (above all for suburban development) tripled, commercial bank credits to real estate trusts and mortgage companies more that doubled¹.

In this way the prices of suburban areas have increased, making it more productive for capital to develop suburban housing, and distancing social strata with higher incomes away from city centres, while at the same time depriving those city centres of rates, taxes, etc.; and setting in motion the mechanism of "fiscal crisis" of public spending, which is now a well-noted fact. However, we are only at the start of this process, because the acquisition of suburban areas has not been followed by an equally large movement of construction; while the race was on to capture land, the actual construction of housing saw a dramatic decline: if we add single-family and multi-family housing, we see a big increase in the period 1971-72, and then a sudden drop in January 1973 to December 1974. When construction began to lift off again, it was in the single-family sector, and was very weak indeed in the multi-family sector².

Hence vast tracts of suburban landscape are waiting to be built on, in order to make productive the capital that has been "fixed" there. In the metropolitan centres, which have become the privileged zones for the petrification of capital, the mechanism differs: in order to get this capital moving, to give it once again the form of commodity and exchange value, a specific financial structure has been created — a series of special speculative institutions, invented through the crisis, which have increased the rhythm of transfers of property deeds and have given a considerable impulse to the velocity of circulation of money, without it passing through a process of production. In the United States too — and probably more so than in Italy — the "construction interest" has used the crisis in order to subcontract resources from productive capital. Thus, there has not been a "shortage of capital" as some people have maintained; companies' risk capital has been furnished in large measure by private pension funds, which, according to Peter Drucker, today hold one third of all share capital in the USA³. Thus it would appear that productive capital has been financed by the contributions of workers, while the institutional investors — and particularly the banks which control them — have preferred to take the path of speculation in property or in exchange rates.

The huge drain of financial resources on the part of real estate and property capital brings us back to the question of the "party system". The powers conferred on local administrations are as yet uncertain, but there is no doubt that in Italy the "party system" represents the most important conditioning factor in the property market. Large controllers of territory (the DC and the PCI) can, through planning controls, force a bargaining process onto the "construction interest", can force it to make payoffs (which, however, are insignificant compared with the powers that the "construction interest" confers onto the "party system", as regards the directing and control of class dynamics). As some more intelligent analyses have shown, the construction cycle in Italy has functioned as a pump to drain away income from workers and redistribute it to the middle class on the one hand, and to the "construction interest" on the other⁴.

The attack on incomes via the cost of housing has a direct effect on class stratifications, and is a factor of violent proletarianisation; the enforced shift towards badly served peripheral urban areas is a powerful factor of marginalisation. The classes, redrawn through this process, take on the typical mixed characteristics of a period of crisis. The waged worker who, through the guarantees of trade unionism, manages to maintain his income level, but who, for reasons of housing problems, lives in a marginalised area, produces economic, social and political patterns of behaviour that stand halfway between the

"guaranteed" working class and the sub-proletariat even if the actual status of his job might otherwise place him in the lower-to-middle bourgeoisie.

A considerable part of the political behaviour of the young proletariat during the recent struggles should be understood starting from city planning as a space of intervention in class dynamics. The mythical "reconquest of the city centres" is a reaction to the marginalising thrust which the unholy alliance of the "construction lobby" and the "party system" is bringing about. Within this "reconquest of the city centres" there is the desire to count as a political subject, to break the institutional balances, to interfere once again in the internal relations of the "party system", a refusal to be classified as an "area of culture" and that's all.

**THE TOTAL
SUBORDINATION OF
THE PARTY SYSTEM
TO THE POLITICS
OF THE CRISIS**

To conclude: inflation and the mechanisms of the crisis have considerably eroded the power of the "party system" to intervene autonomously in the process of reproduction of classes in Italy. The relative autonomy of the political distribution of income has been greatly narrowed. The possibility of creating status differences via income differentials, dispensing cash through transfers of income, supplementing incomes in the public services, etc., has been diminished. The question of "rational demographic composition" to which Gramsci referred in the thirties) is now coming to depend primarily on capitalist development alone, on the organic composition of aggregate capital. Even the process of tertiary growth or creation of unproductive sectors now depends more on the development of fixed capital than on any autonomous intervention on the part of the political elites.

Nobody would deny that the "party system" had the power in past years to interfere with some independence in this process — via economic controls over credit and distribution of cash as revenue, or through export of the proletariat. But at the same time, the "distorting effect" of these choices is deliberately exaggerated by the PCI and the official labour movement. Their result overall does not seem especially different (for example in the case of the growth of tertiary activity) from the developments in other industrial countries. Nor have they resulted, at least until recently, in any significant change in the distribution of income.

If anything, they have created a social and industrial structure acutely sensitive to the problem of savings — permitting a centralisation of unproductive incomes and their recycling in the form of money capital and public expenditure. The powers that the "party system" *does* still deploy, no longer over the reproduction of classes, but *over the new class aggregation* that has been formed through the crisis, are located at a different level, (ie in externalised forms of control at the social-territorial level to *disaggregate and disintegrate the unity of the class*, and



in perverse relations with specific sectors of speculative capital such as the property market.)

It is from within these narrow limits that the new form of the State is derived. This is not to be seen as the concluding phase of the much-vaunted "autonomy of the political" *vis-a-vis* "economic" development, but rather as an entirely opposite process: that of the total subordination of the "party system" to the politics of the crisis.

The reproduction of classes has become a problem of political legitimation rather than material intervention: a question of social and cultural identity, of acceptance or refusal to accept the norms of social behaviour required and laid down by the form of the State. Classes have tended to lose their "objective" characteristics and become defined in terms of political subjectivity. But in this process the major force of redefinition has come from below: in the continuous reproduction and invention of systems of counter-culture and struggle in the sphere of everyday living, which has become ever more "illegal". The liberation of this area of autonomy outside and against official social institutions, is stronger than the system of values the "party system" seeks to impose.

Hence the new form of the State, or rather its unmasking, already finds itself in a critically weak condition. To turn to the bureaucratic-repressive apparatus, to a "power-State" pure and simple, would mean the end of the "party system" itself, as established for more than thirty years.

What we have witnessed in the crisis is the subjection of the political system on the part of capital, the destruction of its "autonomy". This cannot be properly understood unless we see it in relation to the *centralisation of capitalist command* which defines the politics of the crisis for *all* parties (in the area of "politics" itself). This centralisation is formally represented in monetary institutions, from central banks to the IMF.

For the past three years, we in *Primo Maggio* have been pointing out a fact which is now generally accepted: economic policy choices — and hence also the criteria upon which class relations in nation states are being conditioned — are no longer the result of negotiation or bargaining between parties, unions and so on, (in other words mediated relations of force between classes and interests), but are laid down by external constraints determined by (in the last instance) the International Monetary Fund.

It is this new institutional reality of power on an international scale that provides the basic guidelines for the logic of the current ideology of the crisis and scarcity, and hence also the propaganda for austerity measures. The Carter Administration has developed this particular aspect of *money as capitalist command* as the basis of US global policy. This relaunching of US hegemony depends in addition on results *already acquired*, which allow the USA *control over scarcity*, especially in the key sectors of energy and food internationally. ("The US have emerged as the key source of global nutritional stability" — Secretary Brzezinski, in *Foreign Policy* No. 23). Every "national" choice in the area of basic energy and food must come up against an international division of labour that the USA intends to have respected. The technology of food processing will be as jealously defended as petroleum or uranium. Today it is *command over wage commodities* above all that regulates the relations between the USA and the rest of the world. Since the PCI victory in the 1976 elections and its acceptance of Italy's membership of NATO, followed by the recent DC electoral revival, the Carter Administration, while cautious, has come round to the realistic recognition that the only solution for political management of the crisis in Italy is the reinforcement of the pact binding together the "party system" and a "government of majority parties", including the PCI: as the sole condition, in other words, for the implementation of *austerity by consent*.

So far we have concentrated on the *recomposition of capitalist command* in the

RECOMPOSITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE LATE 'SIXTIES.

crisis and the unfolding of the State form through rigidification of the "party system". We must now turn to the other side — the *recomposition of the class*. To take the factory or the University as a starting point is not a problem, in that both are enclaves of resistance and recovery of an alternative class politics — either starting point would serve us just as well.

If we take the subjective development of the movement through the period since the cycle of class offensive in the late 'sixties, we can distinguish two main phases of struggle. In the first, from 1969 to the oil crisis of 1973-74, the attack on the central militant core of the working class by means of restructuring, productive reorganisation, etc., was combined with the "strategy of tension" (terroristic use of secret services, clandestine proto-Fascist activity backed by the State, with considerable use of Fascist personnel). The most recent generation of militants formed around the movement of 1968-69 was consumed in the response to this attack: following the "parenthesis" of the workers' offensive, they returned to the classic schemas of the Party — the strict relation between programme and organisation, and a perspective on the struggle for power articulated according to the tactics of a militant anti-Fascist movement, combined with the conquest of the formal, electoral level of politics. During the first phase the "party system" was not yet "congealed" into the form of the State: it was divided in a sharp opposition between an executive, which mobilised the clandestine levels of the State (from the secret services to the magistracy), and an opposition which revived the democratic values and traditions of the anti-Fascist Resistance. This was, in other words, a phase of *partial re-absorption of the preceding forms of class autonomy* by the "party system", a recovery of the ideological and organisational traditions of the official working class movement: a certain "introjection" of the "party system" within the revolutionary movement itself.

As regards the relation between subjectivity and models of organisation on the revolutionary Left, this first period, from the State-fascist bombing provocation of Piazza Fontana (Milan, December 1969) to the eventual defeat of the "strategy of tension" (even if its ramifications continued up to the June 1976 Election), was marked by a general rejection of the creative hypotheses of the movement of 1968-69. This was accompanied by the rebirth in the movement of ultra-Bolshevik models of organisation, or — in the case of groups like the *MLS* (Workers' Socialist Movement, based on the Milan student movement), *Manifesto*, *Avanguardia Operaia* and *PDUP* — of traditional historical Togliattian models, embellished, at most, with Maoism. There was, in other words, a certain revival of the historic organisational epoch of the Italian Communist Party and movement, from Gramsci to the Resistance.



This revival drastically marginalised the classic "workerist" area of autonomy inherited from the worker-student movement of 1968-69, as well as the anarchist, situationist, and more intransigent Marxist-Leninist groups.

The central nucleus of the "workers' autonomy" tendency, represented by *Potere Operaio* (Workers' Power) and *Collettivo Politico Metropolitano*, having come up against the institutional-political limits of a strategy based on the political potential of factory wage struggles, made a dramatic choice in favour of fighting for the *militarisation* of the movement. This similarly involved slogans like "overcoming the spontaneity of the autonomous mass movement" and "building the armed party". It involved staking everything on levels of organised militancy, professional cadres, etc. This was to be a losing battle. But the main problem now is to grasp how and why the margins of the Movement were so drastically curtailed, deprived of political space, while only hypotheses of party organisation survived in this period.

THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MOVEMENT, AND THE DEVELOPING 'PARTYIST' CONCEPTIONS.

In general we can say that historical models were taken up uncritically and assumed as *a priori* normative validity and importance. Following the wave of new political hypotheses that went well beyond the communist historical tradition, in 1968-69, we then saw a wholesale recovery and revival of Third Internationalist models and perspectives. The central problem was State terrorism; the problem of power, seen as the smashing of the State machine, further accentuated the classic Leninist features of organisation. This is true especially of the struggle to overthrow the Right-wing Andreotti-Malagodi Government up to 1972, which led to the maximum degree of convergence between the organisational strategy of the revolutionary Left groups and the institutional forces of anti-Fascism. The groups were in the process absorbed into the "party system", to the extent of "crossing the parliamentary-electoral threshold"; leading to the creation of organisations like PD (*Proletarian Democracy*), or tactics of electoral support for the PCI, like *Lotta Continua*. But this already takes us into the second, post-1973 phase, which we shall be examining later.

A sort of imperfect Togliattian system was in operation in this first period: on the one hand a strong presence in the streets, militant anti-Fascism, mass campaigns and demonstrations promoted by the groups; on the other, parliamentary pressure, but above all through institutions and the Press, by the PCI and PSI, to overthrow the terrorist blackmail of the DC Government and its allies. Even the initiatives of the *Red Brigades* (BR) in this period maintain an objective ambivalence between extreme forms of militant anti-Fascism (viewed with considerable tolerance by certain sectors of ex-partisans, veterans of the armed Resistance of the 1940's) and the building of an armed party, derived from within the "post-workerist" and insurrectionist perspectives of the "workers' autonomy" current we have already referred to.

We can therefore distinguish the characteristics of the *average type of militant* formed in this phase of the struggle: a party cadre, with considerable organisational ability, activism and presence at all necessary levels, who developed certainly from his or her own situation of struggle, but who received an overall political framework from the "party school" and the myths of the organisation. It would be unfair to say simply that this implies the formation of alienated militants, expropriated of their own subjectivity. The positive characteristics of this period, the unceasing rhythm of campaigns and mobilisations, sometimes blind, but no less effective in the long run; the new, calculated, organised use of "direct action" in the street demonstrations and confrontations; the prompt response to provocations of the Right — all these activities established and imposed a terrain of mass political practice, which became a *social structure, a class composition*, even if its signs of fragility became apparent in the second period.


The transition to this *second period* of the struggle must be first understood in terms of the changed relation between the revolutionary Left and the factory. This was not only due to the increased emphasis on territorial-community activism

(see *Take Over the City* and similar slogans and projects of this phase). It was rather that the restoration of Third Internationalist models meant that the scientific Marxist concepts of the factory and the working class were lost sight of. The relation between revolutionary politics and the reality of the working class was mediated by one over-riding theme — that of *restructuration*. In other words, a *defensive* terrain, which not only accepted as *given* the fragmentation of the "mass worker" — the driving force of the class in the previous workers' offensive — but made this fragmentation the key point of departure for organisation. This was a confusing period. The Left groups had no factory strategy; their militants were purged from the plants, either sacked (often for absenteeism), by leaving of their own accord, or taking shelter within the Unions. In some of the large working class concentrations of the North, only a clandestine fraction was left to maintain a slender organisational network.

Not that the period 1969-73 was one of standstill as far as workers' demands were concerned — far from it. It was marked by intensive collective bargaining activity — probably the most intense since the War. Few were aware of the reconquest by the "party system" in the factories precisely because this process was covered up by the pressure of Union bargaining. In some sectors labour costs rose by 25% a year, not to mention the Union pressure for the *inquadramento unico* (unification of grading systems for workers and white collar staff) and on working conditions and environment. But this continuous bargaining activity tended to have a fragmenting effect politically: it tended to *dissolve the political identity of the class, reducing it to its lowest common denominator as mere labour-power*. It would be quite wrong to say that the presence of workers' political problems "diminished" in this period at all levels. The reality of the situation was rather that all the properties of the class which unify and define it as a political subject were now transferred to the organisations. The class remained as a subaltern element, as "*material*" for the party, in other words as *labour power*. The spectre of the old separation between "economic" and "political" struggle returned to the scene. This meant a severe setback for the autonomy of the working class: a defeat of working class science, of revolutionary theory.

A NEW POLITICAL CYCLE OF STRUGGLES: THE GENERALISATION OF THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE MASS WORKER

But if the identity of the mass worker as political subject was now dead — long live the mass worker! A political cycle of struggles as deeply rooted and powerful as that which led from the mass confrontation of Piazza Statuto (Turin, 1961) to the generalised offensive of the Hot Autumn (1969) — throughout which the mass worker of large-scale industry had acted as the central driving force — could hardly be expected to disappear without a trace. It was bound to set in motion a whole series of secondary effects and irreversible mechanisms, imposing its *specific hegemony on the composition of the entire class*.



In fact there were plenty of signs of this. Besides the network of smaller factories which began to explode one after another, the rest of the labour force at all levels took the cue and began to organise and struggle along the same lines as the workers of the big factories. Apart from the affirmation of a similar model of political-trade union activity, we find parallel forms of collective behaviour and practices of struggle. The hegemony of the workers over salaried employees can be seen in the mass picketing by bank employees, including violent confrontations with police and scabs (the police were by now being used regularly against pickets); or in the "internal marches" (characteristic form of mobilisation at FIAT) by Government employees at the Ministries. Not to mention certain more specific effects, such as the workers' use of labour tribunals. This began to provide certain levels of the magistracy with a platform to break away from the impasse of a purely juridical-formal battle for respect of labour codes and guarantees against the illegal practices of the judiciary — hence the emergence of a new working class practice in jurisprudence.

Further, the struggle over health and safety at work provided a platform for doctors to break away from the corporate interests of the medical profession; hence the beginning of mass criticism of medicine and the medical-pharmaceutical power bloc, which has been one of the major conquests of working class hegemony at the institutional level. Class resistance to restructuration and technological innovation in the plants led engineers and technicians also to a critique of the organisation of machinery and plants from a working class viewpoint. Finally, there was the unification of grading systems for staff and workers (*staff status*) together with the conquest of the "150 Hours" (*workers' paid study leave*) conceded in the engineering contract of 1972 and subsequently generalised. Autonomous and distinct from both professional work-retraining schemes and trade union training courses, this latter victory reimposed a working class, factory presence in the State schools and Universities.

The arrival of the "150 Hours" workers on study-leave in Universities meant a radical change. The effects of freeing entry to the Universities became macroscopic. Two new elements threw the old elite and academic forms into crisis: students of proletarian background/students who had been proletarianised, and the worker-students. There was also the generational factor — the youth enrolling in Universities have behind them a High School movement, both compact and tested in mass activism in the streets. Those arriving from technical and commercial or accountancy schools come from a background of struggles around the relation between education and employment. The mass meeting (*assemblea*) remains the basis of political formation, but the political structure of the militants comes from the *servizio d'ordine* (the organisation of stewards, the 'shock troops' at demonstrations), and from political organising in the community.

**THE NEWLY DEFINED
ROLE OF THE
UNIVERSITY, AND
THE EMERGENCE OF
THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT**

This new generation of entrants to the University found nothing new or superior in terms of culture and means of political expression, than what had already been conquered in the High Schools, or through activity in political groups. In comparison, the University appeared as a lifeless, squalid, bureaucratic structure, which offered little. The old academic elite, despite the student revolt of 1968, has succeeded in coopting a new generation of young opportunist teachers. The picturesque arrogance of the older academics was being replaced by a new generation of mercurial and spent individuals. The "New Left" intellectuals of the 1968 vintage, and those formed in the so-called minority groups of the 'sixties, if not openly "sold out", were either at the service of the Trade Union Left, or practising a dual role of organisational militancy combined with "scientific" academicism. Any possibility of a new culture, a re-evaluation and relaunching of revolutionary theory and creation of new theoretical weapons that the University could offer, were openly discouraged both by the groups and by Left journalism and publishing. Hence the University was taken for what it was: a bureaucratic filter of social mobility and nothing more. The contents of academic culture were not challenged: instead there was a wholesale desertion of lectures and seminars. The struggle against selection of intake, as in 1968, no longer made sense, since the State itself had imposed massification and free entry. Selection now took

place at other levels — at the level of income and needs: no longer by the vote of academic functionaries, but by the structural inadequacy of services. The impact of the crisis and the rise in the cost of living played the decisive role here.

This account takes us to the end of 1973, and the Oil Crisis, which we take as the conventional date for the opening of the *second phase*. But before we go on, we must turn to the decisive event which began to transform the conditions of the movement from 1970-71, still in the earlier phase: the birth of the feminist movement. This immediately posed a question of hegemony over the whole social fabric, hence was analogous in its dimensions and its claims to the hegemony of the mass worker. The specific, autonomous interests of women, organised by women, not only directly challenge family relations of production; they also, by taking an autonomous political form as an *independent feminist movement*, involved a radical separation from the mediations of the "party system", and from Trade Union representation, but also above all from the revolutionary Left groups themselves. With women's self-rediscovery and claim to control their bodies, their own needs and desires, their subjectivity, we see the beginnings of a new *critique of alienated militancy* — one of the key themes of the movement in the second phase — but also, and more fundamentally, the starting point for the general thematic of *needs* within the movement.

All this remained a latent tendency, however, until the beginning of the acute phase of the crisis in 1974-75. At the institutional level this coincided with the defeat of the "strategy of tension". Just at the point when the violence of the crisis against the composition of the class reached its apex, the Italian Left — including a large part of the extra-parliamentary groups — were celebrating their victory at the *institutional* level, considering their mission practically accomplished!

**THE ERROR OF
MISTAKING THE
APPEARANCE FOR
THE SUBSTANCE
OF STATE POWER.**

Here we see in striking form the precipitation of all the contradictions, above all the gap between "politics" and the reality of the class, which marked the "imperfect Togliattian" situation we described above. The attention of the Left was focused on the form of the State: *but not at the State form as measured or levelled against the autonomy of the working class*. Rather, the State form was seen *in itself*, in its own autonomy, at the formal-political level only. The crisis of the Right-wing strategy of tension was mistakenly seen by the Left as the crisis of the State form. The forced abandonment by the DC Government of its underhand use of Fascist personnel and provocation was mistaken for the crisis of the regime. The temporary virulence of internal battles within the DC and the "separate bodies" of the State (secret services, security, etc.) was mistaken for the crisis of State command. This was to *mistake the appearance for the*



substance of State power. Meanwhile, the *real* reconstruction of the "party system" proceeded *from below*: the form of the State had already penetrated the terrain of the factory, and by now only needed the ideology of the crisis to come out into the open, as a machine directly polarised against the interests of the working class.

Hence there was a temporary crisis at government level, but combined with gradual "stabilisation" in the factories. The application of tough measures in high places; revelation of scandals, and intimidating Mafia-style behaviour at the highest level, exhibited in public; the corruption of the elite and bureaucracy crudely exposed for the first time — but all in such a way as to demonstrate provocatively the privilege of impunity of the "party system". Ministers, attorney generals, bankers, police chiefs, whose illegal and underhand practices were amply proved and discussed, never suffered any penalty in terms of loss of personal freedom or income. Thus the scandals of the regime only served in fact as an element of *intimidation* and hence *reinforcement* of the State form based on the party system.

Meanwhile "tough measures" were being adopted in the factory! From 1974 the tempo of factory closures, sackings and layoffs gathered pace, eased by systematic recourse to the *cassa integrazione* (the State-employer fund to compensate for periods laid off from work, in crisis-hit industries and sectors). The system of labour-contract legal guarantees, established thanks to the workers' offensive of 1969, was not broken and remained intact. In other words, it was allowed to survive as a *juridical-contractual* framework. But the *reality* of "guaranteeism", which does not depend on written statutes or labour contracts, but on the homogeneity and compactness of class organisation and the political network of class autonomy built in the factories in the preceding years — this was attacked by all means available.

As regards the subjectivity of the class, which is our main focus in this article, a period of silence now sets in (apart from the well-known worsening of the conditions of work) — a silence in which *we still find ourselves today*. This occurred, in the absence of alternative political structures, with the decline of democratic trade union institutions. In the factory mass meetings, which become more and more infrequent, the workers no longer speak. They suffer in silence the continuous hammering-home of the official trade union line ("Things could get worse"; "We have to accept the reality of the situation"; "We must tighten our belts, accept certain sacrifices" etc.). They close themselves off into an attitude of non-expression of their own needs, and stand by while vanguard militants are intimidated, purged or expelled from the factory with the open complicity — indeed active connivance — of union and party officials. While the purging of militants had previously been a creeping, silent process, the transition to the second phase becomes open and demonstrative: the political confrontation with the workers becomes a frontal attack, a determined effort by the "party system" to normalise the behaviour of the workers and their forms of struggle. Seen from this context, the advances made in the sphere of "civil rights" in this new phase must be seen as a diversion — although we should not underestimate their effects, in legitimating the women's movement (and hence allowing it to advance on a broader political front) and in precipitating the crisis of the military institutions. Despite these positive aspects, however, there is no doubt that the macroscopic element of the period 1974-76 remains the *inability* of the workers' struggle to break the equilibrium of the "party system" and destabilise its internal relations. In this temporary blunting of the political impact of working class struggle, a considerable role has been played by the decentralised political-administrative structure of regional governments and local authorities. Increasingly they have intervened as mediators and arbitrators in factory confrontations.

The *smaller firms and plants* have a special importance, for the class subjectivity and type of struggle that they engender. At this level, of piecemeal blow against counterblow, closures and occupations, *it is precisely this war of position that gives rise to the recompositional processes of the working class*. It is still difficult to establish, but probably the small factory has provided the best terrain, the "en-

FACTORY AND THE DISSEMINATED WORKER

try hole" through which the mole has started to dig once again. Of course, small factories are not homogeneous among themselves, and in fact exhibit sharp differences and contrasts. For example: differences between low technological levels, antiquated levels of organisation, and big innovative tendencies; between situations of total market paralysis and situations offering possibilities of fresh market penetration; locally-oriented factories, and factories serving only an international market; firms that are totally dependent on the strangle-hold of credit and firms like the cooperatives which are free from bankers' usury; from unionised firms to others (far greater in number) with no trade union organisation; from firms with a labour force which is marginal and underpaid, to those where it is highly paid and skilled; and finally, varying sized factories where all these elements are combined under one roof. Precisely this level of dis-homogeneity means that the small-to-medium factory worker does not express a majoritarian social reference point for the class, whose demands and forms of struggle can be taken up at the general level of political objectives: furthermore, we cannot expect to see the kind of relationship (as with the large-scale factory) of mass vanguards capable of pulling behind them the whole of the movement.

In other words, in this case there is a lack of those political mechanisms that had marked the cycle of struggles of the mass worker. But this does not mean that a general political potential does not exist: here we find instead a set of *recompositional mechanisms that start, precisely, from a base of dishomogeneity*.

Let's begin with *age*: precisely because the small factory tends to use marginal labour-power, the presence of minors and very young people, if not typical, is nevertheless very frequent, and it is from the small factories that perhaps the most solid wing of the movement of proletarian youth has been recruited. At the same time, since the small factories employ a considerable number of *women* workers, they have also provided a recruiting ground for a sizeable wing of the women's movement, with a particular awareness of the problems of material needs. In addition there is the question of the workforce involved in *precarious work* (*lavoro precario*), *work in the home*, *illegal work* (*lavoro nero*), etc: the crisis has swept away the dividing partitions between the various "industrial formations" and has created the phenomenon of the "disseminated worker" (which can also be found in other specific epochs in the history of the Italian proletariat). In other words, the conscious dispersion of the labour force within a territorial dimension, in an intermediate condition between formal and real subjection to capital. This is a precise plan, put into operation against the political aggregation of the class. But, leaving aside these *structural* aspects, the big changes are to be seen in the *subjectivity* of the workers in the small factory, inasmuch as it is hard for them to apply organisational models and forms of struggle which really

A DEVELOPING CLASS COMPOSITION: THE ROLE OF THE SMALL



only apply in large-scale industry. Here we see a crisis in the trade unionist style of operating that characterised the struggle of workers in the large factories. The transition whereby labour power becomes working class (a process which is guaranteed in the large factory by the very fact of massification) is a transition that the small-factory worker must win via political processes that are by no means "given". The practice of violence must make up for the lack of numbers and the low level of massification. If the roots of direct action armed workers' groups are to be found, historically, in the old "Stalingrads" of the working class, in political terms they are based on the standard of the small factory.

To sum up: the small factory has played a crucial role. It has provided a material terrain of recomposition for proletarian youth, for the women's movement, for the struggle against overtime and illegal labour — and it has provided a channel of mediation between the behaviour of the disseminated worker and the behaviour of the workers based in the large industrial concentrations.

However, these positions regarding the small factory must not be taken in an "institutional" sense. In other words, the new class composition that emerges from the second phase has neither an institution to symbolise it, nor is it represented by a majority social figure. This becomes all the more evident if we examine the other large sector of recruitment — the *service industries*. Here we see familiar patterns repeating themselves. In all capitalist societies in the past 30 years, employment has uniformly stagnated in manufacturing and has increased in the services. However, what is not uniform is the level of wages within the respective services sectors, and the huge differences in levels of organisation and efficiency. Here, however, the problem is one of a particular political conjuncture. Namely: the unclear demarcation between the area of receivers of revenue and the area of services; the launching of the trade unions' reform programme after the Hot Autumn with the intention of diverting workers' pressure on the factory wage onto the indirect wage; the decentralisation of the functions of State administration: all these contribute to making the service sector a focal point for a particular set of political tensions. This becomes explosive when the idea of a *right to an income* becomes widespread, alongside the emerging political reality of the "new needs".

THE CHANGING POSITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY AND PARA-STATE WORKERS.

The dominant fact in this situation is the increasing political pressure on the service sector, on the firms and agencies within that sector, and on the political and administrative institutions. This has built up through a whole range of subjective and structural pressures, all of which require a microscopic analysis. The fact of this pressure is the only element of homogeneity in the situation, because when we look at the levels of organisation, or the levels of organic composition of capital, we find radical differences. On the one hand there are the examples of firms like SIP and ENEL (petrochemicals and electricity). Here we find ourselves in an area of large-scale technological innovation, involving huge expenditure, backed by the banks and finance institutions (SIP is far and away the most indebted of all Italian firms), accompanied by phenomena of violent restructuring. We also find ourselves in one of the heartlands of the working class (Siemens, Face Standard, Ansaldo Meccanico, Breda, ex-Pellizzari), and at the same time in an area where sub-contracting has created a large pool of casual labour (*forza-lavoro precario*) (for example, SIP's travelling work-force). The workers' struggles and forms of organisation in these areas have followed the cycles of the wider class struggle, but the fact that these firms are at the centre of fundamental decisions regarding the so-called "model of development" (eg the question of energy policy) means that the workers' demands tend to slip out of the traditional channels of collective bargaining and into political debate *tout court*.

The situation is similar as regards the credit institutions. The fact that we are dealing here with workers who are often regarded as a privileged sector of the workforce because of their relatively high wages, has not prevented their struggle from spreading to the point where it has found precise points of contact with the political form of the autonomy of the mass worker. In these areas the interlock with overall class composition has also been facilitated by the large number of workers from the credit institutions and from the service sector in general who

have enrolled in the Universities. The fact that they are employed by interest-producing capital has allowed bank workers to grasp the way in which capital is managing the crisis, and the function of money within the crisis. However, here we still find ourselves within a framework of trade union control of the workforce.

The situation alters radically when we look at hospital workers, local authority workers and social service workers. Here control of the work-force is exercised directly by the "party system". Here the "party system" is not able to delegate the basically political choices to "economic interests". It has to take initiatives directly at the level of the organisation of hierarchies and the organisation of work, at the level of cutting jobs and cutting labour costs, but above all in dealing with the growing demand for income and demand for services — ie dealing with the new composition of the class and the emerging system of "needs". This is the first test that the Communist Party has had to face in its new role as the ruling party within local authorities. Certain institutions — the hospitals in particular — are exploding for the first time, uncovering conditions of work and wages that disappeared from industry years ago, as well as hierarchical structures that are inconceivable in this "age of egalitarianism". For the hospital workers in particular CGIL leader Lama has reserved words even harsher than those he used on the students. The "party system" brought in the army to break their struggle. The logical sequence of clientelism — tertiary — subversion has been evoked to provide a basis whereby the institutional bloc can oppose the new types of struggles by the workers in the social services.

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS. THE SMALL FIRM AND ASPECTS OF DECENTRALISATION.

The situation is similar in the case of the *transport workers*, the third big sector feeding into this new class composition. Once again the "party system" and the trade unions function as command over the labour force. The struggles of the railway workers were treated in the same harsh manner as those of the hospital workers, but the fact that the Union in question has had a long (and some would say glorious) historical tradition made it all the more striking — the way this Union was rejected when it tried to take control of the workforce and impose the policies of austerity. Whether for good or ill, in the hospitals the autonomous struggle has also sparked a process of unionisation. On the railways, on the other hand, there has been a mass, conscious rejection of CGIL union membership. But here we are dealing with things that are well-known. . . .

Less well-known, but infinitely more explosive, is the situation in road transport. Here we are faced with a mass of waged workers and independent operators equal to twenty Mirafioris rolled into one. The "objective" weight of this workforce is frightening, and it is perhaps the only section of the class today whose move-



ment could paralyse the whole capitalist cycle. The strike of tanker drivers in the North-West gave a taste of this: the Communist Party, through the structure of the cooperatives, controls a fair slice of this sector. The tanker drivers' strike gave an indication of the possible levels of violence: 7-8,000 tires slashed, according to trade union sources, within a very few days.

Here the "party system" (which, by the way, hurried to conclude the contract negotiations, despite the obvious desire of FIAT and the oil companies to provoke deadlock) made widespread use of the spectre of Chile, and once again repeated their operation of political marginalisation of the drivers' demands, etc, in the same way as they had done for the railway workers, the hospital workers, and the social service and local authority workers.

Our account so far has left out the large numbers of workers in each of the above sectors who are employed by contractors and sub-contractors. Their numbers considerably increase the size of the workforce that is commanded, either directly or indirectly, by the "party system" (or, more precisely, by the Christian Democrats or the Communist Party). This network of contract labour brings us right to the heartlands of *lavoro nero* — in other words, that very wide area of waged labour where the system of trade union guarantees is either fragile or non-existent. But is this network only characteristic of the State, local authority and service sectors? Far from it. *It is the structure of the firm itself (impresa) that is being dissolved*, as a means of producing commodities; the firm remains merely as chief clerk, as mere administration of decentralised labour; in fact, the firm dissolves itself as a subject or protagonist of conflict, as an institution of the class struggle. The firm is the fulcrum of the processes of tertiarisation. How can we speak of rigidity of the labour market outside of this institutional break-up? The chain of infinite decentralisation of production breaks the rigidities of age and sex, of geographical location, of social background, etc, and all this is a weighty factor in fusing the new composition of the class.

This chain of infinite decentralisation is one of the more "progressive" elements of capitalism today; it is a far more powerful weapon of massification than the assembly line. The factory, as an institution that is increasingly "guaranteed" and "protected", was becoming socially and politically isolated. It did not allow entry to young people, to women, to students; it imposed its hierarchies and its compartmentalisations on the whole of society; it played a normative role as a complete, perfect social form. It has become necessary to encircle and envelop the factory, and this chain of infinite decentralisation has created large numbers of openings into which the women, the young people, the students, the laid-off workers and the redundant workers have inserted themselves, taking on the aspect of waged workers. And in the meantime thousands of waged workers have been flowing out of the factories and into the Universities, taking on the status of students. These are both movements in the area of political demography, because the status of the waged worker and the status of the student have a precise legitimation within the institutional conflict-system in our country. The whole mechanism of the reproduction of classes had the institution of the factory as its bedrock (with the development of a system of trade union guarantees, a "working class aristocracy" was supposed to be reproduced in the factory) and the University as an institution of social promotion (where an anti-worker middle class was supposed to be created) — but this mechanism has exploded.

So far we have shown that the system of decentralisation has allowed a "mixed" labour force to be absorbed within the wage relation, and that the processes of tertiarisation of the firm have, in turn, driven thousands of waged workers to become students. Having shown that these drives have conferred a new political legitimation on all those involved, we need not list the thousand-and-one positions that the students have taken up or can take up within the opportunities of waged labour that the system of decentralisation offers. These thousands of student-workers have brought a new political dimension to the condition of waged labour in which they find themselves, and it has proved possible to create a mutual strengthening of isolated struggles, even in situations where trade

THE DECENTRALISATION OF THE SYSTEM OF STRUGGLES. THE POLITICS OF "PERSONAL LIFE".

unionism is weak and where there are few traditions of struggle. The University has been used as a focal point. Even this "squalid bureaucratic antechamber" has proved capable of becoming something different — a meeting point, an aggregation point for a system of struggles that is itself also infinitely decentralised. Meanwhile, after years of waiting, the old mole of the student struggle has also started digging again, on issues like canteens, housing, transport, and finally on course contents, exams, and voting rights. The proletarian (and proletarianised) student sectors were able to fuse themselves with the whole arc of struggles that the crisis was setting in motion.

But our analysis of these structural factors will be ineffective unless we can combine it with an analysis of the huge transformation taking place in the sphere of "personal life". This obviously starts from the breakdown of sexual relations brought on by feminism. It then widens to involve all the problems of controlling one's own body and the structures of perceptions, emotions and desires. This is not just a problem of "youth culture". It has working class antecedents in the cycle of struggles of 1968-69. The defense of one's own physical integrity against being slaughtered by line-speeds and machinery, against being poisoned by the environment, etc., on the one hand is one way of resisting the depreciation of the exchange value of one's labour-power and the deterioration of its use value, but at the same time it is a way of re-appropriating one's own body for the free enjoyment of bodily needs. Here too there is a *homogeneity*, not a separation, between the behaviour of the young people, the women and the workers.

The question of drugs now arises. Control of drug usage is being reappropriated by the institutions of the political cycle. No sooner have young people had a taste of soft drugs, giving them a first-hand taste of how much this society has robbed them of their perceptive potential, than the heroin multinationals decide to step in and impose hard drugs. A space of political confrontation opens up, between use value (self-managed, within certain limits) and exchange value of drugs, and this involves organisation and instances of armed self-defence. Nor is the mechanism of the production of new needs the exclusive prerogative of the "liberation movements". it has its roots in the "We Want Everything" of the Mirafiori workers in the Summer of '69. The "Italian Utopia" has a solid working class stamp, which no theorists of an American-style "movement" — ghettoised and self-sufficient — will be able to erase.

THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL FORMS.

As we have seen, the reconquest of "personal life" has also dealt a death blow to the organisations of the revolutionary Left. But the roots of their organisational breakdown do not lie only in questions of sexual relations, of alienating hierar-



THE MEANING OF THE AREA OF AUTONOMY

chies, the denial of subjectivity, etc.: they lie in precise, documentable errors of political choice, mistaken theories of organisation. For example, the current concept of *power*, has been based on the old political cycle (struggle/party/transition/civil war/State power). In other words, a projection into the future, rather than a lived experience within the liberated spaces of the present. This error turns into parody when the groups all troop down into the electoral arena. The rotten institutional forms of politics, eaten away from the inside and abandoned by the more aware elements, become a form of oppression.

However, it would be wrong to theorise on the one hand an irrational society made up of pure behaviours, opposing, on the other, a society structured by logical schemas. What we have are hidden circuits involving particular groups, which then evolve into particular sets of results; there is in fact a conscious practice of the irrational, as a destruction of the bridging elements of language, communication and mediation. In short, any separation between the "post-political" (the area of instinct, of the irrational, the personal and the private) and the political cycle is unacceptable. It is not possible to confine the new subjectivity within the terms of youth counterculture, or to consider it an exclusive prerogative of the women. Current attempts to create an opposition between the liberation movement and the political cycle are false — as false as the theory that defines the new class composition as being made up of the *unemployed* and the *marginalised* sectors. The reality is that politics as a form has undergone a critique, on the basis of a battle between *political lines*, and this in turn has allowed the emergence of new organisations, which have been politically legitimated by their presence within those class nuclei outlined above.

The explosion of 1977, with the occupation of University faculties, was a violent confrontation between the State-form and the new political composition of the class. For a while this new class composition met and based itself in the University, taking it as a material base where different needs, different class segments, social groups, political groups and disseminated groups could come together. The University as an institution became a struggle-base, capable of representing all the various partial programmes of the new class composition.

The new emergence of the women's movement and the youth movement deepens the split with the organisations making up *Democrazia Proletaria* (Proletarian Democracy), but the real origins of this split are to be found in the political disagreements voiced by the emerging forces of the organised area of Autonomy (l'Autonomia Organizzata), in particular the groups representing Rome, the Po Valley and the Milan-Sesto-Bergamo axis. Now, if anything legitimated them as a "leading minority" in the first phase of the occupation of the faculties, it was their relationship with the new class composition, with the service-sector proletariat in a big tertiary city like Rome, with the network of factory vanguards in the industrial zone between Milan and Bergamo, and with the needs of proletarian students and geographically disseminated workers in the Po Valley. The fact that they understood and had subjectively anticipated mass behaviours that were not locatable in the schemas of the wave of contestation in 1968, nor in those of the Hot Autumn — that fact allowed the people of the Organized Autonomy — albeit for a brief period — to carry forward a programme that matched the developing class composition. The relation between these autonomist factions and the wider Movement was on a par with the relation between the anarchist groups and the masses in the Sorbonne in May '68. The ability to match class composition with the political programme means the ability to practice the art of politics (or, more often, plain good sense), in order to pull together the vanguard and the average, the organisation and the Movement.

But instead, with incredible speed, the hoary old questions started coming out: should the organisation, with its programme and its plans, march over the corpse of the Movement; should the programme be external to and counterposed to the composition of the class? The echoes of the clashes in Bologna had hardly died away when everyone whipped out their Lenin masks from behind their backs — in particular the Workers' Autonomy (Autonomia Operaia) tendency in the North.

Meanwhile, in the actual struggle, important things were happening. The current interpretations of them (both those of the DP tendency and those of the Autonomy tendency) are either wrong, or only half right. Particularly as regards the internal mechanics of the events of Bologna.

The main problem bringing about this split between class composition and the programme is the question of the "combat party" (*partito combattente*). When some fractions of the Organised Autonomy decide to *force the pace* on this front (with considerable internal differences between those who base themselves on the need for self-defence, and those who argue for a qualitative advance in organisation), not only does the DP front rebuild itself (Milan provides one example of this), but also we find widespread and increasing resistance on the part of those "libertarian" elements who do not accept a re-introduction of voluntarist practices.

It was no accident that it fell to factions of the Organised Autonomy to lead the first phase of the struggles. Their initial hegemony over the Movement derived from their having understood and anticipated the forms of political behaviour that were characteristic of the new class composition; from the ability to *read parts of the programme within the masses themselves*; in other words, knowing how to present themselves not as a "private" thing, but as a "social" expression, a tendency of a growing movement, rather than a choice wholly confined within the logic of the self-reproduction of a political group. The developing critique of the traditional forms of politics (in particular of the "party form") has sharpened the sensibilities of comrades into an almost neurotic ability to intuit when particular choices and actions function "for all" and when they are only private and personal. Forcing the pace on the question of the "combat party" has set in motion all these mechanisms, and has opened up more contradictions within the Movement than it has in the State apparatus! But then this is precisely the point: with this cycle of struggles, the State-form has undergone an evolution. It is perfectly clear that it has been proceeding full-tilt along the road of unifying the "party system", and that law and order has been the main track along which this process of unification has passed. However, within the "party system" there have been different approaches (or perhaps a division of roles?) on how to proceed with a strengthening of the State-form.

PRACTICAL EXPERIMENTS IN A NEW STATE-FORM

The Christian Democrats have taken the crude line of polishing up existing privileges of the forces of law and order (police laws of arrest etc), as well as introducing new rules and regulations. The effect of this is to confer the whole operation of deterrence onto the repressive apparatus with the intention that, having dealt with the "autonomists", they will then be able to move against the wider



movement of opposition. Certainly the DC has still done this after due consultation with the other parties (i.e., respecting the rules of their joint project, and accepting the inevitable delays and discussions arising), but nevertheless, the DC still bases itself on the State as an apparatus: a separate machine, a "special body", to be used as a means of repression in given emergency circumstances, and in the meantime it leaves the "daily repression" to the capitalist form of command over the factory and over disseminated labour.

The Communist Party in Bologna, on the other hand, has developed and experimented practically with a more mature State-form, a form which is more in line with mass social-democracy in a period of transition. A State-form in which it is *the masses themselves who act as judge and jury*, judging who is deviant and who is not, who is productive and who is not, who is socially dangerous and who is not. Now it is to be the factory mass meeting that expels the extremist: the mass tenants' meeting that decides to expel the young hooligan; and the college assembly to expel the 'undesirable' student with his pistol and iron bar. Of course, the instances I am thinking of have been extreme cases — but the fact that this State-form is being tried out on the "autonomists" as guinea pigs does not lessen the marginalising potential of such a State-form within a framework of developing austerity, of the "politics of sacrifice" and of money being given hand over fist to capitalist enterprises. Once you have the collective acting as judge and jury, then the institutional forces of the law (wigs and robes, etc) have only a ratifying function: they take delivery of the hostage, the tumor that has been driven out of the otherwise healthy body. The State-form appears as a kind of immunising process of civil society. This is a huge step forward — it is a moment of "socialisation of the State," which would be innovative were it not happening within a framework of a freezing of the class power balance, with a restoration of capitalist control at all levels, and a general amnesty for all the criminals, past and present, belonging to the apparatus of clientism, corruption and repression. At the level of power-institutions it is undoubtedly a further element contributing to the stickiness of the situation, but at the same time we must understand its "progressive" character. It transcends two aspects of the present State-form: its aspect as a "party system", and its aspect as a bureaucratic-repressive apparatus, both of which are separate from and hostile to civil society. It is an infinitely more advanced form, a form which, among other things, has no need to break up the present institutional apparatus or purge it by substituting more democratic personnel. . . . This State-form does more than that. It overturns the relationship between civil society and the apparatus. It appropriates the qualitative function of the judiciary, and leaves the apparatus with the quantitative translation, in terms of the penalties to be imposed. Henceforth it is civil society, the collectivity, which fixes the norm and formulates the sentence, while the apparatus is left with the technical task of punishment.

All this presents enormous problems for the legitimation of political actions, inasmuch as organisation is obliged to measure itself day by day against the new composition of the class; and must find its political programme only in the behaviour of the class and not in some set of statutes; and thus must practice, not political clandestinity, but its opposite. Those who practice technical clandestinity generally do not even see this State-form. They continue to relate to the State apparatuses, and by focussing all their attention on them, they then find themselves separated from the mass movement. On the other hand, those who choose political clandestinity — ie refusal to seek or create a base for criticism and legitimation of actions — not only undergo that same segregation from the mass movement, but are also smashed by the apparatus, because they do not have the defences and the weapons possessed by those in technical clandestinity.

Now while it is true that the PCI has proposed (and in some instances put into effect) this new, more advanced form of the State, as an experiment, in actual fact it has oscillated between this type of "political prevention" of subversive behaviour and a complete delegation of repression to the State apparatus. In my own opinion, the first option has carried far more weight, and in this sense I find

tiresome and also incorrect the references that are presently being made to "a new Prague" or "a new Chile". But what we must clarify is the extent to which this proposition of a "social" State-form has met and will meet resistance and refusal at the various levels of the present class composition.

Leaving aside the resistance that it has met even among particular sectors of the judiciary itself (ie in a fraction of the apparatus itself), it has been allowed to pass at the *average* level of class composition (I underline *average*). Not only because it aims to transfer to civil society only some (incidentally, the most odious) prerogatives of the State and not other more attractive ones (like control of resources, for example). But also because it deludes itself into imagining that it can inject people with an abstract sense of the State, whereas in fact the State that people understand is *this* State — ie a State of given power relations and value systems that the working class started to unhinge in 1969, and which the "party system", with the crisis, has not only succeeded in setting back on its feet, but has also taken over as its own. The State-form is not a juridical principle, nor an abstract norm, but a formation that is historically determinate.

TOWARDS A MOBILISATION OF THE ENTIRE MASS OF DISSEMINATED LABOUR

The theory that the University has functioned as a point of aggregation for the Movement runs alongside a theory regarding the figure of the unemployed intellectual (or rather the intellectual unemployed), who has been taken, uncritically, as the most representative figure of the movement. The theory is that the exclusion of the intellectual unemployed from the labour market puts them on a par with other marginalised sectors, for whom the intellectual unemployed then act as a voice. I have already stated my complete disagreement with this kind of interpretation. The University was taken by the current class composition as a point of aggregation, more for reasons of the political forms of the struggle (ie for certain levels of violence and power) than for the fact that it is a factory producing employed intellectuals; it was taken up because it put an end to this process of the marginalisation of demands, subjective behaviours and organisation. But once again we must go beyond the University, both as a base for the Movement and as a point of aggregation, in order to identify the channels that can bring about a mobilisation of the entire mass of disseminated labour — ie in order to provide a way into the factory that produces relative surplus value. For this reason I have taken pains to emphasise the question of precarious labor, together with the system of decentralisation of production, and that social area where the protected system of trade union "guarantees" and conditions has entered into crisis. In order to make this transition it is vital that we first reject the "rhetoric of poverty" — moral protests on behalf of the poor. Instead, we should once again ask ourselves whether it is possible to think in terms of "mass objectives" of the type which characterized the anti-authoritarianism of 1968 (the FIAT workers' demand



for "Grade 2 for all", which led into the egalitarianism of the demands put forward in the Hot Autumn of 1969).

Such a proposal cannot be simply written off as a step backwards in collective bargaining, that would prepare the ground for a new social contract between the Government and the unions. It would be absurd to reject it out of hand, for the simple reason that such new objectives would carry within them the representative weight of the infinite political creativity that has emerged in these past few years. Rather, the bigger problem is how we are going to find the point where such a project can be applied — in short, to choose the "new Mirafioris" out of all the various "driving sectors" of the so-called tertiary sector. More specifically, out of those sectors which function as a connecting link between the production of absolute surplus value and the production of relative surplus value — like, for example, the cycle of transportation. Moreover, even the simple extension of the rigidity of labour (even in its form as a system of trade union guarantism) to *lavoro nero*, subcontracted work, etc, would have the effect of forcing the factory struggle to take a leap forward. In short, we are looking for the social channels whereby we could break the encirclement that is currently under way, and prevent the Movement dispersing itself into a thousand decentralised moments of struggle — a new, long Purgatory of endemic struggles. We have to find something which can function in the same way as the strikes over pensions and the strikes over wage-zones did, in relation to the workers' cycle of struggles in 1968-69.

This approach will be branded as "economic" and "collective bargainingism" by all and sundry. It will be accused of lack of imagination, in putting forward mechanisms that are dead and buried. But let's move gently. The State-form which presents itself today has its origins in the ideology of the crisis and in the austerity programme that this has brought about. The ideology has provided the grounds for establishing the new, tighter relations between the parties. It is the historical basis of the Historic Compromise. It is the justification of the parties' powers of marginalisation. To succeed in overthrowing all this would be no small matter. It would mean, not a return to the old conflictual form of the mediations of the party system, but restoring the conflict between the "grass roots" and the new relationship between a socialised State-form and the production of capital. All the more so, since Jimmy Carter's imperialism — unlike the obtuse accountants of the IMF — has understood that in Italy the system of value and behaviours to which the combination of austerity measures and law and order has to be applied, is stronger than it appears. And therefore it's a good investment to release huge amounts of money (this is Carter's current inclination), and inject huge amounts of "command-money" through the big, private, international banking system. Let us start to turn this command into money-as-money — to transform this measure of power-over-others'-labour into power-over-our-own-needs, power over our own spaces of organisation and culture, a driving-spring for the new development of a new class composition. It is time that we take back from the "party system" their residual power over the reproduction of the classes, so that we can start to determine this reproduction from the base, in such a way as to guarantee the value-systems and the political behaviours that the new class composition has legitimated in the struggles of these past months.

Translated by Red Notes

1. See H. Brand, "The Myth of the Capital Shortage", in *Dissent*, Summer 1976.
2. Federal Reserve Bank of New York *Monthly Review*, October 1976.
3. Peter Drucker, *The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America*, London, 1976.
4. See B. Secchi, *Il Problema delle Abitazioni, dalla Casa al Territorio*, Polytechnic Faculty of Architecture, Milan 1976-77.

ii/2 Genoa housing project

ii/3 Executive members of the Italian Communist Party (August 26, 1964): (left to right) Giorgio Amendola; Mario Alicata; Malro Scoccimarro; Luigi Longo; Giancarlo Pajetta; and Pietro Ingrao

ii/4 ML-621-4/22/75-MILAN, Italy: General view of Piazza Duomo (Duomo Square) during today's anti-fascist mass rally; in background the facade of Duomo Church

ii/5 Andreotti tomb Video/photo: Seth Tillet


ii/6 Arrested hospital workers, Polyclinical Hospital, Rome

ii/7 Chemical plant worker; Ottana, Sardinia

ii/8 CRO 1729468 ROME: Luciano Lama, leader of the Communist-led General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL), addresses hundreds of placard-carrying strikers in St. John's Square here Feb. 3 as the Eternal City is hit by a second general strike in 77 days, seriously disrupting normal life for some 2.7 million inhabitants and thousands of tourists. The strike was called by Communist, Catholic and Socialist-led unions to dramatize the problems of the Rome working man—unemployment. 2/3/72

ii/10 Paolo Tomassini, victim of Rome's Special Squadron 2/2/77

ii/11 SOP 091402 DEATH COUCH SANTIAGO: This is the couch where Pres. Salvador Allende of Chile reportedly shot and killed himself during the coup d'etat in the Presidential Palace here Sept. 11 (UPI) 9/15/73



Domination and Sabotage

Toni Negri

Toni Negri, arrested on April 7, 1979, wrote *Dominio e Sabotaggio* shortly after the emergence of the "Movement of '77". This pamphlet was written in Switzerland where Negri, already accused of being the ideologist of the Movement, had taken refuge. We present here chapters 2 & 3 which synthesize his methodological approach to the dynamics of the new class composition.

PARENTHESIS NO. 1: ON METHOD

When I theorise an independence of the process of proletarian self-valorisation, and when I examine the possibility of its having an internal dialectic of continuous recomposition between structural functions and attacking functions, I am bound to draw certain methodological conclusions. First, it seems to me fundamental to consider the totality of the process of proletarian self-valorisation as *alternative* to, and radically *different* from, the totality of the process of capitalist production and reproduction. I realise that I am exaggerating the position, and oversimplifying its complexity. But I also know that this "intensive road", this radical break with the totality of capitalist development, is a fundamental experience of the movement as it stands today.

Today the process of constituting class independence is first and foremost a process of separation.

I am emphasising this forced separation in order to clarify the overall meaninglessness of a capitalist world within which I find myself constituted in non-independent form, in the form of exploitation. I thus refuse to accept the recompositional dialectics of capital; I affirm in sectarian manner my own separateness, my own independence, the differentness of my constitution. As H.J. Krahl understood (in his book *Constitution and Class Consciousness* — a book which,

with the passing of the years, becomes increasingly important), the totality of class consciousness is first and foremost an intensive condition, a process of intensification of class self-identity as a productive being, which destroys the relationship with the totality of the capitalist system.

Working class self-valorisation is first and foremost *de-structuration* of the enemy totality, taken to a point of exclusivity in the self-recognition of the class's collective independence. For my own part, I do not see the history of class consciousness in a Lukacsian sense, as some future all-embracing recomposition; on the contrary, I see it as a moment of intensive rooting within my own separateness. I am *other* — as also is the movement of that collective praxis within which I move. I belong to the *other movement* of the working class. Of course, I am aware of all the criticisms that could be levelled at this position from a traditional Marxist viewpoint. For my own part, I have the sense of having placed myself at the extreme limits of meaning in a political class debate. But anyone who comes with accusations, pressing me with criticism and telling me that I am wrong, must, in turn, accept the responsibility of being a participant in the monstrosities we have seen in the development of "socialism" — with its illicit dealings with the most disgusting results of the capitalist mode of production. It is only by recognising myself as other, only by insisting on the fact of my differentness as a radical totality that I have the possibility and the hope of a renewal.

Furthermore, in my insistence on this radical methodological rupture I am in good company. The *continuity of the history of the working class revolutionary movement* is the *history of the discontinuity of that movement*, the history of the radical ruptures that have characterised it. The revolutionary working class movement is continually being reborn from a virgin mother. The hacks of continuity are still alive and well in the History Institutes of the labour movement. But luckily militant historiography is undergoing a renaissance too, spurred by the experience of the ruptures in our present movement — and in our history-writing we are now confident enough to present the notion of the "other workers' movement". Thus the methodological precondition of an initial radical rupture (which we consider fundamental for any renewal of the social practice of the proletariat) is empirically corroborated by an extensive documentation (limited, perhaps, in scale, but remarkable in its intensity). When Karl-Heinz Roth (*Die Andere Arbeiterbewegung* - "The Other Workers' Movement", shortly to be published by CSE Books), or Gisela Bock (*La Formazione dell'Operaio Massa negli USA* - "The Formation of the Mass Worker in the USA" — Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976) tell the formidable story of how the working class in struggle has continually destroyed its own traditional organisations, they are certainly not animated by a spirit of iconoclasm: rather, they are highlighting the radical, irreducible differentness of the revolutionary movement. This is a perspective which could also provide us with a feel for other historical revolutionary experiences of the proletariat — experiences that have proved victorious and have (therefore) been betrayed and destroyed.

So, I must assume this radical "otherness" as a methodological precondition of the subversive case we are arguing — namely the project of proletarian self-valorisation. But what about the relationship with the totality of history, the relationship with the totality of the system? Here I must now face up to the second methodological consequence of my assumption: *my relationship with the totality of capitalist development, with the totality of historical development, is guaranteed solely by the force of destructuration that the movement determines, by the global sabotage of the history of capital that the movement enacts.* There is only one way that I can read the history of capital — as the history of a continuity of operations of self-re-establishment that capital and its State have to set in motion in order to counter the continuous breakdown process, the permanent provocation-towards-separation that the real movement brings about. *The present state of things is built upon a continuity of destruction, of abolition, of transcendence that the real movement brings about.* I define myself by separating myself from the totality; I define the totality as other than me — as a net which is cast over the continuity of the historical sabotage that the class operates.

And thus (here is the third methodological implication) — there is *no homology*, no possible immediate translatability of languages, of logics, of signs, between the reality of the movement as I experience it and the overall framework of capitalist development, with its contents and its objectives.

Let us now pause and consider the question from another angle. The fundamental point, however you look at the question, is obviously still the nexus between the process of self-valorisation and its effects in deconstruction. I have taken this nexus to extremes, and I have defined it as separation. Basing myself on the experience of the movement, I have stressed first and foremost the subjective element. If I now approach the question from the objective point of view — the viewpoint of the Crisis-State (*Stato-crisi*), the position is no different. When the State, faced with the crisis in the functioning of the law of value, attempts to reimpose that law by force, mediating its own relation to capital in relation to the commodity form, it registers upon itself, in effect, the crisis of all homologous functions. Force does not substitute for value, but provides a surrogate for its form.

The law of value may be forcibly reintroduced, in spite of the crisis of that law, and its operations may be imposed in modified form — but this does not remove the void of significations that Power is forced to register. The Crisis-State is a power which lives in a vacuum of significations, a void, a logic of force/logic which is itself deconstructed. This logic, this critical form, is a "dark night in which all cows are white": in other words, the meaning of the whole is not in any way provided by the perfect connection of the parts. The State's investment in the totality is purely negative, in terms of meaning. The rule of total alienation is the only possible content of this project. The totality is a void, is structured as deconstruction, as a radical lack of value. Thus it becomes clear what we mean in this case by a lack of homology. All the elements of the whole are unified in a *technical* sense; they only hang together in their mutual untranslatability; only in the form of a forced relationship. So, from an *objective* viewpoint too, the system can be seen — *must* be seen — as deconstructed.

However, while our consideration of the objective aspect of the situation confirms our analysis of the subjective aspect, the objective aspect has neither the same logical extension nor the capacity to substitute for the subjective. One cannot move from the understanding of deconstruction as an effect, to the identification of the process of self-valorisation as the cause. This is particularly clear in the analytic principles of Michel Foucault (and in particular his methodological treatment in *La Volonte de Savoir*), which have caught my attention because of the way they strain after a notion of productivity, a creativity of an unknown quantity located beyond the cognitive horizon.

This is also clear — and, furthermore, scandalous — in the various surreptitious attempts that are being made to reimpose a sense of conclusiveness on this deconstructed horizon. (These attempts, be they humanistic in inspiration, or conceived in terms of *Wille zur Macht*, do nonetheless start from a correct perception of the blind objectivity of the development of capital's system. Regarding Cacciari's *Krisis* — Feltrinelli, Milan 1977 — see my review in Nos. 155-156 of *Aut-Aut*). But this surreptitiously-related homology this "revolution from above" in the absence of radical significance — can be seen clearly, in the light of what we have said, for what it is — a fraud.

The above considerations lead me now to confirm my original hypothesis of the *prevalence of the subjective* in the explanation of the present-day dialectic of capital. Taking the subjective viewpoint to extremes does not negate its methodological validity. Rather, it confirms and extends it. It permits me, in the articulation between self-valorisation and deconstruction, to avoid both premature reductivist foreclosures of the problem (because in fact it is the productivity of the proletarian subject that structures the deconstruction, ie negatively determines its own opposite); and, on the other hand, totalising dialectical extensions of the disclosure, because, in this case, there are no longer any homologous functions.

We are not suggesting that methodology in any sense resolves the problems that face us (although a correct framing of the solution is greatly facilitated). We know that the methodological hypothesis requires confirmation from class analysis. It is only the theoretical-political determination of the composition of the working class that can offer a sound basis for a methodological hypothesis such as ours. And in fact the following methodological approximations, without pretending to be exhaustive, confirm our initial methodological assumption that, today, the establishment of working class independence takes place first and foremost in its separation. But *separation* in this instance means *breaking the capital relation*. Separation also means that, having reached the highest point of socialisation, the working class breaks the *laws of the social mediation* of capital. Marx in *Capital* Vol. II, 1, calls for "another mode of inquiry" in the analysis of the metamorphoses of overall social capital. Is this to be a logic of separation? Is it to be a *Darstellung* built on carrying to extremity this independent proletarian subjectivity built on the movements of proletarian self-valorisation as such?

I think that these questions are important for the further development of this essay. However, before going further, they can be further articulated at a formal and methodological level, in order to constitute a framework for the ensuing debate. Let us look more closely. As I have said, the separateness of the proletarian subject is organised in the dialectic between self-valorising productivity and functions of deconstruction. I know, however, that this dialectic does not produce effects of homology and of totalisation, because it is a dialectic of separation. But, equally necessarily, it is inherent in the complexity of the events that are being determined. How? In particular, how does this articulation of a separate subject relate to the constitution of capitalist domination? Secondly and conversely, how precisely does the constitutive process of the collective subjectivity proceed, in all its radicality and intensity?

In short, *what are the laws that govern* (albeit in a situation of separateness, of lack of any homology) *the parallel and opposed processes of the State-form and of proletarian self-valorisation?*

But in defining the problems we can now add a couple of further notes — first in relation to the *self-valorisation/deconstruction nexus*. In the history of socialist thought and practice, the sense of proletarian self-valorisation has often been expressed with original intensity. (If Gramsci's teachings can be retained in any useful sense today, it is certainly in this regard). But is never expressed in terms of separateness—rather it is always expressed in a dialectical sense in relation to the totality. Reciprocation takes the place of opposition. In the social-anarchist tradition this reciprocity, this correspondence, has been played out in terms of



the dialectic between centralisation and decentralisation. Thus it is not difficult, in a critique that starts with Marx and stretches through to Foucault's edition of the *Panopticon*, to demonstrate the perfect compatibility of Proudhon and Bentham. But this compatibility also exists in the tradition of "scientific socialism" — this time not extensive (between centralisation and decentralisation), but intensive (between the general working class interest and the general interests of society, between socialism and democracy). This compatibility, of the process of self-valorisation with the productive structuration of society, is a myth. It is not Proudhon and Bentham, but Rousseau and Stalin who are the fathers of this much-loved synthesis. Personally, I have no time for the so-called "nouveaux philosophes", but I must say I am rather disconcerted when I see representatives of the historical parties of the working class, who have always been enamoured of the link between rationalism and productive Stalinism, insulting these young philosophers for having drawn attention to this "mystifying connection."

In short, they are addressing themselves to a problem which no longer has any real basis. Class self-valorisation has nothing to do with the structuration of capital. But it has a lot to do with its *de*-structuration. The whole capitalist development, ever since the working class reached its present high level of composition, has been nothing other than the obverse, a reaction to, a following-in-the-footsteps-of proletarian self-valorisation — a repeated operation of self-protection, of recuperation, of adjustment in relation to the effects of self-valorisation, which are effects of sabotage of the capital machine. Tronti is correct in his latest utterance that the modern State is the political form of the autonomy of the working class. But correct in what sense? In the sense — for him too, with his revamped "socialism" — of compatibility and convergence? Not at all, comrade: here the methodology of the *critique of political economy* has to be modified, taking as its starting point proletarian self-valorisation, its separateness, and the effects of sabotage that it determines. In particular it is within *this* perspective that we must frame our analysis of the State-form.

If our analysis of the nexus between self-valorisation and State structure leads us along a path of causality that is negative and destructuring, the situation is different when we come to consider our methodological approach to the *nexus of self-valorisation with itself*, in its separateness. Here we shall have to stress and adequately analyse the synchronous dimensions of the process. But here, too, there can be no recourse to models of "continuity", to functional determinations: What can be said straight away — because it constitutes the heart and substance of the methodological proposition itself — is that the separateness of proletarian *self-valorisation* itself appears as *discontinuity*, as a conjoining of leaps and innovations. The method of social transformation that derives from the self-valorising separateness of the proletariat has nothing in common with the homologies of rationalist or historicist progressivism. Proletarian self-valorisation is the power to withdraw from exchange value and the ability to reappropriate the world of use values. The homologies of progressivism relate to exchange value. The rupture and recognition of the class's own independent productive force, removes any possibility of a resolute dialectic. The dialectical positivity of method in the separateness of proletarian self-valorisation is wholly and solely innovative.

Having outlined our polemical methodological premises, we can now start on the substance of the matter. Facing us stands the State; among us — and sometimes within us — stands the form of the domination. To struggle means that we must recognise the monstrous nature of the power that stands facing us, recognise it with the same immediate clarity and on the same level as we have seen the relationship between self-valorisation and destructuration. Now, *this monstrous nature of power is the effect of our sabotage*; it is the negative result of our actions: "Crime," says Marx, "through its constantly new methods of attack on property, constantly calls into being new methods of defence, and thus is as productive as strikes are in relation to the invention of machinery". (K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*)


This is no paradox — Marx does not like the paradox label, not even in the case

of Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*; this pleasure he leaves to the "phillistine apologists of the bourgeois school". It is, rather, a key to understanding. In point of fact, the more we sabotage the State and the more we give expression to the self-valorisation/destructuration nexus, the more the rules governing the development of capital's State-system become ferocious, monstrous and irrational. So now let us look at how the State and the system of social domination respond to the social sabotage which results from self-valorisation, and let us look at the logic that they express — a logic which is internally coherent, but which is nonetheless negative; a logic of destructuration which can never be sublimated, but only precipitated further.

Capital's continual restructuring is its response to working class sabotage. *Restructuration is the empty, but efficacious, content of the State-form*. Empty, because it lacks any rationality save that accredited by working class sabotage; efficacious, because the form of the restructuring is command. But bourgeois economy's critical consciousness is obliged to fill the vacuum of its own process by spreading a wafer-thin (recuperated and mystified) formal rationality, over the timings set by working class and proletarian struggles. Let us look at how it proceeds.

Within the critical consciousness of bourgeois political economy, the evolution of the logic of command has taken place in at least three distinct phases, following on the great Crisis of the 1930s. Each one of these phases is matched by a particular quality and intensity of working class and proletarian struggles. Elsewhere (in the article published in *Opera e Stato* ("Workers and the State", Feltrinelli, Milan 1972) I have indicated the fundamental characteristics of the *Keynesian epoch*. In that epoch, control of the working class struggle was to be achieved in global terms. Keynes replied to the formation and the struggles of the mass worker with an overall balancing — in progressive terms — of supply and demand. But Keynes based himself on a political proposition that was pure and general — he had stressed the overall *trend*. But when the trend comes into contradiction with the actual progress of the cycle (because working class conflictuality does not respect finalised equilibria), the Keynesian State goes into crisis. Who commands the crisis? The Keynesian-bred politicians try to invent a "political trade cycle", try to form "intermediate regimes" etc: in practice, control is little by little slipping out of their hands — the control-dimension no longer matches the dimensions of proletarian and working class conflictuality. A *second phase* opens. Alongside the theoretical "progresses" that lead Sraffa and his ilk to a dissolution of the aggregate categories of Capital, more concretely we can observe that the working class struggle has a continuity that is discontinuous,

THE FORM OF THE DOMINATION



and that the apparent continuity of the struggle is the outcome of an infinite series of individual crisis-points. The economic and political sciences of restructuring must take account of this. It is no longer possible to invent indeterminate macro-economic equilibria which are independent of short-run variations and independent of the micro-economic components which are variable within the unforeseeable timing determined by the struggles of the collective worker. Based on this necessity, we now see the formation of the State-as-Crisis, the Crisis-State (*Stato-crisi*), on the following lines: to divide up the overall thrust of the working class; to control it from within the mechanisms of its own accumulation; and to forestall it, by attacking it in its class composition. Keynes' broad equilibria are replaced by an internal operation of decomposition, within the class, in an attack that is precisely orientated towards dealing with single and particular class crisis points — a microphysics of political economy. "The long-term trend is nothing other than a component — which alters slowly — of a chain of short-term situations" . . . "it is not an independent entity" (Michael Kalecki, in *Trend and Business Cycles Reconsidered*, in *Economic Journal*, July 1968, pp 263 seq.). Thus it becomes impossible to produce a model of development unless it takes explicit account of the interruptions that occur in the process of production and reproduction, and thus a fresh foundation is laid for a theory of development based on the theory of cyclical fluctuations, incorporating the dynamics that occur at a microeconomic level.


A long phase of bourgeois economic theory now develops around these premises. Michael Kalecki is the leading light in this movement (see Joan Robinson in *New York Review of Books*, March 4, 1976 — and in particular George R. Feiwel, *The Intellectual Capital of M. Kalecki*, Knoxville, Tennessee, 1975). But this theory also falls short. Crisis-State theory is, after all, a *reformist* theory. It faces up to the emerging productivity of the mass worker, and tries to construct an "economy of oligopolies" — on two fronts: on the one hand the capitalist entrepreneur oligopoly, and on the other hand the working class-trade union oligopoly in the factory (M. Kalecki, "Class Struggle and the Distribution of National Income", in *Kyklos* XXIV, 1971, pp 1 seq.) But in the meantime, the struggle has advanced; the action of the mass worker has gradually laid siege to the whole of society. We now see the worker developing as a "social" worker — even (and particularly) if still remaining a "workplace worker". The worker responds to the Crisis-State even more violently than previously to the State-as-Planner (*Stato-piano*). If this latter went into crisis because of its inability to control the quantities of working class demand, the *Crisis-State* is forced into an internal self-criticism of what is now a socially inescapable (and immediately efficacious) extension of working class action. The Crisis-State is not only a State-form that is reformist to its roots — it is also, and above all, a State-form that is still linked in to the dimensions of direct production, to factory command over living labour. But when working class sabotage extends to invest the whole of society, the entire mechanism of circulation, forcing aggregate social capital into a confrontation over the rules governing the reproduction of the system, at that same moment the consciousness of bourgeois political economy — which had actually been consolidating itself up to that point — goes into a further stage of crisis and disintegration.

It is interesting to note the formation of a *third phase* of theoretical development in the political economy of the Keynesian epoch. It is in the process of formation today, and draws on the elements of crisis in the previous schemas. In particular it tries to operate in a more generalised way on the social movements of the working class. Its central arena of interest is the question of *circulation*. The simple transition from global control of production (Keynes), to dynamic control of production (Kalecki) is insufficient. The problem is that of the functional control of circulation, of the dynamic nexus linking production and reproduction. And here the problem of *time* becomes fundamental. Keynes never concerned himself with the temporal determination of equilibria and secondary equilibria. Kalecki, on the other hand, stressed the necessity of determining Keynesianism via the redefinition of phenomena within individual "time units". And now, today, the temporal dimension is being extended to the whole of the process. In analytic terms, the new approach is a sort of Einsteinian theory of relativity: it involves the

insertion of another dimension of analysis, in order to relativise the contents of that analysis. But this is indeed a strange kind of relativity: it is above all a relativity of *time*, the reduction of time to an *indifference of command*. In practical political terms we have an analytic mechanism which assumes circulation-time as a terrain of both theory and control. The totality of circulation-time is drawn into the economic analysis; the totality of circulation-time is to be controlled by economic policy: the hypothesis of the simultaneity of functions and operations within the cycle is not assumed in advance and abstract (à la neo-classics), but operational and political (à la Milton Friedman and his monetarist bedfellows). The Kaleckian interruptions of the short cycle are still mediations between the trend and the overall cycle: here science does not become separated in its application, does not waste its efforts in forecasting, but intensifies its analysis on every moment, every transition. It is a physics of elementary particles — and science stands watchful, like a policeman, over everything.

It is not the Marxists' job to observe that the temporal dimension is decisive in the relation between circulation and reproduction, and in general within the relation as it impinges on the class struggle in the sphere of reproduction (although Geoff Kay draws attention to the problem in his very useful *Development and Underdevelopment*, Macmillan, London, 1975). It is not surprising that the problem is arising again. Rather, what is surprising is the fact that the proposition arouses so much passion. The philosophers are well aware of the problems associated with the dimension of time: infinitely sub-divisible and infinitely extendable. So how should we grasp the analytic proposition in operational terms; how are we to concretise the political project? It is not our job to answer this: suffice it to draw attention to the indeterminateness of the project. Rather, our task is to note how *the process of destructure within the logic of political economy* is taking a further step forward. (See, apropos, the fine essay by A. Graziani, introducing R. Convevole's book *La Dinamica del Salario Relativo* ("The Dynamic of the Relative Wage"), republished in *Quaderni Piacentini*, No.64, pp 113 seq.). In its anxiety to keep up with the process of working class attack against the general dimensions of exploitation, bourgeois political economy strips even the appearance of coherence from its logic, and forces itself into the role of a technical instrument against the emergence of the destructuring power of the working class; it extends itself over the indefinite discontinuity of the movement of self-valorisation, State restructuring becomes increasingly an indiscriminate succession of actions of control, a technical apparatus that is effective, but which has lost all measure, all internal reference-points, all internal coherent logic.

Good working class theory rejoices at this. But, being responsible people, we must recognise the enormous weight of suffering, of inhumanity, of barbarities



that all this brings with it. This revelation of the internal void of capitalist restructuring, this successive self-destruction of the moments of capitalist control, and this *dissolution of theory into a technique of power*, bring closer the final outcome of the revolutionary struggle. But at the same time it makes it hard to endure the harshness of the daily struggle and the cruelty of capital's continued existence. (Note that certain theoretical positions that exist within the official labor movement, and which have nothing to do with Marxism — such as the famous theory of the "autonomy of the political" — ape these bourgeois affirmations). And yet it is still the action of the working class that brings about these effects — to the extent that *the destructuring tendency of these struggles has a direct effect on the very rationality of capitalist restructuring, and removes this rationality*, even in its formal aspect, and leaves us with a whole that is destructured, technical and repressive. The varied and combined modality of working class action is respected in every moment of the restructuring of capital: from the actions of the mass worker, and from those of the "social" worker, arise effects that are then matched, in the sense of a subsequent radical destructuring of the enemy power.

Thus it is no accident that today the big forces of capitalist reformism have adopted — at a world-wide level — a *terroristic strategy of savage deflation* (or "dis-inflation", if you prefer). On the basis of the experience of the *fiscal crisis of the American cities* this political line has been correctly described as a "regressive distribution of income, of wealth and of power" (see the articles by Robert Zevin, and Roger A. Alcaly and Elen Bodian in *The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities*, New York, 1977).

The destructured logic of the economic compatibilities must in fact be extended downwards, to reach single individual social groups, in such a way as to destroy any consolidation of proletarian self-valorization. At every level. Generalized control must be deepened and intensified, to act on every point of linkage in the process of reproduction; it must allow the destruction of every rigidity; it must fluidify, in a new manner, the cycle of capitalist reproduction. But — you say — this has always happened! This is one of the laws of capital! Certainly. But what makes the present situation specific is the depth, the intensity, the extensiveness of the control. Capital has been subjected to a class pressure at the social level, which has definitively destructured its terms of reference. Right down to the level of factory-command (*comando-impresa*), command is in crisis. Restructuration, at this point, is pure form of domination. It aims to be effective even at the level of the individual unit of production, the single social group, the single individual. Thus it is no accident that, acting at such a depth and within such micro-economic dimensions, State power is once again, for the first time in several decades, resurrecting the Ideology of Freedom!


At this stage, the capitalist determination (whose articulations attempt to follow the social emergence of the processes of proletarian self-valorization, and which has to face up to the destructuration effects that these engender), reaches a high point of its logical vacuity: *here the reimposition of the law of value within restructuring is violence, and is logically founded on criteria of indifference*. However, this in no sense diminishes the efficacy of the project of restructuring. The specification of the indifference starts from command. If the social struggle of the working class has driven the capitalist brain into a position of formal indifference, then capitalist command tries to specify itself materially on this possibility. It is important to emphasize this transition. It is important because with it comes a fundamental shift in the development of the contemporary form of the State. That very *social-democratic project*, which since the time of Keynes has been at the centre of capital's interests within the restructuring process, is now *subsumed to the indifference of the possibilities of capital*. This is perhaps a splendid example of how working class and proletarian self-valorization has destroyed an instance of the enemy. The social-democratic project is beginning to disintegrate, and from this point of view, the euphoria that is accompanying the present development of the various Eurocommunisms is slightly macabre.

So, concretely speaking, what is the center of the capitalist restructuring project today? How is the form of domination being realized? The fact of command over living labor taking the upper hand over the law of value is not something new: but *what is specific to today's restructuring is the conjuncture of command together with the indifference of the contents of command, of its articulations*. This capitalist conclusion derives from the powerful socialization of the revolutionary movement of the proletarian class; it is the obverse of this. In this situation, capital's initiative becomes regressive — in other words, it has to base itself on a logic that is as empty as it is separate. Once again a premise which, to us, is fundamental — ie the separateness of the cycles of capital and its State-form from the cycle of working class self-valorization — is verified. But at this point a whole series of problems re-emerge. In particular, if we want to identify not so much the center, as the specific content of capitalist restructuring. This terrible void and indifference, this terribly weak and the same time ferocious freedom of capital — how is it determined today?

For the moment I know only one thing, that from the working class point of view — having arrived at this level of awareness — the effects of the destructuring action that I have set in motion force me to confront — in a destructive manner — capital's powers of stabilization. And this means, above all, confronting that power which provides the breeding ground for the multiple indifferent possibilities of domination. Destructuration of the enemy system involves the immediate necessity of attacking and destabilizing its political regime.

Translated by Red Notes

iii/2-3 Photo: D. Cortez



Autoreduction Movements in Turin

Eddy Cherki/
Michel Wieviorka

THE ITALIAN CRISIS

To consider the new developments in social struggle within Western Europe since 1968, one must turn to Italy. The organization of the Worker's Movement, often on a mass scale, has assumed original forms. Urban struggles have led to organized union and political neighborhood actions with stakes tied to consumption.

From this point of view, the autoreduction movement, which began in Turin in the fall of 1974, constitutes a development of the utmost importance. Autoreduction is the act by which consumers, in the area of consumption, and workers, in the area of production, take it upon themselves to reduce, at a *collectively* determined level, the price of public services, housing, electricity; or in the factory, the rate of productivity.

Above and beyond the "classical" forms of economic crisis and the bankruptcy (or rather absence) of the Italian government's economic policy, the most enlightened sectors of the technocracy and certain leaders of the large Italian monopolies (such as Agnelli, FIAT), centered around Carli, president of the Italian bank, propose and, in June 1974, compel the government to accept a plan of reform, the Carli Plan. Founded on the fundamental hypothesis of the tacit support of the I.C.P., or at least its neutrality, this plan proposes two essential objec-

THE RISE OF SOCIAL STRUGGLE

tives. On the one hand, restructuring the production (diversification of some industrial sectors, notably the automobile industry, formulation of a nuclear energy program) and, on the other hand, reducing, in the area of consumption, public expenditures—in particular, curbing the production of collective tools and arrangements (equipements collectifs). On a more general level, the Carli Plan seeks to place the burden of the Italian economic reform on the working classes by reducing internal demand, thus household consumption. Concretely, the government's principle of "fair pricing" of public services entails a massive price increase in transportation, electricity, telephone, health care and housing. In July, besides a few amendments proposed by the I.C.P., the Assembly approved this program with increases exceeding 50 per cent.

The application of the Carli Plan presupposes a climate of social peace and the absence of workers' struggles. However, in the past few years, social struggles are on the rise. Classical forms of action have been significantly supplemented by less conventional forms: sabotaging production, sequestering leaders, lowering productivity, controlling the rate of production, and massive absenteeism. This movement expresses at one and the same time the rebellion of the Italian working class and its pugnaciousness.

The metallurgical unions (the F.L.M.) and various groups of the extreme left ("Lotta Continua", "Avanguardia Operaia", and later "Il Manifesto") take an active role in this movement. Between 1968 and 1975 forms of direct action reappear on the battleground of urban struggles, they are essentially centered around the problem of housing. The homeless take over empty houses. Public housing tenants autoreduce rents or resist eviction. These struggles are illegal, massive and often violent.

Massive struggles: in Italy between 1969 and 1975, twenty-thousand habitations are "squatterized". Rent autoreduction was the first form of action; the political objective was to limit rents to 10% of one's salary.

These violent struggles cannot be isolated from the climate of social and police violence which reigns in Italy. The most dramatic episode occurred in the San Basilio neighborhood (in the suburbs of Rome). In September of 1974, a militant of the extreme left was killed during a clash between police and squatters.

It is difficult to establish a direct connection between urban struggles and workers' struggles. It is not easy to grasp that the capitalist system in general is under attack in both the areas of production and consumption. The autoreduction movement in Turin strives in to unite through a collective action the forces of production and those of consumption.

Each day, in Turin, tens of thousands of workers commute (*pendolari*). This constitutes a forced extension of the work day and an important financial burden.

Some businesses allow their employees travel expenses; others provide for the transportation for their work force; but often, as is the case of FIAT, transportation costs are directly born by the workers.

In the summer and fall of 1974, the decision of two private transportation companies to increase their fares by 20% to 50% caused an immediate reaction on the part of the workers.

The first reactions are spontaneous, unorganized: buses are blocked at Pinerollo, an important gathering point of Rivalta and Mirafiori workers, some delegations head towards municipalities and the regional government, some tracts are distributed. All of this changes little to the increase. The Rivalta FLM decides to take in hand the organization of the struggle on the basis of autoreduction: the weekly transportation pass must be purchased at the old price. This decision follows a brief political debate. Refusing all payment is practically not considered and, for a very good reason: the transportation companies would simply stop run-

THE AUTOREDUCTION MOVEMENT AND THE PRICE OF TRANSPORTATION

ning their buses. In each bus, delegates, ere designated to gather subscriptions at the old price in exchange for a receipt prepared by the unions. The money collected is then turned over to the companies.¹

The smallest companies refuse the money, then quickly reverse this decision. They threaten to curtail certain lines in retaliation. Worker's demonstrations and pressure from FIAT leads the regional government to demand that the concerned companies accept suspension of their curtailments and operate buses at the old price until an agreement with the unions is reached.

The fact that a *direct action* resulted in such rapid success is of utmost importance, if only on the level of the debate within the unions and leftist organizations.

We are no longer *in the factory*, in the production area itself, but rather at the junction of the factory and the neighborhood or town. This foreshadows the development of popular struggles at the level of consumption, without yet presenting the most characteristic traits (pluri-classism, difficulty in relating to factory struggles). Last and above all, this *form of struggle* constitutes a break from traditional practice.

Autoreduction was not practiced by isolated militants: it was organized, and this is a fundamental point, by unions which brought their active support and simultaneously imposed a coherent line of action. Such a position would have been unthinkable a few years earlier: it strongly suggests a breakthrough, of certain themes of the extreme left. We should, however, assess the scope of this breakthrough: the autoreduction of regional transportation has always been a localized phenomenon involving merely the machinery of local metallurgical unions, for a set objective. At no time was it a question of generalizing the movement on a national scale. The movement on electricity, instigated by the provincial leadership of the FLM will give a new dimension to autoreduction, its truly mass character.

Taking advantage of the summer and in the context of the Carli Plan, the government, at the beginning of July, decides to increase the electricity rates. This increase anticipates an entire series of comparable measures and, as a result, constitutes a political test for the authorities. They will be able to impose the following increases (telephone, public transportation, etc.) all the more quickly and easily if the reaction to their first decision is weak and indecisive. The unions must act, and act fast.

In an economic crisis, *the struggle in the factory cannot serve as a basis of mobilization for meeting demands related to consumption*. The unions of the C.I.S.L.—electricity, using the example of the regional transportation movement, then propose to initiate an autoreduction. Will the bills that the customers receive be reduced by 50% or, more radically, will a refusal to pay the bills be organized?

In fact, this last solution risks being turned against those who use it: various past experiences have failed. In addition, *this form of struggle does not oblige the workers to organize themselves*. Simply asked to not settle their bills, the workers remain passive.

Autoreducing the electricity rates signifies the customers' disagreement with the unilateral decision taken by the government in July. Direct action should force the government to negotiate and thereby determine, the level of demands around which negotiations can take place. The Union members set this level at 50% of the new electricity rates.

The union members thus instill an illegal dimension of "civil disobedience" to the action. In initiating this struggle, the unions play a determining role. From the early days, the electricity unions declared that they would refuse to turn off the electricity in the apartment buildings practicing autoreduction no matter what.

Moreover, they were ready to warn the tenants so that a mobilization to prevent electricity from being turned off be unleashed. The important fact to note is the role of a worker's union in initiating struggles outside of the factory. *The workers' unions have come to somewhat replace parties or political organizations.*

Union initiative can only be understood if one considers the relations of power between the local/regional level and the national level of the confederations. Indeed, there is a specific context of unionism in Turin. The unions of Turin, CGIL, CISL, UIL, and the union of FLM unions are relatively *autonomous* in relation to their national leadership.

The CGIL in Turin, directly tied to the I.C.P. on the national level, is situated to the left of its national leadership; CISL is an "open" union in which militants of the extreme left defend their political ideas and obtain positions of responsibility on the regional level.


This would not be the case elsewhere, notably in Milan where the unions' regional leadership, has curbed the autoreduction movement on electricity initiated by extreme leftist groups, or also at Naples where the autoreduction movement is more spontaneous and unconnected with any union initiative.

The active support of the union initiative by the entire extreme left in Turin constitutes an important point; the movement would never have been able to organize the neighborhoods in the C.P. and the extreme left, with the different grass root neighborhood organizations, had not supported the union's initiative.

The actual struggle will unfold in two stages. In the first stage, a campaign to collect signatures of commitment to the autoreduction position is initiated in the factories, then very quickly, in the neighborhoods. Why this campaign? Because it is necessary to move fast and give a mass dimension to the struggle. The petition allows the unleashing of an immediate and collective action: the signer has committed himself to paying only half price and to sending to the administration, together with his payment, a letter in which he explains that he is acting in accordance with the directions of the unions in Turin: CISL, CGIL and UIL.

The second phase deals with the actual settling of bills. At this stage, the electricity unions intervene, as expected, by furnishing a complete account of the dates when the bills were mailed, neighborhood by neighborhood. As a result of this accounting, the grass root organizations set up pickets in front of certain post offices and distribute to the workers a leaflet which explains the methods of

THE AUTOREDUCTION OF ELECTRICITY



autoreduction. The workers settle the autoreduced bills by using drafts prepared by the unions or the struggle committees.

In Turin, and in Piedmont, within a few weeks, about 150,000 families thus autoreduced their electricity bill. For the most part, these are working class families and also families of the petty bourgeoisie—the famous middle classes—and they confer on this mass struggle a real pluri-classic dimension. However, the movement under this massive form remains very distinctly limited to Piedmont.

In the rest of Italy, there will be several tens of thousands of autoreduced bills, in Tarento, Varese, Milan and Rome. For Milan and Rome, the non-extension of the movement is directly linked to the "curb" imposed by the leadership of the national unions (and indirectly by the political parties, in particular the I.C.P.). In Milan, the isolated extreme left, nonetheless, succeeds in reducing around 10,000 bills.

The conjunction of a leftist unionism relatively autonomous in relationship to the confederations, of an extreme left capable of putting pressure on the unions and on the grass root organizations functioning at the neighborhood level, and the local support of the I.C.P.: the situation in Turin favored the development of this movement.

But the specific character of the union's political situation in Turin is also at the root of its isolation: if the movement in Turin has instigated movements of a similar type in Italy, as well as an important debate, it has never been able to amalgamate ideological and political forces capable of imposing the autoreduction initiative as a form of action that the leaders of the national unions and the parties could ratify.

Rapidly polarized by the hostility of the I.C.P. and the reservations of the unions' leaders, the debate, on the national level, opposes supporters and opponents of autoreduction.

When the I.C.P. takes a position on the autoreduction movement, it does so in order to criticize the bold character of this form of struggle, which in no way constitutes a form of working class action (central thesis, and its variant: workers don't break the law). The only adequate form of worker struggle is the strike. Other types of struggle can only be led and exploited by the extreme left, either explicitly or under its union "cover" (the CSL in Turin or Milan).

The hostility of the I.C.P. in relation to the autoreduction movement is supported by a line of argument based on the notion of the State and of "public service": *autoreduction and the ideology of civil disobedience that it can generate on a mass scale* contribute to accentuating the State's disintegration and the crisis of its institutions. In a political context where any action of the right tends to weaken the State (the strategy of "tension" advocated by the Italian extreme right), such a movement, on the ideological level, can only contribute further to its weakening.

There is no doubt that autoreduction contains the seeds of a serious criticism of a *public service* (or of a State) allegedly neutral, technical, serving everyone, without political or ideological connotations.

In fact, the I.C.P.'s willingness to manage the economic crisis articulates, on the political level, the *strategy* of the Historical Compromise.

The co-management of the crisis and the participation in power together with the Christian Democrats *cannot be organized* by the I.C.P. in a context of increased social struggles. The growing movement of civil disobedience is undoubtedly linked to the negligence of the economic policy of the Italian State, and to *its decomposition*.

The strong reticence of some confederations and the I.C.P.'s disagreement isolate more and more the Turin militants as the date of the second wave of autoreduction approaches (*the first bills are expected in mid December*).

The political context is much less favorable than at the beginning of October. A new center-left government seems ready to settle the question by trying to negotiate as quickly as possible. The economic crisis is at its strongest. Fiat has just put a large part of its workers on technical unemployment.

The union leaders begin negotiating with the government in this context. The national confederations are eager to settle the matter. In Turin also many fear the exhaustion of the movement.

By signing the agreement, the union confederations accept the repayment of the autoreduced part which exceeds the balance agreed upon.

Each component of the movement then draws its own conclusions from the struggle. An internal debate on the political perspectives opened up by this type of struggle takes the place of the opposition between the supporters of autoreduction and its opponents (the I.C.P.), or those more reticent (the unions' leaders).


CONCLUSION

One can derive several political and theoretical lessons from the autoreduction movement in Turin.

The autoreduction movement opens up the old alternative between urban struggles (secondary front), subordinated to factory struggles, and the autonomy, if not the isolation of urban struggles led exclusively by the extreme left. It demonstrates the possibility of a coordinated struggle, the first concrete accomplishment of the theoretical and practical intuitions of extra-parliamentary groups. It is the workers' unions who decisively guaranteed this coordination, because they took the initiative and contributed organizational support to the movement.

Without the union intervention, the autoreduction movement would have remained isolated. What are the conditions which favored such an intervention? Three essential elements:

- 1) the specificity of *Turin*, a *working class city* whose life style is profoundly influenced by FIAT, and the struggles which are conducted therein.
- 2) the strong tradition of *intervention* on the national level in social struggles by



the Italian unions. It is expressed, for example, in the national workers' strikes on the problem of housing (in 1969) or in the support of the FLM for numerous occupations of empty houses.

The unions are no longer retrenched in a political-symbolic support of the Workers' Movement in urban struggles. They organize them directly on a precise objective. Indirect union intervention gives way in Turin to a direct involvement in social struggles which permits a considerable *enlargement* of the urban movement.

Finally, the context of the economic crisis assumes a fundamental importance: during a period of overproduction, unemployment or threatened unemployment, the usual defenses of the working class lose their sting; it becomes harder to enforce strikes, a refusal of regulated work pace, the struggle against an increase in productivity. To keep one's job and to defend salaries become the main thrust of factory struggles. Attacked by both strong inflation and massive increases in public services, worker's salaries cannot be successfully defended by actions within the factories. Fighting for salary increases is no longer sufficient, to defend one's threatened purchasing power requires struggling in the area of consumption.

The struggle to defend one's purchasing power can be developed on a mass scale. Employees, civil servants (breaking with the ideology of public service as "neutral" and external to conflicts), teachers, etc. have participated in the autoreduction movement on electricity. A pluriclassism *constituted by the initiative of workers' unions and on the basis of direct action* (autoreduction) was only previously practiced by active minorities. It has now become one of the most important characteristics of this struggle.

Autoreduction almost always directly puts into question the State and public institutions. Popular control of so-called collective consumption, a "political" pricing for public services, goes against the policy of "fair pricing" put forth by the Carli Plan.

Autoreduction is much more difficult to apply in the private sector. *The repressive machinery moves at once to defend private property.* Two examples: Marxist-Leninist militants initiated autoreductions on products sold in supermarkets in Milan. Result: the police intervened without delay jailing the militants. The second example is the occupations of empty houses: the repression is rarely immediate or brutal when it involves public apartments. The occupation of privately owned housing prompted on the contrary *immediate* repression.

Autoreductions developed for the most part in sectors controlled by the State — a State in crisis, incapable of managing its own contradictions. The development of this movement could only accelerate the disintegration of the State. Its reinforcement required the intervention of an ensemble of forces concerned with the re-establishment of economic order.

Translated by Elizabeth A. Bowman.

1. We are far removed from what happened at Palermo, where transportation "autoreduction" (city buses) was put into motion by students using far less legal forms of struggle (blocking the automatic ticket-punchers).

III/1-3 Photo: D. Cortez



From Guaranteeism to Armed Politics

Oreste Scalzone

Oreste Scalzone, arrested on April 7, was one of the leaders of the student's movement in Rome in 1968. Together with Toni Negri and Franco Piperno, he animated *Potere Operaio* ("Workers Power") until its dissolution in 1973.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF GUARANTEEISM

A name can be given to the well-knit web, to the *system of struggles* which has given life to the strongest and most extensive fabric of *social counterpower* which can be recalled in recent years in the capitalistic metropolis: *guaranteeism*.

By the term "guaranteeism" is meant a sanction-formalization (synonymous with "fait accompli") of the whole of the victories realized by proletarian struggles (on the level of wage, working conditions, social services).

The "soul," the bloodline of guaranteeism has been a total *rigidity of the labor factor* (either in the man-power marketplace or in the factory, in the organizations of production). The justification and continuation of this *rigidity*, which is founded on a network of *guarantees* (job security, limits placed on the "freedom to exploit," exercising of union rights, protection from dismissal, protection from *transferral* of the worker) have constituted the "leit motif" of the struggle of recent years.

What is involved is a collection of social facts of great significance: the obsessive insistence with which even today — after years of planned crisis, of patient union efforts at redimensioning and partially dismantling this state of affairs — the members of the entrepreneurial class insist upon their goal of reassuming full power of management over a work force rendered "malleable" once again, causes us to

see how profound have been the modifications which guaranteeism has brought to the economic-social picture.

We could perhaps describe the state of the power relationships which was established during the heyday of guaranteeism as a *dualism* (informal) of *social powers*: on the one hand, the general movement of *social transformation* — which has been manifest as a network of daily micro-behavior-units, as a disaffection for the rules of the prevailing social form and as insubordination to management; on the other hand, the policies — monetary, inflationary and fiscal, designed to restructure the productive and social systems which together have constituted the *capitalistic manipulation of the crisis*.

It is easy to see that such a dualism cannot last forever; at a certain point, the stagnating balance of power collapses. At a certain point in the development of the clash between classes, *guaranteeism* ends up constituting a restraint, a limit to the development of the general level of social antagonism. It is necessary, then, to take the initiative in breaking the "stalemate," in order to go beyond a mere struggle of resistance. *Escape from the realm of guaranteeism means resumption of the offensive*. That will require, inevitably, a phase of political conflict with the majority of the "traditional" working-class sectors. For, if it is true that *guaranteeism* has expanded beyond the frontier of the factory, it is likewise true that there — in the "classical" area of salary negotiations — it has repeatedly shown its strength and its continuity.

The basic *limitation* in the *strategy* of this movement for social redress and guaranteeism lies in the fact that while it calls into question the "fixed proportions" of salaries, it does not call into question *wage scales as such*. In the *struggle for social redress and in contract negotiations the work-force is not denied as such*; rather, it is represented as *such*: this clarification must be made — for example — in order to understand that basic issue of Italian *operaismo* ("workerism") in the Sixties, which was the *struggle over wage*¹.

GUARANTEEISM IMPLIES THE DEFENSE OF THE GIVEN CLASS MAKE-UP

Everyone can ultimately see that struggles of the "guarantistic" kind (the struggle to defend and/or acquire a job is the perfect example) always become more *minimal — even regressive, and for that very reason, ineffective*. The *conservative and conserving* content of these struggles catches our eye.

Let us consider the rigidity of the worker, his or her protection from *transferral*. It is certainly an example of a significant worker accomplishment, and objective sabotage of management, of the capitalistic freedom to take advantage of the "use value" of the work-force; but its validity lies in its provisional, immediate nature, in its function as a *negating* factor, as a *block* to the initiative of the class enemy. It has meaning and revolutionary strength only if it is the *instantaneous tactical decision of a strategic plan, which is that manifest in the rifiuto del lavoro* ("refusal of work") and the concrete realization of the separation between the concept of *work* and the concept of *production*, realized in a way radically different from the *working* form of productive human activity.

In the middle-of-the-road ideology of the movement, on the other hand, the rigidity comes to be understood not as a "preface," as a pure and simple *tactical prologue*, but as a "*thing of value in itself*." On the contrary, the demand for an immutable organization of production is — in itself — a *regressive utopia*: the modification of the organization of production, in fact, always has an ambivalent content: and therefore *also* a content which includes liberation from work, reduction of work time by means of reduction of necessary work. In the *social synthesis* which capital constantly realizes, this capacity to incorporate — partially — the result of struggles is made manifest (think of the relationship between the *rifiuto del lavoro* and technological innovation).

So then, how can one adopt as a worker-proletarian program of action the stagnation of all changes, the stoppage of that "incessant revolutionizing of itself" which makes of capitalism "the most revolutionary system to have appeared yet

on the stage of history?" How can one think that in place of a *strategically revolutionary* line of action one can substitute the whimsical notion of "preventing capital from extracting relative surplus-value (wasn't that, after all, the condition for determining the drop in the rate of profit?). How can one say *no* to "labor-saving" devices and not first bring up the question of transformation of technological innovation into a reduction of *total labor* — that is to say, into an acquisition of part of the *time saved from labor* by each person?

It becomes clear that *guaranteeism* (the defense of rigidity, taken as the "status quo" of the technical class make-up, of the company work-day, of the "geography of the work force") is a double-edged sword when it is not understood, to a limited degree, as a *means of struggle* (a transitory form of worker influence *in and on* production, *in and on* society) but is understood, exclusively, as a *program of action*, as a "positive" *plan*.

This is no new assertion: a revolutionary point of view can not call for an immobility of the organization of production and of class make-up — rather, it must keep close watch on the aggressive energy of capital, hunt it down, in order to force capital to transform itself, and then be one step ahead of it, wait for it at the newly attained level of development and there make the attack.

The problem is *how to assure the continual decay of surplus-labor and how to get stuck at the level of a resistance struggle against the reduction of necessary labor*. The answer comes from the autonomous fight of recent years: "*in the clash between the capitalistic attempt to limit necessary labor in order to increase surplus-labor as surplus-value, and the workers' practice of assuring themselves more free time (be it time free for "leisure" or time in which to get richer) the behavior of the worker has prevailed over the production and re-production of the companies.*" (Piperno: "On Non-Worker Labor").

MORE ON THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF THE "GUARANTISTIC UNIVERSE"

There are other residual trends which are part of the guarantistic universe. Above all, they take place within the social realm; consider the following examples:

— the "*art of making-do*" (either in the marginal-pauperistic version, or in the "appropriating" fashion, which, in the long run, is made known in the form of the take-it-if-you-need-it activities of the "small fighting group" motivated by its own particular system of needs);

— that brand of permissive "reduction," the welfare and democratic/legalitarian type, based on the "right to life," which, more and more, we see being implemented these days in the rise in government employment.

It is a question of an "art of making-do" which is socialized by means of its own progressive institutionalization: the no-fail exams from the democratic professors (but-for-heaven's-sake-let's-not-talk-about-the-guaranteed-passing-grade-issue); the concession — somewhere between welfarism and payoffs from a new type of political patronage — of forms of "*socially useless work*" in several areas of social services, etc. There would be nothing to object to here, if the issue were interpreted as a proletarian exploitation of all the loopholes in the social fabric, and if it were to function as a practical criticism of salary, as a form of "socialized techniques of reappropriation" (even if not quite reinterpreted and translated into a "new production intelligence"); there would be nothing to object to, however, only on the condition that the disguised motivations of this camouflaged welfare not be taken as sincere, only on the condition that we not *really* believe in the "*socially useful*" character of the specific content of one or another activity. It all has to do, in fact, with bringing to light the fact that these activities — when they take place — constitute minimal, molecular pivot-points within the functioning system of the State; in this sense, they arrive at the point of being the mechanism through which maximum "participation" (of apparent reappropriation, on society's part, of the functioning elements of the State-Machine) coincides in reality with maximum "socialization," or breaking down ("capillarization") of management, or sub-sumption within the *diffuse State* of the institutions of "social self-government."

On the other side of the argument lies the strength of an *unprejudiced* consideration of welfare, of public assistance tied to the emerging needs of society, and

not concentrated on the infinite splitting of the social proletarian body, not tied to the simultaneous strengthening of the system of parties.

It is a question of introducing *guaranteed wage* as a device that will halt the fluctuation — between neo-parasitism and "*proletarianization*" — which prevails among so many, and in so many strata of society?

Translated by James Cascaito

1. *The struggle over salary* — the pivot-point of that which we from *Potere Operaio* called "revolutionary strategy of objectives" — has certainly been a formidable vehicle of unity and of self-identification of class, has certainly had a function of *destabilization* of the "development model" and, more generally, of the existing political-social regime; but it has not had — nor could it have had — a resolute capacity for destructuring the system. The strength and — at the same time — the limits of the autonomous struggle for redress of the last decade in Italy (and, in particular, the richness and the poverty of the unforgettable "troubled autumn") lie in this ambiguity, in this relative "compatibility" — compatibility with the persistence of the capitalistic social form as such — of a dynamics of struggle which is, rather *incompatible* with any particular form, with any level of development *determined* by it. This is the source of the ambiguous destiny of a complete historical arc of struggles: their capacity to promote and to polarize class autonomy and their simultaneous inability to bring it to power.

In the Sixties, *oparismo* ("worker-ism") was what led to a theoretical-practical "break" consisting of the affirmation that — on the level of the *post-Keynesian planned State and of the operaio-massa* ("mass worker") — the distinction between "economic struggle" and "political struggle" is being reduced to the point of vanishing, and that there is a direct conflict between worker struggles and the *Stato-Piano* ("State-as-Planner"). This line of interpretation is correct only in as much as it is a partial affirmation. Today we must complete it: the "economic" struggle is, to the very core, *political* (the vehicle, that is, of concrete anti-State consequences); it is *not, however, revolutionary* (the vehicle, that is, of resolute steps toward destructuring the system). Its limitation, in fact, is that it reveals itself, *in every case*, under the domination of money flow; that is, it does not bring up the question of the fundamental categories of political economics.

2. There is also — in addition to the *social residuality* — a *political residuality*. *Residual* is the ideology and the line of action of the "opposition," with its squalid, minimalistic, parasitic and subaltern dialectic.

Even the *militant line of action* can become *residual* — if it does not exert itself toward a radical re-qualification of things. Here we could define the general limitation of the militant line of action: *just as wage has de-stabilized the economic "model," but not broken down the structure of the social form of capitalism* — so too, *the armed struggle, in itself, de-stabilizes the regime, but does not break down the structure of the system*. The risks for deterioration of the militant line of action are, however, two: on the one hand, by becoming "routine" and *endemic*, it may be reduced to a "deviant social" phenomenon; on the other hand, it may be set forth as war, as if a civil war were actually going on. In either case, that "middle point" is missing — where the specific phases of the problem are understood — that point which we can call *armed politics*.

III/1 Videophoto: Seth Tillet



In the Beginning was Gramsci

Henri Weber

The following text represents a "classical" critique of the Italian Communist Party, i.e. a critique addressed to the ICP from within the tradition of the Worker's Movement.

I. THE ITALIAN STATE

According to a running joke in the Italian left, Italy is the world's first country to realize Marx's prediction: the State has perished and civil society is none the worse for its demise.

This is, of course, merely a joke. The State in Italy continues to be fine, fit and even further fortified. But contrary to the French State, which has long been unified and centralized, the Italian State has for but a century encompassed the many-thousand-headed populations, so rich in traditions and history. As Longanesi explained, "Italy is a collection of families, not a State." And Didier Motchane properly underlines this ponderously important fact: "It is not the State which fashioned the Italian conscience but rather the Church, or better still, that social, mental, and political institution which is Italian Catholicism. . . . The State, that ideological axis of French conscience. . . was never, neither as institution nor as concept, the foundation and the guarantee of social order in Italy."¹

The historical debility of the Italian State vividly explains the considerable importance of certain survivors and archaisms, especially that of the patronage or clientage system; as did the masters and patriarchs of old, the new notaries (the functionary, the entrepreneur, the priest, the secretary of the Italian Communist

Party), all those who in any way partake of an iota of power, establish lines from the obliger to the obliged with their "base," a relation of personal protection-subordination, doubling and transcending administrative-legal relations. From this propensity towards patronage, the Christian Democratic Party forged a system of government: the Civil Service is glutted with its proteges, having obtained their positions in payment for services rendered and in token of political fidelity. Even in the rare case in which these posts correspond to a real service, the promised clients regard their job as an annuity more than as an apostolate. . . Thus occurs the paradox of an under-administered county with a behemoth bureaucracy, and a degree of unparalleled interpenetration between the ruling party and the State machinery. The inefficacy, the formalism, the parasitism, the corruption of this bureaucracy of the Italian State are the object of constant denunciation. A fraction of the upper middle class view the contrast between the progress of Italian economy and the archaic state of the State structures as the principal contradiction of modern Italy, the basis of *malgoverno*.

In control for thirty years, the Christian Democratic Party is frayed to the wire, lacking in both imagination and resources, paralyzed by clan warfare, and above all concerned with survival and thus directing towards that end a politics that daily sinks the country further into crisis.

Afflicted with an inefficient and expanding bureaucracy, filled with a demoralized and oft diseased political personnel, the Italian State is also ruled by one of the most parliamentary Constitutions of Europe — proportional representation, preeminence of legislative power over executive power, and provincial and regional decentralization.

Even more than with France's Third and Fourth Republics, these institutions carry a political impact of great importance to the petty bourgeois and the working class. As long as the Christian Democrats easily imposed their ideology on the masses, as long as the economic expansion permitted the financing of a "consensus"; as long as the Cold War and the division of the labor movement kept the workers in line, the strong parliamentary representation of petty bourgeois and working class interests counted for little. But with the emerging crisis in the clerical ideology (for example the referendum on divorce or the abortion legislation), the end of the long period of economic expansion, the radicalization of the popular masses, the parliamentary nature of the regime constitutes an additional critical factor for the ruling class.

The existent institutions, whose democratic content was restored and extended in the whirlwinds of "rampant May," in no way favor a capitalist solution to the crisis: such a solution would severely injure the interests of the middle classes as well as those of the working class. The felt presence of these factions at the center of the elected assemblies effectively precludes this perspective.

The Italian political crisis is developing in the context of an ideological crisis so profound that the ruling clerical-liberal ideology is further alienated from the conditions and modes of existence created by the wave of industrialization from the years 1950-1970.

The combination of all of these elements in the context of an economic crisis so severe that Italy could not even count on its exports for help, ignites a crisis in the Italian State that verges on paralysis: power declares itself unable to master the situation: the rate of inflation reaches 3% per month (26% per year); the lire experiences free fall; the imbalance in the balance of payments continues to dive; unemployment attacks two million workers, not yet counting the "under-employed." Capital interests take flight in all directions, the postal and public services function poorly if at all, the trains are not on time, a mysterious disease strikes at all small change. . . The citizens feel each day that they are entering deeper into an inextricable chaos. The ruling class appears involved in an irreversible collapse. The labor movement, under the aristocratic mien of Berlinguer, appears as the last recourse.

II. THE STRATEGY OF "EURO-COMMUNISM"

NATIONAL-COMMUNISM

Thus, a period of social destabilization inaugurated in 1968 by the so-called "rupture of all balances of system" present all the fundamental characteristics of a pre-revolutionary situation. On at least two occasions, in 1968-9 and 1975-6, this pre-revolutionary set-up coalesced into an acute crisis, capable of deepening into an irrevocable division of power if a significant fraction of the labor movement had acted appropriately. Unfortunately, in both cases, the Italian Communist Party (the I.C.P.) placed all of its political clout behind the stabilization of the system. As with the pre-1914 Social-Democratic party in Germany, it had simultaneously offered a platform for expression and national centralization to the resurgent working-class, partially adapting itself to their aspirations, as it channeled this surge into the goals of rationalization of the established order. Its reformist politics appeared as the surest support for the declining power of the bourgeoisie.

In the light of the Italian example, the I.C.P.'s own proposal can be reversed to read: it is not true that the bourgeois democracies of western Europe are invulnerable to revolutionary crises. It is precisely the strategy of the I.C.P., the line of "historical compromise," which impedes the development of pre-revolutionary situations into characteristic revolutionary ones (situations of split power).

Of all the Communist parties of western Europe, the I.C.P. pushed first and furthest the movement for autonomy as regards the State Party of the U.S.S.R. Not a week passes without *Unita* denouncing the repressive or arbitrary acts of the Eastern countries, and the Party itself is involved in a tremendous public debate concerning the bases for the "authoritarian degeneration" of the socialist countries and the means to avoid its repetition in the West.

Unlike the French Communist Party, this autonomization does not stop at the repudiation of the lapses of "socialist legality," for it is beginning to assert itself as well in international affairs, as seen by the I.C.P.'s stance towards Europe. For example, in Berlinguer's astonishing interview with *Corriere della Sera*, during the electoral campaign of June 1976, Italy's membership in NATO is presented not as irreversible misfortune but as a guarantee against the onslaught of Russian tanks in the event of a "Roman spring."

If Stalinist parties are national Communist parties absolutely subordinated to the ideological, political, material and organizational purpose and practice of the Soviet bureaucracy; parties which because of their subordination value foremost the defense of the interests of the Soviet State, as conceived by the secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; then clearly the I.C.P., for all the Stalinist elements heldover from its past, is not Stalinist.

As regards the Soviet Union, autonomization is adaptation to both the national bourgeoisie and to its State: at the heart of Italian society, the I.C.P. assumes a function analogous to that of the German Social-Democrats prior to 1914. As a bureaucratic labor party it tries to rationalize instead of revolutionize the existing society. According to Rossana Rossanda, its ambition is "to transform all of Italy into Emilia-Romagna," that is, into a society jointly directed by the labor movement and the bourgeoisie, within the confines of the present framework.

The I.C.P.'s destalinization thus resembles the process of social-democratization: if the Communist bureaucracy has long assumed principally a function of mediation between the interests of the Italian working class and those of the Soviet bureaucracy (to the benefit of the latter), it hereafter assumes a function of mediation between the interests of the working class and those of the bourgeois State.

No longer Stalinist and not yet (if ever) Social-Democratic, the I.C.P. appears as a workers-reformist party with Stalinist origins: a national Communist party.

Its strategy reflects the specificity of its relations to the ruling class, the bourgeois State and the masses.

IN THE BEGINNING WAS GRAMSCI

To establish its concept of the "Italian road to socialism," the I.C.P. appeals to the authority of Gramsci, for in the *Prison Diaries* he underlines the specificity of the revolution in the West as differentiated from the Russian October revolution.

This difference is based on the difference among social structures and political superstructures. In the West, capitalist development engenders a complex social stratification and organization particular to power: the ruling class reigns primarily through consent rather than coercion. Its power does not materialize in an autocratic State that overhangs and mixes a barely structured society but rather in a democratic State that rests on a dense network of social institutions. The Western State is not the singular locus of all power but "an advance trench behind which stands an active line of fortresses and casemates." While in the East it may be possible to conquer and destroy the State by means of a revolutionary explosion of the masses, in the West, this conquest first involves the conquest of the "casemates" and "fortresses" on which the State rests and which represent the real defenses at the heart of bourgeois society.

The socialist revolution is envisioned as a slow process of the working class's assumption of hegemony after a protracted "war of positions" in which the "casemates" and "fortresses" are besieged and overthrown one by one: the intervention of the workers' movement at the heart of institutions, recognized by ever increasing doses of "socialist elements" in the economy and society.

As the Italian communists readily admit, this entails a manifest revision of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the democratic bourgeois State: the representative bourgeois democracy, no longer simply the political regime most favorable to the development of class conscience and workers' organizations, is also the regime under which the transition to socialism can come about by means of a series of modifications.

At that point, the threshold is crossed and the social realities change: political democracy ceases to be formal and becomes real. The ruling mode of production ceases to be capitalist and becomes socialist. The quantity of "socialist elements" progressively injected into society is transformed in quality.

THE HISTORICAL COMPROMISE

According to Enrico Berlinguer, "The strategy of reform can advance only if it is supported by a strategy of alliances, which constitute the decisive condition; for if the alliances of the working class are restricted and if the social base of the ruling groups expands, the very realization of reforms, before or after, will be impossible and the whole political situation will rebound into a total reversal."



The accord with the Social-Democratic leadership is indispensable if the collective action is to attain its widest scope. The dynamics of the struggle which the united proletarian front continually invokes forces the reformist masses to the left and allows for the ultimate obviation of the earlier agreements.

Just as simple denunciation cannot destroy the Social-Democrats' grip on its organized masses, diatribe and confrontation do not affect the Social-Democrats' hold over the Catholic masses. Once again one must follow in the footsteps of the United Front and promote the unified action of socialist, communist and Catholic workers. This assumes an accord among the organizations, the conclusion to which—the Historical Compromise—firmly anchors the Catholic workers in the left, favors the development of their class conscience, and enhances their receptivity to the I.C.P.'s logic. Finally, it exacerbates the contradictions of Christian Democrats, dispersing them into all directions, isolating their right, paralyzing the whole party in the face of the workers' initiative.

III GRANDEUR AND POVERTY OF GRADUALISM

The I.C.P.'s strategy does have the benefit of coherence. Does it embody a "creative application of Marxist theory to the conditions of western Europe," as its partisans claim? Does it define a "realistic revolutionary line" for the workers' movement? Or is it instead the most recent and sophisticated avatar of gradualist reformism, as the extreme left claims?

On four essential points, the revolutionary Marxist critique strikes home.

CONCERNING THE MISUSE OF GRAMSCI

Gramsci's view of the specificity of the revolutionary process in the West is part of a general theoretical movement, borne of the speculation of members of the Communist International concerning the failure of the revolutionary wave of 1917-1923 in Europe.

The endorsement by the 3rd and 4th International of the "United Front," in many ways constitutes a first step towards the elaboration of a specific strategy for the traditionally democratic, advanced capitalist countries. A progress which was soon interrupted by the Stalinist degeneration and then followed by massive regression.

Gramsci's contribution takes place in stride with this effort of strategic re-orientation prior to the great ice age.

This contribution properly clarifies the emphasis on the decisive importance of preparatory work for the revolutionary seizure of power; disorganization of the bourgeois hegemony; endangering of the ruling ideology; dislocation of the conservative block; penetration and, where possible, neutralization of the State machinery; affirmation of the working class and its allies as the country's potential leadership, etc. He does not examine the *revolutionary conquest* of power itself.

The proletariat's struggle for hegemony constitutes a preparation for the revolutionary rupture rather than the actual accomplishment of the revolution; it represents the condition for a victorious revolution but does not stand in for one. It opens directly onto the political-military struggle with the bourgeois State and does not avoid it. It forces the communist party to prepare itself and the masses for this confrontation and does not absolve them.

Only through some fraudulent alchemy can Gramsci appear as a theoretician of gradualism, the strategist of the peaceful road to socialism, the champion of the snail's-pace accumulation of reforms creating an economy of revolution.

THE DISCONTINUOUS CHARACTER OF THE

As with all gradualist strategies, the I.C.P. strategy presents only the weakpoints of rendering the class struggle abstract. Confronted with a full-blown popular revolt, the capitalist bourgeoisie releases its ballast, puts on airs, and avoids the waves: as the late Chairman Mao explained, they relinquish space to gain time.

Faced with the State's inability to clean up the mess in the factories, the Italian bourgeoisie reacts as do all other bourgeoisies: by the withdrawal of investments, the flight of capital, and speculation against the *lira*. Which for the workers means at least massive unemployment, galloping inflation, serial bankruptcy and general instability.

One does not need a financial Machiavelli to orchestrate this economic chaos: the capitalists, forced to respect the "laws of the market," do not invest when profit is risky and place their capital where at least a moderate profit is assured.

This "spontaneous behavior of economic factors" creates the conditions for the bourgeoisie's political counter-attack: for this it can count on the manifold cooperation of the State machinery: The I.C.P. is correct in emphasizing the importance of the Democratic thrust in Italy: the organization of the popular masses was never so widespread nor the presence of the workers' parties so palpably felt in the Parliament and the local assemblies. *But the elected assemblies are not at the core of the modern State.*

In Italy as elsewhere (though in fact a little less than anywhere else) the centralization of capital has occurred in tandem with the shift of real power from Parliament to the administration and in general towards centers of decision-making that are safe from the democracy's scrutiny.

We now turn to the second erroneous presupposition of gradualism: no more than the bourgeoisie can tolerate indefinitely an alliance of strength impeding the accumulation of capital, the working class, in its mass, cannot mobilize itself permanently around objectives as advanced as the organization of control, etc.

The "molecular process" of the constitution of the proletariat as a potential hegemonic class never represents a definitive attainment: if a period of extreme social crisis should arise, or the proletariat should fail to formulate and impose its solutions, or the initiative should revert to the ruling class, Trotsky's molecular process is reversed. Discouragement, demoralization, and scepticism seize the least advanced among the masses. Beneath the veneer of a socialist education, the "old man" sleeps, with his drives, his anxieties, his ancient values. The "Marxist" workers are not immunized against an overwhelming return of the irrational: the mystique of the State or race can subsume the socialist conscience, as occurred in Germany in 1933, Italy in 1921, and, to a lesser extent, France in 1940 and 1958.

There is no reason this involution could not occur today.



SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY

The Marxist critique of the formal character of bourgeois democracy does not stop at considerations of the inequality of social classes before the law—inequality that could be corrected by compensatory measures. Above all it is a demonstration and critique of the process by which the bourgeois State—representative democracy included—atomizes, tranquilizes, vampirizes the social body, stripping it even of the capacities for self-administration which it conceals, to concentrate all its power in its diverse mechanisms.

The realization of the principles of the proletarian democracy—effective control of elected officials sanctioned by their permanent revocability, rotation of elective functions, etc.—implies the grounding of political power in the actual collectivities: the business and the neighborhood community; enforced functional units in which people recognize each other, act and live together, and thus can really define common positions and make them stick.

For this reason between the proletarian democracy and the bourgeois democracy lies not continuity but institutional rupture. The institutions, the procedures, and the personnel who for centuries served to depoliticize society are now inadequate to the rediffusion of power throughout the social domain, for the demise of the State, the self-organization of "associated producers."

To forego this rupture in favor of the integration of parliamentary councils is to choose bourgeois parliamentarism instead of socialist democracy.

A COMPROMISING COMPROMISE

The utopianism of this strategy is reinforced by its politics of alliances. One can admit various things concerning the specificity of the Christian Democrats, its ties to the Catholic world and thus to the workers, but only with great difficulty could one claim that the Christian Democratic Party represents a "multi-class bloc," at the heart of which diverse social classes appear on the same plane.

In reality, the Christian Democrats form the political instrument par excellence of the upper bourgeoisie. As in all parliamentary democracies, this bourgeoisie strove to endow itself with a party of popular support. It did this by adapting to the traditions and prejudices of the Italian petty bourgeoisie and proletariat, that is, to Catholic traditions and prejudices. It grafted itself onto the Catholic movement through agreement and symbiosis with the clerical hierarchy. The success of this operation did not create a multi-class party, regardless of its basic heterogeneity, but a bourgeois party with a mass base. The interests which the Christian Democrats have always represented and defended are those of the major Italian capital interests. The interests of the petty bourgeois and Catholic workers are not equally represented and defended but systematically subordinated to the former, even if the Christian Democratic Party assures its popular "clients" the scraps necessary to maintain the conservative block.

Today, the aggravation of the crisis of Italian capitalism strips the Christian Democrat of his means of sedating the petty bourgeois and populist base. Patronage reached its limits and then begins to produce contradictory effects. The Christian Democratic Party has entered the age of decline; progressively, large sectors of its base are breaking and falling away.

Rather than seizing the times and actively striving to detach the Catholic masses from the Christian Democrat politicians who place them in bondage to the bourgeoisie, the I.C.P. encloses itself in a static analysis, treats its directors as the legitimate spokespeople of Catholic workers, and sees an alliance with these workers as merely a union with the party that served them until today for parliamentary representation but from which they have begun to turn.

The I.C.P.'s line of Historical Compromise, especially, is offset by a support without serious counterpart in the Christian Democratic government, at the precise moment that, under cover of an "austerity plan," that government is launching an unprecedented assault on the workers' gains.

From there to say, with the Italian extreme left, that the Historical Compromise

acts like a rejuvenating spring on the Christian Democrats, while the I.C.P. is forced to play the ignominious usurer of Italian capital, there is only one response possible, which many party militants are making at this moment.

The Christian Democratic Party is the political instrument of the Italian upper bourgeoisie. *Union with it can occur only on the lines of defending Italian capitalism against the global crisis.* It implies the subordination of workers' interests and aspirations to the imperatives of valuation of capital in an already dilapidated international context. This means the workers sacrifice without recompense other than that of remaining the working class of a capitalist country well ranked in the international division of labor.

The strategic demands created by the collapse of the Stalinist monolith, the extremity of the capitalist crisis, the striking inequivalence between neo-reformist gradualism and the revolutionary potentialities of the period require a massive work of elaboration. It is at this level, perhaps, that the European extreme left has revealed most clearly its own shortcomings. It is on this point, apparently, that it will direct its efforts.

Translated by Daniel Moshenberg

1. Didier Motchane, Preface to *Workers' Struggles in Italy* by D. Grisoni and H. Portelli.
2. Enrico Berlinguer, *Reflections on Italy after the events in Chile*. *Rinascita*, Oct. 9, 1973.
3. This is precisely the assertion of Giorgio Amendola, the secretary of the I.C.P. and a major figure of the rightwing part of the party. In a rallying piece, published in September 1976 under the suggestive rubric of "Coherence and Rigor" and presented to the Central Committee in October 1976, Amendola attacks the whimsical incoherence of the Communists leadership, and especially the unionists, who support the Christian Democratic government in Parliament while warring against it in the factories. He also lashes out at certain sectors of the working class who balk at the mention of sacrifices: "When we talk of the necessary sacrifices that the workers must agree to in order to emerge from the crisis, it would be wrong, as it happens, to view those sacrifices as 'concessions' given to the capitalists and the government or as the 'price' of some pretended communist manoeuvre to enter at all costs into the government. On the contrary, the sacrifices are necessary in order to serve primarily the interests of the working class by pulling the country out of the crisis: so that the young might find employment, for the betterment of the living conditions of the people, etc. . . . For this reason it is incorrect to demand some equivalent sacrifices in exchange for the sacrifices necessary to the effort at transformation. The counterpart is not something that the others (the government or the capitalist bourgeoisie) could concede but rather the realization of objectives that concern first of all the workers: the welfare of the country and the pursuit of its progress."

11/1 Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer takes office

11/2 Berlinguer attends funeral services for slain Aldo Moro, 1978

11/3 6/13/79 ROME: Enrico Berlinguer consulting documents shortly before the start of party directorate meeting 6/13. Communists were big losers in the Italian general elections June 3/4.



What the Communists Really Are

Censor

Who wrote this? Who is Censor? What is he trying to suggest? Is he the worst of fascists or the most extreme of communists? What are we to make of this? All we are willing to admit is that the same questions plagued the Italian press when the book from which this article is taken appeared in 1975 under the title *True Report on the Last Chance to Save Capitalism in Italy*. (Oh, we do know that Censor was found in a Situationist group where he said he was Gianfranco Sanguineti.)

From now on, they are over, those seasons of games of verbal prestige by which our political trapeze artists measured themselves in "parallel convergence" with the communists, offering them what was called the "strategy of attention," a waiting room of indefinite duration before the Historical Compromise; and which the President of the Council, the honorable Moro, defined, with such cautiousness that he was obliged to walk on eggs, as "a sort of half-way meeting, something new, which at the same time is and is not a relaxation of the roles of the majority and the opposition, taking advantage of a diversity which does not consist in a change of the forces of direction, but in the modifying addition of the communist element to others." MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING.

Among all those political leaders who for months have been revelling in high-flown words to convoke the Historical Compromise, no one has stated the principal and simplest truth on the question: that the Historical Compromise is a *compromise*, in the true sense of the term, *solely for the communists*, and absolutely not for us; for us, this accord with the communists is not even "historical" — unless you want to call historical every *tactical* action which may be found necessary to make those people work who do not want to work. But in that case, and for want of this accord, how many "historical duties" must the

police perform in front of the factories? Even the ex-Minister of Labor, the socialist Bertoldi, considered by a man from the right, Domenico Bartoli, as "a subtle interpreter of Hegelian dialectics," said it better than anyone else and once and for all: "We must decide whether we wish to govern with the unions or with the gunmen."

For that is the crux of the problem, which is political as well as economic, since, throughout the last few years, we would have gained a lot in the currency exchange if we had been able to use three times fewer gunmen, but three times more union men. Alberto Ronchey, who is by far the best Italian editorialist, recently wrote that henceforth the greatest economic problem is to convince people to work, and that is true. At present it is no longer possible to let things go while always hoping that the workers will delay their smoldering revolt "a little while longer," or that our industry will get a new breath of life and regain its vigor although clamoring anarchy reigns in our factories, and all this while Italy throws out, one after the other, its governments which last only a few months; governments which, moreover, are constantly and solely engaged in the titanic effort to stay in place a little bit longer than what seems possible to them, dismissing all questions, even the smallest ones, because they would be enough to make the government fall!

And who better than the communists can today institute a period of convalescence in the country, during which the workers will have to stop fighting and resume working? Who, better than a Minister of the Interior like Giorgio Amendola, could weed out the delinquency which has spread to every level, and make the agitators shut up, by good methods, or not so good ones? We must undertake long-term governmental action, and to do so we must have a solid and resolute government: not accepting a "compromise" like that in question today in reality signifies fatally compromising, for ourselves, the very existence of tomorrows. Let us remember that neutrality, in such an affair, is the daughter of irresolution, and that "*Irresolute princes, in order to flee present perils, most often follow this neutral path, and most often collapse.*" (*Macchiavelli*) In order not to see the real peril, we pretend to see an accord with the P.C.I. as a peril, and we flee them both.

Fearful minds may perhaps find in our proposals, even if they have to admit they are otherwise correct and useful, the slight defect that they appear precisely to underplay the perilous character which could afterward arise from the fact of having placed a communist party in the heart of political power, at a certain stage of crisis where our powers prove incapable of making the workers work. *Quis custodiat custodes ipsos?* ("Who will guard the guards themselves?")

We would answer that the objection is unfounded and that fear is a poor counselor. First of all, we should never fear future and hypothetical perils at the instant we are dying from a present and certain danger; and furthermore, we should never risk all our fortune without having risked all our forces. Since the present force of the Communist Party and the unions is already serving us and indeed proves to have been our principal support since Autumn, 1969, and since its effect has, however, remained until now quite insufficient to reverse the process, our interest is doubtless to *galvanize* that force with all urgency, by offering it the most central of all application points in society, that is, by introducing it into the center of State power.

Moreover, the supposed future perils of this communist participation in the government, these perils, we insist, do not exist anywhere but in the very sphere of these illusions about the revolutionary tendency constituted in our society by the Communist Party; artificially wide-spread illusions in an era, henceforth concluded, when they were useful for the defense of a world which today, times having changed, needs to be defended with the assistance of those same communists. Only our present government people, aspiring, despite their unfortunate bankruptcy, to the autonomization of their own existence as simple delegates of Italian society to its State administration, still pretend to consider as a real given

of strategic reasoning what — that supposed revolutionary tendency of the PCI — has never been anything other than an ideological "article of export" destined for the people. Which makes these worn-out leaders fall under this severe condemnation: what they in fact want, when they cling to their old specialization, while a necessary modernization imposes their "recycling," is not even to prolong, for their own limited interests, the apparent existence of the profession they still know how to operate, but indeed the existence of a profession they did not know how to operate.

The Trojan Horse is not to be feared except when there are Greeks inside it. The Communist Party has assumed, and must even assume again, a certain costume to disguise itself as an enemy of our City, but it is not an enemy of our City; just as it is not directed by Ulysses. The Italian communist instead resembles that carpenter in a lion's mask in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, who must let "half his face be seen through the lion's neck," and who must say to the spectators: "I would entreat you, not to fear, not to tremble: my life for yours. If you think I come hither as a lion, it were pity of my life: no, I am no such thing. . . ."

And precisely because we dare to admit that Italian workers, who have sworn to the offensive of social war, are our enemies, we know that the Communist Party is our support. We can no longer continue to reassure the country while pretending the opposite, because we have reached the hour of truth, when lies are no longer any use to us, only force is.

Whatever the case may be, let us not go so far as to forget that our parliamentary majority has for a long time already been based on the communist opposition, and that the communist opposition opposes the same things the majority opposes; and, however, the entire political life of the country is as though paralyzed before the nightmare that the idea, for the Christian-Democrats, of ceding a few ministries to the communists seems to be. Up until a recent period, this Christian-Democratic attitude found its semi-rational justification in the necessity of maintaining the monopoly of power so as to continue to hide the way that power had been administered, and some particular facts so scandalous that, if they had been known, would have brought about the immediate collapse of the party; but now that those facts have little by little come to be known throughout the country, even this last justification is void. And it is the collapse of Italy that we must try to avoid, if we can.

And furthermore, let us ask the question, *what is the alternative* of which the Historical Compromise is one of the terms? The other term can be presented thusly: sooner or later we will reach a situation in which neither the communists, nor the unions, nor the forces of order, nor the secret services will be able to manage to hold back the workers from the brink of a general insurrection, all of whose consequences cannot easily be foreseen. If, in the best hypothesis — and we can only see two —, this insurrection does not become a civil war pure and simple, that is, if the communists succeed, in a second attempt, in taking the reins, by first seeming to participate in it so as later to assume command, it is evident that in such a situation it will be up to Berlinguer to impose his conditions, and he will not be disposed to share the government with us; but, rather, on the impetus of the insurrectional movement, the communists will take over the State, in the name of the workers, to whom they will then appeal to defend it. And if, on the contrary, as seems more likely to us, the credibility of the Communist Party with the workers is found to be completely exhausted at the time of this insurrection, which is only all too foreseeable, in such a way that the communist action of "recovery" of the insurgents into the very ranks of the party proves useless or impossible, then civil war will no longer be avoidable, and the Communist Party, amputated from its base, which will inevitably unite with the revolutionaries, will no longer be of any use to us. Those are the two variants that form an alternative with the Historical Compromise; *tertium non datur*. ("the third is excluded").

Finally let us conclude. With the help of the Communist Party in the government, either we will succeed in saving our domination, or we will not succeed. If we suc-

ceed, we will throw out the communists, at the same time as a large portion of the present political personnel, like servants, with the greatest of ease. The communists themselves already openly admit this as an article of their contract of cooperation; and since Heraclitus, we know that "all that crawls on the earth is governed by blows." And if we do not succeed, nothing else matters anymore; because everyone would admit that it would be the worst of Byzantine discussions, at the time when the Turk is on the ramparts, to guess which trophies might have been won in the Green and Blue circus, in a world which will have crumbled.

Translated by Richard Gardner

ii/1 Photo: D. Cortez



The State of Spectacle

Guy Debord

This text, written by one of the leaders of the International Situationists, was published as an Introduction to the 4th Italian edition of his book, *The Society of Spectacle*.

It was up to the society of spectacles to add just what I think this book didn't need: more weighty and convincing proofs and examples. We have seen the falsification getting thicker, descending to the fabrication of the most trivial things, like a sticky fog which accumulates at the ground level of all daily life. We have seen a striving for the absolute — as far as "telematic" madness — in the technical and police control of men and natural forces; a control whose errors grow as fast as its methods. We have seen the State lie, develop in itself and for itself, having so completely forgotten its conflicting links with truth and verisimilitude that the very connections themselves can be dropped and replaced from hour to hour. In the recent events surrounding the kidnapping and execution of Aldo Moro, Italy had occasion to reflect upon this technique at its most highly developed point, which, however, will soon be surpassed, either here or elsewhere. The version given by Italian authorities, made worse rather than better by a hundred successive touch-ups, which all commentators have made it their duty to admit in public, has not been believable for one instant. It was not intended to be believed, but to sit alone in a display window, to be forgotten afterwards, exactly like a bad book.

It was a mythological opera with great machinations, where terrorist heroes quick-

ly change into foxes to take prey from traps, into lions who fear no one for as long as they keep their prey, and into sheep so as not to cause the slightest harmful effect to the regime which they pretend to defy. They tell us that they are lucky to be dealing with the most incompetent of police forces, and that, besides, they have been able to infiltrate the highest ranks without a problem. But this explanation is hardly dialectical. A seditious organization that would put some of its members in contact with the State security forces, unless it had infiltrated agents years before in order to make sure of their loyalty when the occasion for their use arose, should expect that sometimes its manipulators be themselves manipulated. Thus they would be deprived of that olympic assurance of impunity which characterizes the Red Brigade's chief of staff. But the Italian State goes further, with the unanimous approval of those who uphold it. Like any other State, it thought of infiltrating agents of its special forces into clandestine terrorist networks, where they could then be assured of a swift and easy passage up to the leadership, first by getting rid of their superiors in the manner of Malinowski, who fooled even the shrewd Lenin for the sake of the tsarist Okrana, or like Azev, who, once at the head of the "combat organization" of the revolutionary socialist party, pushed his mastery to the point of having the prime minister Stoly Pine himself assassinated. A single unfortunate coincidence came to hinder the good will of the State: its special forces were just then dissolved. But a secret service until now has never been dissolved in the manner of, say, a petroleum tanker's cargo in coastal waters, or a portion of modern industrial production in Seveso. By maintaining its records, its stool pigeons, its working operatives, it simply changed its name. Thus in Italy the S.I.M., or Service of Military Information from the fascist regime, famous for its sabotages and its foreign assassinations, became the S.I.D., or Service of Defense Information under the Christian-Democratic regime. Moreover, when a kind of robot doctrine of the Red Brigade was programmed on a computer, dismal caricature of what one might have thought and done if one had wanted to advocate the disappearance of the State, a slip of the computer — so true is it that these machines depend on the unconscious of those who feed in information — caused the same acronym S.I.M., this time designating the "International Society of Multinationals," to be attributed to the single pseudo-concept repeated automatically by the Red Brigade. This S.I.D., "bathed in Italian blood," must have been dissolved recently because, as the State avows *post festum*, it was the one which since 1969 committed, most often but not always by bombing, that long series of massacres which were attributed, according to the season, to anarchist, neo-fascist, or situationist. Now that the Red Brigade does exactly the same work and for once at least with an operational efficiency which is quite superior, obviously S.I.D. can not combat it, since it is dissolved. In a secret service worthy of its name, its very dissolution is secret. One cannot tell therefore what proportion of the total force was allowed an honorable retirement, what was allotted to the Red Brigade, or perhaps loaned to the Shah of Iran to burn a movie theater in Abadan, and what was discreetly exterminated by a State probably indignant to learn that its instructions were sometimes surpassed. In point of fact we know that the State will never hesitate to kill Brutus' sons to have its own laws respected, since its intransigent refusal to envisage even the most minimal concession to save Moro finally proved that he had all the firm virtues of republican Rome.

Italian capitalism and the government bureaucracy are quite divided on the use of the Stalinists, a vital but highly uncertain question. Certain modern sectors of large private capital are or were resolutely in favor of them; others, supported by many who manage the capital of State supported businesses, are more hostile. Highly ranked State personnel have a wide manoeuvring autonomy, since the decisions of the captain surpass those of the owner when the ship is sinking, but they themselves are divided in opinion. The future of each clique depends on the manner in which it will be able to impose its reasons, by proving them in practice. Moro believed in the Historical Compromise, that is to say, in the capacity of the Stalinists to finally break up the movement of revolutionary workers. Another tendency, the one that is at this moment in a position to command the attention of the commanders of the Red Brigade did not believe in it; or at least deemed that the Stalinists, for the few services that they could render, and that they will

render in any case, should not be spared, that it is necessary to beat them harder so that they do not become too insolent. We saw that this analysis was not without value since, with Moro kidnapped as an inaugural affront to the Historical Compromise finally made authentic by an act of parliament, the Stalinist party continued to pretend to believe in the independence of the Red Brigade. They kept the prisoner alive as long as they thought they could prolong the humiliation and discomfort of the friends, who had to submit to blackmail while pretending nobly not to understand what these unknown barbarians expected of them. The affair ended anyway as soon as the Stalinists showed their teeth, publicly alluding to obscure manoeuvres and Moro died deceived. But actually, the Red Brigade has another function, of more general interest, which is to disconcert or discredit proletarians who really rise against the State, and perhaps to one day eliminate some of the more dangerous. This function the Stalinists approve, since it helps them in their difficult task. The side injurious to them is restrained by insinuations cryptically made in public at crucial moments, and by precise threats voiced in their constant negotiations in private with the State power. Their arm of dissuasion is that they could suddenly tell all that they know about the Red Brigade from its inception. But no one is ignorant of the fact that they could not use this weapon without breaking the Historical Compromise, and therefore they hope sincerely that they can remain as discreet on this subject as they were about the doings of the S.I.D. in its time. What would become of the Stalinists in a revolution? We continue to upset them, but not too much. When, ten months after the kidnapping of Moro, the same invincible Red Brigade knocks down a trade-union Stalinist for the first time, the so called Communist Party reacts soon after, but only in the realm of protocol, by threatening its allies to force them thereafter to designate it as a party, always loyal and constructive certainly, but which will be beside the majority and no longer on the side of the majority.

The keg always smells of herring and a Stalinist will always be in his element wherever one smells an odor of secret crime in the State. Why should they be offended by the atmosphere of discussion at the top of the Italian State, with a knife up their sleeves and a bomb under the table? Was it not in the same style that they took care of differences among themselves, for example, in the cases of Khrushchev and Beria, Kadar and Nagy, Mao and Lin Piao? And besides, the directors of the Italian Stalinist movement became butchers in their youth at the time of their first Historical Compromise, when they were charged with the other employees of "Komintern" with counter-revolution at the service of the Democratic Spanish Republic in 1937. It was then that their own Red Brigade kidnapped Andres Nin and killed him in another secret prison.

A number of Italians are very familiar with this sad evidence, and many more found out about it right away. But it has not been published anywhere; the former have no reason to, while the latter lack the means. At this stage in the analysis there are grounds for evoking a "spectacular" politics of terrorism, and not, as is repeated by so many journalists and professors with the finesse of the hireling, because terrorists are sometimes moved by the desire to make us speak of them. Italy epitomizes the social contradictions of the whole world, and tries, in a manner we are familiar with, to amalgamate in a single country the repressive Holy Alliance of class power, bureaucratic-totalitarian and bourgeois, which already functions openly across the face of the earth in an economic and police State solidarity; although, of course, not without some discussion and settling of accounts in the Italian manner. As the most advanced country at the moment in its slide toward a proletarian revolution, Italy is also the most modern sort of laboratory for international counter-revolution. Other governments coming out of the old bourgeois democracy, "pre-spectacular" in nature, look on with admiration at the Italian government for the impassiveness which it can maintain at the tumultuous center of its degradation, and for the calm dignity with which it sits in the mud. It is a lesson which they will have to apply in their own countries for a long time to come.

Translated by Wendy Greenberg & John Johnston

ii/1 ROP-041906-4/19/78-DUCHESS LAKE, Italy: An army skier probes a hole in the ice covering Duchess Lake with his ski pole 4/19 after detonation squads blasted the frozen lake. Frogmen are dragging the lake where the Red Brigades gang say they dumped the body of ex-Premier Aldo Moro after his "execution". (UPI) (ITALY)



Lama Sabachthani

On February 17, 1977, Luciano Lama, the Communist union leader entered the occupied Rome University to "lecture" the students. He was—none too gloriously—driven off the campus. This is an eye-witness account of the event which broke open the deep-rooted conflict between the "new left" and the Italian Communist Party.

It was the morning of Thursday February 17, 1977. The University campus had been occupied for over a week by students, the unemployed, the comrades. The tall, severe-looking buildings, with their Fascist architecture, had been transformed. The white facade of the Faculty of Letters was covered with slogans and writings. One, which was vertical and many yards high, warned the capitalists and revisionists that they would be "buried by a burst of laughter". It was signed "Godere Operalo" ("Workers' Joy") and "Godimento Studentesco" (Students' Enjoyment)—a pun on the old Potere Operalo ("Workers' Power") and Movimento Studentesco ("Student Movement"). These writings were the work of the Metropolitan Indians, a non-organised cultural movement of young comrades, who turned their biting wit and sarcasm on the Government, the Communist Party, and even on revolutionary "leader-figures" who tried to assert their dominance over the mass. The quality of this new revolutionary movement was, in fact, that the mass refused to be led in the traditional style, from above. It was, to a great extent, self-directing and self-organising.

During the days and nights of the occupation, the entire University seemed to be a continuous people's party and people's forum. There were continuing and endless debates in the various commissions (the counter-information commission, the factory-and-community commission, the teaching-methods commission, the

women's commission). There were also the (often stormy) general assemblies, where the Movement decided its policies.

All the gates to the Campus were guarded by comrades, who took it in turns, and everyone who entered was frisked and scrutinised, to guard against provocateurs.

The Government and the ICP decided to send Luciano Lama in.

The day before, the Movement's General Assembly had voted to allow Lama to come in, and to avoid physical violence, but to defeat him "politically" (ie drown him out by booing, whistling, etc).

Lama came in at about 9 am, on a truck which was to be his platform; it was equipped with a powerful loudspeaker system. He was accompanied by his 200 ICP heavies (with Trade Union "stewards" cards pinned to their jackets) and about 2,000 reps. and workers, hastily called to the University by the Unions, to "liberate it from the Fascists".

In the large open area of the Campus where he was to speak, Lama found another platform already rigged up, with a dummy of himself on it (complete with his famous pipe). There was a big red cut-out of a Valentine's heart, with a slogan punning his name—"Nessuno L'Amo" (Lama Nobody . . . or Nobody Loves Him). Around this platform there was a band of Metropolitan Indians. As Lama started to speak, they began chanting: "Sacrifices, Sacrifices, We Want Sacrifices!" (a parody of the State's economic policy upheld by the Communist Party). "Build us More Churches and Fewer Houses!" (Italy has more churches than any other European country, and a chronic housing shortage). "We demand to work harder and earn less!"

This irony aggravated the humourless ICP heavies. About 10,000 comrades and students gathered. The Autonomists started to put on their masks.

It would be hard to say which side threw the first stone. Certainly there was pushing and shoving and exchanges of insults which led up to it. Violence soon broke out. Bricks, stones and bottles flew through the air. Some Communist Party members received treatment (the non-ICP wounded could not go to hospital for fear of arrest).

The vast majority of those present, both workers and students, did not take part in the fighting. They stood around in groups. I met some reps. from an engineering factory. One said that Lama was "asking for it" He had come to the University to 'pour water on the fire'. Another rep. corrected him: 'Not water—gas!' Other workers were complaining that the Unions had been very high-handed in ringing them up and telling them to come to the University, without any explanation or discussion. A cleaning lady, who worked at the University Teaching Hospital (a badly paid and overworked category; also an Autonomist stronghold) was heard to say: "They ought to shoot him in the mouth!"

A woman, a member of the Communist Party, told me: "These Autonomists really are Fascists—they have beaten up *workers* (ie ICP heavies), and that I can't accept."

After an hour or so, Lama and the heavies retreated outside the University, and all the windows of his truck were smashed. Insults were exchanged over the railings, with each side calling the other: "Fascists! Fascists!" (This is a deadly insult on the Italian Left, and will usually start a fight).

During the afternoon, the riot-police moved into the Campus, and cleared out all the occupiers—who left by a secondary entrance. About 1,000 Communist Party militants stood outside and clapped and cheered. The following day, a young ICP lecturer in sociology at the University remarked: The police were right to clear the University. There weren't any real students in there, only hippies, queers and people from the slum-districts".

The operation was dubbed "Little Prague" by the students.

Painted Politics

Maurizio Torealta

In the Spring of '77, in the midst of violent demonstrations, nihilistic happenings were staged in various cities, especially Bologna and Rome. Their existence was short-lived but the inventiveness of the Metropolitan Indians, their diffidence of radical rhetoric, their use of simulation and parody as political weapons were not forgotten by the Movement.

The term "Metropolitan Indians" is an invented one. The press describes them as the illegitimate child of a clandestine mother and a traditional Marxist father. The detailed physical description presents them with marks painted on their faces as a group whose decisions are not very trustworthy (more than once they have made arrangements for demonstrations that never occurred) and which is unable to participate in public assemblies with sensible speeches. The press conceals the fact that they habitually break into shops and appropriate useless goods (record albums, liquor, sports clothes). They also frequently appear at the most elegant movie theaters in groups of about thirty people, naturally after visiting the most expensive restaurants where they obviously did not pay.

The press often prefers to occupy itself with the marks on the group's faces, with their songs and dances, with their paradoxical slogans, relegating the "expropriations" to the "semi-clandestine independents" who are on the verge of acquiring the clandestine character of the Bunker.

The press has good reason to invent differences and to be concerned. Whoever paints his face taking the marks as an arbitrary characterization of a future people; whoever appropriates in an exhaustive way all possible terms and treats language as a science of imaginary solutions; whoever refuses to explain himself

and, despite this omission, doesn't stop robbing, nor in fact engages in any collective practice — such a person is the agent of subversions which have great significance. Every element in the subversion of a system must be of a superior logical order.

Let us try to get an overview of the scene. The industry involved in the transmission and elaboration of signs is ranked third in the world on the basis of sales. Consider a hypothesis: the diffusion of the sign as the general equivalent of all things and the transfer of the productive intelligence to machines may involve some radical innovations in the social forms of language and thought and in the forms of legal and juridical control. Consider this further hypothesis: the creation of a social intelligence which has been rendered useless and polyvalent may have given rise to the social possibility of simulation or, better, to the production of signs beyond the laws governing property and the forms of control incarnated in signs.

We are convinced that this entire situation is connected with the development of the unforeseen, absurd and paradoxical behavior that is improperly called "the phenomenon of the Metropolitan Indians."

Since all the "real contents" (the referents of production, affect, signification) that ballasted the sign with a kind of useful force of gravity are no longer effectively communicated, the signs are now exchanged among themselves without any commerce with some object in reality. For a social subject, on the other hand, a subject that is diffuse and forced into a relation with fluctuating and indeterminate wages (and the question of wages, by definition, is the general referent of all signs), the "pangs of conscience" and discourses on "political economy" are completely useless; one can not struggle against transience and dispersion with the blows of purpose and conscience.

Thus the social conditions of simulation and of the arbitrary come into being: there arises a social subject that is not reducible to one precise identity, that arbitrarily invents one for itself and at the same time hangs on the thin thread of its own precarious language, suspended between absolute power and total absurdity, waiting without fear for some other determination of identity at its ineluctable opening: that of derision.

If we investigate this development, moving from the March, 1977 demonstrations to an interpretive model which succeeds in comprehending them, it will not be difficult for us to trace this semantic openmindedness, these mechanisms of simulation, to the highest levels of formal languages. The nonsense argument is the basis of logical, mathematical reasoning and the constitutive model of music and the game as well. The analysis and introduction of transgressive and uncontrollable variables into collective systems (which are fictional and sympathetic) form part of every good project in the industry of the spectacle.

We hypothesize, then, the coming of an era which replaces the bearers of truth divided unions, political groups with their identifying signs and their banners) with intelligence and shrewdness. This era will be based on the social possibilities of falsehood, on the technological possibilities resulting from the destruction of rules, on the free exchange of products, simulation, the game, the nonsense argument, the dream, music.

If we now want to retrace the steps that legitimize this hypothesis in the events which have already occurred, we must relate a few scenes, as in a film, even if we all know that the best gags can not be related. Let us begin with a title: "COSSINO ASSASSIGA." This slogan was written in Campo dei Fiori, and it attributes the epithet "murderer" (assassino) to Cossiga, the Minister of the Interior. Yet what is anathema here is not the insult, but the anagram. Saussure was right: political economy has its own discourse, and the very mutation that strikes linguistic signs when they lose their referential status also strikes the categories of political economy; the same process occurs in both directions. In writing, an

anagrammatic sign has dispensed with order: the poetic pleasure comes directly from violating the fundamental laws of human language, from subverting the discipline of their valorization. The anagram in this case is the mark of an antagonistic form, a language without expression, now beyond laws and the purposes that linguistics assigns it.

But let us leave the explanation of this anagrammatic title to describe a few scenes which, in their balanced dimensionality and inexplicable silence, allude to feelings so violent that they brush against certainty (as happens in every well-made film).

Imagine the University of Rome, always seen from above, with a periphery wall that detaches it from the neighborhood of San Lorenzo and emphatically characterizes it as a place delegated for institutional functions. Imagine the entrance to the paths that consolidate the power of a huge truck, a portable place delegated for whoever has pretensions to speak, even in unknown languages; in fact, the truck is equipped with powerful loud-speakers, and it is followed by hundreds of union members enlisted to maintain law and order: it is the day for the meeting of the CGL's secretary general¹ at the University of Rome.

War is always anticipated by the visual function of the parade; in fact, war is the coherent development of the parade. In our case, the action was the introduction of "the union line at the university" — terms that are perhaps careless, but undoubtedly consistent.

It is again at the semantic level that the group's provocation organizes the encounter: the dancing Metropolitan Indians actually carry a hanged puppet of the union secretary dangling before them like a destroyed image, and this action unleashes the anger of the union's law-and-order guard. The escalation of weapons is rather singular: the Metropolitan Indians throw bags filled with water; the unionists respond with the sprays of fire extinguishers. The Indians charge, dispersing and terrorizing the union apparatus, literally destroying everything; but they do not take over the platform on the truck, and they do not seize the microphone.

This day will long be remembered in Italian political history; from that day will gush rivers of speeches on the new needs of the youthful strata of the population; on that day hundreds of self-critical and remorseful discourses will be made, yet only the Metropolitan Indians will remain silent.

Many other things happened, the most important of which were the attacks on the armories in March (to steal not merely guns, but tennis racquets and fishing rods as well), the very violent clashes with the crowd, the arrests, and the armed interventions. But the second important scene is not the battle. It lies precisely in the place of discourse.

Every place delegated for political discourse has a structure that is quite similar to the Panopticon described by Michel Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*. Such places are designed with a central point situated to maintain the least distance from the other points and, at all events, to preserve the power of controlling with one's gaze every other point of the place in which one is positioned. It is generally a question of high platforms (such as the truck mentioned earlier), located in circular places (squares or halls with sloping tiers of seats).

In September, the Movement of 77² or, if you prefer, the Metropolitan Indians launched a mass meeting in the city of Bologna. More than a hundred thousand people responded to the call. The second part of our screenplay on the Metropolitan Indians is concerned with analyzing the structure of this scene with the hundred thousand extras.

The disposition of men and things is always the result of strategies for war and control. Most European cities maintain the architectonic structure of military

camp and medieval fortresses.

At the meeting in September against repression, there was a superimposition of two groups of people and two different cities of language. One part of the Movement chose as its own territory a circular location with sloping seats that surrounded a central platform. It was a sports arena, a place designated for athletic (*agonistiche*) events (*agonism* etymologically derives from *agon*, the war song that Greek combatants sang dedicating themselves to death.) This part of the Movement, about 8000 people, was divided and clashed among themselves, smashing chairs over one another's heads and failing to arrive at any solution (generally, a political solution is represented by a written motion approved by a majority). Another part of the Movement, the majority, entered the city, sleeping anywhere in the streets, under porticoes, creating an enormous curtain, exploiting a few upright sculptures in a small square, conveying furniture and chairs outdoors, conducting discussions and seminars in thousands of small groups, passing out the little illegalities that had been produced for the occasion (fake train tickets, drugs, keys to open telephone coin boxes and traffic lights, etc.).

Thus a very interesting situation was created. One part of the Movement sought the establishment — in the order of signs and discourse — of a city fortress (the sports arena), the "new" bastion of the future people, in reality the mark of an old passion for collecting imported practices. The majority or, rather, the remaining part of the Movement chose not to establish a city; they decided to continue being nomads, but at the same time enter the city of the enemy's language — a city that is always strengthening its fortifications — even if only to remain silent, sitting around, smoking, sleeping. We have termed them nomads, but perhaps it is more correct to call them sophists, in a position to simulate, to enter and leave the walls, to master diverse languages as the situation demands, in a position to play-act, falsify, create paradoxes, sabotage, and disappear once again. This type of sophist is a figure who can intervene in languages with an exact and distinct action, without taking them as a despotic and unyielding totality. This gift is of course not innate; it is a consequence of the relation to wages (wages' general equivalence with the rest of things, exactly like language).

The Metropolitan Indians have stopped using the metaphor of wages, because their enterprise is no longer producing metaphors for institutions, but rather effecting the metamorphosis of them. They wanted to compel Italian youth to reckon with wages, but also to force them all to realize that the Movement is tired of reckoning merely with money. And this break in the scope of the struggle is at once a break in language and the forms of the encounter.



For a brief time, the irreality, the displacement, the revolution of existing relations is no longer the prerogative of capital and its accumulated intelligence. An unforeseen variable has been created in the Italian political scene: a social sector which is illegal more in its behavior than in its relation to wages, and which is at the same time not clandestine, even though clandestine groups can float around within it. This sector is not reduced and not reducible to the productive order; it is intersected and made labyrinthine so as to be rendered indefinable, but even before this, it is subjectively not obligated to any determination of identity.


We can foresee that the forms of the organization, corresponding to whoever leaves his own distinctive marks, will not be precisely symbolic. Rather, they will be and are formations which can be constructed as the need arises and dissolved immediately after, not bound to the criteria of professionalism, notwithstanding all the Leninism of those who bide their time. The immediate steps to be taken by those the press has dubbed the Metropolitan Indians is the production of projects in the field of simulation, falsification, and paradox. The program which guides and will guide the Movement aims at giving their projects the same precision as a knitted work, the same collective participation as a common home, the same rhythmic breathing as that we find in our own lives and in the phases of our collective study, the same range as our journeys, the same organization as our emotional relations, as always illegal but never clandestine.

What is left for us to do before concluding is finally to forget about the Metropolitan Indians and once again prevent a Movement from becoming a fetish, a hypostasis, shortcircuited by the media's diffusion. There will always be animal reserves and Indian reservations to conceal the fact that the animals are dead, and that we are all Indians. There will always be factories to conceal the fact that production is dead, and that it is everywhere and nowhere. We follow the momentum of our projects with our song and occupy ourselves with other things.

Translated by Lawrence Venuti

i. Luciano Lama is the secretary of the General Confederation of Workers, close to the ICP

ii/1-2 Photos: Marion Scemama



The Proliferation of Margins

Felix Guattari

Felix Guattari, the author, together with Gilles Deleuze, of *Anti-Oedipus* (Richard Seaver Books, 1977), has taken an active part in the defense of the imprisoned Italian intellectuals.

— Integrated world capitalism does not aim at a systematic and generalized repression of the workers, women, youth, minorities. . . The means of production on which it rests will indeed call for a flexibility in relationships of production and in social relations, and a minimal capacity to adapt to the new forms of sensibility and to the new types of human relationships which are "mutating" here and there (i.e. exploitation by advertising of the "discoveries" of the marginals, relative tolerance with regard to the zones of *laissez-faire*. . .) Under these conditions, a semi-tolerated, semi-encouraged, and co-opted protest could well be an intrinsic part of the system.

— Other forms of protest prove, on the other hand, to be much more dangerous to the extent that they threaten the essential relationships on which this system is based (the respect for work, for hierarchy, for State power, for the religion of consumption. . .). It is impossible to trace a clear and definite boundary between the recuperable marginals and other types of marginalities on the way to truly "molecular revolutions." The frontiers actually remain blurred and unstable both in time and in space. The real question is whether this phenomenon finally will remain on the outskirts of society — whatever its scope — or whether it will put it

radically into question. What characterizes the "molecular" here is the fact that *the lines of flight merge with the objective lines of deterritorialization* of the system and create an irreversible aspiration for new spaces of liberty. (An example of one of these lines of flight: the Free Radios. The technological evolution, in particular the miniaturization of transmitters and the fact that they can be "tinkered with" by amateurs, meets a collective aspiration for a new means of expression.)

— Numerous factors must be considered both "objectively" and on the level of new social practices, in order to appreciate the possibilities for revolutionary transformations during the period to come:

— Will integrated world capitalism succeed in founding a social order accepted by the greatest number of people and implying an accentuation of social segregation? Capital, in the West as in the East, is nothing more than the capital of power, that is, a mode of semiotization, of homogenization, and of transmission of various forms of power. (Power over goods, over territories, power over work, over subordinates, the "inferiors," power over relatives, over the family, etc. . .) Only the appearance of new ways of relating to the world and to society will alter the individual's "libidinal fixation" to capital and to its various crystallizations of power. This power can prevail only to the extent that an overwhelming majority of individuals not only participate in it, but also unconsciously adhere to it. The reversal of modern capitalism involves not only the struggle against material bondage and visible forms of repression, but also, from the outset, the creation of many alternative set-ups.

— For the last decade "battle lines" widely different from those which previously characterized the traditional workers' movement have not ceased to multiply: (immigrant workers, skilled workers unhappy with the kind of work imposed on them, the unemployed, over-exploited women, ecologists, nationalists, mental patients, homosexuals, the elderly, the young etc.). But will their objectives become just another "demand" acceptable to the system? Or will vectors of molecular revolution begin to proliferate behind them? (Unlocatable on the dominant coordinates, they produce their own axes of reference, establish underground, transversal connections among themselves, and thus undermine older relationships to production, society, the family, the body, sex, the cosmos. . .)

— Will these micro-revolutions, these profound examinations of the relationships within society only remain divided into limited spheres of the social arena? Or will a new "social segmentation" manage to connect them without imposing hierarchy and segregation? In short, will all these micro-revolutions finally initiate a real revolution? Will they be able to take charge of not only local problems, but also administrative larger economic configurations?

— All this amounts to asking whether we will be able to go beyond the various utopias of "return to": Return to the sources, to nature, to transcendence. . . The "objective" lines of deterritorialization are irreversible. We must make the best of "progress" in science and technology, or nothing will be possible, and world capitalism will always regain the upper hand. For instance, it is clear that, in the next few years, the struggle for self-determination in Corsica, Brittany, etc., will not cease to gain momentum. Isn't this a case of "return to"? But what is at issue here is the promotion of a new Corsica, a new Brittany, as well as a new Sarcelles, a new Yvelines. . . Shamelessly rewriting the past on the plot of an open future. The demands of the minorities, for example, as well as those of the nationalists, can be carriers of a certain type of State Power, a power of subjugation, that is, a capitalist virus.

— What will be the form of resistance of the more traditional sectors which find themselves squeezed by the present evolution of integrated world capitalism? Will the union and the traditional leftist parties allow themselves to be manipulated and co-opted indefinitely by modern capitalism, or will they undergo profound transformations?

— It is impossible to predict what *forms of struggle and organization* the revolution just beginning will assume in the future. All answers remain equally open now. . .

— They will not be focused on quantitative objectives; they will again put into question the goals of work and therefore of leisure time and of culture. They will again put into question the environment, daily life, domestic life, male-female and child-adult relationships, the conception of time, the meaning of life. . .

— They will not be focused solely on the working-industrial-qualified-white-male-adult classes. (End of the myth of the Poutilof factory revolutionaries, 1917.) Production today can in no way be identified with heavy industry. It makes use of tool-machines as well as computers, social set ups as well as technico-scientific know-how. It is inseparable from the moulding of the work-force, beginning with child "labor" from its earliest years. It likewise implies the maintenance, reproduction, and formation capsule constituted by the family and its administration, which is in the present oppressive conditions, essentially the burden of women. . .

— They will not be focused only on an avant-garde party conceived of as the thinking-subject of the struggle and the means by which the whole "of mass movements" will be oriented. They will be multi-centered. Their different components will in no way be required to agree on everything, or to speak the same stereotypical language. Contradictions, even irreducible antagonisms, will be allowed to co-exist. (For example, the specific point of view of women with regard to the male-dominated movements.) Here contradiction does not paralyze action, but proves that a singular position, a *specific desire*, is put in question.

— They will not be focused on national frameworks. Close to the most quotidian reality, they will involve social groups which overflow all national boundaries. Today every perspective of struggle formulated only within a national framework annuls its efficacy in advance. The most reformist as well as the most revolutionary parties and splinter groups (*groupuscule*) who specify their objective uniquely as the "seizure of State political power" condemn themselves to powerlessness. For instance, the solution to the Italian problem does not belong to the socialists, communists, or autonomists! It implies a movement of struggle developing in a minimum of four or five European countries.

— They will not be focused on a single theoretical body. Its different components will each elaborate, on their own level, in their own rhythm, their own modes of semiotization in order to define and orient their action. Here again we find the withering away of oppositions between productive, scientific, and cultural labor, between manual and intellectual labor.

— They will refuse to separate exchange value, use value and desire value. These separations constitute an essential support for power formations closed in upon themselves and forming hierarchies upon which capitalism and social segregation are based.

— Social production, under the control of capitalist and technocratic "elites," is more and more cut off from the interests and desires of individuals, and leads:

— to a systematic over-valorization of industries which compromise the very future of the human species (armaments race, nuclear reactions. . .),

— to an under-estimation of the essential use-values (hunger in the world, saving the environment. . .),

— to the flattening out and repression of desires in their singularity, that is, to the loss of the meaning of life.

Under these conditions, the perspective of revolutionary transformations, the collective re-appropriation of daily life, and a full acknowledgement of desires on all levels of society have become inseparable.

Translated by Richard Gardner & Sybil Walker

III/1 Felix Guattari in "Indeces" Video/photo: Seth Tillet



Dreamers of a Successful Life

Paolo Virno

Paolo Virno, a member of *Metropoli*, was arrested in June, 1979.

The practices and the languages adopted by the Movement seem to suggest an alternate type of socialization, different than that based on the exchange of equivalent values. The "technical-scientific intellect", "off-the-books" labor, the feminist movement, young proletarians, etc. may be seen as parts—not reducible to any whole—of a composite praxis in which production and emancipation are intertwined. This praxis cannot be understood through an identity principle founded on categories of commodity. As far as social change is concerned, what counts more and more is not the commonly accepted definition of labor force, but rather all the aspects of the activity of these individuals who find themselves in opposition to that definition. What counts is the qualitative consistency, profoundly varied, of their "doing". To understand this proliferation of the *concrete* and the *different* within socialized labor requires a constellation of materialistic concepts which are totally detached from that *universality* characteristic of the "general equivalent" and which are not used as the bases or synthesizing elements for the actual processes of liberation. Thus it is the empirical-perceptible determinateness of human labor, the specific qualitative richness of labor's use value, which constitutes an autonomous and powerful means for understanding the totality of the production process. The directly social dimension of labor—within which dimension there is no further distinction between "complex" and "simple" labor, though the concept of immediate production is

modified—makes of use value, of physicality, a criterion for understanding which is not at all retrograde, but rather, in the end, "post-Galilean", that is to say, more significant than the quantification and the equivalent-assigning which prevail in exchange systems.

Men and women, factory workers and marginal workers of every species, the partly employed and the partly unemployed, all derive from their articulated *presence* within the system of production a welter of insights, techniques, and tastes that are antagonistic to the assigning of value. Dreamers of a successful life perceive in the process of labor the means to escape from their dreamland; in the tangible—yet blocked and incomplete—separation between production and the assigning of value, they perceive the principal route for a dialectic of liberation. However, it happens—and here one may think of the parabola traced by the "great disorder" of 1977—that the new level attained by the socialization of labor may not come to be manifested in the milieu from which it sprang, that is, in the production of material goods and in the scientific apparatus needed for such production; labor agitation has not affected the forms of the production process, and has not been able to attack in a wide-ranging and significant way the link between the functioning of capitalist management and the functioning of coordination as exercised by the "generalized intellect". One finds—and one will doubtless find for a long time to come—a striking gap between a movement which re-produces itself daily in the process of labor and the self-expression of that movement, which quite often is situated "elsewhere".

"OUT OF DELICACY I HAVE FORFEITED MY LIFE" OR: THE PAINFUL MYTH OF A "PURE" SOCIALIZATION"

The consequence of this "impasse" is that the rethinking for purposes of emancipation of the relationship between labor and socialization, instead of arriving at a transformed and enriched conception of production, gives rise to an extraordinary burgeoning of ideology, the principal characteristic of which is a pining for a "pure" socialization, detached from the sphere of material activity and by design not related to the historical forms by which nature is appropriated. If bodies continue to be measured, their equivalents determined, if they continue to be mortified by the capital-labor exchange, then the possibility of reaching a non-mutilated socialization seems to lie in an indefinite expansion of interpersonal relationships, brought about through interaction: agitation, behavior, needs, languages.

Work and interaction, or "instrumental action" and "communicative action", are seen—in this confused pot of ideology—as two totally separated poles, without any reciprocal connection: on the one hand the praxis of labor, divided down the middle but conceived under a single heading as the imparting of value (and thus—as far as the activity of the individual is concerned—totally devoid of relationships, operating as monolog); on the other hand, free relationships based on dialog between people who grant each other "reciprocal recognition" as bearers of petitions for emancipation. In short: in the realm of production, a sanctioning of the uncontested hegemony of exchange value; in the realm of distribution only, a rediscovery of use value.

In fact, the distinctive aspect of this fantasy-land socialization is a sort of "struggle for recognition" on the part of unhappy minds: unrepressed individuality must be embraced with all needs and desires by other individualities, if only on the letters-to-the-editor page of the newspaper. Antagonism is de-materialized and constantly reduced to the pastime of critical reflection on the inauthenticity of daily life; in the background looms the all-powerful category of commodity-form (the crisis of which is not perceived in the realm of production), which constrains and inhibits reciprocal recognition in relationships based on domination. What is required for interaction between individuals to flow freely is, in reality, the maintenance of that universality and equivalence of values promised by the system of equivalent exchange—but these promises are always betrayed by the essential inequity of the selling and buying relationship which prevails between capital and the labor force. In short, "pure" socialization, which is irrelevant or inadequate in defining the praxis of labor, boils down to the demands for a "fair exchange", or one which will not make the warm-blooded interior space of in-

dividuals seem worthless.

The point is this: if one cannot detect in the fabric of agitation the ready possibility for a socialization which is no longer regulated by the marketplace, but instead based directly on labor, taken as the possession of the power and the skill to produce, or labor "as subjectivity"—then it is inevitable that the relationship between labor and socialization should continue to be mediated by the distribution aspect. A "just" exchange thus represents a final, twisted illusion that the abstract form in which wealth is produced is being reconciled to the disparate natures of individuals, who aspire to a communication-circulation freed from domination relationships. So there is no reason to be astonished that this version of socialization does not contemplate the use of violence: given that such socialization comes into being already "separate"—with agitation and liberation campaigns constituting an autonomous universe—it does not even conceive the need to define—precisely by means of violence—the separation between antinomical elements present in production.

The ideology of liberation, frozen in the purity of those guarantees which have been given to workers, is not capable of envisaging the degree of liberty which can result from the use of violence as a function specific to the further socialization of labor.

Also entwined in the distribution perspective appear to be "theories of needs", variously construed within the movement. What is almost always ignored is the more or less complete lack of autonomy of the "system of needs", that is the dependence of the system on the historical form of labor. This oversight is found even in the most penetrating authors.

Ms. Heller, for example—and the example is significant because of the weight which her theses have carried with our comrades—has detected, in the various connotations with which Marx employs the term "need", the clear presence of a "judgemental" approach in economic critiques: according to Heller, actual "determinations of value" are at the bottom of the principal Marxian categories. "In his works," Heller writes, "the principal tendency is to consider concepts of need as extra-economic, historical-philosophical categories, that is, as anthropological categories of value, and as such, not susceptible to definition within the economic system." These needs, then, precisely because they burst out of and transcend the narrow boundaries of those concepts found in political economics, constitute the foundations necessary for a superior organization of production.

But this transcendental conception of needs, which become the true privileged seat of subjectivity regained, cannot help but pay the price of its ethical and anthropological origins. The system of basic needs, precisely because it is situated in a space structurally different than that occupied by the "real abstractions" of capitalist society, becomes rather ineffective as a means of critiquing from within the full weight of economic categories, and instead is limited to coexistence with these categories, bringing no substantial changes to them.

Heller, unlike many of her readers, carefully refrains from confining the new needs to some unspecified expansion of consumerism and instead strives to read them in relation to a reconsidered appreciation of the goal- and planning-oriented nature of labor. Nevertheless, she cannot help feeling that the "counter-economy", to which her writings implicitly refer, in no way undermines the universally prevailing system of wage-earning labor; rather, she limits herself to defining marginal spaces within which a renewed "system of ethical conduct" can be cultured. Ethical Marxism, even in the most up-to-date versions, cannot avoid papering over the relationship which exists between critiques of capitalistic economic forms and the composition of subjectivity, preferring to consign the latter to a "theory of values". More generally, the pretense of deducing the transformed form of labor in a "society of confederated producers" through studying the articulation and the quality of social needs amounts to repeating the point of view found in the great bourgeois ideologies and applying it to the

NEEDS AND IDEOLOGY. THE HELLER CASE


LABOR AND NEEDS: TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF THE MOVEMENT

specific theme of the transition to communism. Quite early, Hegel and Smith pointed unhesitatingly to the infinite multiplication and specification of needs as the distinctive trait of post-feudal society. Thus they turned from the marketplace to labor: the omnipresent exchange of products is such that the individual no longer works for his own concrete need, but for the abstraction of a generalized need; consequently labor too becomes abstract and generalized. The quality of the need conditions the quality of the labor; the abstraction of need is precursor to the abstraction of labor; the modern form taken by the distribution of wealth determines, for Hegel and Smith, the form of the production of wealth.

From the beginning, the anthropology of need has celebrated its rites in the domain of distribution: this fate has befallen Heller as well, for she limits herself to creating a mirror image of the classical figure of "homo oeconomicus", replacing this character with the equally anthropological model of an individual rich in radical needs.

Marx, in fixing the relationship between needs and labor, reverses the order of the sequence and locates the genesis of needs within the structure of abstract labor: "Inasmuch as labor is labor to earn wages and its immediate goal is money, a general wealth is set as its object and aim ... Money as goal here becomes the means for the general laborosity. People produce general wealth so that they can gain possessions of its token." If the immediate goal of abstract labor is not this or that particular product but rather "the general form of wealth" (money), then it is clear that social needs no longer represent either the point of departure or the point of arrival for the process of production; instead they constitute a "middle term" in the route traveled by "money as capital". Needs themselves are seen as needs for a general equivalent. And, given that this general equivalent is the specific product of paid labor, the "system of needs" necessarily tends to reproduce that particular link between individuals and general wealth which is established precisely by the capitalist form of labor. Therefore: the needs of paid labor consist in the reproduction of paid labor.

When the accent is placed emphatically on the antagonistic immediacy of needs, one loses sight precisely of that "expanded reproduction" of the prevailing social relationships, of the labor force taken as goods, which is implicit in the "system of needs" that has evolved from the abstraction of value. Thus one neglects the "coercion to repeat" which is inherent in the general equivalent. Then the smug and unanalytical adoption of one's own existential radicalness—silent or vociferous, it hardly matters—as a pole of inevitable conflict comes near to being a labor of Sisyphus, a flight which "always amounts to a forced repetition of the



state, from which one fled."

In the same way, as far as collective processes are concerned, the "Americanization" of the behavior of non-working class labor and the extremist struggles opposing industrial reform and defending the old class organization can be seen as two from among the many possible examples of a "radical needling" in which is inscribed *a priori* the reproduction of domination. Other examples: the forms of agitation by which needs are manifested come under discussion as a matter of course. Is it necessary to repeat that Carniti's hard-nosed brand of labor unionism is a hand-me-down from the ruling class? And that even the most extreme forms of agitation cannot redeem a content that is subaltern? That one can prepare oneself for full employment, while still being less advanced than the young proletarian who has many jobs, all precarious, all interchangeable, and who wants nothing to do with a permanent position?

To represent the collection of needs which the movement exhibits as a pluralistic, evenly-weighted set of elements without hierarchy is an illusion that has no sense: there is always hierarchy, and one must find what the principle is that regulates and classifies. To this end, Marxian arguments show clearly the necessity of discussing the theme of needs in terms of the all-important form which labor activity assumes. This necessity prevails whether the perpetuation of capitalistic relationships of production or the exact opposite is being considered. Either one or the other: either needs are ordered by money and abstract labor, or they are filtered and arranged in a hierarchy in accordance with all the ramifications of the social aspect of the labor process, which is no longer measurable in terms of the law of value. Obviously, to take the productivity of the "social individual" as a critical parameter for needs does not mean resorting to any very idealistic "regulatory idea"; on the contrary, what organizes the chain of needs here, elevating some and pushing others into the margin, is not the future of the utopian society, but the present reality of a *divided production* in which there exists, on the material level, a different and highly efficacious coalition of the forces of production, amounting to a new principle of synthesis. *In short: from the reality of a broadened concept of labor stems a hierarchy of needs oriented toward emancipation, a hierarchy which is antithetical to the one mandated by the general equivalent.*

In the composite structure of the social work-day, in its inhomogeneous and fragmented articulation, time does not pass evenly. Time is not always the empty and abstract index for assigning value, a unit of measure in itself. The simultaneous presence—and the rather haphazard combination—of work as "coordination" and "supervision", together with embryonic elements of counter-economy, submission to the machine or nomadism among many and various precarious activities, establishes a pluralistic perception of time, a diversified perception deeply marked by the "space" of the experience. Unremunerated social cooperation, or what little of it is found today—and that seeming something of a fetish—as a potent aspect of human labor, restores to production time body and quality, feeling and relationships, the pleasure of understanding and the desire to organize with the greatest possible tactical intelligence one's own hatred. Within this "diachronic zone" of the work-day is also situated the problem of hedonism, of realized happiness, of the restored power of the category of the individual, beyond any ideological parody of the self.

In the experience of production—as rich as it is conflict-ridden—of a young worker or a young engineer, in that externalness of the particular assigned task, in that internalness where the consciousness of cooperation lies, the potential "full significance" of the individual no longer appears as an effect of the poverty of social relationships—as in precapitalistic economic organizations—but rather the result of the acknowledged universality of these relationships. Hatred and scorn at "working under the boss" express the potential for an immediate correspondence between the production activity of the individual and that of the species; thus the possibility for an automatized appropriation in the external realm and a full appreciation of "internal nature", that is, precisely of the in-


dividual and his or her body. If capitalistic society conceals the connection between labor and nature ("The bourgeoisie has good reason to attribute a supernatural creative force to labor", as Marx said)—subsuming the connection beneath the rubric of productive labor, in which productivity is something purely social—on the other hand the connection is rehabilitated in "qualitative" time, which infiltrates the work-day, pointing to the contradictions in it.

The natural corporeal reality of individual, his or her socially enriched senses, instead of constituting the tedious and superfluous empirical zone in which value is produced, suggest a different criterion of productivity, no longer based on the blind necessity of self-preservation or "time-saving", but rather on the variegated time of conscious planning activities.

Which, after all, is what Marx alluded to when he spoke of the composer of music and the work of art as anticipations in terms of form of production without domination.

Translated by Jared Becker

II/1-2 "Fibonacci 1202" Mario Merz, 1970. Sperone editore, Turin



Hegel and the Wobblies

Eric Alliez

The experience of the Italian Movement has thrown a new light on one of the most original forms of organization developed within the American proletarian movement at the beginning of this century. The Wobblies (International Workers of the World) were mobile militants who tried to organize immigrant workers throughout the country.

The State has been reduced to a senseless machine that nevertheless works; a center-less machine that absorbs value-time and speaks the abstract language of mobility of labor, of work spread through space and through daily life. The margins are at the center; at the center of the assigning of value, at the center of socialized production. The Wobbly figure re-emerges in the form of the fragmented worker. An experience long-removed from institutionalized worker movements appears to us as the present-day form of organization. The hobo. Hegel, at one point, can no longer explain or understand the fact that the lack of territoriality (of Power and of the insubordinate class) is not equivalent to the territoriality of the Individual, the State, Politics, and the Political Party. At that point, perhaps, one may begin to grasp what route freedom and autonomy take within the urban society.

The process of assigning value comes out of the factory, expands everywhere: in the city, in urban space, in the home, and in the existence of millions of workers and non-working workers such as the unemployed, marginals, drug-addicts, in the proliferation of part-time and "off-the-books" work, and in the infinite forms by which time assigns value. What is the proletarian individual like? Labor force mobility, the lack of proletarian territoriality, the historical experience of the Wob-

blies in the '20's amount to thousands upon thousands of mobile workers who move from one part of the continent to the other. An experience which totally escapes the traditional ideological and organizational schemes of the Marxists, Leninists, Linkskommunisten, and in-factory unions. The Hegelian categories of dialectics cannot deal with the reality of a social organization of labor, the disappearance of the laboring individual, nor the practices of a movement which refuses to be reduced to the territorialization of a party or program. It is true that the American rebellions have never produced a form of consciousness of social reality as all-encompassing as the Hegelian-Marxist dialectics, nor a form of political planning as all-encompassing as the insurrection to conquer Power. A weakness of the American movement, as is explained by traditional Marxism, which in fact disregards the history of this unorthodox movement; or is it rather that a real society in movement cannot be reduced to the formal schemes of an all-encompassing design?

It is not by chance if today we pose this question. The end of the factory as a central place of exploitation; breaking up of leisure time, reassembled only in the abstract continuum of Value: in Italy the CENSIS¹ discovers that the economically sound sectors are those where the irregulars and the marginals are employed. The factory becomes a sort of social welfare for unproductive workers. It is evident that the form of organization of America's working class can only function as a driving belt between the State and ranks of unproductive workers who are always aided, insured, and become, paradoxically, parasites. The parasites, such as extremists, drug addicts, marginals, and degenerates are the motor of a productive up-swing. We declare this without the haughty attitude of an employer, but recognize it simply as a political defeat. We were not able to organize the movement of the non-guaranteed workers into a movement of freedom, that is, making intelligence autonomous as a productive force. We were not able to make an autonomous force of the mobility of labor and, especially, of intelligence, the inventive power of the young proletariat and of the educated young, who are the carriers of technical-scientific know-how. Here lies the problem, and we should begin anew.

Translated by William Pagnotta

1. CENSIS: Center for Socio-economic Studies (Rome).

Let's do Justice to our Comrade P.38

In April of 1977, a new element surfaced onto the political scene: comrade P.38. It appeared at the time of the violent clashes with the police in Bologna and Rome. Its introduction was intended to challenge the clandestine nature of the Red Brigade's operations and encourage illegal, but *collective*, forms of action.

There was a great need for this, considering the confusion reigning among the zealous directors of the disinformation newspapers. Lately, on several occasions, we have heard talk of a phantom "38 special". Well, this weapon no longer exists. It is the product of the perverse imagination of journalists who confuse the trademark of a particular weapon (the Walther 38, the number 38 referring to the year of manufacture) with the 38 special, which is not a particular weapon or model, but a caliber, and, moreover, not a caliber used in semiautomatic pistols (like the Walther), but in revolvers.

Let us clarify the difference between revolvers, semiautomatic pistols, and automatic weapons:

The revolver is comprised of a fixed barrel, mounted on a mechanism, and a revolving cylinder which has different breeches for the cartridges.

Automatic weapons (machine guns) are those whose firing, when one keeps one's finger pressed on the lock, is only interrupted when there are no more cartridges.

For semi-automatic weapons, the cartridges, in an automatic loader, fire one after

the other.

We should clarify one point: while, in semiautomatic pistols, the ejection of the shell occurs at the moment one fires, in revolvers, the shell remains in the cylinder.

This is the reason that the discovery of shells from 38-special cartridges fired by assassin extremists, as we have often the opportunity to read about, seems to us completely impossible.

It must be added that if revolvers that can be loaded with 38-special cartridges are on sale in gun stores, and thus offered for the use of the Movement, as in Rome or Bologna, the same is not true of pistols like the Walther P. 38, which is loaded only with 7.65 and 9 caliber automatic cartridges, since the sale of these weapons is prohibited in Italy; they are only found on the international markets. It is enough to say that pistols are certainly unobtainable for the modern proletariat bands, which, unfortunately, have not yet achieved enough mobility to permit them to cross the borders and roam through the capitals of Europe.

If, in autonomous demonstrations, the "comrade P.38" is mentioned, it is certainly not because we are hiding P.38's under our coats; but we must observe that there is a symbolic aspect to this, the admission that today it is necessary and just to carry arms. What is obvious is that those who consider arming themselves in view of relatively close prospects do not envision equipping themselves with a 6.35 Bernardelli.

During the last war, the P.38 was the best perfected and most modern handgun (the introduction of the double-action mechanism was significant in this regard). That's where it gets its prestige. It performed satisfactorily on all fronts and the Afrika Korps was the only one to complain of some jamming because of the sand; with this in mind, they slightly increased the space between the stock, the hammer, and the barrel. The safety mechanism proved exceptionally solid.

The German Army adopted the P.38, perfected Waffenfabrik Carl Walther, as the standard issue pistol beginning in 1938 (whence the pistol's name, 1938 = P.38). They decided to use the Walther at the same time as the P.08 (better known as the Luger), then to replace the Luger with the P.38, because the latter was a weapon better adapted to mass production and less likely to break down in combat.

The manufacture of the P.38 began again after the war, and today this weapon still represents the best mechanical system among double-action pistols, with a cylinder which can even take high-power cartridges.

Thanks to the double-action firing mechanism, when the lock is deactivated, the gun is cocked while it is still in a rest position; which enables the cartridge to be brought into the barrel with precision as soon as the hammer is pulled back; the first shot can thus be fired with the greatest speed, exactly as in a revolver. For further explanations, we advise journalists and all interested parties to address themselves to the Chief of Security Services' Emilio Santillo, who has a reputation as an expert in the field and as an infallible marksman; beyond clarification of a general nature, he can explain the operation of the Colt Python 357 caliber Magnum, which he always carries on him.

Translated by Richard Gardner

1. The SDS, ex-reserve affairs, ex-anti-terrorism, is a kind of Italian political anti-gang brigade; a socialist Italian deputy accused it, in August 1977, of having participated in the "strategy of tension": assassination attempts, attempted government overthrows.

Nonviolence in Bologna

Judith Malina

Now based in Rome, the "Living Theater", animated by Julian Beck and Judith Malina, has been touring Italy for the last few years. These are fragments from Malina's unpublished journal.

JUNE 11, 1977
BOLOGNA

Early in the morning, we go to the offices of the Bologna Comune — to the cultural wing of the communist municipal government.

Mario, who guides us through the bureaucratic maze, comes to get us at our hotel. He tells us that the *Questura* is refusing permits for the sites for The House of War in front of the *Carabinieri*, and The House of Death in front of the church. . . He's an amiable man of about 45, handsome in that natty Italian manner, in formal suit and tie, and altogether in the old-fashioned style.

As we cross the *piazza* to the offices, we pass the corner under the *portici* where the hunger-strikers have chained themselves together — in support of those arrested at the closing of *Radio Alice* — where we had been made very welcome and promised return. The cause of the closure and arrests: they reported the recent street events, with minute to minute news reporting where and when the actions were taking place. Telephone calls received from the sites of police confrontations were transmitted directly onto the air. This made it possible for the demonstrators to be in close communications with each other, and for sympathizers to aid them, or to rally support. They are charged, however, with inciting to the actions.

The police received all the information along with the *compagni* — that is, it was always *public* information — if anything was inciting, it was the actions of the police which were being reported; of course, there's a deeper problem, of which we're all a part — and there's no sense for the people in jail to be the scapegoats for our collective failure to provide peaceful revolutionary tactics that work. In a corner under the *portici* at the doorway of the Municipal Building, they are lying on the sidewalk on blankets and sleeping bags. Posters around them, their chains visible around their ankles. . . We greet each other. I promise we'll return. But for now, we must go with the Functionaries and the Officials, the Police, the Church.

The offices of the *Comune* are in a palazzo of sumptuous murals, works of art, vases, statuary; the great hall, with splendid walls, ceiling, marble floor has a stairway leading to it that is made so that the horses, too, can enter, for in the old days, even the horses were *Nobili* and the pompous beasts entered the halls of their masters' houses. The *assessore* is friendly, bearded, young. . . willing, but worried. We must go the *Questura*. . .

Across from the *bello* palazzo is the white marble fascist-style building of the *Questura*. The captain receives us amidst his trophies. He's a sleek man. It's not for him to decide what can happen on the grounds of the property of the *Carabinieri*. . . or the Church. . . We must go and ask them. Julian says, "My Aunt Miriam would say, 'They're giving you the run-around.'"

Mario remains in the outer office — his political relationship — that is to say, the political relationship of the *Comune* with the police, is too delicate to disturb.

On the way to the *Carabinieri's* offices we talk, he and I, of the practical aspects of the Historic Compromise. Such as we now confront. Mario explains how difficult it is — to keep the balance with a police force that's politically hostile. . . "Until. . . for now. . ." The young people are too anxious to move too quickly. . .

The *Carabinieri* are in a palazzo. The colonel in his *army* khaki officer's outfit, is not hiding behind any modern art. He's got the framed photo of the President of the Republic and the *capo* of the *Carabinieri*. . . He knows we'll never get an ok from Rome as well as we do — and we don't want/need to stir up the problems that will ensue if our dossier is reexamined — our two expulsions from Italy, our many *denuncie*. . .

We go then with Mario to the *quartiere* San Ruffiello and walk around the *caserma*. We find a parking lot behind it, but choose rather a spot in front of some stores down the street. We settle for it, though the '*funzionario*', as he calls himself still has trepidations.

In the evening we rehearse in the writing salon of our hotel — a dark room with desks and an air shaft. There's a note from the *compagni* on the hunger strike delivered to the hotel to me and Julian.

"We are the comrades of Radio Alice and the Student Movement. We are on a hunger strike and are chained in Piazza Maggiore for the liberation of our comrades imprisoned for the March events. We would like to see you and speak with you. Come and see us tonight, or better we will come to your hotel. When? Where? Kisses. (The Chained)

The fasters are asleep. We walk among their sleeping bags to read the posters they have written:

3rd Day of Fasting.
Those in jail are on their 12th!

At noon in the Piazza Maggiore we meet with the hungerers. One of their placards reads,

JUNE 12, 1977
BOLOGNA

Who is hungry is good.
Who is well-fed is bad.
It's better to be hungry
than to be rich.
-Irish saying

Standing in their chains, they gather round us and tell us of the complex encounters they have had in their defiance of the police.

We go into a nervous rehearsal.

Maria Rosa and Billy fear that the police here may follow the recent awful precedent of attacking without warning and using tear gas at minimum, or worse, clubbing and breaking heads — or worst, at the extreme, using guns without warning. The dead in several cities attest to this custom. . .

The latest news arrives hour by hour: the strikers are moving to the *Due Torri* to avoid a conflict with the Church, which doesn't want them in the path of today's *Corpus Domini* procession. They don't want to rouse hostility of "the community" and they rather reluctantly make the concession. Julian's praise of their willingness to use such "strategy" relieves their sense of compromise.

It's strange that they haven't won the support of "the community," but as one looks at the vast Piazza Maggiore at night, and sees the hundreds (maybe 1500-2000 tonight!) or thousands of young people sitting on the steps, gathering round guitars, discussion groups, idlers, talkers — and all more or less Freaks. These aren't "The Community;" in fact, what we mean by community is just that: All the people who *aren't* these people — who *aren't* students, politicals, freaks, flowerkids, idlers, tea heads, new worlders. . .

And the prejudice isn't, I think, against the *incatenati* and their cause, but against the whole spirit of the New World, which seems to endanger their dearest concepts of how and what we are and should be.

The latest news: the *incatenati* returned to the piazza, they were taken in by the police, who took away their chains. Tomorrow there will be a demonstration in Piazza Maggiore. The police have given permission for it to go on from six o'clock till nine o'clock. And they have decided definitely to clear the piazza at midnight.

The demonstration is, of course, at the same hour as our Public Acts. I suggest that at the end of the Love House the Time Shaman announce that it is now time to proceed to Piazza Maggiore to participate in the demonstration in solidarity with the people of Radio Alice who are in jail, and that we then proceed in procession, perhaps singing.

Cos'e Radio Alice?
Cos'e la liberta d'espressione?
Cos'e la prigione?
Cos'e la liberta?

This brings up a terrific wave of fear. . . We'll be shot in the streets, without even being told to stop. . . they fear. . . Leroy and Annie and I say we won't be in the piazza at midnight under threat of a police attack. . .

In Memory of Francesco LoRusso. . .

Late at night we hear: the police agree to allow the demonstration to continue till just before midnight — then they may take action. The Living Theatre, however, is *not* to perform in the piazza — if we attempt to, they will make arrests. I'm personally prepared to do the House of the State with new blood lines for some of us.

JUNE 13, 1977
BOLOGNA

Much ado this morning for the preparation of the play.

We enter the police car and drive the whole route, pointing out each spot where we'll perform. Only the Church presents problems. They want us away in a hidden parking space; we want the Church as a backdrop. We settle for the side entrance, where a working class high-rise with perfect balconies for a new audience adds to the utility.

We return to the hotel. When we emerge from the car on Piazza Franklin Roosevelt, where we normally park, we see an armed force of extraordinary proportions. The men are not only armed, but holding machine guns and rifles at alert, carrying helmets and gas masks (?) and seeming to be mustered for action. I think there are 5000 men; Annie guesses 10,000 — in any case it's formidable. Isha whispers, "I want to go home," and clings to me. The way home is through the army. We walk in a group, talking together, as though we don't see them.

It's eleven thirty as we enter the piazza walking between lines of heavily armed men into a scene of innocent pleasures. There are only a few police scattered in the piazza, only as many as one would see on a normal night in summer.

The rest of the scene is almost Paradisial. There are people singing, talking, dancing, playing ball. . . A large white ball like a peace dove keeps flitting in a huge arc over the piazza. The women tend again towards soft summer clothes, and Indian cloths, linens, flowered skirts brighten the scene. We are stepping out of jeans. . . yet I notice sadly how many women are cutting off their lovely hair — yes, it's just and right that I notice it here, in the little circle of light surrounded by an armed force that could, that might, that stands ready to destroy their felicity at any moment.

Sing, dance and think of summer dresses: this is not the death dance of Antigone's city, this is the dance of *vita*. . . yes. We go up on the platform — Julian, Pierre, Annie, Tom and I. . .

I look out across the piazza — from where we are it seems full, even to the portals of the Cathedral. The church is half-renewed, and the cleaned marble gleams pinkish white like infant's skin, and the dark part seems like an evil mirror of its sinister. . . This polarity is especially keen here, because of this confrontation, and I can't imagine that the hearts of at least a few of the grim-faced soldiers weren't moved by the image of good and evil that the contrast between the two groups spelled out.



I'll remember the Piazza Maggiore in this particular light.

Looking into the faces of thousands of people who wanted to defy evil without violence. . . Julian praises them and tells them their theatre is better than ours — and yet they express disappointment that we're not going to perform — Pierre spoke his dramatic designation

. . . this piazza as the House of Violence
this piazza as the House of Hope
this is the House of Our Brothers the police. . .
this is the House of Our Brothers in *carcere*. . .

I didn't get to hear the rest because a young woman said to me, ingenuously horrified by Pierre's implications: "But they *aren't* our brothers when they shoot at us. . ." How could I say it succinctly? How can I answer her surely enough and quickly enough, the loudspeakers blaring, standing on the platform in the light. Everyone hearing the Martial Music.

The Martial Music — Silently Waiting. Drowning out all our sound. Annie takes the microphone and says some fiery words. . . There's a great *orologio* that's lit till midnight in decorative floodlights. Everyone's eyes travel up to it once in a while.

When our speeches are over, it's a quarter to 12. I promised Isha, when she was full of fears, seeing the fire-ready cops and hearing paranoid stories, that I'd return at 5 or 10 to midnight. . . So I begin to make my way toward the *orologio* where the street to our hotel is connected to the piazza by a sort of *piazzetta* where the Carabinieri are mustered. Here we spend a few minutes — Julian says: They say they are all leaving at midnight, but I think everyone wants to stay around as long as possible.

A woman from the *Partito Radicale* is talking about nonviolence. I'm glad to hear it proclaimed so loudly. "*Stanotte faremo Cenerentola!*" (Tonight we'll play Cinderella) cry the *ex-incatenati*. . . We sit on a little stoop behind the police.

At 5 to 12 the police leave the *piazzetta*, except for one who stays to guard some official's car. . . The others retreat away from the piazza.

I return to the hotel. We stand in the window and hear at midnight: a countdown, and at zero — no police, no attack. A shout, as of victory, went up among those who remained in the piazza.

But the hunger strike and the chaining action, that's all over — they've wiped out the street theatre, and the people of Radio Alice are still in jails — in different jails, in fact, to separate one from the other.

Show enough guns and you won't need to fire a shot. . . How many burned for that false precept? I'm sorry we didn't perform.

No matter, it's all part of a somewhat laggard but unflinching cultural revolution.

In the evening we hie us to Radio Alice. It looks quite the same as when we went there last, despite the dramatic events that have taken place there since.

The published tapes that record the entry of the armed police into the station while the broadcast continues live on the air, "They are pointing machine guns at us. . . Our hands are in the air; they are. . ." make drama of the little rooms.

Here are the *ex-incatenati* in their own environment. The only technician left among them fled Bologna yesterday, in fear of the police terror, and none of those present are familiar enough with the technology to run the sound efficiently, but they bravely muddle through.

The talk is long and moving. Moving because we are talking with people whose

peaceful attitudes and mentality is evident in all they say — more than that, even in how they move, their expressions, their language, their Reichian postures — non-aggressive people — but they are at the end of their tether. . . The murder of Francesco LoRusso, the incarceration of their fellow workers, the police fears that are tangible in the air, visible in the streets, evident in the bittering of the sweet faces. . .

All that we say — and we say all that we know — seems abstract to them in their concrete situation.

Long after we are off the air — after more than an hour of talk — we go on, the same as when it was public — searching for the possibility that we all want, but that they can no longer believe in.

JUNE 15, 1977
BOLOGNA

It was a good show in the Palazzo dello Sport. The police were obviously pretty uptight at the outset — frisking everyone that came in and searching all handbags — thus creating the atmosphere of fear and the insecurity/distrust. . . terror that later led to the fracas. . . Even the *Assessore alla Cultura* was frisked, feeling rather strange that this should happen to him at a cultural event that he was sponsoring, but. . . I sat, as usual, in the circle, facing the door and the agitation of the uniformed police was almost distracting.


Great consternation in the Torture scene among them. . .

But all went well and I was in a good talk with two people interested in studying autogestion within a state-controlled school. . . I noticed Chris Creatore sitting at the exit/entrance rapping with soldiers and the police. . . I hear Sibilla suddenly shrieking. . . we look up — she's screaming with Malcolm in her arms — a circle of police around Chris; they are lifting him rather brutally and carrying him off. . .

I see Isha run towards them — soon all of us come running. . .

At first, we only demand to know what's happening, but get no civil answer. A plainclothes *capo* is directing the activity of the police, who respond like marionettes. A general shouting and confusion of protest results, and the more we are noisy, the more aggressively the police handle Chris. . .

We learn later that the origin of the difficulty was a demand by the police that Chris identify himself and he didn't do that, perhaps in the mistaken belief that our identity is part of our right of privacy in the face of the police. . .



JUNE 14, 1977
BOLOGNA

Alas and alack! Our identity *belongs* to them and we must give it them when they demand it.

They carry him a-ways and then put him down. He squirms under the heavy grasp, and the strength of his Tai-Chi-trained body, and his youthful vigor that defies curtailment makes it very hard for them to carry him.

And he shouts. And I shout and Julian shouts.

The *capo* orders him picked up again. We proceed another few feet from the stadium into the hallway that encircles it. Julian loudly demands from the *capo* what has happened — the *capo* says he wouldn't give his name and adds aggressively, "And what's *your* name?" And Julian shouts back. "My name is Julian Beck, and I am asking you what happened here." The *capo* orders the men to take Chris up again. We go down the hall; I'm shouting little moral lectures about the nature of violence that nobody wants to hear. . .

Isha comes shrieking along the hallway to Julian, into his arms— then out again, and to me, crying I want to go home. . .

Out in the rain, our bare feet in the puddles, I stand there with the LOVE and ANARCHISM texts in my hands. . . Trying to take Isha to the dressing room, running back into the fray after her.

They brusquely throw Chris into a police car. . .

Tom tries to get in to him (why do we do such things?) and then madly throws himself on top of the car — twice, he does this. . . And I shout at the police for being a bad example for Isha who screams when a second contingent arrives with shields and helmets and cocks their rifles, "They're putting *bullets* in their guns!" The cops drive away with Chris. All the police leave. We're standing there to our ankles in rainwater on a dark street.

Rehash. Blame. Plans. Self-reproach. Speculations. Not yet analysis. Chris will have to stay in overnight for an "*interrogatorio*" in the morning. . .

Julian and I feel we should have handled it better. It could have gone down calmer. I think it was only because we were on the high wave of the performance, our theatrical energy still potent.

Chris can't be "interrogated" — heard — till tomorrow. We try, but it's "No" all the way.

We perform without Chris. Leroy's the Victim. There are no police visible at the Sports Palace at all.

I had asked the Mayor if it were in their power to stop the police from frisking everyone as they came in, a practice we had never encountered anywhere and which set up an atmosphere of terror and bellicosity. But not even one cop tonight. . . Plainclothesmen everywhere.

Radio Alice opens the play, with a flute solo entering the opening meditation, followed by a letter from Alice to the Living which is a love letter. Read aloud in the concentration of the opening meditation it's very moving and sets a sad, sweet ambience for the performance which goes well.

Chris is still inside. We hear he's been beaten up.

We have one of those intense company talks, the kind that almost always follows group action in which there are arrests. Questions: Were our actions nonviolent? What is, in practice, nonviolent resistance?

On the street we are stopped several times and asked about Chris. Late in the day we hear that he was, in fact, pretty badly beaten. After the arrest, he was taken to the hospital — stitches in his head — the police say that he beat his own head against the wall! And the *Resto del Carlino* prints this! *L'Unita* assumes that he was violent. *Manifesto* and *Lotta Continua* support us. . .

In the afternoon we go to the Quartiere Mazzini, where we meet with a group for an "animation;" even as we try to set dates, the man from the Party tries to put up obstacles that are irritatingly stupid — and we're frustrated by his flak — but Julian says everyone saw this dumb tactic (I'm not sure).

A meeting on the piazza — a woman speaking ardently, but blurred by a fierce sound system. It's a Partito Radicale meeting about abortion, and it has called out truckloads of the different armed forces who are parked at each entrance to the piazza — the army, the Carabinieri, the Vigili Urbani, the Questura. . .

We sip our *caffè freddo* in the sun, calmly surrounded by this armed might, hearing the voice of a woman, telling passersby the news of our jailed *compagno*.

JUNE 20, 1979
BOLOGNA

Much consternation in the company that Chris is not released this morning, and they're saying tomorrow, maybe — maybe a few days — Ugh!

Everyone suggests different tactics. Fears of a bust if we act dramatically, Fears of Expulsion if there's a bust. There'll be a meeting about it tonight, after the Public Acts.

A good performance in sunshine in the Mazzini *quartiere*. Pierre makes a fantastic Blood Speech about Kim Sek Jong — orphaned by the American Army, adopted by Americans who re-named him Chris Creatore, imprisoned by the Bolognese police. . .

II/13 Photo: Matthew Geller, 1979



JUNE 16, 1977
BOLOGNA

JUNE 17, 1979
BOLOGNA

Radio Alice— Free Radio

Collective A/Traverso

After the events of March 1977, *Radio Alice* became the symbol of the free radios. It was emitted from Bologna, one of the strongholds of the ICP and the explicit showcase for the Historical Compromise.

When the accusation of obscenity was flung at us, we were a little disconcerted. We had thought about many possible accusations: pirate station, underminers, communists, subversives, but we did not anticipate this one. But that's natural and proper. Language, when it is freed from the sublimations which reduce it to the code and makes desire and the body speak, is obscene (literally: obscene).

The body, sexuality, the desire to sleep in the morning, the liberation from labor, the possibility to be overwhelmed, to make oneself unproductive and open to tactile, uncodified communication: all this has for centuries been hidden, submerged, denied, unstated. *Vade Retro, Satanas.*

The blackmail of poverty, the discipline of labor, hierarchical order, sacrifice, fatherland, family, general interests, socialist blackmail, participation: all that stifled the voice of the body. All our time, forever and always, devoted to labor. Eight hours of work, two hours of travel, and, afterward, rest, television, and dinner with the family.

Everything which is not confined within the limits of that order is obscene. Outside it smells like shit.

THE VOICE OF THOSE PUSHED ASIDE

All the "unstated" is emerging: from the *Chants de Maldoror* to the struggles for reducing the work-day. It speaks in the Paris Commune and in Artaud's poetry, it speaks in Surrealism and in the French May, in the Italian Autumn and in immediate liberation; it speaks across the separate orders of the language of rebellion. Desire is given a voice, and for them, it is obscene.

Alice looks around, plays, jumps, wastes time in the midst of papers illuminated by the sun, runs ahead, settles down elsewhere.

And yet everything functions in the order of discourse.

Discourse connects, explains, allows no interruptions, organizes, participates, reprimands. . .

Like an invitation to talk with you about your work where they don't give you anything to eat.

Silence.

The subject has changed.

Pant, hiss, don't think you're right.

The silence, the uncanny, the "unstated," that which remains to be said, , frightens.

In the program, so many dense headings, as dense as in a newspaper. . . A half-hour with your Carlo. . . Cheek to cheek with folks. . . All that Jazz. . . 1, 2, 3 o'clock bulletin.

Alice hisses, yells, contemplates, interrupts herself, pulls.

Go tell him that it's spring.

We have received a telephone call from the Technological Institute: "We have occupied the president's office and we are calling from his phone, listen how he yells. . . He wanted to impose upon us a vote by a show of hands and then he'd shove it up our ass."

It's better that way.

The discourse of order's desire for power

or the power of desire against the order of discourse.

Radio for the participants

or radio for the uncanny?

In the first case the language is univocal: the announcer's, who announces that the event has happened. They talk about something which means something else and can therefore never be captured because it is over.

A mirror.

In this sense, attempts at imitation are pathetically ridiculous: dialects and accents are not tolerated. In the second case something continues to flee from language. This is manifest in outbursts of laughter, words in suspension, the word which cannot be found and which refuses to change into another one, stammering, silence.

Well, "let's talk about the uncanny."

One cannot pass from one discourse to another (from inside Italian Radio to outside Italian Radio).

The subject changes? The new subject is collective and does not speak.

Or speaks when it wants to.

Silence: a hole.

Let's allow holes to grow, let's not fear orifices, let's fall into them and pass on elsewhere.

Wonderland.

Another direct phone call:

"We are workers on strike, we want you to play some music and we want to talk to you about the 35 hour week, it's time they talked about that in contracts."

Another direct phone call:

"Dirty communists, we're going to make you pay dearly for this radio station, we know who you are."

Another direct one:

"We are from the anti-fascist committee of the Rizzoli Hospital, don't worry about anything, and call us if something happens, we are here night and day."

Break the cycle of the valorization of capital in the process of circulation of the sign-value (no more appropriation of merchandise to interrupt the A-M-A' cycle, but a savage strike in the circulation of the single sign-value A-A').

Interrupt the language of machines, of the work-ethic, of productivity.

"An invitation not to get up this morning, to stay in bed with someone, to make musical instruments and war devices for yourself."

GRAY, OBTUSE, DANGEROUS

Gray are the coats of the cops who have imprisoned comrade Bifo, gray are their instruments of death. Gray is the prison where he has been locked up, gray are the bedroom communities, gray are the streets of the business district. Obtuse is the constable who holds in his hand the hoods of his colleagues who rummage through the comrade's effects, obtuse are the police who for three months recorded the phone calls (what are we having for dinner today? let's get together on this), obtuse is television. Dangerous are the organs of repression, dangerous because of the latest submachine gun model, dangerous is the judge who arrests first then looks for proof. Dangerous are the roads and squares infested with the angels of death of a system always more minoritarian, dangerous are the factories and the shipyards, dangerous to decide whether or not to let a child see the light of day.

Gray, obtuse, dangerous, they want to impose their scale on the world: gray, obtuse, dangerous.

The totalitarian society of capital lives on the monotonous repetition of the existent. It serves the owners, the cops, the judges. None of them are indispensable to the structure they serve.

They make a life of shit the only model of life possible.

But communism is young and beautiful.

COMMUNIQUE No. 2 — from the San Giovanni in Monte Prison, 3/20/76. They ar-

rested me on the fifteenth, submachine guns in hand, in the house where I was sleeping with my comrades. First they accused me of belonging to the Red Brigades. In the space of two days this accusation became so ridiculous that they had to invent another one. So they accused me of being the ideological organizer of an incredible series of criminal plots committed in Bologna in the last few months.

Not the slightest bit of proof of these subversive activities that were supposed to have been mine exists. They are trying to give a recognizable appearance to the incomprehensible (for Power) course of liberation located in the space of separ/Action, of ignor/Action which constructs liberating spaces and moments of collective transformation of existence.

But then let them say it clearly:

The practice of happiness is subversive when it becomes collective.

Our will for happiness and liberation is their terror, and they react by terrorizing us with prison, when the repression of work, of the patriarchal family, and of sexism is not enough.

But then let them say it clearly:

To conspire means to breathe together.

And that is what we are accused of, they want to prevent us from breathing because we have refused to breathe in isolation, in their asphyxiating places of work, in their individuating familial relationships, in their atomizing houses.

There is a crime I confess I have committed:

It is the attack against the separation of life and desire, against sexism in inter-individual relationships, against the reduction of life to the payment of a salary.

But then let them say it clearly:

It is dada that terrorizes the gray, the obtuse, the dangerous.

Guardians of order and of the exploitation of poverty — for them, the transversal writing which runs through the separate orders and reunites isolated behaviors is not just obscene, any more, it is a *crime*.



**THE UNCANNY IS
WHAT MAKES ME
CRAZY**

What makes me crazy is the uncanny. Bifo, Fontana, and Marchi are in prison.² Bifo, Fontana, and Marchi are still in prison; Bifo, Fontana, and Marchi are always in prison. There isn't a single comrade who does not ask me, "And what do we do now?" Silence. And they take advantage of our silence. A month has already passed. But it was like a month in the mind of someone who isn't thinking: an instant. A month has already passed since the arrest of Bifo and we have not gotten him out of there. There is no proof, it's all a plot, we know it. And now what do we do? And now what do we do? We must do something, I want to do something, it isn't true that we are powerless before the monsters, the angels of death, the gray, the obtuse, the dangerous, I cannot keep quiet much longer.


They have killed Mario Salvi³ in Rome. Silence.

Either the prison must explode or my head must explode. Radio Alice is quiet, the comrades are quiet, they invent words, the habitual masks. They don't speak and they don't even have any ideas. Lethargy. We are already creating the little ghetto: we are or we are not wild cats running through the town. Let's not give free rein to our jailers, strike the tiger's heart every day, in every way, according to our differences, against the sadness and the solitude of cells of confinement, 24 hours of air. This is an invitation to speak and to think, and invitation to be always present in the situations in the town the neighborhoods the schools the barracks the factories the roads, let's exhaust the enemy, let's wear out the giant monster by beating it all over its body. Let's not talk about desires anymore, let's desire: we are desiring machines, machines of war.

*Translated by Richard Gardner
& Sybil Walker*

1. San Vittore: a prison in Milan. San Giovanni in Monte: a prison in Bologna.
2. Fontana, Marchi: Bolognese students thrown in jail.
3. Mario Salvi was killed in the vicinity of the judiciary prison in Rome after a motorcyclist launched a Molotov cocktail against the prison.

II/1 Felix Guattari with staff of Radio Alice Sept. 1977 Photo Marion Scemama
II/2 Photo: D. Cortez



The City in the Female Gender

Lia Magale

Lia Magale is a Roman feminist writer.

This personal and subjective reading of some writings by women is not, let it be clear, a mini-history of "feminist thought," nor the attempt to propose an analysis of the different theories circulating in the Movement. Nor is it the reconstruction, through the words of other women, of a speech of mine on Roman feminism. What is it then?

Nothing more than statements, impressions, itineraries which are, together with so many others, memories, in the memory of feminism, in the memory of women who have lived through splendid and tiring years of revolt, rigor, intransigence, weakness. They are also my memories.

And the difficulty of clarifying a work that revealed itself only in action, only when concretely experienced, during which "a lot" and its opposite have been experienced: self-control inspired by the desire for an identity, a constant loss in the absence of desires. Committing the sin of speaking under the influence of cultural reminiscences, a synthesis reached by forgetting any language. A body loved and hated in its incessant presence. Differences put into practice, similarities loved. Power refused, fought even in its minimal creation-recreation; attraction for power. Guilty feelings, loss of inhibitions. Sexuality. Sexuality.

READING ONESELF IN MUSIC

Suspension of sexuality. Seduction in words, meaning, speech and then finally, why not, self-disclosure.

All this required the creation of another time. It has been said: "Woman's time is woman's time." Tautological, or maybe another dimension, where the production of meaning does not consist of the production of exchange value, but primarily of the experimentation on oneself.

On the cover of an issue of *Differences*, the magazine of the Roman collectives, there is a score by Schönberg.

"The idea came up almost by chance. We were pondering over time, on the many types of woman's time: on work time and love time, on "free" time and "liberated" time, on research time. One of us put forward the idea of having an hourglass on the cover, an ancient instrument of timekeeping. Then musical time came to mind, perhaps just by playing on words. Someone else suggested putting the score of a Schönberg piece on the cover, a piece called "All in due time." Later, we were not able to trace that score. In the meantime we had started discussing Schönberg, whom some of us loved, some did not, and others knew little about. It seemed that the contrasting readings offered on Schönberg were relevant to us: the drama of dissolution of tonality and the ultimate failure in the attempt to construct a new musical norm, said somebody. Others did not agree. Atonality and 12-tone music, breakdown of the old order and the impossibility of a "spontaneous" and non-painful journey towards a new order of things..."

(The women of the Center Collective).

A time that invokes multiplicity...

BEING IN TOUCH WITH THE UNCONSCIOUS

"The subjugation of the feminine (in woman, naturally, but also in man) has produced a body that is no longer possessed by desires, but by the laws of marketing, by a desire that does not enter the body but is bartered in a game that reduces life to economic laws with death as its end. The destruction of the feminine is the thread that runs through and accompanies the destruction of humanity, its disintegration through inhuman role constraints, the colonization of existence, the parcelization of time and space, the upholding of the purported objectivity of consciousness over the flux of the unconscious. The progressive separation-estrangement of the masculine from the feminine, and of the feminine from itself results in the fictional appearance of woman on the scene; results in the disappearance of pleasure, which is seen as feminine and nonproductive, rather than economic and productive. Woman becomes the opposite of something else, the opposite of a man, therefore a being that cannot exist by herself. A move to help us go beyond the stage of not-being-fully-realized yet no-longer-lacking-something must be the rejection of the vision of ourselves as women-holes, women separated from our livable feminine, and therefore condemned to the nonlivable. This entails disrupting the usual manner of speaking, narrating, by means of incisive, forceful fragments of desires, dreams, unconscious states. It entails refraining from the whining accounts of one's misery, attacking the mechanism that not only produces repression in the unconscious, but that represses the unconscious itself. This calls for a project to research the diversity of women, not their identity. It entails capsizing the reality principle and considering desires the true reality..."

(Marilina)

But desire, such a magic word, sometimes expresses itself in a strange manner, as a "suspension" of desire.

"It is not easy to talk about sexuality; however, we stubbornly switch from the psychosomatic code to the linguistic one hoping to compare a greater number of experiences. The opposition woman-man, the ancient root of our disfranchisement, of our obstructed self-assertion, impinges on our workaday reality, forcing us to make painful choices, and, often, approximate ones, causing the separation

to appear hard and problematic. In my life, as a woman who long ago rejected the role of reproducer of the species, the alienation of motherhood, who chose to be separated from man even sexually, the sense of oppression continues, leaving me with rare moments of lucidity, when I realize that my negative relationship with the world derives from the fact that I introjected the law of "do ut des," in producing, if even just an image of myself, in order to show to myself that I exist.

So while the drive to produce still lingers within me in the form of a necessity to create, the annoyance and the futility of a quantifying test of myself drive me into a state of sexual "suspension," apparently devoid of needs and desires, but critical and active nonetheless.

I do not know how one comes out of such a quantitative abstraction of life. The certainty of a theory or the acquisition of practice does not reassure me. I only know that every time I move away from this "suspension," my emotions wane and I become more aware of my oppression.

(Bianca)

Then one looks for a way beyond, for stepping beyond oneself, for ways to use the body as a bridge.

"The pleasure I am talking about is something more than pleasure; it is something in excess of it, not the satisfaction of a desire, but something that exceeds the possibilities that desire had foreseen. Something that, starting from totality, ends up exceeding it: a totality without remainder, a sum without exclusion, a place with no limits. A sense of *complement*, probably, a sense of fullness that goes beyond that of a cup already full to the brim. The copresence of all the fullness and emptiness I am able to feel. I am. A relationship with myself that works perfectly. Ecstasy. One in tune with the whole, without the need of explanation. To get in touch with the whole without feeling overpowered. My body occupies a space that feels right. I am my body. It is a duration, time disappears. Death is no longer measurable. I do not wonder any more if I am realized, fulfilled, if I correspond to what I think I should be. I am not any more at the planning stage. Not an abstract identity, but existence, not a focusing but a diffusion. Everything within everything else, everywhere, always at the same time. *Complement* is not planned any more, it is not a goal to reach, it is an excess, an extra."

(The women of Studio Ripetta)

One may object: "What narcissism!" Why not! Since representation is history, and women have never been history, but just "le repos du guerrier," a warm lap to come back to, then why not start creating a character out of ourselves!

Little comedy in one act:

"To Be or Not to Be"

After a whole day spent at the television center, pushed from the first floor to the second, then back again to the first, going around in circles and getting nothing accomplished, Antonella and I drove back downtown.

Since Antonella is angry, and when she is, she usually goes and lets it out through exercise, she doesn't come along to our meeting. She drops me off, not at the bus stop, but on the opposite side of the street, even though it's raining cats and dogs. So I say to her: "Watch. I'm going to act out our depression." I get off, cross the street calmly, then I stand under the stop sign, erect, at attention, with my head high, like a heroine, amidst the amazement of the bystanders, who are huddling around their umbrellas, and those without one, who stand flat against a building to find shelter. I feel beautiful, standing on the curb, as though on a ship's upper deck. Out of the corner of my eye, I see Antonella laugh, go into first gear, and drive away.

When I arrive at the meeting, soaking wet, Marinella is frightened: "What happen-

ed?" I tell her, she laughs. I try to represent myself, act out the inconsistencies, contradictions, how I play, desire, labor. It's not enough for me just to give an account of myself. Behind that pointing finger, raised to accuse, I want to hear not only "I heard you!" but also "I saw you!" Yes, this character of mine is positively political."

(Alessandra)

TO GEORGIANA

In Rome the Feminist Movement has always been given a political label, appropriately so for a Movement that negotiates for women. Rome has been the place of the great demonstrations, of the occupation of the Women's House, of the organized struggle in the hospitals to guarantee the right to abort. The debates within the Movement have always taken into account the problem of the "outside," the "outside" meaning the "institutions," "male politics," "the relationship with the other oppressed." And in Rome, more than everywhere else, women brought about the eruption of major contradictions within the parties of the extreme and institutional left. It is here they participated in the Movement's meeting of 1977. It is in Rome Giorgiana Masi, at seventeen, died on March 12, 1977, assassinated during a protest march. Her feminist comrades could just write poetic words in her memory, but they covered every wall with them, to keep the memory alive.

... IF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

HAD BEEN IN MAY

IF YOU WERE STILL ALIVE

IF I WERE NOT IMPOTENT IN THE FACE OF YOUR ASSASSINATION

IF MY PEN WERE A VICTOR'S WEAPON

IF MY FEAR EXPLODED IN THE SQUARES

A COURAGE BORN OF THE ANGER STRANGLER IN MY THROAT

IF HAVING KNOWN YOU WOULD BECOME OUR STRENGTH

IF THE FLOWERS WE GAVE

TO YOUR COURAGEOUS LIFE IN OUR DEATH

WOULD AT LEAST BECOME WREATHS

IN THE STRUGGLE OF ALL US WOMEN

IF...



IT WERE NOT WORDS TRYING TO AFFIRM LIFE
BUT LIFE ITSELF, WITHOUT ADDING MORE.

**N POWER,
S REFUSAL,
S VULGARITIES**

We were talking about politics, which also implies organization. Consequently, the big problem of power came in. The power of the opposition man/woman and woman/woman.

"What bothered me most was the continuous repetition of "we are half, we are half, we are half." Are we half or do we want half? Are we half of the clear, beautiful, wild, but never conventional sky, or do we want to eat our half of the cake here on earth. I do not want half of what there is today, of those values I refuse and fight. I want the unity of the sky, even though I am only half the sky. I do not refuse anything, I want everything. But I do not want what exists already, I want what I create, what is created through struggle."

(Lia)

"If one grants the inevitable distortions faced in talking about the vast theoretical, practical aspects of the Movement, one can then summarize in three fundamental points all the themes on power: 1) analysis of power and of the powers of the male society divided in classes; 2) analysis of the power relations created within the Women's Movement; 3) the elaboration of a liberation plan with regard to power. In other words, in accordance with the feminist attention paid to the known dynamic forces intrinsic in every human aggregation, and to its usual repetition of the Oedipal triangle, women are slowly investigating the power wielded by the father-mother side, and the prospect, now still utopian, of a social collective independent from the rules of the Oedipal game.

From the streets, theoretical and strategic problems are transferred to the small space of little groups and collectives. Does the women's revolt aim at a greater acquisition of power or at its total refusal? Will the obdurate search for "identity," the "new subjectivism," bring about new independence, male and female, and lead to the consequent disappearance of sexual roles, because they will prove useless? Or, on the contrary, will it become the social basis for a new female power?

An analysis of the subjective intentions of the Movement will reveal its anti-reformist character: individual emancipation and emancipation as a political program are rejected because considered an expression of integrationist subordination and a source of division among women.

Within political collectives, and also in small consciousness-raising or depth-analysis groups, the masculine and feminine roles, the maternal and paternal roles recreate themselves through the intricate inter-relationships of leadership and delegation, complicity and discomfort that emerge from the progressive discovery of individual differences. As soon as the political definition of "identity against" collapses and the male *qua* opposition fuses with a hypothetical "outside," it is the inside of the collective that is threatened by a reflection of the male-female bipolarity, under the guise of aggression-passivity. The woman who is able to take the floor more easily becomes, in the Movement, a typical figure of male power. Power, in fact, takes the form of a tendency to exclude someone different from oneself and to solidify a collective usage into linguistic and ideologic norm. Word power is therefore exerted by women who appear to be sexually repressed and with dependency needs.

Since the exercise of power always refers to a relationship of seduction and therefore to reciprocal dependency, the reverse of "word power" is "silence power," springing from old feminine seductive guiles (beauty, sweetness, emotionality, instinctivity). Anyway, what feminism intuits is that the first type of domination, which is considered the more dangerous because 'more introjected and omnipresent,' is not less real than the second, since it too is a distorted and

partial reflection of the real relationships of power active in the so-called "outside."

(Biancamaria)

**WHAT OF THE BIG
DEMONSTRATIONS?
50,000 WOMEN
IN THE STREETS**

A special date was November 1976. For the first time Roman women would take to the streets, not to claim something, but to make a direct affirmation of their presence. Together they would claim the night for themselves. This demonstration followed three days of debates, when the discovered unity of Roman feminism became manifest as a practical possibility of collective work. In short: a high point of the Movement. From that moment on, we would be facing new problems, but let's go back to the demonstration.

"Roman feminists marched at night against violence. Many were heavily made up. The group went through the neighborhood of Stazione Termini, Rome's train terminal, a place frequented by the poorest prostitutes, a place of the most profound and public submission. Mimicking prostitution, the visceral and nightly feminine, cut off from the awareness of itself, enacted, behind the screen of upturned signification, under its own eyes and those of the men waiting in ambush on the sidewalks, the usual ceremony of the come-on. In so doing, the Roman feminists experienced prostitution, 'retravelling' the condition of the harem.

A march in the night. The women hollered Third-World come-ons, pressing close, huddling, bearing torches. Clothes were used as a sexual signal, a negative one for the men who watched on the sidewalks, a positive one for the women. Repossessing, claiming prostitution, 'retravelling' our condition of sexual signals, facing the provocation coming from the sidewalk, from the 'outside', meant facing collectively, politically the tunnel of regression. Being with other women, experiencing again the condition of imprisonment, the intimacy that blinds and divides, the impossible communication of contact; going beyond the historical ritualism, the oblique expression (Achilles' slaves mourn 'using Patroclus as a pretext/ each her own sorrow'); penetrating deliberately the aphasia that tries to remedy its shortcomings through body language; all this means experimenting, in a conscious and explicit way, the inevitable, non-programmatic solidarity of the regressive condition. It is regression with a progressive value that the Women's Movement introduces in the political universe."

(Elisabetta)

As we were saying, something had to change. It is the beginning of the clash between the women for the Movement and those who gravitate toward Autonomy. The problem of violence, the handling of women's violence, the use of force



become divisive issues at every meeting. The Movement loses its homogeneity with regard to the "outside." The new debate must deal with terrorism, the armed struggle.

ICELESS
S

"I would like to begin by paraphrasing Artaud, by saying that never more than today has there been so much talk about the State and politics, when it is life itself that escapes us. There is a strange parallelism between the generalized collapse of life which is at the core of the present discouragement, and the problem of a political course of action that never harmonized with life, and that is imposed on it. Two years ago, when we came out, almost en masse, of the new-leftist organizations, we more or less said the same things. Today we still say that we must talk about life, perhaps not aiming at discovering in the midst of the day-to-day reality the existence of that "feminine identity" that we carried/carry glued to our skin, which, one day, in different times, we defined as "woman is beautiful."

But I do not think that to proceed straight, to have, if we only want, hopes, we must prefigure something: our identity, the state, life. After all, I do not think that it is even necessary to program them. I do not think that our future planned/plannable identity is a set of mosaic pieces, a series of assembled little victories. I do not believe in any form of survival one is able to come up when the need arises. Yet, most certainly, I constantly live with the forms of survival I make up as I go along. Hopeless? No, hope is the last to die, but I must admit that these hopes of mine are faceless, and why not, timeless.

Nothing is more attached to the past than our imagination. My past, everybody's past, I only accept it as a learning process. I categorically reject it as nostalgia. The nostalgia of those who would rouse our affection for the state and enfold us in organizations, as women, workers, young people, families, etc. The nostalgia of those who would muster us for an armed struggle and organize us in brigades, nuclei, lines.

A geometry that, to be sure, rejects a self-transparency made up of truths and certainties over that achieved through the effort to know oneself, the difficulty to endure the discovery of the nonlinearity of ourselves, the discovery of our multiplicity, the effort exerted not to kill any part of ourselves.

The destructuring of thought concerned with finality, i.e. planning, projection, world view, seems to me an obligatory step to remove from ourselves the weight of ideology, a necessary step to arrive at the process of creation. For this reason, we must live with our continuous inventions of survival, without strongly believing in them, but, at the same time, without the negativity of letting ourselves merely exist. Our faceless hopes are the only possibility to know, love, acknowledge ourselves and to be able to love. Maybe I am only speaking of my life, but I want to speak of my life. Going back to Artaud, I want to add that today it is unthinkable for us who have undertaken a physical and cognitive journey that took us through factories, neighborhoods, local and national meetings; a journey that went on inside us, in the unmasking of our personal relationships; we who concerned ourselves with the politics of the great systems down to the politics of dish-washing; we who analyzed dynamic forces and the subconscious, as I was saying, it is unthinkable for us not to place at the center of our analysis life itself, and not any longer "what is the right identity in order to live." Around us we see alternative survival tactics, idealized and ideologized: from creative workers to heroin addicts, to those who practice "the refusal of work," to those who choose to be Communist fighters. In the face of these Choices, all with capital 'c', because, in the end, they kill all other possible choices, how can we talk about the political crisis without talking about our ideas on life?"

Even a debate on terrorism is organized.

"First I would like to analyze the "political" side of terrorist action, which comes within that category of political strategies rejected by us women: loss of control on the lower levels, absolute delegation, total and absolute split of the political


from the private; a political course of action that forces one to an either/or situation—with us or against us. On violence, I would like to hear more concrete discussions, without lapsing in such abstractions as 'everything is violence,' 'everybody practices it.' Nor do I consider it right that those who reject the planned and specific type of violence must right away be labeled pacifists. I am not a pacifist, but I believe that political choices must be made in the present, now. From a general historical point of view, there is an enormous difference between homicides and the political violence practiced now, and a situation of revolutionary mass violence. We are forced to the usual modes of survival: either total emancipation, total identification with man or becoming super-emancipated terrorists or super-emancipated women within State institutions, in the midst of the usual forms of 'emargination.' I think, therefore, that it is vital not to remain silent, but to denounce, as we have always done, even this form of physical and political violence. Since political violence is denounced nowadays by those in power in a generic and 'instrumentalized' manner, to serve their political aims, only we women can reiterate the condemnation of the various levels of violence of which the physical type is just the tip of the iceberg. Just as we have learned that rape is a repressive weapon turned against women, since it keeps fear alive, and with it high levels of moral and psychological violence practiced on women.

Let us go back, therefore, we women, to denounce the levels of violence one wants to hide, and our complicity, too. Let's denounce all that through the centuries has kept us divided and incapable of rebelling; the present attempt to assert ourselves on the level of emancipation, a level for which we don't possess yet a plan and a fight strategy. In fact we are, on the subject of emancipation, still divided and subordinate to man. In the Movement we condemned emancipation as a simple request of equality to man, an equality that proves to be false, because it forces us to be equal to him in work, sexuality, choice of values, robbing us of our identity. However criticism of emancipation has only remained theoretical, because it is still to be translated in a practice that would help handle our individual relationship with work, politics, man.

(Michi)

One more statement.

"To give an example, I will say that I have asked myself what I would do if I met an ex-terrorist along the way and if she needed help, i.e. a house, a little affection, someone to trust, that is. Well, I think I would help her with great fear to 'make a new start,' as the expression goes. Fear of what? To become part of the political persecution that hits anyone suspected of being a fellow traveller. The fact is that, because of this fear, I would fall into a pattern of behavior, that as a



woman I know well, the one used by mothers with their daughters when they cover up for them with father: 'I will help you, but you must guarantee that you won't get me in trouble.' That amounts to being a kind of father substitute, which in this case is the State. Worse, one becomes a moral and guilt-producing figure. Fine result after so many years of struggle when I proclaimed with others the respect for diversity. The fact is that, in the hypothetical case I put forth, the diversity would be reduced to nil, if not by me or the woman in question, by the logic of terrorism itself: 'with me or against me.' Undoubtedly terrorism must be rejected through words and actions because it does not propose but impose. But I have many doubts about the fact that the female presence in terrorist organizations is totally to be ascribed to the subordinate character of the women who made that choice. Behind it, I believe, there is a subjective and objective situation. If I just go back two years, the memory emerges of the big break among women. Feminists clearly split from the supporters of Autonomy, a break that marked a division not only between two ways of understanding women's politics, but also between two generations. What has happened since then? We have talked so much between emancipation and liberation. To be emphatic, between the two words we put a dash, useful visually but too vague practically; perhaps we have to start from here to understand what is happening among women now.

Emancipation, in our country, implies going through a political organization much more than the job world. The 'double militancy' has been a specifically Italian phenomenon, because in the opposition between emancipation and liberation, the political militancy in the organizations has been for many of us the only thing that saved us from dangling in the abyss that divided us from liberation, in the absence of a bridge. Now the question arises if, in the last two years, we have gone all out to develop a plan of action that will not systematically exclude many women different from us because of age and social level. I firmly believe that feminism has transformed society, and I would add, all women in an irreversible manner; however, I do not believe that our political strategies have been sufficiently modified by the coming on the scene of different feminist levels. For this reason nowadays it is no longer possible to define a woman as being more feminist than another. The same phenomenon of feminist terrorism, in fact, goes back, in part, to the radical way in which we disassociated ourselves from every kind of institutional politics during the last years.

When political disintegration is great, it is hard to single out the enemy with precision, so that one turns to the most symbolic and eternal enemy there is: the State. I believe instead that feminism has still a lot to say about the nature of the opposition, and I also believe that it can be defined in more present terms behind what disguise the eternal enemy is hiding. According to me, this must be done quickly, because it is an illusion that the thousand streams that form feminism at this time will automatically become a single great river. Some of these streams are already becoming big lakes where the consciousness of many women stagnates.

(Manuela)

At this point my memory becomes presence. And if one must talk about presence, one must do so in a different manner. The right side and the reverse of our history are mixed, and if one remembers the right side any more, one speaks about it more easily, as these writings bear out. Without doubt, it is the reverse—the changes, the sensibilities, the dynamic forces—that sets the pace, the return of possibility. So then of the presence one will speak some other time.

Translated by Vincenzo Buonocore

11/1-4 Leisa Stroud Photos: D. Cortez



Reading makes me sick. I have a ton of books here. But reading makes me sick. 195 days in jail. 196 days in jail. 197 days. 198. 199. 200 days in jail. Hurray, let's have a drink. When I get out I'm going to settle on one of Saturn's rings so nobody can ever again break MY BALLS! ! ! 201 days in jail. 202 days in jail. 203 days in jail. 204 days in jail and so on. 205 days in jail. 206 days in jail. 207 days in jail. 208 days in jail. And 209 da . . . wait a minute, the other day, my 206th day in jail, was my birthday . . . FUCK . . . 210 days in jail I hate you you make me sick. 211 days in jail. 212 days in jail. How will things be when I get out? Normal? 213 days in jail. I've learned how to sew. Yesterday I had sex with a man. First I took it — then I gave it. I couldn't jerk off any more, I'd had enough of that. He is very young. 214, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 220 days in jail. Uh, 221 days in jail. 222 days in jail 223 days in jail 224 days in jail. 225 days in jail. 226 days in jail. Today there are some new arrivals. Three men sent up for armed robbery. A murderer. And a purse-snatcher. 227 days in jail. 228 days in jail. 229 days in jail. 230, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 DAYS IN JAIL. 240 days, eight months in jail. Today I saw Darla. I saw her a month ago too. The way she looks at me is different from before. . . . I'm afraid she doesn't love me any more. 241 days in jail. Dling-sdling. It's nightlma. They've woken me up. ENOUGH WITH THAT FUCKING NOISE . . . I'M HERE . . . WHERE DO YOU THINK I'M GOING? . . . 242. Days in jail. 243 days in jail. 244 days in jail and 245. Days less to do in jail. Up your ass with this shit, I won't give you the satisfaction of killing you like dogs so you can beat me for the next 246 days in jail. 247 days in jail. 248 days in jail. 249 days in jail. 250 days in jail. Tried speed, heroin, acid, opium, grass, and hash. Uh. In one week, I've put my head outside this shitty jail, they can't stop me from doing everything. My brain is mine . . . in jail. 251 days in jail. 252 days in jail. 253 days in jail. 254 days in jail. 255, 6, 7, 8, 9, 260 days in jail. SDLING, SDLING. It's night again. the 261st night of the 261st day in jail. 263 days in jail. 264 days in jail. 265 days in jail. I'd like to sleep through 500 days of freedom on an iceberg and I wouldn't give a fuck whether I died from pneumonia. . . . 266 days in jail, 268 days in jail. 269. 260 days in jail. 271, 72, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 280 days in jail. I'm afraid. SOLITUDE IS A DARK ARMY ON THE HORIZON. . . . 281 days in jail. Bum. 283 days in jail. Bum. 284 days in jail. Bum. 285 days in jail. Bum. 286 days in jail. Bum. 287 days in 288 days in, 289 days in JAIL. Aitallallallallall. Who remembers anything . . . when I came . . . It must have been a — 290 days in jail — Thursday. A Thursday in jail. 291 days in jail. 293 days in jail. 294 days in jail. That guy in the next cell has finished his sentence. Lucky him. Ten years. Maybe I'll make it too. 295 days in jail. Uh. 296 days in jail 297 days, 98, 99. THREE HUNDRED DAYS IN JAIL. Was there a suicide last night? Ah,

3 April 7 Arrests

Anatomy of Autonomy

Bifo

Franco Berardi, alias "Bifo", was one of the main figures of the Movement of '77 in Bologna. He was arrested at that time under the charge of "subversive association". We asked Bifo to write the following presentation on the context in which the Movement developed and the problems it had to confront up to, and after, the April 7 arrests.

On April 7, twenty-two militants and intellectuals from Padua, Rome, Milano and Torino were arrested. What they have in common is their participation, until 1973, in the group Workers' Power (*Potere Operaio*) which then dissolved and became an element in the movement of *Autonomia*. They were arrested on the charge of leading the Red Brigades, the strongest of terrorist organizations in Italy. And in particular, they are accused of directing the kidnapping and execution of Aldo Moro, head of the governing Christian Democratic party. There are no grounds and no proof whatsoever for these charges. And practically everyone in Italy who has read a newspaper knows it. It is not only false that the militants of Autonomy and the intellectuals arrested on April 7 directed the Red Brigades, but, in fact, the political and theoretical lines of the Red Brigades diverge drastically from those of the individuals arrested. Essentially what is clear in all this operation is that the prosecution—and thus its sponsoring agency, the government—has decided to make this group of intellectuals pay for the last 10 years of mass revolutionary struggle in Italy. The government thinks it can succeed, and that the balance of power may be shifted decisively to its advantage. But we can make no sense at all of the actions taken by the government during these past months if we do not understand at least some things about the political situation in Italy, and about the Italian revolutionary movement:

FIRST: The crisis of Capitalism and of the Italian State subsequent to the workers' struggle during the Sixties.

SECOND: The Historical Compromise, an attempt to get beyond this crisis and to defeat the revolutionary movement.

THIRD: The novelty of the revolutionary movement for Autonomy with respect to the historical Socialist and Marxist Workers' Movement; its theoretical originality and its political praxis, as seen in 1977.

FOURTH: The problem of the civil war, and of the Red Brigades.

The experience of the revolutionary movement in Italy, from 1968 to 1979, is unquestionably the richest and the most meaningful within the capitalist West. To comprehend the novel elements that this experience contains we have to look at the theoretical and organizational currents that come to a head in *Potere Operaio*—until 1973—and are then dispersed and articulated in various organizational forms within "Workers' Autonomy" (*Autonomia Operaia*).

It is precisely because the progress of the workers and of Autonomy constitutes the most interesting and essential element of the entire revolutionary movement in Italy during these 12 years that we should consider the repressive initiative on the part of the judiciary in Padua. It is the Paduan court which was responsible for the arrest of most of the militants and intellectuals who took part in the movement. And the court's action must be seen as a real attempt at a final solution, an attack directed toward the elimination of those forces that constitute the elements of continuity in the history of the revolutionary movement, those forces that have provided the catalyst for very significant theoretical departures.

I. In order to understand the history of the last 10 years in Italy, we must start with the wave of conflicts begun in 1968 at universities and at some factories (Montedison in Portomarghera, FATME in Rome, FIAT in Torino). Spreading then, throughout the following year, in the "troubled autumn" of 1969, the conflict eventually involved all the Italian working class in strikes, demonstrations, take-overs, and acts of sabotage. During those two years of struggle a division occurred between the Left and the Workers' Movement. And in the following years this division produced a variety of organizations to the left of the Italian Communist Party—outside the official Workers' Movement, at the local level, and in the factories and schools.

During the same period, the group Workers' Power (*Potere Operaio*) was formed at the national level; it was composed of smaller groups already in existence: the Workers' Committee at Portomarghera, groups for workers' power in Padua and Emilia, and a part of the student movements at Rome and Florence. In September, 1969, the PO consolidated itself and began publishing a newspaper by the same name.

But to understand the political and theoretical ferment underlying the creation of the PO, we should first of all say more about the new organizational experiments of 1968 and 1969, made by the working class in the larger factories of the North.

For the present we seek to identify the consequences which the class struggle during those years had for the country's economic and institutional equilibrium.

The struggles of 1968 had their greatest effects in the university, where they were waged hand-to-hand by the students and the young (as in most of the world, the West in particular). These struggles forced a definitive crisis for the politics of the Center-Left (an alliance among the Christian Democrats and Socialists) which throughout the 60's had made possible a government founded on the policy of vague reform.

The anti-authoritarian assault by the Movement of '68 made problems and ten-

sions emerge which the Center-Left could not absolutely control. And in a general way the Movement brought the politics of the D.C. under accusation—for being partly responsible for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in Italian society and for the nation's dependency on the Church and authoritarian elements.

The Italian Communist Party, meanwhile, maintained an essentially ambiguous link to the movement of the students and the young. While disapproving of their radicalism, and despite the claim to Autonomy from which the movement never wavered, the PCI nonetheless saw an opportunity, in the events of 1968, for breaking the Christian Democratic hegemony and pushing for a displacement of the political balance to the left.

Naturally enough, the vanguard of workers who were organizing in the factories had quite different aims. During those years, in fact, the worker's cause tended increasingly toward bargaining for equality (equally increased salaries for everyone; abolition of piece-work and salary differences; abolition of job classifications and against the interests of production (abolition of promotion by merit, of production bonuses; rejection of accelerated production, etc.). The cumulative effect of the workers' demands provoked a crisis in the economic balance on which industrial development, until then, had depended: that is, the balance between low salaries and intensive exploitation of the labor force, a balance maintained by high unemployment and a large labor supply. An important element in the social scene of that period was the initiation of an organizational campaign among migrant workers from the South. Until then these workers had provided the mass-base for controlling union pressures in the large labor centers; however, between '68 and '69, especially in Torino, they became the mass-base at the forefront of the union struggle (and the base, too, for organized political revolution).

Unquestionably the crisis over political control of the production cycle, and thus the economic crisis of 1970 as well, have their roots in the strength and continuity of this workers' struggle, and in the considerable results achieved by it (across-the-board salary hikes which in 1969 alone, increased labor costs by more than 20%, with continued wage pressures in the following years).

The dominant political class revealed its inability to deal with this struggle. Thus there arose in those years a policy—directed and supported by the D.C.—called the strategy of tension (*strategia della tensione*). This policy amounts to the artificial creation of moments of extreme tension through such means as incidents provoked by fascist groups or by agents that often have direct links to the government's Secret Service. The first large-scale act resulting from this strategy was the assault on the Agricultural Bank of Milano that killed 14 persons on Dec. 12, 1969—at the culmination of the Workers' struggle begun in the "troubled autumn." The bombs were placed (the deed was discovered and denounced by democratic forces, by groups on the extreme left, and by a large number of militant groups engaged in counter-intelligence) by a group of fascists connected to the Secret Service and protected by powerful Christian Democrats. But anarchists were accused of the bombing, and the revolutionary movement came under violent attack from the press and the courts. In the following years, these acts were frequently repeated: in every instance fascist crimes were used as an occasion to accuse the left of violence and to institute repressive counter-measures.

But the Movement was neither broken nor driven back by the "strategia della tensione." In the years following 1970, it grew in new sectors, among the youth and students. And the Movement gained continuity through the formation of revolutionary organizations which arose throughout the country. These quickly acquired the capacity to mobilize people, gathering the remnants of the student movement of 1968, and a segment of the workers reorganized during the struggles of 1969. The strongest of these groups were "Lotta Continua" (particularly among Fiat workers), "Avanguardia Operaia" (entrenched in Milan among workers in large factories and among students), and finally "Potere Operaio" — which was a major presence at Padua, in the factories of Portomarghera, and at the University of Rome.


These groups organized in factories, schools, and at the local level (promoting political strikes, the occupation of schools, student demonstrations against the government, and occupation of vacant houses by homeless proletarians — in Rome and Milan especially). They assumed a position of opposition to the Italian Communist Party, which, after decades of Stalinist loyalty, was taking on the characteristics of a social-democratic party and was condemning the most radical working-class and student demonstrations in the name of unity with the middle classes and in the name of a policy of legality and respect for the fundamental rule of the capitalist order.

This position of opposition had already been manifest in 1968, when the PCI had been criticized and superseded by the student movement. And again, in 1969, the methods of the decisive struggle in the factories had been resisted by the PCI. But the antagonism grew more acute and became an open break when, in 1973, the PCI arrived at its choice of a Historical Compromise, that is, of an alliance with the Christian Democrats, and of subordination to the will of Big Capital in the name of economic revival.

Meanwhile other significant events took place that same year. The first was the occupation of FIAT by thousands of young workers. Acting with complete autonomy from union decision-making, they decided to occupy the factory and set up barricades in order to impose their demands for significant wage increases and reduced work loads. Revolutionary groups such as "Lotta Continua" and "Potere Operaio" were a marginal presence in this occupation. Thus within the takeover itself was contained the possibility of transcending those vanguard organizations that had come near to assuming the role traditionally played by the workers' movement: a role of authoritarian leadership, of bureaucratic intransigence in the face of the passions and the new types of needs expressed, above all, by the young.

The workers had learned only too well to fend for themselves, and they began organizing autonomously. At the same time, the first armed cells began to be formed inside the factories (first in Milano and then in Torino and Genoa). They organized sabotage against machinery, disciplined foremen and guards, besieged the rotten bosses — in short, they brought into being embryonic stages of a workers' counter-power.

All of Italian society was affected by this extremely vast network of counter-insurgency. After it had broken owner's control, in the "troubled autumn" of 1969, and assaulted the rule of low wages and intensive exploitation, it began to deal



directly with political problems — problems of power. But it is also true that the problem of power remained an indissoluble knot in Italy, on the theoretical even more than on the political level.

What the struggles during all those years actually amounted to was a rejection of the wage-earning system, and a rejection of that exploitation which transforms human life into a working death on credit, forcing people to sell their own lives in exchange for their wages. And this rejection which entered into the social thinking of a culturally advanced proletariat continually better educated and endowed with an ever increasing technical and scientific expertise — evolved into the very real issues of power and liberation.

Labor's rejection of work expressed itself in many ways: the reduction of the work week to 40 hours; the right to rest periods and control over production time; the imposition of a counter-power inside factories; the rejection of the ideology of production; and criticism of the methodology of exploitation. But a more pressing need exerted itself within the struggle; that of transforming these objections into a program for the liberation of existing energies, into a program of self-organization of the production process and of the entire social cycle of production and consumption. In this lay the possibility for a liberation of repressed workers.

During those years the utopia of workers' liberation was a massive driving force, a power for organization and for calls to action. But the ideological baggage of traditional Marxism continues to be borne not only by the official Workers' Movement (primarily that of the PCI) but by the newer groups of the revolutionary left as well. As an ideology based on socialism—and thus on a form of organized social exploitation that is all the more rigid in its domination of working life—traditional Marxism could not contain the forceful energy and, above all, the radicalism which the movement displayed.

At this point, the groups on the revolutionary left itself entered a critical period of their own, and their forms of organization, from the bottom up, began to divest themselves of their own trappings. As a new radicalism expressed itself among the proletariat, especially among the young, these groups began an inexorable process of bureaucratization by which they became the small appendages of the official reform-oriented Workers Movement. They participated in elections, distancing themselves from tactics that could not be reconciled with the old modes of making policy. This new process of radicalization in which Power itself was brought under discussion, was already at work in the occupation of *Mirafiori* (FIAT) which took place in March and April of 1973. It is undeniable that the only ones to take cognizance of the course of this transformation on both the theoretical and political levels, were the militants of Workers' Power. In fact, the PO decided, in May of '73, to dissolve, diffusing itself throughout the committees, collectives and base structures which constitute the extensive network of Autonomy.

II. It was in 1973 that the PCI, guided by the lessons of the Chilean experience, worked out its so-called policy of Historical Compromise. The policy was based on the hypothesis that Italy cannot be governed except by an institutionalized political accord between Communists and Christian Democrats. This political "about-face" was already implied at every point along the Italian road to socialism and represented less a radical break with the tradition of Togliatti's PCI than a logical development of it. Yet the consequence of the "about-face" was the further exacerbation of the rupture between the official Workers' Movement (PCI and Union) and the new groups in the factories and large cities, who were organizing at the ground level, consolidating themselves and working together for the social and political realization of Autonomy.

The disputes between the PCI and the Movement toward Autonomy became increasingly more violent during the following years, and in 1975 particularly, when Autonomy emerged as a true mass movement which united young workers, the

unemployed, students, and others living on the margins of society. In Spring of 1975, Autonomy was put to its first test as committee members took on fascists and police in a confrontation in Rome. The conflict spread to Milan, where, in mid-April, a young fascist was killed, as well as a member of the "carabinieri." Thousands of young workers, mainly from small factories, joined with students and unemployed youth and put the inner city under siege, demonstrating and rioting. Other organized demonstrations occurred in Bologna, Florence (where a man was killed by police), Torino, (where a worker at FIAT was killed by an armed guard), and in Naples. These were heated days, in which Autonomy had its first experiences among the masses.

The State recognized, at that point, its principal enemy: Autonomy represented a new level of social organization which no longer accepted the union as a mediating agent, no longer accepted the line of the PCI and its strategy of compromise and acquiescence.

The State replied to Autonomy's efforts during that week in the severest manner: repression, the legalization of police violence, and the systematic use of arms in public confrontations. In May of 1975, the Christian Democrats and their allies in the government passed a Parliamentary act called the *Reale Law (Legge Reale)*. Its terms provide that police can shoot any time public order is felt to be threatened. Furthermore, jail sentences would be more severe for anyone found in possession of defensive weapons, such as bottles, molotov cocktails or handkerchiefs, ski masks and helmets that could mask faces in demonstrations. The law was explicitly directed against the youthful proletariat who were organizing within the ranks of Autonomy. And it was supported by every party, with the exception of the PCI, which feebly abstained from voting. But the Communists would not oppose the law and thereby endanger their intended accord with the Christian Democrats.

The day the law was passed marked the beginning of the most violent and bloody phase of the class struggle in Italy. Demonstrators, or the marginal and delinquent elements in general, began to be wounded or killed by police firearms. Citizens who did not come to a halt at police blockades, chance passersby who found themselves in the press of a demonstration—they too met their deaths by virtue of a law "for the public order."

The revolutionary left and Autonomy had to pay the price for the increased violence of the State and of the police. The casualty list within the Movement is endless. It is enough to mention here Pietro Bruno (18 years old, militant member



of "Lotta Continua", who died in the spring of '75); Giannino Zibecchi (antifascist committee, killed in May 1975); Mario Salvi (worker for Autonomy, 21 years old, killed at San Basilio, Rome, during a housing occupation in October 1976); Francesco Loruzzo (23, "Lotta Continua", killed at Bologna, March 11, 1977); Giordiana Masi (killed in Rome, May 12, 1977, a feminist linked to "Lotta Continua"). But these are only the most notable. It is estimated that the victims of the "Legge Reale" numbered 150 in the period between May '75 and December '76.

If we wish to understand the rise of "terrorism", the formation of militant organizations, the choice of clandestine armed warfare by an ever growing number of proletarian youth, then we cannot forget the role played by the "Legge Reale". Nor can we forget the role of that aggravated and general violence perpetrated by the State from the moment Autonomy appeared in the factories and streets of the country, as a socially diffuse and politically organized Movement.

We also need to remember the other side, the policy of the official Workers' Movement (chiefly, the PCI): a policy that was first of all dependent on the decisions of the Christian Democrats, and subordinate to the movement of repression. In addition, this policy sought to isolate the youthful elements of Autonomy, causing a division within the working class and the proletarian movement. The PCI became a sort of political police made up of enforcers, spies and stooges.

In the following years, rather than being resolved through the accord between the Communists and the Christian Democrats, the institutional crisis in Italy assumed an increasingly dramatic character. The impossibility of governing the country was highlighted. The basic reason for the crisis was the growing distance between representative political institutions (parties, the Parliament, and other structures of participation) and a population of hopeless young people. Autonomy was at once a symptom and a cause of this distance.

In the political elections of 1976 the PCI considerably increased its voting strength, posing a threat to Christian-Democratic power: the DC was no longer guaranteed a parliamentary majority with its traditional allies (centrist parties) without either the agreement or the neutrality of the Communists. On the other hand, Christian-Democratic rule could not be substantiated by a Leftist majority either, because the Left simply did not have the strength. Convinced that it needed to quicken the pace of an alliance with the DC, the PCI began in 1976, to press for the Historical Compromise. It supported the Christian-Democratic government without, however, entering into that government. The situation, then, was paradoxical: while the masses had supported the PCI, believing this was the best way to promote a policy of radical change, the policy of the Historical Compromise ended up bolstering the tottering forces of the DC.


In terms of Italian society at large, this meant that workers had to pay for the economic crisis (which continued to grow worse between 1973 and 1976, as a result of the oil crisis). The PCI and the unions explicitly assumed the task of forcing the working class to accept a policy of sacrifice, consumer restrictions, and reduced public spending. In the autumn of 1976, a few months after the elections, the Andreotti government instigated an economic offensive against workers' salaries, increasing the prices of the most essential goods—gasoline, bread, pasta, and services. The PCI and the unions were used in order to deliver this blow. Workers in the large industrial centers of the North reacted in a wave of furious protests, launched autonomously and against the will and intentions of the unions: at Alfa-Romeo, at FIAT, at ITALISIDER, and elsewhere, they waged independent strikes. But the "crunch" passed: living conditions worsened notably for workers; their faith in the unions collapsed. And from that time, rejection of the forms and directions of union organization increased. What is more, the policy of "sacrifice" which cut consumption and public spending and promoted worker lay-offs, rebounded back on those who were employed. It produced a constantly growing unemployment rate, which at the beginning of 1977 reached an unprecedented figure (1,700,000 officially; in reality more than 2 million).

THE ORIGINALITY OF AUTONOMY

III. Finally we arrive at 1977. The point of arrival, in many respects, of ten years of class struggle. The point of arrival for the student struggle begun in '68, for the workers' struggle of '69. It is the moment at which all the fundamental contradictions accumulate and explode, provoking a profound crisis for State control over society, for party and union control over the masses of youth. But at the same time, the revolutionary movement produced its most mature form of expression, in which a fully articulated need is expressed for a communism that is the direct translation of proletarian society, without any necessity for external or ideological organization. The Movement of '77 represents, in all its aspects—social, political and cultural—the moment of culmination in the ascending phase of the class struggle in Italy. But for the very reason that it is fraught with contradictions, and for the very reason that it poses with unrelenting urgency the question of the transition to communism, the year 1977 is, for everyone, a definitive test. Italian society has been tested by ten years of uninterrupted social conflict. The masses are disillusioned and tired of the politics of the official Workers' Movement, of reforms and of compromise. Now they await a radically new perspective that will abandon and surpass the old categories of political institutions, a perspective that will at the same time produce a workable program for superseding capitalism. Such a program would have to be innovative compared with the Soviet type of socialist experience, which is authoritarian, bureaucratic, and based on a new socialized form of labor exploitation. The innovation is awaited everywhere, but the hopeful expectation can easily turn into passivity and disillusionment if signs of something new do not emerge.

The Movement of '77 gathers together the new proletarian strata: young proletarians in the big cities who refuse to devote their whole lives to salaried labor, who refuse any kind of work at all. The unemployed who issue from the schools or universities as possessors of a high level of technical-scientific knowledge, are compelled to waste their productive potential, or not use it at all. The forms of social behavior, of cultural identity that these strata produce isolate them from the political tradition; rather than speak of marginal living (*emarginazione*), we can talk at this point of self-directed marginal living. The cultural revolution of 1968, which upset forms of behavior, values, human relationships, sexual relationships, the relationship to country and to the home, has ended by creating a social stratum that is recalcitrant before the notions of salaried work, fixed residence, and fixed position of work.

Moreover, the enormous technical-scientific and intellectual potential that the education of the masses has produced—a potential which fermented on contact with the process of mass self-education that the revolutionary movement has represented for 10 years—all this renders even more insupportable that contradic-



tion of capitalism, according to which, as technological and scientific capacities increase, intellectual and creative energies are wasted, while the possibilities for innovations in production are suppressed so that the existing labor organization and the organization of knowledge crucial to labor's functioning are not disturbed. Cultural transformation, mass creativity, and refusal of work are the dominant themes of the Movement of '77. But only with difficulty could the Movement succeed in organizing all that potential constituted by the intellectual energy, technical-scientific expertise and innovative energy that the young-proletarian strata possess. The enormous richness that the Movement of '77 expresses could not succeed in finding a formal program and positive organization. This is because of capitalist repression, but also because of the inability of the revolutionary movement to adjust with rapidity its interpretive categories and its practices to the reality of a mature, post-socialist proletariat.

All during 1976, new forms of organizations—connected with Autonomy, but related to all aspects of collective life and cultural identity—were being established. The rejection of the family and of individualism had found a form of organization in the experience of proletarian youth associations. These associations were communes set up by squatters in certain neighborhoods of big cities; young proletarians thus organized territorially and experimented with forms of collective-life-in-transformation.

The storm that the feminist movement provoked in male-female relations and the subsequent explosion of homosexual collectives thus found a territory in which to consolidate, in which to transform the customs of living, sleeping, eating, smoking. In the same period, the movement for free radio spread widely. In every city, neighborhood and village the young proletarians, together with students and communications workers, used the occasion of a legislative vacuum (the result of which was that the State monopoly on information lapsed and was not replaced by any other sort of regulation) to give life to a network of small "wildcat" stations. The radio stations were operated with luck and very little money, but they could cover a territorial space adequate for the organizational forms and communication needs of the emerging proletarian strata. This was a truly revolutionary fact: with free radio it was possible to communicate rapidly the decisions and appointments of revolutionary organizations or base organizations. Through this channel circulated an uninterrupted flood of music and words, a flood of transformations on the symbolic, perceptive and imaginative planes. This flood entered every house, and anyone could intervene in the flow, telephoning, interrupting, adding, correcting. The design, the dream of the artistic avant-garde—to bridge the separation between artistic communication and revolutionary transformation or subversive practice—became in this experience a reality. The brief, happy experience of Radio Alice—which from February 1976 to March 1977 transmitted from Bologna—remains the symbol of this period, of that unforgettable year of experimentation and accumulation of intellectual, organizational, political, and creative energies.

The year 1976 is also the year of the great concert-festivals of proletarian youth: a last wave of pop music, which arrived in Italy five or six years later than in the U.S. or Great Britain, but which found here an extremely fertile cultural terrain. The sweet sound of pop immediately combined with a certain dimension of mass cultural transformation. It became the constituent element in a vision of the "soft" cultural and social revolution.

The harshness of organizational life in the Workers' Autonomy was united and merged with the sweet experiences of cultural transformation and the easy flow of information. Lambro Park, 1976, in Milano: 18,000 proletarian youths performed a gigantic sun dance, the likes of which had never been seen before—then fought with police for several hours.


The autumn of 1976 saw an explosion in the movement toward "autonomous price-setting" (*autoreduzione*). Tens of thousands of young people, organized in associations of proletarian youth, came in from the suburbs of Milano, Rome and

Bologna, laid siege to the city centers, confiscated merchandise from luxury shops, "autonomously reduced" the prices of movies, theaters and restaurants (that is, they paid what their politics required—a third or a fourth of the usual price). But the final test of the movement toward "autonomous price-setting" was a violent clash, a forerunner of the violence that would explode in 1977: the battle of La Scala, on December 7, 1976.

La Scala is the bourgeois theater of Milano. December 7 marks the inauguration of the new season, the "opening night" gala. But young Milanese proletarians said that they would not permit the Milan bourgeois to stage this yearly provocation with its pomp, finery and 80,000-lire tickets. They declared war on the Milan bourgeois and their festival. The government accepted the challenge, and thousands of police in battle formation defended La Scala. Hours and hours of conflict, 300 imprisoned, dozens arrested, 7 gravely wounded. The youth movement reflected for a month on this battle and on its catastrophic outcome. But only in order to be better prepared the next time.

The next time was in February of 1977.

The struggles that exploded in 1977 were completely out of proportion to what occasioned them: they began with a small university campaign against a Christian-Democratic "reform". On February 3, the fascists wounded a student in Rome, and the university was subsequently occupied. First in Rome, Palermo, and Naples, then in Florence and Torino, finally in Bologna. The occupation of the universities was a pretext: the academic institutions were occupied not only by students, but by young workers who worked in small factories, and had no other possibility for organization and concerted action. Then there were the unemployed, those who lived in the city outskirts, the juvenile delinquents, the disenfranchised. . . . University communities became general quarters for a wave of social struggle that had as a fundamental theme the refusal of the capitalist organization of work, the rejection of that system which generates exploitation and unemployment as the two poles of socialized work. "All work for less [time]" became the watchword for this wave of struggle of young proletarians—a group heterogeneous from the point of view of productivity, but homogeneous from the point of view of culture. "All work for less" is a watchword which has nothing to do with questions such as "the right to a job", or the right to a full-time position. Work is necessary evil—or at least remains so for a historical period that we wish eventually to surpass and extinguish with collective force. What we want is to apply, totally and coherently, the energies and the potential that exist for a socialized intelligence, for a general intellect. We want to make possible a general reduc-



tion in working time and we want to transform the organization of work in such a way that an autonomous organization of sectors of productive experimental organization may become possible. These sectors would give rise to experimental forms of production in which the object of worker cooperation would not be profit, but the reduction of necessary work, the intelligent application of technical and scientific knowledge, and innovation.

This program actually existed among the young proletarian social strata that in February 1977 filled the cities with their demonstrations.

The cultural transformation and the rejection of prevailing values that the cultural experience of '76 (radio stations, associations, journals, "grass roots poetry") had accumulated, exploded with a wave of anti-institutional creativity. The critique of power is the critique of the language of power. On the 17th of February, the critique of power, the critique of representative institutions, and the critique of institutional language were united in a unique action. 7000 young proletarians who (a fact without precedent in the Movement's history in Italy) expelled, with uncontrollable rage and fury, the most important figure among Italian labor leaders, Luciano Lama, secretary of CGIL and exponent of PCI, from a lecture hall at the University of Rome, where he was delivering a policy statement. The PCI accused the young proletarians of being "enemies of the working class" and tried to divide them from factory workers. But this move did not succeed; no factory supported the great union leader. Instead, the young workers of the Northern factories expressed sympathy for the young proletarians of Rome who had expelled Lama. The split between the PCI and the Movement reached its apex at this period, and will likely never be repaired. On the 17th of February a mass sector of the Italian proletariat was liberated with violence from socialist traditions, both Stalinist and reformist. The autonomy of the movement had been assured, in the consciousness and in the organization of ever-growing strata. And the stage was being set for the insurrection of March.

March of 1977 was the moment of greatest intensity in the explosion of the struggle for autonomy. The social strata that were mobilized in this month were the young unemployed intellectuals, together with "off-the-books labor and seasonal workers"—that is, all sectors of irregular or marginal workers. At the same time, March was the moment of the greatest tension and distance between the new movement for autonomy and the Communist Party. The act of expelling Lama from the University of Rome established a precedent from which the people at the University of Bologna proceeded in the days of March. The occupation of the entire university zone by huge numbers of young proletarians coming from every area was transformed into a true insurrection when on March 2, a youth was killed by police. But Bologna is also the city in which the PCI has always been strong; the local government is a leftist coalition and bosses and organizations of the Workers' Movement collaborate to ensure social peace. The exploitation of young workers in Bologna is controlled by a network of little bosses and bureaucrats, often linked with the Communist Party. In brief: Bologna is the city of the realized Historical Compromise. And for that reason (as well as for the reasons of the Movements' extraordinary creative vitality) the Bologna experience marked a moment of absolutely central political importance.

The extraordinary violence of the days in March, the mass following attracted by the Movement, and the radical nature of its objectives created a crisis for the city's Historical Compromise by offering evidence of the government's inability to function as an instrument of control over vast proletarian sectors.


For ten days, two large cities (Bologna and Rome) were in the hands of the Movement—in very violent conflict in Rome on March 7; on the 2nd and the 12th of March in Bologna. On the 12th, Rome was the theater for a six-hour battle in which tens of thousands of youths were engaged, while 100,000 filed by in demonstrations. And then in the following days at Bologna the Movement invaded the city. The Italian bourgeoisie recognized at this time the serious danger that its design for institutional order faced, and saw that the PCI's ability to guarantee

order had been undermined. Consequently, the PCI lost credibility both as the governing party, and because it had let control of so vast a movement slip away from it. The State was forced to resort to brutal repression: hundreds of arrests in Bologna, and then the unleashing of a campaign of repression all over Italy that struck most heavily at groups that worked on the cultural level: radios, journals, publishing houses, and bookstores were closed and searched.

But the Movement was not broken; in Milano, Turin, and then once more in Rome the mass demonstrations continued. The summer began with a violent polemic—inspired by an appeal launched by French intellectuals against the repression—on the repressive nature of the Historical Compromise as an institutional design for the elimination of all dissent.

Also at that time, there began in Italy (and here the Movement was behind the times) a critical analysis of socialism of the Stalinist type (of which, in the last analysis, the PCI is only a variant). On the strength of theoretical reflections developed in France by those such as Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari (a more critical and doubtful reception was given to the Nouveaux Philosophes, who were too removed from any concrete experience with the critique of institutions and with class struggle), and a new front was opened in the struggle against the State. Thus new forms of totalitarianism were seen developing as the historical left was assimilated by the apparatus of power. And so the critique of the institutionalized Workers' Movement acquired a new connotation: according to the PCI, all the years after '68 had been marked by gains for social democratic and reformist causes. But now one began to discover that social democracy, even though introducing new elements into the communist worker movement tradition of the Third International, was not necessarily in contradiction with totalitarian, violent and Stalinist trends. In fact, the two aspects were mixed in the PCI, which had become a component of bourgeoisie democracy by abandoning every type of violence against the existing order and at the same time a violent force of totalitarianism against the revolutionary movement.

Confronted with the wave of repression that followed the events of March, and mindful of the discussion that had developed on the nature of the State after the Historical Compromise, the Bologna movement set forth a proposal for a Convention to be held at the end of September. At the Convention, all components of the Movement in Italy could come together, along with all the European intellectuals or political groups that were interested in the Italian revolution as a forerunner of things to come. The September Convention was the great opportunity—missed, however—for the Movement to overcome its purely negative, destructive connotations, and formulate a programmatic position for the autonomous organization of



a real society against the State, an autonomous organization of social, intellectual, and productive energies that might make possible a progressive liberation of lives from salaried work. Unfortunately, the Convention turned into a reunion against repression, and this greatly reduced the theoretical importance and the possibilities of this period. Nonetheless, 70,000 people were present at the convention and the attention of the whole Italian proletariat (as well as that of vast numbers of intellectuals all over Europe) was directed toward the Convention. But the gathering concluded without producing any direction for the future, any new program, and without advancing the Movement. Instead it was restricted to hearing tales of repression and then defining, in negative terms, its reaction. A long phase of crisis had begun for the Movement, a crisis that involved dispersion, disorganization and above all, the lack of prospects.

WAR: RED BRIGADES

IV. Up to this point, we have completely ignored the problem — absolutely central to the analysis of class struggle in Italy — of terrorism. Armed struggle was a form of agitation that grew ever larger after a certain point, and finally became preponderant in September 1977. The problem of terrorism probably cannot be dissociated from the whole complex of experiences connected with the Movement's organization in factories and in society.

On the other hand it is also true that the entire rapid analysis we have made of the most significant moments of the class struggle in this decade remains incomplete and spotty. We have neglected, on purpose, an analysis of the relationship between the mass movement and clandestine organizations or armed actions. The reason for this omission is that we would like, within the framework of our necessarily simplified "history", to view the experiences of the armed struggle as a symptomatic fact, as a symptom of the problems not resolved by the mass movement.

This is certainly a valid enough viewpoint today. In recent years, the armed struggle has more and more assumed a "terrorist" connotation; no longer within the mass movement, it has completely replaced the Movement and occupies all the available space.

The first and most important armed organization in Italy — the Red Brigades — was born out of the workers' struggle in the first years of the 70's. The militants of the Red Brigades come from the large factories in Milan, Turin, and Genoa. The first armed actions (the kidnapping of managers of factories, together with acts of sabotage) were linked to the workers' struggle against the factory hierarchy. But after these first actions (1971, 1972), the Red Brigades evolved rapidly toward a strategy of frontal, "political" — in the worst, most abstract sense of the term — opposition to the State. From this point they began to behave like an actual party, whose actions and objectives are neither related to, nor dependent on, the times and on the forms of the mass struggle. In this new phase the Brigades reached a critical point, at which the extreme "ML" (Marxist-Leninist in the most dogmatic and avant-garde sense) types of thinking prevailed in the fighting organization. Moreover, the theoretical-political grounding of the militants in the Brigades is distinctly Stalinist. Part of their background, especially their social context (the factories) comes from the "hard" Stalinist base of the Communist Party. The social contexts of the Brigades — even more than their selection of a clandestine *modus operandi* — set them apart from others even as early as 1974; by 1977, the differences between the evolving Movement for Autonomy and the Brigades had become even greater.

The highest point in the career of the Red Brigades was the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, President of the DC. These events took place at a time when the Movement found itself in a state of crisis and immobilization, largely because of the "failure" of the September Convention. It was precisely the immobilization induced by the Convention that led ever larger sectors of the Movement, especially those harassed by repressive measures, to choose a clandestine life. Many other fighting organizations smaller than the Red Brigades were formed. These smaller organizations had objectives that were closely linked to social

struggles (acts of sabotage, burning of employment offices), while the actions of the Red Brigades had an effect almost exclusively political, directed as they were at the DC or at the headquarters of the majority party.

The question of the "armed struggle" gave birth in these years to a number of dubious theses, whether within the Movement, in the press, or in propaganda emitted by the forces of the regime. Terrorism came to be considered a direct expression of the forms of struggle of the Movement. The Movement has certainly expressed and practiced forms of violent struggle, when violence represented a necessary means for the defense of organizational levels (taking to the streets, occupying buildings, picketing), but it has always refused to see the military organization as an autonomous political body, or as an "armed party." The strength of the Red Brigades is thus directly proportional to the weakness of the Movement. And so, as the repression of the regime weighs more heavily on the Movement, the power of the armed organization increases. On the other hand, we must also recognize that, beginning in the Spring of '77, when the strength of the mass movement brought about a crisis for institutional equilibrium and the Historical Compromise, the State undertook to reconstruct its stability and institutional equilibrium on the basis of the opposition to terrorism. The policy of "national unity" — amounting to a reinforcement of the Christian-Democratic government (always a fragile majority) with uncritical support from the PCI — was adopted as an emergency measure in the face of the Red Brigades' assault. And on the same day that Moro was kidnapped the PCI decided to support a DC government that was completely unacceptable. For this strategy the PCI paid, with its electoral losses in June, 1979. But this is of little interest. What is interesting is that terrorism created a situation of crisis for the revolutionary movement, or rather inserted itself into a pre-existing crisis of the Movement. And thus inserting itself, it accentuated and consolidated the crisis, reinforcing the repression from the one side and, on the other side, restricting the revolutionary process to a pathway without egress, without alternative routes.

This said, then, we have to recognize that the extension of the armed struggle and the great impact of armed terrorist action (to be differentiated from a practice of mass violence justified by the needs of the proletariat) are directly linked to that crisis in the Movement which evolved after '77. We can say that armed terrorist action is a symptom of the revolutionary movement's inability to put a program into effect, as well as a symptom of the Movement's cultural impoverishment.

After '77, and especially after the Moro affair, sectors of Autonomy began to



realize all this. And here our study must become more complex, if we wish to comprehend the most recent period of Italian history, that is, the events of April 7, 1979.

In '77 the positions taken by the Movement on the armed struggle were imprecise. The entire Movement had rightly refused to condemn (as the bourgeois regime and its parties requested) mass violence. The March insurrection had been a virtual explosion involving tens of thousands of proletarians and young people, and that level of violence was an inevitable stage which gave to the Movement the maneuvering room always denied it by the institutions. But on the subject of terrorist action the debate was always more confused. All the components of the Movement recognized the proletarian and revolutionary origins of the fighting formations (a few idiots actually sought to excommunicate the armed formations, or to declare them agents of foreign secret services or of reactionary groups—but everyone knows that the militants in these formations are comrades who come out of agitation in factories or in the slums, out of experiences we all had in those years). So the problem was put in terms of "legitimatization."

Within the Movement, there are two opinions on this question of "legitimacy". One faction considers armed clandestine action as a simple "extension" of mass violence, an "extension" of proletarian restiveness at the legal limits imposed by capitalism. But others demur, claiming that this outlook underestimates (in the name of spontaneous sympathy) the radical contradiction between autonomous behavior on the part of proletarian strata (who are the bearers of a potential for liberation) and the Stalinist politics, or even State-like behavior, of the B.R.

Positions on the legitimacy of terrorism differ within the various components of the Movement. The Bologna movement (the so-called "creative wing") recognized without hesitation the contradiction between terrorism and the mass movement. The committees of Autonomous Workers (*Autonomia Operaia*) at Rome (the "Volsci") forcefully criticized the politics of the Red Brigades, while other groups maintained more problematic position in order to avoid lumping together terrorism and the most radical practices of the Movement. But while the "ideological" discussion of terrorism continued, people lost sight of terrorism as spectacle, of its capacity to occupy progressively more space on the stage-set of class struggle. And when this aspect of terrorism was considered (after the Moro kidnapping) a new operation began: one did not attempt to condemn or exorcise terrorism (as the great bourgeois journalists did, and behind them the little journalists of *Lotta Continua*), nor even to support it in order to gain something from it. Instead, one sought to supersede it. Superseding terrorism became the true problem for the revolutionary movement. Given that combat formations represented a product of a faction which the Movement had not been able to supersede, it was necessary to supersede this faction and its terroristic manifestations. It was necessary to engage oneself in this effort. We can say that the intellectual and militant segments of Autonomia were concerned after the death of Moro with finding methods of superseding terrorism. Superseding terrorism did not mean becoming involved in the Nazi extermination that the super-policemen (like General Dalla Chiesa, plenipotentiary of the anti-terrorists) tried to effect with dragnets, with indiscriminate arrests, with corruption and stool pigeons, with torture and internment camps. Instead, superseding terrorism meant creating a foundation for pacification and for the reconstruction of conditions needed for the class struggle. To pacify obviously meant to remove the obstacle constituted by the more than one thousand political prisoners. Liberation, then, of the political detainees, along with amnesty, elimination of the camps, and dismissal of Dalla Chiesa. All these are objectives of pacification originating within the Movement, objectives that the political planners of Autonomia want to make into the aims of a mass initiative capable of setting up the conditions for a resumption of the class struggle in a strategically autonomous form, no longer determined by the difficult straits of a civil war.

But suddenly, just when the possibility of superseding terrorism began to be perceived and began to mature, State repression intervened with all the power that it could put into the field. We have reached the events of April 7.

THE SEVENTH OF APRIL ARRESTS

THE SIMULATION OF POWER, THE POWER OF SIMULATION

The desire of the State to eliminate every attempt at superseding terrorism became yet clearer when the editors of *Metropoli* were arrested and the publication suppressed. *Metropoli* in fact is a journal devoted specifically to the goal of surpassing terrorism and reconstructing autonomous conditions for the class struggle.

For quite some time to come, the revolutionary movement will have to deal with the actions taken by the State on April 7. Even beyond the question of liberating the comrades who were arrested, some fundamental doubts have been raised, and the possibility of making a transition to a new epoch in the process of liberation from capitalist domination has been jeopardized in a dramatic way.

To divest oneself of these last ten years and at the same time to uncover the continuity inherent in the process of liberation—these are two apparently contradictory moves, but moves which must be effected simultaneously. This is the problem facing us at the moment. But the actions of the government were aimed at rendering any transition impossible.

In the campaign which the power structure has launched against Autonomia, everything is false: not this or that detail, not this or that assertion, but everything—the evidence, the proof, the circumstances. Everything is false, and the power structure knows it, even declares it. It is of no importance to the power structures whether something is true or not. This is the spirit behind the government operation. The deterrent power of the operation lies in its capacity to unleash a violent campaign of immense proportions, a campaign based on SIMULATION. The real operatives of the offensive are not the judges, but the press, the TV, and the Performance. Thus the offensive is beyond politics, freed finally from any remaining link to truth, liberated from any correspondence with actuality. Simulate an infinite number of war scenarios and project them on the screen of the mass imagination—this is the strategy. For in truth it is in that territory of the imagination that the real war is being fought. On one side of the battle is Dissuasion (the infinite power of the State, the all-seeing eye, the all-knowing brain, the all-imagining mind), on the other is Liberation of the creative energies of a proletariat whose intellectual potential is immense, but whose conditions of material existence are cramped and miserable. This is the real contradiction, the real war.

So; the Performance of April 7 has shown that the power structure can win the war today by invading the realm of the imagination. And, having conquered the realm of the imagination, the power structures now run rampant, demonstrating a violence that has no precedents, and arrogance that is totalitarian.



**ANALYSIS
ORGANIZED
AUTONOMY**

How can one deny that the power structure "seems" to have won? Hasn't it, after all, with that stroke of simulation, arrogated to itself the right to put an entire decade on trial? It has set itself up as a trial judge. And so the decade of egalitarianism and solidarity, the decade of collectivization and rejection of work are now on trial. What better introduction, what better premise to a "backlash" that promises a return to normal production, to the usual, day-to-day violence that occurs in the family and on the job?

Meanwhile, as the power structure prepares to try our entire decade as criminal, subversive and paranoid—well, here we see the forces that *represent* the existing Movement unable to understand the meaning of this Operation Simulation launched by the power structure, unable to understand anything in fact, and unable to react in any way.

So it goes for Organized Autonomy. Its paralysis is complete. As of April 7 it has been shunted into the Wax Museum of politics. In the face of the power structure, in the face of that game of mirrors which is Simulation, the good little bad boys of Autonomy have replied with the conviction that their party (with all its holy, eternal principles such as "active abstention" . . .) can match the State regiment for regiment. But the State operates on a hundred battlefields, while the party of Autonomy cannot even operate on that single field it has chosen for itself—the streets are off limits, and for those incapable of thinking in any terms but street campaigns, the streets themselves have become unusable. Those who want to respond to the simulation-filled power structures with the power (but does it exist?) of truth and of counter-information will find their words turning to dust in their mouths.

Let us also examine those whose business it is to be concerned about guarantees of freedom. The intellectuals—yes, even they seek to reaffirm their role by seeking out the "truth". Take a look at what Umberto Eco has to say in the April 22 edition of *La Repubblica*. After having sought the "truth" for half a page, using methods worthy of a detective novel, he announces that the boundary between legality and illegality can shift depending on the moment, on the circumstances. Power relationships, he says. Of course! It's true: legality is determined by the power relationships that obtain between old and new, between the liberation of the possible and the dictatorship of the present. The greater the strength of that Movement which strains to liberate the possibilities compressed within the present, the farther the boundaries of legality will be pushed. Because legality is only the sanctioning (by structures, by judges, by the police) of the present state of affairs, of the present's right to suppress the energies, the creativity and the inventive powers of the proletarian segment of society. Good thinking, Eco. Except that the people who set those boundaries of legality are people (like Eco) who write for *La Repubblica*. And the people who decide where the boundaries should be shifted are truth-seekers of Eco's ilk—as if it were possible to continue with that attitude of the entomologist which he shows, the attitude of someone examining historical processes, struggles, programs, passions and defeats as though they were natural phenomena, as though within them were not the pulsation of a subjective intensity and the possibility for a disruption and overthrow of the entire scenario. Today, after the events of April 7, it is the power structure which simulates the scenario in which power relationships are determined. The truth determines nothing.

Or take the case of Luigi Barzini, who on April 10, on the front page of the *Corriere della Sera*, defines the comrades arrested on April 7 as Messianic visionaries who provide an irrational movement with a program that constantly feeds the utopian impulses of the masses of young people, who would otherwise be scattered, desperate or resigned. Well that's true enough. But that obstinate anger with which revolutionary thinking in Italy has nourished the desires and wants of the masses of proletarians and youth has nothing irrational about it. It is the reality of the social contradictions in urban areas, the dramatic reality of the contradiction between man and nature, which is the radical element—not our wants. It is reality which sets before us the choice between utopia and barbarism, between a

**INTELLECTUALS,
LEGITIMACY AND
TIMIDITY**

**UTOPIA,
MESSIANISM,
BREAKDOWN OR
BARBARISM**


**THE NON-
CENTERED
FORM OF THE
POWER
STRUCTURE AND
PRODUCTION**

breakdown of the present system and the permanent threat of destruction, ecocatastrophe and psychocatastrophe. And the choice will have to be made very soon, very quickly. The acceleration of pace in urban areas, the mad inhumanity of relationships between people, the hallucinatory quality of every form of expression and every form of existence, and the increase in militarization—all these developments combine to set an urgent choice before revolutionaries: breakdown or barbarism. And even if the possibilities for a breakdown were very limited, even if everything were tending in a direction opposed to the possibility of liberating humanity's technical, scientific, creative and inventive energies from the destructive domination of capitalism and ecocatastrophe, even if the idea of liberating these potentials were a utopian one—well, even so, the only realistic choice would be revolution. If we are interested in life, then only revolution is a realistic alternative.

The situation in Italy provides a social laboratory of exceptional interest, both from the point of view of capitalist domination and from the revolutionary point of view. The most important fact for understanding the present situation is that centralized and coherent forms of control over the social sector have come to an end, and thus the society and the forces which circulate in the social sector are no longer governable by politics.

The real mystery of the Italian situation is how an apparatus of domination over social beings can be maintained by a functioning which must deal with and organize the most varied and contradictory types of behavior imaginable. The real problem is how the functioning of domination and the capitalist system's assigning-of-value can be established by means of unfocused conflict. There is a thread of functioning which runs through discontinuity, fragmentation and conflict. The question is how can the labor market continue to function, when an enormous quantity of surplus-value is produced by a segment of the labor force which is politically and culturally insubordinate, extremely flexible in terms of its mobility, unwilling to accept the fixed arrangement of salaried output, and obliged to accept a relatively high rate of confiscation of the surplus value produced. The marriage of insubordination and productivity, of conflict and functioning, is the point of departure for a new alliance between capitalistic development and the proletarian liberation movement. This alliance provides the only possible means of resolving the present crisis, the only way in which conditions for a productive autonomy, rather than an ossified subordination, can be established.

The present situation—in which a totalizing functioning exists without the totality, and in which power exists without a government—has in fact seen power present itself as mere tactics, as "day-by-day politics", capable of functioning only



under that guise. The functioning of this type of politics is not guided by any coherent strategic planning, but by a game of internal self-regulation. To oppose this mechanism of self-regulation (in which the official declarations and the announced strategies are only simulations of tactical scenarios that cannot actually control the forces they summon up)—to oppose this mechanism of self-regulation by offering a coherent alternative strategy—as Organized Autonomy has sought to do—only amounts to remaining ensnared in a game, the rules of which none of the players can make operative. So: there is no strategy, no criterion of truth in tactics. But there is a point of contact—at least on the tactical level—between the proletariat's impetuous desire for liberation from the slavery of work and capitalism's interests in increasing the relative rate of surplus-value and increasing social productivity. It is at this point of contact that one can occasionally break the power of that Domination which wishes to forestall Autonomy, which restrains the intellectual energies of the proletariat, which organizes Knowledge and Know-how in a functional design aimed at reproducing the form of Capital and the form of Value, so that the road to the liberation of life from work is closed off, so that the potential contained in the intelligence and activity of the Individual is held in check, while he is compelled to de-individualize himself and submit to being made into Abstract Work.

THE INDETERMINACY OF LAW AND THE SELF-REGULATION OF THE IMAGINARY

Thus we stand before the paradox of a domination which is exercised without any government, a controlling of the system without a governing of the system. When a system becomes very complex and has numerous independent variables, then the adage "an empty mind is an open mind" seems to apply. It is the absence of "planning" which makes the system controllable. The "full weight" of an articulated plan tends to polarize society by making people erect "walls of judgement". In complex systems polarization is eliminated and the means of regulation tend to be in conformity with the indeterminacy of the system. This rule of thumb prevails even on ideological and judicial levels. So let us examine once again that judicial campaign launched on the 7th of April.

The "castle" of accusations built up has no "foundation". But this is exactly what the government actions were designed to show: "justice" reveals its lack of foundation in "law" in a way that is nearly obscene. Only in this manner can "justice" enter into a "crime-accusation" relationship with social beings that are very different from one another.

Illuminating for the study of this phenomenon are the revelations of certain intellectuals who would have us believe they were once "plants" within the Movement. Consider some of the more dignified confessions: "Forgive me if I insist on this point, but that version of 'Potere Operaio' (i.e., the Veneto-Emilian branch to which Cacciari belonged) has nothing at all to do with the version which arose after 1968." (Cacciari, in an interview granted to *Repubblica*, 10/4/79). Or this: "I had my last political discussion with Negri more than ten years ago. . . . Since that time I haven't seen him. . ." (Asor Rosa, in *La Repubblica* 24/4/79). You know the saying—"People betray themselves"! And this is the mechanism which the forces of "justice" want to set in motion: individuals must autonomously come to feel a need to exculpate themselves, or a need to separate themselves from the accused in order to savor the "pleasure of having survived"—to borrow a phrase from Canetti.


The law's lack of foundations becomes strikingly apparent when the "law" lives in a state of "emergency", when it becomes a "judicial emergency measure". But emergency means a cut-off of rationality; thus the hype must show itself as hype—it can only be effective if it is *lived* as hype. The "law" feels the need to make itself indeterminate in order to be able to prosecute all those beings who are determined by society, in order to control every determination.

The indeterminacy of the "law" in fact amounts to the indeterminacy of social types: what, after all, is *the* typical revolutionary of today? This indeterminate "law", in spite of appearances and in spite of the price that has been paid by the vanguard movements, is not intent on hounding these movements (if it were, then

the "law" would be a quite determinate thing, would have foundations—this is the position of the PCI), but rather directs its attentions toward indeterminate elements. An American researcher wrote in a recent analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism that "the 'moral sensibility' of the normal citizen is not very different from that of the terrorist" (Jan Schreiber), since, in a complex system in which "mediation" as a structure has failed, every group, down to the level of the individual, tends to define itself autonomously, and not see itself in relation to "others". In a similar vein, Brian Jenkins has defined terrorism as the "instrument for gaining political objectives that have been set autonomously." The indeterminacy of the "law" serves as a means for pursuing social beings who autonomously define themselves to the extent that they are no longer identifiable by their social "status". To "prosecute" social beings thus means that the law must make itself "im-personal" to such a degree that it becomes a symbolic representation, a performance or spectacle of accusation and trial. Rather than prosecute private citizens, it aims at prosecuting symbolic figures, products of a collective imagination; the Guilty Party is a product of everyone's imagination. At this level of abstraction of beings, the law can no longer sustain itself and has need for abstractions promulgated by the mass media. Indeterminacy requires a relationship with the mass media—only then can the "theater of cruelty" be staged.

The law turns into a combination of emergency and mass media, exists in the form of emergency as it becomes identified with the mass media, is the one in virtue of being the other.

Court action operates in the realm of contingencies not only because it is a system of tactics which shifts the boundaries of legality according to individual circumstances—as Umberto Eco asserts—but also because today every boundary is outside the scope of classically codified law, because there is no longer any point in prosecuting "private" beings. What matters is not so much the outcome of the court action, but rather the symbolic trial set in motion through the mass media. And the objective of court action is not so much the maintenance of order, but rather the immediate creation of a collective recognition of the "boundaries"—a recognition that can be created *only* when disorder prevails. There is no more "personal" penalization, only symbolic penalization. The traditional trial in the courtroom has become irrelevant in the face of the imaginary trials (i.e., enacted by the imagination) staged by the mass media. What cannot be penalized in physical terms is instead penalized by means of a universal sacrificial rite, that is, the symbolic trials which the mass media stage in the imagination of the collectivity. It is the imagination which is actually on trial. The



trial is aimed at creating certain attitudes and insights, at forcing indeterminate social beings to assume, autonomously and of their own accord, an identity defined for them by the courts.

To this end, *lexical items* from Negri's texts and ideas have been put on trial; it is of no interest *whose lexicon it is— rather, it is the lexicon, the ideas of the imaginary social being which have been charged.* The prosecution is not seeking a single guilty party, but rather the Guilty Party— the collective imagination of the Guilty Party. The deconstruction and construction of texts and lexicon are functional elements in the establishment of the lexical and linguistic Guilty Party. It is not accidental that Umberto Eco feels the need to use ambiguities in his article. Putting words on trial is not possible in the courtroom; it is done instead in the mass media and in the symbolic process.

CLUSIONS

Having come this far, we now need to construct an operational synthesis which is capable of overturning the premises which the power structure imposed by its actions of April 7 (as well as all the other premises which the power structure has imposed in recent times). The goal which the revolutionary element has been seeking to attain (more or less consciously) in recent years is the liberation of that potential for autonomy which has been propagated in society by the efforts of the present form of organized Autonomy. This goal is equivalent to the aim of undertaking a passage from the 1970's to the 1980's while maintaining structural conditions that ensure the liberation of life from labor and that avoid the logic of extermination and ecodestruction promulgated by Nuclear Age capitalism.

The offensive undertaken by the power structure during recent months is directed at making this passage impossible— that is, it is aimed at restoring the initiative to the State while preventing the continued existence of the structural conditions needed for revolution.

Power exercised without an attempt to govern accepts a very high level of conflict. Thus the power structure has learned to survive on a discontinuous terrain, reconstructing the continuity of its functioning across this discontinuity. Revolutionary impulses are permitted to operate in every social milieu, in every type of production function except for that fundamental function which is the function constituted by Knowledge. Present urban society may in fact be conceived as medieval fiefdoms: highwaymen and madmen can roam about seeking booty or indulging in fits of insanity, but only if they stay in the countryside, in the desert places and in the woods, and do not come onto the manor grounds. The manor in the metropolis of the 1980's is the place where Knowledge is produced, the technological heart of production. The access routes to this manor are closely guarded, while in the streets and homes of the metropolis, anything goes.

The center of the social organization lies in that zone where Knowledge is produced and functions. But it would be simplistic to conclude that the revolution therefore needs to substitute a Leninist seizure of Knowledge for a Leninist seizure of the State. The problem is in reality much more complicated, since not only the properties and use of Knowledge, but also its structure, are determined by its capitalistic functioning. And the process of overturning the functioning of Knowledge (today Knowledge functions to control and to assign value, but within it lies the possibility for a self-transformation into an infinitely productive force capable of progressively freeing segments of social existence from the constraints of work)—this process of overturning is linked to a repeated, long-term (perhaps extremely long-term) dislocation of the modes, the procedures and the instruments of the production of Knowledge (a passage from the power structure to an autonomous social arrangement). And only this long process of repeated dislocation and appropriation of the modes and instruments of the production of Knowledge will be able to modify the epistemological, and thus the operative, structure of Knowledge.

But the forms and the politics involved in this process are still entirely unknown to us. That is to say, we have not elaborated any theory of "transition" (to use

that horrible and imprecise word). The only theory of power and transition that we possess, the theory to which we must constantly refer—perhaps in order to deviate from it, though always remaining in some ways entrapped within it—is the Leninist one. Essentially, the Leninist theory can be formulated as follows: the proletariat must take possession of the State, bolster the machinery of the State and the domination of the State's will over society in order to abolish capitalism (only afterward will the extinction of the State be possible). We have had the dream of realizing this program on our minds for fifty years now, from the time of "war communism", from the time of the NEP, through the period of Stalinism, up to the Chinese experience, up to the awful reality of present-day socialism. Capitalism has been neither abolished nor transformed, but rather has become ossified, inasmuch as the State, which ought to incarnate the will to supersede, has instead been nothing more than the reification of those relationships of production inherited from capitalism. In other words, the State has represented a terrorist-style forced recapitulation of the existing modes of production, a throttling of every possible move toward autonomy in the social system.

Thus the time now seems ripe to formulate an hypothesis concerning the "transition". The hypothesis which we advance as the premise for further theoretical work is an exact reversal of Lenin's theory. That is, we seek to reify an "ignoraction" toward the State" ("ignoraction": adapted from the German *ignoraktion*—an action which ignores, does not recognize those formal boundaries which the State imposes), to reify an abolition of the mechanism of State control and to reify a political formalization of the alliance between mobile strata of the labor force and dynamic capitalism, between capitalistic, post-industrial, electronic development and proletarian insubordination to the work ethic. It is interesting that at present renewed attention is being given to neo-libertarian hypotheses in economics. The interest that many revolutionary Marxists have manifested for economic hypotheses of neo-libertarian tendency thus becomes understandable.

ON THE TRANSITION

Revolutionary thinking must focus its critical skill on the problem of transition, if only to liquidate and supersede the concept. As L. Berti has said, the concept of "transition" and the system of categories which it involves can "produce" a real scenario—can produce a vision of the revolutionary process which gets in the way of liberation. Divesting oneself of this concept means divesting oneself of a practice and an ideological projection, and thus, in the end, divesting oneself of an effect of reality. Freeing oneself of the idea that capitalism and communism are systems which succeed each other in a diachronic scheme amounts to recognizing that in a revolution from the apex of capitalism lies the only possibility for a Movement of Autonomy from capitalist domination. This Movement of



Autonomy involves liberation from work, and suppression of the general formal conditions of capitalist domination. The breakdown of this domination can thus be conceived (and put into effect) as a subjective mode (in the Movement toward Autonomy) of a process in which capital determines the material conditions for the reconstruction, without reproducing the formal conditions of the previous system. Separating the material organization of Know-how from the form of Value then becomes—not a natural tendency, but the strategic objective, the plan of operation of the revolutionary movement.

*Translated by Jared Becker,
Richard Reid & Andrew Rosenbaum*

- 11/1 BO-1-8/41974-Bologna, Italy: A view of a wrecked car on the Rome-Munich Italicus Express. After two explosions and a fire in a tunnel through the Appenine Mountains south of B., Police said a time-bomb apparently exploded in a toilette, triggering a second blast and the fire, which killed 12 persons and injured more than 30 others. In foreground 12 bodies covered with sheets. (UPI/ANSA)
- 11/2 ML-803-4/17/75-MILAN, Italy: a priest blessing the body of Gianni Zibecchi, 26, killed during the riots today in Milan. (UPI)
- 11/3 Fiat Mirafiori plant, Turin
- 11/4 Pier Paolo Pasolini Photo A.F.P./Agence France-Presse
- 11/5 *Tables for 34 Persons*, 1974-75 Mario Merz Installation in an abandoned factory near Stuttgart, Gallery Hetzler & Keller GmbH
- 11/7 Photo: D. Cortez
- 11/8-9 via Fani
- 11/10 Super-8/photo: Seth Tillet
- 11/11 ROM 1205101 DRUM BEATERS ROME: Lending emphasis by pounding on metal drums, striking metal workers stage a noisy demonstration demanding higher wages and a 40-hour week. More than 50,000 persons took part in the biggest labor march of the year, Nov. 28. Despite fears of police authorities, the manifestation was orderly. (UPI) 12/5/69



April 7: Repression in Italy

Cari

The following analysis of the April 7 operation was written by the New York Committee Against Repression in Italy.

On April 7, 1979 the police arrested about 20 people claiming that they were "dangerous terrorists" and charging one of them, Toni Negri, with being the "secret leader" of the Red Brigades. Those arrested were neither underground terrorists caught red-handed in the act nor were they found in secret hideouts with compromising documents. All the defendants have been openly active for many years in the political movement of the extra-parliamentary left and comprise most of the department of Political Science at the University of Padua as well as the editorial staff of two radical magazines.

The accusations are extremely serious and some carry sentences of up to life imprisonment. Here is a summary of the official charges; nine of the defendants face accusations such as "conspiring to form and participate in armed groups," carrying "insurrection against the State" as well as "being responsible for the organization and leadership of the Red Brigades." Furthermore, all the defendants are accused of "subversion" for having organized and led a group called "Potere Operaio" (dissolved in 1973) as well as other groups related to "Autonomia Operaia."

Despite the gravity of the charges, the arrests were made without any factual incriminating evidence. The accusations were mainly based upon the writings of the

defendants, who have been primarily charged for their political ideas. Other "evidence" consists of telephone tapes, secret witnesses and informants. For example, the major "evidence" linking Negri and the journalist Nicotri with the Moro kidnapping is alleged phone conversations between the two defendants and members of the Moro family. Nicotri was eventually freed on July 7, after 3 months in jail. As for Negri, voice-print analysis conducted both in Italy and at the University of Michigan cleared him entirely of the charge. The Italian press, so insistent on the telephone accusation, hardly mentioned the results of the voice-print analysis reached in July 1979. Toni Negri is still in prison.

Of utmost concern is the violation of the defendant's right to construct their legal defense. The prosecutor has imprisoned and isolated them (without bail), and only then has he attempted to construct his case. This is a dangerous precedent (reminiscent of the West German *Kontaktverbot*) for it makes it impossible for the defense lawyers to defend their clients against vague general charges, supported only by contradictory "evidence."

As *La Repubblica* states, concerning the arrest warrant of Negri, it is "10 pages without any proof." What Calogero, the prosecutor, claims to be "evidence" against Negri simply refers to his ideas and writings which have been openly sold in bookstores for years. Thus, under the pretense of defending democracy, the prosecutor has actually swept away the last vestiges of the individual's legal rights, beginning with freedom of expression.

LAWS INHERITED FROM FASCISM

The Italian State, which has retained the criminal laws of the fascist period (i.e., the Codice Rocco, which makes it possible to convict someone for having "dangerous" opinions) has reinforced its fascist inheritance by instituting the "Legge Reale" in 1975. This is a body of laws, purportedly against terrorism, which severely curtails personal freedom giving the police the right to shoot individuals without any legal consequences. In the referendum of 1978, the Christian Democrats (CD) and the Communist Party (ICP) joined forces to support the "Legge Reale." This coalition was a blatant attempt to muzzle the new emerging social movements.

In Italy there is no bail procedure and a defendant can be kept in jail for up to 2 years before being tried. In the case of Negri and the others, where charges are serious, preventive detention is allowed for up to 4 years. Further, if the defense is unsuccessful, they must remain in jail for 2 years before their appeal; then, if they lose that appeal after 2 more years, they can go before the Supreme Court.

The deep crisis within the Italian political system enables the leading parties (the CD and ICP coalition) to look for "scapegoats," thereby diverting attention from the real problems. The ICP after its Historical Compromise with the Christian Democrats, has been encountering increasing disillusionment within its rank and file, evidenced by a record collapse in membership and heavy losses in the past administrative elections. In response, the party has labeled dissidents as either terrorists or fascists. Thus, it is not a coincidence that Calogero, the prosecutor in the recent wave of events, is a ICP member. The Communist Party has willingly paraded itself as the main defender of law and order to gain respectability.

The extra-parliamentary left is strongest among the social strata which has traditionally supported the communists. It was reinforced by the ICP's decision to ally itself with the Christian Democrats and thus become a part of the State apparatus.

WIDESPREAD SOCIAL DISCONTENT

The ICP, as well as the Christian Democrats, are confronted with widespread social discontent that has been intensified by the stiff economic measures instituted in the '70's in the name of the energy crisis (layoffs, rampant inflation, etc.). Not only have the workers refused to accept the call for "restraint and sacrifice," but in the midst of the crisis a mass women's movement has exploded, while more recently in 1977 a new student movement has swept both the schools and the universities.

The ICP and the Christian Democrats blame the problems of the Italian society on "terrorism" instead of admitting that the crisis is a result of broad social problems. Hence, the attempt to "criminalize" the extra-parliamentary left Movement. The search for "terrorists" has been aimed at those groups and activists who have theorized on the new social phenomena. In particular, the members of Autonomy, a loose network of groups, publications, radios, etc. According to the prosecutor, Autonomy is a breeding-ground of terrorists. He claims that *Autonomy and the Red Brigades are one and the same*. Repeatedly, in their writings, Toni Negri, Oreste Scalzone and the others have severely criticized the actions and political positions of the Red Brigades, whom they have accused of bypassing the Movement and dispossessing it of its real strength: *mass mobilization instead of individual acts of terrorism*.

Massimo Cacciari, an ICP member of the Italian Parliament, who is familiar with Negri's writings has concluded: "Nothing would lead one to an even theoretical connection with the Red Brigades." He continues: "What is happening is the planned victimization of an entire political Movement, that of Autonomy, which can have serious consequences if the attempt is not circumscribed."

Caccari is not an isolated voice. Many scholars and intellectuals as well as various political and cultural organizations have protested these arrests. Michel Foucault, Felix Guattari, Jean-Paul Sartre as well as other members of the French intellectual community have made public statements demanding the immediate release of the political prisoners.

Seven months after the arrests, the magistrates still refuse to produce any direct factual evidence for their case. In the words of Padua Prosecutor Calogero: "To imagine that an investigation of this type may quickly and directly arrive at some facts and evidence makes no sense. . . the relation between a leader of a structure like Autonomy is hardly ever with a crime, but with the organization" (*L'Espresso*, July 15, 1979).

In Italy no evidence is needed to put somebody in jail, *the sheer suspicion of crime is already a crime*. Italy has never excelled in its respect for political liberties (the last ten years offer an uninterrupted example of hush-up political scandals and frame-ups) never has the State so explicitly upheld its disengagement from the legislature. Some jurists refer to the difference between the case of Autonomy and the case built in 1969 against the anarchist Valpreda, accused at the time of bombing the Piazza Fontana (Valpreda spent four years in jail before it was 'discovered' that the fascists were responsible for this crime).

While Nocotri was being released, a new blitz has taken place in Padua, where the magistrates have issued fifteen judiciary communications for "formation" or "participation in armed band."

Among the people who have received the judiciary communication for "participation in armed band" are Ferruccio Gambino and Maria Rosa Dalla Costa, two of the only three teachers from the Padua Institute for Political Science who have not been arrested. Ferruccio Gambino teaches sociology at the Institute since 1970. Maria Rosa Dalla Costa is a widely known feminist, who for years has worked in the "Wages For Housework" movement and is the author of many feminist texts, including *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community*. 'I can only understand this judiciary communication as an attack on feminism. . . It is the last act of a witch-hunt launched since April 7 against the Institute where I work, as well as against many brothers and sisters, in the attempt to criminalize our contribution to scientific research and the political debate. As far as I am concerned, it is clear that this time the target is "Wages for Housework," for all that this strategy implies in terms of the struggles for autonomy, more money and less work, that women have made.' Dalla Costa to *Il Manifesto* (13/7/79).

Alisa del Re, also openly active in the Women's Movement has been incriminated and investigated by the judges for "terrorist activities"—a clear proof that the

scope of the April 7 operation goes beyond and has more ambitious aims than an attack on Autonomy.

Alisa del Re is the author of *Beyond Housework*. When she was arrested she was ill and her health has deteriorated. So far every attempt to obtain her release on account of her health has been frustrated. Del Re has been subjected to a harsh jail discipline.

Her interview to *L'Europeo* illustrates the type of "evidence" on which the judges have so far based the charges, and the type of treatment which is reserved for women in Italian jails. Del Re explains that the "evidence" produced by the police is a map found in her possession marked with some locations which were targets of the Red Brigades.

"As far as the topographic map of Padua is concerned . . . it was seized by the police in a raid on my house in March 77 . . . I was interrogated in June 77 and stated it belonged to my husband. He had used it in July 73 when he substituted for a doctor in Padua. Since he didn't know the town, he marked on the map the streets of his patients. The funniest thing is that they connected this map with actions made in October 77 . . . Moreover, on the map are marked about 180 streets. The actions that correspond to the marks on the map are 2 or 3. As for the treatment I was given the day I was arrested and afterwards, I have the impression I had been condemned to death . . . With suspected pneumonia I was brought to the Venice jail on a motor boat. Seven days after, I was brought to Trieste and thrown in to a damp and cold cell (the Trieste jail does not have an infirmary). After 15 days of continuous requests, I managed to get an X-ray confirming pneumonia in the right lung . . . In the view of the treatment I have received, it is an accident I have survived."

The zeal of the magistrates has reached the point of raising suspicions even against the Socialist Party (ISP). The attempt to involve the ISP has centered around the initiatives it took during the Moro kidnapping. At that time, in the spring of 78, the ISP was the core of the "party of negotiation" (i.e. those who were in favor of dealing with the Red Brigades) and some of their members met some Autonomy people, beginning with Franco Piperno, to consult on possible steps to be taken in the attempt to save Moro's life. These meetings, now, one year later, have raised the suspicion of the magistrates, who have hinted that the ISP supports Autonomy and may even have contacts with the Red Brigades. Since accusing an institutional party is a more difficult operation than jailing some militants, the magistrates have conducted their attacks on the ISP from behind the scenes, often relying on the help of the press and a well-calculated use of hints and

THE PARTY OF NEGOTIATION



FACTUAL EVIDENCE

ATTACK ON FEMINISM

rumors. The magistrates are presumably investigating whether the ISP protected Piperno while he was underground. It is also hinted that the ISP financed the research center *CERPET* (founded by Piperno) and therefore indirectly the magazine *Metropoli*. Finally, evidence of the "suspicious relation" between the ISP and Autonomy would be the fact that Piperno teaches physics at the University of Calabria in Arcavacata, whose director is Giacomo Mancini, a high ranking member of the ISP.

IPERNO AVAGANZA

Meanwhile, the magistrates and the police have done their best to build the image of Piperno as a dangerous criminal. The most "brilliant" operation against Piperno was the one organized on August 17, 1979. In the late afternoon, a man arrived at the Viareggio railroad station on the Rome-Turino train. Two men on the train shouted to a transit police agent " he has gone down that way." The agent ran after the man shooting, but the man, shooting as well, escaped in a car. The Italian police declared that the man was Piperno, and that he was armed and dangerous. The newspapers headlined Piperno as an "armed bandit." The incident would have been the best evidence of his "connection with the armed struggle." Unfortunately Piperno was arrested a few hours later in a Paris cafe by Interpol. He had been recognized by a vacationing member of the ICP. The party has gone a long way into transforming its members into alternative police. A warrant of arrest with 46 charges ranging from the Moro killing to traffic violations, was sent by the Rome judges to the French magistrate, in order to justify the request for extradition.

More than 1,500 political prisoners are presently being held in Italy. In September, 1979, an appeal was signed by a large number of Italian intellectuals around and within the ICP. It includes Bernardo Bertolucci, Masimo Cacciari, Umberto Eco, Alberto Moraria, Leonardo Sciascia and Mario Tronti. The Appeal demands an *immediate trial of the accused* in order to put an end to the spiral of ambiguity and defamation fueled by the media.

II/1 Ailsa Del Re (left), 1976

II/2 Ratner Fassbinder (right), 1971 Photo: Digne Meller Marcovicz



Workerist Publications and Bios

INDICTMENTS

According to the magistrates conducting the inquest against those who were arrested on 7 April, the political group Potere Operaio (Worker's Power), which emerged in 1969 and disbanded in 1974, was the point of departure for all the developments during the past five years, from Organized Autonomy to the Red Brigades. Under this indictment fall the most diverse people, many of whom no longer have anything to do with the organizations that are prosecuted today. It is in this way that the Italian State tries to "facilitate" its repressive operation: any kind of involvement with Potere Operaio is enough to put someone under indictment.

This brief chronology, compiled for us by Sergio Bologna, seeks to demonstrate that the area of Autonomy, both in theoretical terms and as a militant practice, contains profoundly different tendencies distinguished by their choice of thematics, researches, and theoretical elaborations.

Raniero Panzieri founds *Quaderni Rossi* (Red Notebooks) with the collaboration of Vittorio Foa, Marlo Tronti, Toni Negri, Alberto Asor Rosa, Romano Alquati, Romolo Gobbi, Pierluigi Gasparotto, Claudio Greppi, Rita di Leo, Vittorio Rieser, and Caspare de Caro. Foa is a national official of the *Confederazione Generale*

Italiana del Lavoro (Federation of Italian Trade Unions), the union of the social-communist majority. The first issue is subsequently published by the editorial staff.

- 1962 During the metal workers' contractual struggles, the editorial staff publishes a series of pamphlets (*News from Quaderni Rossi*), in addition to the review.
- 1963 The group's first political crisis occurs; a majority of the editors wants to organize local "workers' editorial staffs" and factory newspapers. *Potere Operaio* (Milan, 1 May 1963), *Potere Operaio di Porto Marghera* (Padua, May 1963), *Gatto Selvaggio* (Wildcat) (Turin, June 1963), *Classe Operaia* (Working Class) (Genoa, June 1963) appear contemporaneously. These local newspapers try to unite themselves under the heading *Cronache Operaie* (Labor News), and in this operation there is a break with Panzieri, Rieser and others.
- 1964 In January, the remainder of the editorial staff founds *Classe Operaia* with numerous local editors: Tronti, Asor Rosa, Di Leo, and De Caro are in Rome; Negri, Bianchini, Ferrari Bravo, and Cacciari in Padua; Casparotto, Sergio Bologna, Forni, Brunatto, and Gobbi in Milan; Alquati and Gobbi in Turin; and Arrighetti, Greppi, Berti, and Francovich in Florence.
- 1966 *Classe Operaia* ceases publication.
- 1968 Negri, Asor Rosa, Cacciari, and Tronti found the review *Contropiano* (Counterplan). It lasts until 1973. Negri leaves after the second issue. In this year, pamphlets are published by *Linea di Massa* (Mass's Line) on the party committee's struggles at Pirelli and on the organization of the technicians in the State's petroleum industry (S. Donato Milanese's companies).
- 1969 On 1 May, *La Classe* appears. The editors are Negri, Piperno, Scalzone, Bologna, Daghini, Magnaghi, Dalmaviva and others. In the summer of this year, there are extensive strikes at Fiat in Turin, the worker-student assembly is formed, and the first fliers with the title *Lotta Continua* appear. In September, the first issue of *Potere Operaio*, the newspaper of the organization, appears.
- 1970 In January, the first meeting of Potere Operaio is held at Florence, and a national secretariat composed of Negri, Piperno, and Bologna is formed. In September, Potere Operaio holds its second meeting. The national secretariat is Alberto Magnaghi.
- 1971 Potere Operaio holds its third meeting in September at Rome.
- 1972 Negri and Bologna edit the "Marxist Materials" series for the publisher Feltrinelli, which publishes, among other things, *Workers and the State*, *The State and Underdevelopment*, *The Multinational Worker*, *The Other Labor Movement*, and *Crisis and Labor Organization*.
- 1973 The first symptoms of the crisis manifest themselves according to two lines: the first is represented by Toni Negri; the second by Piperno, Scalzone, Magnaghi, Dalmaviva, Marongiu, and others. Negri subsequently breaks with Potere Operaio and founds the review *ROSSO (RED)*. In September, the first meeting of the Autonomous Workers' Assembly is held. This is the point of departure for Workers' Autonomy. Comrades from Milan, Porto Marghera, Florence, Bologna, Rome, the collective of Polyclinic and of Enel (National Company of Electricity) are present. Also in this year, Sergio Bologna founds *Primo Maggio* (May Day), a review of militant history.
- 1974 Potere Operaio disbands.
- 1976 Piperno and Scalzone found the review *Linea di Condotta* (Line of Conduct).

7-78 *Autonomia* appears at Padua. The newspaper *I Volsci* The *Volscians* appears at Rome.

'8-79 Piperno and Scalzzone found *Metropoli*. Toni Negri founds *Magazzino*.

OS

ERGIO BOLOGNA

Sergio Bologna participated in *Quaderni Rossi* and *Cronache Operaie* in 1964. He founded *Classe Operaia* with Tronti, Negri and Alquati. As an employee of Olivetti, he participated in the first attempts at unionizing the new white collar workers in electronics and in data processing. In 1966, he began teaching at the University of Trento. He also contributed to *Quaderni Piacentini*. At the end of '68 he edited the first two issues of *Linea di Massa*. With Negri, Scalzzone, Piperno, Dalmaviva and others, he founded *La Classe* (May 1, 1969). In September 1969 "Potere Operaio" was founded; Bologna, Negri and Piperno made up its first national secretariat. In November of 1970, he left "Potere Operaio" because of disagreements over the organization's general policy.

In 1972, with Negri he edited the first four volumes in Feltrinelli's "Marxist Materials" series. In 1973, he founded *Primo Maggio*, a review of militant history. In 1978-79, he supported the policy of returning to the worker's centrality, the analysis of the large factories, and above all to the problems of the workers in the ware transportation sector. He has contributed to *Lotta Continua*, *Il Manifesto*, *Il Quotidiano dei Lavoratori*, the three dailies of the new Italian left. From 1970 on, he has been a professor of the History of the Workers' Movement at Padua, in the same department with Negri and Ferrari Bravo.

ANTONIO NEGRI

Antonio Negri, having left the Italian Socialist Party, edited in 1959 *Progresso Veneto*. In 1961 he participated in *Quaderni Rossi* and later led the split with Raniero Panzieri which gave rise to *Potere Operaio di Porto Marghera* (1963) and *Classe Operaia* (1964). In 1968, together with Massimo Cacciari, Alberto Asor Rosa and Mario Tronti, he founded *Contropiano*. He left the review after the first two issues. In 1969 he was one of the main figures in the foundation of "Potere Operaio." He took care especially of the international connections of the organization, and forwarded the publication in foreign languages of Italian workerist literature. He was the national secretary of the organization from 1970 to 1973, the year of his expulsion. From 1973 to 1974 he developed the theory of the transition from the mass-worker to the "socialized worker," in which the role of the new social subjects becomes strategically important. In 1973, together with the other ex-members of "Potere Operaio" (among them Gianfranco Pancino) and ex-members of the "Gruppo Gramsci," he founded the magazine *Rosso* and the organization of the same name. In 1973 he also founded, together with Emilio Vesce and Franco Tommei, the journal *Controinformazione* in which the Red Brigades were also involved. He left the journal after the first issue.

Among Negri's numerous writings are: *Crisi dello Stato-piano*, Feltrinelli, 1974; *Proletari e Stato*, Feltrinelli, 1976; *La Forma Stato*, Feltrinelli, 1977. He is co-author of *Operai e Stato*, Feltrinelli, 1976, and of *Crisi e Organizzazione Operaia*, Feltrinelli, 1974.

Since 1976 he has been considered the theoretician of Autonomy. After April 7, 1979, the date of his arrest, his political auto-biography appeared with the title *Dall'Operaio-Massa all'Operaio Sociale*, Multipla Edizioni.

FRANCO PIPERNO

Franco Piperno, having left the Italian Communist Party, became one of the leading figures in the student movement in Italy in 1964. Together with Oreste Scalzzone, he led the university struggles in Rome in 1968, for which he was arrested for several months. He also played an important role, together with Adriano Sofri (leader of "Lotta Continua"), in the formation of the worker-student's council in Turin, during the wild-cat struggles at FIAT in the summer of 1969. From 1970 to its dissolution, he was the main figure in the organizational structure of "Potere Operaio." He supported the centralization of the political leadership against Negri, who wished to see it dissolved.

Franco Piperno has always been more active at the organizational rather than at the theoretical level. From 1975 to 1977 he withdrew from active militancy. After the '77 Movement he again played an important role in the definition of Autonomy. At the end of 1978, together with Oreste Scalzzone, he founded *Metropoli*. He was arrested in August, 1979, in Paris and extradited from France on October 16.

ORESTE SCALZONE

Oreste Scalzzone was, together with Franco Piperno, one of the most representative figures of the students' movement in Rome in 1968. He was injured by the fascists during the occupation of the university. In 1969 he edited *La Classe* and, in September, founded "Potere Operaio." In 1970 he moved to Milan and became one of the most active militants in mass demonstrations. In "Potere Operaio" he was instrumental in building connections between the organization and the general movement. He supported the political prisoners and the struggle against the special jails. For these reasons he still is the most popular figure of the "Potere Operaio" experience among the rank and file, and the spokesman of the organization.

After the dissolution of "Potere Operaio," which he opposed with Piperno, he founded the magazine *Linea di Condotta* and organized the group called *Comitati Comunisti Rivoluzionari*. During the '77 Movement he played an important role in the representation of Autonomy and emerged as one of the most prominent figures in the Bologna Convention, September 1977. At the end of 1978, together with Franco Piperno, he founded *Metropoli*. He was arrested on April 7, 1979.

Translated by Lawrence Venuti

III/1 *Potere Operaio*, May-June 1972

POTERE OPERAIO / MAGGIO-GIUGNO 1972

PAGINA 15

Il momento dei contratti sarà quello in cui la forza repressiva dello Stato verrà alla luce. Dobbiamo avere la forza di anticiparli sul terreno dello scontro.

CONTRO I CONTRATTI

CONTRO LA GABBIA CONTRATTUALE, PROGRAMMA OPERAIO E VIOLENZA PROLETARIA

**Gli obiettivi del programma:
MENO LAVORO E SALARIO GARANTITO
PER TUTTI I PROLETARI!**

Nel documento politico della Segreteria di Potere Operaio appare con sufficiente chiarezza qual è la linea che P.O. porterà avanti all'interno, ma soprattutto già prima dei contratti.

trapreso dalla generalità dei compagni fin da subito, può permettere di arrivare ai contratti avendo determinato un terreno, sia per quanto riguarda gli obiettivi, sia per quanto riguarda l'identifi-

ciamente iniziative di rottura sindacale.

Fin qui i padroni. Per parte loro i riformisti di tutte le specie stanno già preparando il loro lurido arsenale di repressione delle lotte. Lo conosciamo tutto e lo abbiamo già largamente descritto in queste pagine: dall'insistenza sulle riforme ai mille mezzi per rompere le reni agli operai in lotta con infiniti imbrogli e la divisione del fronte

mo renderci conto che OGGI LA LOTTA PER IL SALARIO TRAPASSA IMMEDIATAMENTE IN LOTTA PER IL POTERE, in lotta di partito armata contro la violenza dei padroni, contro la loro necessità di scatenare l'attacco più pesante dentro le lotte operaie.

Abbiamo già detto che lotte operaie di portata formidabile sono in atto. Alle grandi lotte delle fabbriche di Milano e di Porto Marghera dei mesi scorsi

Open Letter to Negri's Judges

Gilles Deleuze

This critique of the legal basis of the charges against the Anarchists was published in *La Repubblica* one month after the initial arrests in Padova and Turin.

One is rapidly gaining the impression from the judicial proceedings that there is nothing, literally nothing, in the dossiers of the prosecution to back up the committal to prison and further detainment of Professor Negri and his colleagues and comrades.

The voice on the telephone in the call to the Moro family is suddenly being played down; the places where Negri was supposed to have been are somehow disappearing from the case; and his writings, so far from being "strategic resolutions of the Red Brigades," turn out to be texts which express clear opposition to the positions of the Red Brigades. The prosecuting judges, throughout the committal proceedings, have continuously put off presenting their legal evidence — we are told to "have patience." And meanwhile the committal proceedings have taken the form of an ideological debate on Negri's writings, in a spectacle worthy of the Inquisition. True, the judges have time on their side: the Reale Law (1975) allows them to keep those charged in custody for up to 4 years before they come to trial.

Two principles are at stake in this case, two principles that vitally concern all responsible democrats.

Firstly, justice must conform to a principle that the content of the charge must have a certain identity. Not only must the accused be identified precisely, but so must the substance of the charge. It must have been a *precise identity* and must be *non-contradictory*. If other, differing, elements of accusation emerge later, then this involves a new case. In short, the charge brought must contain in its substance a minimum of *identifiable consistency*. Unless such a precise identification exists as to the charges laid against the accused, as long as the accusations remain general and unspecified, the legal defence cannot operate.

This principle has been violated, for example, in the committal warrant issued from Rome. This starts by recapitulating the Moro kidnapping of March 1978 (as if Negri is accused of having been present). It then goes on to invoke his writings and ideas (so that even if he was *not* directly involved, he was nonetheless "responsible" for this event). Here we have a "catch-all" formula, not a legally consistent charge; it leaps from action to instigation to pure thought, from ideas to whatever events suit the prosecution case. Such a charge, so diversified and indeterminate, lacks the most elementary juridical identity: "You will be made guilty in any event. . . ."

Secondly, the committal hearings must conform to a certain principle of *disjunction and exclusion*. Either A is the case, or B; if B, then it is not A, etc. Yet in the Negri case it appears that the judges are intent on "keeping their opinions open," so that opposed facts are no longer alternatives which mutually exclude each other. If Negri was not in Rome, the telephone call to Moro's family is still kept as an incriminating lead, by switching its caller to Paris (or vice versa). If Negri was not directly involved in the Moro kidnapping, then at any rate he inspired it, or "thought" it and that is tantamount to having carried it out. If Negri in his texts and statements has clearly opposed the Red Brigades, this was only a smart "cover" proving even more conclusively that he was in secret agreement with them and was their hidden leader. And so on. Contradictory elements in the charges do not cancel each other out. Rather, in this case, they become cumulative.

As Franco Piperno, one of the accused "in hiding"¹ has pointed out, this implies an extremely curious way of evaluating the significance of political and theoretical texts. Those bringing the accusations against Negri are so used to the belief that in a political discourse it is possible to say anything, since overt "politics" is always a cover, that they simply cannot conceive of the situation of a revolutionary intellectual who has no possibility of writing anything but what he really thinks. Andreotti, Berlinguer and their likes² can always hide what they really think, because in such political discourse everything is calculated opportunism. Such can certainly be said (to cite one notable example of another revolutionary intellectual) in the case of Gramsci. In short, far from proceeding through the *exclusion* of alternatives, the committal hearings of Negri and the others accused in this case have been based on a principle of *inclusion*, the *adding together* of contradictory elements.

We must now ask how and why such negations of justice become possible. It is here, I believe, that the role of the Press and media has exerted, with few exceptions, and continues to exert, a crucial influence in the Negri case. Not for the first time, of course, but perhaps for the first time in such a systematic and organised way, the Press has pre-empted and prepared the ground by a sensational "pre-trial" (and the French Press has been no less willing to join in this campaign of defamation and calumny). The judicial system would never have been able to abandon the principle of *specific identity* in the accusations; the hearings would never have been conducted on the basis of *inclusion*, if the Press and media had not prepared the ground, offered the means, whereby these rules could be flagrantly abandoned and forgotten without public outcry.

In fact the media, for their part, operate according to another, specific principle. Whether in the case of daily or weekly papers, or radio and TV, the media are governed by a principle of *accumulation*. So that there can be "news" to report

each day, and since repudiations or contradictions from the previous day have no influence whatever on the "news" of the following day, the Press and media can operate an accumulation of everything that is said from one day to the next without fearing any contradiction. The use of the "conditional tense" allows all possibilities to be multiplied and to co-exist. Thus it is "possible" to present Negri as being in Rome, Paris or Milan on the same day! The three "possibilities" are simply accumulated. He is presented at one point as an "active member" of the Red Brigades, or their "hidden leader", and at another as representative of a totally opposed tendency and tactics. No matter. . . the differing versions are again accumulated.

If we are to believe one French paper (*Le Nouvel Observateur*), we get the following result: even if Negri were not in the Red Brigades, he is an Autonomist, and "we all know who the left Autonomists in Italy are". Whatever the facts, the treatment of Negri becomes justified.

The Press has abandoned itself in this affair to a fantastic accumulation of make-believe, which has *not followed after*, in the wake of, the judiciary, but by their "pre-trial", has actively prepared the way for the judiciary and the police to conceal their total lack of evidence or substance to the charges. The new space for judicial and police repression in Europe today can only function *through* a crucial preparatory role of the Press and media. All organs of the media, from Left to far Right, have in this case, "made up for", made acceptable this gross breach of justice and due process. It seems that the time has come in Europe, when the old reproach that the Press should "keep a certain distance", should represent a certain resistance to "official slogans", will soon no longer apply.

Given the alleged international ramifications of this conspiracy, as reported in the Press ("the French Connection", the "Parisian HQ of the Red Brigades", etc), let it not be thought on this occasion that my letter is a "meddling in Italian affairs of which we are ignorant"³. Negri is a political scientist, an intellectual of high standing, in France as well as Italy. Italians and French today have the same problems in facing escalating violence, but also in confronting an escalation of repression that no longer even feels the need to be juridically legitimated — since its legitimation is carried out *in advance* by the Press, the media, the "organs of public opinion".

What we are witnessing here is an authentic judicial slaughter, by the modalities of the media, of men and women who have been interned, indefinitely, on the basis of legal "evidence" of which the least one can say is that it is as unsubstantial and vague as the accusations. Meanwhile, the long-awaited "proofs" are constantly put off until tomorrow. We do not in fact believe in these "proofs" that have so often been promised. We would like more information, instead, on the conditions of those being detained, and the solitary confinement to which they have been subjected. Perhaps we are to await another "prison catastrophe", which would no doubt give the Press their chance to find that elusive "definite proof" of Negri's guilt?

*Translated by Committee April 7,
London*

1. Piperno was arrested in Paris on September 18. The Italian authorities have asked for his extradition under the charge of "armed insurrection against the State."

2. Giuglio Andreotti: a leader of the DC, he often headed up the Italian government. Enrico Berlinguer: General Secretary of the ICP. He was instrumental in implementing the Historical Compromise.

3. This reproach was made by Italian politicians of both Left and Right, following the "Protest by French intellectuals against Repression in Italy" in 1977.



The ANSA Story

Ferruccio Gambino/ Seth Tilet

ANSA is the official Italian news agency. The 'terrorist' image of Autonomy has always been a CO-PRODUCTION of the Italian judiciary and the news industry. Ferruccio Gambino is professor of Labor Relations at Padua University and one of the last remaining members of its Political Science Faculty, in which Negri also taught. At the time of this interview (Aug. 1st) he had been notified by the police that he too was under investigation.

Seth Tilet How effective is a "Blackout" in the Italian press, how does it function, what is the leverage that's used?

Ferruccio Gambino: The Italian bourgeoisie has always worked quite informally. In the 1870's or 1880's, even early in this century, the Italian policy makers used to meet at the Monte Catini baths in Tuscany in the summer, and they would decide upon the next policies, especially foreign policies, while they were taking therapeutic waters there.

After 1945, some publisher published the orders that the fascist regime was giving to the so called Agenzia Stephane, which was the main national news agency. Every day the Agenzia Stephane used to receive orders directly from the executive, sometimes straight from Mussolini. After the second World War and the fall of facism, things have become somehow better. That is, orders may not be so direct, they can be circumvented, and they focus basically, I think, on the economics of printing and publishing. Government has a direct control on the price of cellulose and paper. It has established a so called National Organisation for Cellulose. It sets the price of newspapers, especially daily newspapers. It has a wide range of power over newspaper, TV, and radio advertising, especially through the *State Owned Industry* and its advertising needs. And it can

manipulate also with its own dailies. // *Giorno* in Milan, for instance, is directly owned by state-owned ENI—E N I, the oil company. It can manipulate through its own party newspapers, for instance the daily, // *Popolo*, a Christian Democratic newspaper. It can manipulate through large concentrations, the largest publishing concentration being Rizzoli (Mondadori comes in second). It can intimidate or make journalists shy, at the very least, as Giorgio Bocca, the Italian journalist is saying. He says: "When an American journalist interviews a Secretary of State or the Secretary of Labor, he is bold or she is bold. In Italy, when they interview the power structure, they shy away. It is like apologizing for posing a question. So that's one side of the story. The other side is, of course, the general political situation.

They have flair enough to smell what is happening in this country and when the tide is not high . . . or when water is—how do you say that—at low ebb.

They know the ebb tide and the flow tide, let us put it that way, *politically*. So that accounts for large segments of the Italian press. What cannot be controlled directly through the capitalist press is controlled through the *parties*. Of course, the Communist Party has a daily paper, *L'Unita*, and it has *open orders*, so to speak. It has a very straight posture on the case. The Socialist Party has *L'Avanti*, a daily paper and it is the same thing.

Then there are the supporting papers. *Peese Sera* is a supporting *communist daily*. So that is more or less the picture, I think.

T What is the connection with ANSA, how is ANSA controlled?

G ANSA is directly controlled by the government and the executive in this country. ANSA representatives are chosen by government agencies. ANSA is the *direct descendent* of Agenzia Stephane; and I am sure that in a few years, or maybe in many years, I don't know, somebody will publish again the anthology of orders coming down from the government to ANSA every morning, as Agenzia Stephane received them in the 30's.

T Did you know that the Director of the Photographic Archives at ANSA is the brother of the Director of Photographic Archives at U.P.I.?

G No.

T Enzo Brizzi and his brother, Renzo Romano Brizzi. I think they're twins.

Negri's Interrogation

Arrested on April 7, 1979, Toni Negri appeared a few days later before his judges. As opposed to Oreste Scalzone, Negri then found it advisable to answer questions to his writings. The following transcript is invaluable inasmuch as it exemplifies the "bizarre" procedure adopted by the judges. As it happens, the Autonomists were incriminated on the basis not of any previous evidence, but on their very answers.

Judge Tell us what you have written about armed struggle.

Negri In regard to armed struggle my position has been expressed most completely in my book, *33 Lessons on Lenin*, in which a re-examination of Lenin's thought leads to the acceptance of armed struggle as an essential moment in the development of mass and class revolutionary struggle. Yet I have, in all my public statements, always expressed the deepest, widest, reasoned rejection of any form of armed struggle that involves the militarization of the Movement and clandestine activity.

J You have said that most of the militants of "Potere Operaio" (P.O.) were opposed to clandestinization and to armed struggle. I show you two documents which were found in your files. The first is a mimeographed sheet which praises the armed struggle of a few P.O. comrades arrested for possessing Molotov cocktails. The second, also a mimeographed sheet with the P.O. letterhead, explains "why Idalgo Macchiarini and Robert Negret have been kidnapped and put on trial," (two corporate managers, one from Sit-Siemens of Milan and the other from Renault of Paris). I must remind you Macchiarini was kidnapped in 1972 and the action was claimed by the Red Brigades (B.R.).

N They are leaflets that could have been found among the documents of any of the organizations of '68. In any case, they do not indicate a P.O. line as much as the indiscriminate and general praise that the Movement bestowed on the first initiatives of mass armed struggle.

Public Prosecutor. Have you ever distributed this kind of leaflet?

N I stopped doing it about ten years ago, around 1970.

J I show you this typewritten material that contains some notes I believe you wrote. Do you want to verify the contents?

N The document contains analysis of the current situation that I think I can agree with. The document in its entirety seems to be mine, without excluding the fact that it may represent the outcome of a collective discussion, and hence contain some points that I could not accept. In general, the document is characterized by the assumption of the irreversible fact of extremely antagonistic class relationships. Therefore, it talks about a "Vietnamese" strategy in the Movement within this given and irreversible situation. It emphasizes the major aspects of mass struggle, which are clarified in the central part of the same document about the four campaigns: concerning the working day and the wage; concerning public expenditure; concerning nuclear power; and against State terrorism. It is clear that when one is speaking about offensive struggle — one is speaking about the material conditions of exploitation in relation to the new conditions of social production (socialized work, off-the-books work, women's work, various methods of extracting absolute surplus value and therefore more brutal exploitation). All this defines a situation of extreme social antagonism among classes and social groups, for which the conclusion inevitably tends to be made in terms of civil war. Notice the huge and dramatic difference that these theses make in relation to the B.R. position.

J I do not quite see this fundamental difference.

N It is the difference between the dismantling of power and the destabilization of the political system. In fact, the fundamental problem is one of destabilizing the political system through the dismantling of the social system of exploitation. This is the revolutionary process as I mean it — a material process simultaneously breaking the whole capitalist machine's domination and providing for the fundamental needs of the proletariat (self-amelioration). The insurrectional process (therefore the process connected to the civil war) can only place itself at the end of the complexity of this social movement. It is at the point of the explosion of objective contradictions that the struggle is intensified and the economic system of exploitation has difficulty keeping its laws functioning. As a consequence, the system that represents it lives only out of the terroristic irrationality of domination — a political class that does not know how to produce surplus value is a dead political class.

PP But I still have not understood the difference from the B.R.

N The difference between what I said and the ideology of the B.R. rests on the following points. First, the conception of organization. The B.R. has an extremely centralized idea of organization (the party), which is presented as the fundamental and exclusive weapon and the determining factor in the clash with the State. The mass movement, while said to be fundamental, is regarded as ineffective without the party's external guide. It is the classic Third International ideology. "Autonomia Operaia," on the contrary — on the basis of the tradition of Italian revolutionary Marxism — considers organization as mass organization that filters and translates into itself, overturning the capitalist organization of social production. "Autonomia" emerges out of the growth of the immediate needs of the proletariat. It is a moment for dismantling through a struggle against exploitation and liberation of proletarian needs.

Secondly, the concept of insurrection. For the B.R., the concept of insurrection is

connected to the issue of taking over State power. For "Autonomia," take-over is a meaningless term at least on two accounts: that no State power exists outside the material organization of production; that there is not revolution except as a transitional process in the making and partly realized. It is therefore clear that "Autonomia" rejects any idea of a State "coup" through actions directed against the institutions. Any action must direct itself toward providing for the fundamental needs of the proletariat. For the B.R., proletarian liberation and any effort and any moment of struggle in this sense are impossible if the State power structure is not attacked and destroyed.

J I show you a series of documents on union issues, in which among other things "attack and turn the tables" is mentioned. I believe that these objectives are the same ones pursued by military and clandestine organizations, such as the B.R.

N Most of these documents — like the ones we discussed earlier — have been published in the journal *Rosso*. I believe that the call for "attack against even democratic union representation," is part of the constant permanent line of "Autonomia" and that it is justified by general course of political relationships in this society. When one speaks of the attack against the union structure, one means the mass opposition to the union and the exercise of the radical democratic rights of the workers and the proletariat.

J Explain the meaning of the expressions "organized axis of Autonomy" and "complementary axis".

N When I speak of "organized axis of Autonomy" I am referring to the autonomous mass vanguard acting in the factories, in the service organizations, in the neighborhoods. By "complementary axis" I mean small spontaneous groups that are working in the area of Autonomy.

J But do you or do you not share the same objectives as the B.R.?

N It seems to me erroneous to assert an unambiguous relationship between the generally developed anti-union polemic in the movement of the Marxist Left and the military practice of the B.R.

J Remember that you also had in your files this document entitled "Outline for the Construction of a Workers Coordination". Among other things, in this material of yours, it is stated: "The huge platoon of the owners' servants should be placed in a situation of not being harmful. The managers are the first link of the organized chain through which the owners' command is exercised." And later: "Let us organize the proletarian patrol in order to eliminate scabs from the workshops; let us make the patrol an instrument of permanent organization inside and outside the factory. . ." There is no question that these are typical objectives of the Red Brigades.

N From an even cursory reading of the document, I believe it is not mine.

P P But remember that in in your files there were other documents, handwritten or typed by you, of the same content!

Defense Lawyer. You have to tell us what this document proves! The judicial code requires that the accused be made aware "in a precise and clear manner" the acts attributed to him as punishable offenses and all the proof relative to such acts.

P P You are trying to obstruct the answering of the question.

N It is useless to get excited since I am willing to answer the question. In my files I was gathering both material I wrote and documents from the various existing political positions in the Movement. The whole of which, as I did once before in the 1960's, would have been donated to a foundation.

J For completeness I now show you the other three documents: a manuscript, "The Patrol, the Brigade, the Red Guard with Tennis Shoes"; typewritten material in which, among other things, it is stated that "the patrol in tennis shoes covers the master's territory and strikes the enemy recomposing the class"; and a letter addressed to you, in which the sender agrees with you concerning the practicality of the patrols.

N The manuscript is the outline of an article I wrote for *Rosso*. The idea of the proletarian patrol seems to me to be a useful tool of organization for today's proletariat, which is forced into territorial dispersion of productive activity, forced into "off-the-books" work, diffused work, tertiary work. Only the patrol would be able to create an aggregation of these forces not gathered inside the large factory of capital and therefore allow the ripening of class struggle in terms adjusted to the mobility of this new work force. The function of the patrol is the economic-political representation of the productive proletariat involved in "off-the-books" work, in order to improve working and living conditions.

J We believe that what you define as the "ripening class struggle" is carried out by the patrols through the use of illegal and violent means.

N In the majority of the cases the work of the patrols is not carried out through illegal and violent means, but rather through political pressure and negotiations. The cases in which there are elements of violence, would, I believe, be the kind that are well-known in the history of class struggle when sectors of the unorganized labor force asks for union recognition. One should not forget that the history of union organizations in the large factories has included considerable violence — violence, first of all, in reaction to the repressive forces of capital.

J Now I show you another series of documents that you had filed. There is writing about columns, politico-military cadres, logistical sections and mass work. Specified are the tasks of the military structure, including "action against the enemy, defense action, training, expropriations." Finally, arming, financing, and clandestine behavior. What do you have to say in this regard?

N It is not my material. They are documents that don't have the slightest relationship with the kind of political line I am following. The hand-written notes on the borders are not my handwriting. Those documents were circulated in Milan within the Movement as proposals for discussion that were engaged in by people that I presume later merged into *Prima Linea*.

J Who are these people?



N I am not able to tell you their names. They were people who hung around in the coordinates of "Autonomia." The organizational model in those documents, however, is pretty much terrorist. A debate on these issues went on around 1976, with these ideas meeting substantial opposition in the Movement.

J But why have you saved several copies of the same text?

N Probably these documents were given to me in order to get my opinion and support. I want to make it clear that it is precisely the abundance of information made available to me that has enabled me to oppose such positions more effectively.

J But you should be able to remember who these people were who gave you these documents and asked for your support.

N I repeat I cannot answer. Terrorists never introduce themselves as such! This material circulates during public meetings and often through several hands.

P P When you speak in this excited tone, you remind me of the voice in the phone call to Mrs. Moro!

N You have no right to make these insinuations! You have to prove what you say first. You are insulting me!

D L I demand that this incident be put in the record.

J Agreed. Let us record everything. But let's be calmer.

N In short, it is just about impossible for me to identify the ones who brought these documents.

J "Elementary Norms of Behavior" is the title of another typewritten document from your files. The concepts presented here are similar to the ones contained in another typewritten page with the title "Norms of Security and Work Style for the Irregular Forces" by the B.R., which was found in the apartment of Via Gradoli? With these documents we have discovered clues concerning the existence of illegal, clandestine, and militarized bodies within the Movement to which you, Professor Negri, are not extraneous.

N Of course I have not written this document. It belongs to documentary material I have gathered. It is worth remembering that the process of gestation and political identification of "Autonomia" in Milan which has been developing in recent years requires the overcoming of the militarist "impasse" inside the Movement. It should be clear that the organized "Autonomia" of Milan is struggling against this "impasse".

J There are handwritten notes on a leaflet I have here concerning union issues.

N They are items for a discussion concerning the organization of the struggle against Saturday work.

J What does the expression "I" near the word "leaflet" mean?

N Probably it means that somehow I had taken care of the thing, or that I wanted to take care of it.

J Is this pamphlet, "Workers' Power for Communism," yours? If it is the fruit of a collective work, did you participate in it?

N It is not a pamphlet of mine and I did not collaborate in drawing it up. I have never been a part of the Revolutionary Communist Committees which are given as authors on the first page.

J Who are the persons who supported, as you said earlier, the "directive line of the B.R." and the B.R.'s initiatives as a moment of unification for the Movement? And who formed the "little groups" that supported the "clandestine" and "terrorist line"?

N It is difficult, indeed impossible to answer that question.

J You keep talking about the constant rejection of armed struggle. We have obtained a transcript of your statements during the third organizational conference of P.O. in September 1971. You had stated then that "appropriation" on the one hand and "militarization" on the other were absolutely related, and that the development of the "clash" and the "organization" had to proceed together.

N That position (even simply expressed off the cuff and in the course of a very complex and confused conference) was consistent with the positions that I later supported. It is clear that the perspective of armed struggle, as it is called here, refers to the perspective defined in the Marxist classics and does not correspond at all to a particular program for the militarization of the Movement.


D L These are not relevant questions. The accused is being forced at each point to provide not concrete answers on factual elements, but rather to engage in analysis concerning philosophical premises, a specialized lexicon, and correlations among political and historical issues. It seems to us that you expect some element of evidence from the answers. We thus ask that the accused be questioned directly in relation to the charges. In particular, the two reports by the *Digos* (secret police) and the witnesses who will testify.

J I agree. Let us invite the accused to prove his innocence in relation to the following probative elements against him, the sources of which cannot be indicated without prejudicing the judicial inquiry. 1) Statements according to which Negri helped to develop, on the one hand, the military actions of the B.R., and on the other, the mass actions of "Autonomia", the one being coordinated with the other through centralized (central and peripheral) structures. The link between the armed vanguard and the base of the Movement had to be assured by the rigid centralization (the so-called "workers' centralism") of the mass and vanguard initiatives. 2) Statements according to which, in the course of meetings among members of the organization, Negri advocated the necessity to raise the level of confrontation (sabotage of industrial plants, the beating of factory supervisors, proletarian expropriations, and kidnapping and confiscations in reference to union leaders, judges, and factory managers), with the aim of conquering power. 3) Statements according to which Negri pointed to the B.R. and P.O. as connected

esaustivo della realtà. È una giusta- insieme un'ordin
la scarcerazione le insieme di at
di falsità docum capire il silenzio
a nessuno scoppi zione? Quando, i
letto transocean



Toni Negri, professeur de sociologie. Il est inculpé pour menées subversives.



Toni Negri con la figlia Anna a Venezia nel 1965

structures, and according to which he participated in B.R. planning. 4) Revelations made by a B.R. member to a person who had later informed the judicial authorities about the direct link between the B.R. and P.O. 5) Statements according to which the militants of P.O. in Padua had available arms and explosives and were training themselves in military techniques. Statements according to which Negri taught the "technique" of building Molotov cocktails.

N I am completely astonished by the probative elements stated here. They are not only untrue accusations, but downright unlikely and incompatible with everything I have said and done during the times I belonged to P.O. and later "Autonomia". The opposition between the B.R. and "Autonomia" is clear from the documents of the two groups themselves. It is preposterous to say that I taught people how to make Molotov cocktails, which, by the way, I do not know how to assemble. I have never spoken in support of making links between the B.R.'s military actions and the mass actions of the organized Autonomy. The accusations are based on pure fabrication—they are fantasies!

J At this point we are questioning all your writings, charging that you present programs tending towards armed struggle and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship.

N I refuse to accept the legitimacy of your questions and of the reports which were used to justify my arrest. Nothing in my books has any direct organizational relationship. My responsibility is totally as an intellectual who writes and sells books!

J If you have always expressed the rejection of armed struggle, tell us then how you justify this phrase contained in this leaflet: "The heroic struggle of the B.R. and the NAP (Armed Proletariat Nuclei) comrades is the iceberg of the Movement." I want you to notice that the document, taken from your files, has notations and corrections, some of which quite likely are your own.


N Yes, the document seems to be mine; at least some of the marginal notations are mine. But it contains classic expressions of Marxism. For "democracy" one should understand the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and for "proletarian dictatorship," the highest form of freedom and democracy. As for the sentence in question, it is indeed necessary to recognize as a fact the emergence of the B.R. and NAP as the tip of the iceberg of the Movement. This does not require one in any way to transform the recognition into a defense, and this does not in any way deny the grave mistake of the B.R. line. At one point I defined the B.R. as a variable of the Movement gone crazy.

I have expressed in the most emphatic way my disagreement regarding the B.R. initiatives—a position that I believe coincides with a very large majority of the comrades of "Autonomia". Therefore, let there be no confusion. At the same time this does not mean that the B.R. comrades should not be respected. For it is necessary to have some respect for all those who are seeking proletarian communist goals, even as one deeply criticizes their "regicide" strategy, which is contrary to all the premises of Marxism. Marx himself tipped his hat to Felice Orsini. Nevertheless, I state again that terrorism can only be fought through an authentic mass political struggle and inside the revolutionary movement.

Translated by III WW & Phil Mattera

1. The only "evidence" brought by the judges to justify Negri's arrest were tapes of phone calls made by the Red Brigades to the Moro family, presumably proving that it was Negri's voice. It turned out that the tape had never been analyzed. Their recent analysis by the American expert appointed by the prosecutor remains inconclusive.

II/1 Judge Palombarini questions Toni Negri, May 18, 1979, Padua
II/2 Negri
II/3 Chief Prosecutor for the Republic, Pietro Calogero



Memorial from Prison

This document was written on May 24, 1979 from the "Special Wing — G 8" of the Rebibbia jail in Rome by Mario Dalmaviva, Luciano Ferrari Bravo, Toni Negri, Oreste Scalzone, Emilio Vesce and Lauro Zagato. Footnotes were added by the Editors.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS TRIAL?

The arrests and imprisonments put into effect against militants and intellectuals of the Left, starting April 7th 1979, have set in motion a *political trial*. This is not just a trial of ideas, a trial of certain intellectuals, but a judicial prosecution of an entire section of the political movement in Italy—of comrades belonging to the independent Left movement of *Autonomy*. These comrades in no way deny or conceal their record of political militancy in this movement.

We are being tried for a decade of political struggle in Italy, from 1968 to 1979. With this prosecution, State power has spoken out loud and clear — a horrendous alibi for its incapacity to resolve the real underlying problems confronting Italian society in the crisis. This trial is aimed to outlaw the political movement of working class and proletariat autonomy.

In order to succeed, State power has to state and prove that "the party of the new social strata of the proletariat" is the same thing as "the armed party" — i.e. the terrorist groups. They have to be made to appear as identical.

All of us in the Movement know the motive behind this operation. The State "projects" onto these strata and onto the men and women who have lived the social struggles of the new proletariat, the accusation of being terrorists, "the armed

THE RETROACTIVE CHARGES AGAINST "POTERE OPERAIO" (WORKER'S POWER).

party in Italy", so that, by criminalizing the Movement, it can resolve its own inability to function. We are militants and intellectuals of the autonomous Left movement. In striking its blow at us, the State is attributing to us a power as "leaders", a representative role, that we do not possess.

The first accusation against us all relates to having constituted and participated in *Potere Operaio* (1969-1973)¹. Inasmuch as PO is taken by the prosecution to be the "original source" of armed terrorism—of having therefore been collectively responsible for the entire trajectory of armed struggle in Italy in recent years — its dissolution in 1973 is regarded as having been "fictitious": it is alleged to have continued its existence as an armed conspiracy.

A very important preliminary point needs to be made, regarding the consistency of this charge. It is true that all of those who are charged in this case, in one way or another, at different times and at different levels of activity, did participate in the experience of PO. This is a past "associative link" which we have no intention of denying — in fact we regard it, perhaps ingenuously, with pride. But thousands of other comrades also participated in this political experience. One might rightly ask by what criteria so few cards, from such a huge pack, eventually came out in the shuffle. One might think that the accused were the "political leadership" of the PO group. But this is not true — not all the accused played such a part in PO, and of those who *did*, not all are being charged. So the accusation of having participated in PO is not self-sufficient, is no basis *in itself* for the charge brought. This is the case (if for no other reason) because the PO was in *its own time* investigated on the grounds of being a "subversive organization", and was in fact cleared.

Hence there must be something more behind the charge and the selection of those accused. The allegation runs as follows: *these* individuals are those who *having been* comrades in PO, *subsequently* maintained "associative links of a subversive nature" aimed to direct, in one way or another, the armed struggle in Italy. But here the make-believe behind the accusation is even more astonishing.

From the time that PO dissolved in 1973, some of those presently accused have had *no political links whatsoever* with the rest of the accused. Moreover, in some cases it has been years that some members of the accused have not seen each other! It must be admitted that for a "conspiratorial group" alleged to have been nothing less (in the case of 9 of us) than the "strategic leadership" of the Red Brigades, not to have met each other, even briefly, in all this time constitutes a strange kind of association! And it is not by chance that 6 weeks after the arrests, not one single piece of evidence has been brought to prove or indicate any such association between those charged, from 1973-4 up to the present day. The reason is simple — no such proof exists.

THE VIOLATIONS OF PROCEDURE BY THE PROSECUTION.

We shall take only a few examples of the legal procedure adopted by the prosecution in the "April 7th case". This is only a summary of a few of the most flagrant *abuses of due process* that we — and we are not the first — have had to face. This is a list of points which are taken from a much fuller documentation of examples contained in the memorandum presented by our legal defence team.

(A) *Violations of the rights of defence* in the phase of the preliminary investigations ordered by the examining judge. Failure to notify, in some cases, of proceedings against those being investigated, despite the fact that the prosecuting judge, Calogero, has admitted that this judicial inquiry has been going on over a period of two years *before* the arrests;

(B) *Arbitrary use of coercive powers:*

— Issue of arrest warrants either without legal grounds at all, or on "apparent" grounds, altered later, at will.

— Use of preventive detention for ends other than those specified by law.

(C) *Arbitrary mode of imprisonment:*

— Unspecified reasons for differing prison treatment (solitary confinement, etc.) imposed on those detained.

— Refusal to notify, for a period, the whereabouts of those detained, or to notify families of prison transfers, etc.

(D) *Arbitrary use of norms of territorial judicial competence* (i.e. the division of judicial competence in the case, between Rome and Padova):

— Abnormal *unilateral decision* on the part of *prosecuting judge Calogero* as to judicial competence (transferring part of the case to Rome) *after* the request for formalisation of proceedings (i.e. that they be brought before the competent judge in Padova) had been made.

— *Subsequent* addition of the charge related to the via Fani (the Moro kidnapping) case, for the sole purpose of justifying transferral of the judicial competence in the case of some of those accused (to Rome), in order to bypass any potential conflict with the judges in Padova. This was *after* charges of "formation of armed bands" had *already* been brought in Padova.

This relates to other precedents (e.g. in the Valpreda case) which involve the arbitrary transfer of proceedings to Rome — i.e. the informal, but no less real, use of this tactic in order to set up a "special tribunal" for political persecutions².

(E) *Systematic violation of the rights of legal defence in this case*; in the course of the committal hearings:

— Violation of article 365 in the Procedural Code ("the judge must proceed to the formal 'interrogation' without delay").

— Systematic inversion of the burden of proof onto the defence.

— Acquisition of "evidence" a long time after the warrants for custody and detention of the accused had already been made out.

— Lack of any evidence, or precise accusations (to be proved or disproved) related to the charge of "subversive association". The accusations are entirely "hypothetical-deductive", of a "logical" and hence speculative nature.

— Illegal retention of precise information, evidence etc., related to the prosecution charges, thus allowing a continuous fluidity, reformulation and alteration in the accusatory substance of the charges (e.g. request by judge Guasco for formalisation of the charges "pending" *later* specification of the actual crimes alleged to have been committed!).

— Systematic and underhand violation of the confidential secrecy of the committal hearings by the prosecuting magistrates (use of insinuating "leaks", informally passed to the Press and media throughout the proceedings — and often later dropped!).

All the above points might appear secondary to anyone not experiencing them first hand! Yet they amount to a real illegality of the mode of the prosecution procedure in this case, a degradation of "due process", by the systematic refusal to back or specify charges by precise accusation, hence ensuring an "open-ended" set of options in the committal process.

The presumption of guilt based on *deductive hypothesis* has been the *leitmotif* in the prosecution procedure right from the start. It covered, from the word go, insurrection, leadership of the Red Brigades, and leadership of the armed struggle *in general*. In other words, the "generic" and the "particular" are conflated, strung together, to make us responsible, as a "collective plot", for virtually all that has happened in Italy over the past ten years. This is the starting point — the *initial* thesis of the prosecution.

Once this overall hypothesis of guilt is *first* established, any element of *physical* or *mental/intellectual* links that can be found (e.g. Padova University Institute; activities of an academic nature etc.; or similarities between documents — any Left revolutionary literature inevitably has *some* points of similarity) can then be construed as a "lead" or as "incriminating substance". All such material can be re-interpreted, pieced together according to the *initial* deductive hypotheses, by a process of *osmosis*. Time and space become irrelevant. Documents or events over a period of ten years are flattened into the present, into a static "*present-day*" plot for "armed insurrection". In Negri's case, this process of osmosis during the committal hearings has amounted to a crude and arrogant distortion of texts taken out of context, a deliberately falsified reconstruction of his ideas, collapsing the past into the present.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CLASS STRUGGLE.

The method of the prosecution's case has been the separation of selected elements and ideas from their overall context. This is done by arbitrary selection of individual phrases from a vast mass of *published* and *entirely public writings or statements*. Moreover, these are selected from a long time-span, often separated by years. This method of arbitrary separation and reconstruction or hypothetical links between ideas — and events — has been the basic norm in the construction of the prosecution's case against us.

We wish to make an appeal for the widest possible solidarity with those 23 arrested on April 7th 1979³.

The prosecution case against us is overtly political, and we are asking for political solidarity. We wish to emphasise that "political solidarity" does not mean "identifying" with our personal ideas or positions as such — it is correct, we think, to make this clear. To ask for political solidarity in our case is to appeal also to responsible democratic opinion, apart from the Left and communist movement, on the basis of recognizing what is at stake, in terms of the relationship between class forces in this type of political prosecution.

In our case — quite apart from our own political situation — what is being tested or decided, is whether there is to be any further space, politically, for the broad movement that has developed in society, expressing the new needs of the proletariat today. Or, on the other hand, whether the forces in power, the effective "constitutional coalition" that governs Italy, is to become more rigid, and base its political pact on the destruction, criminalization and repression of the class movement in civil society.

The choice is obviously not in our hands! But the prosecution and proceedings against us are an essential part of this project, a key test-case. We are fighting for an outcome on the side of the class movement, and it is on this that we base our calls for solidarity. Let it also be clear that we *also* insist on the defence of certain legal guarantees. This is not opportunism on our part, but relates directly to the struggle and the goals of the class movement itself. Both before, during and after the revolutionary process.

This appeal to civil liberties and defence of legal "due process" is not in our case restricted to the mummified liberal tradition of civil rights (open to many abuses). We call for the guarantee of freedoms that are *historically and dynamically constituted* by the relation of class forces as it exists in all the industrialised countries today.



We believe that in Italy, today, and in Europe, the political prosecution of the "Worker's Autonomy" movement has a wider significance, which concerns the broadest possible sections of the class movement in all its various articulations. This is because it represents a specific attempt, an attempt with ominous implications, to "turn the clock back" historically to set up and formalise on a permanent basis a new level of State repression, aimed to attack and destroy the space for independent class politics; to attack the guarantees of rights to express theoretically and exercise in practice any alternative basis of power for the transformation of society; and to attack the spaces for the exercise of "counter-power" — all of which spaces have been fought for and won over the course of the last ten years.

Translated by Committee April 7, London

1. This comes in the list covering charges of "subversive association" — Article 270 in the Fascist penal code of 1929. The nearest British equivalent is the charge of *sedition*, as brought against the Betteshanger miners during the War.
2. "Special tribunals" were the political anti-communist courts set up by the Fascists in 1926. It was one of these tribunals that sent Gramsci to prison.
3. Under these vague, unspecified and unsubstantiated charges the accused may be subjected to a possible period of detention of up to FOUR years *before* they need be brought to trial.

II/1 Massa Carrara, November 18, 1972



The Naked Truth about Moro's Detention

Franco Piperno

This interview was published in *Il Male* one week after the April 7 arrests. *Il Male* is a satirical weekly magazine linked to the Movement. That Franco Piperno, although wanted by the police, would agree to take part in this parody constitutes an indirect commentary on the "seriousness" of the accusations and the theatricality of the media.

Being convinced that the series of recent arrests involving such eminent personalities of the cultural and theatrical world, such as Toni Negri (culture), Oreste Scalzone (theatre), were part of a farcical pre-electoral setting, we went to find Professor Piperno, who by chance escaped arrest, at his new residence. But we were indeed surprised to find ourselves in front of an individual in an advanced ethylic state who would toast in friendly company the arrest of his long-time rival: Professor Toni Negri. As many do not know, Toni Negri not only held professorship at Padova but he was also the director of an institute, something which has not been let out and which is far from succeeding to Piperno. An ulterior motive for the friction between the two lies in Negri's recent Parisian success at the Sorbonne and at the Eiffel Tower, while Piperno remained in Arcavacatoa in the province of Cosenza.

Question Well Franco, some of Toni's defects?

Piperno The most sickening thing about him is his pretense to understand the informatics. In any case, he is a man full of defects.

Q And Oreste's defects?

P He takes notes on whatever is said.

Q And you?

P I was the only one in this group without defects.

Q But in short, do you make a positive estimate of what has happened?

P Substantially yes, also because the unfortunately temporary jailing of these, my dear friends, guarantees the Movement of a series of breakdowns that would have certainly combined either in contrast or in conflict within them.

Q Is it true that you are jealous of Negri?

P Yes, Above all because he has an undeniable advantage over me: to be able to pass off political punches that he writes as scientific publications. Something which is not accepted by me, being a physicist. With this system, he has gained the professorship, while I am still stabilized.

(...After having indulged a bit more upon personal aspects, we proceeded to ask him the news relating to the judicial and political aspects of the event, as soon as we saw that he was more clear-minded.)

Q In your opinion, what are the fragile elements in the warrant for arrest?

P In reference to Toni and Oreste, I believe that the weakest element lies in the position that these two friends assumed when it was a question of deciding Moro's fate.

Q You were all therefore present at the meeting?

P Yes, by now, it's useless denying it. The judges Calogero and Gallucci searched Massimo's Venetian house.

Q Which Massimo?

P Cacciari naturally! Thus searching Massimo's home, they found the authentic tape of the meeting of the strategic direction on May 1, 1978, which was annually held in Chiavari.

Q Who were the participants of the meeting?

P Always the same, and that is: Tronti, Asor Rosa, Cacciari, Oreste, Vidali, Rita di Leo, Osvaldo, Pesce, Trombadori...¹

Q But Trombadori how? Wasn't Via Rasella² enough for him?

P But how! dear Antonello is insatiable. At least once a year, he needs to "proceed", it's like a bad habit for him. You need to understand him.

Q However, Trombadori often wrote against the Red Brigades, demanding a rapid capture.

P Trombadori does what Toni does, and besides, Toni has learned from him.

Q Don't you think you're exaggerating these revelations?

P You see, I have a scientific background and I pay attention to facts: I know that the judge knows. It is therefore better to precede the adversary, as we did after Feltrinelli's death.³

Q Since you have decided to talk about everything, who were the other members of the strategic direction?

P Do you mean the effective members or the candidate members?

Q No. No. the effective ones. The others don't count and we also don't have enough space. Hence, who are they? Moretti?

P No. no. no. Moretti no.⁴ He is an invention of the press. He is only a surrogate member and besides Tronti had strong doubts about him, because he didn't know the writings of Kvasnjak.⁵

Q If not Moretti, who?

P Pintor and Sofri,⁶ but I must tell you that they did not come to the mentioned meeting, claiming to be sick. In reality, they preferred, as many times before, not to take positions on heated arguments.

Q In short, who were the marshalls?

P I remember everything perfectly. I don't know why, but that afternoon in Chiavari in a house by the sea has remained indelibly impressed upon me. Asor expounded the pros and cons of the execution. But I must say that his discourse was not impartial, in the sense that, in his exposition, the pros prevailed over the cons. The central argument was that by now the games were made in the PCI (Italian Communist Party). The long adventure, undertaken in '69 by Massimo, Mario, Alberto, Rita, Aris and Umberto⁷ to free the party from the hands of those who had control of it, while Toni, Oreste and I were occupied with the Movement, had arrived at a dead end. They already foresaw that they would not be elected to the central committee in the next Congress and that the Villari lobby⁸ would have prevailed (as it then came about, n.d.r.). And therefore they believed that the only possibility was to cut Moro off and in this manner break up the internal equilibrium of the two biggest parties, whether the DC or the PCI. Asor, I remember well, obsessively repeated the phrase: "let's shuffle the cards", "let's shuffle the cards".

Q And you?

P I voted in favor.

Q But why? What did Moro ever do to you? Wasn't he a man like yourself?

P If it is in this sense, he was even a better man than myself. But I did not have a choice. It's been years now that I do only what Tronti does.

Q And now what plans do you have?

P To do better than Fiora (Piperno's wife, far more brilliant than her husband, n.d.r.). While she is occupied with the zone south of Volturmo, I wish to busy myself with the zone north of Volturmo and hope for a reunion. . . if Lanfranco permits.⁹

Translated by Rosamaria Salamone

1. Mario Tronti, Alberto Asor Rosa, Massimo Cacciari, Rita de Leo are ex-militants of *Potere Operaio* who eventually joined the ICP. Vidali and Trombadori are orthodox militants of the ICP.

2. Via Rasella: partisan action against the Germans during the WWII. Dozens of citizens of Rome were assassinated as a reprisal.

3. G.G. Feltrinelli: left-wing publisher found dead in suspicious conditions. It was assumed that he belonged to the Group for Partisan Action.

4. Mario Moretti has been presented by the media as the mysterious head of the BR.

5. Mario Tronti: theoretician of the Italian "Workerist" Left, now in the ICP.

6. Luigi Pintor: a leader of *Il Manifesto*, a political group (and journal) at the left of the ICP. Adriano Sofri: a leader of "Lotta Continua".

7. See note 1. Aris Acornero and Umberto Terracini are prominent members of the ICP.

8. Villari: historical official of the ICP.

9. Fiora Pirri Ardizzone: Piperno's wife, suspected of terrorism and incarcerated. Pace: wanted

by the police. Inseparable from Piperno.

III/1 Franco Piperno (right) with *Il Male* editor, April 1979



Piperno's Counteroffensive

Many members of the Italian press expressed their doubts about the authenticity of the foregoing interview. Certainly, it would be unlikely for the wanted head of the Red Brigades to be involved in a parody, let alone to expose himself by granting an interview.

Il Male responded to this doubt simply with the publication of this second interview which promises "shocking new revelations from that most wanted fugitive, Franco Piperno: names, weapons, plans, the inside word on the mysterious world of the Red Brigades."

Q Well, Piperno, how is life on the run?

P Believe me, it's really not so bad. I've taken refuge in the margins of Italian society and I do my best to survive. The hardest days were the ones at the beginning.

Q Why?

P Because at the beginning I was living with the brigades and this meant I had to put up with some unbearable annoyances...

Q For example?

P I could never sleep at night because my comrades, being all mad wolves, as Scaifari has lucidly written, howl at the full moon, and as you will recall, there was a full moon the night of 7 April.

Q And so what did you do?

P I moved, and now I live on a yacht anchored in this bay. Here, in a word.

Q This is a yacht? It rather looks like a small villa to us...

P No, no, it's a yacht. We're on the water; the yacht was redone to look like a small villa. It belongs to Crociani,¹ the famous unknown "puppeteer" in the Moro affair.

Q How are your comrades in jail doing on their own?

P Oreste Scalzone is in a creative phase, so to speak: he has discovered the fascination of a sexual relation beyond heterosexuality, and he tests this new dimension of freedom all day on Lauso Zagato...

Q This is a disgrace! Oreste has always been faithful to Lucia!

P True, but you forget that prison has a peculiar atmosphere, and besides, you probably don't know that we managed to send him a few grams of cocaine through Ferrari Bravo. After a good healthy snort, Oreste lost all his inhibitions—and he had many of them.

Q And what about Toni Negri? Every morning he gets drunk on Stock 84. Does his drinking have any effect on the interrogations?

P Of course. The effect is obvious: every time he gets drunk, he talks non-stop for six hours. Spazzali² told me that the last time he drank he kept on talking even when the judges and lawyers left, and he stopped only when the guard shut off the light.

Q Excuse us if we ask a personal question, but do you continue to meet with journalists on this yacht?

P Yes, but it causes me much trouble, especially with Bocca.³

Q Why him in particular? At bottom he is a democrat...

P And just like every democrat, he takes advantage as soon as he can. The other night, during one of the many interviews he's done with me, instead of taking notes he kept on staring at, and playing footsie with, Comrade Kioto Lota of the Japanese group Karakiri. Lota had served as an intermediary for the operation against the coast of Montenegro...

Q In what sense was it an operation? Wasn't there an earthquake?

P I spent two years at Cosenza setting up the "seismic cannon", with the assistance of the rector, Professor Bucci. Based on the principles of Ugo Amaldi, the cannon generates gravitational waves of arbitrary power. The operation on the Adriatic coast was just the beginning. We planned to attack Tito's revisionism.

Q Then it is true that a scientific intelligence is at the bottom of the destructive plan which has bloodied our country and Europe for years now?

P It's true. The judges have discovered this too, and there's no use denying it. The proof of it lies in the fact that, despite the perspicacity of the journalists who are covering the *affair*, no one has yet asked why on earth only Amerio and Sossi⁴ were abducted, after the decision was made at a meeting of *Potere Operaio* to abduct Agnelli and Fanfani.⁵ The truth, now clear to the judges, is that even in this case, our line of conduct was guided by the well-known physical law called "the principle of minimization." With this law in mind, I want to give you a sensational prediction. At the most recent meeting of the tactical command, we decided to kidnap Pecchiolo⁶ and the familiar Saragat,⁷ but you'll see that in the end we'll limit ourselves to seizing Giacomo Marramao⁸ and Augusto, a vintner from Trastevere.

Translated by Lawrence Venuti

1. Crociani is a manager of the State-owned Italian industry who escaped the country after a financial scandal.
2. Giuliano Spazzali is Toni Negri's defense lawyer. He became famous during the Valpreda case.
3. Giorgio Bocca is a well-known journalist of *La Repubblica* and *L'Espresso*.
4. Both were kidnapped by the Red Brigades in 1973. Amerio, a FIAT engineer, headed the personnel office.
5. Umberto Agnelli is the head of FIAT. Fanfani is a high-ranking member of the Christian Democrats. In 1963, he headed the "center-left" coalition with the Socialist Party.
6. Pecchioli is the chief of the federation of Turin's Communist Party. He heads the ICP's Bureau of State's Problems and is considered the "shadow" Minister of the Interior.
7. Giuseppe Saragat founded the Social Democratic Party. He was President of the Italian Republic during the Valpreda affair and was the first to accuse the anarchists for the bombing of the bank in Milan.
8. Giacomo Marramao is a philosopher-historian of the ICP.



Violence of the State

I Volsci

I Volsci (The Volscians) are a group of Autonomists well rooted in the proletarian quarters of Rome. They are considered the "hard" fraction of the movement. I Volsci are known for their political agitation inside the Polyclinic and for their active support of the squatter's movement. Their free radio, *Radio Onda Rossa*, covers the metropolitan area.

We present this statement to the politicians, the judges, and the journalists of this country, "one of the most free in the world," asking to be proven wrong.

We are convinced of one thing: the arrest of comrades in Padua, Milan and Rome and the entire investigation opened by the Padua magistracy are the outcome of initiatives taken by democratic people; that is, by men who believe in the institutions, support the multi-party system and who therefore work for the defense of the resultant social order, all of which comprise the existing democracy of our country.

These and many other persons have often alluded, in the newspapers and from the seats of Parliament, to the necessity of putting an end to the organized and diffuse violence, urging us on to the very limits of our constitutional freedoms up to the point of requesting, as La Malfa¹ did, the institution of the death penalty. Incitement to violence in each one of these forms (except for the death penalty) is manifest in what Leo Vallani², just to name someone who well symbolizes the institutions, has been capable of writing in the *Corriere della Sera* from February to April.

Someone might think that by citing Vallani we wish, as usual, to show that he, like democracy, adopts a double standard. He doesn't attack the crimes of the powerful with equal vehemence (rather, he acquits them a priori as he did with Baffi, Sarcinelli³, and all the little bureaucrats whom he moreover wants to judge "fiscally" and not penally). Or someone might believe that we wish to show that Vallani complains of the "senseless dismantling of the most severe laws" when to a great extent the Reale law is more "severe" than the Rocco Codex⁴, and besides, it is still in effect. Someone might even believe that we wish to point out that Vallani doesn't even hide his pleasure with the arrest of Toni Negri and the other comrades. (By the way, even Pertini complimented the Padua magistrates, but there is no evidence that he telegraphed his indignation to the Catanzaro magistrates when Freda and Ventura⁵ escaped). Anyway, if anyone believes this he is mistaken.

It is not our intention to complain about the non-equality of the law nor to emphasize the non-equidistance of the democracy which we undoubtedly are. Rather we wish to reveal how this state of affairs is inevitable and necessary for the institutions. From the point of view of democrats like Leo Vallani, in fact, it is right that things are this way because it is right that men like him come to the point of calling for the application of violence when it is to be used in the defense of something that exists—democracy, to be exact—and against episodes or persons who in the name of something that doesn't exist—communism—combat these institutions without excluding violence. From one side, there is the tendency to overthrow it. Whoever defends the first is justified in his use of violence, whoever is for the second, is not.

If it were to be shown that democracy doesn't exist, in the sense that it has not been fully realized, there would no longer be any legitimacy for the violence of the state, or at least there would be an equal measure of legitimacy for the violence used to overthrow the state.

The idea that democracy doesn't exist doesn't even occur to Vallani. He sides with Baffi and Sarcinelli, that is, with the institutions and the multi-party system, starting from their evils and their contradictions (scandals, frauds, killings, etc.) which are erased in one blow by the demon of terrorism, which can only be combated with an increase in the number of police, preventive (which in practice becomes definitive) incarceration, and an ulterior arming of the forces of order. In other words, the generalized application of repression and violence without ever doubting the true basis of its legitimacy.

HE WHO DOESN'T TERRORIZE BECOMES SICK WITH TERROR

In order to respond in a practical and non-elusive manner to these positions, and therefore without falling into an ideological debate, it is left to us to examine from a very concrete (even if guarded) point of view what the pulpit of democracy, from which the sermons like those of Vallani are preached, is made of.

Now, it seems to us (and we ask nothing but to be proven wrong) that this democracy denies in principle but in fact allows:

1. The systematic fiscal evasion of the capitalists (in vulgar terms, those who accumulate wealth by taking it from the workers), and therefore, the robbery of the citizens and of the State;
2. Thousands of clandestine abortions done in contempt of the dignity and freedom of women, and therefore, the violation of the laws of the State and robbery of the citizens by the physicians who perform such abortions;
3. Hundreds of deaths, thousands ofcrippings and mutilations at the workplace because of the impunity allowed to the capitalists, which therefore transforms the constitutional declaration of the "right to work" into a "condemnation to work";
4. Hundreds of thousands of unemployed to whom neither the right nor the condemnation to work applies, but to whom is recognized the free will to choose bet-

ween hunger, robbery, drugs, and submerged economy, which would actually be the condemnation to working without the right to work;

5. Tens of homicides by the police or carabinieri caused by their "slipping up" or by invisibility at road blocks, recognized by the Italian State as legal based upon the Reale law;

6. The panic and terror, not counting the damage to health and environment, widespread among the population because of the production of certain materials in plants such as Seveso, Marghera, Manfredonia, Priolo, etc.;

7. The fact that Baffi is not arrested in consideration of his position and his advanced age, while provisional freedom is repeatedly denied to 72 year-old Salvatore Manunta⁷ who is seriously ill and in prison for over a year.

The conclusion then is that this democracy permits social inequality, homicide and exploitation in perfect harmony with the laws of the State. Democracy, therefore, has not been fully realized (and let's hope that the usual shithead, who pretends to demonstrate just the opposite by explaining that if it weren't this way then we wouldn't even be able to say these things, doesn't come forward). We would remind him that being able to say from the very beginning that Valpreda⁸ was innocent served no purpose whatsoever as he remained in prison for over three years and he was released only because the truth was imposed upon the democratic institutions by extra-parliamentary struggle.

If democracy has not yet been fully realized, if it is still as much a utopia as communism, then why is its present form nurtured by violence?

Justice helps us to understand why through the conclusions arrived at by the magistrate Luigi Gennaro in regards to the comrades of the Workers and Students Collective of Castelli⁹. We present here a few significant passages from the court order for retrial. We do not know in detail the motivations of the accusation formulated by the magistrate Calogero concerning the Padua comrades, but we believe that those made by Gennaro¹⁰ several months ago may be illustrative of the pretentiousness and the danger with which one part of the magistracy assumes the duty of "resolving" some problems of social and political nature for the multi-party system.

Gennaro no longer judges only the completed fact or the hypothesis of a crime, but he goes beyond them and arrives at social behavior. From here he continues on to political theories and then on to ideas, setting up a true and personal ideological process. The process moves from mass illegality, exemplified by the forms of autoreduction (considered a priori to be an underhanded way of legitimizing crime by comrades), to civil war and finally to terrorist militancy for having defined as comrades the militants of the Red Army Fraction.

At this point the discussion becomes extremely clear: it is no longer a matter of answering the arguments raised by a Leo Vallani on the more or less just use of violence. The existence of democracy is no longer in discussion here, not because it is seen as having been already attained but because it is propped up by the Power of the State, which, as Gennaro states, cannot be usurped.

Other than defense of democracy and liberty, here is the established Order that becomes a part among parts, that seriously attacks men and ideas in virtue of an ideology loosened from social matters and conflicts, abstract and narrow as only the ideology of Power can be.

Even a liberal like Locke affirmed as early as 1690 that no reason of State can stand before abuses and prevarications of power, nor are there any motivations for disorders and bloodshed that can stop the just rebellion against the State.

Someone might say that even though our reasoning makes sense, it is still true

that we are better off than under Fascism or than the Chileans under Pinochet. For that someone the fact that democracy has not been fully realized becomes still another reason to defend the status quo, even if only to broaden it through struggle.

In principle this would be an acceptable way of reasoning if it had not already been worn out by recent and past history.

The struggle for democracy in Italy began more than thirty years ago and it was an armed struggle: the workers saved the factories from the Germans in order to see them returned safe and sound to the same bosses as before; the Napolitans liberated their city by themselves in order to see it sacked by the Lauros and the Gavas¹¹; Almirante and the other fascists were given their freedom by Togliatti.


After these initial outcomes, the struggle for democracy has had other products such as the banana, the tobacco and the Anas scandals, the secret funds and bribes at Montedison, Sifar, Vajont, and Lockheed, and the killings from Portella della Ginestra to Reggio Emilia, from Avoia to Piazza Fontana, from Brescia to the Italicus.

This is the "slow march of democracy" that has brought us to the present state of affairs which we have described.

Translated by Mary Jane Ciccarello

1. Ugo La Malfa: Secretary of the Republican Party.
2. Leo Vallani: Historian and Journalist of the *Corriere della Sera*.
3. Paolo Baffi: ex-governor of the *Banca di Italia*. Sarcinelli is a public figure involved in financial scandals.
4. Rocco codex: criminal laws of the Fascist period which makes it possible to convict someone for having "dangerous" opinions.
5. Sandro Pertini: President of the Italian Republic.
6. Freda and Ventura: well-known fascists. They instigated the attack of December 12, 1969 against the National Bank of Agriculture in Milan where 15 persons were killed. It marked the beginning of the "Strategy of tension".
7. Salvatore Manunta: unknown to the Editors.
8. Valpreda: anarchist accused of the bombings of the National Bank of Agriculture. He was proved innocent after 4 years in prison.
9. Collective of Castelli: one of the many political collectives of Autonomy.
10. Di Gennaro: Italian magistrate.
11. Both Lauro and Gava belong to the DC.

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The Sandstorm Method

Dario Fo

Dario Fo is a leading Italian dramatist well-known for his satire of Power.

Clytemnestra's invective against Power:

"You have blackened your eyelids with soot, as the tragic actors do to portray a sorrow that you can not even feign. You have pasted tears of melted wax on your cheeks. The swelling drops do not stream down to bathe your mouth with salt. Your grimaces of hopeless suffering are nauseating; they resemble the comic mimes' sneers. Power extends his arms in a plea for help and clemency, but note well how the folds of his chlamys trace broad curves with his solemn pace. This is the significant gesture. With his head slipped inside a huge mask of whitened papier mache, his pupils do not look out through the hollow eyes; the mouth gaping wide in a silent shout like a funnel sends forth reverberations that resemble words. Yet they are only his legal code."

Terrorism never destabilizes the established rule; rather it strengthens it, since it destabilizes the opposition (even when the opposition is most moderate) which is thus forced, in order to avoid being suspiciously drawn in as a cover to terrorism, to accept, support and allow those laws and those uncontrollable, violent acts which will in fact be used against citizens and workers (and their class warfare), not to mention the spontaneous movements of those who have been deceived.

Terrorism compels us to disguise in the facts the "infernal duel" between State

and terrorists in a logic of conflict between two armed organizations. The clash goes well over the heads of those who are involved only on the level of dismay and fear. Thus an impotent (fatal) tension is created, which upsets any reaction and any real participation in political events, making any discourse drown in the formula: "There is need to establish order, no matter what the cost."

And the cost is the sacrifice of democracy (especially as an active, rational presence in the control of social, judicial, economic, etc., events of life), the instrumental panicky fear of the parties, of the labor unions, the falling apart of the logic of the "unprovided-for/mindless" who are driven by brains hidden in the shadows—the (absolute) non-intervention, better yet, the running away from the commitment to sustain the defense of Civil Rights and its relative struggles, the repression in jails, the refrain when faced with women's actions: all struggles for housing, unemployment, the youth, ecology, nuclear power, disarmament, drugs, etc.

This is how a broad, and very diversified, slice of the electorate manifested its disappointment. All to the advantage of Power, which gained immensely from it. Power has no real interest in really fighting terrorism with determination, by co-involving, on the democratic plane, the responsible presence of the citizen; this would mean taking away the basic motivations that constitute it, that give it a space for action and a consensus, especially among the emarginated and the hopeless, without any real perspectives.

Power has no real interest in reorganizing (in a controlled, more efficient and democratic form) the police, but prefers to delegate everything to a super-cop (Gen. Della Chiesa) giving him carte blanche so that the big shots may be brought to justice.

The solution to the problem is of no interest to Power or to the Power Party. What interests them is the spectacle and the emotional participation of the spectator citizen in a continuous merry-go-round of bombastic facts, much like a television "mystery" where everyone is the suspect, everyone is the murderer—the accomplice—the instigator—the terrorist—the right-hand-man. Even if it cannot be proved that he or she is guilty, anymore, nobody is ever left innocent.

The important thing is the sandstorm, to raise hell, to dazzle, to create a scene. The newspapers and television do not even bother saying anymore "They say, "It appears that," "There is a suspicion:" no: they say: "is" and "it is certain!" Expect that the next day all is denied, in a hush, between the lines.

In this "blizzard," where everyone is screaming "*he* has the plague," Power has freed itself first of all from the presence of the so-called front-line democrats, the intellectuals, the artists, the free-thinkers: it has assigned them the role of perplexed observers who await clearer developments: "We are waiting for proofs and confirmations, we do not wish to interfere with the process-inquiry, we all are for lawfulness."

In the meantime, the power of spectacle has free reign in this "pot-shot" scene: leaking of news, making of inferences.

It is a very old game, one already well unmasked by Machiavelli, in 1589, in his *Discourses*:

"Consider the cunning that sustains that State: Games of prestige that conjure up profound political designs. Before this spectacle, we most resemble the unwary dullard at a play, who does not see the ropes and is amazed by a flying aureole.

Let us suppose, then, that just in the middle of the prince's performance, the badly mounted machine gives way. The screens vanish, letting everything be seen: how fast the trick leaps to the spectator's eye!

How simple it all is, and what a vulgar fraud! Look, then, at the pulley's noose!

How poorly the mechanism works.

The prince's thoughts and the State's plans: look on what meanness their lot depends! Crude devices fly around terrorizing the people who shake before the incredible prodigy. Here it is, look at it. Look how everyone shudders and trembles! After an instant of alarm at the uncovered trap, the simple audience understands and laughs.

It laughs more than it ever laughed before. Then it stops; indignation and rage replace the laughter. Next the audience will grasp the reason for the incredible fraud.

You too can play this game of uncovering the fraud.

Let us uncover it and we shall see whether and how much the people will laugh, and whether they will grasp the reason."

*Translated by Peter Caravetta,
James Cascaito & Lawrence Venuti*



From Terrorism To Guerrilla Warfare

Franco Piperno

Franco Piperno is one of the historical leaders of *Potere Operaio*. Wanted by the police since April 7, he was arrested in Paris on September 18, 1979.

In the last ten years we have witnessed a quiet upheaval "in the mode of producing wealth." The productive process exploits nature as a resource rather than redistributing surplus work and consequently reducing working time. To say it in other words, the different forms of social production are no longer organically connected by the law of value. This consequence is of great importance since it involves not only social issues but also labor co-operation. In this context a new proletarian subject is born, who is the producer of wealth but is no longer perceived in terms of productive or unproductive work. Thus, the class composition of the proletariat is changed. In particular, the technological intelligentsia (which could be roughly defined as "non-worker labor") takes on a central position in the production of social wealth. However, we are not talking about the proletarianization of the middle class. The "non-worker laborer," by acting not as part of a residual class but as a material subject of this new mode of production, carries with him behavior, cultural references, and ideologies which cannot be reduced to the historical precedents of workers' struggles.

The change in composition of the proletariat implies a new "spontaneity" that appeared for the first time in 1968. This new spontaneity has its own characteristic relationship to social wealth. In fact, social wealth is enjoyed as use value, in the

sense that its appropriation equals its "enjoyment." Therefore, production stops being an a priori human characteristic or a moral necessity. Production is investigated and re-dimensioned as the production of "humanly enjoyable" wealth. Here are some of the typical manifestations of this new spontaneity: absenteeism as mass sabotage against the work ethic; shoplifting in supermarkets as an individual re-appropriation of objects, the enjoyment of which has been hindered by monetary mediation; employment simply as a source of income; a "generous availability" in relation to those moments of social activity in which "work and need coincide"; the many different forms of rebellion in which a radical and sometimes violent social malaise is expanded in the "anonymity of daily life." These types of behavior break any relationship between participation in production and the amount of salary received, between working time and the number of objects required for our existence. It is self-evident that, these activities being behavior (and not harmless ideas), their manifestation requires the practice of illegality as a necessary condition for existence.

3 Beneath this behavior we find a culture that despite the evident naivete and obvious failures cannot be easily liquidated as false consciousness. Although this culture feeds on alienation and misery, it also holds great promise in that it contains a promise of overcoming, immediately and materially, both alienation and misery. From this derives the issue of immediate fulfillment of body needs, of individual "difference and uniqueness." We presume to have reached the age of fulfillment through the concrete enjoyment of available wealth, since we can now convert "objective wealth into wealth of the subjects." Prolonging the condition of misery is simply an arbitrary outcome, which is technically and socially unexplainable and unjustifiable.

4 On the other hand, we are not only faced with the urgency of new needs which are pressing for fulfillment within an old world incapable of providing for them. Even the morphology of the modern State changes. We witness the failure of the "economy as structure" or, more precisely, the disappearance of any economic rule, which implies the establishment of an autonomous political power for the control and use of the fruits of social co-operation. In this framework is found the intercorporate war over the allocation of social surplus through monetary means. The new corporate state is consequently revealing its incapacity to provide materially and coherently for the general interest as distinguished from the rapacious demands of corporations. At the same time, even the institutions of representative democracy are emptied of any decision-making strength and survive as a costly ideological apparatus which records and supports operations ripened elsewhere. Political apparatus produces its own results without rules other than the rule of force—and this means that "politics is war in a different form."

5 In this context, those social needs that cannot be fulfilled by the corporate system because they cannot be treated as commodities, tend to impose themselves by escaping political mediation and by becoming, with no moral reservation, the motivation for warfare. Such a new spontaneity has been perfected in a real sense primarily among women and youth, both employed and unemployed. The State can only exist as a bureaucratic apparatus, superfluous on one hand, and hostile and foreign on the other, appearing to proletarian youth as authoritarian. In this case the term authoritarian does not mean the "limitation of traditional individual liberties," but rather implies that the State imposes and legalizes an arbitrary schism between people and social wealth, between objective wealth and the enjoyment of it, between existing and possible wealth.

6 The Workers' Movement is not only incapable of translating this new spontaneity into political terms, but is even unable to recognize it and make contact with it. The reason for this incapacity is other than the presumed "betrayal of leadership." The Workers' Movement is in fact a political experience that has exhausted itself over other social issues, other morphologies of the productive process, and another spontaneity. In other words, it was extinguished in a different historical era, in which starvation was the main theme of the division of labor and

the consequent need of individual self-realization. It is for this reason that the Workers' Movement is out-dated when it fights profit as the source of wealth whereas the entrepreneurial form has gone bankrupt out of an excess of development; when it fights for a national independence whereas there is no longer a national market; when it promotes manual work in an era of automation; when it preaches sacrifice whereas people practice consumption as freedom in daily life. The tragedy of the Workers' Movement is its outdated rhetoric. In the end this proud initiative, so-called "worker becoming the State", is only a residue of the social legitimization of the modern corporate State. At the same time another Workers' Movement is emerging from other needs and forms of struggles. This other Movement not only is becoming autonomous vis-a-vis the first one, but it is also antagonistic to and openly fighting the first one.

These being the facts, the existence of a Movement which practices armed violence in order to pursue its own objectives is somewhat obvious, just like a natural phenomenon. One should be surprised at the opposite. Inside the armed movement, the presence of the Red Brigades is characterized in relation to other armed groups by a practical discourse on "effectiveness." This means not only the coherent and effective use of terrorism (meant according to revolutionary tradition as an instrument of intimidation rather than the material destruction of the enemy), but also the attempt to legitimize the existence of its military organization as an indispensable device in the struggle for social emancipation. The BR's demand for the recognition of their status as fighters is born here. Perhaps formal, but certainly "reasonable."

Having thus fixed the terms of the discussion, we can now face the central political question: the relationship between armed violence and the Movement, or between terrorism and the emergence of the above mentioned, new spontaneity. It is worthwhile, however, to rephrase the question in a "clear and distinct" fashion. We have to investigate (both as "given" and as "possible") the relationship between terrorism and the new spontaneity in order to verify the inter-relation between the two phenomena. More correctly, we have to discover the possible link through which the new spontaneity can avail itself of the effect of terrorism and, in general, of the armed struggle in its realization as a daily practical emancipatory process. The resolution of this problem holds a "chain of solutions" for other issues like recomposition or de-structuring of the State, expropriation or strengthening of mass struggle. In short, by answering the first question we can understand terrorism. Obviously we cannot answer through biblical "universal meanings" such as the "sacredness of human life," "homicidal fury of the terrorists," "the plot of the super-powers against Eurocommunism," and so on, which are not verifiable.

In the empirical investigation we have to refer to specific episodes. In the early Seventies, the great factory struggles showed that the supervisors lacked any technical productive meaning. In fact, the boss has no real function of coordination in the productive system. Instead his task is to separate the workers from the authority above them. He is an agent of the evaluating process which is extraneous to the process of production, since all the productive acts are made with the workers' co-operation outside the supervisor's function of control and the work cycle. Following this "mass discovery" the intimidation of bosses began and was accompanied occasionally by their assassination. This is now history, which however, gives us some clues to the possible link between Movement and terrorism. Mass struggle can isolate those articulations of power which are devoid of technical foundation and therefore lack the consensus within the productive fabric. (Their existence can only be explained as an arbitrary imposition, as an effect of force by the enemy; their extinction is a problem of material destruction). The network of control over workers' behavior is eroded today, at least in the large factories. We even have an "acceptable proof" of this phenomenon in the effective labor time, which is significantly less than what is expected from the contract, even when all the time spent to sustain the union liturgy is included: official strikes, demonstrations, the speeches of the authorities, and so on.

10

Let us now examine some of the facts related to Moro's kidnapping. First of all we have to make a marginal but not irrelevant observation: there is no substantial difference between Moro's kidnapping and the terrorist acts against the bosses. They constitute the same path for the mass struggle: from the factory to political power. Needless to say, the *new spontaneity* is the element that has affected this development, but it is the success reached in the attacks upon the daily life of the masses that has made it a necessary path. Besides, isn't it true that a State fetishism is present in the Italian Communist Party, a fetishism which has been manifested as hysteria among some of the party's leaders? Terrorism, too, has gone from the control of the factory to social control. Such a critical analysis shows the premises of Moro's kidnapping.

In relation to the power that limits the processes of emancipation and forbids, especially for youth, the "endless enjoyment of social wealth," terrorism works in reverse by forbidding the power to forbid. There is a possibility of growth for the Movement within the new open territory. Certainly, we cannot yet outline all the results of such a terrorist act. However, there is enough evidence for everyone to see that the State does not emerge stronger and more legitimate after Moro's kidnapping, but rather more impotent and more ferocious.

11

The corporate State has immediately perceived the subversive aspect, the threat to the social fabric inherent in Moro's kidnapping. But instead of "sticking to the facts" and analyzing them adequately, doubting the legitimacy of its own existence, it has preferred to consider the Red Brigades as bloodthirsty beasts escaped from their cages. The reduction of terrorism to an issue of public order and of moral hygiene has emptied repressive behavior of meaningfulness and made it ridiculous. It is as if an elephant were chasing a mosquito through the narrow Roman streets — passersby beware! It was at once a tragic and an exhilarating spectacle. In the meantime the high priests of the regime flooded the press and the air-waves with a call to first principles. In tears they launched humanitarian appeals, and solemnly they proclaimed the absolute value of human life. It was a declamatory diarrhea which did not stop them from using Moro's blood, with cynical hypocrisy, to dodge that squaring of accounts which now weighs upon the "upright lives" of the leaders of the regime.

12

It is not too difficult to understand that the Red Brigades wanted to show with Moro's kidnapping how the high priests of the regime, who are adept at the rites of the Modern State, are neither untouchable, nor unimpeachable. "The infinite power of the State" rests in fact on the clay feet of the "subjects'" passivity.

Furthermore, the Red Brigades, once they apprehended Moro, had intended to pur-



sue another aim (the release of some political prisoners) which would have materially reinforced the organization and would have somewhat legitimized their existence as a military organization breaking the State's monopoly on armed violence. But the kidnapping of a "real personality" like Moro implied the immediate neutralization of his security guards. Once inside the war machine of kidnapping, the death of the five security guards was an inevitable step. The interface in fact was carried out on the firing line.

However, after the State's refusal not only to exchange, but even to bargain, the execution of Moro became another inevitable step; otherwise all future bargaining power would have been lost together with the BR's organizational credibility.

In a sequence of inevitable steps, we have had a very singular action. With Moro's corpse the brigades seemed to contribute to the new political balance which, for a couple of months, the system of parties and syndicates tried to achieve, exercising the more dangerous and thorny possibility: to have to accommodate a physically alive but politically "foul" Moro, a "ticking bomb" as far as the central government was concerned. Then what are the mistakes that redefined the meaning of Moro's kidnapping?

Firstly, with the very use of kidnapping, blackmailing: a recurrent use in terrorist practice, but already inadequate today since the phenomenon has acquired such power that it required the adoption of real forms of guerrilla warfare. Secondly, to have made such a great show of power for such a minimal objective, which not only was an almost private matter but also quite an unrealistic one: the release of some political prisoners.

Within this imbalance between the destabilizing effectiveness of the intelligent use of military rules and the inept political management of the achieved effects, we have witnessed those spectacular and ambiguous elements represented in the final act: the ingenious and mocking return of Moro's corpse to the proximity of the Ruling Party's headquarters. In a sort of boomerang effect, the BR have been branded with the label of "impotent ferocity," as happens to all those who cause useless deaths.

The debate over the Moro affair has put to the test the "culture of the left" as dominant ideology. Its structural incapacity to discover the causes that underlie and constantly regenerate terrorist practice has emerged. The Red Brigades — lucid "dispensers of death" — have been exposed as puppets in the puppet-masters, powerful but obviously secret, or at best the receptacle for past errors of the communist movement; but in any case, as alien to and enemies of the process of social emancipation.

Some — like Scalfari,¹ curious heirs of the "distinguished Croceans" — have gone even farther: they have expelled the brigades from the human species genetically and consider them maddened wolves — in other words, materialization of evil as infantile category. Everyone knows that a pack of wolves would barely be able to terrorize a remote agricultural community; whereas a complex and ailing society like ours, capable of tolerating with resigned passivity the meaningless ferocity that punctuates the anonymity of daily life, would have quickly minced and digested any damage inflicted by a statistically cruel and bizarre behavior.

But there is more: the culture of the left, resorting to the superstitious use of a-historical and ossified categories ("life," "civil co-existence," "eternal values," "humanity") has revealed its own spasmodic need to *endure*, the physiological rejection of self-criticism, and hatred for events that threaten those minute virtues on which a whole political class has built its scanty fortune in this post-war period. Let us think, for example, of the question — raised in various quarters — of the "means of struggle" as measure of the true nature of armed violence. This somewhat unexpected reversal — of the traditional cult of the end has been replaced and there presently rages on a sort of idolatry of the means — this

reversal reveals, in the intolerance peculiar to it, a foolish ideological scheme: to remove and exorcise what is *new* in order to sanctify the means, the political choices, and the "vulgar and self-satisfied" way of life of the red bourgeoisie. Thus, all that talk about life that we have heard, as bewildered spectators, in the weeks of the Moro affair, smells irremediably of rhetoric and death. The proof of this comes from the very comrades of *Lotta Continua* who, involved with unwarranted generosity in an unprecedented priestly mission, have rediscovered very recently the sacredness of life qua biological life — and they retreat with more moral horror before the eventuality of "giving or receiving" — experienced as a catastrophe for the human essence. In reality, human life is not merely a biological miracle. It thrives as a network of social relations; and, in the case of the "agents of domination," it comprises a power sufficient for creating and/or interdicting the life of other men. Thus it can happen — and this is the scandal — that the death of a man results in freedom and life for others. This is a "banal piece of evidence," difficult to accept as a fact; it determines the behavior of all of us in the face of death as daily event. In fact, the inequality that gives hierarchy to the life of men obviously confers various weights to their deaths. Such is the way of the world. And to pretend that "the rules" are different, that "humanity has already been realized," is an expression of sheer "desiderata" when it is not a vulgar ideological lie. And since it is plain today that the future will be inhuman, decency requires that everyone choose his wounded and his dead, that he mourn the latter and cure — if he can — the former.

14

Often critics have called into question the inconsistency between the political programs of the armed factions and their indubitable operational capacity, which, as in the case of the BR, has attained effects so powerful as to be without precedent. But this divergence between intention and power of action is not, in fact, a real limitation. The truly novel characteristic of Italian terrorism is that "it does not need a program in order to affirm itself." It does not have, despite all things, a social model to offer us. In fact, if we make a distinction between the ideology of the terrorists, which procreates theoretically muddled documents, often hallucinatory, and the chain of events that the terrorist acts produce, the result is as follows: the plan controlling terrorist practice and causing its success is suitable as military strategy, that is, it is designed for the material destruction of the enemy (the State in all its articulations) according to the rules of military intelligence.

This strategy does not need a political program (understood as a design for the forms of production and for the power in the society to be created) since it lives inside the "use-value movement" which we have mentioned earlier, and in fact constitutes one of its most extreme articulations.



The critical consciousness of the possibility of seizing, here and now, social wealth that has been arbitrarily denied, penetrates to youth as common sense. Therefore this consciousness is able not only to replace the traditional political program, but also to become an immediate way of life which establishes itself by its own actions. In other words, if this new spontaneity, based on the use-value movement, is seen as a multiplicity of perceptions, units of behavior, and individuals, then terrorism is not outside the movement, but rather one of its functions. Specifically, this function is to destroy the power of the State, since this power prevents the emergence and the realization of the diverse ideas and concrete needs which form the Movement itself.

It is self-evident that this inter-functional relationship between new spontaneity and terrorism is not an eternal given. It depends upon the modes and the timing according to which terrorism and spontaneity are developed. In particular, it indicates that the situation is at a crossroads.

The Moro affair has marked, for many reasons, the highest point and, at the same time, the limits of terrorism. Now terrorism is forced to make a choice. On the one hand, it may crystalize and perfect itself as a separate populist practice with self-determined forms, timing, and objectives, by, for example, insisting obsessively on the theme of the release of prisoners. In this case, as has already happened elsewhere, the political phenomenon of violence will end up in the category of the case study of social malaise in the age of late capitalism; and thus it will be interpreted as one of the prices to be paid for the survival of the status quo. On the other hand, it may move toward forms of real guerrilla action, and it may consciously set down its roots within the new spontaneity.

However, this transition implies a profound re-structuring of the military organization, whose capacity to last and to extend itself is attributed to "social complicity," instead of to the self-sufficiency of the organization itself. It is obvious that such a successful change will imply an increment in the offensive capacity of the armed struggle.

In the short run, that is in the next few months, this taking root will certainly not occur on the level of behavior: here the difference between the rich and immediate living of the young and the military, rigid, inhuman abstraction of terrorism is irreducible. Vice-versa, the con-joining, as subjective operation, could take place through the objectives that the Movement has promulgated in these years: in the first place, that key idea "less time for work, everyone working." It should be kept in mind, however, that to emphasize intelligently some of the mass objectives and to practice them would mean to discharge on them the indubitable power of the armed struggle.

On the other hand, the new social behavior, confined to a "molecular" impact (rather than "spectacular") with terrorism, would come out profoundly modified and strengthened. The menacing quality of "subversion of existing order" that the new spontaneity carries and conceals in itself would prevail; a quality that — to impose itself — needs to achieve success and to withdraw from the atmosphere — between allowable marginality and harmless dissent — that today limits it and vexes it as a heart condition would.

One cannot in fact forget that the "expropriation of the struggle" and of the mass initiative happens wherever the Movement clashes with obstacles which it cannot remove with appropriate actions; satisfied with the consciousness of its legitimacy, the Movement does not organize itself in order to impose this legitimacy. In the end, its tension is evaporated in an empty "obligation to repeat," which is only the beginning of future passivity and impotence.

Precisely for this reason, the conjunction of the frightening beauty of March 12, 1977 in the Roman streets² with the geometric power displayed in Moro's kidnapping becomes the narrow door through which the subversive process in Italy can either grow or die.

To sum up, we can state that the "serendipitous uniqueness" of the Italian situation consists precisely in the circumstances described earlier. Presently in a state of tumultuous expansion among youth is a way of life based on need, that is, on use-value. This development is accompanied by, in a relationship not devoid of tension and hostility, the definition of a political being which raises in military terms the question of the break-up of the State machinery. As a consequence, in Italy, the social practice of use-value is charged with offensive significance and demands a mutation in the mode of production, whereas in other countries the same practice, perhaps wider and richer, lives a virtual, interstitial, and somewhat transient life *side by side* with the capitalist society and its State.

The new corporate State is not capable, at least for the time being, of accommodating the new behavior through any mediation or management of its dynamics. The regime is therefore forced to confront head to head the new spontaneity (which it rejects even as pure datum by denying its existence) while it attempts to destroy it, wishing to respond only in terms of interdiction and death.

In reality, this operation of death and restoration must be based immediately on the social network, represented politically by the Italian Communist Party. However, the process of State institutionalization of this party (with the simultaneous witting of its reformist-progressive role into impotence) may unleash the social contradictions within it, contradictions which Togliatti's machine had succeeded in suppressing and managing. The costs of such a process are so great as to be — perhaps — unacceptable. The Italian Communist Party risks breaking the branch on which it sits.

As everyone can see, "great is the disorder beneath the heavens, and for that reason the situation bodes well."

1. Eugenio Scalfari: Director of *La Repubblica*, a center-left daily paper.
2. Benedetto Croce: literary philosopher at the beginning of this century.
3. On March 11, 1977, a Bolognese student, Francesco LoRusso, was killed by the police. On March 12, more than 100,000 people demonstrated in Rome. They attacked the seat of the DC, broke open an arsenal, and fought with the police throughout the city.

11/1 via Fanl, Rome, March 1978
 11/2 Hanns Martin Schleyer, 1973 Photo: Digne Meller Marcovicz
 11/3 3/16/44-NAPLES, ITALY: Carrying placards reading "Down with the Fascist King", "Long Live Anglo-American-Soviet Coalition", more than 7,000 Italians paraded to the Galleria Umberto to hear three hours of speeches advocating the overthrow of the monarchy.



Living with Guerilla Warfare

Lucio
Castellano

Lucio Castellano, a member of *Metropoli*,
was arrested in June, 1979.

Last year an interesting study was published in England: a number of statisticians classified various professions on the basis of the life expectancy of the people practicing them. The results show that miners have the shortest life expectancy — on a scale that goes from manual labor to intellectual pursuits — while those with the longest life expectancy are professors, lawyers and politicians. It is an observation, in part banal, which should be brought to the attention of the recent glorifiers of manual labor, and which has wrongly been kept out of the ongoing debate on democracy, on violence and death, on the body and on personal daily needs. It could be caustically stated in this manner: the probability that Colletti¹ will live longer than a large majority of his students is well grounded. It gives one much to reflect upon.

It is however best to analyze the problem from the beginning, from the first conditions through which it presented itself.

1977 saw the overwhelming emergence of a central category — physicality, the body, personal needs, desires: in other words, the emergence of the individual — and with it, diversities and private life, both of which seek to define their place within a collective process of liberation. The *critique of politics* — understood as

that process which equalizes men in the abstraction of the State, isolating them in the concreteness of their diversity by placing itself in opposition to each of them in the name of the "general interest" which dominates them — is the synthetic image of this passage.

Behind it there is still the re-evaluation of the concreteness of daily life in contrast to the totalitarian abstraction of the "great ideals"; the refusal to subordinate the present to the future; the vindication of the materiality of one's own existence; hatred of sacrifice, of heroism and of rhetoric. It is not important at this time to trace the genealogy of this *immediatism*: there is the worker's stamp, radical and egalitarian of the "all now", and the crucial role of the women's movement; essential — in this discourse — is the break, not the continuity, the fact that for the first time this thematic block has become the point of aggregation, the moment of identification of an articulate and powerful political subject.

THE EXPLOITED POLITICAL SUBJECT

These are the terms of the question which profoundly innovate the debate on the State and politics, on revolution and war, on the process of liberation and personal needs. In order to understand how much re-exhumed banality and tediousness, how much haughty Catholicism has had the opportunity to come forward from such a rich base, from such eversive premises, there is a knot which must be understood beforehand: the reason is that in the span of several months a mysterious distance has created, from this conglomeration of thematics, the ground for the foundation of a heretofore unknown culture of emargination, of a language limited to a small group, repetitive, petulant and baroque, the language of those who have made a profession of faith of "exclusion". Initially there was a displacement which must be accounted for: it is not true that between the movement of '77 and the letters to *Lotta Continua* there exists a simple and direct thread of continuity: there is, on the contrary, a selection process, a precise and determining political filter. The '77 Movement was not, socially, a movement of marginals — in the limited sense — nor was it one of "non guaranteed" individuals: within it there were relevant sections of service laborers, of technicians and office workers, of young workers of small factories and students; there were also sections of part-time workers and of the unemployed. It also had a close relationship, thematic and political, to the women's movement. The Movement was a social subject united in large part by its being on the outside of the mechanisms of co-optation of the system of parties and by its being bearer of extremely advanced demands. It was, however, well within the processes of production and reproduction of social well-being, strongly interrelated with the whole of the social fiber, it was something which could not be isolated and was socially powerful because it was a holder of knowledge and of information by its being an internal part at the very heart of the reproductive mechanisms. It was not a ghetto rebellion, but the emergence of processes of profound modifications which have gone through the whole of the social and class fiber in our country in the past few years: the fact that this political subject is external to the system of parties is not to be interpreted as its emargination, but as a profound weakness of the political and institutional assets of the "Italy ring".

AGAINST THE FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE MARGINALS

The thematics of emargination has not been a *natural* identity for this Movement; it has been the toilsome product of a political administration that has reduced the radicalness of the difficult problems which had been posed into an easy identity and which has once again brought about the emergence of the new thematics within the structure of old ideologies. It has in essence split the Movement by isolating one of its components and has eliminated the problem of its identity as a political subject through the social identification of a part of it.

In this way, the political critique has lost the depth which would have permitted it to be a *practical critique of power and of the State* and has reduced itself to the practice of *exclusion from both*; the emergence of the individual and of the comonomer within the collective process of liberation has been driven back into the secure guaranteeistic ghetto of "let us live" and has been sent in search of marginal spaces, while the problem of political "legitimization" of the radicalness of behaviour and forms of action has found the most traditional and poor founda-

tions: exclusion, desperation and anger. Desperation as a collective identity, as a sign of recognition and along with it, impotence. It is a reassuring identity, both for itself and for others: "I'm an angered marginal, I have no need to correct my errors, when I'm hungry, I scream"; "he's a poor marginal, the harm he is capable of is small, he harms himself above all". It is at this point that the letters to *Lotta Continua* become a national occurrence, a literary boom and are printed in *Espresso*. Emargination and desperation undoubtedly exist, but this is not the point; here we are dealing with something else, with a culture, with a language, with a profession: we are dealing with a large ideological filter through which everything wishing to remain "within the Movement" must pass; it is an obligatory form of expression, a language which gives legitimacy and which compels mimicry. This language has its cultivators and administrators the sacred teachers, inflexible and authoritarian in dictating the rules of the game, the ones who have suffered from the 'shake-up' and the ex-singers of the praises of the service orders, the experts of "human relationships" and the feminist professionals.

The debate on violence seems to be the first victim of this unhappy situation. It has an important point of departure: the vindication of the right to life, the rejection of sacrifice, of heroism and of bellicose rhetoric. Political critique is also critique of war; it is the rejection of *destruction in the name of a future ideal*, the rejection of the subordination of oneself to the "greater interest of all": it is a rejection of that aspect of the emergence in which a woman behaves like a man, and everyone behaves like a soldier, where there is no room for playing, for celebrating, where the rights of daily life do not exist, and all of the destructive forces of society are concentrated in order to "build a better future". The discourse, however, cannot end here, otherwise it becomes a natal rhetoric. *This is because the critique of war is also the critique of peace, which war produces and reproduces internally, and it is critique of that part of society which is always armed in order to guarantee peace.*

In actuality it is — it can't help but be so — a critique of the obligatory distinction between peace and war, between army and society, between soldier and civilian.

Here too there is a central problem, a problem of the displacement of the subject and of our history, both collective and personal. If we in fact look at it with the eye of the militant and of the ideologist, the '77 Movement was the field of battle of fiercely opposed political groups — some militant, others pacifist: within this view, organizations of diverse natures — some created for war, others for peace — disputed the political space among themselves.

If we, however, view the phenomenon from its external aspects (in other words, if we look at the face it has shown of itself), or, if we look beyond the clash, at the cohabitation of tendencies of diverse natures and at the biographies of the comrades, we see, beyond the veils and categorical prescriptions, that they slip from one role to another, that they combine and have histories normally incompatible and we then realize that the Movement of the last few years, in Italy as well as in the rest of Europe, has intimately interwoven, in a continuous and systematic way, legal and illegal initiatives, both violent and non-violent, of masses and of small groups, and has based its actions at one time on the laws of a state of peace, at another on a state of war: this fact is not lived within a single organization, but has crossed them all, overpowering them and forcing cohabitation of different organized groups within the same social subject.

This characteristic, this capacity to mix peace and war, to produce offensive initiatives without producing soldiers, has not only constituted the strength of the Movement, but this is an element central to its being a communist and eversive movement.

To erode the distinction between peace and war means placing oneself on the terrain of critique of the State, it means doubting the principles of legitimation of political power, which affirms a distinction between 'State' and 'society', 'public'

CRITIQUE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR


VIOLENCE DOMINATES SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

and 'private', 'general and 'private'. The general interest is armed whereas the private interest is evaluated on the basis of the laws that govern peace. The arming of the State guarantees the disarming of society; the fact that one part of society — the repressive and military apparatus — erects itself as a separate body and functions according to the laws of "war", guarantees that the rest of society live in "peace". "Peace" means only that "war" has become the *private matter* of a few men who thrive on it (the police and the military), or of those private men who take command over all others, demonstrating through fact that they — being the guarantors of the peace of all — also govern it by being a ruling part of it. War guarantees peace, the threat of war conserves peace, within States and in the relationships between different States. The concept of State in Western political culture seems to be founded on the distinction between peace and war.

This distinction between peace and war forces the definition of violence in categorical terms and, by making a *private matter of a group of private men*, it truncates the links with other forms of action and of social communication: *'violence' is presented not for what it is — a feature of every human activity within the relationship of capital, present in every form of expression within the relationship of capital, present in every form of expression and of communication, where it carries the sign of the relationship of power, but appears as an activity alongside all others, yet specialized and monstrous and which blackmails the rest.*

Every relationship of power has its military aspect and every human relationship is primarily a relationship of power: for this reason the war machine sinks its roots into relationships of peace, and the violence which dominates them is given its general representation in the "infinite destructive power" of the modern State. *The repressive apparatus, with its war specialists, is a synthesis of the violence which dominates social relationships, and it is the armed guarantee of their reproductions: in order that salaried labor not be uncovered as violence, violence is presented as a labor equal to all others; in order that the laborer not discover that he is immersed in daily violence, it is presented to him as the profession of another "laborer", the policeman. Placing on its feet "this world that is upside down" means revealing the violence that is hidden in daily life and confronting it for what it is, without giving in to the extortion of terror, attacking the machine in order to sabotage it; it means learning to use violence, so as not to have to delegate it, so as not to be blackmailed; it means learning to recognize it or live with it.*

Alle Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus Grundgesetz Art. 20/1



WILL
HAVE THE
ARMY?

The Movement of the last few years has not been insurrectionalist or militaristic because it has not been pacifist, because it has not respected the succession of peace which prepares war or its apparatus (its ordered army) nor has it respected the succession of war which prepares new peace; because it has not seen violence concentrated in the Nth hour of the rendering of accounts — the blind, inhuman and abstract violence of armies — but has seen it unfolded and apprehended along the entire arc of the political struggle for liberation.

Two are the roads (and the "pacifists" are always demonstrating it) which can be taken: a) political struggle excludes the use of violence in its horizon and consequently respects the existing military apparatus, or else it hastens to organize one that is an alternative and an equivalent to the existing one, eventually passing on to a phase of war, open or "legitimate", army against army, State against State (it is a story which we already know, and like parrots have learned to ask the question: who will dissolve the Red Army? who will fight against the State when the working class has become the State?); b) the process of liberation is not first "political" and then "military"; it learns the use of arms throughout its course; it frees the army to carry out the thousand functions of political struggle; it mixes in the life of everyone, the civilian with the fighter; it forces everyone to learn the art of war or peace.

One cannot claim to live the process of communist liberation and to have the same relationship to violence, the same idea of beauty and of good and right, of desirable, the same idea of normalcy, the same habits of a middle-aged bank clerk from Turin: *living with earthquakes is living always with terrorism and in order not to have an "heroic" idea of war one must first of all avoid a beggarly idea of peace.*

Pacifists such as Lama enlist policemen, while those "most to the left" ask for the legitimization of "violence of the masses", of the "armed proletariat". The actual Movement was more realistic and less bellicose, more human and heroic; it put peace up for debate because it criticized war and it shattered the criterion of delegation and of legitimization because it rejected the army; it has done this with errors and inaccurate approximations, with terrible deviations, by cultivating absurd myths, all within a history. It has been contradictory, but it has learned and has improved a process that has modified reality more than an insurrection.

Consequently, a critique of politics is also a critique of the war/peace distinction. The peace to which we refer is the peace of democracy and the violence which it uses is "legitimate violence", which the majority has delegated to the institutions of the State: to criticize that violence means to criticize the most developed principle of political legitimization, democracy. That is because the problem of legitimacy is the problem of the majority, and the problem of the majority is that of the institutions through which it expresses itself, in other words, the State: "majority" and "minority" belong to the universe of political thought, they divide their hold over the "common interest", they live through the separation of "public" and "private", of State and society, immersing their roots into the relationship of dominion which alone forces men to see themselves in terms of quantity. *The majority constitutes itself in order to administer power: the more power is concentrated, the more the majority can do, and the less each individual can do; the more the "public" is well off, which is the interest of everyone, so much the more is the "private" poor, expropriated; the more dispossessed, destitute of expression, is the individual interest. Democracy is both the maximum development of State power, the maximum concentration of political power, and the seat of the uncontested command of the principle of the majority: the point is not that in the modern State there is little democracy, that the minorities are not safeguarded; but — on the contrary — that there is a fight to the death against all that is not expressed in terms of majority or minority, which is not expressed in terms of power and of administration. It is for this reason that the communist movement for liberation is outlawed everywhere, because it places itself outside of the democratic code, and this code defines the universe of politics in an exclusive manner. The radical Marxist criticism of democracy individuates the*

categories which are the foundation of the struggle between democracy and communism, between democratic power and communist liberation. The rest is destitution, entanglements *ad usum delphini*.


In a democratic State it is obligatory to "fight for the majority" because without a majority nothing can be accomplished, not even the production of a pin, or the playing of a clarinet. Everything can be asked of the State, but without the State nothing can be done, and the relationship of power is presented as the universal language through which everyone condenses or translates himself. The struggle for the majority is obligatory, whatever majority it might be; and the majority of a small group defers to the majority of a larger group, while the parliamentary institutions develop throughout the social fabric, and growing armies of delegates learn the mystery of the conciliation of the maximum divisibility of power with maximum concentration.

With the majority all is possible, without the majority nothing is possible: the only recognized social action is the struggle for the majority ("it is the dictatorship of the lawyers over American society" as was written by a journalist many years ago with regard to the U.S. Congress); the only social relationship recognized is the one of assemblage, of majority and of minority. Maximum concentration of power, its best administration. Capitalism concentrates the means of production and of social wealth while democracy administers them according to a code, the code of the relationship between the majority and the minority: it's the best code, but it belongs to the world of capitalism.

We do not know of another code to "legitimize" political power; the socialist State moves within this same horizon. This means that we are fighting against political power, against the State-form, against democracy, against the universe of capitalist relationships of production, for *communism*.

Translated by Felicia Czini

11/1-2 Tim Guest Photos: D. Cortez



MUNIST
ICISM OF
OCRACY

Why Italy?

Felix Guattari

Felix Guattari is the author, with Gilles Deleuze of *Anti-Oedipus*. This unpublished interview took place in France several months before the April 7, 1979 arrests.

Why Italy? The first entry is relatively contingent. A number of people responsible for a free Italian radio station in Bologna, Radio Alice, asked me to introduce a French edition of their texts. That interested me because their inspiration was at once Situationist and "deleuzoguattarian," if one can say that.

The second axis is the conjunction between the State apparatus in the traditional sense and the bureaucracies of the Worker's Movement. We have seen it at work in a spectacular manner in both the U.S.S.R. and China. The Western democratic tradition, the evolution toward Eurocommunism, and the humanism of the socialist parties made us believe that we weren't exposed to that kind of totalitarianism. It's true that the modes of subjection function differently. Yet there is an irreversible tendency pushing the State to exert its power no longer by traditional means of coercion, like the police or army, but also through every means of negotiation in every domain, from the systematic shaping of children in national education to the immense power of the media, particularly television. This State apparatus is highly visible but often powerless on the national level since real decisions are often taken at the international level. It is on the contrary more and more powerful in its miniaturized interventions.

If one's nose is pressed too close to national realities, the impression is that

England is very different from the existing regime in Germany, France or Italy. But stepping back, one can see that a certain kind of totalitarianism is being set up which goes along very well with traditional divisions. The machines of production, formation, and reproduction of the work force imply an immense machinery of State power, and then all kinds of cogwheels in politics, unions, education, sports, etc....In this regard I believe the Italian experience to be the most exemplary, for there we can see the lines of flight and the road that lies ahead. It doesn't lead to an alternative of the English type, or a French popular front, whether on the left or on the right. It amounts to making sure that the Communist Party, mass organizations, and unions will function at full capacity within a national consensus like the Italian political spectrum.

A kind of State regime is now being devised which won't require an October revolution or even a Chinese revolution, but will produce the same result: the people will be controlled by every available means, even if they must be conceded a measure of political and regional diversity.

Why Italy? Because the future of England, France and Germany is Italy. When I got involved with Italy the Common Program of the French left had not yet exploded, but I had already sketched out the idea that it didn't make sense, that things wouldn't happen that way. But integration is inexorable, and the Italian scheme will eventually be reproduced in France.

What I'm saying can only be understood in relation to what I have called the molecular revolution. There is a certain level of desire, violence, and revolt which has become impossible and unbearable in societies such as they have developed at both the technological and social level. Let's take the example of terrorism: throughout the history of the Worker's Movement, there have been armed actions and acts of terrorism. There have been enormous discussions throughout the communist movement to put into perspective and to situate armed action. Nowadays it's no longer a theoretical problem, but a problem of the collective sensibility as it has been shaped by the State apparatus with its audiovisual tentacles: one doesn't accept any more the idea of death, the idea of violence, the idea of rupture, or even the idea of the unexpected. A general infantilisation now pervades all human relationships. If there's a strike at the National Electric Company, be careful. A code of ethics for the strike must be drawn up. Confrontation in Bologna? Be careful, a full negotiation must be made. And if one senses an aberrant factor, if there's a handful or resisters who don't accept the ethical code, it's a black hole. The most beautiful black hole that's been seen was New York during the black-out. When one can no longer see, anything—a great mass, strange fauna—can loom up out of the dark.

A certain type of brutality inherited from capitalist societies of the 19th century was symmetrical with a certain truth of desire. Some people could still free themselves. The progressive tightening up by the Marxist worker's movement has put a stop to that. Today you can't desire rupture, you can't desire revolution, or indeed anything which puts in question the framework and values of contemporary society. Now the control begins in childhood, in the nursery and in school, for everyone must be forced into the dominant redundancies of the system. The repressive societies now being established have two new characteristics: repression is softer, more diffuse, more generalized, but at the same time much more violent. For all who can submit, adapt, and be channeled in, there will be a lessening of police intervention. There will be more and more psychologists, even psychoanalysts, in the police department; there will be more community therapy available; the problems of the individual and of the couple will be talked about everywhere; repression will be more psychologically comprehensive. The work of prostitutes will have to be recognized, there will be a drug advisor on the radio—in short, there will be a general climate of understanding acceptance. But if there are categories and individuals who escape this inclusion, if people attempt to question the general system of confinement, then they will be exterminated like the Black Panthers in the U.S., or their personalities exterminated as it happened with the Red Army Fraction in Germany. Skinnerian conditioning will be used all over.

In no way is terrorism specific to Germany and Italy. In three months France could be crawling with Red Brigades. Considering how power and the media operate, how people are cornered, prisoners in these systems of containment, it's no wonder that some become enraged, and start shooting at people's legs or wherever.

The molecular revolution, however, is produced neither on the level of political and traditional union confrontation, nor on the front of different movements like the Women's Movement, the prostitutes, the Gay Liberation Front, etc., which are often only provisional reterritorializations, even forms of compromise with the State power and the different political forces. There is a miniaturization of forms of expression and of forms of struggle, but no reason to think that one can arrange to meet or wait at a specific place for the molecular revolution to happen.

At a deeper level in contemporary history, it hardly matters anymore whether one lives in Brezhnev's regime of goulags or under Carterism or Berlinguerism, all the powers are intricated in the same bizarre formula. To be sure there will be contradictions, confrontations, landslides, class struggles in the traditional sense, even wars, but it's actually society as a whole that is now shifting. It won't simply be another bourgeois or proletarian revolution. The gears effected by this shift are so minute that it will be impossible to determine whether it's a class confrontation or a further economic subjugation. I believe that this shift in society, which implies not only a re-arrangement of relationships among humans, but also among organs, machines, functions, signs, and flux, is an intrahuman revolution, not a simple re-ordering of explicit relationships. There have been major revolutionary debacles in history before. In the 18th century, ranks, orders, classifications of all kinds suddenly broke down. Today no one or anything seems to be able to semiotize collectively what's happening. Panic creeps in, and people fall back upon State powers more overwhelming and tentacular, ever more manipulative and mystifying. In Italy the Communist Party is often heard saying: *let's save Italy*, but the more uncertain Italy's future becomes, the more claims there are to save it.

In Italy there is no tradition of State power, no civic spirit, nothing like the French tradition of centralism and hierarchical responsibility. The situation therefore is more favorable for bringing about a number of shifts. Entire regions will be downgraded because of the restructuring of capitalism on the international scale. As for the "Italian miracle", or the French miracle, we'd better forget about it.

I am of a generation which really experienced a deadlocked society. Stalinism then was an institution, a wall blocking the horizon to infinity. I now sense an extraordinary acceleration in the decomposition of all coordinates. It's a treat just the same. All this has to crumble down, but obviously it won't come from any revolutionary organization. Otherwise you fall back on the most mechanistic utopias of the revolution, the Marxist simplifications: at the end of the road lies victory...It's not the black hole of the 19th century, lots of things have happened since, like the barbarians at the gates. Political superstructures and systems of representation will collapse or crumble down in ridicule and inanity, but there are already an enormous number of things which function, and function remarkably well, whether at the level of science, esthetics, or in the inventiveness of daily life. There is an extraordinary vitality in the machinic processes.

The Italians of Radio Alice have a beautiful saying: when they are asked what has to be built, they answer that the forces capable of destroying this society surely are capable of building something else, yet *that will happen on the way*. I have no idea what the future model of society or of relationships will be. I think it's a false problem, the kind of false problem that Marx and Engels tried to avoid. We can only do one thing, and that's to acknowledge the end of a society. The revolutionary process won't stem from a rational, Hegelian, or dialectical framework. Instead it will be a generalized revolution, a conjunction of sexual, relational, esthetic, and scientific revolutions, all making cross-overs, markings, and currents of deterritorialization.

On the molecular level, things function otherwise. Looking through the glasses of traditional politics, there is nothing left, for example, of the American radical movement. If one changes glasses, if one peers through the microscope, there is another picture altogether. There is a new sensibility, a new way of relating, a new sort of kindness, all very difficult to define. Historians have a hard time dealing with these objects—history of tenderness! In all sorts of complex ways, through the history of the feminist movement and the history of homosexuality, through relationships in general, this new type of sensibility *is* also the revolution. If revolutionary glasses don't allow us to see that, then there is no more revolution, it's all finished.

There will be no more October revolutions.

Translated by John Johnston

II/1 FC.1077232-WATCH YOUR CREDIT. INTERNATIONAL NEWS PHOTOS. SLUG. (FLAGS) RED BANNERS ON THE MARCH IN ITALY — MILAN, ITALY — THE MASSES RED BANNERS OF COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE BORNE ALONG A STREET OF MILAN AS THE COMMUNISTS MAKE A SHOW OF STRENGTH DURING FUNERAL PROCESSION FOR A SLAIN RED RIOTER. THIS LATEST "MARTYR" FOR COMMUNISM WAS KNOCKED OFF IN ONE OF THE RED-INSTIGATED RIOTS IN MILAN. ITALY IS BEING TORN WITH SUCH AFFAIRS AS THE REDS TRY TO DISCREDIT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN THEIR OWN BID FOR POWER. THE BITTER POLITICAL RIOTING HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SEVENTEEN DAYS, LEAVING AT LEAST TWENTY PERSONS DEAD SO FAR. (SM-11-22-47)



On Armed Struggle

Paolo Virno

Paolo Virno is a member of the Editorial Committee of *Metropoli*. He was arrested in June, 1979, together with two other members of the Committee, when the first — and so far only — issue came out. This article was meant to present a document from the Red Brigades on their attack against the seat of the Christian Democrats in Piazza Nicosia, Rome, on May 3, 1979.

A year after the Moro affair, the happenings of Piazza Nicosia constitute a clamorous test for the development of effective guerilla action in our country. These events also offer a precise view of the contradictions involved in such action.

Above all, no one can rationally deny this: that the attack on the Roman branch of the Christian Democrats signaled a turning point with respect to the entire political-military experience of the Red Brigades, including the Via Fani Incident. What has occurred is the progression, consciously pursued, from an operative terrorist "model" to a guerilla one. The latter model involves a high level of social cooperation, a freedom of movement in enemy territory, a capacity to cope with a multiplicity of variables in the course of action: all factors evidenced in the events of May 3.

And yet this type of guerilla action, no longer merely alluded to but openly displayed, reveals a particular incongruence when one considers the objective to which it is applied. Rather than addressing itself strictly to the subversion of "real" work, strengthening its impact and guaranteeing its "bargaining power," this armed initiative proceeds directly toward a destabilization of the party

system. The "Autonomy of the 'Political'" is, so to speak, its truest presumption.

The Christian Democrats are not struck as an articulation of the system of production, as an organization legitimized by the system of production, but as a personification of power, as a Bourgeois Party and as an Electoral Machine.

In reality, the "Autonomy of the 'Political'" has bearing not so much on guerilla action as on traditional discussions of insurrection, civil war, formation of a "Red Army," and that type of power-equivalent to "might makes right" tactics—which is waiting to be seized.

Guerilla action, on the other hand, (as exemplified also by other less frequent activities of the Red Brigades, such as the murder of the head of the Schettini homes) exercises direct power, a decentralized and diffused power, as pluralistic as the enemy's power. It does not allude to the "breaking up" of the State machine, but rather severs its terminals; these are rooted in the condition of merchandise imposed upon the labor force, and, in their togetherness and spontaneity, they also constitute the secret mechanism, delicate and irreplaceable, by which the State machine functions.

We have given as an example the action against Schettini. Very well: it is evident that that action required less organization than the Piazza Nicosia Affair; and yet it appears that the former action more clearly resembled a guerilla action, in the pure sense.

In fact, it introduced a "scale of measurement" for the political efficacy of the armed struggle; and this is the important point which distinguishes an urban political-military operation from the type of warfare inherited from the labor movement. That unit of measurement is provided, specifically, by the strengthening of the housing movement and by the "discouragement" induced among those who suffered eviction; more generally, it is provided by the material gains—yes—material, economic and regulatory—obtained by the proletarian strata together with the help of guerilla initiatives.

This "measurability" of the organizational process (if not reduced to the number of recruits) is a necessary condition for, among other things, discerning the military "character" even if totally weaponless, of the mass struggle.

This latter, in fact, corrodes the unity between capitalistic command and the functioning of the coordination of social production, rendering capitalistic command fragile and exposing it to destructive attack. Mass struggle exposes the restrictive and oppressive character of social relations; on this basis we see that armed action turns against that functioning and those men, already destitute of any social justification, that remain standing because they are imposed by force. This enmeshment, we believe, cannot help but influence the very "form" of the armed organization, nourishing those of the Movement's roots that lie in social power, and discouraging the growth of the Movement as a self-sufficient military instrument. Viceversa, the assault on the political heaven reveals the absence of a "principle of control" on the effects provoked. The long-term disorganization of the party system does not induce in and of itself the Movement's progress. Rather, this disorganization may have the effect of dispersing the Movement because of the speed with which parties approach their goals, enclosing themselves in the circle of chalk—very "private"—of the "Autonomy of the 'Political'."

Thus we have made a preliminary evaluation of the unsteady course of guerilla activity from Via Fani to Piazza Nicosia. It is clear that we must return to this topic. Not only because discussion leads to understanding and is therefore good, but also because it is not possible to reconstruct the conditions under which Italy's new types of social behavior are manifested without interweaving with their development—whether one wishes or not—the question of "military philosophy," as posed initially by the Red Brigades.

Translated by Robert Zweig

On the Recognition of Armed Struggle

Lanfranco Pace/
Franco Piperno

This letter was sent to *Lotta Continua* in June, 1979. At the time both Pace and Piperno were "in hiding." It is far from certain that the proposition of amnesty formulated in this letter will ever be taken up by the Italian State. The importance of this letter, however, lies in the wide debate it generated around the political deadlock resulting from terrorist actions and State repression.

1. *Metropoli* is not on the newsstands anymore. It has been confiscated by the same judges who have devised and conducted an arbitrary and illicit operation against Autonomy. The editors of almost all newspapers, as well as the press federation itself, with that sort of "diffuse complicity" always work in these organizations, have disguised, or worse, sanctified this gesture. But the confiscation is not in consonance with judicial proceedings, and openly violates one of those fundamental liberties revered by all — though unheeded by many among those who count.

The pretext is ridiculous: an article that could have and can at most figure as a serious "unpremeditated" crime, had it been read (and transcribed) in its entirety, without the old trick of having only its title reported¹. This is proof of an unjustified trust in the institutions's capacity to learn from recent tragedies and to correct itself by bringing charges against those responsible for harmful illegal actions, especially public officials.

2. As if this weren't enough, Bibbo, Lucio and Paolo², other editors of the review, have been arrested, with the usual hyperbolic accusations. Obviously nothing is known or will become known of the specific, differentiated respon-

sibilities which are attributed to them: the articles which were written or simply endorsed by them, their joint militancy in *Potere Operaio*, or the actual participation in what for Gallucci has become the March 16 procession, in Via Fani³. For the judges, the counts of the indictment are all of equal seriousness. Therefore it is not necessary to specify: it is no single one of them, but it is (a bit of) all of them. The well-proven method is that of keeping to vague terms, continually changing the "proof and presumptive" material. The result of all this is that at cell G.8 of Rebibbia something like ten years of our lives is being confiscated. We declare in clear terms that, as far as we are concerned, we are willing to surrender ourselves only if the Inquisitors can show with actual, concrete acts that they are retreating from the territory of arbitrariness and illegality.

PLAYING THE PART OF "JEWS"

3. We are certainly not consoled by the fact that this sequence of arbitrary acts alleviates our skepticism toward "democratic legality" and, in particular, toward those famous, fundamental rules called guaranteeist principles.

Written rules notwithstanding, we have long been well aware of the fact that the power structure possesses a decisive, even peremptory authority. For our part we cannot but acknowledge that at the present stage of things, the power structure works entirely against us: that is only too obvious. Everything converges to isolate us: our failure to define our position; the "ambiguous" role which we are attempting to play (an ambiguity which, by the way, we claim as the proper stance in view of the "facts" with which we deal); the disconcerting and "provocative" nature of the arguments we have set forth: all combines to create around us justifiable wariness and to make us play the part of "Jews"; whether we want to or not. And so we make tempting targets for those who have the know-how and the *capabilità* to play the role of "Nazi".

We ourselves are therefore the last ones to bet on our success; and these days — let it be said with rage and fear — even on our own individual lives.

4. Thus we write this piece so that no one may exculpate himself through the claim of misunderstanding and the dubiousness of the situation. But we also write so that our position on one of the basic issues taken up by the short-lived *Metropoli* would clearly emerge. We believe that we are indirectly helping to clarify the meaning of this campaign of persecution, as well as the damage which it is destined to produce.

THE NEGOTIATING PARTY

5. One can say that *Metropoli* took on its own distinctive features with respect to organized Autonomy precisely at the time of Moro's kidnapping. In some ways, *Metropoli's* political program was sharpened and finalized while the magazine operated within the "negotiating party", and its short existence was anything but futile in spite of the harsh defeat it suffered at the end. Actually, the "party" in question brought under discussion for the first time — with the help of Aldo Moro's enforced but nonetheless lucid cooperation — the question of political recognition for the armed party. This question is obviously quite different from pretending or imagining a civil war situation in our country; it is a question, we believe, that is destined to occupy a primary position in the social and political conflict in Italy.

6. Recognition of the armed party does not mean legal recognition of the fighting squads, nor does it mean their institutionalization. Nobody — and we least of all — proposes a Lebanese alternative for Italy: a pure and disastrous military shambles of social conflicts. This type of formal recognition has certainly been, and can still be, a judicial obsession with the Red Brigades, but it lacks any political thrust, being devoid of any positive results. If by chance it would meet with success, it would only serve to freeze the present situation. In other words, a disaster.

Nor does recognition of the armed party necessarily mean accepting or taking into account the political plans of the fighting squads. These programs, when they are set forth, are in fact either confused — and therefore the objectives pursued

are not distinguishable — or uselessly clear, tautologically entwined by the stale category of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thus sorrowfully lacking in any identifiable and realizable objectives.

7. Instead, recognition of the armed struggle must mean dealing with the social problems that arise from the area where the struggle draws its origins and within which it finds its nourishment. From this point of view, we believe that even today the fighting squads are more significant for the questions they indirectly raise, than for the solutions they openly advance. And the questions they raise are certainly many. The armed party is born and nourished by all our unsolved problems: temptations to coup d'etat felt by various sectors; the institutional habit of practicing arbitrariness and illegality under cover of the laws; the dramatic divergence between the growth of the worker's struggles and the filmsiness of the modifications introduced into the power structure. We are in any event interested in a specific topic that falls within the problem of the armed struggle: we mean that topic which has been improperly labeled the youth question. We hold this territory to be the real *solid* hinterland of the fighting organizations not only for the decisiveness with which it works toward the destruction of social equilibria; but because it is the most European and Western problem, the least Italianate, we might say, among those that characterize the situation in our country.

8. We said that to speak of the youth question is incorrect. In fact, we are not talking about the eternal generational affliction, which may be exacerbated by the crisis which our country is going through. We are talking about something else. The behavior of youth is emblematically inscribed and represented in that significant area of the unemployed which in its wholeness makes up a new social subject and of which much has already been said. Now, to refuse forms of expression and survival to this area, to prevent it from having a cultural identity, and to push it back systematically into an illusory condition of non-existence — all this means to promote at the molecular level the "large-scale", wide-ranging terrorism and the entire spectrum of illegal practices from appropriation to sabotage which today render Italy not the most violent country in the world — a lie easily disproved by comparative statistics — but rather the country where social violence tends most to encroach on politics. This zone of violence is bound to grow, not only due to its subjective aspects — think of the channels of communication in the heart of the working class itself which the refusal of work has historically found and finds today in Italy — but because the capitalistic development itself leads to the same end, and precisely in the forms of modern investment, which are investments to save work.

9. Therefore, from the politics of the armed struggle to the social situation that nourishes it, it is possible to equip oneself for the solution of the problem. One can break into the area of legal action and, by up-setting the established order, reach that social configuration capable of assuring to the new forms of life, to the new subjects, the material conditions for living and expanding.

10. But the thematics of the new deeds and of the subjects who are their bearers cannot be faced without interrupting the craze for physical destruction which has entered many hundreds of fighters. Again, it is not a matter of sanctioning a special legal status expressly for them, but rather of showing readiness to accept a true inversion in their tendency. A tangible sign of this readiness would be, for example, an amnesty for political prisoners. It must be borne in mind that even by official estimates their number is close to a thousand: while by contrast in the Soviet Union the number of political prisoners as a result of dissent are about six thousand.

Nobody then would wish to deny the complexity of the problem. Detention in subhuman conditions acts as an insurmountable obstacle to any effort geared at bringing the struggle, which may be radical but is nonetheless a mass phenomenon, within "less costly" forms and means of strife. Thousands of prisoners constitute a counter in the hands of the "warlords" who are determined to carry out a military solution, the most realistic solution as far as they are concerned.

We expect at this point the irony and the slightly insolent and vulgar sarcasm of the press: "They ask for amnesty now that their friends are in jail." As a response, only this remark: the amnesty applies to the "communist fighters", a status which, despite what Judges Calogero and Gaillucci seem to believe, the comrades arrested on April 7 do not have.

11. To conclude, what must be urgently thwarted is the attempt to solve the problem of the armed struggle on the lowest level: that of public order. The armed struggle has in fact already reached, in Italy, the critical point, the point of no return. The normal solutions, through the police and the Courts, are obviously impracticable: public order is then tantamount to calling up the army, to military repression. This is a possible but not a final solution, in the sense that it implies a widening of the afflicted area beyond all bounds, and in addition an extended militarization of social life. In other words, an Argentinian solution: capable, hypothetically, of extirpating the phenomenon, but capable also of inducing dreadful transformations in all areas of society.

Translated by Peter Carravetta

1. The title of Piperno's article in *Metropoli* was: "The sooner we pay, the better."
2. Paolo Virno, Lucio Castellano, Libero Maesano.
3. The execution of Moro occurred on March 16, 1978 in via Fani.

II/1 ROM 919838 PEACE CONGRESS OPENS ROME, ITALY: The French High Commissioner for Atomic Energy Frederic Joliot-Curie (left, behind microphone) opens the Congress of the "Partisans for Peace," in Rome. Some 100 delegates of leftist organizations from 40 countries attended.



Sorry, It's Exactly the Opposite

Massimo Cacciari

Massimo Cacciari left *Potere Operaio* in 1968 to join the ICP. He is considered one of the most brilliant contemporary philosophers in Italy.

It appears to me that the proposal for amnesty for the "communist fighters," advanced by Piperno and Pace's article, does not contain at all the "turning points" that some insist on seeing in it, but it is rather one of the most equivocal and mystifying products of its authors. The misunderstanding hinges completely, with obvious "malice," on the term "recognition." Piperno holds that this means neither the institutionalization of the armed groups, nor the acceptance of their political plans, but instead the "taking up of social problems from the area where it (i.e. *the armed struggle*) draws its origins and within which it finds its nourishment." These social problems are then traced back to one great, unique question: the dramatic "increase" in the difference between the transformation of social make-up, the new subjects which are thus generated, and the Power structure and its degree of "ability to transform" itself (a concept not reducible to that of government or of formal institution). Who will deny that this question must be "taken up"? It becomes evident that the weakness of the left, which is theoretical before being political, in dealing with this question, is one of the elements that explain the result of the last elections.

But what link can there be between this necessary "taking up" and any "recognition" whatsoever of terrorism? This would be the case, if it were established that

terrorism "represents" the new demand for the development and the transformation of democracy. But exactly the opposite is true: the effects and the "theory" of the armed party block in all ways the process of democratic growth, and they are, in fact, founded upon the axiom of the total unfeasibility of this path. It is said that the hinterland of terrorism is basically produced by the failure to solve that political problem. It is obvious that the massive reversal of the whole crisis upon the new generations shapes an environment that fosters terrorist pollution. And it is obvious—or it should become so immediately—that in order to sustain the struggle against the armed party, this environment must be transformed from the ground up.

But not only is it not obvious, it is extremely mystifying to assert that the armed party owes its origin to this habitat, or, moreover, that its politics represents, albeit in a "mad" fashion, the instances of the development of the forms of participation and democracy which make up *the problem*—certainly not Italian—of our country. The armed party represents the *negation* of these instances—again: in its effects as well as in its own "theory." The "taking up" of the same problems that Piperno indicates are tantamount not to the "recognition" of the so-called "communist fighters" (and here, too, as Andrea Casalegno¹ has lucidly pointed out, the misunderstanding is lethal), but to the awareness that their political program (for that is what it comes down to) contrasts in the most radical manner with the very possibility of taking up seriously those problems and starting out toward a real solution of them.

When Piperno speaks of the social problems in which terrorism had its "origin," he is consciously bringing back into circulation those sociological interpretations that necessarily lead to the heaping together of armed party and the various exasperated, even violent, forms of youth protest. And this heaping is fruitful only to those who would like, among other things, to resolve the problems of the armed party exclusively on the grounds of the public order or of military action. Only beautiful (and fake) souls can believe that terrorism represents (again: even in its aberrant forms) the new political question nurtured in this country from 1968 to today, and that therefore a political response which would finally level with it implies the annihilation of its reason for being. Instead, terrorism can be isolated, rendered bare, choked: but above all, the *politics* of terrorism would result as the net alternative to this question and its instances. And it makes no sense at all to serve an amnesty to a politics that kills democracy. Exactly as it makes no sense to speak of an amnesty for those who have nothing to do with the armed party, or for those forms of protest that can be dealt with only politically. It is obvious, on the other hand, that the so-called "communist fighters" are praying intensely for an exclusively military-judicial response to these forms of protest: it would only strengthen the hinterland enormously. But would we then say that a political system which "uses" terrorism in order to reduce its degree of democracy, to enclose and corporativize itself, would we say that this political *decision* has its "origin" in the failure for reform in its democratic and institutional sense?

Translated by Peter Carravetta

1. Andrea Casalegno, vice-director of *La Stampa*, (considered a strong supporter of Fiat's policy) was killed by the BR.

The Red Harvest

Leonardo Sciascia

Leonardo Sciascia, recently elected on the *Partito Radicale* ticket, is a Sicilian writer. He is well-known for his studies on the Mafia and the corruption of the Italian State.

In the discussions which followed Franco Piperno and Lanfranco Pace's article, published by *Lotta Continua*, 13 June, one fact was not properly accounted for: the amnesty proposal came from Piperno and Pace and not from Curcio. It was discussed, in other words, as if the proposal came from a Brigadist either dependably self-styled or indubitably identified, or still sufficiently accredited by the underground organization. Whereas it actually came from people placed in an ambiguous sector and role, and in such moments where this ambiguity brings with it, for those who have lived it, certain risks and dangers which every citizen with the least awareness of the situation cannot help but see.

I would say immediately — abstractly evaluating the facts (note: abstractly) — that the police and the court action in attacking this ambiguous sector and in pursuing elements that have had and continue to have an ambiguous role, can, after all, be considered intelligent: but only in the sense in which Dashiel Hammet speaks of a "red harvest" — that is, heterogeneous, unspecified and properly indiscriminating harvest of dead among which there will also be the *right* ones.

In a less abstract evaluation we find ourselves in an objectionable situation: we certainly do not want a given number of dead, among which there might or might not be the *right* ones; but a given number of arrests and convictions that would

surely be *right*, while enjoying all constitutional privileges.

There is a passage in Piperno and Pace's article that greatly impressed me, and I hope it will have the same effect on every law-abiding Italian who abhors violence: "We ourselves are therefore the last ones to bet on our success; and these days — let it be said with rage and fear — even on our own individual lives."

This is a passage that demands reflection and concern and, for those responsible for it, those steps aimed at avoiding the "red harvest."

Translated by William Pagnotta

Beyond Terrorism

Oreste Scalzone

Oreste Scalzone, one of the April 7 prisoners,
was a leader of *Potere Operaio*.

A "sally" that struck at the root of the problematic relation between "terrorism" and institutions, between guerrilla tactics and social change, was enough to throw the intellectual leaders of the "struggle for subversion" into confusion. We are referring to the letter by comrades Franco Piperno and Lanfranco Pace published in *Lotta Continua*. The argument set forth in this letter posed a serious problem to the "legal left": above all to the *opposing* left, but also to the components of that *institution* who do not idolize the State.

The problem, it seems to me, was grossly put in these terms: having momentarily set aside their own opinions of "armed struggle," of its features, its roots and the individuals who are its agents, the authors argued that any "progressive" component interested in social change is blind if it does not understand that the path followed by the State to eradicate "terrorism" leads to a vertical rise of the conflict in terms of civil war, to an inexorable and gradually irreversible barbarization of the conditions and modality of the engagement.

"Armed struggle," then, is a variable that is now firmly established in the context of social engagement existing in this country (a state of affairs which is less than pleasing to each one of us). The "legal left" is the last group that holds a few

cards able to reverse this course. Under this profile, the left has ruined itself by covering its eyes for years, giving credit to the most incredible "backward-logical" buffoonery, putting aside the problem and refusing to recognize its nature. The "get-thee-behind-me-Satan's," the pleas, the tomfoolery, the "elementary-my-dear-Watson's," the nonsense about the "right-at-the-moment-when's" and the "who-does-it-help's" are useless in terms of reversing this tendency even one step, or of forcing a single proletarian to withdraw, a single comrade who might eventually decide to enter the field of "combatant practices" by his own decision. The extra-parliamentary groups — or the ghosts of those who survived the consecutive crises of recent years — have seen droves of comrades break away from "legal" political practice, and become "Indians" or continue to unleash powerless curses.

It seems to me, then, that Piperno's central consideration on "provocation" is this: the *opposing* left (bound to a vision which we still regard as "progressive" — apart from the radical politico-theoretical differences — because it is interested in the emergence of a "conflictual" and not a "unified" society) finds itself before the fact that the State, its parties, its separate bodies have embarked on the path toward a *military* solution to the problem of "terrorism."

This inevitably means the privilege of a "military" approach to the relation with the entire "critical mass" represented by social subversion, by the different forms of antagonism and radical conflict. Such a solution also points to the rigidity of the institutional framework, overwhelmed by the repercussions of the "social crisis," incapable of taking on the pressing demand for the radical modification of the quality of life within a politics of social innovation by the capitalist party, incapable of translating new social needs into standardized "requirements" which are commensurate with those needs.

For the progressive sectors, all this means accepting an unbearable dynamic. In the reorganization of the separate bodies, in the rigidity of the party system, in the frightening obstinacy of the mass media, in the deterioration of the mechanisms of the lawful State, in the self-affirmation of hybrid devices that synthesize elements of McCarthyism and the socialist Gulag — in all of this there occurs a *liquidation* of the entire patrimony bequeathed by more than a decade of emancipative struggles which have spread by lines of force form their worker and proletarian nucleus through the entire social fabric.

And at this point it does not make sense for these "progressive components" to continue to recriminate against the "terrorists."

The *opposing* legal left, then, finds itself implicated in a counter-offensive modality on the part of the State, not just because of the old story about "liberty that is indivisible," and therefore "today it is my turn but tomorrow it can be yours, in fact it will certainly be yours"; but equally because in the State's militarization of the engagement lies the *overall condition* for the operation of a model of conflictual society which turns out to be compromised in a very serious way.

In fact, the dominance of a *military* logic in the State's actions means — apart from any apocalyptic representation — that the principal technique is the *reclamation* of the entire area of social subversion as a single effectual anti-guerrilla mechanism.

The Dalla Chiesa-style neo-McCarthyism becomes the only winning proposal, once it has been accepted that the primary objective is the "defense of the *democratic compromise* against *terrorism*."

"Hic rhodus, hic salta," therefore: those who live completely in a situation of crisis are not so much *we* — this line of "Potere Operaio" (*Worker Power*) caught in the eye of the hurricane, like a kind of modern KAPD — even though the phenomenology of political defeat today seems to regard us *conspiratorily*, we who are so heavily attacked by an offensive without precedents in the post-war judiciary system of this country. In perspective it could be precisely the "in-

termediate" sectors that constitute the area opposing progress toward a situation of unendurable destruction.

Some people with the instinct for "half-bred" politics — which today they are and want to be — have sensed the problem. The half-libertarian, half-neo-institutional area that extends from the radicals to *Lotta Continua* has raised it for the first time. And this area has brutally posed it *from the right* (yet at least they have not dismissed it). Admitting the "secret joy" he felt at Toni Negri's arrest, Enrico Deaglio was heard singing the "de profundis," the requiem for the "new left." Since, in their opinion, the class categories proposed by Marxism (or at least their centrality) have fallen, the left must rearticulate itself with respect to a fundamental distinction: *violence or non-violence* (in the "radical case" it is an alternative between a revolutionary and *classical logic* and the *emancipatory logic* of a community in the struggle for civil rights).

Bifo has already promptly responded to Deaglio, and I am not about to repeat that polemic. I note only that there is a second reason which presumably motivated Deaglio's hasty requiem, in addition to the insight into the *consequences* of a dominant *military* solution to the problem of social subversion.

And it is an entirely positive fact — from our point of view. It is the emergence, in the June 3rd elections, of that "invisible party" of at least four million people who are disturbing the sleep of the least obtuse and hardened members of the political and institutional order of this country.

Let us summarize a series of surveys which are now well-known:

A) The PCI lost about 3% of its vote to the left, and, in particular, something like 12 points of the youthful vote. As Cacciari realistically admitted in *Repubblica*, these votes lost by the PCI are unequivocally proletarian votes, "lost at Marghera and not in the center of Venice, in the Roman suburbs and not at Pairoli," in the great worker and proletarian cities — and, in particular, in those where the PCI has held the local government in recent years. This defeat of the PCI was had at the price of a result "by 48": in fact, even the DC lost votes.

B) There is the 3% increase in abstention, which has reached a total of 10%. These abstentions are for the most part by proletarians, young people, "reds." It is a massive plebiscite against the State, a sign of hostile estrangement from the party system and political institutions.

The fact the abstention on the European question is not greater confirms the idea that it is a compact social area, remarkably homogeneous and strongly characterized by "the left."

C) A conspicuous part of the voice of the vote for the radical rolls and the "New Left Unity" is recorded in the same area that rejected the party system. This is not far from that 20% of the vote cast a year ago against the Reale law, which still included segments of the socialist electorate. As one can see, it is a *proletarian, red, anti-institutional* block. Thus, many are now devoted to the "recovery" of this block, to the conquest of their political representation. Even the honorable Magri and Caffero have the impertinence to play up to it. Even Occhetto, even a few young members of the aristocratic entourage.²

Deaglio plays it safe in this situation, on behalf of an entire political area of which he intends — in theory — to take the lion's share. With the usual distinction: the social antagonist exists as an indistinct mass, beneath its elements of internal, political, organized and militant constitution.

The repudiation of violence (properly understood as "illegitimate" and "illegal" violence, because that *legal* variety is seen as a "natural phenomenon") is set as a frontier and a test, as a line of demarcation. Boato³ would think of it as making a peephole for someone's conscience.


It is in this logic that a discourse of "pacification" starts to circulate.

It is in this logic that — apart from every noble intention — this discourse assumes a characteristic with a unique meaning: the exhortation to desertion, to unconditional, unilateral and precautionary surrender, on the part of the individual subjects or components of the variegated archipelago of armed struggle. It may be said without malice: the dream of Boato and his comrades seems to be that of stimulating a myriad of cases like Baumann and Klein.⁴

In this context, it seems to me that apart from everything, the "provocation" of Piperno and Pace touches the sore spot. In fact it is said to all "progressive" sectors, to what is (or was) the "new left": let us still put aside, for the sake of argument, the entire contentious politico-theoretical debate on social subversion and armed struggle, its roots and prospects. In any case, *you forget* one small detail: you fail to take the army into consideration. You forget that almost a thousand political prisoners exist in Italy, a great part of which are and declare themselves to be "communist combatants," and are therefore destined to a long imprisonment. Some are known comrades; others are unknowns. As many come from *our* ranks as from *yours*, but we don't intend to deny them, or reduce them at random to carriers of the virus of political evidence that is always seen as "the individual case," one plus one plus one . . . Well, comrades, we tell you that even though (paradoxically) all the political motives for the development of the revolutionary struggle might collapse in five, ten years, this contentious one would represent a link for thousands of comrades. You know, therefore, that any discourse against the precipitation of the frontal engagement, against the precipitation of civil war, against the barbarization and sovereign dominance — on both sides — of a linear *military* (and even "terrorist") logic must reckon with this problem of political prisoners.

This is the challenge. If your operation is not one that simply proposes self-ghettoization (and not even the gilded ghetto of the U.S. Welfare State or German social democracy), defeat, unconditional surrender, and desertion, declare your stand on this: a *general amnesty*, which includes the liberation of political prisoners at the center of a much more extensive provision. (And here, it is useless to gamble on bombast and sympathize with the left by saying "everyone is a political prisoner." We are well aware of this, but we are also aware that this is often a convenient screen.)

Besides, critical bourgeois thought offers decisive arguments for a radical critique of the penalties and imprisonment in such cases. At this point it is clear to



everyone, except the insane bigots, that prison is a crime-causing institution, a machine that produces and reproduces deviance. Therefore, the neo-humanitarians, the neo-libertarians, the neo-civilizers must give their opinions on amnesty.

It is necessary to add, for clarity, that this is a context of *challenge*, within which intentions, aims, diverse and even contradictory analyses come into play.

On the one hand, there is a discourse of *truce*, as a congealment of relations of force, as a recognition of defeat and a decision to demobilize and choose a momentary rule by the "great ghetto" of the second society.

On the other hand, there is a radically different discourse, one that rather refuses a linearity of process by which the "language of war" assumes authority as the dominant one and — using an apocalyptic and catastrophic scenario as a point of departure — theorizes the immanence/imminence of the frontal engagement, even for a long period of time.

However one regards us, we have spoken and written about the problem precisely because we hold that this new social subject needs to grow, identify itself, strengthen itself, speak, communicate, insinuate itself in the social fabric, invent, produce: "we consider the frontal engagement a misfortune" (editorial of *Metropoli*).

For us the problem is posed in terms of the Movement's capacity to go beyond *terrorism*. For us, therefore, there is no choice of the ghetto, defeat, or desertion. And at the same time we agree to reasonableness, the primacy of the logic of social transformation, of the comprehensive processes of liberation.

And therefore we agree to the recognition that can become, in determined phases, a convergent understanding of the struggling parties to avoid a catastrophic and apocalyptic precipitation of the engagement toward its decisive, military outcome.

Of course (and we haven't been talking about it just today or for the past few months) this recognition can be of interest to the revolutionary movement, and on the basis of it one can find a convergence of the "progressive" groups interested in maintaining a vast conflictual dynamic.

It is certain, all the same, that there obviously will be no extravagant, monstrous, and juridically abnormal threats of prison, to distance us from the communist point of view, by the various Calogeros or by Gallucci and their "Special Tribunal," whose "criticism of weapons" it seems realistic to consider as one variant present in the overall practice of the movement for transformation and communist liberation.

The problem, however, is one of combating the tendencies which aim at turning this variant into an omnivorous, totalling component that wants to impose with maniacal determination the predominance of its one-dimensionality, its monodic unilateral nature, on a movement which is irreducible to this disastrous simplification.

If this was the spirit of Piperno and Pace's letter, it finds agreement with us; if it was otherwise, we have plenty of time to polemicize, clarify, rectify. We must return at all costs to the complex bond-relation between *social subversion*, *guerrilla practices*, and *revolutionary politics*.

There is one final observation that I would like to make. I frankly say that I find insufferably bigotted the scandal caused by sectors (we may even say the majority) of comrades in the area of Autonomy every time someone poses *political* problems which disturb the dark horses and break the routine of their own self-assertion.

And, fraternally, I advise the comrades of "Radio Onda Rossa" that the revolution does not need so many sentinels and vestals whose ideological purity is in doubt. Therefore, comrades, let us begin a debate without hysteria. Let us begin it in a less hasty, conspiratorial, and subjectivistic way than many are doing (including myself, since I am tossing off this letter in a loose and confused manner. It is three in the morning; every so often the guard opens the peephole and observes me with a certain troubled suspicion. My cell-mates mutter in their sleep, forced to drowse with the light on. But I began writing at one because tomorrow morning I may be able to send or dictate this letter; otherwise, who knows when it may be written.)

In conclusion, we must take as our point of departure an analysis of the social crisis/institutional crisis relation, of the consequences of the "micro-indonesia politics" that the PCI has been building with their own hands in recent years.

There must be an understanding of which paths the Movement will be able to cover, now that the requiem has been sounded for the Historical Compromise which will be reorganized from the level of *government* to a purely *institutional* level.

There must be an understanding of what it will mean to have before us a double problem instead of the regime of Historical Compromise as a political form of the neo-corporate State — the double problem of the neo-laissez-faire tendency toward the re-consolidation of the capitalist order and the search, on the part of the PCI, for a *monopoly of opposition* (which will probably push the party's apparatus to an even more pitiless attack on the *political* forms of antagonism, while it tries to recover in a deceptive way a few *social* reasons for the attack). An enormous tangle of problems stands before us; they give the impression of the necessity for an *epochal* leap to political maturity.

The State's very leap to the level of the counter-offensive after 7 April must be a significant signal, and must represent a valuable lesson to be absorbed and thoroughly utilized.

Translated by Lawrence Venuti

1. Enrico Deaglio is Editor-in-chief of *Lotta Continua*.
2. Achille Occhetto is a leader of the ICP.

- II/1 "Jail" by unknown child artist
II/2 "Policeman" by Ian Rusten



I, Toni Negri

Eugenio Scalfari

This interview, written from Rebibbia, is the first of its kind to appear in a daily newspaper. Eugenio Scalfari, director of *La Repubblica*, is a respected figure in Italian political life. Advocate of a form of enlightened capitalism, he supported the Historical Compromise as an alliance between the productive forces against the most speculative financial and industrial corporations.

Scalfari Franco Piperno proposed a sort of pacification between the Italian State and the armed party. The first sign of such a pacification should be, according to Piperno, a general amnesty for all "political" prisoners presently in jail. How do you view this proposal? Are you in favor of the idea of "pacification" and of the amnesty?

Negri Dear Scalfari, you put me in an awkward position. In what role should I actually answer? As the promotor of an unlikely insurrection, as Gallucci¹ would have it; or as the founder and member of the Strategic Command of the Red Brigades, as Calogero² believes; or rather as the leader of the "hard" line of the Red Brigades — such is the opinion of the *Unita*, which then considers Moretti³ head of the "soft" line; or, on the contrary, head of the said "soft" line, as Sica⁴ seems to believe? Or should I instead respond according to the illusion, which appears to filter right through your question, whereby I am a hostage with whom to negotiate? It's up to you to decide, but bear in mind that I do not care for anybody's sticky concern to bestow upon me the role of "leader," not even to exercise a "truce."

So to answer, then, I cannot but hold on to good sense and reiterate what I have

already said to *Lotta Continua*: the proposal for an amnesty and for pacification expresses a rational concept only if conceived as an inversion of the emergency politics as administered by the heap of the last legislature; only if correlated to the demolition of the exceptional, anti-terrorist structures of the State; only, finally, as the result of a tendency that reopens the political spaces for an independent class warfare of the proletariat.

S For a "pacification" to take place, there must have been a war. But the Italian State has never accepted the idea of being involved in a war with the armed party and with the various subversive organizations that constitute it. For the Italian State, it is a matter of dealing with common citizens that commit common, though "politically" motivated, offences. So that the idea of a possible "pacification" between the State and some of its guilty citizens is unthinkable. What is your view on this? Are we, in your opinion, in the presence of two belligerent parties between which speaking of a "pacification" has no sense at all?

N I don't think so, and I concur with the tone of the question. As concerns the amnesty, however, I think it would be difficult to distinguish political prisoners and common prisoners. However, rereading the question, I begin to fear that your question bares a formalistic presupposition that risks of confounding the terms of the debate. One can in fact say, as the Italian State says, that there aren't here in Italy any political prisoners but only citizens who commit common crimes and whose motivations are subjectively political. But this is exactly like the rigid and legal manner in which the Soviet State requires that when the politically motivated behavior of one of its citizens gets out of hand, that person be cured in a psychiatric institution. The law is always the law. The fact remains that, although the Italian State has not acknowledged to be waging war with the terrorists, the latter have actually been at war with it. In other words, by sticking to your question there is the danger of certain mystifications — which do not much interest me — and of certain consequences — of which I am rather concerned. For example, in a State in which the lowest position in the least important bank, and the ultimate financing of the least important Representative — and here the line that divides public and private interest is meager at best — is fiercely negotiated and nobody, from the political establishment, believes this to be a degradation of the concept of State, well, in this same country, by means of an incredible shift in perspective, the negotiations with the Red Brigades to save Aldo Moro's life are refused (private negotiation, as it seems, for they were held between the Christian Democrats and the Red Brigades, and not between the State and the Red Brigades). Can I then consider this as a consequence — to my view exorbitant — of a formalistic concept of the State?

But there is more, turning to another argument. By assuming such a rigorous concept of the State, I frankly have the impression — on the basis of the experience of the last legislature — that too much red tape is being covered up. To be clearer: can it not be that, by assuming a rigid stance towards the terrorists, one advocates an uncompromising attitude of the State towards all struggles incompatible with it? Can it not be that all "special" legislation introduced against the terrorists is in fact directed against the social forces that attempt to reopen a perspective for political transformation, and strive for a break within the corporative block imposed during the last legislature?

In other words, it would be a good thing, in this odd country of ours, not to be too enthusiastic about the formal rigor of the judicial definition of State. One can end up using the *arcana imperii* in the manner both crude and cruel in which the "historical compromise" has wielded it. This only resulted, besides the moderate loss in votes, in an haphazard shifting away of proletarians from the State and in accentuating the political crisis.

S How do you explain the fact that an exponent of *Autonomia Operaia* like Piperno, who refused any connection with the Red Brigades — exactly as you do — proposes a "pacification" between the Red Brigades and the Italian State? Are the exponents of *Autonomia* then capable of speaking in lieu of the Red Brigades, or at least to make proposals held to be acceptable by the Red Brigades?

N You know very well — and if you still don't know it, I'll tell you, hopefully definitely — that the comrades of *Autonomia Operaia* are neither the interpreters nor the allies, but rather the sharpest adversaries of the program, the strategy, the tactics, and the model of organization of the Red Brigades. As far as Piperno is concerned, I don't think your paper ever had any difficulty in meeting him: therefore, ask him directly. In any case, as far as I know, Piperno represents neither *Autonomia Operaia* nor the Red Brigades. He only represented the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) in the "negotiations." Still, I learned all this while in jail, for it so happens (one of the many strange things of this trial) that I have not had any political dealings with Piperno since 1973.

S Independent of the major or lesser "credibility" of Piperno, do you think that an amnesty would actually be accepted by the Red Brigades and the entire armed party, in the sense that members of these organizations would put an end to their acts of violence and terror?

N If you people grant them amnesty, I think they would be happy — that is obvious — on the basis of the unpleasant experience of being in jail. How will they employ it? I really don't know: ask them. Personally, however, I think that it would be worth-while to go all the way in this matter, to overcome this diplomatic barrier. As for me, I am horrified by the mechanical deductions of some sociologists. I am however convinced that a de-escalation of the armed struggle in Italy doesn't depend so much upon the amnesty, as on the reopening of a highly conflictual social situation. Is the Italian capitalistic democracy able to withstand it? Is the Italian State capable of responding to the worker's and proletarian's struggle in any other manner than through exceptional legislation, exceptional plans, exceptional cuts in the budget, exceptional austerities, exceptional demonization of the *Autonomia*, of the hospital workers, of the temporarily employed, etc.? How many are the "terrorists" — and I am speaking not of those recruited by the Red Brigades, but those subjectively predisposed to the proletarian use of violence — produced by the Fiat labor disputes in these days? If these questions are not answered, what your newspaper methodically does with obscuring efficacy, will continue: to keep on separating the editorial page from crime news and then both from the economic page. . . Only, the crisis runs everywhere, and your scissors with not stop it.

S What credibility can be obtained by the eventual "pacification" offer on the part of the Red Brigades? As they are unknown, underground people, who would be the counter-party in this hypothetical negotiation?

N How should I know, Dr. Starched. . . I mean, Dr. Scalfari. As far as I know, it shouldn't be difficult for you upholders of the State of the Historical Compromise, to establish a contact with the Red Brigades, who are the founders of a New State based upon the real socialism (with some Catholic component). After all, the heroic furors that pervaded your newspaper in favor of the emergency and of the unanimity of the past legislature, ought to have provided you with the right equipment to handle a discussion with the strenuous and coherent upholders of the real socialism, such as the Red Brigades are. If you people never had any difficulty in reasoning and politiking with Rodano and Lombardo Radice,⁵ why should you have any difficulty in dealing with the Red Brigades? Perhaps it is only your snobbism that prevents you from dealing with common delinquents, albeit with subjective political motivations. But stop and think for a moment: what difference runs between Calogero, alias Ibio Paolucci⁶ whose articles, incidentally, display a surprising osmosis with the articles that appear on the *Unita* and any whatsoever strategist of the Red Brigades, if not the fact that — all to the latter's advantage — he doesn't cowardly pretend that his paranoia be covered up and protected by society and its institutions?

S Piperno's proposal is based upon the existence of "political" prisoners in Italian jails. Piperno speaks of several hundreds of them. Are you agreed on this definition and this figure? Who are, in your opinion, the political prisoners in a regime like ours, where there exists a Constitution that allows anybody to prac-

tice freedom of speech and freedom of association?

N Newspapers, including yours, speak of thousands of common prisoners with subjective political motivations. To distinguish them from the others, they are being kept like me in Rebibbia and other special jails. I must also admit that the Constitution allows freedom of speech and of association; but that's not all, however, as certain articles of the Penal Code demonstrate — never declared unconstitutional — the Constitution also affirms that the anticapitalistic struggle is an anticonstitutional struggle. If then you have still some difficulty in acknowledging the communist political prisoners, I cannot but refer you to the abacus or to those famous pages where a Milanese nobleman declares it impossible for the plague to exist. And pray tell, in this bestialry, what sort of prisoner is your own newspaperman Nicotri⁷?

S Do you consider yourself to be a political prisoner?

N Are you joking? I'd lose your respect. It is true that I have not robbed, killed, etc., but I did have subjective political motivations that were definitely anticonstitutional. So as you can see, the circle is closed, rather in Brechtian fashion, true, but not any the less effectively: I am a "common" prisoner. What saddens me is the fact that, having been tagged with the status of "common" prisoner, no attempt is made to consider "political" prisoners people the likes of Sindona, Rovelli, Leone,⁸ etc., that is, people who have certainly acted with subjective constitutional motivations.

S If the State accepts the "pacification" principle, and therefore that of "belligerency" that precedes it, and after the eventual amnesty the Red Brigades and other subversive organizations continue their acts of terrorism — or of war, just to remain within Piperno's terminology — the State would be authorized to exert not the Penal Code anymore, but the rules of actual warfare. You are aware of the radical difference this implies, in both the relationship between the State and the individual members of the subversive organizations, and between the State and all common citizens. Are you aware of the fact that this would modify the very nature of the Democratic State? Or are you of the view that this State is so very little democratic that it is better to abandon all pretences and expedite its progressive decadence? In short, do you prefer an outright totalitarian and authoritarian State, so as to fight it more effectively, rather than a State like the present one, to which you are not willing to concede a democratic status?

N The choice for anticapitalist warfare in a Democratic State is the basis



itself of the Marxist theory of workerism (*operaismo*). I prefer therefore the Democratic State because in it I can more effectively fight against capitalism. But I also know, as historical experience teaches, that middle-class capitalism has very often preferred the Totalitarian State to the Democratic State. This because the Democratic State, not succeeding, for example, in maintaining a high level of clashing interests, is compelled to induce exceptional situations in the police, administration and politics in general, within which democracy is worn out; but note, not so much in its most spectacular and liturgic forms, as in its judicial, guaranteeist and negotiating mechanisms that make it up.

And do not accuse me of any Togliattian and communist ambiguity, really: for in the first place, this democracy is not *octroyee*, that is, granted under certain conditions by some regal bourgeoisie, rather it was first snatched and then defended in 1960 against Tambroni⁹, in 1969 against the State's massacre party, in other words, at any moment of the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie or its non-irrelevant stratifications. Secondly, as a sensible communist, I do not accept the Berlinguerian "Chilean blackmail:" we collaborate in destroying democracy to prevent it from being destroyed by the bourgeoisie, we accept the conditions of development imposed by capital otherwise there is a collapse!

At this point you can very well bring me to consider the power relationship among the classes, the international overdeterminations, etc., and I am more than willing to follow you in this area of discussion. But please, I don't believe that in this territory the attitude of vestal of democracy is any more suited to you than it is to me.

S You said recently that guaranteeism is none other than the formalization of the power relationship among the classes. But on the basis of this thesis of yours, a strong State should therefore have the right to keep you in jail even unjustly. How do you resolve this obvious contradiction in your thought?

N I think I said something very banal, certainly not worthy of such a scandal. Because, you see, any person, whether Marxist or not but who professes political realism, believes the same. Try asking Prof. N. Bobbio¹⁰. Insofar as constitutional guaranteeism is concerned, which cannot be confused with the liberal, continental concept of the Law State, it is both a genetical and historical form of power relationship among the classes. And I'll add: any attempt to detach guaranteeism from this material base is a tacit invitation to conceive totalitarian forms, utopias more or less Rousseauian or Jacobin, where the contempt for freedom is at least equal to my contempt for utopias.

As concerns the fact that the State is holding me unjustly in jail, this is proof of an obvious contradiction in your thought and not in mine. And I would also like to point out (something which in the famous supper the begone Alessandrini¹¹ pointed out to me) that the technique of intervention by "great examples" carried out by the various attorneys of the Republic, corresponds to the attempt, on the part of the Prosecutors, to adopt a political substitution to the downfall of the State and consequently to stabilize, through a repressive strategy, the power relationship among the classes and modify their dynamics. Here the Reason of Law becomes Reason of State, coherently with the capitalistic ends of the Italian democracy.

S The judicial investigation sanctioned against you has provoked, even in those sectors of public opinion basically critical of your views and activities, many reserves for the way in which it was carried out, for the uncertainty concerning the main accusations, and for the centralization in Rome of proceedings that had begun in other places and with other judges. Would you explain what is your position with regard to the continuing interrogations and which of your rights are violated by what is happening?

N This investigation is just an *infamy*. By accusing me of being a leader of the Red Brigades it attempts to expropriate my real identity, built by years of intellectual and political toil, as the whole movement knows. And all this, inevitably,

on the basis of false proofs which the judges know to be false: the famous phone call!¹² A Stalinist or a McCarthyist technique? You choose.

But the matter extends beyond my immediate case. The whole investigation, for those indicted April 7, is a stack of vulgar constitutional violations: of the principle of the natural judge (Art. 25) (and with what institutional bad faith and mercenary slyness has Judge Calogero himself recently declared it to be the case!); of the principle of the personal nature of penal responsibility (Art. 27); of the principle of the presumed innocence of the accused (Art. 27); of the freedom of the press (Art. 21); and even of the simply human principle of the prohibition to inflict moral violence on the prisoner (Art. 13), as Bortoli's tragedy — the comrade who committed suicide in Verona — demonstrates. Is that enough for you?

But you see, to me that is not enough, because beyond what I have just said, the situation appears to be substantially unreal and fundamentally comic. You see, at times I imagine Rome just before Porta Pia (1870), with a papal Minister named Giulio who cruelly and stolidly commands by means of a group of brown noses: the Head of the Fire Dept, that of the City Police, the organizer of the *circenses* and the Head of the Education Office. Does this bring anything to mind¹³? Why don't you compare this with your beautiful Republic?

S You always stated that your theories and your analysis on proletarian violence, on "sabotage," on the "vietnamization" and overall on the right/duty of the proletariat to overthrow the dominion of the Capital, even by force, is nothing other than the legitimate analysis of a social condition actually existing. It so happens, however, that you are an "organic intellectual" of the Movement and more specifically of that sector of the Movement that defines itself with the name of *Autonomia Operaia*; and it so happens that this sector recognizes you as one of its leaders and finally, it turns out that this sector systematically realized the theories you propounded: don't you think that at this point your legitimate opinions have become, objectively, specific "instructions" of concrete behavior, arousing in the investigators the conviction that they are faced with a case whose nature is totally different than that of a pure and simple "crime of opinion?"

N As an answer, I should like to submit three points: 1) "The sabotage." When in 1971-72 we pointed out that capital's restructuring implied a strategy to destroy the mass-worker, we identified the genesis of that formidable transformation of the proletariat's composition — over which the entire left today sheds tears. We were then considered (and have been until June 4 of this year) to be subversive fools, parafascist delinquents. After June 4 the left, if not yet totally



emasculated, must begin to face the social worker, the refusal to work, sabotage. And its plausible alternatives are extremely clear: either disappear as a great historical force — and survive only as a definitive corporative force for privileged strata of a class (like the American Unions or the French Communist Party); or it can renovate itself, without any useless tactics, at the contact with this new class composition (and I am sorry for all the well-thinkers: a working class and a proletariat that are made up of what has always constituted the proletariat: proletarian misery and revolutionary riches). 2) "Organic intellectual." My dear Scalfari, you too have read too much of Gramsci and Co.: why don't you bring yourself up to date? You had to come to me just to reinvent obsolete categories? Personally it is since 1968 that I do not speak in a Movement assembly: I'd be booed off the stage. I have instead written books, articles, pamphlets which I have sold: my rapport is organic with the market. 3) "Legitimate opinions which become instructions." You'd like that, wouldn't you? The subjective responsibility becomes objective. On this connection, see Solzenitsyn's *Cancer Ward*. However, having said this, let's be clear on another point. I am fond of what I think, I'd stay in jail twenty years not to abjure but one of my thoughts (even if I criticized or surpassed it). I am proud to have succeeded in stealing so much knowledge from the working class and set it back in circulation in the proletariat, taking advantage of my instruments as an intellectual. If this work of mine had been instrumental in building an autonomous organization, I'd be extremely happy. If it were a weapon that the proletariat could wield in order to destroy the Capital, I could consider myself satisfied.

S You have often lamented that there is a total incomprehension and myopia towards the Movement on the part of large sectors of the press and of public opinion. This would push certain areas of the Movement to a growing radicalization and to "desperate acts" from which it would then be impossible to retreat. Don't you think that the Movement too has demonstrated and proves still a total incomprehension and narrowness towards the entire society and towards the Republic's institutions, causing in its interlocutors-adversaries the same kind of radicalization?

N It appears to me that with your question you are doing nothing more than describing a factual situation in which incomprehension is total, on both sides. But one must at least avoid being irritated to such a point that the Movement is accused of the Piazza Navona¹³ crime! In any case all this goes beyond your opinion and mine and is being expressed on a political plane by means of a fracture characterized at this moment by the invisible army of about 4 to 5 million voters.

Now, you see, I don't think this happened because of contingent reasons, like a major or lesser understanding of the institutions, of the party system, or of the press. I think instead that it is structural, that is, I think that the reproduction of the capitalistic system, in Italy and in the Western world, involves the necessary exclusion of millions of proletarians from political life (that is, from a progressive bargaining on the redistribution of profits). It's a problem, I know, especially for those in your generation whose hopes for reforms have been squelched at least twice in this heavily disappointing post WWII period.

Personally I think instead that, by taking off exactly from the radical nature of this crisis, it can be possible to reopen an anticapitalistic battle in which the autonomy of great proletarian masses can impose, with the communist transformation of society, the needed gratification for a free production, and for a happy reproduction of social wealth. As you know, *Autonomy* does not promise violence, but undergoes it. It promises instead wealth and freedom.

S Re-examining today what you have done in the past 11 years, from 1968 onwards, do you have any self-criticisms to make, besides the criticism of others?

N The most important self-criticism concerns the state of the organization. Not so much of *Autonomy*, as of the worker's movement (*Movimento Operaio*). But the situation is too long and complex for me to take up and examine here. In any

event I do think that today, perhaps for the first time since 1956-58, one can realistically reopen the space for a communist renovation of the worker's movement and of the proletariat. In short, in the course of these years we have only sown, but the seed has taken well into the ground.

Translated by Peter Caravetta

1. Achille Giallucci, General Prosecutor.
2. Prosecutor Calogero from Padua. He initiated the April 7 arrests.
3. Moretti, probably the most wanted man in Italy, is the (mythical?) head of the BR.
4. Judge Sica is one of the Roman prosecutors.
5. Franco Rodano is a prominent intellectual of the ICP. Lombardo Radice, a Marxist philosopher close to the ICP.
6. Ibio Paolucci is a correspondent of *L'Unita*, organ of the ICP. He covered the April 7 prosecution started in Padua.
7. Giuseppe Nicotri, a journalist from *Espresso*, was accused of being the telephonist of the Red Brigades during the Moro affair. He was freed on July 7 for lack of evidence after 3 months in jail.
8. Michele Sindona, a member of the CD, was involved in financial scandals before disappearing mysteriously. Presently wanted by Interpol. Ninno Rovelli, President of the Italian Society of Resine (SIR), also involved in financial malversations. Giovanni Leone, former President of the Italian Republic. Involved in the Lockheed scandals, he had to resign from his functions.
9. Tambroni, member of the CD. In the '60s, he headed a government whose conservative policy led to violent popular protest and a confrontation with the police which resulted in numerous deaths.

IL/1 ROP042502 ROOFTOP VIGIL GENOA ITALY: Rioting prison inmates, some of them wearing masks, sit on the roof of the Marassi prison facing police stationed on a prison wall (foreground) here April 25th. The inmates seized control of three prison wings April 24th, burning bedding, flooding corridors and smashing windows. The riot ended April 25th when the Justice Ministry promised action on prison reforms. 4/25/74

IL/2 SOP092502-9/25/73-SANTIAGO: Chilean military junta leader General Augusto Pinochet (second left) walks with Enrique Urrutia Manzano (civilian clothes), President of Chile's Supreme Court after courtesy visit on the court 9/25. With him are other junta members General Cesar Mendoza (left), leader of National police force, and Admiral Jose Toribio Merino (right), Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy. (UPI)

IL/3 FK1229101 SHOULDER TO SHOULDER ROME: An unruly mob? These "leftist" demonstrators are far from that during a recent clash with Rome police. They maintain a united front even though the air is filled with tear gas. Demonstrators used rocks, sticks and gasoline bombs in battles with police. 12/29/72



Unpublished Interview with Piperno

Franco Piperno, professor of physics in Cosenza, is one of the historical leaders of *Potere Operaio*. Wanted by police since April 7, he was "in hiding" at the time of this interview.

This interview, which we received in August in the mail, took place somewhere in France in late July. Franco Piperno was finally arrested in Paris on September 18 while drinking a soda at a coffee house in the Place de la Madeleine.

Question I read in *Le Monde* of July 10, 1979, an article by Sole which raised the issue of your proposition in favor of social "truce," or amnesty. But the article gives no information about the debate that followed in Italy: can you briefly recall your proposition and the tenor of the reactions to it?

Piperno In the letter to *Lotta Continua*, neither I nor Lanfranco Pace ever spoke of "social truce,"—or any such silliness. And we didn't for a number of reasons: because it is not in the interest of the Movement in Italy, because at any rate no one would think of proposing—and even less of negotiating or guaranteeing—anything of the sort; because we do not assume for ourselves any right to propose or even talk of social truce. All this is obvious, but evidently not for M. Sole.

The problem we have posed for ourselves pertains rather to the forms of conflict that have occurred in the Italian situation. More precisely, you know well how in Italy the conflict is largely characterized not only by the practice of armed formations, but also by the possibility of "war" alluded to by that which manifests itself as a great organizational power. Think for example of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the role that the image of organizational power of the BR played; think

of those 55 days in which all of the active power of the State could not win out against the offensive of the brigades.

Many prefer to ignore this situation, and to limit themselves to deprecating it, to rejecting it in the name of a humanism which might have a thousand reasons, but which neither modifies the form of armed struggle nor its capacity of resilience and hegemony over a considerable part of the Movement, nor the social motivations that underlie and sustain it. Thus, while no one can ignore the solidity of the phenomenon of armed struggle in Italy, we ask ourselves what may be the interest of the Movement in the practice of armed struggle—and what in going beyond it. Obviously, the latter option must not be understood in the sense of the transformation of Italy into a lager-country with thousands of political prisoners, but rather 1. in the broad sense of a critique of "armed ideology" by the Movement itself capable of capturing and interpreting the high levels of conflictuality (*conflittualità*) expressed by armed formations, and 2. in the sense of a concrete initiative that the country's institutions can and must assume and which would go in the direction of recognition—certainly not of the armed formations themselves—but of the social motivations that underlie their political choice, their "war." Such, then, is the sense of the proposition of amnesty.

Q Can you clarify the possible function of such a critique?

P When we spoke of amnesty we were thinking of a political measure apt to disentangle the situation and to permit partial disclosure of the substance of the problem: in fact, we forget all too often that, in Europe, Italy is the only country that apports no employment compensation at a time when the number of unemployed workers continues to rise and is close to two million—a situation which, nevertheless, does not prevent it from having the highest rate of economic growth after Germany.

We need not emphasize the fact that this political measure does not contain any possibility of resolution of the fundamental problems of the social conflict. But it is all the same extravagant that a proposition of amnesty should appear scandalous, since the question has always been present in the tradition of revolutionary movements.

All in all, however, the real problem is not that of amnesty. It would be rather that of the effects produced or possible, of the roots, the growth, the image of death—and power, of terrorism. The violence of the repressive apparatus weighs not only upon "communist fighters," but also and above all upon the emergence of certain behaviors that express either the refusal of misery (in every possible sense of the term) or the effective possibility of freedom from it.

Q Among the "Autonomisti," in Italy, it has been said that the limits of your proposition reside in the arbitrary amalgamation of the situation of the comrades arrested April 7 and that of the "communist fighters" imprisoned on account of a completely different ideology and practice. In this respect you would be playing into the hands of the Italian judiciary which is trying to prove that between organized Autonomy and Red Brigades there is a "division of labor" and not real opposition

P To begin with, I would like to underline one thing: in our letter to *Lotta Continua* we did not speak of amnesty for the comrades arrested April 7. These comrades, and we have written it, must be freed because the reasons for which they have been indicted are altogether invalid. But having said this, since we are talking at a juridical level, let us play on this ground! let us claim at least the respect of constitutional pledges. But beyond this Judge Calogero's initiative, as Leonardo Sciascia has said, makes one think of what Dashiell Hammett calls "the Red Harvest": to arrest a hundred in order to capture one that may be "guilty." This situation, while decreeing the end of the Law State, reduces the phenomenon of armed struggle from its social roots, from the force of attraction that such a phenomenon exercises over the young.

The real problem is to make possible an overcoming of the form the social conflict in Italy seems to present as ineluctable. We must attempt to elaborate richer forms of organization of the Movement.

Q But Sole presents your position as that of an isolated individual. It is not easy to see your possible impact in view of the elaboration of these richer forms .

P Listen, let's drop the stupidities about isolation of a Sole. I am somewhat isolated, today, because evidently, as you can imagine, I'm having some difficulty in going to my favorite cafe or to the movies. But for the rest, I think I am in good company. In fact, last year a number of comrades of diverse cultural and political origins achieved a consensus on a project that could be defined generically by the will to go beyond the current form of the Movement, the existing Autonomy; that is to say, by the will to go beyond a certain type of organized rigidity, of runaway militarization. . . . A project, a working hypothesis capable of freeing the "social Autonomy" whose emergence is blocked by ossified ideological forms. Therefore, we speak of Possible Autonomy, an Autonomy that, I think, is much larger, even in quantitative terms, than that which recognizes itself in existing organizations and in their strictly ideological extremism.

Q Behind the term "Possible Autonomy" are there already concrete projects?

P "Possible Autonomy" is also the subtitle of our magazine *Metropoli* whose first issue has been seized by order of the judiciary under absurd pretexts. Moreover, they have taken advantage of the requisition to arrest or incriminate four other editors of *Metropoli*—Paolo Virno, Lanfranco Pace, Lucio Castellano, and Bibo Maesano (Scalzone and Lauso Zagato had already been arrested April 7). But in spite of such incidents along the way, the magazine continues to be published. There is already a second number and we are now working on projects for the Fall, to give the magazine an even more open character, capable of proposing a debate that would not be limited to registering the level of existing conflictuality. This thematic overture will correspond to a broadening of editorial participation that will make it no longer just Italian. . . .

Translated by Peter Caravetta

III/1 Photo: Seth Tillet



Popular Defense and Popular Assault

Paul Virilio

Paul Virilio has written extensively on war. His most well-known essay is *Vitesse et Politique (Speed and Politics)*.

Military socialism or new detonator of the a-national military class? The Euro-terrorism of the Red Brigades confronts us with the question, since once more instead of renewing revolutionary analysis it claims solely to deliver the dialectic of war from a state of passivity.

In the "Practico-theoretical" manual which circulated through Rome under the significant title "Resolutions for Strategic Direction, February 1978," militants were invited to *act militarily in order to act politically* against "bunkers in which the agents of counter-revolution are hidden." At each level workers have to form into "combatant parties" and "rid themselves of the idea that the development of an armed struggle toward a generalized civil war, a popular war of long duration, can be a *spontaneous process*."

At the moment when, in full view of the nuclear dead-lock, the old Communist parties of southern Europe are *compromising themselves historically* for the health of the political State, the "brigadists" are reaffirming the permanence in history of the concept of pure war, the autonomy of great nihilist thought in the West, rightly destined to disrupt the social and political realms of nations by way of the abuse of an illegally armed force, the exercise of pure power.

Popular defense, so why not popular assault? That, then, is the heart of the problem.

The debates and divisions which have agitated the opposition since the defeat of the leftist parties in the 1978 legislative elections in France and the belated effort by people like Althusser to make an issue of "the military aspect of the Communist Party" are finally only an obscure questioning of the politically enduring limits of that power to absorb civil society possessed by States or corporations which seek, in every domain, to base the mechanics of their power on the exclusive development of techniques of war, whether civil or foreign. Thus we must no longer consider too hastily defense and popular war, national mobilization and popular defense, as identical. What is popular defense? From whom and against what must we defend ourselves? In what areas and from what perspectives?

I. Originally, the right to armed defense was the necessary complement of the right to judicial defense (the judiciary duel legally combines this essential passage from the right to speak to the right to act), and is conspicuous for its permanence: civilian populations must be able to defend themselves in time of peace as in time of declared war and open conflict. . . .

II. In fact, in every case since antiquity, tension forms between two types of people according to the manner in which the land is occupied. The mass of struggles generally result in a social status-quo, a *pact of semi-colonization*, inaugurating the payment of tributes and taxation in exchange for a sort of military protection. The pact is extorted from the indigenous population, the workers and producers, by the foreign occupants, a *luxury-people* well described by Julien Gracq as "the lazy and violent military caste, relying on civilians for their daily bread. . . idlers of Apocalypse living free of material cares at the edge of a domesticated abyss. . . no longer having any business but with a few great and catastrophic incertitudes."

And in effect, the profits drawn from the mutual service pacts by these military predators were not destined initially for the capitalization of the land nor even of its riches, but for the ruinous and perpetual perfection of their war machine, for the sophistication of arms systems and fortifications, and for preparations for distant expeditions. If we leap through history we see that *this semi-colonial economy, this military protection racket, forms the constitutional base of the great modern States*: the a-national monarchies which have governed Western Europe up to the nineteenth century have finally only perpetuated this process which originated in the strategic fixation of "luxury-peoples," in this case horsemen who came from the East and elsewhere at the fall of the Roman Empire. . . . We are not surprised then that the inevitability of military defense leaves a good part of the masses of people indifferent until the twentieth century. In neutral countries one encounters the same hostility to the problems of permanent armies as one finds in regard to diplomacy and the politics of state, its inevitable complements. In Sweden, for example, it is the *forvarsnihilism*, the nihilism of defense, animated essentially by the Federation of Socialist Youth and an anti-military radicalism which asks "if the invasion of our territory by another civilized people is such a truly serious matter?". In fact, until the eve of the last war there were still manifestations in Sweden of the more or less occult persistence of a semi-colonial situation close to those of the Ancien Régime or of antiquity. Haven't the masters of the military State always been "foreigners" in Sweden, from the Suiones to Charles XIV, alias Marshal Bernadotte of France! What then does a change in domination matter to the working people?

III. The appearance of fascist methods after the war of 1914 had to alter the splendid isolation of the "nihilists of defense" by turning the Swedish question around: can one still speak of a "civilization" common to both military invaders and natives in the case of a total war when this type of conflict has for its objective precisely the destruction not only of the armed body of the enemy, but also of the social and territorial body, the ruin of the environment, identity, and honor of the civilian population? We have not measured the considerable historical conse-

brutal rupture of the social status-quo between civilians and the military and replaces the thousand-year-old pact of semi-colonization with a tendency toward total colonization, the *ostkolonisation* asserted by the German National-Socialists. But this total war was conducted on both sides, and the Allies also had a wealth of experience in the domain of economic-physiological violence, a past heavy with ethnocide, deportation, slavery, and colonization. From then on popular defense lost its military character as it dissolved into a state of precarious survival in a devastated habitat and became more a physiological defense than a measure of insurrection. Much later the people of Vietnam had recourse to this defensive procedure, but already new realities were emerging, in particular the political and military limits of the ecological defense of populations before the onslaught of the destructive systems brought forward by the military-industrial powers.

But here again, we must step back in order to discover the general tendency. In the nineteenth century the Spanish popular resistance waged against Napoleon's military assault already brought together certain characteristics of modern popular war. The *absolute shapelessness* of the Spanish defense created conditions in which the heavy French war machine succumbed to "something fluid and vaporous which condensed *nowhere* into a solid body" (Clausewitz), the compact defense of an armed body giving way to and succeeded by a resistance without body. This Clausewitzien *nowhere* is essential, for beyond a resistance without body one already imagines a *resistance without territory* on a land rendered *uninhabitable* by the military predator. It is the end of on the spot civil defense, since the mechanical power of the new armies of the State have forced the Spanish combatant to withdraw provisionally from the soil he is supposed to protect. The unity of time and space is shattered, for popular war is now only a *war of time*, a war of timely encounter. While the Spanish combatant is no longer master of the terrain, he is still in effect master of the hour, the speed and facility of his movements permitting him to choose his moment, to avoid being cornered in any desperate combat, to harass, surprise, and finally conquer Napoleon's army, a "gigantic automaton" slowed up by its heavy logistics in an inhospitable country.

Some hundred years later the resistance of the Vietnamese people to the American technological assault is still a war of time, but it can no longer be a war of military encounters. This time the military prejudice towards aggression can only result in total destruction, and the entire social body, in order to survive, is constrained to flee and disappear in a new underground population. This form of defense reveals the new and tragic impotence of civilian populations. Entrenched in the sub-soil, they must somehow manage to re-surface and re-populate their territory in order to attempt a victorious military conclusion, as was still the case in May of 1954 with Dien Bien Phu. In fact, the Vietnamese success then was founded only on the *duration* of their population's physiological resistance, on the degree to which they had become acclimatized to an environment suddenly made unknown and deadly, where more than being heroic, they had to deploy great ingenuity and patience daily. Paradoxically, it was the American people, living comfortably without menace or material want, who gave in first. However that may be, it was necessary to return to classic methods of warfare in order to terminate the conflict and through stages to bring about a difficult agreement. The apparent political victory of the people was in reality only the most cruel of its military defeats: after several unfruitful attempts, it was clear that the popular defense was no longer succeeding in a final assault of the masses on the "field of honor," and the last, decisive assault was henceforth reserved for the military elite alone, with their mechanized vehicles, as was revealed by those last filmed images of the fall of Saigon in which a North Vietnamese tank broke through the gates of the government palace, long since deserted.


Although exploited and over-exploited by strategists since antiquity, popular defense thus asserted its authority again in Vietnam as a non-military entity with specifically civilian and non-violent goals and methods. . . . The civilians had con-

ceived of their war as a sort of *agrarian revolution* whose objective was the topological conquest of their own sub-soil, and they succeeded in appropriating increasingly more vast areas underground for the purposes of life. By making this pioneer adventure their primary social practice they could disappear completely from their territory and thus finally save it.

Already, however, these forms of struggle seem outdated by what is newly and redoubtably implied by the world-wide resistance of the Palestinian people for their civil rights. Heretofore the defense of a group has been identified with the defense of its legal place of habitation. Whether in areas of agricultural production or in great industrial cities, the "arms of the people" were only common tools and places transformed from ordinary usage. For example: hatchets, sickles, mowers, hunting equipment, ambushed and various traps in the country; barricades, the shut-down of machinery, and the strike in urban terrain. Under these conditions, it is clear that for the civilian populations every territorial loss also represents the loss of their transformed armament and of their legal identity. Deprived of their arsenal of production, they cease in effect to be economic partners with certain privileges in the pact of military semi-colonisation.

The principal end of all truly popular resistance then is to oppose the establishment of a social status founded uniquely through the illegality of an armed force and which amounts to that of a *movable slave*, which is to say a *commodity*. This domestic condition is hardly better than that of a collection of animals, and in fact the proletarianization of the military and worker class has only had the effect of reproducing this progressive reduction of the deterritorialized countryman to the condition of *movable or immovable*. The trade unions were not deceived, however, for they ordered the workers to maintain carefully their tools of production, as if in their spirits the tools were the last representation of their original situation, guarantee and mainstay of their whole legal existence. . . .

At this moment in history the case of the Palestinians has a prospective character for populations: we now find them at a further stage, a stage which anticipates the work-house and the Nazi deportation camps, since here is a *nation having become entirely movable*, violently uprooted from its land and thrown into transit camps. For its instigators, the defense of the Palestinian people can only be a reflection on a national dislocation, a spatial schizophrenia which will soon replace the temporal schizophrenia of permanent migrants. Here we must expect unprecedented forms of survival, since the legal terrain, the political territory, has completely disappeared in order to become the very stakes of the struggle, a combat not to defend the frontiers of an area of life but to succeed in drawing boun-



daries around some part of it, while in Damsacus and Beirut we see one Palestinian defeat after another in their struggle for a place. Where is the enemy? Who is the enemy? For the Palestinian, he is not national, he is *world-wide*. . . . Those who claim that the Palestinian combat is not a popular "defense" are right, *it is a popular assault become suicidal*. Because they have not had any choice, after their geographic disappearance, the last objective of the Palestinian people is that they not disappear from memory as they have disappeared from the map. If, like migrants, they had ceased to be legal inhabitants of the earth, they would still possess a specific territory: that of the media. In the air and by rail, on the roads, in the press and on television, they could not lose this last advantage; the carriers could no longer remain neutral. If in the nineteenth century Ratzel had already claimed that "war consists in extending one's frontiers across the boundaries of others," one can now say that the Palestinians have extended theirs in the form of information across the entire world. Whether they horrify or seem exemplary, henceforth the Palestinians are masters of an audio-visual empire; they exist somewhere, with a precarious and phantasmal identity, in the backs of the memory of 4 to 500 million television viewers. They hope that at the end of this conquest they will succeed in recovering at the negotiating table the right to a legal defense, that is to say, to existence at the political level. But it's possible to think that they are fooling themselves and will only succeed, like the Tupamaros in Uruguay some time ago, in hastening the development in Europe and in the world of the *doctrine of security*, which is nothing but a procedure for the political disappearance of people and nations. . . .

The deterritorialisation and bewildered flight of civilian populations in the "territories" of the media, this facility with which they pass from robbery to aerial hijacking or to the political debauchery of kidnapping — all these final and degraded forms of a *popular opposition which is no longer situated anywhere* draw us irresistibly away from the loss of the ancient right to armed resistance of a place, to the annihilation of the contemporary right to a judiciary defense, in other words, to the definitive reduction of peoples to silence. This is what President Giscard d'Estaing called to mind in December 1977 at the Brussels Conference when he suggested the creation of a *European judiciary space*. This new *Lebensraum* that a German chancellor himself could not decently propose to his partners can be considered as the outline of the MINIMUM POLITICAL TERRITORY of Europe. What frontiers, in effect, will the dissident be able to reach, what refuge will there be for social or union opposition, since the project tends, as we have seen with the extradition of Croissant¹, to suppress the last juridical asylum? The suppression of national frontiers, the hyper-communicability of the world, does not enlarge the space of liberty but on the contrary signals its collapse and disappearance before the expansion of a very tangible totalitarian power, an always more rapid and refined technical control of civil society. Thus, the project elaborated in 1973 by OTAN and its "Committee on the Challenge of Modern Society," which aims at the *universal planification of the circulation of persons as commodities*, is by stages being realized. In March of 1978 this same OTAN intervened directly in the Aldo Moro affair. Appearing simultaneously, the torture re-instituted in Latin America, the unbridled multiplication of kidnappings, the scandalous exhibition of prisoners in Turin² chained in a cage during their trial are not the results of chance; they visibly restore in the twentieth century the millenary image of *commodity-man*, degraded and reduced to impotence by the military master. . . .

Pure warfare, perennial feature of the military effort, transformed the ancient metaphysical vision of the warrior into a terrifying re-ordering of the world. Renato Curcio, "historic leader of the Red Brigades" but also ancient neofascist of the New Order, does not call for anything else when he declares that "in this society the only thing that one can construct is a machine to destroy." As if we were lacking any!

But today, in order to create a *totalitarian Lebensraum*, it is no longer necessary to resort to an extraordinary invasion with motorized vehicles, the tanks and stukas of lightning warfare, since the *ordinary penetration* of the news media, the


information blitz, can be used. The abundance of surrounding dangers, formerly posed by the belligerents armed with explosives, projectiles, gas, etc., can henceforth be created at home, simply by manipulating the audio-visual enclosure. Walled in at home, behind alarm systems and secured doors, the citizen is still never safe from a televised aggression which composes, condenses, and reproduces at will a cataclysm, criminal attempt, or murder, thus installing stereophonically the decor of distant disaster and foreign wars in the foyers of peace. . . .

If at the right time civilians could have resisted the assault of the war machine through the creation of a *defense without body*, condensed nowhere, it seems likely that today they would not be conscious of submitting in turn before a technological advancement over this sort of popular defense. No more need for an armed body to attack civilians, provided the latter are trained to turn the buttons on their radio or to plug in their television set; no more need for solid bodies difficult to move when one can project their spectral image anywhere simultaneously. From now on, it is the military assault which is deformed in time and space. The absolutely vaporous and orgiastic adhesion of populations is now only an irrational adhesion to a techno-logistic supra-nationality, the last stage of civil dislocation and thus of servitude. . . .

The new *ideology of security* is detained to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of the right of populations to armed defense and by the progressive loss of their juridical-political identity: it is equivalent to putting the whole of civil society under a regime of military security, that is to say, under a regime of so-called military justice. . . .

Just as military justice was a matter of transferring fear of the enemy to the partner in order to bring about discipline, so it is a matter now of transferring fear of confrontations from the outside to the inside, a fear still more formidable than the fear of a declared enemy, friend or suspicious parent. In fact, the doctrine of security extends the strategy along the whole azimuth to the ensemble of civil objectives. Truly beyond politics, it cleverly completes the nuclear dissuasion with a perverted popular dissuasion. . . .

Thus, when Curcio speaks of terrorism as a machine of destruction, he doesn't know what he's talking about: the exterminating angel is only the exterminating engine which henceforth escapes everyone's control. At this level terrorism is only a final simulation of the revolutionary loading of the masses into the machine of internal warfare, a survival technique comparable to the nostalgic taste which pushes more and more people in the age of supersonic jets to use old prop-driven



planes, old model cars, steam-driven trains, even to buy ineffective railroad stations in order to rebuild the old transportation system of the voyeur-voyager and restore the illusion of a certain individual power over the conception and control of vehicles slower and less sophisticated. The instantaneity of the explosions and the rapid deflagration of criminal attempts appear to this individual as a paroxysm of the speed permitted but left unpaid for by the hierarchy of media, as the shattering of the mirror of travel. But are intimacies among criminals the last representation of the family? With the disappearance of territorial strategy, it is logical to see indissoluble couples reforming, as the last forms of the original tactical unity, the little commando family, "linked by love and by hate," the minister Streibel will say at the burial of Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader, before their bodies were buried in the same grave at the request of the young man's father, the minister Ensslin who did not want them separated.

Translated by John Johnston

1. Klaus Croissant: Defense lawyer of the Red Army Fraktion. He was in turn accused of terrorism and extradited from France to Germany.
2. The first trial of the BR took place in Turin. The political prisoners appeared chained in a glass cage.

II/1 Shrapnel and Legs McNeil, 1978 Photo: D. Cortez
II/2-3 Legs McNeil, 1978 Photos: D. Cortez



A Brigadist Speaks

Valerio Morucci

Valerio Morucci was arrested at the end of May, 1979. The interview took place at the GB wing of the Rebibbia prison in Rome during the exercise hours. Giuseppe Nicotri is a journalist from *Espresso*, also imprisoned for allegedly participating in the Moro's kidnaping (and subsequently released for lack of evidence).

NICOTRI During your interrogation by Judge Caselli you introduced new techniques of "non-collaboration" such as paradox and sarcasm. You actually ended by saying: "Now I have to go. They're waiting for me in the court-yard to play volley-ball". This attitude could be said to confirm the much talked about hypothesis: that is, your break with the Red Brigades; is there any truth in that?

MORUCCI I don't see anything sensational in the fact that I, not wanting to acknowledge the status of antagonist of that mediocre aspirant to the role of Commissioner of justice, chose that kind of behavior. Having said that, it's obvious that inside the sphere of armed struggle there exist very different languages and "cultures". And also various options. However, I don't think this is the place to reconstruct the progress and organizational histories inside the revolutionary movement.

N In your Memorial you state that "this movement is mature enough to impose communism through the strength of warfare and arms". A statement which remains to be proved, but exactly what does it mean?

M We mean that for us, and, I believe, for the majority of the revolutionary movement, the theme of "transition to socialism" is absolutely surpassed and in-

adequate at the level of the quality of proletarian struggles. Real socialism, in all its variants, has proved to be a social model which is anything but desirable for the proletariat.

N In what sense?

M Economic science studies how to meet "unlimited needs with limited resources". Well, today resources are no longer "scarce"; therefore it becomes possible to go beyond economy, that is to say, communism becomes possible. And socialism is then an old instrument politically and practically surpassed.

N It has been written that the contents of your Memorial reflect thematics which are typical of "Autonomia Operaia" of which you are said to be the "armed body"...

M Our distance from comrades in the historical groups of organized "Autonomia Operaia" is undoubtedly profound on the level of certain contents, and more so, on the level of the theory of the organization. We consider the "Autonomia" to be a phenomenon in the stage of irreversible decline, now confined to the ghetto of vindictive extremism, and, in some of its components, actually leaning toward "institutionalism". We could say that they are "comrades who are mistaken". We want other things: we want to join the armed initiative to the communist tendency that is present in the various expressions of the class movement. It is not a question of rediscovering a kind of "theory of needs with a P.38"; but rather of confronting the problem of the combating praxis by starting precisely with a criticism of that theory. Working on that hypothesis, armed struggle is put in the direction of revolutionary war: it is something that does not at all remain confined to a simple military and destructive connotation, but is instead the deliverer of energies and lays the foundation of a new social power.

N If, as you say, various differentiations exist, what do you think is represented by the operation of April 7: that is my arrest, and that of Negri, Scalzone and other comrades?

M A damned mess. The history of the left, the official left as well as the revolutionary left, is a history of divisions and of distinctions. The judges, instead, threw together, to their own advantage, a mass of very conflicting facts. In their reconstruction, typical of police mentality, all differences, logical, historic, and temporal distances do not count. No differences are made between those comrades who declare themselves to be communist combatants and those who claim, even with hunger strikes, due process (and who therefore recognize the authority of the State). The only thing that holds up that accusatory castle is indeed its indefinite character. Take, for example, the story of the "fake dissolution" of "Potere operaio" at the Rosolina meeting. Applying the same mental scheme, one could say that the break of "Contropiano" between Tronti, Cacciari and Asor Rosa on one side and Negri on the other, was equally simulated. Or, going back farther, we could consider the split of "Classe operaia" a fiction; and, even before that, that of "Quaderni Rossi". We were formed on Tronti's books before, then on those of Toni Negri.

N Various inferences concerning your arrest have appeared in newspapers. Your arrest was put in relation to alleged divergences and splits inside the armed party...

M It's real infamy. Those who write such things only reveal their propensity to use treason and delation as instruments of warfare. Those who think that political struggle between revolutionaries can arrive at the point of erasing the prejudicial solidarity between communists against the class enemy have had their heads rotted by a stalinistic and gangsteristic logic.

Translated by Nadina Laspina

Dissenting Brigadists

This document, attributed to Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda (both in prison since May, 1979), was sent to *Lotta Continua* in July, 1979. It is the first public recognition of dissension within the Red Brigades.

In order to fully understand this document, it is necessary to keep in mind the nature of the BR's internal organization as well as their specific position within the revolutionary movement in general.

The BR are organized in autonomous columns which communicate only at their summit, ie through the Strategic Direction. The five columns of the organization correspond to the five main Italian cities (there is none in the South). Each column is divided in independent cells. Gravitating around the clandestine organization proper, a wider zone of militants take care of all the logistic work (propaganda, communication, etc.). These are the MPRO (Proletarian Movement for Offensive Resistance).

Although the most powerful organization, and the only one to actually operate at the national level, the BR are not by far the only

combatant unit. Other clandestine formations, independent from, but linked to, the BR are also active in various areas of the country. A complex and fluid network of autonomous—but not clandestine—armed groups also operate "horizontally", at local levels.

The "Dissenting Brigadists" document addresses in priority all the combatant network. It deals with the specific problems of armed action. It could not, therefore, be too explicit nor easily accessible. After several attempts at a faithful translation (by Dan Scanlon and Wayne Storey), we decided rather to clarify and greatly emendate this allusive, repetitive and highly rhetorical text in order to give the reader a chance to grasp the nature of the dissension declared within the BR as well as the indications given to the various armed groups. In short: the authors violently accuse the Stalinist line adopted by the "Strategic Direction" of the Organization (O.). They advocate a return to grass-root actions and a closer adherence to the dynamics of social antagonism in order to overcome the increasing isolation of the communist fighters.

TO THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF LOTTA CONTINUA

Comrades:

The mystifications circulated by the press concerning the "case of the 7 deserters" from the Red Brigades, along with an outline of death sentences and insinuations of informants, have persuaded us that the revolutionary movement needs to know the political terms of the question. The labor document we are sending you clearly shows the existence of a "struggle between two lines," which however bitter has nothing to do with the rules of mafia and gangster feuds.

These deliberate distortions alarm us. We are seriously concerned for the physical safety of imprisoned comrades—Gallucci's carbons might well be feeding the voices of "death sentences."

We invite the Movement to keep a close watch. We warn whoever takes part in this infamous misrepresentation of the internal struggle as "mafiosa" and "gangsterish" that we will use every means of action to block what is fast becoming a concentrated campaign of misinformation about the Movement and provocation in respect to imprisoned communists.

LABOR DOCUMENT FROM THE DISSENTING BRIGADISTS

In the early '70s, after the powerful cycle of workers' struggles and their illegal outcome, the problem of how to connect this underground aftermath to a "legal" initiative was hotly debated at the highest levels of the revolutionary movement.

Put in these terms, the connection between armed struggle and legal action couldn't be established. The transition to armed struggle had to be acknowledged in its specificity and in its political and organizational implications.

In this framework, to put it simply, the initial intervention of the O. confused the terms of this problem by asserting that it is the autonomy of the working class that has to be organized around the armed struggle, and not the reverse.

The major instrument, in that phase, was the Armed Propaganda which attempted to demonstrate the practicability of the Armed Struggle.

In the last two years, the situation has evolved in such a way as to affect a reversal of the situation of the early '70s. At that time, the specific form of armed spontaneity constituted a restraint to the qualitative expansion of the "proletarian struggle"; today, the organizational and political rigidity of the model that was necessary to provoke that rupture is becoming an impediment to the quantitative expansion of the "armed proletarian struggle."

The O. does not realize that the phase of the single "strategic" direction stifling spontaneity has ended. The MPRO requires party cadres, elements capable of organizing and directing the armed struggle—and not professors debating abstract contradictions between "partiality" and "strategy".

Therefore there is no one more legalistic and opportunistic than he who continues to assert the permanent necessity of an avant-garde role which constitutes, through its own directions, a lighthouse in the nocturnal darkness of the proletarian "unconscious".

THE STORY OF O.

There are periods in which the "strategic" tendency asserted itself within the O.

Significantly, in September 1976, the Front organizing action within the masses was definitively broken up. The O. identified the enemy as the Multinational Imperialist State (MIS). The contradictions within the MIS made it such that the existence of a "specific" front for political action was no longer justified. The consequences of this "vertical linearity", imposed from above, struck mainly those sectors of "recent" political intervention in the masses, especially those who had demonstrated a capacity for independent analysis most likely to counter the tendency toward abstraction inherent to this kind of choice.

IF IT DOESN'T CONCERN THE FACTORY, IT IS SECONDARY

This point of view was limited historically by its strict emphasis on the economic re-structuring of big industry. This disregard for the overall social level relegated the new quality of the worker's struggle to the underbrush of "partiality" and "secondary" contradictions. Unable to integrate into its program the political enrichment derived from these struggles, the O. mechanically reasserted the hegemony of industrial labor, issued from an antiquated, and by now obsolete, conception of "productive" work.

THE DISMISSAL OF MASS INITIATIVE

The O. is constantly forced to reduce the State's initiative to political forces (the "Command") and ultimately to a single political force, the Christian Democrats. Such an analysis, imposed from above, was found to render their attack against these forces inefficient and misplaced.

The actual dismissal of mass initiative was a decisive act. It made it impossible for the O. to intervene from within the real class contradictions.

On the contrary, the total political dependence of the Brigades on the "central" directives coming from the Counter-revolutionary forces, and mediated by the direction of the Column, was, as a reaction, indirectly enhanced. It is from the

political organization of the Column that the Brigades received the "strategic" indications to be articulated in the field.

THE O. LEADERS COMPLAIN ABOUT THE BRIGADES

This could only lead to a total failure, but the O. still is unable to understand the reasons for this bankruptcy. In fact, the O. complained bitterly over the years of the lack of propositions emanating from the Brigades. They were deprived of any possibility to discuss internally problems concerning specific situations; they were given "strategic" indications on targets to strike, based on inadequate "general analysis" of the enemy; they were constantly warned about the uselessness and danger of their participating in mass organizations of the Movement; they were constantly warned of the "danger" entailed by a line aimed at partial objectives. And yet they were supposed to come up with propositions!

Another tragic aspect of this choice is that it magnified the defensive character of the O., which had come to merely "mirror" the initiative and the structures of the enemy. Here arises this aspect of a "negative" copy of the State that will ultimately prove devastating.

DO MORO

The Moro operation constitutes a quantum leap in the Red Brigade's attack against the State. This battle represents the apex of the strategic line of the armed struggle. It provides the highest example of the levels of power that the proletariat can achieve through the principal instrument of its struggle: organization. It was essential, after this display of power, to look backwards so that this "concentrate", this "school" of power be reappropriated by the proletarian movement as a whole.

It is one thing for a group to demonstrate how far proletarian counter-power can reach and it is another to believe that this example is the actual counter-power of the proletariat. Everybody should see the abyss that separates these "experimenters" from the rest of the revolutionary movement. Everybody should perceive the lack of connection between the offensive level reached by the O. and the scattered character of the attack assumed on the horizontal level by the MPRO.

WHATEVER THE DEATH TOLL

Something could have been done with the enormous power displayed in Via Fani and in the following battle. It should either have been conserved, or converted into actions—whatever the death toll—capable of reintroducing that power into the daily struggle of the proletariat (e.g. the destruction of an electronic control system spying on the workers of a big factory). It should have been preserved as a powerful reference, and not used as a launching pad towards an adventurist leap into warfare.

Success goes to one's head: the "strategist" tendency has been reinforced by the Moro affair. It appears unlikely that, already launched on this dangerous track, the vehicle can be stopped. Eager to "denounce" the counter-revolutionary nature of the MIS, the O.—consciously or not—limited its goal to accelerating the pace of war and repression in order to "show" the proletariat how "ferocious" the enemy is. It totally neglected the fact that prematurely restricting democratic spaces could only weaken the proletarian organization.

THE IMPRISONED COMRADES

It is, paradoxically, the imprisoned avant-gardes who better understood the danger of a "strategist" deformation. The physical separation from the field of action did not result in alienating the imprisoned comrades from reality. On the contrary, it allowed them the political detachment required for thorough reflection at this most delicate juncture. Unfortunately it is this thoroughness of reflection that the leaders on the outside lack most.

Communism doesn't amount simply to overcoming the crisis. Let's address the meaning of the statement of the Strategic Directive number 3.

As a consequence of its instrumental and defensive use, the O. remains on purely formal grounds. It keeps reasserting that the main problem is to attack and

destroy the MIS. It defines communism as a "form", a "system" "applicable" after this stage only.

COMMUNISM WOULD BE POSSIBLE IF

Contrary to what the O. theorizes, communism will not be achieved by one or two five-year plans: "communism is the real movement which destroys the present status quo." (Marx).

"The more this contradiction develops, the more does it become evident that the growth of the forces of production can no longer be bound up with the appropriation of alien labor, but that the mass of workers must themselves appropriate their own surplus labor...The measure of wealth is then not any longer, in any way, labor time but rather disposable time." (*Grundrisse*, Notebooks VII).

Contrary to what the Stalinists think, communism and its mode of production, which is superior to that of capitalist productivity, is not a "system" dictated by the people's commissions. It results from a social and political process, based on a high level of development of productive forces, which affirms a "social subject" able to destroy and to replace the whole system based on the division of salaried work.

WE NEED A PROGRAM


The party and its program cannot be formulated from the point of view of capital and the State it has put into power. It cannot assume an analysis of the enemy and its initiative as a base on which to model and elaborate an attack.

The first and most probable risk, in such a perspective, is to distinguish at the outset between the capacity for destabilization and the capacity for a prompt, continuous and comprehensive counter-position of the working class in relation to all other articulations of the capitalist State.

MESSENGERS OF DEATH

These messengers of misfortune and death who hope in this way to "convince" the masses of the necessity of taking up arms do not even realize that they are addressing a working class who have far more than their chains to lose and who probably will only decide to take up arms when they will have achieved a program of power commensurate to their own development and to capital's development. Only at that point will the "necessity" for war become a positive affirmation within the growing confrontation of classes.

The opening of a process of guerilla-type armed struggle cannot be understood as a mechanical transition from the attack on people to the attack on a system. If until now the line pursued by the O., in the armed propaganda phases, could be



seen as a fighting line "in the apparent form of terrorism," what is now proposed is a terrorist line "in the apparent form of guerrilla-armed struggle."

The distorted reading of Lenin proposed by the O. leads to the absurd affirmation of the DS3. The practice of armed struggle by the masses is thereby defined as a militarism of the minority.

It is certain that the MPRO should more and more abandon the field of nocturnal attacks (already politically surpassed by richer means of struggle) and capture a battleground apt to increase its wealth, creativity and capacity for class recomposition.

The use of provocation was justified by the necessity to shock the avant-gardes in the "legal" area, and it had to be essentially a political provocation. Today, on the contrary, there exists various set-ups and structures of the avant-gardes organized within the MPRO—and therefore still in the field of armed struggle. If instead of strengthening these structures, one aims at destroying them, the only result that one can expect is a regression of the process of construction of the Fighting Communist Party (PCC) as well as a "reinforcement" of the "strategicists" organizations assured by the MPRO turncoat.


Under these conditions, the provocation isn't political anymore, it is provocation pure and simple.

This is the most difficult moment in the battle: if the one organization which had accumulated sufficient prestige and authority in order to impose and direct the construction of the PPC; if that organization turns away from this role, and in fact operates against it, a prisoner of its own ultra-strategicity, it is necessary to impose modifications in the line that are indispensable to bring back within the growth of the revolutionary movement the richness of its own experience.

W1-2 Photos: Seth Tilet

THE WORST
PONTANEISM

A PROVOCATION
PURE AND SIMPLE



Who is the Traitor?

Renato Curcio

This document written from the Asinara prison and published in August, 1979, in *Panorama*, constitutes a violent response to the various attempts at putting an end to the spiral of terrorism and repression created by the Moro affair. It is a specific answer to the proposition of amnesty launched by Franco Piperno and the subsequent publication of the "Dissenting Brigadists" document, allegedly written by Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda. Attributed to Renato Curcio, it was signed by 16 other imprisoned founders of the BR.

Asinara, July 31, 1979

To the entire revolutionary movement.

Summer is the mosquito season. And just as annoying as mosquitoes, there is a gang of stinging troublemakers who work for the imperialist counter-revolution, and who buzz around the zone of guerrilla warfare with the ambitious desire of consigning into the hands of the bourgeoisie the "maddened variables." They are not the first ones to attempt this, and they will not be the last ones either. Every revolution inevitably drags along its edges dirt and refuse of all sorts.

The hunters of "maddened variables" much like the upholders of Deaglio and Marcenaro's denouncement,¹ are our own brand of "blockheads," and a very wicked one at that.

This is the topic we'd like to discuss, so that no militant can ever say about them that "they are comrades who make mistakes!"

The imperialist State deals with the crisis of representation in the "party system"

and within the unions by means of a highly sophisticated technique of control, absorption and recovery of revolutionary thrusts: it coopts the pacifist and legal group leaders — whether sympathizers of the Communist Party or small-time leeches of the Socialist Party — by using the appropriate mechanism for absorbing these revolutionary impulses, mechanisms disguised as "special services" of the State.

The forms of this integrating cooptation are manifold. Newspapers (like *Lotta Continua* which, as everyone knows and by its own admission, receives the needed funds from the Socialist Party (PSI); or like *Metropoli*, which seeks sustenance from the same trough, centers for advanced studies (like the CERPET², which feeds on the funds from the *Cassa del Mezzogiorno*), universities (where would-be revolutionaries disguise themselves as berons, or viceversa), publishing houses, little-parties, etcetera.

The essential thing is that these "characters," while they are concretely introduced into the mechanisms that activate the reproduction of the modes of capitalist production, and while they are also adequately rewarded for calming down the "restlessness" of their conscience, are also placed in such positions where they may organize around themselves small clientele. Thus to the factions of bourgeois power are added those of lower middle-class intellectuals and both are ultimately a less expensive solution for the imperialist middle-class than any — at any rate impossible — integration of entire social strata.

In recent years this technique, which has been experimented widely in the United States, has been applied broadly in our country; whoever is above the magic of big words will find proof of this every day in the news. A good example is the history of a document unanimously attributed to the Red Brigades by both the regime's mass media and the coopted pseudo-newspapers — and in particular by Mr Valerio Morucci and Miss Adriana Faranda.

We do not know who these gentlemen are specifically, but by looking at their papers and bearing in mind their behavior, we can safely declare that they are neophytes of the psychological counter-guerrilla warfare, poor madmen deployed by the counter-revolution. And, frankly speaking, the attempt made by certain "counter-guerrilla advisors" like the journalists Carlo Rivoita, Mario Scialoia and Enrico Deaglio³ to dress these people up as Brigadists and sustain an alleged "scission," more than being hilarious, disgusts us.

We do not know if for offering their services as "advisors" Rivoita, Scialoia and Deaglio were well rewarded by their bosses, but we are sure of the fact that they have a very dim idea of the times in which they live. These are times when much more than money, the reward for certain "operations" is a good shower of bullets, as it happened to their friend-in-bad-ventures Casalegno.⁴ Is this a threat? God forbid, no, it is only a statement of fact.

If we participate in the saraband orchestrated by the "advisors" with the help of the "neophytes," and performed in the area of the "great socialist family," it is only because we have been unwarily called onto the scene, so to speak.

It is well known that the "historical leaders" — or the "muscles" of the heroic age, whichever is more appealing — always draw more attention. With great clamore yesterday we were asked to make a pronouncement on the question of amnesty. Today they demand nothing less than a supporting statement to a written statement which certainly comes from the most stupid, least informed sectors of the counter-revolution.

Com'on Gentlemen, take your wheeling and dealing more seriously.

How can you demand "an amnesty" from us?

We are at the onset of war and already you are begging for a truce?

We should however spend some time with the document. Now we are not doing this with any intention of "becoming dialectical" with all that ideological rubbish, with all that dislocated discourse collected here and there from the sacred texts of some university professor in search of violent "emotions:"⁶ all this is none of our business and it actually disgusts us. If to some this still sounds unconvincing, all he has to do is leaf through our declarations at each trial; if they do not meet with the standards of the literary fads of the academic mafias on the extreme left, they have at least the virtue of clarity. We come forth because the propaganda campaign tacked on to this document, hypocritically attributed to our organization, may spread uncertainty in those sectors of the proletarian movement's offensive resistance of recent formation.

We come forth because these positions are not, never have been, those of the Red Brigades.

We come forth to laugh at those puny unendowed brains which were capable of conceiving, even if only to hope for it, our involvement in such an infantile and wicked operation. We come forth to declare that we are not leaving any room for Mr Morucci and Miss Faranda's provocation, nor to the megalomaniacal projects of the baron Piperno and their "Saints in Paradise," that is, Mancini, Signorile and Craxi⁷; it is they who are directing this squalid operation since the days of the "Spring Campaign (*Campagna di primavera*)."

These tools, these would-be *autonomi*, or liberal-gobettians⁸ or Craxo-socialists are all (blunt) weapons against guerrilla warfare and it is high time that the movement gets rid of them with the greatest clarity and decision. It is time to do away with all those who meddle in the marshes of all "ambiguities"⁹ with whispers of hypocrisy. The revolutionary movement must understand that its proletarian soul has the courage and strength to call shit what is shit and communist only what is communist. And then they speak of "comrades who make mistakes!"

These objections are permitted to the youngest comrades: but the bourgeoisie attacks them too and someone even ended up in jail. That's the way it is. One must bear in mind that the peculiar shabbiness of the "senior" political ranks, the ones that run the party system, has not allowed the teutonic-american (*amerikano-tedesko*) control machinery supported by Craxi to fully unveil its ill-omened actions. It is proof once more of the extremely violent contradictions that shake the imperialist State and that wear out its initiatives, strewing them in diverse directions.

The "bisons' line" charges head-first, without looking anybody in the face. The policeman-general's monocle isn't even capable of distinguishing the insidious function of a political subdivision which the "integrating cooptation" line develops side by side with the movement. Or is it maybe that the Piedmontese general¹⁰ is convinced, in his militaristic delirium, that guerrilla warfare can be beaten with a military campaign? It is the same "ambiguous meddlers" who are the first ones to complain of it and everyone, fugitive or jailed, feels the pangs, as when they implore "are we not the last dam against guerrilla warfare?"

Allow us to feel sorry for these moaning educands of yesterday who — from their tranquil desks and in their magazines — urged the imprisoned proletarians to fight the most truculent battles, and now — shy lambs — entrust the vindication of their innocence to a hunger strike.

One asks himself: old "cadres of the movement" and still innocent?

Yet one should be ashamed of this kind of virginity.

At any rate, we have something very clear to say to the innocent little boys who play at making the revolution from their little newspapers (while with much less innocence they cooperated with the counter-revolution: whoever is innocent for the bourgeoisie is definitely guilty for the proletariat!)

It may sound like a slogan, but it is true nevertheless.

To conclude: if up to now there could have been some doubt on the effective situation of these ambiguous characters within the proletarian movement's offensive resistance, today they have been unmasked by their own actions: the contradiction is thus between ourselves and the enemy.

At this point we should like to say to the entire "junior" political class. . . let's start singing, gentlemen! The cards are uncovered, the "players are all well known," the game is clear. Whoever has been dragged in by inexperience or simple-mindedness should jump ship now.

We, militants of the Red Brigades, together with the proletarian components of the resistance movement, know how to solve these fastidious little quarrels with all the required decidedness.

And one thing is sure: we'll do it with joy!

ATTAINING HEGEMONY OVER THE WORKING CLASS

What do our pretty gentlemen actually say in their "summa?" That the class' composition is changed and that the protection of the worker's centrality demonstrates the absolute incomprehension of the epoch in which we live; that the party was well and good at the onset of the armed struggle but that today, in order to continue with its avant-garde role, it must dissolve itself in the Movement; that proletarian power is built not in relation to the State but upon itself.

These are three vital theses over which some violent political and ideological battles are being fought today within the proletarian movement's offensive resistance. These debates cannot be underestimated since they are rooted in the complex composition of the metropolitan proletariat, that is to say, in the attempt on the part of indirectly productive — or unproductive — components to attain hegemony over the working class.

It would be a good idea not to shrug the problem off, because the question of the worker's hegemony over the proletarian movement's offensive resistance is a question which determines the victory or defeat of the proletarian revolution in the imperialist city. To support or discard the thesis of the centrality of the worker becomes thus a strategic discriminant; that explains why we opt to delve into this issue a bit.

"To concentrate on the highest levels of the class offensive means necessarily to examine much more thoroughly the analysis of class composition." This is what



they tell us, and it is true. But it could be a banality (in the sense that, in an epoch of rapid structural transformations of the economy as a result of the process of crisis-restructuring-internationalization of capital, it is taken for granted that the analysis of labor's public figures and of political behavior cannot slacken); or it could be that we are dealing with a pompous questioning of the essential thesis on the centrality of the worker.

"Know the analysis thoroughly" they continue, it could lead to the discovery of a "new class composition" and therefore to avoiding "pitfalls of interpretation."

Their suggestion is, more precisely, that the communist avant-garde must "develop that power drive which today is exemplified in certain struggles (hospital workers, women, etc.) and which constitute for the proletariat an appeal for union and integration of various social personalities within a still unclear project of organizing society differently; it is to this project, which tends to be global, that the party should restore refinement and planning."

That's the game and the center of gravity shifts elsewhere. From the centrality of the worker or of directly productive labor, to the centrality of the work not directly productive or unproductive. It is an overturning that places at the center of the revolutionary process people who, though proletarians or on their way to becoming proletarians, are not at all at the center of the capitalist mode of production, nor can they be placed there with falsifications extracted from the worst bourgeois sociology.

To ditch the centrality of immediately productive work: this is the dream of all petit-bourgeois ideologues who attempt to ride the true movements of the non-working components of the city proletariat, and then absolutize their relative importance.

In this effort the common places on "mature capitalism," where the boundary between productive and unproductive work should be dissolved, are wasted; the quoting of the magic *Grundrisse*, stretched like American chewing gum to the point of referring them to the entire society instead of only to the factory, as in the text, multiplies rapidly; the charges against those who stick to this keystone of Marxism become burning anathemas, and at times defaming accusations, of the stalinist-paleo-vetero-marxist type; the more audacious go as far as throwing off the marxist cowl which for years had masked their liberal-gobettian creed and which the first breath of wind now unmasks; the more clever ones prefer to get on line behind the chorus of laments on "the end of Marxism," coin theories on "the new revolutionary subject," on the "social laborer (*operaio sociale*)," and toll the funeral march of the mass-worker.

(The document at this point probes a class analysis on the composition of the city proletariat and concludes that the revolutionary supremacy belongs to "immediately productive workers of surplus value" and in particular to the mass-worker.)

Mature capitalism is not that of czarist Russia of the beginning of the 20th century, but this does not mean that, still today and here, it shouldn't be the directly productive workers who conceive of a strong *general interest* toward the destruction of the capitalist mode of production and toward the construction of the communist society. Of course, it doesn't mean either that they are the "only ones" to have this interest and so, around them, and around their GENERAL POLITICAL PROGRAM, it is possible to draw together all those people directly or indirectly opposed to the capital and who articulate and circumscribe the city proletariat.

It is the working class that must direct with its general political program the entire proletarian movement's offensive resistance: whosoever opposes this will be routed. Thesis number two: the party was doing well at the beginning of the armed struggle, but today, in order to carry out an avant-garde role, it must dissolve into the movement.

There are cute little "gentlemen" who write that "in the last two years the situation has evolved to such a point that it forced an overturning of what it was in the early '70's."

According to them, party action has seen its better days and perhaps yesterday was necessary, but, under the new situation, to insist upon this road is to have the "arrogance" and presumption proper of a group and not of the proletarian, avant-garde. In other words: today the proletarian avant-garde, to be such, must negate its role as avant-garde!

And then, if the strategy is already thriving in the new political make-up of the class, what's the point of party action?


"To stop the quantitative expansion of the armed proletarian struggle," say the disbanders to one another, is simple. It is not a new lesson: from the beginning the ARMED SPONTANEITY preached that the avant-garde must, so to speak, dissolve itself in the movement. The authors of *Mal piu senza fucile* ("Never again without a gun")¹¹ had told us this back in '75, leaving in that little journal a testimonial which runs more or less as follows: the Red Brigades have been a tiny motor which turned on a great motor, and that is good, but now that a fighting movement is born what need is there for a fighting party? To us instead the problem was and is articulated differently. First of all these absent-minded people should remember that from the very beginning our militancy took place *on the inside* of real class movements and that means that the armed propaganda action positioned itself inside and at the highest point of the struggle which the city proletariat was building up.

It was precisely this positioning which allowed us to transform the armed propaganda action into Organization; it allowed us to verify and, when needed, rectify our fighting programs; it allowed us to resist the harshest of repressions and to grow as a political-military avant-garde; it permitted us to contribute to the ripening of the proletarian movement's offensive resistance which, in virtue of its maturity and consistency, is today a truly revolutionary mass movement.

It was precisely this development of the objective situation caused by the crisis — and by our history within it — that put us face to face with the necessity to take a qualitative leap: skipping the party.

(To prove this, the theses of the strategic leadership are quoted. To sum up: the fighting party is part of the movement, but at the same time is different because it possesses its own military, organizational, and political autonomy).

A QUALITATIVE LEAP



It is a *political* — and thus not only organizational — *leap* because being “interns” of a specific class movement in this transitional conjuncture requires above all the political capacity to condense the specific necessities of this movement in an IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PROGRAM.

This Program, in any event, is not — as the spontaneists hold — the immediate expression of the *most urgent* interests which each proletarian sector deems necessary to solve. It rather expresses those real, strategic interests which the *power positions* gained allow to place on the agenda.

(To place above all the political struggle, and then the economic one: to underscore this primacy the document invokes lengthy quotations from Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and concludes with: in this sense we are absolutely Marxist. On this basis the leadership role undertaken by the fighting party is explained.)

The immediate political program, therefore, while it captures the specific traits of the essential interests of each proletarian sector, subsequently connects them, by way of Party initiative, to a strategic unitary design in a common project to erect the RED POWER, in a GENERAL POLITICAL PROGRAM.

(According to Curcio, to deny that things were exactly as he described them, his adversaries excogitated the falsification of Lenin and of the Red Brigades' strategic resolution of February '78.) The two manipulations are closely linked, as they were both aimed at showing that within the Red Brigades the spontaneous mass tendency to fight for concrete economic and social objectives, including those involving power and restructuring, is discarded with the definition of “economicist-spontaneist.” This “mass tendency” is not, however, any better described; thus, by remaining geographically and historically indeterminate, can be smuggled as an omnicomprehensive — economic, social, of power — tendency, in other words, a restructuring.

One could have wished for more from the man who pretends to be the paladin of the proletarian movement's offensive resistance; from the man who pretends to give the lie to the Strategic Resolution.

(Another passage follows from the Feb. '78 strategic resolution where, according to the Asinara prisoners, there is presented “a thesis completely the opposite of the one denounced by his poor readers.”)

Let's turn then to the real meaning of the attack supposedly brought on the so-called “strategist tendency.” It is now possible to understand that with these two words the neophytes of the psychological counter-guerilla warfare want to refer to that correct line in the Red Brigades which has placed and places politics in the forefront!

And precisely this has been the target, the central thesis of the Red Brigades, which runs thus: “To attack the heart of the State means the following: that the communist revolutionary forces must install themselves at the head, they must organize and direct armed and proletarian mass movements and lead their attacks: in each phase against the main contradiction, and in any *conjuncture* against the principal aspect of this contradiction: against the heart of the State, precisely!” The strategic objective of the attack is at this point defined by its contours: the concept of Party itself, its most profound essence, its avant-garde role and its project of unification of the city proletariat with respect to the anti-imperialist civil war for the cause of communism.

That this is the actual state of things is confirmed also by the attack the detractors launch against the strategic tendency of which the “Moro operation” represents the high point. According to these people, on the one hand this operation constitutes the highest example of what levels of power, what kind of challenge to the State, and what bargaining power the proletariat can attain by utilizing its main instrument of class warfare, the Organization; on the other hand,

this “operation” would reveal the “mirror image quality of the Organization which does not revolve, as a strategy and a structural set-up around the proletariat of offensive, but is reflected in the structures of the enemy.”


The Red Brigades, in other words, would be “the face of the negative side of the State,” that is to say, an “avant-gardist” organization whose prime occupation is to show the proletariat “how ferocious the State is.” More than revolutionaries, the brigadists would then be disclaimers, and with the “Moro operation” they did nothing more than to offer the proletariat a great spectacle, a symbolic representation of what “can be done!”

Now to this the non-believers add: subject and representation would be tolerable, even though the representation involves arms and actions drawn from real life, but on the condition that the spectacle (the Moro operation) not be confused with the reality (the fighting revolutionary movement).

The great leap forward which should have been taken after the Spring campaign was to put aside “the recently shown power... and begin to teach the revolutionary movement the next step in order to reach that power.” Party and Movement are here seen in a teacher-student relation and behind the apparent tension for a possible re-marriage there lurks the “conscious and unconscious” conviction that “it is” an incurable fracture.

The conclusions to which such teachers arrive cannot amaze us anymore, not even when they despair for the danger of “a premature closing of democratic spaces” which, by reducing their possibility of calmly imparting lessons in how to make a revolution, would go “against the fighting revolutionary movement.” And not even when, caught by an uncontrollable surge of sincerity, they tear away their mask and declare, without false modesty, not to be afraid of aligning themselves “with the vultures of opportunism that have been saying so for nine years”: seeing that the prevailing wind is the “strategic tendency,” they too croak that the Red Brigades are “fully in the political sphere of provocation.” And since “it pains them to say so,” they add...“unconsciously.”

in the pamphlet *La Campagna di primavera* (“The Spring Campaign”) the Red Brigades dedicated some paragraphs to the criticism of these positions developed by the weakest sectors of the Movement; we refer you to them. What interests us here is the thread of a discourse which traverses other areas of the said document, and that is the thesis that proletarian power (“potere proletario”) is built upon itself and not in relation with the enemy's power, with the power of the bourgeois class. The key idea of the separation as a condition of demonstra-



tion of the proletariat's power is typical of the "immediatists-economocists" to which even some members of "our" line belong.

(The adversaries are accused of believing that it is possible to realize a proletarian power totally independent of the power of the bourgeois State by means of the struggle. In other words, it criticizes the view that the revolutionary action should proceed independently without attacking the heart of the State.)

It is by striking right at the heart of the State that the proletariat expands the horizon of its class interests, establishes ever more solidly its general political program, and reinforces and extends its autonomy.

Arm-wrestling between love and revolution, without stirring our libertarians, always requires two contenders: from Russia in 1917, to China in 1949, to Italy in the '80's... even though there is always somebody who can realize "his capacity to rejoice" even by himself!

(There follows other polemical uppercuts against the concepts expressed in the paragraph of the enemy's document entitled "Socialism and Communism." The accusation is that of being metaphysically abstract and of ulterior falsification in the reading of the strategic resolution "for the sheer desire of an antistalinist polemics.")

In any event, and to conclude, it appears that our "Independentists," riding the crest of the subjective delirium that inspires their unreasoning, after having disbanded, so to speak, the party, land in the most nebulous of anarchist theses: one paradigmatic example is the overt refusal of the fundamental concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat." (...)

We call upon all comrades of the revolutionary movement to take a stand on the issues raised in this document.

Translated by Peter Caravetta

1. Andrea Marcenaro: a journalist of *Lotta Continua*.
2. CERPET: Institute for Social and Economic Research. Founded in Padua by members of *Metropoli*.
3. Enrico Deaglio: Editor-in-Chief of *Lotta Continua*, a daily paper influential in the area of Autonomy.
4. Carlo Caselegno: Vice-Editor of *La Stampa*. Killed by the BR.
5. Giulio Andreotti: influential leader of the DC. Berlinguer: Secretary of the ICP. Gramsci: communist theoretician who died in prison. Craxi: Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party.
6. Negri: Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua. He is the author of numerous books and essays on Marxism.
7. Leaders of the ISP.
8. Piero Gobetti was a liberal political and literary figure influential in the anti-fascist movement. He was killed by the fascists.
9. In his letter, Piperno revendicates ambiguity in his efforts to mediate between the BR and the State.
10. The General Dalla Chiesa is the Head of the special anti-terrorist force in Italy.
11. *Mai Più Senza Fucile* ("Never More Without Guns"): armed group that claimed actions in the North of Italy. Born at the time of the publication which bears that name.

II/1-3 Bronzino (Agnolo di Cosimo di Mariano)
Italian (Florentine) (1503-1572)
Portrait of a Young Man (Possibly Guidobaldo II, Duke of Urbino (1514-74))
Oil on wood 37-5/8 x 29-1/2 in.
The Metropolitan Museum of Art
Bequest of Mrs. H.O. Havemeyer, 1929
The H.O. Havemeyer Collection
29.100.18 / 173316 13
II/4 Super-8/photo: Seth Tillot



J'Accuse

Toni Negri

This interview, written from the Rebibbia prison in Rome, was published in *Europeo* in September, 1979 after the publication of the "Asinara document" (Renato Curcio). It indicated a possible softening of the Italian press toward the April 7 prisoners.

Question Do you believe, along with Minister Mancini¹, that Judge Calogero is crazy, or do you think that the trial has a logical and rational aim in attempting to establish a connection between the ideological roots of Autonomy and the armed struggle of the Red Brigades?

Negri I am not a psychiatrist and I don't get involved in the lunacy of others. I already have a hard time keeping sane in the situation I'm in. However, one thing I'm certain of: that up to now the trial of April 7 has been under the pall of a wretched and frenzied ideology, an ideology that is opposed to the logic, the distinction, the function of judicial thought, which is that of sifting and evaluating facts. Now, facts, proofs, these are absent from the trial. Calogero says they are useless, Gallucci² affirms that mere "affectio" is enough. What we have here is frantic ideology, reactionary fanaticism. If 1789 generated terror, will 1917 generate Stalin? Or yet a Jacobin fanaticism: are all popes Borgias? What's worse: according to the last statements by Calogero, all Jacobins are Borgias and all popes are Stalins.

Madness? It's not my specialty. What I know is that, if there isn't a shift of viewpoint, one will not get out of this mess. One must understand that proletarian autonomy was not invented by anybody, least of all by the former leaders of

Potop (Potere Operaio). We're in the presence of a vast socio-political phenomenon which creates a constitutional problem. Why? Because the Italian constitution has been changed by the way parties run the State. Yet workers' autonomy is not represented by the parties; what's more, most proletarian movements are no longer represented or mediated by the constitutional structure. What is the thrust of the constitutional problem created by workers' autonomy? It involves widening and redefining the basis of political participation, wage negotiations among the social classes, breaking the solidity of the present block of corporative interests preserved by the DC and PCI.

Envisaging the high cost that this involves, all sides—the conservative, the economic right, the bureaucratic left—pull back. The PCI foresees a rightist *coup* and a leftist plot, and any challenge to the constitution appears to it apocalyptic. But not taking up the challenge is going to cost, is going to cost more. It is already costing more, in terms of the credibility in the institutions, keeping up a trial like the one of April 7, refusing the political responsibility of honestly facing the problem raised by the existence of workers' autonomy. One must never forget that, as all classic thinkers on constitutional thought uphold, the worst State is absolutely that left to the government of magistrates.

Q The PCI is leading an active campaign both against terrorism and the demonstrations of Autonomy, considering them the same phenomenon. In actuality, violence has been part and parcel of Autonomy, and has had deplorable and condemnable consequences. However, the PCI does not condemn a certain kind of violence with the same harshness: the violence that sometimes breaks out during union strikes, as for example, during the last one by the metal workers. What is your stand today in the face of these events, and what is your opinion of the Communist position?

N The PCI, on the left and in its left, has only one problem: the elimination of every attempt of alternative political aggregations. The problem of violence has been viewed by the PCI only from the point of what advantages could be derived from it. If violence is used to develop an alternative political strategy, the PCI is against it. But it is also opposed to nonviolence, if it serves the same purpose; this is amply demonstrated by the unfortunate (?) accusation of fascism directed to the radicals. If the acts of violence that break out during proletarian and workers' demonstrations do not immediately lead to the formation of politically alternative groups and organizations, the PCI—if the power relationships are not in its favor—can bear with them and try to "surpass" them, namely to drain their efficacy and phase them out.

When organizational interests are at stake, the PCI is either sectarian or opportunistic. During the last contract negotiations, the PCI has behaved opportunistically. However, I have the impression that, this time, opportunism does not pay, because the relationship between the working class, generally considered, and the PCI is inexorably taking on the character of a growing estrangement. In the last few years, workers' behavior has gone beyond that area of relative indifference, within which, however, a stable relationship can exist between the party and the masses. But when one starts talking about trust and consensus, one must be very careful: the line between speculation and bankruptcy is an imperceptible one, so they tell me.

Q Don't you think that the position of the PCI derives from the fact that, within the party, the conception of "workers' centralism" lingers on, and therefore, at least on this score, Curcio and Berlinguer's ideologies coincide? (See the Asinara papers).

N I have the impression that "workers' centralism" is being used in two different meanings. Let me explain: they share a similar ideological *genus* (the working class of the big factories), but not a political, specific difference: for the Red Brigades a big factory is always the revolutionary Putilov of the Soviet insurrection; for Berlinguer, a factory is the focus of co-management of productive labor.

What is strange is that both positions do not comprehend, from an empirical point of view, that the working class of big factories is: 1) a small minority of productive labor; 2) that the specificity of the working class in big factories is disappearing within the framework of the social organization of productive labor. Now, the only essential thing that, for those who work within Marxism, must be done is analyzing more deeply the political make-up of productive "social" work, that of the worker who, socially, produces surplus value and is therefore socially exploited.

This is, I believe, the only recognizable Putilov of late capitalism. And it is here that all those problems arise, of organization, of the State, of transition, that are—in spite of the obtuse ideology repropounded by the party central committees—the center of attention for the Communist militants of Autonomy. For how long do "the repression people" think they can hold out in the face of the degraded life conditions of "social" workers? How much longer do "the corporation people" think they can hold out against the pressure the "social" worker has begun to apply even within big factories?

Q What responsibility did the PCI have in the Padua trial of April 7?

N Total. It built up the case for the trial (from theory to practice, from speeches to judges, witnesses, accusers, gossipmongers, slanderers, etc.: it took care of everything) and boasted about it. On April 7, while arrests were still going on, at 2:00 p.m. Padua was snowed in by handbills which announced the capture of the Strategic Committee. To be sure, this trial is a product of the degraded government of the Historical Compromise. It's one of the few moments when the bureaucracy of the democratic centralism has shaped itself into a State, giving us a small example of what real socialism might be like. But in the whole situation there is also a more serious and dramatic element.

The fact is that April 7 marks the point of the reversal of the good intentions of many Communists, and in particular of that judicial group which had turned to the PCI to develop a democratic legal line, an alternative to legal formalism; not an unnatural and indiscriminate punishment, it was proposed, but prevention. With the fine result we have reached: prevention goes so far as to see in the ideas the enemies to strike down, so as to build ad hoc an ideology of conspiracy. By underlining this, I do not wish to express the opinion that the remedy lies in throwing away the baby with the bath water. I think that it is possible to start our journey again on the main road, by talking about the political space of Autonomy and the constitutional guarantees for the new emerging political forces.

Q Keeping in mind your past and present position, after the tragic escalation of the armed struggle, do you think that, in any way, your writings could have influenced the Red Brigaders?

N No. It has been said that we are dealing with two different cultures. It is true. But something else must be added. We are dealing with two political strategies that never crossed. The political clarification was offered, at the level of the masses, around 1973, after the occupation of Mirafiori by the "red handkerchiefs." There an alternative sprung forth which vertically split the revolutionary front on the problem of the relationship between the vanguard and the masses. (This problem, as all the militant culture of the 60s knows, is an unsolved leftover from that time of struggle.) To this ambiguous problem, which still lingers in the post-68 groups, a solution was attempted at the time. There were two ways out: one called for the glorification of the military vanguard to strike at the heart of the State, the other, pursued by Autonomy, posited the reevaluation of the concept of power itself as practiced within a mass framework; either the reproposal of the Leninist party or the revision of the concept of party itself. Outside the institutional bounds, since 1973, only these two lines exist. And at no point can they converge, because they represent two irreducible ways of conceiving power. For this reason Autonomy is far away from the Red Brigades.


Q What do you think of the document of the Asinara 16, and what do you answer to the offensive criticism directed at you in this text?

N First of all, it lacks seriousness: culturally, it is as archeological as Valiani³; what's more it has the polemic gilbness worthy of Antonello Trombadori⁴. But it is above all a tragic document, suicidal on two counts: first, because it reveals that there is no way out of a political minoritarianism; second, because it condemns itself to the most total isolation and self-destruction if only one of the threats there voiced are acted out. This document is vitiated exactly by those attitudes that lucidly the Red Brigaders seemed to have left behind: the adventurism of Mogadishu and the tragedy of Stammheim⁵.

Q Does the proposal by Piperno and Pace, who are calling for an amnesty for "Communist fighters," make sense to you? What are the reasons for your falling out with Piperno?

N I have no reason to contend with Piperno because we have been politically estranged since 1973. This does not exclude my feelings of friendship and liking for him. Now his proposal of amnesty is a whim for sure! It seems to me, however, that even beyond the misunderstandings caused earlier, he deserves credit for having started off a discussion on much more basic problems. That's to say, we come back again, as Federico Mancini remarked recently, to the central issue: the need to give a dynamic interpretation to the constitution as far as it applies to the power relationship among the classes, the need to shift the conflict over to a wider territory. Personally, I cannot guarantee a smooth and peaceful journey over this new territory. But watch out: we cannot forget the situation we're in, characterized by the worsening of the economic crisis, with very serious consequences for salary levels and the unemployment rate.

If there is anyone who still thinks we can act on all this simply by resorting to the rational usage of administrative mechanisms (a stable and efficient government!), that person is deluding himself. Unless we go on branding as criminal "anything that moves," as the Historical Compromise has done. With what results? Italy, "the freest country in the world," is second only to the USSR as to the number of political prisoners; it is second only to Northern Ireland as to the number of special repressive forces; it is second only to East Germany as to the deployment of special laws and administrative measures to prepare for and counteract an emergency. How long will it be before the freest country in the world will be second to none?




Q Are you optimistic about the outcome of the trial? What about your outlook on the Autonomy Movement in general after these events?

N It's a little hard for me to be optimistic. Yet I am more optimistic now than when I was put in prison. Why? 1) Because public opinion seems better oriented, and it will not be so easy to hurl at us again the crazy accusations and insults the magistrates threw at us in the earliest stage of the trial. 2) Because, if they hope they will be able to separate April 7 from the Movement, they're wrong. They have offered an echo chamber to the issues raised by Autonomy. Pascalinio, Gallucci, it's not a coincidence, make their moves today in a disorderly fashion, but not less harshly (in this they get cooperation from the prison directors) in order to take away from us the right to speak, to defend ourselves, to fight back. They are trying again to illegally isolate us from our families and our lawyers. But they will not succeed. 3) Because I have the impression that, in spite of everything, the issue raised by Autonomy, that of finding new political space for the struggle, is asserting itself, breaking the rigidity of the political picture predating the April 7 arrests.

Translated by Vincenzo Buonocore

1. Giacomo Mancini is a senator of the Italian Socialist Party. He expressed disbelief on the accusations immediately after the April 7 arrests.
2. Achille Gallucci, General Prosecutor.
3. Leo Valiani, ex-partisan, is a historian and journalist of the *Corriere della Sera*. He is known for his violent right wing comments on the Italian extra-parliamentary left.
4. Antonello Trombadori is a representative of the ICP.
5. Plane hijacking by the Red Army Fraction and subsequent "suicide" in jail of its historical leaders.

III/1-2 Photo: D. Cortez



angry how angry I am that I've forgotten you. I had thought about taking a long trip before the judges gave me 750 days in jail. Still, I have already spent 413 days and most of my sentence is over. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. Uh. 419 days in jail. What kind of clothing styles will there be when I get out? 420 days in jail. 421 days in jail. 422 days in jail 423 days in jail. 424 days in jail. LONG LIVE CUNT is written in the toilet and also WHOEVER READS THIS IS FUCKED UP. But LONG LIVE CUNT is written there the most times. I've counted 141 of them. 141, got it? 425 days in jail. 426 days in jail. Yesterday three inmates smashed the color TV. So no game. What shit. What utter shit. What balls. What shit. What a mess. What shit. It's the worst shit I've ever encountered in my life. 427 days in jail. 428 days in jail. 429 days in jail. 430, 31, 32, 33, 34, 3... Hey. They've gotten another TV. 43... They broke it again. 438 days in jail. 439 days in jail. Yesterday was 439 days and the chaplain came and I gave him a kick in the ass. Many. Kicks. In. His ass. What. Satisfaction. Stop. Jail. 440 days in jail. They've put me in solitary confinement for a week. Do you think a week compares with the satisfaction I felt when I gave the chaplain all those kicks in his ass? Uh. 440 days in jail. 41. And 42. And forty-three. And 44. And forty-five. And 46. And forty-seven. Solitary confinement is over but I still have a good bit of my sentence left. 448 days in jail. 449 days in jail. 450 days in jail. 451 days in jail. 452 days in jail. I deliberately cut myself with some broken glass. In order to go to the infirmary and get some morphine and pass time on the outside. 462... ten days in the infirmary... I broke all the windows... I cut myself all over but time passed. 463 days in jail. 464, 5, 6, 7, days in jail. 468 days in jail. Uh. I knew an inmate who occupied the prison / I knew an inmate who knows occupied the prison / He called me "Fortunate" / He called me / I knew an inmate who occupied the prison / 400 69 / / days in jail. 470, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 days in 91 jail. 492 days in jail. Uh. Ho. Uh. I've found a way to make the days pass more quickly. I continually hold my breath until I'm ready to burst. Then I faint. I got through today very quickly. And yesterday too. 493 days in jail. 494 days in jail. 95, ty-six, ty-seven, ty-eight, ninety-nine. FIVE HUNDRED DAYS IN THIS FUCKING FUCKING FUCKING FUCKING FUCKED-UP FUCKED-UP FUCKED-UP FUCKING FUCKING FUCKED-UP JAIL. And one and two and three and four and five and six seven. And eight and nine and 510 days in jail. Oh boys the jail the jail the jail the jail the jail comes out of me with all the walls the jail the. 511 days in jail. 512 days in jail. 513 days in jail. 514 days in jail. 515 days in jail. I've decided to stop talking to the others. They all say what I say. They all think what... Indeed. In the meantime I've started singing, today. And now I have a sore throat. Even the warden came to check it out since I

was singing at the top of my voice. "What are you doing?" the idiot asked me, "what are doing?" "I'm singing. Can't one sing?" 516 days in jail. 517 days in jail. 518 days in jail. Nineteen, twenty. Twenty-two. Twenty-three. Twenty-four. Twenty-five. My voice is strange. But it is recognizable among a thousand other voices. Now I know. 526. 527. 528. 529 days in jail I even know my feet very well and my legs and my balls. 530 days in jail I'm afraid of becoming important. I can't masterbate any more. 531 days in jail. 532 days in jail. 533 days in jail. 534, 554. 564 days in jail. Now I can stay I stop hours and hours with my eyes closed and when I finally move it's because I know that it's dark and another shitty day has slipped by me. 565 days in jail. In a true jail. In 500 566 days in a True Black Jail. 500 76. 586 days, 7, 8, 590 days in jail. 591 days in jail. If I shut my eyes very tightly I can see green and red. 592 days in jail. 593 days in jail. Four, five, ninety six, ninety-seven, ninety-eight, 599. Six hundred days in jail. DO YOU BASTARDS REALIZE THAT YOU'VE STUCK ME HERE IN THIS FUCKING JAIL FOR SIX HUNDRED DAYS? Six hundred days. I don't want to turn back as Lot did, yet I am already a statue. 601, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; 608 days in this immobile jail. VISITING HOURS! The warden screamed, I went to the sitting room, but in the hallway I suddenly felt the need to vomit. Oh Christ, not now, I have visitors. Oh no. Uh. I vomited iron bars, cell walls, years in jail, pieces of the rotten judge, I vomited 609 days in jail. Uh. In jail. Uh. In jail. Uh. Oh. Uh. Oh. Uhhh. Uhhh. Uhhh. Ohhh. Ohhh. Ohhh. 610 days in jail. I walk so much that my heels have become as hard as a horse's hooves, and a tail has risen from my back. A horse's tail. What uhhh's, what heeheehee's, I whinny and gallop and jump and rear up and come back down and stroke myself and sweat and faint and faint and get up again and heeheehee and ohhh and heeheehee and ohhhh. Like a horse. A horse that's been galloping for six hun... elev... twel... thir... four... fif... sixt... sev... eigh... nine!... twen... thir... for... fif... . sixt... ahh... sev... elgh... ni... ehh 650 days and days and days and days and days and days and uh and heeheehee and ehhh and... in... uh... uh... JA-UH-AIL. My sentence is finished. I'm free. I'm going to party. Why not? But... Oh... DID I MAKE A MISTAKE? two and a half years — nine hundred days. I understand. Uhhhhhhhhhh. I don't want to count any more. 651 days in jail. 652 days in jail. 653 days in jail. I'm a horse. Let me go. I shall close my eyes until the nine-hundredth day.

Two and a Half
Years in Jail

J. and V.

Translated by Lawrence Venuti

March 16, 1978 The Aldo Moro Kidnapping




B. Madaudo Melville

This comic strip of the Aldo Moro kidnapping by the Red Brigades was published in the first issue of *Metropoli*. It stresses the rigidity of both the Italian system and of the BR in the tight bargaining to save Moro's life in exchange for the liberation of a number of imprisoned brigadisti.

It also presents the unsuccessful attempts made by the "negotiation party" to unlock the situation.



Some details, like the location of Moro's hideout, were subsequently considered "evidence" by the Italian State, of a collusion between the Editors of *Metropoli* and the BR. As a result, the magazine was seized by the police.

(Translated by Vincenzo Buonocora)



FEB 8 1978

The man who got off has many names. To his friends he is "Blasco".




...MAYBE IT'S NOT THE RIGHT TIME - WE AREN'T JUST GOING TO HIT A FOREMAN OR A JUDGE, MORO IS INVOLVED HERE.



"WRONG, MARCO..."

"ANNA" leads a normal life, teaches in a school, belongs to a party...


I got a school meeting, don't wait up!




"MARCO", a chemist, just stopped working. He too has an appointment



"...IN the last months the movement has been heading towards civil war."



"BY TRYING CURCIO AND OTHER COMRADES..."





...THE STATE IS OUT TO PREVENT THAT FIGHTING ORGANIZATIONS ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS MOVEMENT.

We must give them an example of the offensive power of the mass struggle.



Sure, maybe they won't give in on the exchange of prisoners. Let's not fool ourselves. By kidnapping Moro we'll show the weakness of this regime... Even if they won't deal, they will have to recognize the reality of ARMED STRUGGLE.


9:05 A.M. Moro and his escort are driving along VIA FANI, IN ROME.





It's a risky undertaking, let's not forget SCHLEYER.







A "12B" makes a short stop in front of the CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT LEADER'S CAR.



MARCH 16th
8:55 AM.








MAY 7th It would be senseless now, cherishing any kind of hope. The parties are fused in a spurious Union & solidarity, & are therefore deaf to any humanitarian appeal. They don't understand that my death will shatter that political pad to the ephemeral stability of which they're proud to sacrifice me. Those in favor of a humanitarian move are up against the cowardice of my party who would favor a change of the party line.

Mr. Fanfani, we have precise information. The execution can be suspended if within 48 hrs, An Important D.C. member will take an open stand in favor of negotiations.



Those who dispute the authenticity of my letters fail to understand the core of the matter. An institutional compromise that does not include the political & social forces outside those in power is a puny accomplishment.


you all know the decision we reached after a long debate. Lets see now if something new has emersed.

MAY 8th 3 PM.

I still think that a live has a more disruptive effect on the political situation executing him is a mistake.



The situation is difficult. My friend party directors are going along with the P.C.I. we need proof that our openness to negotiations would be of any use.



Perhaps proof exists, but time is running out! Mr FANFANI you should come out in the open.




NOT TRUE. Moro's death will upset the political balance more than the exchange of prisoners.



I agree. they're trying to trap us with their delaying tactics. Even Bartolomei's speech offers nothing NEW.



Listen, Bartolomei. At the rally today, drop a hint of cautious openness. For now that's all we can do."



We gave them all the time they needed. We gave them another chance when the deadline was up. They're dragging it on to intensify the search. WE MUST EXECUTE MORO.



So, IS IT AGREED?

AGREED






MAY 8th 8 p.m.

Resident, the situation has taken...




11:00 P.M.
MAY 8th




...a bad turn.

I expected it.



It's hard accepting death Not only because of the people I love, but also when I think of the things I'd like to do... Against the inhuman rigidity of the parties, Against false friends.



Killing is hard, too But these are the laws of war.



I pictured myself many times how one dies. It's not so... What remains now is the lucid dismay of someone who is all alone - I cannot bear the thought of dying. Knowing that I have been sacrificed not to my cause, but to that of all those who condemned me.

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