Rethinking the Mind-Body Relationship in Early Modern Literature, Philosophy and Medicine

The Renaissance of the Body

Charis Charalampous
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This book examines a neglected feature of intellectual history and literature in the early modern period: the ways in which the body was theorized and represented as an intelligent agent, with desires, appetites and understanding independent of the mind. Its central aim is to rethink the origin of dualism commonly associated with Descartes; uncover hitherto unknown lines of reception; explore the importance of this intellectual history for readers’ responses to the period’s literary writing; and interrogate related ideological, formal and rhetorical aspects of literary art. Too many readers have been content to assume simplistically that mind and body were conjoined until Descartes, and then suddenly they were separated. But this is not how ideas are typically propagated, particularly ideas as fundamental and visceral as mind-body relations. This study gives a more nuanced and textured account of the ways that the body was itself imagined to be a thinking and feeling entity, one that was not merely associated with abjection, moral blemish and mortality, but with moral, spiritual and artistic gain. The book explores the development of the ontological phenomenon of the intelligent body across a wide range of genres, topics and authors, including Montaigne’s Essays, Spenser’s allegorical poetry, Donne’s metaphysical poetry, Shakespeare’s tragic dramaturgy and Milton’s epic poetry and shorter poems.

Charis Charalampous is the Toby Jackman Isaac Newton Research Fellow at St Edmund’s College, Cambridge, UK.
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1 Introduction
Intelligent Bodies in Early Modern Philosophy, Medicine and Literature

This book examines a neglected feature of intellectual history and literature in the early modern period: the ways in which the body was theorized and represented as an intelligent agent, with desires, appetites and understanding independent of the mind. Its central aim is to rethink the origin of dualism commonly associated with Descartes; uncover hitherto unknown lines of reception; explore the importance of this intellectual history for readers’ responses to the period’s literary writing; and interrogate related ideological, formal and rhetorical aspects of literary art. Too many readers have been content to assume simplistically that mind and body were conjoined until Descartes, and then suddenly they were separated. But this is not how ideas are typically propagated, particularly ideas as fundamental and visceral as mind-body relations. This study gives a more nuanced and textured account of the ways that the body was itself imagined to be a thinking and feeling entity, one that was not merely associated with abjection, moral blemish and mortality, but with moral, spiritual and artistic gain.

The book explores the development of the ontological phenomenon of the intelligent body across a wide range of genres, topics and authors, including Montaigne’s Essays, Spenser’s allegorical poetry, Donne’s metaphysical poetry, Shakespeare’s tragic dramaturgy and Milton’s epic poetry and shorter poems. The complexity and importance of the intelligent body shaped, to a significant extent, contemporary aesthetics and approaches to emotions, cure, cognitive psychology and theology. At the same time, it cut right through the heart of literary art because poets and dramatists used it as a means not only to represent the human body and mind in their works, but to structure the encounter of the reader with the text and to condition the experience of performance. My primary focus is on literature because it is in the contemplation and experience of art that we are tasked to synthesize the response of body and mind to a single stimulus, and to reflect upon the notion of a bisected and bi-subjective self. Literary art, above all, especially as it leaps off the page into reading aloud, into music and into theatrical representation involves us in ways that lead writers themselves to meditate on and exploit the experience of a bisected but bi-subjective self.

In early modern texts, be they literary, philosophical or medical, we frequently witness bodies invested with intelligence. In attributing to the body
memory, will, passions, imagination and understanding of its own, early moderns projected a psychological schema onto the somatic which operates independently but parallel to the conscious, rational mind. From Johannes Eck (1486–1543) and Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) to René Descartes (1596–1650) and his critics, this form of dualism occupied a central position in philosophical and theological enquiries, mainly because it furnished the intellectual framework for thinkers arguing for the personal immortality of the rational soul, as the Fifth Lateran Council of 1513 demanded that they do through a dogmatic proclamation urging them to prove the soul’s immortality by means of natural reason, not faith alone. In turn, theories of somatic cognition in philosophy, religious thought and medicine were tested and reworked in literary culture. The Ecumenical Council’s decree and the rise of Descartes’ philosophy of the mind-body relationship constitute the bookends of this study’s inquiry into a form of dualism based upon analogy (i.e. both constituent components capable of thought) rather than opposition (i.e. the body as an unthinking thing). In order to highlight the body’s independent cognitive abilities, the book focuses primarily on instances where early modern writers and thinkers represented it as capable of understanding what the intellect is unable to grasp, as well as on occasions where they held that the body is able to contradict the mind’s judgments and intentions.

Glimpses of the history of the intelligent body are often captured in secondary literature. In her seminal study *The Body Embarrassed*, Gail Kern Paster found that the everyday functioning of internal organs was “tumultuous and dramatic” even in health, noting that this aspect of early modern physiology “ascribes to the workings of the internal organs agency, purposiveness, and plenitude to which the subject’s own will is often decidedly irrelevant” (Paster 1993, 10). As Paster indicates here, evidence suggests that various early modern physicians, philosophers and literary writers did not understand the unwilled physiological alterations of the body as mere reactions caused by a mechanical imbalance of the body’s fluids, but as physiological processes suggestive of “agency,” “purposiveness” and “plenitude.” Paster, however, does not explore these cognitive aspects of the body and their consequences for literary art, as her main purpose is to link the suppression of bodily secretions and evacuations and the appearance of new kinds of bodily shame to the supersedure within medical science of humoral theory. Yet, a central question that grows naturally out of the research devoted to the body in this period is what it means to say that bodies are autonomous entities whose operations demonstrate “agency, purposiveness, and plenitude.” This view points at a shared understanding of the somatic as a cognitive agent in its own right, one that has the ability to respond to events and assess situations meaningfully and independently of the mind.

More recently, the contributors to *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare’s Theatre: the Early Modern Body-Mind* have provided thought-provoking insights into the notion of the intelligent and autonomous body, encouraging
us to “query the standard historical attribution of a damaging dualism to the ‘wound inflicted by the Cartesian split of mind and body’” (Johnson, Sutton and Tribble 2014, 1–2). Jan Purnis’s “The Belly-Mind Relationship in Early Modern Culture: Digestion, Ventriloquism, and the Second Brain” is particularly outspoken in its insistence on the notion of somatic intelligence. Here, Purnis presents “a belly that is especially thoughtful, seemingly with the capacity to think and reason on its own and even to undertake the complex intellectual work involved in making up an audit. Although the importance of all organs working together is a key element of the moral of the fable, the belly appears able to operate independently of the brain and heart” (Purnis 2014, 238). Purnis, then, suggests a form of intelligence on the body’s part, one that demonstrates autonomous thinking and reasoning capabilities, linking this ontology to modern advances in medical and cognitive science, particularly Michael Gershon’s The Second Brain: A Groundbreaking New Understanding of Nervous Disorders of the Stomach and Intestine. And Michael Schoenfeldt has observed that the physiology suggested in Donne’s writings “underpins a world where bodies could be imagined to speak and think, where blood could be characterised as eloquent” (Schoenfeldt 2009, 145). But what exactly does the body think of independently of the conscious mind during the act of reading? What are the historical and epistemological foundations for this understanding of the body as an intelligent and autonomous cognitive agent? And how did the theory of the intelligent body animate the intended effects of key literary devices as those devices are presupposed to operate within the horizon of the period’s notions of perception? It is this history, its complexity and significance that this book seeks to recover.

In this introductory chapter, I explore, in brief, examples in contemporary philosophy, medicine and literature which represent the phenomenon of the intelligent body. My aim is to introduce the ontology of the intelligent body and show that it was not an isolated phenomenon that can be attributed to a very limited set of authors, but an ontological outlook well-woven into the literary and intellectual fabrics of the early modern period. Here I also trace the origins of the notion of the autonomous and intelligent body back to the philosophy of William of Ockham (c.1287–1347), who may be conceived of as the first dualist.

THE BODY “THINKS AND JUDGES”
(MELANCTHON 1998, 240)

Early modern natural philosophers and physicians divided the powers of the body or, more accurately, of the organic soul-body composite, into the powers of the external and internal senses. The former gather information from the surrounding world and the latter process this information and yield the results to the intellectual soul or mind, the distinctive cognitive processes of
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which are conceptual apprehension, reasoning and self-reflection. In order

to exemplify the dominant view of the cognitive processes that the body

performs, we may appeal to Pierre de La Primaudaye’s (1546–1619) sum-

mary of the cognitive powers of the organic soul’s internal senses, which are

“diuided by some into three kindes, by others into fiue. They which make

fiue, distinguish betweene the common sense, the imagination, and the fan­tasie, making them three: and for the fourth they add Reason, or the judg­
ing facultie: and for the fift, Memorie. They that make but three kinds differ

not from the other, but onely in that they comprehend all the former three

ynder the common sense, or ynder one of the other twaine, whether it be the

imagination or the fantasie” (Primaudaye 1594, 131). Despite its precarious

name, “reason” does not refer to the rational mind or the intellective soul. It

has this name because of its ability to produce judgments based on a cogni­
tive process that resembles an intellectual cognitive process. As the popular

treatise Batman uppon Bartholome has it:

THE vertue of feeling that commeth of the soule sensible, is a vertue, by

which the soule knoweth & iudgeth of coulours, of sauours, and of other obiects that be knowne by the vverter wits. The vertue imagi­
natiue is it, whereby wée apprehend likenesse and shapes of things of perticulars recceyued, though they bée absent: As when it séeemeth that

we sée golden hills, either else when through the similitude of other hills

we dreame of the hill Pernasus. The vertue Estimatiue, or the reason

sensible is it, whereby in being heedfull! to auoide euill, & follow that

is good, men be prudent & sage. And this vertue Estimatiue is common
to vs & to other beasts: As it is scéne in hounds & also in wolues: but

properly to speak, they vse no reason, but they vse a busie & strong esti­
mation, but héereof we shall speake in another place. But Memoratiue

is a vertue conservatiue or recordatiue, wherby the likenesse of things,

least they should be forgot, we lay vp & safely reserue. Therefore one

said, the Memory is the coffor or chest of reason.

(Bartholomaeus and Batman 1582, 15v)

This form of sensory cognition (reason sensible) had a longstanding history

in medieval theories of cognition since Avicenna’s (c.980–1037) postulation

of an estimative power located in the inner senses that distinguishes between

various features of perceptible objects. Avicenna posited the existence of an

estimative faculty in order to explain the innate ability in all animals, includ­
ing humans, to sense an intention that is intrinsic to the object. Intentions are

the extra-sensible properties that an object presents to an animal or person

at the moment of perception. These intentions affect the perceiver power­

fully, such as the negative feelings a sheep senses in perceiving a wolf, or the

positive feelings sensed in perceiving a friend or child (see Black 1993 and

Tachau 1993). It is this faculty’s ability to perform judgments that prompted

early modern thinkers to name it “reason” or “reason sensible.”
In his *Table of Humane Passions*, Nicolas Coeffeteau elaborated on the cognitive powers of the organic soul. He wrote that “the Knowing powers” of the organic soul “are of two sorts, that is to say, the Exterior and the Interior” (Coeffeteau 1621, A12r). “The Interior powers capable of Knowledge,” he continues, are three, “whereof the first is the Common sense” (Coeffeteau 1621, a1v). Its main duty is to receive the sentient qualities of a cognitive object, “Compare them, Discerne them, and Judge of them” (Coeffeteau 1621, ar). The function of Coeffeteau’s “common sense” corresponds to Primaudaye’s “Reason” or Bartholomaeus’ (and Batman’s) “reason sensible,” as by means of this faculty “the creature may distinguish that which is healthfull from that is hurtfull” (Coeffeteau 1621, ar). Reason then sends the information to “another Power meerely Knowing, which is called the Imaginative; as that wherein are graven the formes of things which are offred unto it by the common sense, to the end the knowledge may remaine after they are vanished away” (Coeffeteau 1621, a2v). As in Bartholomaeus’ (and Batman’s) account, the imagination’s role here is to preserve and project the form of the cognitive object which the common sense has judged in the physical absence of that cognitive object. Then, imagination sends this information to the “Store-house and Treasury […] which is the memory” (Coeffeteau 1621, a2v). Its function is to present to the common sense the forms which have been “consigned unto her.” For this reason, memory “may well bee sayd also to helpe to Knowledge” (Coeffeteau 1621, a2r). It should be noted that the intellect has not, as yet, been involved in the process: A person’s body performs these cognitive processes without the need to apply any corresponding concept. The body can perform judgements, store and recall information, and prompt an action without the need for any discursive, linguistic content.

A number of early modern authors adopted this terminology in their divisions of the powers of the body’s internal senses. Sir Thomas Elyot (c.1490–1546) notes that “wha the thing selfe is removed out of sight that impression that remaineth is called imagination who comittith it forthwith unto memori” (Elyot 1533, 34v). Similarly, Guglielmo Gratarolo (c.1516–c.1568) writes that “There be three operations of the [organic] soule in the braine, fantasie (or imagination), reasonyng (or judgement), and memeorie (or remembrance)” (Gratarolo 1562, B.ii.r). Lodowick Bryskett (1547–1612) offers a similar account (Bryskett 1606, 123). Helkiah Crooke (1576–1635) explains the function of each of these faculties at more length: “This common sense Aristotle compareth to the center of a circle, because the shapes and forms received by the outward senses are referred or brought hereunto as unto a Judge and Censor” (Crooke 1615, 502). Then, he continues, the imagination “apprehendeth andretaineth the same images or representations which the common sense received; but now more pure and free from all contagion of the matter, so that thogh those things that move the senses be taken away or otherwise doe vanish, yet their footsteps and expresse Characters might remaine with us” (502). Finally, memory is
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a “faithful Recorder” (502). Likewise, Robert Burton (1577–1640) notes that “This common sense is the judge or moderator of the rest, by whom we discerne all differences of objects [...] Phantasie, or Imagination, which some call Aestimative or Cogitative, confirmed, saith Fernelius, by frequent meditation, is an inner sense, which doth more fully examine the species perceaved by common sense, of things present or absent, and keepes them longer, recalling them to minde againe, or making new of his owne” (Burton 1621, 35). Burton adds here that imagination is stronger in people suffering from melancholy, as well as in poets and painters. “In men,” he continues, the imagination “is subject and governed by Reason, or at least should be” (36). Burton’s “should be” is highly suggestive, as it allows for the emergence of an ontological phenomenon wherein the imagination may rise above the governance of reason and directly prompt an action. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) describes this topography as the “Janus of imagination,” with its one face turned towards the intellect and the other towards the senses. “It is true,” Bacon explains in the Second Book of The Advancement of Learning, “that the imagination is an Agent, or Nuntius in bothe provinces, both iudiciall, and Ministerial. For sence sendeth over to imagination before reason have iudged; and reason sendeth over to imagination, before the Decree can be acted. For imagination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion. Saving that this Janus of imagination hath differing faces” (Bacon 1605, 47r). Accordingly, the imagination does not perform the office of the messenger alone, but is itself invested with authority. The power relation between imagination and intellect, in Bacon’s pictorial description, is one of succession: “Reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen; who may come also to rule in his turne” (Bacon 1605, 47r). According to Bacon’s logic, not only does imagination precede conscious action, but it can also prompt an action directly and define human behaviour.

In order to gain a better insight into the workings of these somatic components, we may turn to Melanchthon’s Liber de Anima. Following the traditional view of the cognitive powers of the body, Melanchthon notes that the organic soul consists of five external and three internal senses, and depends on corporeal organs to exercise its powers (Melanchthon 1998, 255). According to Melanchthon, the internal senses are “common sense, thought or composition, and memory,” and they are responsible for retaining and manipulating the sensible species received by the five external senses (Melanchthon 1998, 240). Melanchthon explains the workings of each part: common sense “perceives the images offered by the external senses, and discerns the objects of the individual senses”; composition, is the force “of composing and dividing, [and] draws one thing from another as it thinks and judges”; and memory “retains the objects and records them” (Melanchthon 1998, 240). It should be noted that the rational mind is not involved in this process. The human body is able to discern between objects through cognition, judge them and store these judgments, but it does so without the activation of the conceptual apparatus of the intellectual soul.
To illustrate his account with an example, Melanchthon tells the story of Leo (the Lion), who “saw a doctor in the circus at Rome who had once extracted a thorn from a wound, and since he retained in his head his image and the memory of his good deed, he recognized him and distinguished him from others by his own process of composition, and thought of him, in a sense, as pleasantly as he had when he accepted the good deed” (Melanchthon 1998, 239–40). In this instance, common sense compared the individual data gathered by the various external senses. Composition then combined and divided the sensible qualities of the cognitive object and yielded a new image; in this case, the image of the doctor as a source of pleasure. Finally, memory stored the images derived from the external senses and the judgment of composition. Affected by these sentient cognitive processes Leo experiences a pleasant feeling which is naturally activated at the mere sight of the cognitive object. Melanchthon’s literary ploy to frame his account as the story of Leo (the Lion) reminds the reader that the cognitive processes he describes take place in the organic, animal soul.

Having described the faculties of the organic soul’s internal senses, Melanchthon proceeds to explain its “appetitive ability,” which is itself “associated with cognition, as the senses show what is helpful and harmful to their life” (Melanchthon 1998, 241). This appetitive ability is divided into three parts: “the natural, the sensitive, and the voluntary” (Melanchthon 1998, 242). The natural part involves appetites such as thirst and hunger (Melanchthon 1998, 242), which occur naturally in all living beings. In the sensitive appetite arise passions like delight and sadness, which can be activated “either through contact or without it” (Melanchthon 1998, 242). When one’s feet, for example, are cold, s/he will naturally undergo a certain pleasure when exposed to the warmth of fire. Alternatively, when the subject touches fire, s/he will naturally feel pain. Sadness, according to Melanchthon, is linked to pain and entails “a wounding or laceration of the nerves or nerve-endings of the skin” (Melanchthon 1998, 242). In the appetitive ability there are also passions or affects, which constitute a self-contained cognitive system (the voluntary part): These affects perform their own cognitive processes, impose their own judgments, and accordingly shape the psychology and behaviour of the subject. Affects like love, hope, fear and anger (Melanchthon 1998, 245) do not have their sites in the ventricles of the brain but in the heart (Melanchthon 1998, 243), and they have the capacity to be activated on their own accord. Depending on the stimulus they receive from reason, affects are either pleasant or painful. Melanchthon explains that when we “obey our awareness of the right things,” that is, when we experience pleasure because we are intellectually aware that we do the right things, then we “rejoice in the knowledge of agreeing with God” (Melanchthon 1998, 244). This kind of emotion, Melanchthon teaches, “aid[s] nature.” On the other hand, there are emotions that destroy human nature. This destruction is nevertheless beneficial as it helps humans regenerate (Melanchthon 1998, 244). Feelings such as
sadness, fear, anger and hatred “come from an awareness of something bad, whether it be bad for the whole person or a part” (Melanchthon 1998, 244). Human beings feel shame, for instance, as a punishment for their “wicked deeds.” In this respect, emotions perform the office of the judge, reflecting the divine power that implanted them within human nature (Melanchthon 1998, 243). Emotions therefore form an innate cognitive mechanism, naturally “planted in us in order that there be performers of perceptions and laws within us” (Melanchthon 1998, 244). In Melanchthon’s view, not all emotions are corrupting forces to be rejected: “It is absolutely certain that in no way are all emotions bad by their own nature” (Melanchthon 1998, 251). Rather, when emotions are in agreement with reason, then we have what Melanchthon calls “political leadership,” and real virtue is thereby elicited, but when mind and body are in dispute, reason must restrain passions, in which case we have “Despotic leadership” (Melanchthon 1998, 248, 280–1).

For early moderns, the role of the internal senses in cognition was so central that their malfunction was thought to cause madness. According to Thomas Adams (c.1612–1653), in order to “vnderstand the force of madness, we must conceiue in the brayne three ventricles; as houses assign’d by Physitians for three dwellers, Imagination, Reason, and Memorie. According to these three internal senses or faculties, there be three kinds of Phrenses or Madnesses” (Adams 1615, 35). For Adams, madness can be rooted in a damaged somatic faculty, which will give rise to a particular type of mental disorder. For example, “There are some, that be hurt in both imagination and reason, and they necessarily therewithall doe lose their memories. That whereas in perfect, sober, and well composed men, Imagination first conceiues the formes of things, and presents them to the reason to iudge; and reason discerning them, commits them to Memorie to retaine: in mad-men nothing is conceiu’d aright, therefore nothing deriu’d, nothing retayn’d” (Adams 1615, 35). Having described the forms of madness rooted in the body’s internal senses, Adams proceeds to describe the types of madness rooted in the intellectual, spiritual soul: “For spiritual relation, we may conceiue in the soule; understanding, reason, will. 1. The understanding apprehendeth things according to their right natures. 2. The Reason discusseth them, arguing their fitness or inconuenience, validity or vanity: and examines their desert of probation or disallowance, their worthiness euyther to be receyued or reiected. 3. The Will hath her particular working, and embraceth, or refuseth the obiects, which the understanding hath propounded, & the reason discoursed. Spiritual madnesse is a deprauation, or almost depriuation of all these faculties” (Adams 1615, 35–36). Adams’s “understanding” corresponds to the type of cognition that scholastic philosophers had termed “intellectual intuitive cognition,” which is responsible for automatically applying the corresponding concept to the now interiorized perception of the cognitive object. “Reason” corresponds to the “intellectual abstractive cognition,” which deals with concepts and derives universal
essences from both the actual existence of a cognitive object and from the recollection of that object. For scholastic philosophers, it is only by means of the intellectual abstractive cognition (Adams’s “reason”) that universal ideas are abstracted and discursive/reflective thinking is enabled, as the intellectual intuitive cognition (Adams’s “understanding”) can process only mental terms that exist subjectively in the cognitive object. That is, intellectual intuitive cognition is a proper cognition of singulars only. Adams’s “will,” as in scholastic philosophy, is an independent cognitive mechanism that can act in conformity with the judgments of the intellect, but it does not have to. It can choose between being neutral towards an object, accepting its qualities or rejecting them despite reason’s dictates. Like sensory cognition and intellectual intuitive cognition (Adams’s “understanding”), the will is an independent and unconscious cognitive mechanism. The will emerges as another natural thinking component, one that is an intellectual power and yet constitutes an autonomous and unconscious thinking thing, drawing the processes of sensory cognition to an even closer epistemological proximity with the cognitive processes taking place in the intellective soul. As Vesa Hirvonen has it in her discussion of scholastic theories of the passions of the will, “the will and its phenomena resemble the sensory appetite and its phenomena [because] the will is not bound by the judgments of reason. Some of its acts are unpremeditated reactions to things, and even when the intellect evaluates alternative ways of reaction, the will does not necessarily conform to the judgments of reason” (Hirvonen 2004, 72–73. See also Knuuttila 2002, 77–78).

Like Adams’s account of the types of madness afflicting humans, Philip Barrough (d. 1600) identifies the malfunction of the body’s internal senses as a possible cause for phrenitis, a particular type of brain inflammation accompanied by fever:

PHRENITIS in Greeke and in Latin is a disease, wherin the mind is hurte, & doth differ only from madnes, which is called in Greeke and Latine Melancholia, or Mania. For that a feuer is ioyned with the phrenisy, and therfor the frenisy may be called a continuall madnes & fury ioyned with a sharpe feuer. Galen saith that the frenisy is an inflammation of the braine or of the filmes therof. Aetius saith that it is an inflammation of the filmes of the braine with an acute feuer, causing raging and vexation of the mind. Ther be three kindes of frenisies (as Galen doth witnesse in his fourth Booke de Locis affectis. cap. 40.) according to the internal senses, which be three in number, that is imagination, cogitation & memory, which may seuerally be hurt.

(Barrough 1583, 17)

In his Arcana microcosmi, or, The hid secrets of man’s body discovered, Alexander Ross (1591–1654) explains the connection between common sense’s malfunction and madness at some more length. He begins by noting
that the internal senses consist of the powers of common sense, imagination and memory. The former, Ross notes, “apprehends and judgeth the objects of the outward senses [...] the eye cannot put difference between colours and smells, but the common sense doth; and though the eye see, yet it doth not know it self to see, that is the work of the common sense; therefore mad men in whom this sense is hurt, see, but perceive not” (Ross 1652, 67).

According to these accounts, the body performs cogitations that resemble reason, it has its own imagination and memory, and its estimative power resembles the function of the will. Thus, Richard Baxter’s (1615–1691) account seeks to differentiate between the rational and sensitive souls in a way that suggests an analogy rather than opposition between the two. He notes that the former’s distinctive characteristic is meditation, although the sensitive soul is also capable of some kind of meditation too: “I call this Meditation [The acting of the powers of the Soul] meaning the soul as Rational, to difference it from the cogitations of the soul as Sensitive; the Sensitive soul hath a kinde of Meditation by the common sense, the Phantasie, and Estimation” (Baxter 1649, 691). Similarly, Mathew Hale (1609–1676) observes that the internal senses “have some adumbration of the Rational Nature,” continuing to draw a symmetry between the estimative power and the will (Hale 1677, 46). And in his New Method of Studying and Practising Physick, Simeon Partlicius (d.1620–1624) notes that in humans exists “The Intellelctive Animal Vertue,” which is “called Understanding, and consists either in doing or suffering” (Partlicius 1654, 169). The distinction of mind and body, intellect and organic soul, is based upon analogy, not contradiction (i.e. intellectual thought and passive matter, subject and object). Here, then, we may observe a shift in the traditional dualism paradigm (i.e. thinking/unthinking), as a number of early modern physicians and thinkers advocated a form of dualism wherein they projected a psychological schema onto the somatic by investing it with will, memory, imagination and reason of its own.

The notion that the body is capable of performing complicated forms of cognition independently of the mind was highly suggestive for early modern literary writers, who represented this ontological outlook’s implications for human psychology and behaviour in varied ways. The idea that the somatic can contradict the rational mind based on a judgement that appears to possess superior intelligence was particularly common among early modern poets and dramatists. In “Rules and Lessons,” Henry Vaughan (1621–1695) advises: “Injure not modest bloud, whose spirits rise / In judgment against Lewdness” (Vaughan 1655, 56). Vaughan presents us here with a body invested with the ability to judge against lewdness, thereby guarding the intellective, immaterial principle it houses against moral corruption. The traditional view of reason as the faculty that is meant to control the powerful sway of passions is reversed, as it is the body that seeks to avert the intellect’s inclination toward corruption. Likewise, in Christopher Marlowe’s (1564–1593) Dr Faustus the body acts against reason’s self-indulgent and sinful inclinations in order to protect the human composite from sin. Here,
Faustus’s body, although cut, refuses to bleed, expressing thus its unwillingness to sign the pact with the devil (Marlowe 2003, 5.61-73). More than a parabolic myth that falls outside the bounds of contemporary scientific and philosophical discourses, this incident participates in a rich intellectual framework that invested the body with cognitive capabilities. In “Timber,” Vaughan makes serious use of the idea of “resentience,” the idea that the body of a murdered man will show its resentment of the murderer’s presence by bleeding afresh from its wounds:

So murthered man, when lovely life is done,
And his blood freeze’d, keeps in the Center still
Some secret sense, which makes the dead blood run
At his approach, that did the body kill.
And is there any murther’er worse then sin?
Or any storms more foul than a lewd life?
Or what Resentient can work more within,
Then true remorse, when with past sins at strife? (Vaughan 1655, 23)

Although evacuated of the spiritual soul, the agent of rational thought and intellectual cognition, the body is still in possession of a sense that can understand and respond to its surrounding world. In Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) *Troilus and Cressida*, Ulysses does not merely read Cressida’s body, but her body is speaking: “There’s language in her eye, her cheek, her lip; / Nay, her foot speaks. Her wanton spirits look out / At every joint and motive of her body” (Shakespeare 2005, 4.1. 58–59). Such forms of language use may produce an alienation effect on modern audiences, for whereas we may usually think that the agent of action is a unified and domineering I(ntellect), early moderns tended to transfer the agency of the personal I to impersonal, material, bodily organs. The I of the early modern subject is not the sole agent of cognition and action. In this context, mind and body figure as two really distinct entities that often engage in dialogues and disputes: “my soul disputes well with my sense” (4.3.9), Sebastian states in *Twelfth Night*, demonstrating how the sensitive faculties of the human body are invested with autonomous cognitive properties that resemble those of the intellect. Likewise, in *Troilus and Cressida* Ulysses tells us that “twixt his mental and active parts / Kingdomed Achilles in commotion rages / And batters ‘gainst himself” (2.3.171–3). In Edmund Spenser’s (1552–1599) *Amoretti and Epithalamion* we read:

Vayne man (quod I) that has but little priefe
in deep discouery of the mynds disease,
is not the hart of all the body chiefe?
and rules the members as it selfe doth please (Spenser 1595, D3v).

Spenser attributes to the body autonomy of thought here, going even as far as to suggest that it is the governing function of the human composite.
And in James Shirley's (1596–1666) *The Constant Maid*, Close (servant to Hartwell) confesses to Nurse (servant to Bellamy and Frances): “I have / A humour now and then, when I am ask’d / A question, to tell true, though I be chid for’t; / And I do not love blows” (Shirley 1640, D4v). Accordingly, the body can prompt an action that contradicts the rational mind’s inclinations and will. Such instances promote a view of the somatic as an autonomous and intelligent cognitive agent. It is a thinking thing, as poets and dramatists invest matter with a psychology and a consciousness separate from the familiar conscious consciousness.

**THE ORIGINS OF THE ONTOLOGY OF THE INTELLIGENT BODY**

The origins of the ontological phenomenon of the intelligent body can be traced back to the writings of William of Ockham. *Pace* his predecessors and contemporaries, who either argued that mind and body comprise a single substantial form or that they are to be distinguished only formally for analytical purposes, Ockham contends that mind and body are really distinct, adducing a number of arguments to corroborate this thesis. Three are particularly important: “my first proof that they are really distinct is as follows: It is impossible that contraries should exist simultaneously in the same subject. But an act of desiring something and an act of spurning that same thing are contraries in the same subject. Therefore, if they exist simultaneously in reality, they do not exist in the same subject” (Ockham 1991, 1:132–3). Ockham points out here that the acts performed by the mind and body can contradict each other. For example, a person may desire something with his/her senses but at the same time intellectually abhor the same object and vice versa. If the sensory and intellectual souls were identical, two contrary appetitive acts regarding the same object would not be possible.³

The second proof concerns the fact that “sensations exist subjectively in the sentient soul […] And they do not exist subjectively in the intellective soul. Therefore the two souls are distinct” (Ockham 1991, 1:133). The sensory soul is the subject of the sensations, which exist in the sensory soul as in a subject. The sentient soul gathers data from the sensible qualities of a cognitive object and yields images of that object. What the intellect processes are these images, or *phantasms*, not the sentient qualities themselves.⁴ Since the intellect cannot act upon sensations directly, it follows that the two souls are really distinct. Accordingly, Ockham introduces an ontology whereby the sentient soul’s capacity to act upon itself recalls the intellective soul’s ability of self-reflection. “The same thing,” Ockham notes, “can act upon itself not only by means of a spiritual action, as is the case with the intellect and the will, but also by means of a corporeal action.” The sentient soul is thus, in Ockham’s terminology, both an “agent” and a “patient” (Ockham 1991, 1:299).
Ockham’s third main proof is that the sensory soul is always present in the body and, therefore, subject to material conditions, whereas the intellective soul is immaterial and not extended: “Third, I argue as follows: It is not the case that what is numerically the same form is both extended and non-extended, both material and immaterial. But in a human being the sentient soul is extended and material, whereas the intellective soul is not, since it exists as a whole in the whole [body] and as a whole in each part” (Ockham 1991, 1:134). Ockham rejects here the Thomist stipulation that there is numerically one substantial form in each human being, arguing instead that we are conjunctions of three really distinct forms: the form of corporeity, the sensory form or soul and the intellectual form or soul. The sensitive soul is extended throughout the body, it is transmitted through human generation, that is, through the seed of the parents, and it is corruptible and mortal (Ockham 1967–1988, 7:268, 275 and 6:124, 136–8). The intellectual soul, by contrast, is a “nonorganic power” that “does not need a corporeal organ in its action” and is hence immortal (Ockham 1991, 1:305–6. See also Ockham 1967–1988, 5:307, 6:270–1 and 7:79, 121–2). Even when a person “lacks all sentient intuitive cognition [i.e., senses],” Ockham notes, s/he nonetheless “experiences an intellectual cognition” (Ockham 1991, 1:69). This addition renders the intellective soul a purely spiritual essence, one that can exist and be aware of its existence even in the absence of the sentient faculties, as “our intellect [can] know its own acts intuitively” (Ockham 1991, 1:68). It is in this connection that George Lawson (c.1598–1678) noted that “A Person was defined long ago by Occam, to be Suppositum intellectuale, an individual intellectual Substance, subsisting by itself” (Lawson 1659, 31). Thus, whereas the sentient, organic soul is “extended, generable, and corruptible,” the intellective soul is “immaterial […] ingenerable and incorruptible” (Ockham 1991, 1:57, 56), that is, it is divinely created and infused into human beings: “the intellectual soul […] is produced by the only one who is able to create it outside of matter — and this is God alone” (Ockham 1991, 1:129).

This account may naturally raise the problem of the two components’ interaction. Ockham addresses this difficulty directly: “it would seem that the intellect does not have an intuitive cognition: first, because an intuitive cognition [apprehends] only singular things, whereas the intellect understands only universals” (Ockham 1967–1988, 6:121–2). Ockham points here at the difficulty of positing a cognitive component in the intellect that is subject to singulars, for if it is an immaterial power indeed, then it follows that it would be impossible for it to apprehend something which exists subjectively in a material object. Ockham provides a solution to this problem by drawing attention to the cognitive processes taking place in the exterior (i.e. sentient intuitive cognition) and the interior senses (sentient abstractive cognition), noting that the mind can never be the subject of anything pertaining to the former: “those things that pertain to the exterior [senses], the mind does not sense at all, that is to say, it understands intuitively without
For Ockham, then, this is a purely spiritual intuition or, more accurately, an intellectual intuitive cognition. This is possible because the mind is capable of processing the images or phantasms that the interior senses produce after processing the data gathered by the exterior senses. In order to reinforce his argument, Ockham evokes Aristotle’s authority: “I say that it is not the intention of the Philosopher to argue that nothing is understood by the intellect except that which is perceived by the senses, but that nothing is understood by the intellect which is perceived by the exterior senses except that which is perceived by the [interior] senses” (Ockham 1967–1988, 1:67–68). This argument is connected to Ockham’s second proof for the real distinction between mind and body, where he argues that the intellect cannot be the subject of sensations. Rather, the body apprehends through the external senses the sentient qualities of an object. Then, the inner senses produce and store a phantasm of that object. The intellect can have a cognitive intuition of this interior product, not of its sentient qualities themselves (see also Ockham 1967–1988, 5:294). Accordingly, the interior senses process the qualities of a sentient object in such a way that they render it a phantasm, that is, an interiorised perception that has no longer physical or objective reality, enabling thus the unextended and spiritual intellect to produce contingent judgments about the surrounding world. Thus, insofar as Ockham provided proofs for the real distinction of mind and body, argued for the immateriality and immortality of the rational soul, and offered a solution to the interaction problems that such an ontological theory introduces, he may be conceived of as the first dualist.

Ockham’s dualism survived to flourish during the early modern period. Particularly in the wake of the Fifth Lateran Council’s demand to prove the soul’s immortality by means of natural reason, not faith alone, early modern thinkers turned to Ockham’s theories, whose name was associated during the period with the real distinction of mind and body. For example, Melanchthon disputes the idea that the soul is substantially one, arguing that the rational soul does not depend on organs to carry out its operations. Instead, it is incorporeal and therefore immortal. As a proof of this, Melanchthon quotes Aristotle: “The mind alone comes from without, and it alone is divine, because it does not communicate any of its actions to the actions of the body” (Melanchthon 1540, 20). Immediately after quoting Aristotle, Melanchthon evokes Ockham in order to corroborate the thesis of the real distinction between mind and body: “Ockham, the most acute man, argues that the souls in man are distinct in reality [reipsa], rational and sentient. And he puts forth many arguments as proofs for his opinion. The appetites are contrary, rational and sensual, therefore it is necessary to be distinct substances, because in one and the same and indivisible nature, contrary appetites cannot exist simultaneously” (Melanchthon 1540, 20–21). Melanchthon is appealing here to the first proof that Ockham provides in order to argue that the rational and sentient souls are really distinct. Following Ockham, Melanchthon goes on
to conclude that humans are conjunctions of one organic soul, made from human generation (*ex traduce*) and propagated through the seed of the parents, and one rational and immortal soul, created by God and infused into humans (Melanchthon 1540, 21–22).

Among the early modern thinkers who also acknowledge Ockham as the first dualist who proved the rational soul’s immortal by means of natural reason are Johannes Eck (1486–1543), a German Scholastic theologian and defender of Catholicism during the protestant Reformation (Eck 1512, Dr); Agrippa (1486–1535), who was widely read by poets and philosophers throughout the period (Agrippa 1676, 139); Petrus Tartaretus, a French Scotist philosopher and theologian (Tartaretus 1583, 155); Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), a Dominican priest and Scholastic theologian best known as one of the major figures of the School of Salamanca (Soto 1557, 453); one of de Soto’s most distinguished students Francisco de Toledo (1532–1596 [Toledo 1591, 205r]); Pierre de La Primaudaye (1546–1619), another major writer whose celebrated *French Academie* was widely read (Primaudaye 1618, 579. See also Primaudaye 1596, 430–1); Jacobus Typotius (1540–1601), court historian to the Emperor Rudolph II (1552–1612 [Typotius 1595, 142]); Rudolph Snellius (1546–1613), a highly influential Dutch linguist and mathematician whose students included figures such as Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609) and Hugo Grotius (1583–1645 [Snellius 1596, 52]); Cornelius à Lapide (1567–1637), Flemish Jesuit and exegete who was a Professor of Holy Scripture and Hebrew at Leuven and Rome (Lapide 1732, 29); Gregor Horst (1578–1636), the outstanding German physician and anatomist at the University of Giessen who founded the Academia Ludoviciana in 1607 (Horst 1661, 415–6); Johann Angelius von Werdenhagen (1581–1652), a highly respected German philosopher, political scientist and diplomat (Werdenhagen 1632, 54); Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655 [Gassendi 1678, 480–1]); John Evelyn (1620–1706 [Evelyn 1636, 115]); the authors of the celebrated *A General Dictionary* (1734–1741 [Bayle 1734–1741, 8:768]); Jean Gironnet (Gironnet 1690, 231–2); and the annotator of Scotus’s *In VIII libros physicorum Aristotelis quaestiones* (Scotus 1639, 595).

The widespread dissemination of Ockham’s theory of the mind-body relationship during the period alerts us to the need to map out the indirect ways in which the Ockhamist dualism penetrated early modern culture. For example, Melanchthon’s treatise on the soul was highly influential, particularly in protestant countries, while Gassendi’s two-soul account and his arguments for immortality were popular throughout the seventeenth century, particularly in the scientific community, being explicitly accepted by, for instance, Walter Charleton (1619–1707 [Charleton 1674, bb4v, E7r]), Francis Bacon (Bacon 1638, 263) and Thomas Willis (Willis 1683, 40–42). Among the writers who adopted this ontological outlook and demonstrate familiarity with Ockham’s writings are Jean Calvin (1509–1564), who, like Melanchthon, employs Ockham’s first proof to argue for the real distinction between mind and body (Calvin 1561, C.viiv [The seconde booke] and
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G. viir [The Fyrst Booke]; James Howell (c.1594–1666), who follows the Ockhamist stipulation that whereas the organic soul is produced ex traduce and is therefore mortal, the rational soul is divinely created and therefore immortal (Howell 1650, 84); Richard Baxter (Baxter 1675, 74–76, 87 [The First Part] and 88 [The Second Book]); Anthony Burgess (d.1664 [Burgess 1688, 130, 374]); and John Owen (1616–1683 [Owen 1676, 75, 263]).

Ockham’s philosophy marked a turning point in the intellectual history of the body and its relation to the mind as it helped to establish what would otherwise be a matter of faith alone: the real distinction between an immaterial, immortal intellect and a material, mortal body. This division facilitated the development of an intellectual current of thought in which the body is studied and treated as an independent cognitive agent. It is on the basis of this connection that Descartes launched his attacks on the Ockhamist dualism. Like Ockham and his early modern successors, Descartes, who invokes the declaration of the Fifth Lateran Council regarding the soul’s immortality (Descartes 1985–1991, 2:4), postulates that body and mind are distinct as material and immaterial, extended and unextended. However, he also argues that mind and body are distinct as thinking and unthinking, thus marking a break from an intellectual tradition that was woven into the intellectual fabric of early modern culture. In the seventh set of objections to Descartes’ Meditations, Pierre Bourdin (1595–1653) objected to Descartes’ view and drew a distinction between a reflective intellect and a body that is capable of sentient cognition alone (Descartes 1985–1991, 2:364). Descartes responded by arguing that this was a dangerous line of thought, one that might ultimately lead to the conclusion that the body too can perform intellectual processes, thus obfuscating the clear distinction between mind and body:

And if it is conceded that a corporeal thing has the first kind of thought [i.e. sentient cognition], then there is not the slightest reason to deny that it can have the second [i.e. reflective thinking]. Accordingly it must be stressed that my critic [Bourdin] commits a much more dangerous error […] He removes the true and most clearly intelligible feature which differentiates corporeal things from incorporeal ones, viz. that the latter think but not the former; and in its place he substitutes a feature which cannot in any way be regarded as essential, namely that incorporeal things reflect on their thinking, but corporeal ones do not. Hence he does everything he can to hinder our understanding of the real distinction between the human mind and the body (Descartes 1985–1991, 2:382).

Descartes attacks Bourdin here on the basis that the attribution of one type of thinking to the body leaves open the possibility of investing it with reason as well. This theory, for Descartes, poses a serious threat to faith because it entails the possibility of rendering the existence of a separate intellective soul unnecessary, leading straight to monistic and mortalist views of the soul, against which he railed throughout his writings, particularly in the wake of Hobbes’ materialist monism.
Hobbes’ ontological theory and Descartes’ attack on the pluralists of the period who attributed cognition to the body were not based on thin air. Ockham’s dualism legitimized, theologically and rationally, a form of dualism whereby the body was being increasingly invested with intelligence. It is on this historical juncture — between Ockham’s dualism, Hobbes’s materialism and Descartes’ ontological outlook — that this book seeks to shed light. This is not to suggest that early moderns adhered to a single line of thought, but that the notion of the autonomous and intelligent body was highly suggestive for thinkers and literary artists alike. Given the widespread dissemination of this form of dualism in early modern thought, it would have been readily available to the literary writers and philosophers I discuss in the subsequent chapters, either through firsthand knowledge of Ockham’s writings or through secondary sources.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Another strain of thought that may have facilitated the view of the organic soul-body composite as an autonomous and intelligent cognitive system comes from the contemporary debates on animal intelligence. Taking for granted that early moderns thought the organic or animal soul to be commonly occupied by humans and brutes alike, and that during the period thinkers were increasingly viewing animals as intelligent beings, the implications for human cognitive psychology are tantalizing. Several early modern thinkers made this connection, thereby reinforcing the notion of the intelligent body during the period. In order to tap into this link, as well as into the suggestiveness of some of the key notions explored in this chapter (i.e. imagination and reason sensible as powerful somatic cognitive components), the next chapter focuses on Montaigne’s *Essays*. I argue that Montaigne suggests an ontology wherein the body is represented as an independent and psychological construct. Within this framework, the French philosopher developed some fascinating medicinal techniques to alleviate the excruciating pains of his disease. In general terms, three discourses combine to draw Montaigne’s portrait of the body: the investigation of the unstable divide between animals and human beings, the imagination, and the unconscious bodily operations both while awake and in the states of sleep and near death. Montaigne’s view of the subject as a bisected but bi-subjective being is made manifest in several places throughout the *Essays*. However, instead of concentrating on such instances alone, I also lay equal focus on the ways in which early modern thinkers received his writings in order to provide a historically and intellectually faithful portrait of Montaigne as a philosopher. Montaigne’s *Essays* provides thus an ideal opportunity through which to explore how this influential thinker treated, in conversation with contemporary models, some of this chapter’s main ideas, and to study how his ontological theory, which represents a broader tendency in this period
to invest the body with forms of intelligence, was received by later thinkers, from the early reformation era to Descartes.

In attributing to the body autonomy of thought, the authors I discuss in this and the next chapters point at a curious connection between the thinking body and allegory as they promote an understanding of the somatic wherein its defining term “material” means something other (i.e. active thinking entity, subject) than what it professes (i.e. passive matter, object). In Chapter 3 I turn to Spenser’s allegorical poetry primarily for thematological and chronological purposes. Here I place particular emphasis on the aspect of antiphrasis, on the material body’s ability to convey meanings that contradict the meaning of aural/written discourse. Such instances open up a window into criticism through which to reconsider the ideological and philosophical undercurrents of Spenserian allegory and to view how the poet used the phenomenon of the intelligent body in order to criticize some aspects of the period’s religious culture and the Queen’s policies.

If allegory is an extended metaphor that involves antiphrasis or opposite speaking, a poem, on the more localized level of single metaphors, can consist of antithetical meanings. Donne’s poetry brings such metaphorical systems to the fore so that they are impossible to marginalize. What may be implicit or relatively inconspicuous in an allegorical poem, Donne highlights and compresses in single lines. This fourth chapter seeks to establish that Donne advocates a fallen ontological dualism wherein the body is not a mere prison that repels the superior soul’s or mind’s progress toward God, but a cognitive agent that can perfect human perception and drive us closer to the divine. This ontological outlook has significant consequences for our understanding of Donne’s poetics and theology. It would seem that reading Donne serves to prod and complicate to the point of lexical and syntactic delirium. Yet, the poet’s tendency to synthesize antitheses, to produce discordia concors, allows both himself and his readers to transgress, however momentarily and imperfectly, the boundaries posed by discursive reasoning, as it encourages a reading process wherein mind and body merge in order to expand their impoverished experiential and cognitive horizons. This chapter, then, links Donne’s philosophical and theological thought with his poetic practice, corrects reductive accounts of his mind/body dualism and demonstrates how his figures short-circuit discursive reasoning in such a way as to convey the inexpressible. Donne tends to bring together seemingly irreconcilable figures, thereby baffling his readers, often to the point of frustration. But if one reads primarily with the senses instead of reason, then Donne’s paradoxes do make sense, encouraging us to understand, aesthetically, what transcends our intellect’s abilities to comprehend. Through this process Donne seeks to bring us closer to the apprehension of the divine, to expand our cognitive and experiential horizons and drive us some way toward our fortunate, pre-fallen past, when human intelligence was not tainted by sin.

The concept of the thinking or allegorical body allowed me to develop in Chapter 5 the model of a divided self which is at the heart of early modern
tragic drama. This chapter, then, adds fresh insights into the book while fuel­
ing its forward movement by peeling another layer off its central argument. The cognitive and emotional states that the body conveys, I argue here, are generated through a pre-linguistic mode of communication (i.e. gestures, sweat, trembling, etc.) shared by audience members and actors alike. In turning to somatic communication and perception, tragedians aim at conveying to audiences what cannot enter the symbolic order of signification and understanding: unutterable, tragic sorrow and pain. At once physical and arcane, the corporeal mode of cognition that tragedians trigger through this style of performance implicates the audience’s discursive mind in an endless quest for knowledge as a means to discharge their cognitive and emotional enunciatory urges into the symbolic order of understanding. This approach to tragic dramaturgy is often employed by early modern playwrights in order to cause a sense of wonder in the audience members, which, in turn, arouses pleasure, opening new vistas of thought against which to reconsider Aristotle’s theory of catharsis and the paradox of tragic joy.

Chapter 6 turns to John Milton, a writer informed by the various theologi­cal, poetic and philosophical strands explored in the previous chapters. Here I argue that Milton is encouraging us to create good out of evil through his poetry’s music; to combine the low (hell) and the high (heaven) into a perfect concord (octave) that has the ability to thrust our perception into an intuitive type of reasoning whereby intellection and intuition, mind and body, combine to produce an exalting cognitive phenomenon whose product cannot be conceptually arrested and articulated. In this way, we come to listen to a type of music that echoes the music of the angelic choir and the music of the spheres, which drives us closer to the divine by suspending the effect of fallen dualism: tainted understanding. While Donne attempted to drive us closer to the divine visually — that is, through a poetics wherein contradictory images merge to produce an exalting aesthetic and cognitive experience that brings readers closer to the apprehension of divine mysteries and the nature of God — Milton put his theory of music’s ability to bring heaven and earth together into praxis by producing a melodic language wherein its aesthetic import can contradict its discursive, semantic content. The effect of this poetics is that we may experience a form of thinking that elevates human understanding so as to hear an echo, however faintly, of the perfect song of the spheres.

The last chapter charts some of the ways in which the notion of the intelli­gent body survived the collapse of Renaissance humanism, from eighteenth­century philosophy, science and literary art to modern cognitive science and medicine. Twenty-first century cognitive theorists, philosophers and medi­cal practitioners have called for a turn to the body as an independent and intelligent cognitive agent. This theory, I argue, has a long, complicated and fascinating history, one whose roots are found in early modern theorisations of the somatic. The central claim of this part of the book, then, is that the notion of the intelligent body survived the Cartesian model of the self to flourish in varied forms.
NOTES

1. In order to avoid misunderstanding here, it should be noted that reaction is the one thing that the will cannot be. Rather, we should read Hirvonen’s statement as referring to the fact that the will’s judgments and cognitive actions surface in the conscious mind as if they were reactions, thereby defining human behavior on an imperceptible, unconscious level. In short, the will’s actions are unmediated as far as the conscious mind is concerned, but they were premeditated by the will. For more information, see Charalampous 2013, 246–7.

2. References to Shakespeare’s works are to Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor’s edition.

3. For a detailed discussion of Ockham’s analysis of the processes of cognition when one experiences conflicting emotions, see Perler 2005, 250–74.

4. By such terms as phantasma, simulacrum, idolum and imago, the authorities, according to Ockham, do not refer to the sensible species of the objects, to something extra and distinct from the object itself, or to anything else mediating between the objects and the acts of the interior senses. Rather, the terms signify the sensible objects themselves and connote the acts of the interior senses. See, for example, Ockham, 1967–1988: Opera Theologica, 6:121–2: “Quia omnia illa quae a philosophis et sanctis doctoribus vocantur phantasmata, simulacra, idola, sunt ipsamet sensibilia prius sensata et post phantasiata, et non species sensibilium. Eundem enim hominem quem prius vidi, nunc imaginar, et non speciem hominis. Et ideo de istis idolis dicendum est, quod ipsamet res singularis quae primo terminat actum videndi corporalem, ipsamet ommino indistincta terminat actum phantasiandi et intelligendi abstractive, et nulla species terminat [...] hoc nomen ‘phantasma’ vel conceptus eius significat principaliter ipsam rem imaginatam, connotando act urn phantasiandi. Et secundum istud patet quod quot sunt individua phantasiata, sive sit eiusdem speciei sive alterius, tot sunt phantasmata. Et sic illud dictum commune falsum est, quod quaelibet species habet tantum unum phantasma, quia tot sunt phantasmata quot individua.” See also, Ockham, Opera Theologica, vol. 6, 128–9: “Et dico quod Philosophus per phantasmata, simulacra, idola, imagines non intelligit aliqua realiter distincta a rebus extra, sed [...] in proposito imago dicit ipsam rem secundum quod terminat actum sensus interioris in absentia rei sensibilis. Hoc patet in simili, quia dicimus quod aliquis videt imaginem ipsius in speculo, et tamen nulla imago videtur sed ipsa res extra videtur [...] sicut in aqua appareat idolum, non quia aliquid ibi appareat praeter rem extra existentem, sed ipsamet res, ita est interius quod ipsamet res prius sensata apparat, hoc est terminat actum phantasiandi.” For more information on this point in secondary literature, see Hirvonen 2004, 78–81.

5. In Question 76, Article 1 of his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas raises the question whether the intellectual principle is identical with the substantial form or soul of the human animal and argues that they are identical. As he writes in his reply to the question, “It is necessary to say that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, is the form of the human body.” See Aquinas, 2002, 20 (76.1.50–1). In parenthesis are the Question and Article numbers, followed by line numbers.

6. See, for instance, Ockham 1991: 1, 136–9, 305. For more information in secondary literature regarding the reasons that led Ockham to draw a distinction between a form of corporeity and the sensitive soul, see Hirvonen 2004, 35–39. See also, Ockham, 1991, 1: 137 fn.58.
7. Although the conclusion of Lawson’s appropriation of Ockham’s theory is correct, his statement nevertheless is rather imprecise and could be misleading: the intellectual soul, whether conjoined or separate, is not a “supposit” as it is naturally apt to combine with other things to make a unified composite. A metaphysical “supposit” or “person” is not the same as a psychological subject of experience. Lawson does not provide a reference to Ockham’s writings, but his background as a Church of England clergyman, political writer, and long-term friend and critic of Richard Baxter, who demonstrates (as we will see later) a detailed knowledge of Ockham’s writings, suggests that he had a first-hand knowledge of the late medieval philosopher’s works, or that he acquired his knowledge via secondary sources rather than from hearsay only.

8. Integral to Ockham’s structural analysis of human nature is his account of the different cognitive processes taking place in each soul, the intuitive and abstractive cognitions in each soul, respectively. These divisions are central not only to our understanding of Ockham’s philosophical psychology and theory of human cognition, but also to our understanding of his ontological and theological projects, as they demonstrate how human cognition is radically different from animal cognition and corroborate his thesis of the immateriality and immortality of the intellectual soul. For more information, see Charalampous 2013, 537–63.


10. “illorum quae exterius sunt, id est sensibilium, mens nihil sentit, id est intuitive cognoscit sine sensu”.

11. “dico quod non est de intentione Philosophi quod nihil intelligitur ab intellectu nisi quod praefuit sub sensu, sed quod nullum sensibile extrinsecum intelligitur ab intellectu nisi quod praefuit sub sensu.”

12. “Mens sola extrinsecus accedit. eaq; sola diuina est, nihil enim cum eius actione communicat actio corporalis.”

13. “homo acutissimus Occam defendit, reipsa distinctas in homine Animas esse, rationalem & sentientem. Et colligit multa argumenta huius suae sententiae. Contrarii sunt appetitus, rationalis & sensualis, ergo necesse est & et substantias distinctas esse, quia in una & eadem atque indivisibili natura, non possunt esse simul contrarie appetitiones.”

14. Bacon’s influence on contemporary thinking cannot be overstated, and it is probable that he developed his view of the mind-body relationship via first-hand knowledge of Ockham’s writings rather than through secondary sources, although the possibility that he referred to Latin compendia cannot be ruled out. As Anthony Quinton notes, “it is Ockham, in particular, who is the exception to the principle that Bacon’s sources are not English” (Quinton 1980, 9).

15. Burgess was a clergyman and ejected minister, a close friend of Richard Baxter, and the tutor of John Wallis, the future Savillian professor of geometry, as well as the controversial Presbyterian William Jenkyn.

16. Owen was a theologian and independent minister closely associated with Cromwell and his vice-chancellorship. For a more detailed account of Ockham’s
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theory of the mind-body relationship and its transmission to early modern thinkers see Charalampous 2013, 537–63.
17. On this point, see also Michael 2002, 171; and Charalampous 2013, esp. 560–3.

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Montaigne’s Corporeal Self
A Dialectics of Bisubjectivity
and its Medicinal Virtues

I study myself [...] That is my metaphysics, that is my physics
Montaigne 1958, 821

[A] Soul cannot be denied to Beasts, and that Soul is held to be material [...] Their sensitive Soul bears such Marks of a reflexive Intelligence, that it must be granted either that they have two Souls, or that Matter thinks.
Genard 1753, 37

Do you then think it irreligious to dare to say that the body can think?
Voltaire 1843, 2:492

In his Essays, Montaigne endeavoured to translate his image onto the page, to essay his own self for the perusal of himself and others (Montaigne 1958, 272–3). As Nicholas Malebranche (1638–1715) has it, “Montaigne wrote his Book purely to picture himself, and represents his own Humours and Inclinations; [...] I give the picture of myself, says he: I am my self the subject of my Book” (Italics original. Malebranche 1700, 97v). “The book is the man,” as Donald Frame aptly put it (Frame 1958, v). Yet, despite the production of voluminous modern studies on Montaigne’s philosophy, we still have no clear picture of what his self-portrait represents in any philosophical or ideological context. His experience of grappling with the torments of painful, life-threatening kidney stones pervades his Essays. He was using the shaping and transforming power of words in an attempt to tame the horrors and pain of his illness (Healy 2005, 231–49 and Heitsch 2000, 96–106). Renal stones cause ureteric colic — excruciating, acute pain radiating from the lower back to the groin to the genitals (often producing nausea and vomiting) — frequently described in twenty-first-century medical textbooks as one of the most extreme pains known to man (Healy 2005, 234). As Elaine Scarry has highlighted in The Body in Pain, intense pain makes the subject acutely aware of his or her body: The soma is no longer a background medium of foregrounded action, and the individual can become immersed in a world of pain whose parameters consist of a highly restricted body image (Scarry 1985). It is thus no surprise that Montaigne’s self-portrait is largely a record of how he experienced his own body as well as an epistemological enquiry into the nature of the human body and its relation to the inner self.
In her insightful account of Montaigne’s theory of the soul and its relation to the body and subjectivity, Felicity Green cites several examples in the essayist’s writings that lay focus on the fact that, “absent the soul,” the “motions” observed in states of unconsciousness or cases of near death, “do not properly belong to the self” (Green 2013, 97). Donald Frame had similarly argued that Montaigne’s emotions, fancies and the imagination have the ability “to oppose him successfully or even manipulate him” (Frame 1976, 195). The body’s ability to contradict the mind, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was a standard argument among early modern thinkers tasked to demonstrate the real distinction between mind and body. Accordingly, Green’s and Frame’s examples suggest the existence of two distinct cognitive subjects within the self-same subject, not an intimate union between mind and body. Three main discourses combine to draw Montaigne’s portrait of the body: the investigation of the unstable divide between animals and human beings, the imagination and the unconscious bodily operations both while awake and in the states of sleep and near death. Within this framework, I argue, the French philosopher developed some fascinating medicinal techniques to alleviate the excruciating pains of his disease.

MONTAIGNE’S DIALECTICS OF BI-SUBJECTIVITY

Montaigne’s thesis that animals are fully cognitive creatures is well known. The main faculties that distinguish animals from humans and place the latter on the highest level in the chain of being are language and reasoning. To dislocate this border, Montaigne begins by discussing the communicative abilities of animals (i.e. 331–5), and then proceeds to propose that they are capable of exercising forms of intelligence which early moderns traditionally attributed to the intellect (333–7). To be able to communicate, to have a system of self expression, is intimately related to cognition, to an inner mental language without which there could be no meaningful or significant utterance. Thus, against the belief that animals are instinct-driven, Montaigne argues that they are capable of performing complicated intellectual processes and reflective thinking: “Why does the spider thicken her web in one place and slacken it in another, use now this sort of knot, now that one, unless she has the power of reflection, and thought, and inference?” (333). Attributing such processes to merely mechanical automations, Montaigne contends, is “a chimera, and cannot enter our imagination” (337). Dogs and birds, for instance, exhibit a certain extent of intelligence that cannot be reduced to merely mechanical reactions: “This dog, having trouble getting some oil that was in the bottom of a pitcher, where he could not get at it with his tongue because of the narrow mouth of the vessel, went and fetched some pebbles and put some in this pitcher until he had made the oil rise nearer the edge, where he could reach it. What is that if not the work of a very subtle mind?”
They say that the Barbary crows do the same thing when the water they want to drink is too low” (341).

Apart from reasoning and language, animals have other characteristics common with humans: They are affectionate, sympathetic, clement (346, 353) and can acquire divine grace (356, 358); they demonstrate love towards creatures of their own species and humans (347); they have a sense of community and brotherhood (348, 352); they possess the faculty of imagination (75) and exhibit homosexual desires, trickery and forms of avarice (347). For Montaigne, animal societies are not so different from ours, indicating how they can be used to teach us some truth about our cosmos, or as mirrors to reflect the values of human society. According to Montaigne, beasts have much to teach us indeed, including a better and happier way of life (331); the art of weaving (340); medicine by various animals that recognize the therapeutic virtues of certain herbs and plants (339, 340, 345); warfare techniques (335, 342); music (340); architecture (340); mathematics, geometry, astrology and arithmetic (344, 353). The list is still incomplete, but it is long enough to demonstrate Montaigne’s view that humans can learn by imitating animals. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) followed Montaigne in considering the benefits humans can elicit by observing animal behavior. Invention, for Bacon, “is no other method, than that which brute beasts are capable of and do put in use” (Bacon 1605, 49r–50v). Quite characteristically, Bacon adopted Montaigne’s example of the “Barbary crows” throwing pebbles to raise the level of the water so as to be able to drink it: “who taught the Raven in a drowth to throw pibbles into a hollow tree, where she spyed water, that water might rise, so as shee might come to it?” (Bacon 1605, 50v).

Montaigne’s view of animal intelligence stirred a controversy that would make its way well into the eighteenth century. A brief overview of this critical scene shows that early modern thinkers held that Montaigne’s thesis on animal cognition was inextricably linked to human nature and the theological discourses pertaining to the problem of the human soul’s (im)mortality. Montaigne’s early critics were divided into two opposing camps: the vigorous supporters of his natural philosophy, on the one hand, and the equally vigorous polemists of his anthropomorphic presentation of animals, on the other. In the prelude to his English translation of Montaigne’s Essays, suggestively entitled “A Vindication of Montaigne’s Essays,” Charles Cotton (1630–1687) inserted a helpful overview of the early modern scene of Montaigne’s criticism, both negative and positive. Cotton tells us, for example, that among other “angry Gentlemen […] Scaliger was used to stile him a bold ignorant,” while “Mr de Silhon in his Book of the Immortality of the Soul confutes what Montaigne has alleg’d to prove that Brutes are capable of thinking” (Cotton 1700, 3v). Jean de Silhôn (1596–1667), a French statesman and moralist who was a friend of Descartes and Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac (1597–1654) — another friend of Descartes — needed to defend his treatise on the immortality of the soul (L’immortalité de l’âme, 1634) against Montaigne’s ontological outlook because he thought that the essayist
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conflated the animal and intellective souls. Such a conflation would suggest that the latter is ultimately material and mortal. In Concerning the Search after Truth (De la recherche de la vérité, 1674–1675 [translated into English in 1694 by Thomas Taylor]), a work stemming directly from Descartes’ writings, Malebranche also complained about Montaigne’s demolition of the border that separates humans from animals, a demolition that seemed to advocate a material and mortal soul (Malebranche 1700, 98r). It is in the intertwined natures of the animal and the human souls that Descartes understood Montaigne’s thesis on the ability of animals to exercise intelligence, rejecting the essayist’s arguments in the same way that he refuted ideas about the thinking capacities of the organic soul. In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, Descartes explicitly states his disagreement with Montaigne’s attribution of “understanding or thought to animals” (Descartes 1991, 3:302). Descartes cites a number of Montaigne’s examples and contends that these indicate an expression of passion rather than reason. Descartes’ focus here is on language: The mock-speech of birds and the motions of the other animals in question, all signs that may be meaningful to human minds, are clearly the results of passion. These signs must be strictly distinguished from those of human language: “There has never been known an animal so perfect as to use a sign to make other animals understand something which bore no relation to its passions; and there is no human being so imperfect as not to do so, since even deaf-mutes invent special signs to express their thoughts.” Animals do not have a coherent system of communication for the reason that “they have no thoughts” (Descartes 1991, 3:303).

The argument hinges on the same point as that in the Discourse: all human beings are capable of “arranging various words together and forming a discourse from them in order to make their thoughts understood; whereas there is no other animal, however perfect and well-endowed it may be, that can do the like” (Descartes 1991, 1:140). It is thus conclusive that animals, being unable to speak, “have no reason at all” (Descartes 1991, 1:140). The difference between the res cogitans and the res extensa that Descartes elaborates in the Meditations is the same as that between a human soul and a body, between that which is in possession of reason and that which is not. “It would be incredible that a superior specimen of the monkey or parrot species should not be able to speak as well as the stupidest child,” Descartes states, “if their souls were not completely different in nature from ours” (Descartes 1991, 1:140). In the replies to the fourth set of objections to the Meditations, Descartes explains that an animal soul is not a res cogitans. Rather, it is a res extensa, an agglomeration of “animal spirits” operating in an automatic system. Animal spirits are also at work in human bodies, with the difference that they operate under the control of the reasoning soul and are the means by which the soul moves the muscles (Descartes 1991, 2:161–2). Philosophically, Descartes appears to anticipate the opinion of Locke, for whom language is an expression of mind. It is a science that belongs to epistemology rather than to zoology, and it is a function of knowledge and ideas.
To attribute language to an animal is to attribute first a structure of ideas, something that to Locke is absurd (Locke 1979, 159–60, 332–3, 408).

On the other end of the spectrum, the natural philosophy of “This prince Montaigne, (if he be not more)”, to use John Florio’s (c.1553–1625) words (Florio 1613, A4v), was zestfully defended and highly respected. A number of early modern thinkers adopted the essayist’s thesis on animal reasoning and communication skills in different ways, producing, in their turn, influential philosophical enquiries. In his Visiones rerum, John Hagthorpe (1585–c.1630), who acknowledges Montaigne as his source, devotes an extensive commentary both to animals’ ability to communicate through a coherent system of language and to their capacity to perform complicated cognitive activities (Hagthorpe 1623, 60v). Similarly, Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1594–1669), who also acknowledges Montaigne as his main source, is adamant in his position that animals perform forms of reasoning (Chambre 1657, 11r). As Richard Serjeantson notes, de la Chambre, as well as his acquaintance Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), Montaigne’s follower Pierre Charron (1541–1603) and Hieronymus Fabricius ab Aquapendente (c.1533–1619), “attacked the idées reçus about animal language on every major point” (Serjeantson 2001, esp. 436–41). So convincing de la Chambre’s arguments were that his English translator asserted: “if any man after the perusal be startled or offended, that he [de la Chambre] hath granted Reason to Beasts, give me leave to beleeeve it must be either out of ignorance or pride” (Anon 1657, A3v). Montaigne’s view on animal cognition reflects, as historians have suggested, “an increasing tendency” in the early modern period “to credit animals with reason, intelligence, language and almost every other human quality” (Thomas 1984, 129).

Marie de Gournay (1565–1645) also supported and admired Montaigne (Gournay 1998). She is best known for her 1595 edition of Montaigne’s Essays. As Cotton reminds us, “Mademoiselle de Gourney has prefixed a long Preface to the French Folio Edition of his [Montaigne’s] Essays wherein she does not only give a full answer to all the objections made, or that can be made against Montagne, but also talks of him as of a man whose works have revived the Truth in his Age, and which, therefore, she calls the quintessence of Philosophy, the Hellbore of Mans Folly, the Setter at Liberty of Understanding, and the Judicial Throne of Reason” (Cotton 1700, 4r).

In an attempt to avoid the accusation that de Gournay’s opinion is prejudiced since she was Montaigne’s “fille d’alliance” (roughly, “adopted daughter” [Cotton 1700, 4r]), Cotton surveys a number of other supporters, including Étienne Pasquier (1529–1615), whom Cotton quotes in order to defend Montaigne against critics who accused him of promoting the unchristian idea that the human soul is mortal due to its intimate connection to the material body: “Montagne has several Chapters, whereof the Body is no ways answerable to the Head, witness these following, The History of Spurina, of the Resemblance of Children to their Parents, of the Verses of Virgil, of Coaches, of Lame people, of Vanity, and Physiognomy”
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Montaigne stresses the body’s independent nature, its ability to perform activities that are not the products of our intellective soul, thereby positing a real distinction between mind and body. Indeed, Montaigne underlines throughout his Essays the disjunction between our volitional, intellectual actions and somatic activities. “For I ask you to think,” Montaigne tells us, “whether there is a single one of the parts of our body that does not often refuse its function to our will and exercise it against our will. They have passions of their own which rouse them and put them to sleep without our leave” (72). These unconscious bodily operations are the products of our organic soul, for “the same cause that animates this member,” without our conscious volition, “also animates, without our knowledge, the heart, the lungs, and the pulse” (72).

Montaigne draws a dichotomy between mind and body, between the intellective and organic souls, as the body, in Pasquier’s words, “is no ways answerable to the Head.” “It is much to be able to curb our appetites by the arguments of reason,” Montaigne writes, “or to force our members by violence to stick to their duty” (555). Montaigne stresses here the autonomy of the somatic substrata to act on their own accord, finding it extremely difficult for human beings to force their bodily members into complying with the demands of the rational soul or mind.

The problem of emotional conflict, as we have seen in the introductory chapter, is one of the main proofs that Ockham put forth in order to argue for the real distinction of mind and body. A number of Montaigne’s contemporaries adopted this specific proof. In “How we cry and laugh for the same thing,” Montaigne appears to have followed the impulses of this Ockhamist thesis. The essayist calls our attention to the fact that “not one of us can boast, however much he wants to make a trip, that on parting from his family and friends he does not feel a tremor in his heart; if he does not actually shed tears, at least he puts his foot in the stirrup with a sad and mournful face” (173). According to reason, taking the trip is a desirable and pleasant event. However, the heart stirs emotions of sadness, thus demonstrating its unwillingness to comply with the reasoning processes of the rational mind. The emotions felt by the parting subject are as distinct as their source or origin. This emotional conflict, according to Montaigne, does not indicate that “I contradict myself” (173) because this is precisely what myself is, a conjunction of an organic, bodily soul and an intellective, rational one, each of which contains its own cognitive components. “When Timoleon weeps for the murder he has committed with such high-minded deliberation,” Montaigne tells us, “he is not weeping for the liberty restored to his country, he is not weeping for the tyrant; he is weeping for his brother” (174).

By murdering his tyrant brother and restoring liberty to his country, Timoleon took the rational, “high-minded” course of action, which naturally causes a feeling of pleasure. Yet, Timoleon is not solely a rational being, but organic as well, and this, for Montaigne, is what accounts for the humanity of humans: “One part of [Timoleon’s] duty is performed; let us allow him to
perform the other” (174). By crying, Timoleon does not contradict himself, but he “spontaneously follow[s] nature” (173). Accordingly, for Montaigne mind and body are distinct cognitive agents.

At the same time, early modern investigations into animal behaviour were intimately related to debates concerning human nature.⁶ As Keith Thomas summarizes it, “it is impossible to disentangle what the people of the past thought about plants and animals from what they thought about themselves” (Thomas 1984, 16). And as Gail Kern Paster maintains, “it is important to our historical understanding of passions that they belonged to a part of the natural order jointly occupied by humans and animals” (Paster 1993, 135). To support her argument, Paster reminds us of three basic early modern beliefs about the cosmos. First, in the hydraulic model of the passions, organs or systems of organs provide a locus for various psychological functions. Second, animals with a heart and blood also inhabit humoral bodies. Third, although humans alone possess an intellective soul, both animals and humans possess a sensitive soul that controls perceptual, motive and appetitive faculties (Paster 1993, 136). As Montaigne often tells us, we must look to the animals to see what is truly natural in us: “We must seek in the animals evidence of her [nature] that is not subject to favor, corruption, or diversity of opinion [...] The young of bears and dogs show their natural inclination, but men, plunging headlong into certain habits, opinions and laws, easily change or disguise themselves” (803, 109). And in the words of de la Chambre’s early modern translator: “a discovery of the nature of Animals, and of the resemblance betwixt Men and Beasts, teach us that those whose parts are like theirs, have the same inclinations” (Anon 1700, A2r–A3v). By directing our attention to the intertwined discourses of animal and human behavior, the early criticism of Montaigne’s thesis on animal intelligence points at a complicated dialectic concerning our understanding of contemporary notions of the self and human nature. When Paster’s assertion that the organic soul was “jointly occupied by humans and animals” is coupled with Montaigne’s attribution of reflective thinking to animals, the ontological implications concerning human embodied experience point at a radical view of somatic cognition, for the human sensitive soul, common as it is with the soul of animals, emerges as fully cognitive and psychological entity. That is, since Montaigne posits a real distinction between the intellectual and animal souls in humans and takes for granted that the human animal soul is connected to the souls of animals, then not only does a vision of anthropomorphic animals emerge in Montaigne’s thought, but the human body is itself invested with reflective thinking. Descartes’ objection against the pluralists of the period who postulated that the organic soul is capable of performing certain cognitive processes is resoundingly pertinent here. If the body can perform some cognitive activities, Descartes objected, then why not all? If the body is capable of sensory cognition, why not of reflective too? (Descartes 1991, 2:382). Montaigne appears to have entertained this possibility, drawing a portrait of the human subject as an essentially bisubjective being.
A clearer picture of this somatic self is captured in the states of sleep and near death: “When we hear” unconscious persons that are “wounded in the head”, Montaigne observes, “groan and from time to time utter poignant sighs, or see them make certain movements of the body, we seem to see signs that they still have some consciousness left; but I have always thought, I say, that their soul and body were buried in sleep” (270). Body and soul do not go to sleep together. Rather, the former remains conscious and awake even when the latter is put to sleep. And as our conscious self lies inactive, we live but we are unconscious of our life, of the life of our somatic soul. Studying animal behaviour alongside the human, Montaigne concludes that our unconscious activities cannot be called ours. Instead, they are the products of another entity, the organic soul which is common to animals and humans: “There are many animals, and even men, whose muscles we can see contract and move after they are dead. Every man knows by experience that there are parts that often move, stand up, and lie down, without his leave. Now these passions which touch only the rind cannot be called ours. To make them ours, the whole man must be involved; and the pains which the foot or the hand feel while we are asleep are not ours” (271). Montaigne’s suggestion that in such instances it is not the “whole man” that is involved bespeaks his tendency to view human nature as a conjunction of distinct parts. Even physiognomy, which seems to establish a link between soul and body, does not signify that the organic soul depends on the intellect for its operations. Refuting doctors for attributing “an outward change to the spirit and some secret passion growing within me”, Montaigne objects that “[t]hey were wrong. If my body obeyed my orders as well as my soul, we should get along a little more comfortably” (842). Montaigne’s soul may obey his orders and will, but his body is not so tame, articulating an ontology wherein his soul and body may be said to have their own personalities. He treats his body as an alien other with which he is striving to get along.

In confessing another of his personal experiences, Montaigne presents us with a body that performs rational forms of cognition independently of the mind, registering the human subject as a phenomenon dissected between a somatic and an ego consciousness: “while wholly unconscious, I was labouring to rip open my doublet with my nails [...] and yet I know that I felt nothing in my imagination that hurt me; for there are many movements of ours that do not come from our will” (271). He advocates here a body invested with reasoning capabilities and psychological dimensions that are analogous to the cognition and psychology of our conscious self. The central subject of these critical speculations is the return to a body perceived as a psychological agent rather than as a mechanical extension. Showing that it is not merely a matter of applying thoughts (or theories) to bodies, Montaigne envisions how the body-subject, which makes itself insistently known in diurnal life, provides access to new avenues for thinking. Our body harbours a life of its own whose cognitive activities are analogous to those of our conscious self. Montaigne recounts a dialogue
his somatic self had with the people around him while being unconscious: “not only did I make some sort of answer to what was asked me, but also (they say) I thought of ordering them to give a horse to my wife, whom I saw stumbling and having trouble on the road, which is steep and rugged. It would seem that this consideration must have proceeded from a wide-awake soul; yet the fact is that I was not there at all” (271). The body is an autonomous thinking thing; matter, or physicality, figures as a psychological entity. In such instances, Montaigne charts a shift of emphasis from the mere visual apprehension of the body to its sensory and cognitive dimensions, as well as a shift in language to represent new phenomenological reconfigurations. In this dialectic, the body does not merely affect the state of mind. Rather, it constitutes a somatic self. As in the case of animals, whose souls are capable of reasoning, the human animal soul is a cognitive agent whose activities are analogous to those of our conscious self, dislodging the border that separates the terms with which we traditionally characterize body and mind, even as he retains a distinction between the two constituent components. As de la Chambre explains, “It’s impossible but we must beliye, or at least suspect that Actions which appear so reasonable, cannot but be managed by Reason. For if we would refer them to instinct, the nature thereof is hidden, that there is no likelihood to destroy such clear and strong conjectures, by so obscure and ill establish’d a thing; And which perhaps, if it were well known, would be found nothing different or estranged from Reason” (Chambre 1657, 2v–r). De la Chambre’s central thesis here is that what has been axiomatically labelled as instinct hinders any attempt to gain a better insight into the dynamics underlying somatic operations. Like Montaigne, de la Chambre insists that although we cannot gain access to the source or mechanism that produces the operations of the body, this does not indicate that reasoning is not at work (Markus 2008, 443–61). For Montaigne, the human body is a thinking thing whose complicated forms of reasoning, imagination, psychological domain, subjective point of view and will, render the somatic a res cogitans rather than a res extensa, drawing on the canvas of his Essays the portrait of his corporeal self for his own and his readers’ perusal. In his Essays on several important subjects, Joseph Glanvill (1636–1680) wrote that “Lord Montaigne hath observ’d that [...] every Man differs from himself” (Glanvill 1676, 33r). For Montaigne, this man that differs from the selmsame man is his thinking body, into whose cognitive processes the conscious mind attempts to gain access. This corporeal other constitutes the focal theme of Montaigne’s essays to portray and present himself as it is — a self of the senses: “I judge myself only by actual sensation, not by reasoning” (849). Montaigne’s otherwise paradoxical treatment of “self”, “physics” and “metaphysics” as cognates — “I study myself [...] that is my metaphysics, that is my physics” (821) — is to be taken literally, for to study my own self, for Montaigne, is to study my physics (my body). At the same time, my body-self transcends the limits of authoritative scientific scrutiny, for to study me, myself, my
body, is to study my metaphysics, that is, a somatic self that is beyond my control as it performs its own cognitive processes and has its own subjective point of view. Such an approach to corporeality projects a psychological schema onto the material body. In attributing to the body will, passions and imagination of its own, Montaigne offers a portrait of the somatic as an independent psychological entity whose nature and operations are foreign albeit analogous to our familiar, conscious consciousness.

**BISUBJECTIVITY’S MEDICINAL VIRTUES**

Montaigne’s antipathy towards the art of the physicians, who claim to sustain bodily and spiritual health, has been well documented. As Montaigne boldly claims: “The arts that promise to keep our body in health and our soul in health promise as much; but at the same time there are none that keep their promises less [...] The most you can say for them is that they sell drugs; but that they are doctors you cannot say” (827). In “Children and Fathers”, Montaigne acknowledges that the propensity for stones is not the only thing he has inherited from his father: his “antipathy,” “hatred and contempt” for the physicians had been inherited too (579). He argues that “The doctors are not content with having control over the sickness; they make health itself sick, in order to prevent people from being able at any time to escape their authority” (581). In “Of Experience”, Montaigne mocks and teases professionals: “If your doctor does not think it good for you to sleep, to drink wine, or to eat such-and-such food, don’t worry: I’ll find you another who will not agree with him.” (833). For Montaigne, then, professional medicine falls short of the objectivity and authority it should inspire as a science.

A central thesis in Montaigne’s anti-professional discourse is his view that imagination is a powerful therapeutic means. Imagination is a disruptive force that resists being defined in respect to conscious cognition. The Montaignean imagination charts a shift from the Aristotelian imagination which was subject to the demands of rational discourse, aligning his thought with contemporary arguments on the autokinetic power of the sensitive or appetitive imagination (O’Brien 1993, 8–12). He opens “Of the power of the imagination” by stressing the deep impression that imagination leaves upon us, an impression which, in turn, gives rise to a particular somatic action. He notes, for instance, that “a continual cougher irritates my lungs and throat” (68). Imagination depends on sensation, working as a form of empathetic power capable of overthrowing as well as changing its victims. In dreams, for example, a “boiling youth satisfies its amorous desires” (69), while “a very excited spectator at a bullfight [...] grew actual horns on his forehead by the power of his imagination” (69). Apart from an attack on miracles and/or a reflection of some contemporary debates about the nature of sense impressions (Gauna 1989, 17), Montaigne’s interpretation of imagination accommodates its power in medicine as an alternative method to
the often inconsiderate verdicts of professional doctors. In the power of imagination Montaigne discovered the placebo effect. In his characteristically humorous attitude, he called this method a “monkey trick” (71) or “benevolent trick” (74). To cite an instance, Montaigne tells the story of a merchant at Toulouse who had the stone and needed enemas to assuage his pain. The apothecary was always following the procedure dutifully: “he tested [the enemas] by hand to make sure they were not too hot. There he was, lying on his stomach, and all motions were gone through”, except this time, “no injection was made. After this ceremonial therapy, the apothecary having retired and the patient being accommodated as if he had really taken the enema, he felt the same effect from it as those who do take them. And if the doctor did not find its operation sufficient, he would give him two or three more, of the same sort” (74). The phenomenon of the “benevolent tricks” appears to defy explanation, as it is “their inanity [that] gives them weight and reverence” (71). But Montaigne continues to provide an answer: “all this”, he argues, may be attributed to the imagination, “the narrow seam between the soul and body, through which the experience of the one is communicated to the other” (74). Imagination occupies an intermediary locus between the soul and body, which allows it to slide between the two. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Bacon described this psychological topography as the “Janus of imagination”, with its one face turned towards the intellect and the other towards the senses. As noted in the previous chapter, according to Bacon’s logic, not only does imagination precede conscious action, but it can also directly prompt an action and define human behaviour. Such an inversion of roles occurs in cases where powerful emotions overwhelm the intellect. According to Montaigne, in such instances “it is passion that is in command at first, it is passion that speaks, it is not we ourselves” (540). Cognitive operations are being performed by a bodily, material shape of self, while reason figures as its executive, mechanical member or, as Bacon would have it, as a citizen under the commandment of its magistrate. The mind becomes a mechanical extension of a thinking object, “for we move other weapons, this one [anger] moves us; our hand does not guide it, it guides our hand; it holds us, we do not hold it” (545).

This logic of reversal may be said to anticipate the philosophy of Nietzsche (1844–1900), a great admirer of Montaigne’s philosophy who insisted that the mind is essentially the instrument of the body. Yet, in contrast to Nietzsche’s hyperbolic somaticism, where he postulates that the “soul is merely a word for something about the body” (Nietzsche 2005, 30), Montaigne gives expression to the shifting contours of an ego in a constantly unstable oscillation between a somatic and an intellectual self. “Every reader of Montaigne, Donald Frame notes, “has surely been struck by the many times when he embarks upon some sort of dialogue with certain aspects of his self which I am here calling very loosely his faculties or when there is simply some sort of interaction between the self and his je” (Frame 1976, 196). It is in this context that, immediately after attacking doctors for their inconsiderate verdicts,
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Montaigne resorts to a long prosopopeia in order to explain the imagination's therapeutic powers. Montaigne performs this medicinal procedure by reciting the words that his mind customarily addresses to his imagination in order to assuage his bodily pains. When coupled with the comforting advice of the mind, the imagination becomes a life-giving force:

Now I [je] treat my imagination as gently as I can, and would relieve it, if I could, of all trouble and conflict. We must help it and flatter it, and fool it if we can. My mind is suited to this service [...] Would you like an example? It [il] tells me that it is for my own good that I have the stone; that buildings of my age must suffer some leakage [...] The company should console me (emphasis added, 836).

In this apostrophe of the mind to the imagination we can witness within the subject’s bisected subjectivity a dialogue between an it (il, imagination) and a me. Montaigne treats his imagination as a cognitive entity controlled by the body rather than the conscious mind, as it lies outside the sphere of the I-intellect. This dialectic is complicated when the “I treat my imagination [itil]” of the opening phrase is transposed into “it tells me [...] I have the stone”, thus reversing the roles of the I and the it, the former now occupying the place of the latter and vice versa. An awareness of our bisubjective nature (it and me) requires thus an I as a third term that slides between the intellectual and experiential domains, as well as a fourth impersonal term that apprehends and reflects upon the I's oscillation between these two distinct domains. Jean Starobinski reads this passage as an allegory whereby “a he, which is the mind, preaches to and tries to persuade a you which is the imagination” (Starobinski 1983, 295). By substituting the it and the me with a you and a he, and ignoring the role of the I, Starobinski overlooks two crucial aspects in Montaigne’s philosophical psychology: first, the shifting identifications of the I now with his body and now with his mind; and second, the emergence of a fourth term which, like us the readers, observes the psychological phenomenon of bisubjectivity and is capable of reflecting upon the I's oscillations. In the opening phrase of the passage, the I of the subject represents the conscious self, the mind or intellect that attempts to “flatter” or “fool” the imagination (il, it). Here the imagination (it) has an explicit connection to the somatic, experiential domain, for to relieve my imagination of “all trouble” is, essentially, to relieve my body of pain (me).

Whereas the imagination has an explicit connection to the me of the bodily, experiential domain, the I, by distancing itself from and thus objectifying the experiential situation in order to flatter it (referring both to the imagination and the body), has only an implicit or indirect relation to the somatic. Having conversed with and attempted to persuade his imagination, Montaigne’s condition is now to be defined by it. As it has to be flattered, fooled or convinced by the conscious mind’s advice, it is thereby treated as a self-contained somatic cognitive component within the self-same subject.

The placebo effect works in a similar way, as it is not the chemical values of the medicine per se that affect the patient’s bodily condition, but the
imagination. Like the doctor who tries to fool his/her patient that the placebo medicine is not, in fact, an inert pill or enema, injecting therefore into his/her patient's body/imagination a mere belief, so Montaigne injects into his it (body/imagination) the belief that “it is for my own good that I have the stone.” In treating it as he would treat another person or patient, Montaigne articulates an ontology whereby the experiential condition of a human being is largely defined by his/her imagination, over which s/he has little control, because it has its own subjective point of view and, according to how convincing the arguments of the mind are, it can choose between being convinced or not. The Montaignean subject is an essentially bisubjective being, one that converses with itself as another self. It is a subject that treats its imagination as a bodily other, which other is a subject that defines the human condition and behaviour.

Early modern physicians were particularly attuned to the idea that the imagination has powerful healing powers. Reported cases of the various uses of this therapeutic technique stretch at least as far back as Avicenna (1193–1280). Galeotto Marzio (1450–1497) rehearsed traditional pronouncements on this subject by Hippocrates, Galen, Rhasis and others (Schleiner 1995, 25). Early modern medical writers emphasised the role of the imagination and the function of fiducia in therapy. For example, Joannes Jonstonus (1603–1675) prescribes that a sick person can be cured if he or she “is to be wrought into an Imagination quite contrary” (Jonstonus 1657, 21). Similarly, Marchamont Nedham (1620–1678) notes that “Diseases are causable and curable by the force of Imagination” (Nedham 1665, 303), and Heinrich Nolle (fl.1612–1619) boldly claims that “this bare perswasion or imaginative faith heales more and more effectually, then any virtue in the exhibited Medicine” (Nolle 1655, 128). Likewise, Simeon Partlicius (fl.1620–1624) finds that “Imagination bears a great sway not only in causing, but also in curing diseases” (Partlicius 1654, 88–89), while James Primerose (c.1598–1659) observes that “it must necessarily follow that the cure is miraculos, or else that it depends on the imagination of the sick” (Primerose 1651, 436). For many early modern physicians, this therapeutic process is predicated on fiducia, on the patient’s faith in the authority of the doctor and in the effectiveness of the treatment. Julius Alexandrinus (1506–1591) summarises this argument concisely: “One is allowed to lie for the health of the patient”, while “The sick person’s respect is to be won” (Schleiner 1995, 26). Montaigne appears to share the same principle for, as we have seen, he acknowledges that unless the patient is unaware that he or she is being tricked, the “monkey trick” will have no effect. It would thus seem that Montaigne’s self-healing therapy would be bound to fail because if he is aware that he is injecting into his body a mere belief, then the curing function of fiducia would be ineffective. But Montaigne’s medicinal procedure is predicated on treating one’s own body as an alien other, just like a physician treats a patient. In short, this medicinal procedure is predicated on bisubjectivity.
NOTES

1. References to Montaigne’s works are to Donald Frame’s edition.
2. For instance, despite her observation that Montaigne often articulates an ontology where body and soul or mind may appear to be distinct cognitive agents, Green argues that “what most exercises Montaigne […] are those accounts that (unlike Aristotle’s) contest the soul’s close union with the body” (Green 2013, 103). In order to corroboration this thesis, Green appeals to two central arguments: first is the propagation theory, which Montaigne approves, as evidenced by the “resemblance of children to fathers’, and by the fact that we have no memory of any such prior existence” (Green 2013, 103). Since the soul is propagated by our parents, it follows that it is also material and intimately united with the body. Second is the Platonic idea that in the afterlife it is only the intellectual soul that is rewarded, a theory that Montaigne rejects as illogical, because it entails “so extreme and universal a change” in our being that, ‘according to the teachings of physics, it will no longer be ourselves’, but ‘something else that will receive those rewards’. By that reckoning’, Montaigne argues, ‘it will no longer be man, nor consequently ourselves, whom this enjoyment will concern; for we are built of two principal essential parts, whose separation is the death and destruction of our being’” (Green 2013, 103). Indeed, Montaigne embraced the propagation theory and rejected the Platonic idea that the rational soul is the sole agent that will be received in heaven. Accordingly, we may conclude that Montaigne adhered to the idea of the inseparability of mind and body. But if we do so, we will be confronted with an apparent contradiction: how can we reconcile Montaigne’s monist materialism with the fact that he often describes instances which suggest that there are “movements and utterances that operate independently of our will and awareness”, or with the fact that, to recall Donald Frame’s words, the essayist’s emotions, fancies and the imagination have the ability “to oppose him successfully or even manipulate him” (Frame 1976, 195)? It is thus difficult to see how such an ontological outlook is possible if mind and body, in Montaigne’s thought, are identical. Moreover, as we have also seen in the previous chapter, the propagation theory does not necessarily refer to the intellectual soul. On the contrary, it was very common for this theory to refer to the organic. At the same time, dualism does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the intellectual soul alone will be rewarded after physical passing. This doctrine may arguably be attributed to Plato, but not all dualists were Platonic dualists, the day of Atonement presupposing, according to traditional theology, the resurrection of the human body and its (re)union with the soul.
3. It should be noted that Montaigne was by no means the first thinker to support the idea that animals can perform complicated cognitive processes. We can find the rudiments of this philosophical tradition in Western thought as early as in Aristotle’s The History of Animals, Plutarch’s Moralia and his unfinished Beasts are Rational, as well as in Pliny’s Naturalis Historia. For a concise study that focuses on this line of thought, see Sobol 1993, 109–28.
4. This doctrine has its origin in Aristotle’s De interpretatione. See, for instance, Aristotle 1962, 16a 3–8. The doctrine was common to logicians throughout the middle Ages, and it continued well into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, being found in Descartes, Locke and Leibniz. For more information
on this doctrine in secondary literature see the concise account by Ashworth 1988, 143–72.

5. For a translation of key-extracts from Jean de Silb6n’s L’immortalité de l’âme, see Silhon 1998, 176–200.


7. For a more detailed discussion of this Nietzschean strategy in secondary literature, see Shusterman 2000, 137–54.

8. As Elain Scarry and Stephen Pender have noted, since pain has no object, the imagination is pain’s “intentional object” (Scarry 1985, 164). Pender adds here that “pain affects, even colonises the imagination but appealing to the imagination also remedied pain [...] somatic and noetic suffering were treated imaginatively in early modernity” (Pender 2009, 471).

9. For an alternative account that discusses Montaigne’s retreat to his inner self as a healing method, one that resembles the placebo effect, see Lyons 2006, 525–38. For recent studies that discuss how the imagination fashions possibilities of human events and the psychic life, see Kritzman 2009; Panichi 2008; and Westerwelle 2002.

10. It would be tempting to tease out here the connections between Montaigne’s theory of the placebo effect and modern studies by medical practitioners and scholars within the medical humanities who call for a theory of the mind-body relationship formidable enough to explain phenomena that resist traditional accounts of the nature of the body and its cognitive abilities. Walter Cannon, for instance, titled his book on homeostasis The Wisdom of the Body (1932), recognizing that the self-regulation of the body entails a form of wisdom, or self-knowledge, on the part of the body. Following Cannon, Mark D. Sullivan (1990), in “Reconsidering the Wisdom of the Body: an Epistemological Critique of Claude Bernard’s Concept of the Internal Environment”, noted that “it is more customary to speak of minds as capable of ‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’ rather than bodies. Yet [...] we neglect the self-knowing and self-healing powers of the body at our peril” (Sullivan 1990, 493–4). Similarly, Michael Gershon describes the enteric nervous system as having a mind of its own (Gershon 1999). And according to Oron Frenkel mainstream attempts to understand the placebo effect appeal to the expectancy theory, “arguing that expecting certain outcomes from a treatment or intervention can manifest those outcomes”. Pace this approach, Frenkel contends that the “expectancy theory is incompatible with the phenomena of placebo responses” because it “utilizes reflexive consciousness to connect a world of conceptual representations to mechanical physiology”. In the light of this incompatibility, Frenkel goes on to support an “alternative account based upon a theory that the body understands and is capable of responding to meanings without the need for any conceptual or linguistic content” (2008, 58). I provide a brief discussion of these and other examples of the modern tendency to invest the body with autonomy of thought in the concluding chapter of this study.

11. For more information in secondary literature on the theme of the powers of imagination to heal and cause disease, as well on the ethical concerns raised by this approach to medical practice by contemporary physicians, see especially Schleiner 1995.
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42 Montaigne’s Corporeal Self


The word “allegory,” from the Greek *allos* (ἄλλος, other) and *agoria* (ἀγορία, speaking), is etymologically self-explanatory. “Allegoria,” Richard Sherry (1506–1555) tells us, “is an inuersion of wordes, where it is one in wordes, and another in sentence or meanynge” (Sherry 1550, 45). The view of the body as a cognitive entity may thus be said to gesture towards allegoresis, as it promotes an understanding of the somatic wherein its defining term “material” means something other (i.e. active thinking entity) than what it professes (i.e. passive object). This chapter shows how Spenser took up the intimate connection between the thinking body and allegory and brought it to bear on the philosophical undercurrents of the genre as well as on questions of religion, justice and power.

The body is not simply one topic among many others that allegorists have dealt with. It is part of the very nature of allegory. As Torquato Tasso (1544–1595) noted, the body is as vital to allegoresis as it is to human life: “Allegorie respecteth the passions, the opinions and customes, not onely as they doe appeare, but principally in their being hidden & inward [...] Allegorie: which, as the life of man is compound, so it represents to vs, sometime the figure of the one, sometime the figure of the other: yet because that commonly by Man, we understand this compound of the bodie, soule, or minde, and then mans life, is said to be that, which of such compound is proper, in the operations whereof euerie part thereof concurrets, and by working gets that perfection, of the which by her nature she is capable” (Tasso 1600, A3v). In Tasso’s view, then, allegory is a literary genre in which the body is an integral constituent that cannot be explained away. Like human life, allegory is composed of beings that are “compounds” of a material body (i.e. the image of the allegorical figure) and a mind or soul (i.e. the abstract principle the allegorical character embodies). Tasso’s emphasis here is on perspective: In an allegory we can see “sometime the figure of the one [i.e. body], sometime the figure of the other [i.e. mind].” The intimate connection between human nature and allegory points at an
approach which presupposes that an understanding of the body and its relation to the intellect will help us to understand the workings of allegorical poetry and, conversely, that an understanding of allegoresis will give significant insights into the body and its relation to the immaterial principle (intellect) it envelops. Spenser, as we will see, follows Tasso in drawing a homology between human nature and allegory as well as in laying focus on perspective. But whereas Tasso upheld the idea that in allegory “perfection” is attained when “euerie part thereof concurses,” Spenser articulates a poetics wherein each part is often in conflict with the other, wherein the material body of the abstract principle may contradict the very principle it is supposed to have materialized. Andrew Wadoski argues that “Spenser’s most radical departure from Tasso’s precedent is in the way he stages his garden’s end: where Tasso’s garden magically vanishes, Spenser’s knight of Temperance, Guyon, razes it with considerable effort” (Wadoski 2014, 365–6). This departure, according to Wadoski, marks Spenser’s rather more symbolic and profound break from Tasso’s paradigm: “Read as a narrative account of allegory in action, Guyon’s laborious destruction of the Bower of Bliss opens a pointed inquiry into the ways allegory struggles to marshal or contain the unsettling possibilities of irony, ambiguity, and equivocation in its own figures [...] Intervening in a poetics that elides internal difference in its drive to absorb all transgression into an ethical code, Spenser’s response to Tasso in the Bower suggests that the Liberata taught him the need for an allegory that seeks out the liberating possibilities of its messiness, recovering not only the ethical necessity but the conceptual force of disorder in representing our status as fallen beings in the mutable world” (Wadoski 2014, 366). Indeed, Spenser fueled his writing with the possibility of irony and ambiguity. But his most radical departure from Tasso, I argue in this chapter, finds expression in the fact that he grounded ambiguity, aspectual reality and even irony (defined as “opposite-speaking” by the period’s literary theorists) on the material bodies of his characters, so often thought in modern criticism to be merely visual manifestations of the ideas they are presupposed to body forth.

THE BODY, ALLEGORESIS AND THE PITFALLS OF LITERARY CRITICISM

If, as Tasso insists, the body is vital to allegorical poetry, then the tendency in extant criticism to marginalize the somatic in favor of the autonomy of language threatens to obscure our understanding of allegory’s complexity and significance. The register of allegory in the critical idiom as a tropological disposition of discourse itself rather than as a model or genre was systematized by Paul de Man in “The Rhetoric of Temporality” and later in “Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion.” In the former, de Man argues that the temporality of allegory “dissolves in the narrowing spiral of a linguistic sign that becomes
more and more remote from its meaning” (de Man 1983, 222). Christopher Burlinson provides a concise restatement of de Man's position: “Although allegory seems to represent in an emphatically clear way, it is not dealing with something that can be represented, and although the narrative form of allegory forces it to be temporal, it doesn’t necessarily deal with a temporal topic at all” (Burlinson 2006, 10). Similarly, Maureen Quilligan argues that allegory “relies on a realist attitude toward language” (Quilligan 1981, 185), noting that “the ‘other’ named by the term _allos_ in the word ‘allegory’ is not some other hovering above the words of the text, but the possibility of an otherness, a polysemy, inherent in the very words on the page” (Quilligan 1979, 26). This focus on the semantic instability of words has pushed to the margin the importance of materiality within the narrative. This is tantamount to denying a fundamental aspect of allegoresis for, as Thomas Cooper (c.1517–1594) notes, an allegory is a “figurative similitude” (Cooper 1573, 369r).

Although understanding what the word “allegory” means is an uncomplicated task, identifying a text as allegorical is problematic. The dilemma of what can or should be read allegorically constitutes an interpretive crux not only for early modern thinkers, but for modern critics as well. A panoramic view over contemporary theorisations of allegory and the main corpus of modern criticism shows that within this general confusion lies another fundamental and intimately related error in our approaches to allegorical poetry: the notion that polysemy (pluri-signification) and antiphrasis (opposite speaking) are incompatible.

Lutheran evangelical writers repudiated allegory and figurative readings of scripture wherever possible. Scripture is plain and incontrovertible. It interprets itself, and is in any case easy to read because its only sense is the literal sense. For others, however, who supported the official Catholic Church teaching which discerned four levels of meaning, — the literal, allegorical, anagogical and tropological — the scriptures should be read as allegorical poems under whose heavily symbolic language lies hidden the true meaning. This early modern allegorical dilemma is best illustrated by William Tyndale’s (d.1536) infamous debate with Thomas More (1478–1535), in which the latter rebukes the former for reading the Holy Communion as a spiritual allegory and discrediting its literal level and vice versa (Tyndale 1533 and More 1533). This debate represents a general attitude towards the scriptures. As William Perkins (1558–1602) complains, “how Commentaries ought to be written, it is not so easie to define […] For besides that the Popish writers make foure seuerall senses of the Scripture, commending _Jerome_ to excell in the Literall, _Origen_ in the Allegoricall, _Ambrose_ in the Anagogicall, _Chrysostome_ in the Tropologicall; they haue above fiftie seuerall waies of expounding the Scripture” (Perkins 1604, f14v–r). Modern literary criticism and theory do not always use the term “allegory” more precisely than that. Poems, for instance, are commonly referred to as allegories. This practice goes back to the earliest interpreters of Homer, that is, to the beginnings of western literary criticism. In an even broader conceptualisation of allegory,
Thomas Adams (fl.1612–1653) asserted that “All is an Allegory. The Earth is Man: the Raine, Gods Word: the herbes are Graces: and the Blessing, is a sweet retribution and accumulation of mercie” (Adams 1616, 3). Adams’s understanding of allegory is often reproduced in modern interpretations of allegory. Brenda Machosky, for example, introduces Thinking Allegory Otherwise by asserting: “Embedded in museum displays, providing the structure for scientific thought, evading the hegemony of the idea, allegory is thriving in the twenty-first century” (Machosky 2010, 1). It is this conceptual framework that led to the idea that allegory simply happens (Hunter 2010, 266–80). The result, as Gordon Teskey notes, is “a tendency to confuse allegorical interpretation with the making of allegories, subsuming a general concern with heterogeneity under the spacious term, ‘the allegorical’” (Teskey 1996, 2). However, the most important oddity that emerges from within this confusion is not so much the insurgence of allegory into non-allegorical texts, but of the literal level into allegory. Within this confusion, Spenser’s poem is considered to monger its mystery conspicuously: Its figures are nothing more than mere representatives of the principles after which most of them are named. Allegory is basically simplistic and reductive. Its levels of meaning are susceptible of clear rationalization. Decoding is easy, for “allegorical intention is in general a simple matter” (Fletcher 1964, 323). If this uncomplicated form is accepted as the model, it will follow that the personified abstraction will manifest a pattern of behaviour so limited in variety as to suggest possession by a “daemon,” as Angus Fletcher has it. In simplistic allegory determinism governs. Allegorical heroes are compelled or driven by an abstract principle or besetting idea, of which they are the embodiments. They have no autonomy: their actions are wholly predictable as they are definable in terms of the function allotted by their “daemon”. The allegorical agent tends to act not in accordance with human probability, but “his choices, if they can properly be so called, are made for him by his daemon” (Fletcher 1964, 67. See also Hinks 1939, 106–13).

However valuable the results of literal interpretation may be, this approach stands in sharp contrast to Spenser’s description of The Faerie Queene as “a continued Allegory, or darke conceit,” “dim veil,” and “shady” (Spenser 2001, 714, 727–8). These characterisations prompt the reader to resist simplistic readings, invoking a rich tradition that repeatedly stressed the instability of meaning in allegories. In A treatise of schemes and tropes (1550), for instance, Richard Sherry identified three tropes in “Allegoria,” which are particularly pertinent to Spenser’s allegoresis: First, recalling Spenser’s description of his poem as a “darke conceit,” is “Sermo obscurus, a riddle or darke allegorie, as: The halfe is more then the hole”; second is “Adagium, a sayinge muche vsed and notable for some noueltye”; and third is “Dissimulatio,” the act of feigning or concealing (Sherry 1961, 45). Obscuring, feigning and blending the familiar with the unknown are the main characteristics, according to Sherry, of allegorical poetry, making meaning elusive, even illusive. Thus, poets who
write “blynd allegories,” Thomas Wilson (c.1525–1581) maintains in *The arte of rhetorique*, are “delityng muche in their awne darkenesse, especially, when none can tell what thei dooe saie” (Wilson 1553, 87r). Sherry’s characterisation of allegory as *dissimulatio* is echoed in George Puttenham’s (1529–1590/91) definition of *allegoria* as a “false semblant or dissimulation” (Puttenham 1970, 186). For Puttenham, this figure is the centre of all poetry and oratory: “not onely every common Courtier, but also the grauest Counsellour, yea and the most noble and wisest Prince of them all are many times enforced to use it, by example (say they) of the great Emperor who had it usually in his mouth to say, *Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare* [Whoever doesn’t know how to dissimulate, doesn’t know how to rule]” (Puttenham 1970, 186). An understanding of allegory as “false semblant” suggests that the opposite is meant to what appears at the surface. Thus, Quintilian advises that the definition of allegory as “inversion” signifies that what is meant is the opposite of what is said: “Allegory, which is translated in Latin by *inversio*, either presents one thing in words and another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to the meaning of the words. The first type is produced by a series of metaphors […] On the other hand, that class of allegory in which the meaning is contrary to that suggested by the words, involve an element of irony, or, as our rhetoricians call it, *illusion*” (Quintilian 1921, 3:327, 333). Teskey argues here that the two claims are incompatible because “one cannot, by extending a metaphor, say the opposite of what one means” (Teskey 1996, 56). Antiphrasis and polysemy, Teskey continues, “are as incompatible as are the relations of the different to the same and the part to the whole” (57). The simile Teskey uses to demonstrate the incompatibility of allegory and irony echoes Sherry’s “The halfe is more then the hole.” As we have seen, however, Sherry uses this idiom to stress the compatibility between allegory and irony. Inherent in the definition of allegory is thus the potential of antiphrasis, of opposite speaking, and hence the infusion of irony within allegorical discourse. In *The Arcadian rhetorike* (1588), Abraham Fraunce (c.1558–c.1593), who, as Walter Davis notes, “knew Spenser or his circle well enough to quote a stanza of *The Faerie Queene* in manuscript version” (Davis 2002, 154), offers a similar account: “*Ironia* is a Trope, that by naming one contrarie intendeth another. The speciall grace whereof is in jesting and merie conceipted speaches. This trope continued maketh a most sweet allegorie, and it is perceiued by the contrarietie of the matter it selfe, or by the manner of utterance quite differing from the sense of the worde, for then it is apparant that wee speake but iestinglie, and not as wee thinke” (Fraunce 1588, A7v–r). According to Fraunce, irony is not only integral to the polysemous nature of allegory, but it perfects it, as it “maketh a most sweet allegorie”. And as Puttenham writes, antiphrasis, which he defines as “plaine and flat contradiction,” is among the “souldiers to the figure *allegoria* and fight[es] under the banner of dissimulation” (Puttenham 1970, 191). Antiphrasis is not only a species of
allegory that Spenser uses along with polysemy, but polysemy and antiphra-
sis are mutually reinforcing. In Spenser’s allegoresis, as we will see, there are
two levels of meaning: the one lies on the surface of words, and the other
finds expression through the argument or mind of the allegorical figure’s
material body. Perspective, as Tasso reminds us, furnishes a crucial key to
our understanding of allegorical texts. What each perspective reveals, never-
theless, may signify the opposite meaning to that of its counterpart.

THE ALLEGORY OF THE BODY: “THE BODIE EITHER AS
AN OBJECT, OR AS A SUBIECT” (BRYSKETT 1606, 276)

Spenser makes particularly pronounced his interest in the nature of the body
and its relation to the mind or soul in Axiochus (1592), a pseudo-Platonic
dialogue between Socrates and Axiochus that revolves around the mind-body
relationship and the question of the soul’s immortality. This treatise suggests
that Spenser’s interest in the soul-body relationship was not superficial. Even
if we question its authorship, the fact that it was attributed to the poet is
important to our historical understanding of the early modern reception of
Spenser as a thinker because it bespeaks a readiness to associate the poet’s
name with a work dealing with the mind-body relationship. Spenser’s preoc-
cupation with this ontological problem is also suggested in Bryskett’s A dis-
course of ciuill life (1606), where an interlocutor named “Maister Spenser”
intervenes to ask if one should consider mind and body to be distinct or united
(Mills 1973, 173–86). The central role of the body in Spenser’s thought is also
reflected in The Faerie Queene. All of the allegorical cores of the 1590 ver-
sion of the poem — the House of Holiness, the House of Alma, the Garden of
Adonis — focus on embodied experience. In the House of Holiness, Redcross
undergoes castigation and purification of his body and in Book III Venus
keeps Adonis’ body forever in the ground beneath her sacred hill, boaring
away. In what follows, I focus on the anthropomorphic Castle of Alma, the
most conspicuous and heavily discussed allegorical representation of the
body in the poem, whose “famously enigmatic geometrical and arithmetical
stanza (II.ix.22),” Elizabeth Harvey noted, “furnishes a crucial key for under-
standing The Faerie Queene’s thought” (Harvey 2007, 260). Here I argue
that the material body is invested with intellectual properties, articulating an
ontological outlook and a poetics where the somatic is no longer understood,
in Neoplatonic terms, as a female, passive recipient longing to acquire mean-
ing or form from a male idea, but as an active cognitive agent that can be
antiphrastic to the idea it embodies, thus destabilising interpretive fixity.

The stanza introducing the Castle of Alma has long proved the single
most perplexing passage in The Faerie Queene:

The frame thereof seemd partly circulare,
And part triangulare, O worke divine;
Those two the first and last proportions are,
The one imperfect, mortal!, foeminine;
Th’other immortall, perfect, masculine,
And twixt them both a quadrate was the base,
Proportioned equally by seven and nine;
Nine was the circle sett in heavens place,
All which compacted made a goodly diapase (II.ix.22).

Speculation on the symbolism possibly involved in these lines has produced a formidable body of psychological, geometrical and arithmological interpretation. Recorded interpretations began with William Austin in 1636, and since Digby published his Observations in 1644, which according to James Riddle and Stanley Stewart was based on Ben Jonson’s glosses (Riddle and Stewart 1994, 183–200), most critics have interpreted it as an allegory of the body-soul relationship. The common idea around which interpretations on the stanza revolve, in varying ways, is that the poet offers a vision of unity between mind and body, microcosm and macrocosm, flesh and spirit. Despite this consensus, a paradox has always been staring the reader in the face. Due to their degrees of perfection, the triangle (female, material, imperfect) is traditionally considered to refer to the body and the circle (male, immaterial, perfect) to the rational soul. However, Spenser does not describe the soul (Alma) as a circular structure, but the frame of her Castle, that is, the body: “The frame thereof seemd partly circulare” (emphasis added). Spenser’s word choice directs the reader’s attention to the castle’s fleshy exterior (the material body) as “frame” refers to the outline of a given structure or edifice, not its interior content. Thus, whereas we have been analysing the symbolism of the circle as referring only to the immaterial, rational soul, Spenser’s language indicates that we should also turn to the material body as a circle, as an allegory of the somatic as a partly intellectual entity.

Most commonly, the opening couplet of the stanza is graphically depicted as a triangle within a circle, and as the poem develops a square is added. The body is often left totally out of the equation or picture, and even when it takes its place within the circle it tends to be buried beneath diagrams and mathematical equations. Schemata of this kind can be useful indeed, but they also threaten to render obsolete a vital key to our understanding of this most problematic of poems: We no longer see the body, the subject matter of the stanza. In order to avoid this interpretive predicament, we should see the body as a triangle, circle and square through a process of repeated anamorphosis, not the body in a triangle, circle or square. Anamorphosis, from Greek ana (again) and morphe (shape), fascinated early modern writers, including Spenser (Stapleton 2009, 130–50). Anna Riehl provides a concise summary of the viewer’s response to an anamorphic figure:

Presented with the obscurity of a tricky form, viewers are compelled to seek disclosure first through physical movement, and later through corresponding mental effort as they ponder the meaning of their discovery.
The search for the advantageous viewing point demands an exercise of perceptions that comprise a linear advancement from mystery to revelation. However, once acquired, both images coexist in the viewers’ subjective memory, just as in the objective reality both images always exist simultaneously, even though they can be seen by the same pair of eyes only one at a time. Moreover, these images share the same material elements even as their meanings do not coincide. Finally, the remembrance of the unseen form enables the interpretive efforts that extend any anamorphic experience beyond the mere game of visual perception.

(Riehl 2009, 143)

The figurative representation and logical thinking of stanza 22 are deeply anamorphic. As an anamorphic conundrum, the poem calls for a process of discovery through perspective. Confronted with the image of the body, we are encouraged to visualize it as a circle, but we cannot see it at the same time as a triangle. The body acquires, or is shaped into, the proposed schema consecutively, whereas the other diagram remains a meaningful symbol in the background of the image’s form and of our mental processes during the act of understanding. Having visualized the body as a circle and invested it with the meanings that this symbol carries with it (divine, perfect, intellectual, masculine), we are then called to anamorphose it into a triangular structure and re-conceptualize it in terms of the meanings that characterize the new symbol (material, imperfect, feminine). The body is thus a mixture of earthy and divine attributes, of female and male elements. It is a circle superimposed by a triangle and vice versa. Mixture, superimposition and perspective, the integral techniques of anamorphosis, are the prevailing concepts in this poem. Emphasizing that the body “seemd partly circulare,” the poet allows for the emergence of a body that is at once an intellective and a material thing.

Operating as an elaboration of the couplet under discussion, lines 3–5 are suggestive of this form of anamorphic confusion:

The frame thereof seemd partly circulare,
And part triangulare, O worke divine
Those two the first and last proportions are,
The one imperfect, mortall, fæminine;
Th’ other immortall, perfect, masculine (II.ix.22, 1–5).

As we have seen, lines 1–2 encourage us to visualise the body as a circle and then as a triangle. Line three insists on this sequence for, according to their degrees of perfection, the circle comes “first” and the triangle “last.” Lines 4 and 5, however, disrupt our logic of sequential substitution: The “one” of line 4 echoes the “first” (circle) of line three but, quite unexpectedly, we read a description of “Th’other’ diagram” (triangle), which is “imperfect, mortall, fæminine.” Reversing the expected sequence, the poem reacts against the reader’s anticipations. The one-another formulation also signifies that body
and intellect, circle and triangle, are interchangeable and complementary. At the same time, nevertheless, the “one” and the “other” remain distinct unities, creating a logic of anamorphic con-fusion where the body is partly intellectual (circular, masculine) and partly material (triangle, feminine). The give-and-take of these conjunctions coordinates with the rhetorical structure of the Spenserian stanza: the rhyming couplet formed by the “feminine” of line 4 and the “masculine” of line 5 pairs femininity to masculinity where it is least expected, creating a logic where the body figures as an androgynous entity: it is both masculine (intellectual, circular) and feminine (material, mortal, triangular). The symbolic representation of the body as an androgynous agent is figured forth through Spenser’s omission of any detail in his portraiture of the human body that would suggest a genitally based gender identification, thereby giving the body a deliberately androgynous cast (Hamilton 2001, 239; and Schoenfeldt 1999, 62).

The stanza’s closing couplets insist on the anamorphic logic of confusing binary opposites through a process that retains the friction between those opposites:

And twixt them both a quadrate was the base,
Proportioned equally by seven and nine;
Nine was the circle set in heavens place,
All which compacted made a goodly diapase (II.ix.22, 6–9).

The first line introduces the image of the quadrate. According to Digby, the quadrate stands for the quadrate of humors — choler, blood, phlegm, and melancholy — which supply the “base” of man’s physical existence as long as they are kept in good order (Digby 1643, 15–16). Nevertheless, Alastair Fowler contends that the quadrate’s symbolism is more ambiguous than that. In Renaissance arithmology, Fowler sums up, “the quadrate (quaternion: tetractys) was regarded: (1) as a base (base of numeration, fundamental principle, root or foundation of all existence); (2) more particularly, as a mean quantity (often the soul, anima), partaking of both corporeal and incorporeal natures, and therefore able to unify mind and body; (3) as a principle of harmony in nature (to ‘quadrate’ meant to harmonize); and (4) as the fountain of all virtue” (Fowler 1964, 279). Within this general framework, Fowler looks into the two complementary meanings of the word “twixt,” the one suggesting that the quadrate is positioned between the circle and the triangle, and the other that it is shared between them, sharing, that is, “in both natures, as part corporeal, part incorporeal.” In this respect, the quadrate represents the harmony of Spenser’s “goodly diapase” (Fowler 1964, 279). Fowler then discerns a level of significance at which the numbers 7 and 9 participate mathematically as well as symbolically, because the Aristotelian mean between numbers 7 (corporeal, triangle, mortal) and 9 (immortal, circle, incorporeal) is the arithmetic number 8, which is the octave (Fowler 1964, 285). In Vincent Hopper’s words, the “‘goodly diapase’ of Spenser’s concluding line is
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a perfect measure for the circle of the universe, ‘the harmony of the spheres’” (Hopper 1940, 964–5). And according to Maren-Sofie Røstvig, in the “diapason or octave three symbols coincide: that of the ratio, that of the circle, and that of the number 8” (Røstvig 1994, 17).

The benefits of these studies notwithstanding, we should also take into account the fact that Spenser does not only encourage his readers to recognize that the octave refers to the mind and body, but also to the body itself as a partly intellectual and partly material component. “Diapason,” from the Greek dia (δια, across) and pason (πασῶν, all), is the perfect concord because it forms a faint echo of the harmony which exists between heaven and earth. The miracle of the octave is that it dissects wholeness into two audibly distinguishable parts, yet remains recognizable as the same musical note. It is the product of a combination between a lower and a higher note. The idea of two distinct sounds appearing to be one is analogous to an anamorphic image, where two entities share the same space and elements and yet both exist in their own right. Anamorphosis and music coordinate in Spenser’s mathematical stanza to articulate an ontological outlook where the material body seems to be “partly circulare, / And part triangulare”, that is, partly male and intellectual, and partly female and material. Spenser invests thus the body with intellectual capacities of its own, rendering it, in Bryskett’s terminology, “a subiect” (Bryskett 1606, 276). This view has a topographical component that is registered schematically through the body’s anamorphic character, a body that may appear to schematize a circle, triangle, or quadrate, depending on the viewer’s perspective.

When we come to read the symbolic meanings of the circle and the triangle as referring to the two constituent components of human nature, Spenser’s stanza draws attention to the incommensurability of mind (circle) and body (triangle) and to the difficulty of establishing proportion between them. On this level, where the anamorphic body’s relationship to the intellect is the focal point, perspective is again instrumental to our understanding of the poem’s representation of human nature. The stanza may appear, at first sight, to promote a vision of ideal unity between mind and body. This concord is nevertheless disrupted by the fact that earlier in the poem we witnessed Alma leading the knights up to the castle wall (flesh) and entering the body through the mouth (II.ix.23). This event recalls Aristotle’s stipulation that the rational soul comes from outside and that it alone is thereby divine: “It remains, then, that Reason alone enters in, as an additional factor, from outside, and that it alone is divine, because physical activity has nothing whatever to do with the activity of Reason” (Aristotle 1943, 2.3, 736b27–29). This passage is regularly cited by early modern writers and theologians in order to support the thesis of the real distinction between mind and body. For instance, according to Melanchthon, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the rational soul does not depend on organs to carry out its operations. Instead, it is incorporeal and, therefore, immortal. As a proof of this, the protestant reformer quotes Aristotle: “the mind alone comes from
outside [extrinsecus], and it alone is divine, because it does not communicate any of its actions [actione] to the actions of the body” (Melanchthon 1540, 20). Alma’s (the soul’s) entrance into the castle (body) from outside introduces thus a complication to the vision of monism that the poem appears to project. And just as we cannot visualize the body as a circle and triangle at the same time, so we cannot establish the proportion between mind and body that would compact them into an undifferentiated unity, albeit through a processes of repeated anamorphosis whereby the two segments retain their independence even as they share the same elements.

To sum up Spenser’s allegorical rendering of the material nature of the somatic and the soul-body relationship, the meaning of the body exerts its force by driving a wedge into its material nature in order to make two opposed things, two others (i.e. object, triangle, on the one hand, and subject, circle, on the other) and by yoking these antithetical others together through its anamorphic character so that one may be thought to refer to the other or each one of them to the constituents of human nature respectively. The body always refers to a meaning other than the one it seems to profess. It is a perpetual allos for as soon as we attempt to conceptualize it as an imperfect, female, material object, this conceptualization is superimposed by its other, circular, male, perfect, intellectual character and vice versa. At the same time, this organizational principle may be said to refer to human nature as a conjunction of two distinct components, the one organic (body) and the other intellective (rational soul or mind). As we will see in the following section, this organizational principle replicates the impulses of allegory, as the body of the allegorical character in Spenser’s allegoresis is often invested with the ability to convey meanings that contradict the meaning of the besetting idea that his/her body is supposed to have materialized, suggesting an ontology and a poetics wherein body and mind, image and concept, figure as two distinct agents.

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Teskey argues that a gap or rift exists at the heart of allegory: the problem of “methexis and chorismos, ‘participation’ and ‘separation,’” the strategy by which “abstractions are predicated of individual things only after being predicated of themselves through the trope of personification, as when Justice is said to be just” (Teskey 1996, 14–17). The logical concepts that underpin Platonic idealism, Teskey continues, engage a “metaphorics of insemination and parturition by which a form like Justice can multiply itself through a featureless, alien mother — even as it continues, in the empyrean, to father itself” (Teskey 1996, 17; see also Teskey 1994, 299). In this interpretation, allegory is not just a demonstration of animated idealism, but a way of perpetuating social hierarchy, a hierarchy in which allegory seeks to capture the (female) material and elevate it to the level of the (male) concept (Teskey 1994, 300 and Teskey 1996, 17). Allegory is thus imagined by Teskey as a violent sexual
congress, a version of the Aristotelian conception in which the male is the active partner who contributes form to the female's passive matter (Teskey 1994, 297–8; and Teskey 1996, 15–16). The material in allegory, which Teskey aligns with the feminine, is both the site of the rift at the heart of the allegorical project and also the “other” that remains heterogeneous to the abstract forms that are imprinted on it. Teskey termed this structure the “poetics of capture” (Teskey 1994, 307; and Teskey 1996, 5–6, 23). To argue thus, however, is to render obsolete a vital aspect to both the allegory of the body (the body as a thinking thing) and the body of allegory (the philosophical undercurrents of the genre): by sustaining the idea of the feminine as feminine (i.e. passive matter), the poem is deprived of its already anamorphosed feminine, material aspect into a circular, male and active substance. The material in Spenserian allegoresis is not the passive matter (female) that takes its form and meaning from an idea (male), but an active cognitive agent that can refine, redefine and contradict that idea. In short, the material can be heterogeneous and/or antiphrastic not only to the abstract forms that are imprinted on it, but to its own materiality as well: to the term “material” itself. The body is a subjective, self-contained cognitive force infused into the very heart of allegoresis which palpitates in the rhythms of a poetics that continuously destabilizes material and interpretive fixity. This principle is materialized, as we will see, through the figures of Una and Duessa, who are the embodiments of allegory itself and the main figures of The Faerie Queene's opening book, the one representing virtue and unity, and the other vice and duplicity.

The earliest recorded reference to Spenser's Duessa comes from Robert Albott's (fl.1600) Eng-lands Parnassus (1600). Albott quotes poems from several authors in order to define “dissimulation”. The first is a passage from the The Faerie Queene, where he evokes Duessa (Albott 1600, 428). As we have seen, the threat of “dissimulation” within allegorical poetry recalls Puttenham's definition of allegoria as a “false semblant,” as a process of “dissimulation.” Similarly, in the glossary he appended to his Psychodia platonica (1642), Henry More (1614–1687) defines Duessa as “division or dualitie” (More 1642, 3v), attributing to her the power to divide and unite as well: “great skill [she] hath to joyn and disunite” (More 1642, 24). The acts of dividing, yoking and dissimulating are the main characteristics of both allegoresis and Duessa. Accordingly, from the very outset Duessa is presented as the embodiment of allegory within an allegorical poem. More, moreover, underlines the danger of dissimulation by comparing Duessa to Una: “Duessa till unstripped will compare with Una; you know the story in Spencer: and the bold ignorance of some does ordinarily make others take a great deal of pains to explain and evince that which to any indifferent man is usually true at first sight” (More 1660, 153). The allegorical hero, who is not allowed the interpretive tools the readers have at their disposal, is required to see through the veil of “false Duessa.” At first sight, the reader does not face such a predicament because we already know that Duessa is duplicity incarnate. In the reader’s eyes, Duessa is “unstripped.” But still, as readers, we are
warned of “dark conceits,” “false semblants” and “dissimulations.” Like the intra-fictional characters, we are cautioned to “beware of fraud, beware of fickleness” (I.iv.1). Duessa, we are told, is the adversary of Una, of holiness/wholeness, the one true church. However, “Oft fire is without smoke,” Una warns the Red Cross Knight, “And perill without show” (I.i.12), her advice being directed not only to the Redcrosee but, of course, to the reader as well. In the reader’s eyes, Duessa is a conspicuous “perill.” Here there is smoke. But like the characters within the narrative, we are prompted, if not required, to see through “dark conceits” and discern vice where it is least expected. Putting this speech in Una’s mouth is bitterly ironic because Una herself, as we will see, is for the reader what Duessa is for the allegorical hero: an embodiment of allegory, of dissimulation and duplicity. In his study of iconoclasm in the English Reformation, Ernest Gilman discusses the example of George Sandys (1578–1644), whose frontispiece to his translation of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* is followed by a brief poem called “‘The Minde of the Frontispeece, And Argument of this Worke’. This poem does not only clarify the allegory but also suggests that the frontispiece is itself the image of a ‘Minde,’ of the integral idea of the metamorphosis now unfolding into the sequential ‘Argument’ of Sandys’s text” (Gilman 1986, 18). The image, according to Sandys, has a mind of its own. Recalling Sandys’s attribution of mind to the image, R. J. Manning found in the Book of Justice what he calls ‘iconographical wit” (Manning 1985, 71). In Manning’s reading, Munera, as her name suggests, represents justice corrupted by bribery. In cutting off her hands and legs, Talus, according to Manning, reformed her into a traditional image of Justice as a handless and legless emblem. Later on, however, Spenser enunciates this principle, telling us that it is “better to reforme, then to cut off the ill” (V.x.2), but in Munera’s case to “cut off” is “to reforme” (Manning 1985, 70–71). There is thus a clash between the argument of the image and the argument uttered at the level of rhetoric. Focusing on the material body’s mind in Spenser’s poem, a different story is unraveled than the one uttered at the surface of the narrative; one that returns to be imprinted on the character in an anamorphic rather than metamorphic way.

Una’s portraiture at the opening of the book is laden with symbolic signification. She is presented as a mournful lady riding an ass:

A louely Ladie rode him faire beside,  
Vpon a lowly Asse more white then snow,  
Yet she much whiter, but the same did hide  
Vnder a vele, that wimpled was full low,  
And ouer all a blacke stole shee did throw,  
As one that inly mournd: so was she sad. (I.1.4)

Hamilton notes here that Una is associated “by the ‘lowly Asse’ with Christ’s humility,” and by “‘the more white then snow’ with truth and with faith” (Hamilton 2001, 32). A lady riding an ass was a familiar Renaissance
emblem which symbolized the true church (Steadman 1979, 131–7; and Perry 1997, 33–48). According to John Steadman, the ass symbolized the ministry, “the vehicle of the orthodox doctrine and one of the signs or notae of the True Church” (Steadman 1979, 134). The Bible, moreover, insists that God is known through his Word. Thus, James Nohrnberg observes that Una’s “frequent quotation of Scripture and the veil that in part identifies her with the ark of the testimony make her, among other things, the Word of God” (Nohrnberg 1976, 151). The ass, from this point of view, is an emblem of humility and a sacred carrier of the Word of God (Steadman 1979, 134–6). In Saussurian terms, the ass is the signifier, the sound-image-word, and Una the signified, the meaning itself.

Nevertheless, apart from an emblem of divine virtue and a commemoration of Christ’s humble entry into Jerusalem, the ass was also associated with ignorance and undue pride. Babrius’s fable “De Asino gestante simulacrum,” which was popularized through its various appearances in Renaissance emblem books, supports this view (Steadman 1979, 134). Andrea Alciati’s (1492–1550) Emblem VII, for instance, which bears the motto “Non tibi, sed religioni,” depicts a throng of worshippers kneeling before a statue of Isis borne on an ass’s back. The accompanying verses explain that the ass foolishly imagined himself the object of this devotion (Alciati 1584, 11r; see Figure 3.1). Geffrey Whitney’s (c.1548–c.1600) A Choice of Emblemes (1586) reproduced Alciati’s emblem with the same motto (Whitney 1586, 8; see Figure 3.2). In thinking that the people kneel for him, the ass, like the clergy, is
The Allegory of the Body

Figure 3.2 Whitney, Geoffrey. 1866. “Non tibi, sed Religioni.” In A choice of emblems: A facsimile reprint. London: Lovell Reeve & co. Courtesy of The Internet Archive Library.

an ignorant fool. Spenser’s participation in this emblematic culture is made evident when he has the Satyres in Canto vi mistake the ass for Una:

During which time her gentle wit she plyes,
To teach them truth, which worshipt her in vaine,
And made her th’Image of Idolatryes;
But when their bootlesse zeale she did restrayne
From her own worship, they her Asse would worship fayn (I.vi.19).

A carrier of the Word of God and Truth, the ass is also an emblematic vehicle for foolishness, undue pride, vainglory and ignorance. Thus, Cesare Ripa (fl.1600) explains that the ass in his iconography of Indocility symbolizes ignorance (see Figure 3.3): “On the Ground signifies her Indocility, not being able to rise higher, but stands still with her Ignorance, intimated by the ass” (Ripa 1700, 41v). A conflict is thereby introduced by the iconicity of the ass: On the one hand, it is an emblem of humbleness and divine virtue, a carrier or signifier of Una. On the other, it is a symbol of ignorance and undue pride. Moreover, Nohrnberg observes that “it is of some significance for this theme that in each of the low points of the knight’s passage Spenser includes a sinister version of the Word; we have already met Error’s books, like the Bible, ‘hard to be vnderstood’ (I.x.13, II Peter 3:16), and Archimago’s ‘Magick books’ and saints’ legends (I.i.35)” (Nohrnberg 1976, 151). This sinister version of the Word that Nohrnberg identifies in Spenser’s representation of
the Word is reinforced by the shared iconicity of Idleness and Una.11 At the House of Pride, the first of Lucifera’s six Wizards, Idleness, is a monk who guides Lucifera’s way: “Vpon a slouthfull Asse he chose to ryde, / Arayd in habit blakke” (I.iv.18). Una is similarly mounted and dressed, carrying herself “heauie” and “slow,” replicating the image of Idleness riding an ass: “ouer all a blacke stole she did throw, / As one that inly mournd: so was she sad, / And heauie sate vpon her palfrey slow” (I.i.4. See also Nohrnberg 1976, 151). In the emblematic culture of the period, as Francis Quarles’s (1592–1644) illustration demonstrates, slowly riding an ass signifies that “wee stray, / Or idly loose the way” towards grace, the snail crawling ahead of the ass betraying how “heauie” and “slow” the ass is moving (Quarles 1635, 53; see Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.3 Ripa, Cesare. 1709. “Indocilleness.” In Iconologia. London: Printed by Benj. Motte. Courtesy of the Rare Book & Manuscript Library, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Figure 3.4 Quarles, Francis. 1635. “Emblem XIII.” In Emblemes. In the Savoy: Printed by J. Nutt, and sold by E. Nutt. Courtesy of Penn State University Libraries’ Digital Collections.
A split is thus introduced in Una’s figure, a split between the argument of the image and the argument at the surface of the poem that pictures her as the personification of unity, truth and virtue. On one level, Una is supposed to represent perfection. On another, she is pictured as diverging from truth and virtue. Like her negative other Duessa, Una assumes a double identity.

Early modern iconographers were particularly attracted to the idea of dual representation. From a distance, for instance, Jan David’s (c.1545–1613) emblem does not pose any significant oddity (David 1610, 12; see Figure 3.5).

A closer look, however, reveals that in fragment C the wings of the celestial creature are turned into horns upon its head, thus representing the angel as the devil (see Figure 3.6).
Spenser is like a painter who sets out to paint a fair model which, as spectators alongside the painter, we can see. However, the model’s reflection on the artist’s canvas is deformed, and just as the angel’s wings are turned into the devil’s horns, Una’s celestial image is turned into a reflection of Duessa and Idleness. “Perspective,” the poet in Shakespeare’s Sonnets asserts, “is best painter’s art, / For through the painter must you see his skill / To find where your true image pictured lies” (Shakespeare 1977, 24.4–6). In Spenser’s Amoretti the same confrontation is enacted:

Leaue lady in your glasse of christall clene,  
Your goodly selfe for euermore to vew:  
and in my selfe, my inward selfe I meane,  
most liuely lyke behold your semblant trew (Spenser 1997, XLV).

The poet points here at the existence of two levels of imagery, the one drawn on the surface of poetic discourse and the other veiled underneath that discourse. Likewise, Una, on one level, is imaged as the embodiment of divine virtue. On another level, however, this image resists such absolute and unilateral presentations, introducing a friction between the argument of the material image and the principle to which this material image is supposed to have given a body. As the anamorphic figure of the body at the Castle of Alma which is partly circular (masculine) and partly triangular (feminine), the allegorical body of Una fathers meanings that are antiphrastic to the idea she appears to represent. Una is an allos (other) in an agoreusis (speaking) which means the opposite of what it says and says the opposite of what it means. Spenser’s symbolic representation of the body as “partly circulare, / And part triangulare” is thus intimately related to his representation of Una and Duessa as embodiments of allegory itself, highlighting the homology between the allegory of the body and the body of allegory. On the one hand, the triangle, as Fowler notes, is associated in early modern arithmology with number 2 (Fowler 1964, 266), the number that gives meaning to Duessa’s name. Number one (Una), on the other hand, Fowler
observes, is associated with the circle and perfection (Fowler 1964, 266). The relation between Una and Duessa replicates the relation between the circle and the triangle: by the degree of their perfection, Una (circle) is the first and Duessa (triangle) the last, but as if an anamorphic image, Una contains Duessa at the same time that both stand as distinct figures. And like the human material body, which is invested with intellectual attributes, Una’s material body is invested with a form of a somatic discourse that argues against the semantic meaning of the rhetoric uttered on the level of discursive articulation.

Teskey reminds us that literary romance and scholastic philosophy opposed notions of the feminine (material) substance on which meaning and form are imprinted. The one regards the feminine as that which resists the desire of the male, the other as that which longs for it. According to Teskey, the former is only a histrionic resistance, a “version of the fantasy of the suppressed smile of the woman who only appears to resist what is happening to her” (Teskey 1996, 21). Rather than a sexual congress, however, Spenser’s poetics draws out a vision where the Aristotelian conception of the female longing for the male is rendered an imposition of a unilateral idea (male) onto the material. This violent imposition is tantamount to rape, as the material (feminine) decisively rather than histrionically resists the besetting (male) idea, that is, Fletcher’s “daemon.” The body of allegory is bifurcated by two opposing ideas: the one is an offspring of the body’s mind and is distinct from the besetting idea; the other is the (male) besetting idea that is violently imprinted upon the (feminine) cognitive material. The tangled encounter of antiphrasis (i.e. the body speaking the opposite argument than the abstract idea it has supposedly materialized) and anaphora (i.e. the body’s agreement with, or reference to, the abstract idea) may be represented by the concept of anamorphic superimposition, whereby the material body is now an active, male cognitive agent (circle), and now a passive, feminine matter (triangle), both entities sharing the same space and elements (body), yet both existing in their own right.

The antiphrastic/anaphoric segments or meanings that the material body holds together as in an anamorphic painting may be said to invoke Teskey’s insistence on the incompatibility of polysemy and antiphrasis, and Stanley Fish’s theory of literary works as “self-consuming artifacts.” Teskey, as we have seen, argues that antiphrasis and polysemy are incompatible: There can be no narrative progress as “one cannot, by extending a metaphor, say the opposite of what one means” (Teskey 1996, 56). Teskey’s account of early modern allegoresis appears to support Fish’s thesis that self-negation and progress cannot coexist (Fish 1972, 224–38). After the manner of the deconstructive theorist Paul de Man, who argues that “deconstruction is not something we have added to the text but it constituted the text in the first place” (de Man 1979, 17), Fish assumes that literature is largely constructed of its own failures of signification, asserting that these texts thus become “self-consuming artifacts.” As Fish put it, “a self-consuming artifact signifies most successfully when it fails, when it points away from itself to something its forms cannot capture” (Fish 1972, 4). Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene*, however, is self-assertive because it seems to be self-consuming. To clarify this idea it
is helpful to appeal to the Socratic “I know one thing, that I know nothing.” This philosophical outlook is self-consuming in the sense that the philosopher, granted that he knows nothing, cannot know that he knows nothing. This moment, however, is when the Socratic statement is reasserted because this is the meaning Socrates wishes to communicate: by not knowing if he knows what he says he knows, the idea of knowing nothing has returned more forcefully. By creating what would appear a self-consuming artifact, Socrates does not fail to signify most successfully. On the contrary, he succeeds. Spenserian allegoresis works in a similar way: *The Faerie Queene* reasserts itself as an allegorical poem by channelling the potential of antiphrasis throughout the narrative. The fact that the body is both a material object and a cognitive agent, or the fact that the material body of the allegorical character has a mind of its own that can be antiphrastic to the abstract idea it had supposedly materialized, does not render Spenser’s poetics and representation of the human body self-consuming artifacts. Spenserian allegory does not point “away from itself to something its forms cannot capture.” By contrast, allegory (the pointer) is precisely that other, that *allos* it points at. Pointing away in Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene* is pointing back to itself, as if in a mirror. The image of Una, for instance, as the Word of God, the True Church or the Queen herself, points away at a negative other (Duessa) which other nevertheless is herself. This formulation does not indicate that the Spenserian text consumes itself. Rather, it is self-assertive as an allegorical project.

Manning, as we have seen, has already entertained the possibility that by being antiphrastic to rhetorical discourse, Munera’s body raises questions about justice and power. Extending our field of inquiry to the bodies of other figures, we discover more unsettling findings. To associate Una with Duessa, Idleness and other evil figures, is to associate the period’s religious culture and the Queen herself with the meanings that such figures symbolize. Several critics have shown how Spenser camouflaged his critique of the Queen and her policies under the appearance of rhetorical praise (Hadfield 2003, 56–76), articulating a theory where the “fairy Queen” becomes a “fiery Queen.” This is a pun to which Spenser often draws our attention, as in “The flaming corage of that Faery knight” (I.v.1), where “Faery” does not allow the reader to distinguish between “fairy” and “fiery.” In this context, it is bitterly ironic that Spenser would have the faerie queene, Glorane, and Queen Elizabeth herself, look at his “faire land” as if in a mirror: “And thou, 0 fairest Princesse under sky, / In this faire mirrhour maist behold thy face, / And thine owne realms in lond of Faery” (II.i.4). Double speaking, opposite speaking, perspective, aspectual reality and anamorphic superimposition are the prevailing concepts in Spenserian allegoresis, not absolute truths. In this poetics, polysemy and antiphrasis are so intimately connected that they confuse, but it is through this confusion that allegory is perfected. As Fraunce insists, “Ironia continued maketh a most sweet allegorie” (Fraunce 1588, A7v). Spenser grounds the potential of antiphrasis not only on the level of discourse, but also on
the material bodies of his allegorical figures. Early modern literary/cultural criticism may thus be significantly benefited by approaching the body of allegory through a theoretical framework that supposes the body to be an autonomous thinking agent, by approaching, that is, the body of allegory through the allegory of the body and vice versa.

NOTES

1. Maureen Quilligan, for instance, criticizes de Man’s allegorisation of non-allegorical writings and accounts for this paradox by drawing a much-needed distinction between allegories proper on the one hand, and allegorical interpretation on the other, as mutually exclusive projects. See Quilligan 1981, 163–86.

2. It is important to add here that Tyndale’s approach to the scriptures is problematic as he sways from the literal level back to the allegorical. For more information on how Tyndale both champions and repudiates the literal level, see Simpson, 2008, 37–55; Barnett 1998, 63–73; and Karpman 1967, 110–30. For more information regarding the controversy between Tyndale and More, see Hitchcock 1971, 448–66 and And Maveety 1966, 151–8. Note also that Hitchcock draws attention to the fact that More “vigorously upholds the use of allegory” (Hitchcock 1971, 460). Both Tyndale and More appear to oscillate between the literal and allegorical approaches, between, that is, the “Lutheran/Protestant” and “official/Catholic” readings of the scriptures.

3. Following the German critical tradition introduced by Goethe and Schelling, Coleridge condescendingly pronounced allegory to be “a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses” (Coleridge 1969–2001, 6:30). To the translation-language of allegory, he opposed the quasi-mystic incarnation of the Symbol, characterized “by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal” (Coleridge 1969–2001, 6:30). Similarly, Paul Alpers argues that “in reading The Faerie Queene, one apprehends the depths only by staying on the surface” (Alpers 1967, 157). And, as Kathleen Williams put it, “focus on the image, not the person behind the image” (Williams 1966, 33).

4. These references are to Spenser’s “Letter to Raleigh” and “Dedicatory Sonnets” in A.C. Hamilton’s edition of The Faerie Queene (Hamilton 2001). All references to Spenser’s The Faerie Queene are to this edition.

5. (for a concise account of early modern theorists who stress the instability of meaning in allegory, see Davis 2002, 152–167).

6. For more information on the controversy surrounding the problem of the treatise’s authorship, see Hamilton 1990, 200–1; Weatherby 1986, 95–113; and Freyd and Padelford 1935, 903–13.


8. (for more information on the mathematical and graphical interpretations of the stanza, see Burlinson 2006, 103n.25–27).

9. A number of studies have stressed the fascination of early modern literary writers with anamorphosis and perspective. See, for instance, Boyle 2010; Riehl 2009, 141–62; Massey 2007; and Elkins 1994.
10. Note here that the narrator in Bryskett’s *Discourse* rejects the “arithmetical” mean in favor of a “geometrical” one. See Brykett 1606, 209-11.

11. Observe also how Spenser has Una’s image operate as a reflection of Archimago and Night. Compare, for instance, I.i.4 with I.i.29 and I.v.20.

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4 Thinking (of) Feelings
Reaching for the Divine
in Donne’s Poetry

It is possible to present the ‘unpresentable’ [...] from beyond but also including language.

Broadhurst 1999, 8

“Have I spoken something, have I uttered something, worthy of God? No, I feel that all I have done is to wish to speak; if I did say something, it is not what I wanted to say. How do I know this? Simply because God is unspeakable” (Augustine 1995, 17). St Augustine’s (354–430) frustration at having to praise God in an imperfect language echoes a theological predicament that afflicted early modern priests, philosophers and poets. Fallen reason and language are, simply put, inadequate to comprehend and express the nature of God.¹ Donne’s “Negative Love” is underpinned by a similar albeit wittier and more playful sense of frustration. In the poem’s opening the poet pronounces that perfection “can by no way be exprest / But Negatives” (Donne 1912, 11–12).² The title itself indicates that Donne is borrowing from negative theology, which tries to describe the divine through negation, to speak the incomprehensible by negating the terms with which divinity was first described in order to reassert its transcendental and indescribable nature. Negative theology found expression in the writings of a number of philosophers and theologians, some of whom were major sources for Donne, including Gregory of Nyssa (c.335–c.384 [Carabine 1995, 223–58]), Augustine (Carabine 1995, 259–78 and Ettenhuber 2011a), Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (c.650–c.725[Carabine 1995, 279–300]) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274[Rocca 2004]). The inability of the human mind to grasp theological mysteries, to decipher what Donne calls “ainigmata Divina, The Riddles of Heaven, and the perplexities of speculation” (Donne 1953–1962, 8:106), — i.e. ex nihilo creation, the Resurrection, or God as the enfolding One — gave rise to what Robert Markley has termed “crises of representation” (Markley 1993, esp. 1–33). This, in turn, triggered what Umberto Eco identified as The Search for the Perfect Language: a search for universal language schemes or new systems of expression that would restore humankind to its prelapsarian state (Eco 1994). The notion that reason has been corrupted due to the fall cuts right through the heart
of Protestant theology. Since fallen humanity is mentally blind, any human activity unaided by divine grace is bound to be sinful. The only alternative, Luther preached, is passivity (Luther 1963, 26:9, 120). Augustine had likewise attacked the gratuitous thirst for knowledge, the mind’s restless and sinful self-indulgence. The end of Augustine’s quest, according to several critics, is the liberation from the “bondage of the sign” (Caranfa 2004, 187–210; Mazzeo 1964, 1–28 and Fish 1972, 21–43). Thus, in contradistinction to thinkers like John Wilkins (1612–1672), who attempted to create a new system of signs so as to have, in Joseph Waite’s (fl.1668) phrase, “Babel Revers’d,” Augustine’s focus lies on the liberation from signs.

Ronald Levao traces Augustine’s paradoxical formulation from Pseudo-Dionysius to Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464). He describes how the idea that God is greater than thought led a number of thinkers to embrace the principle of coincidentia oppositorum, a notion promising to liberate human reason from its cognitive limitations. As Levao shows, for Cusa, the major theorist of the coincidentia oppositorum in late-medieval and early modern thought, the coincidence of opposites is a powerful metaphor “because it violates the Law of Contradiction, the most fundamental of logical laws” (Levao 1985, 22). The intellectual exercises that this dialectics entails “share the search for the unifying One” (Levao 1985, 22). However, as Levao continues to note, Cusa’s writings — with which Donne was familiar as he cites and paraphrases him in several works — highlight how such attempts were bound to fail, as God is “beyond all distinction and opposition” (Levao 1985, 22). As a result, the mind “must short-circuit its own categories” (Levao 1985, 22). Ultimately, Cusa’s philosophy shows that the coincidence of opposites symbolizes “the limit beyond which the mind cannot go; an illustration not of the divine but of the mystery that prevents the individual from comprehending it [...] It becomes a powerful symbol of the ambiguities of human discourse, not an escape from them” (Levao 1985, 37). The moment that best exemplifies the circular dialectics the mind creates through coincidentia oppositorum, out of which it cannot escape, is found in one of Cusa’s parables, where he imagines God resting shrouded under the veil of the coincidence of opposites: “this is the wall of Paradise wherein Thou dost abide.” Standing guard at the door leading into paradise is “the most proud spirit of Reason, and, unless he be vanquished, the way in will not lie open” (Levao 1985, 81–82). As Levao explains here, within the larger metaphor of spatial progress, the coincidence of opposites “poses a problem: ‘I go in and go out simultaneously when I perceive how going out is one with going in, and going in with going out.’” The circuit becomes a vicious cycle, “a figure of frustration in the ‘wall of absurdity’ (murus absurditatis), the limit of discursive thought whose coinciding opposites repel any metaphor of progress by equating it with its regressive contrary” (Levao 1985, 82). According to Levao’s reading of Cusa’s parable, no creature can surmount the wall of coincidentia oppositorum by means of discursive reasoning. Indeed, Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia bristles with references to this predicament: “reason cannot leap beyond contradictories [...]
For who could understand the infinite Oneness which infinitely precedes all opposition?” (Cusa 1981, I.24,77). Cusa sums up his view of the human inability to comprehend the divine by noting that God “transcends all our understanding. For our intellect cannot, by means of reasoning, combine contradictories in their Beginning, since we proceed by means of what nature makes evident to us. Our reason falls far short of this infinite power and is unable to connect contradictories, which are infinitely distant” (Cusa 1981, I.4,12). Acknowledging the limits of human thought to comprehend the nature of God gives meaning to Cusa’s Learned Ignorance (De Docta Ignorantia): “Only He Himself apprehends what He is; [...] And this is that learned ignorance which we are investigating” (Cusa 1981, I.16,44).

Donne’s tendency to combine opposites is well known. Samuel Johnson’s (1709–1784) observation that metaphysical poetry produces “a kind of Discordia concors; a combination of dissimilar images” (Smith 1975, 1:218) is regularly cited by modern Donne scholars. In general terms, the fusion of opposites in Donne’s poetry is seen as reflecting divine mysteries with the aim to draw the reader’s “mind upwards to meditate upon God” (Wanamaker 1975, 21), and/or as a means to excite readers and thereby give cognitive pleasure (Byatt 2006, 247–57; Herz 2006, 101–15; and Schoenfeldt 2009, 145–160). Archdeacon Thomas Plume (1630–1704) jotted down in his notebook a witty quip at Donne’s expense which he attributed to King James I (1566–1625), a quip that captures the tendency in modern literary criticism to draw a symmetry between Donne’s metaphors and the mysterious nature of the divine: “Dr Donne’s verses were like ye peace of God they passed all understanding” (Smith 1975, 1:74). However, Donne’s poetics is more intricate and ambitious than passively reflecting divine mysteries and exciting readers. He employs the coincidence of opposites and turns it into a system of discourse that allows both himself and his readers to transgress, momentarily at least, the boundaries posed by discursive reasoning. Whereas Cusa warned that such an approach leads inevitably to dialectical impasse, Donne constructed a poetics capable of conveying the inexpressible. But how can one express and communicate what one cannot utter discursively; how can the centre of thought decentre its own self through thought? As we will see, Donne uses the coincidence of opposites as a vehicle to unite the intellective and somatic cognitions. During these moments of unison, he encourages his readers to think via their body, which is capable of intuiting the existence of what eludes the conceptual grasp of discursive reasoning.

Donne reflected on the state of fallen humankind at some length in his 1626 funeral sermon for Sir William Cokayne: “God made the first Marriage, and man made the first Divorce; God married the Body and the Soule in the Creation, and man divorced the Body and Soule by death through sinne, in his fall” (Donne 1953–1962, 7:257). For Donne, the calamity of the fall is the disunion of soul and body, a disunion that had as a result the tainting of the human spirit and the impoverished cognition that characterizes fallen humanity (Donne 1650, 197). To overcome this type of death in
Thinking (of) Feelings

life, however momentarily and imperfectly, he produced a poetics capable of (re)uniting mind and body. At first sight, the belief that ontological dualism represents the calamity of fallen humanity may appear to promote the Platonic philosophy of the soul-body relationship. This type of dualism is reflected in various places in Donne's poetry, as in “The Extasie,” where “soules descend / T' affections, and to faculties” (65–66). The idea of the soul descending to a lower level is Platonic in its conception, projecting onto the material body the image of a prison that holds the superior soul in captivity. Nevertheless, Donne’s view of the body and its relation to the soul is far more complicated than that, for the poet, I argue here, reversed this traditional view by promoting a theory wherein the rational soul is required to turn to the body in order for it to encounter that which it is unable to comprehend.

An astonishing share of scholarship in Renaissance studies has attempted to shed light on the ways in which the body is involved in the act of reading, to penetrate into what Adrian Johns refers to as “The Physiology of Reading” (Johns 1998, 380–443) or into what Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker refer to as the “corporeality of reading” (Sharpe and Zwicker 2003, 14), revealing, in varied ways, the intimacy of the body and the book. The language of humanist classicism described the very processes of reading and understanding as physiologies of imbibing and ingesting. The active work of reading was figured as mastication and absorption; the consumption of the text was understood as digestatory in every real sense (Schoenfeldt 1997, 243–62; Schoenfeldt 1999; and Schoenfeldt 2003, 215–43). As Sharpe and Zwicker sum up, “[i]n early modern England the book was implicated in and with the body in every way” (Sharpe and Zwicker 2003, 15). Thomas Wright (c.1561–1623), George Puttenham (1529–1590/1) and Philip Sidney (1554–1586) are typically evoked and scrutinized in order to tell the (hi)story of how passions aroused during reading are not necessarily bad for morality. Rather, they are qualities that can be harnessed, controlled and used for the establishment of ethical polity (Craik 2007 and Timlouth 2007). The metaphors of bodily digestion of texts are intimately connected to the passionate, somatic response to words. According to Donne’s contemporaries, whenever one looked, read or listened, it was fancy that took the synaesthetic fusions of the “common sense” and the “phantasmata” of imagination and memory and delivered up the result. To use Bruce R. Smith’s words, “[a]s Wright tells the story, phantasmata sent from the brain in the form of aerated spirits cause the heart either to dilate or to contract, changing the balance among the body’s fluids. The result is felt by the perceiver as passions of one sort or another. Only then, when sensations have been felt throughout the body, does the perceiver begin to put words to what he or she is experiencing” (Bruce R. Smith 2009, 4). The body performs certain cognitive processes, and it is only after these cognitive processes that a certain passion is produced. When analyzing early modern literature, critics interested in the involvement of the body in the
reading process traditionally focus on the latter part of the dialectic: on the product of the body’s cognitive processes, not on the cognitive processes per se that preceded the activation of the passion.

**DONNE’S DUALISM AND MONISM**

In *John Donne: Body and Soul*, Ramie Targoff provides an extensive commentary on Donne’s understandings of the mind-body relationship, drawing attention to his “obsession with what connects, and what severs, the body and soul” (Targoff 2008, 6). Targoff charts the various theories that surface in Donne’s works and concludes that the early modern poet and priest oscillates between what she considers to be two opposing approaches to the creation of the soul: the *ex traduce* and the *ex nihilo* theories: “The idea that the soul is formed inside the body through ‘propagation from parents’ is known as traducianism or *ex traduce*. [...] The *ex traduce* or generative theory of the soul’s origins stands in opposition to a theory known as *ex nihilo* or infusionism, which holds that souls are not made from human generation but are created by God from nothing’ [...] Over the course of his career, Donne wavers between these two positions” (Targoff 2008, 11).

Targoff provides abundant evidence to corroborate her thesis, her analytical impetus bearing on a number of aspects of Donne’s thought, including his theology, personal letters and poetry. But the propagation and infusion theories need not be mutually exclusive. As we have seen in the introductory chapter, a number of contemporary philosophers and theologians held that whereas the organic soul is transmitted through human generation, the intellective soul is divinely created and infused by God. This theory has its roots in the writings of William of Ockham (c.1287–1347), whose name was associated during the early modern period with the real distinction between mind and body, between the intellectual and organic souls. Based on the proofs he provided in order to argue for the distinction of mind and body, Ockham taught that the organic soul is generative, that is, transmitted by the seed of the parents, while the intellective soul is created by God *ex nihilo* and is therefore immaterial and immortal (see Chapter 1).

Donne’s ontological outlook follows the impulses of this Ockhamist thesis. In the *Devotions*, the poet pinpoints the problems posed by the either-or formulation of the *ex traduce* and *ex nihilo* theories. He argues that the philosophers’ theory that human and animal souls share the same faculties is not only heretical but contrary to reason, as one can discern in humans a distinctive cognitive action which animals are incapable of performing: self-reflection (Donne 1987, 91). The propagation theory, Donne continues, propounded by “Philosophicall Diuines,” also entails a denial of the soul’s immortality, as a soul transmitted by mortal parents involves the possibility that the soul will have inherited their ancestor’s mortality (Donne 1987, 91). The infusion theory fares no better because it advocates a malevolent God
who actively plants sin in his subjects whether they will it or not (Donne 1987, 91). Donne’s resolution to this dilemma is the postulation of two really distinct souls: “Man before hee hath his immortal soule, hath a soule of sense, [...] This immortal soule did not forbid other soules, to be in vs before, but when this soule departs, it carries all with it; no more vegetation, no more sense” (Donne 1987, 93). Humans are conjunctions of two distinct souls, the one immortal and the other mortal, the one made of “Angel-like Spright,” Donne tells us in “Holy Sonnet V,” and the other of material “Elements” (1–2). In “The Funerall” we similarly read that upon our death, our “outward Soule [i.e. material, organic soul]” remains with the body, whereas our spiritual, intellectual soul evacuates the body and ascends to heaven. Once the intellectual soul ascends to heaven, the organic soul acts as its “Viceroy” and protects the body from “dissolution” (1–8). But although dualism does solve the problem of the soul’s immortality, it nevertheless poses a setback: It is unlikely that God would actively infect an untainted, spiritual soul with sin by planting it in a defiled body. “For God,” Donne preaches, “creates nothing infected with sinne, neither should that soule be damned, if it came not into that body” (Donne 1953–1962, 5:172). Donne’s response is that neither the body nor the soul is originally infected. Rather, it is the combination of the two that stigmatizes humans with sin: “[t]he body, being without sinne, and the soule being without sinne, yet in the first minute, that this body and soule meet, and are united, we become in that instant, guilty of Adams sinne, committed six thousand years before” (Donne 1953–1962, 5:172). In the Devotions he similarly writes: “that which destroies body & soule, is in neither, but in both together; It is in the union of the body and soule” (Donne 1987, 118). Body and soul are, therefore, not as different as one might suppose.

Although one can hardly read Donne’s poetry and prose as a coherent whole because he composed his writings on different occasions and for different purposes, and because he does not claim, like Ben Jonson (1572–1637) for instance, authorial possession of his works, we can nevertheless discern a theme in his works to which the poet/priest returns repeatedly: He often demonstrates an intense desire for a creative and ideal (re)union of mind and body in this life (Targoff 2006, 1493–1508; and Targoff 2008, esp. 49–51, 88–100), for a transformation of the fallen and sin-infested marriage of mind and body to an ideal form of union wherein the two constituent components coexist in a synagonistic rather than antagonistic relationship. We can catch a glimpse of Donne’s desire to have mind and body reunited in his prayer before a sermon preached at the Earl of Bridgewater’s house in London at the marriage of his daughter, where he says: “as thou hast maryed in us two natures, mortall and immortall, mary in us also, the knowledge, and the practise of all duties belonging to both conditions, that so this world may be our Gallery to the next” (Donne 1953–1962, 8:94–95). The ideal marriage of mind and body in this life, the complete symphony between their faculties, mirrors the two components’ glorious and perfect reunion on
the day of the Resurrection. On another occasion, Donne draws again an analogy between matrimonial marriage and the marriage of soul and body, asking of God to reconstitute in him purity by spiritualizing his body, that is, by having fallen ontological dualism collapse into monism: “O Eternall, and most gracious God, who hauing married Man, and Woman together, and made them one flesh, wouldest haue them also, to become one soule so, as that they might maintaine a sympathy in their affections, and haue a conformity to one another, in the accidents of this world, good or bad, so hauing married this soule and this body in me, I humbly beseech thee, that my soule may looke, and make her vse of thy mercifull proceedings towards my bodily restitution, & goe the same way to a spiritual” (Donne 1987, 109). This marriage between husband and wife, male and female, which Donne associates with the marriage of mind and body, is directed at “the repARATION of the world” in order “to maintaine a second eternity,” one that “illustrate[s] this union of our soules to Christ” (Donne 1953–1962, 8:104).

The emphasis in these examples is on God’s agency: Their drive is to argue that sinful man can do nothing of his own accord, but is dependent on the gift of grace, the kind of Protestant doctrine at which this chapter glanced earlier. According to Donne, nevertheless, humans can approach the divine through poetry, recalling Philip Sidney’s insistence that the only human activity capable of bringing the species some way back along the road to its fortunate past is verse because of its equal appeal to the two constituent components of human nature (see Evans 1969, 9–14; D.G. Craig 1988, 62–80; and Maslen 2002, 38–44). In “A Valediction: of the Booke,” for example, we read that “in this our Universe / Schooles might learne Sciences, Spheares Musick, Angels / Verse” (26–28). Donne is drawing our attention here to three separate modes of communication and expression, each of which corresponds to different realms of existence. The scientific discourse that is being taught in the schools is connected to the fallen, earthly world, the phenomena of which it is trying to decipher and explain. Next, Donne introduces the idea of the music of the spheres, which marks a shift from the earthly to the celestial, from the sciences of the earthly to the divine symphony produced by the heavenly spheres in praise of God. According to contemporary theory, the perfect harmony of the music of the spheres represents life without sin. As a result, fallen humans have lost their ability to hear this divine song; the symphony or connective link between earth and heaven has been broken (Hollander 1961). But although we are no longer able to hear the music of the spheres, we can nevertheless listen to another type of song which heavenly entities also learn and enjoy: verse. As the poet notes in a letter to George Gerrard, this form of communication can be heard both on earth and in heaven, the pieces of poetry he is composing being the same pieces which he will sing with angels after his physical passing: “If I shall at any time take courage by your Letter, to expresse my meditations of that Lady in writing, I shall scarce think lesse time to be due to that employment, then to be all my life in making those verses, and so take them with me and sing them amongst her fellow
Angels in Heaven” (Donne 1651, 260). Although the analytical discourse of the schools holds us bound to the mortal, fallen world, and although our ability to hear the music of the spheres has been lost, verse operates as the locus where the earthly and the heavenly meet. Through poetry we can capture a glimpse of heaven and elevate our understanding to a higher level, one that may approximate the superior mode of cognition and expression that angels possess. Thus, in The First Anniversary the poet famously proclaimed that “Verse hath a middle nature: heaven keepes Soules, / The Grave keepes bodies, Verse the Fame enroules” (473-4). Donne’s metaphysical mode sustains a perpetual metaphysical suspension above the fate toward which gravity steadily pulls the physical body, but below the ethereal nature of heaven. Located in a middle region, verse is the locus where heaven and earth, souls and bodies, fuse as they converge in the poem’s remote logical places.

“The Extasie” also rehearses the idea of the mind uniting with the body, suggesting at the same time that this union can perfect human perception. The poem begins by describing how the bodies of the two lovers have merged their souls suspended above them: “Our soules, (which to advance their state,/ Were gone out,) hung ’twixt her, and mee” (15–16). As Clayton MacKenzie and Lyndy Abraham have noted, the similarities of Mylius’s emblem (Mylius 1622, Lib 1: 243) to the image summoned by Donne’s poem are striking (see Figure 4.1 [MacKenzie 2001, 96–99 and Abraham 1991, 312–3]):

Figure 4.1 Mylius, Johann. 1622. “Coniunctio Sive Coitus.” In Philosophia Reformata. Francofurti: apud Lucam Icnnis.
Two souls hover above the corpses of two lovers, the image expressing a stage in their union. The alchemical union of the lovers' souls fuses the two agents into a "new," "more refin'd" and "purer" substance, as one may "thence a new concoction take, / And part farre purer then he came" (21, 27–28). Several commentators have ascribed the poem's ideas to Neoplatonic influences, involving, as Donne himself wrote in a letter to Sir Thomas Lucy (c.1583–1640), "a departure and secession and suspension of the soul, which doth then communicate it self to two bodies" (Donne 1651, 11). As we read further into the poem, however, we come to realize that this Neoplatonic union between the lovers’ souls is detrimental rather than ideal, as it gives rise to a state of being that holds their souls in captivity:

But O alas, so long, so farre  
Our bodies why doe wee forbeare?  
They are ours, though they are not wee, Wee are  
The intelligences, they the sphæare.  
[...]
So must pure lovers soules descend  
T'affections, and to faculties,  
Which sense may reach and apprehend,  
Else a great Prince in prison lies.  
To'our bodies turne wee then, that so  
Weake men on love reveal'd may looke;  
Loves mysteries in soules doe grow,  
But yet the body is his booke (49–52, 61–72).

Donne is not imagining the kind of ecstasy described by Plotinus, but pinpoints the consequences of separating soul from body. He underlines the idea that unless the soul descends to the body and its faculties, it will remain a prisoner of its perceptual limitations. At first sight, the idea of “descending” to the body seems to impose interpretive difficulties, as it projects onto the body the image of a lower, inferior component in which a superior “Prince,” the intellect, is forced to live. But this Neoplatonic idea should not obscure the transformative power of the body’s cognitive abilities. Indeed, fallen dualism, according to Donne, is the outcome of primordial sin, an idea that may promote the view of the body as the dungeon that impounds an immaterial, immortal and superior soul. But the body and its cognitive faculties are also the means to overcome this dualism. Consequently, the body assumes a dual identity: one negative, Neoplatonic, and one positive, which does not suppose the body and mind to be antinomic principles that are forced into an incompatible and violent match, but two really distinct cognitive entities whose (re)union represents an ideal state of being. The poem rehearses this dual identity by projecting onto the body the image of an inferior component and, at the same time, by renouncing this image through a theory that
requires the soul to “descend” to the body in this life in order to ascend to a higher level. If not, “a great Prince in prison lies.” The ideal state of being that Donne envisions in “The Extasie,” the consummation of love which the poet often associates with divine mysteries (Datta 1977, 5–25), does not require an ecstasy of the soul outside the body, but an ecstasy of the soul in the body in order for the intellect to grasp what only “sense may reach and apprehend.” This is Donne’s most significant challenge to a philosophical and theological dualism that unequivocally privileges the spiritual over the material self.

MAKING SENSE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL SIGNIFIED: COINCIDENTIA OPPOSITORUM AND THE UNION OF MIND AND BODY

The most memorable idea in Johnson’s essay is his account of metaphysical images as a type of coincidentia oppositorum, “as a kind of Discordia concors; a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike [...] The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together” (A.J. Smith 1975, 1:218). Indeed, Donne’s tendency to combine opposites pervades his poetry. In “The broken heart,” for example, he employs the following metaphor in order to give expression to love’s powerful and violent sway over the lover: “Who would not laugh at mee, if I should say, / I saw a flaske of powder burne a day?” (7–8, emphasis original). A mere flash burns for a whole day. How is the reader supposed to conceptualize this puzzling metaphor; how are we supposed to comprehend something that defies one of the most basic laws of logic? Donne’s “Who would not laugh at me” bears an air of irony for 21st century readers, as the passage under discussion constitutes an instance of what made Ben Jonson (1572–1637) complain “that Done himself for not being understood would perish” (A.J. Smith 1975, 1:70). It is also what had driven Lewis Theobald (1688–1744) to assert that “Thus became the Poetry of DONNE (tho’ the wittiest Man of that Age,) nothing but a continued Heap of Riddles” (A. J. Smith 1975, 1:197). At first sight, Donne’s poetry appears to construe mere riddles indeed. The imagery of the ignited powder-flask (flash) is automatically pictured in the reader’s mind without any effort. But what Donne gives in one breath he takes in the other, as we appear incapable of conceptualizing as readily the image of a flash burning all day. He counters our expectations by appealing first to what is empirically familiar and by turning this experientially recognizable object into a new one that has no conceptual correspondence. In encountering the new object, the mind is naturally excited, and it struggles to apply categorematic and syncategorematic terms to it, but however we try, such an enterprise appears to be impossible: the new object cannot be conceptually arrested. Discordia concors creates a dialectical impasse that seems impossible to surmount.
Yet, Donne’s metaphoresis is a powerful vehicle that brings mind and body together in an attempt to convey the inexpressible and prompt the reader to encounter what transcends the powers of discursive reasoning to grasp. To use the Scholastic terminology, when Donne’s reader confronts the line “I saw a flaske of powder burne,” the sentient abstractive (organic soul, body) and intellectual intuitive cognitions (intellectual soul, mind) are automatically activated. During this process, the sentient abstractive cognition (sensory cognition, body) projects the image of a flash and the intellectual intuitive cognition (intellect) automatically applies the corresponding concept. When, however, the reader proceeds to read that the flask of powder would “burne a day,” sensory rules interfere in the cognitive continuum, the lexical codes getting jammed in the metaphor. Donne registers this effect on the reader’s sensorial faculties, as the semantic dissonance, the disturbance in the whole sequence of signification, forces the reader’s sentient cognition into a search for familiar images that might be applicable to the new visual conceit. The reader’s senses manage to extend the chronological duration of the flash. We sense that we understood something, that the instantaneity of the flash can extend its temporal span to something more permanent. But our inability to find the terms to categorize what we sense we understood, to activate intellective cognition, locks the reader’s mind in an embryonic state (somatic cognition) where it cannot deliver conceptual understanding (intellectual cognition). The poet thereby displaces the force of reasoning upon somatic enunciative urges. The result is the emergence of an aesthetic phenomenon that resists entering the symbolic order of understanding absolutely, and which can thus be studied only in its effects on mind and body.

Petrarch had often described the paradoxical physical symptoms resulting from Love’s wound. In sonnet 182, for instance, we find the Italian poet enumerating the four main aspects of love in antithetical statements — “la speranza o ‘l temor, la fiamma o ‘l gelo” [hope or fear, flame or ice] — whereas in 132 love’s symptoms are expressed as contrary feelings, or, as he called them, “Contrasting winds” (contrari venti):

If it’s not love, then what is it I feel:
but if it’s love, by God, what is this thing?
If good, why then the bitter mortal sting?
If bad, then why is every torment sweet?
If I burn willingly, why weep and grieve?
And if against my will, what good lamenting?
O living death, O pleasurable harm,
how can you rule me if I not consent?
And if I do consent, it’s wrong to grieve.
Caught in contrasting winds in a frail boat
on the high seas I am without a helm,
so light of wisdom, so laden of error,
that I myself do not know what I want,
and shiver in midsummer, burn in winter (Petrarch 1996, 4, 1-14).
Petrarch’s metaphor of the frail boat is tasked to illustrate the fragility of his argument. As a means of support it can easily be overturned, like a point of dialectic weighted to one side. Accordingly, the poet is describing love here as the point where opposites meet in a way that makes sense rationally because the outcome of this coincidence is the continuous overturn of the very point where the opposites meet (i.e. the frail boat), threatening to result in its eradication. Donne appears to have adapted the motif of the wounded heart to develop the latent possibilities of treating love within a Petrarchan mode, revealing a pervasive awareness of the attitudes, conceits, and situations in the *Canzoniere*. Petrarch was not for Donne simply a repository of fashionable conceits and mannerisms, nor was he the object of satiric ridicule. Donne carried Petrarchan thought and expression a step further. He made an original contribution to the mode by producing a language that although makes no sense rationally, it nevertheless makes sense aesthetically. The type of love which Donne describes in the “Broken Heart” may be beyond rational comprehension and baffle the mind. But he insists that he saw the powder of flask burn for a whole day, and that he “had the plague a yeare” (6). And rather than sending him swirling down into the Petrarchan seas of love’s paradoxes, the *contrari venti* of the “Broken Heart” animate Donne’s poetry and lift both the speaker and his reader beyond the boundaries of discursive reasoning. For Donne, the human ability to rise above the wall of reason through the coincidence of opposites has significant philosophical and theological implications, not only because it is a subject that preoccupied philosophers and theologians alike, but also because he held love to be connected to the divine, a theme he treated at more length in “Aire and Angells.”

“Aire and Angells” is one of the most notoriously challenging pieces of writing in Donne’s poetic corpus, its many paradoxes tempting some into a quest to stabilize their signifying properties and others into the conclusion that such an enterprise is bound to fail because we ought to look for problems in Donne’s poems, not solutions. As Herz has it, “There are few poems that have invited so many and such conflicting readings as this one, but that is part of the pleasure it offers. ‘Aire and Angels’ is ‘intolerant of doctrinaire interpretations,’ cautioned Patrides in his footnote to the poem. One reads, as I have been arguing, for the problems, not for their solutions. This poem has more than most” (Herz 2006, 107). According to Herz, reading for problems rather than solutions increases our delight in receiving Donne’s poetry, which is marked by “never quite fulfilled desires” (Herz 2006, 102). Indeed, “Aire and Angells” is not an intellectual exercise challenging readers to reduce it to a body of emphatic statements, but nor is it a mere brainteaser that aims at providing cognitive pleasure through its contradictions. Rather, as we will see, we are encouraged to have the poem’s rationally irresolvable paradoxes aesthetically resolved.

From the very outset, the reader encounters the lyric’s inversion of the Petrarchan sonnet form, as the traditional octave ABBAABBA and sestet
CDECDE are inverted into ABBABACDCDDEEE. This inversion of the Petrarchan rhyming and structural patterns reflects the poem’s philosophical and ideological breaks from an intellectual tradition that was well woven into the literary fabric of the time. Normally, the sonnet tradition followed the standard Neoplatonic progress of love from body to spirit. But just as Donne’s poem inverts the normal form of the sonnet, it also reverses this Neoplatonic progress, for the poet, we are told at the beginning of the lyric, loved his mistress before knowing her “face or name.” Naturally, then, the mistress is first perceived as an immaterial, spiritual entity (1–6), only to have a string of nouns later on that stress her physical presence (14). Whereas the sonnet tradition would ascend from the physical to the spiritual, in Donne’s lyric the speaker descends from the spiritual to the physical. The lyric’s opening signals thus the establishment of a framework wherein ideal love follows the opposite trajectory of the Neoplatonic progress, and which requires, in the words of the Extasy, the souls of lovers to “descend / T’affections, and to faculties, / Which sense may reach and apprehend.”

It is this inverted Neoplatonic movement that the reader is encouraged to follow during the act of reading “Air and Angels” and thereby to experience what transcends the abilities of discursive reasoning to convey. The opening lines set the lyric’s tone, its main drive being to express the nature of the poet’s love by associating it with the angels’ and his mistress’s ontological nature(s):

Twice or thrice had I loved thee,
Before I knew thy face or name;
So in a voice, so in a shapelesse flame,
Angells affect us oft, and worship’d bee (1–4).

Like an angel’s presence, the mistress’s presence affects the poet as a “shapelesse flame,” and so she (and the angels) should also be worshiped. The question that naturally arises is how exactly. In order to understand the nature of the poet’s love, as well as the way in which the mistress and the angels affect the poet, we are required to decipher the meaning of the rather challenging “shapelesse flame.” If it is conceived of as an intellectual exercise, we will inevitably implicate ourselves in a cycle of dialectics from which it is impossible to find a way out: rationally, the paradox of a “shapelesse flame” makes no sense. Reading with the senses rather than reason, however, the paradox dissolves into a feeling that communicates to the mind what analytical discourse is inherently incapable of conveying in any meaningful way. The moment we encounter the metaphor, we automatically project the image of a flame. Subsequently, we are prompted to strip the flame off its shape and thus experience the flame’s aesthetic content in the absence of the flame. It is the flame’s shape, its physical existence, that Donne tells us to purge, not its aesthetic content, thus encouraging us to feel the presence of a physically absent figure, and thereby witness, in the words of the 1628 Easter sermon, “the
evidence of things not seen” (Donne 1953–1962, 8:230). During this process, the aesthetic qualities of Donne’s shapeless flame thrust themselves into the perceptive faculties of the reader’s body, the initial feeling triggered by the visual presence of the flame turning into an experience the content of which is now impossible to be articulated via discursive reasoning, as we come to sense the presence of a cognitive object that cannot be physically seen and which eludes the rational mind’s conceptual grasp. Our response to the shapeless flame reflects the way in which the Lady and the angels affect the poet.

It is no surprise then, that, as we have seen, the mistress is first perceived as an immaterial, spiritual entity, — “Some lovely glorious nothing I did see” — only to have a string of nouns later on that stress her physical presence and beauty: “thy lip, eye, and brow” (6, 14). The mental flashings that this physical description triggers are resisted as soon as they are formed in the reader’s mind, for the mistress, we were told, is a “lovely glorious nothing.” The stress on the fact that the poet “did see” what belongs to the spiritual realm suspends the mistress somewhere between materiality and immateriality. Love can likewise inhere “nor in nothing, nor in things / Extreme, and scatt’ring bright” (21–22). The poet’s description of Love as a thing of nothing and as “Extreme, and scatt’ring bright,” which is ambiguously linked to the mistress’s every hair (19), further challenges the mind’s comprehending limits. As in the case of the ignited powder flask and the shapeless flame, we attempt to recreate Donne’s poetic scenery. We try and accomplish to transmogrify, however obscurely and tenuously, the lady’s hair into beams or flashes of “scatt’ring bright.” We sense that the Lady (and Love) is suspended somewhere between existence and non-existence, between an intensely sensual physicality and an equally intense spiritual immateriality. Although the conceit does not make sense rationally, it nevertheless makes sense aesthetically. This fusing of sense (semantic meaning making) with sense (feeling, sentient perception) establishes a double edged rendering of making-sense/sense-making. What we learn is not that antiphrasis and polysemy are incompatible, as Gordon Teskey, for example, argues (Teskey 1996, esp. 56–57), or that discordia concors is another expression for Stanley Fish’s notion of poems as “self-consuming artifacts” (Fish 1972, esp. 224–38), but that the use of metaphorical structures to appeal to sensitive cognition has the power to make the mind encounter forms that is unable to conceptualize. Language eats itself up indeed. By consuming itself, however, it does not produce forms that do not make sense, but forms that only sense can make and apprehend. Thinking feelings prompt us to think of our feelings in a process whereby the poet’s sensate experience cannot be conveyed by discursive reasoning but can be transmitted aesthetically through his metaphorical practice.

Donne’s closing lines have caused considerable interpretive unease, as they seem to contradict the emotional and rational thrust of the poem, which is to idealize Love: “Just such disparitie / As is twixt Aire and Angells puritie, / ‘Twixt womens love, and mens will ever bee.” As commentators
have acknowledged, central to our understanding of these problematic lines is the exact meaning of the word “disparitie.” Interpretations vary, ranging from readings that would have it to signify mutuality, admittedly within a masculine hierarchy, to insolence, rudeness, an unsuccessful addition tacked at the end after saying all that the poet had to say, and a joke.\(^{13}\) Donne has nevertheless defined the meaning of the word by associating it with the “disparitie” that exists between “Aire and Angells puritie.” Thus, in order to understand what “disparitie” means in the case of “womens love, and mens,” we are required to define the meaning of “disparitie” in the case of “Aire and Angells puritie.” In “Angels in ‘Aire and Angels,’” Young assumed the task to explain the meaning of “Angels.” He emphasizes a Thomist intellectual grounding, which identifies them as “separated substances or pure intelligences, conceived in Aristotelian terms” (Young 1990, 1). Indeed, according to Aquinas, angels are purely spiritual, intellectual entities, existing entirely without bodies (Doolan 2012, 31-33).\(^{14}\) As Young continues to note, however, this definition introduces problems: “When an angel is thus understood as an utterly simple substance with no physical component at all, the notion of angelic relic becomes especially peculiar and problematic; and important issues are raised in explaining the apparitions and actions of angels recounted in the Bible” (Young 1990, 1). In other words, if angels are conceived of as purely immaterial entities, then it would be impossible to comprehend how they can influence the material world in any way. And yet we know that they do affect the material world. At first sight, it would seem that no single exegesis will ever be formidable enough put the matter to rest, and that Donne’s tendency to portray figures that oscillate between inexistence and existence passively reflects the problem that lies at the heart of the definition of “Angells.” Yet, through his metaphorical practice Donne has shown that immaterial entities are not only able to somehow influence the physical realm, but to bear transformative effects on it. This “disparitie” between “Aire and Angells,” between that which can hardly have any influence over the corporeal (“Aire”) and that which is purely spiritual and yet can bear a powerful sway over the material world (“Angells puritie”), is key to our understanding of the “disparitie” that exists between “womens love, and mens.”

If we reduce the poem to a set of exercises whose main purpose is to excite readers into a quest for unilateral solutions, then the “disparitie” that exists “twixt Aire and Angells puritie,” or “Twixt womens love, and mens,” will never be experienced and recognized, because our ability to discriminate between love (air) and Love (angels) is predicated upon our ability to experience the emotional impulses of the poet’s ideal love (and the angels’ presence) through a reading process in which the body is the primary conduit of reception. Donne’s “disparitie” is thus a bi-conditional term invested with contradictory meanings: one negative, whose consequences will take their toll the moment we implicate ourselves in a perennial attempt to reason our way out of the poem’s paradoxes; and the other positive, whose effects we will enjoy if we allow our senses to become the primary receptive
conduits of the poem’s conceits. This “disparitie,” in other words, is the difference between loving (and reading “Aire and Angells”) primarily through reason and Loving (and reading “Aire and Angells”) primarily through the senses, for if the poem’s metaphors, which are meant to express the poet’s Love, are conceived of as a challenge to our reasoning abilities, then these metaphors will automatically collapse into mere paradoxes which can yield nothing meaningful, and which will thus be distilled into thin air. Reading with the senses, however, we come to sense and experience the presence of a “shapelesse flame,” of the “Angells puritie,” and of the Lady as a “lovely glorious nothing.” Unless we experience the intermediary nature of these figures, Donne’s “disparitie” will operate as a divide that keeps lovers apart and Love a mere fable, an imperfect experience obscured, like God in Cusa’s parable, by a cloud of paradoxes under which its purity and transcendental nature remains hidden from both feeling and reason. As long as the meaning of “disparitie” passes unnoticed through our attempts to figure it out by means of reason alone, so long Love will remain concealed, just like the angels’ purity.

Accordingly, if commentators are indeed correct in arguing that for Donne there is a fundamental distinction between men’s and women’s love, the former being superior or purer by virtue of the fact that there is a correlation between “aire” and “womens love” on the one hand, and “angels puritie” and “mens” (in Latin “Intellect”) on the other, then this is not a pessimistic conclusion that renders true Love elusive, and even illusive. On the contrary, it is a “disparitie” that can be amended, the cure lying within the poem’s premises themselves, for the mistress, like us, is encouraged to emulate and thus reproduce the poet’s Love. Just like the Lady’s (and the angels’) presence perfects the poet’s love, so Donne’s poem operates as an exercise in love aiming at perfecting the Lady’s love by encouraging her to experience and reproduce his Love. They are, in short, complementary. “Then as an angel,” Donne declares, “face and wings / Of air, not pure as it, yet pure doth wear, / So thy love may be my love’s sphere.” Donne does not envision his love wearing something less pure than itself in order to purify it, as a number of critics have argued, but something that complements and completes his own love: her love as his love’s sphere. The analogy is with the heavenly spheres of medieval cosmology, each inhabited by particular angelic intelligences. The poet’s love has a natural inclination to unite with the Lady’s love. Once this union has been achieved, the poet’s love will reach its ultimate stage of completion. Performing the rereading that these lines require, we come to realize that Donne is not lamenting because he has come to face the impossibility of ideal Love, but he seeks to animate it. The sexual undertones of these lines notwithstanding, once conjoined the poet and the lady will create a perfect harmony, just like the celestial spheres, which, occupied by angelic intelligences, produce the perfect concord in praise of God.

This process of perfecting love has theological implications not only because it is linked to the divine symphony of the heavenly spheres, but
also because, as we have seen, it is inextricably linked to the apprehension of the nature of angels, triggering an intuitive form of understanding which presents the reader with the “evidence of things not unseen.” As Ettenhuber has noted, for both Augustine and Donne the perfection of vision depends on the perfection of love (Ettenhuber 2011a, 205–7). Through the seeming negation of the final lines, therefore, Donne reasserts rather than denounces the main thrust of the poem’s emotional and logical import, a fitting conclusion to a poem whose physico-spiritual impulses spiral their way through contradictions towards meanings whose metaphysical content can make sense only aesthetically. But it should be noted here that although Donne insists on turning to the senses in order to experience Love, this should not to be confused with the sensual, or the mere physically erotic, pleasures of love. For Donne, this is a degraded and sin-infested form of love. Rather, the poet gives expression to a form of love whereby sense perception is meant to be directed toward the apprehension and experience of spiritual truths and pleasures. It is only by reaching down to the senses that we can ascend to the comprehension of the poet’s Love, which has assumed his Lady’s body (13), a body that is connected to the intellect, the rational soul (7, 28), and the angels’ ontological nature (3–4). It is the love for the spiritually beautiful that directs the intellect’s decent to the physical in order to ascend to a higher level of perception and thereby experience an elevated form of Love. And, as we have seen, in Donne’s poetry this reversal of the Neoplatonic ladder is not restricted to the level of paraphrasable meaning, but leaps off theory into praxis at the level of reader response.

In an often quoted passage, T. S. Eliot remarked that “Tennyson and Browning are poets, and they think; but they do not feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose. A thought to Donne was an experience; it modified his sensibility” (A.J. Smith 1975, 2:427). In her appropriation of Eliot’s critical speculation, A. S. Byatt argued that “Donne does feel his thought. But what he feels — and makes us his readers feel — is the peculiar excitement and pleasure of mental activity itself. It isn’t smelling roses. It’s being aware of, and delighting in, the electrical and chemical impulses that connect and reconnect the neurones in our brains. Thought is material, according to neuroscience” (Byatt 2006, 248). And Michael Schoenfeldt has found “particularly insightful Byatt’s account of the delight, at once cerebral and corporeal, of reading Donne […] Not only does Donne register psychological and spiritual matters in deeply embodied terms, but also his work offers to the reader the intellectual, even neurological, thrill of comprehending the tacit meanings embedded in a complex, even difficult, metaphor. The embodied thought experienced by Donne’s speakers incites the same range of sensual media in his readers” (Schoenfeldt 2009, 151). Despite their different inflections, the common premise around which these readings revolve is the idea that Donne invites his readers to feel their thoughts. According to this line of thought, we may assume that even some of the most purely rational thoughts become immediate experiences through the
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poet’s ability to associate them with sentient stimuli. In Eliot’s and Byatt’s readings of Donne’s poetry, all thought seems to have been reduced to sensual thought in a process where feeling and thought have become cognates. To argue thus, however, and accept the a priori definition of feeling as thought and vice versa, is to push to the margin a central aspect to Donne’s metaphoresis and the aesthetic reception of his poetry, because it is not the case that we feel our thoughts while reading Donne. Rather, we think of our feelings, somatic cognition directing and controlling our mental efforts to transfer our sentient response into the symbolic order of understanding and signification. What Donne feels may not be the scent of roses, but neither does he take pleasure in becoming aware of his brain’s neural activity. He conveys feelings which lock the rational mind in a bewildering mode of thinking wherein no single exegesis can fully explain their properties and aesthetic import. The ability to grasp and convey a thought that surpasses thought (i.e. a divine mystery or Love) presupposes the ability to formulate such a thought in the first place, whereas to be able to think of and convey a feeling that surpasses thought presupposes the ability to experience such a feeling and make the reader recognize aesthetically that which the mind or thought is unable to contain, comprehend, and communicate via analytic discourse. In Donne’s poetry, rationally irreconcilable figures converge to produce an aesthetic effect or cognitive experience which cannot be the product of thought, not the least because it was impossible to be thus conceived by the poet in the first instance. To be able to understand the product of the coincidence of opposites, Cusa warned, is to be God. But whereas in Cusa’s analytical discourse coincidentia oppositorum can yield nothing that makes sense through thought and sentient perception, in Donne’s metaphorical practice discordia concors consumes these opposites and turns them into a singular experience which makes sense aesthetically although it does not make sense rationally, thereby making the mind vividly encounter the existence of what transcends its powers to comprehend. Discordia concors thus yields an inversion of the Eliot/Byatt line about the poet “feeling his thoughts,” his figures short-circuiting discursive reasoning in such a way as to encourage readers to think of our feelings.

Moreover, Eliot’s and Byatt’s interpretations may strike a reader as inherently flawed, because even though modern neuroscience informs us that thought is material, for Donne, and the majority of early modern thinkers, thought is immaterial. To recall one of the poet’s arguments, humans, in contrast to animals, are able to perform a cognitive process that is immaterial as it does not depend on organs to perform any of its operations: reflective thinking (Donne 1987, 91). This was a standard argument during the period in discussions tasked to prove the immateriality and immortality of the rational soul. According to this analysis of human cognition, during the process of receiving poetry it is the body that filters the sentient qualities of a metaphor, projects images, and triggers feelings that are associated with the sentient qualities of that cognitive object, not the rational mind, whose
function is to apply concepts and deliver those concepts for introspective reflection. Thus, for a reader faithful to historical criticism, it is fundamentally inaccurate to assert that “a thought to Donne was an experience,” or that all “thought is material,” unless “material thought” is to be conceived of as the product of the body or the sensitive soul rather than of the mind or the rational soul.

The notion that the reader’s body is the primary receptive conduit of metaphors is not idiosyncratic to Donne’s poetry. Contemporary writers and theorists acknowledged that metaphors are embedded in our physical experience of the world and enable us to identify the idealized cognitive models that underlie the understanding of the text at hand and of the world we live in. Richard Sherry (1506–1555), for instance, wrote that a metaphor can be accomplished in many ways, but “Fyrst from the senses of the bodye to the minde: as, from the sight” (Sherry 1555, xxiiijr). Likewise, Thomas Wilson (1523/4–1581) noted that a metaphor “is commonly, & for the most part referred to the senses of the body, & especially to the sense of seing, which is the sharpest and quickest aboue all other” (Wilson 1553, 91r). Sherry’s and Wilson’s stress is on the idea that metaphors affect primarily the senses, the sense of sight being “the sharpest and quickest aboue all other.” Donne’s tendency to construct visual figures which he then calls us to experience and decipher through thought reflects this general understanding of metaphors as a sentient and primarily imagistic communication of feelings and thoughts. Similarly, Sidney argued that poetry puts all sciences to shame, including its most notable rival disciplines, philosophy and history. The poet’s unrivalled persuasive power is expressed in one of the most famous metaphors in the *Apology*, that of the poem as a “speaking picture.” The teachings of the philosophers and the historians, Sidney asserted, “lie dark before the imaginative and judging power, if they be not illuminated or figured forth by the speaking picture of poesy” (Sidney 2002, 90).

Metaphors activate the senses, which project “speaking pictures,” and it is because of a metaphor’s direct imprint on sensory cognition that poetry’s figurative language is regarded as the most powerful discourse. Hence, Puttenham called metaphors “figures sensible,” as “they alter and affect the minde by alteration of sense” (Puttenham 1970, 178). Accordingly, for Puttenham it is the feeling that modifies thought, not the other way around as Eliot and Byatt claim, the sensual perception of metaphors taking precedence over discursive reasoning. Through his puzzling poetics, Donne epitomizes and underlines metaphors’ connection to the body, semantic excess enabling somatic access.

The narrow brush with nonsense that Donne’s cross-metaphorical assimilations may involve is what links them to the transformative inner articulation or “endophony” (Greek ἐνόης [endo-prefix, inner] + φωνία [phony, voice]) of what Sidney terms “speaking pictures.” When we read to ourselves, our ears *hear* nothing, but we *listen*. As Roland Barthes has written, “Hearing is a physiological phenomenon; listening is a psychological act”
(Barthes 1985, 245), and as Bruce R. Smith has noted, “hearing is a physiological constant; listening is a psychological variable” (Bruce R. Smith 1999, 7). Barthes’s theorizing of the psychology of listening arrives with the closing paragraph: What is for the most part listened to in the field of art “is not the advent of a signified, object of a recognition or of a deciphering, but the very dispersion, the shimmering of signifiers, ceaselessly restored to a listening which ceaselessly produces new ones from them without ever arresting their meaning: this phenomenon of shimmering is called signifying, as distinct from signification” (Barthes 1985, 259). Extend the field of application from music to other forms of textuality, other forms of attendance, and the chief repeated (and italicized) tenet of his essay, “listening speaks” (Barthes 1985, 259), should operate to rephrase and so reassert Sidney’s notion of the “speaking picture.” Donne’s metaphors make the reader listen to a type of physico-psychological language that halts the mind’s activity in silence. What the reader is listening to is an orchestrated and silent polyphony of signifyings whose signifieds can never be arrested, conceptualized and reflected upon. In his insightful reading of Donne’s metaphysical poetry, Schoenfeldt has argued that “our protracted delight as readers […] emerges from the excitement, at once spiritual and visceral, intellectual and corporeal, of apprehending language as sound and sense, as reason and emotion, simultaneously” (Schoenfeldt 2009, 157–8). But more accurately, our delight and excitement emerges from our attempts to separate mind from body, intellectual conceptualization from aesthetic intuition. In this dialectic, feeling and thought merge as there is no ascent from somatic to intellectual cognition, from feeling to conceptual and rational understanding. The one is attached to the other in an entangled encounter where body and mind, like Venus and Mars, are caught in Donne’s poetic nets at once copulating and striving to break free, but it is through this interplay between union and simultaneous drive for separation and discharge that the mind is enabled to encounter what transcends its abilities to comprehend.

Augustine’s theory of language involves the search for such a mysterious “signifying” (significandi) in order to understand theological mysteries. The final book of De Trinitate elucidates the problem of figurative signs in its analysis of a baffling theological concept: how the Godhead can unite three persons — the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit — in one. In his Confessions, Augustine offers a preview of the overall project that occupies him in De Trinitate: “Betwixt these three, let him discern that can, how unseparable a life there is; yea, one life, one mind and one essence: yea, finally, how unseparable a distinction there is, and yet there is a distinction” (Augustine 1919, 2:395). Augustine reprises and extends in De Trinitate his analysis of signs in the De Doctrina Christiana. The Bible’s explanations of mysteries of faith like the Trinity can only be understood in enigmatic allegory. The sign is supposed to point to a thing. However, figurative signs convert things into signs in a process that may be interminable. Thus, the process of commutation works to undermine the stable referentiality that
Augustine seeks. The Trinity asserts the stability of the biblical sign to guarantee that the relationship between literal and figurative uses is as stable as the relationship between sign and thing. But Augustinian sign theory requires a mysterious transcendental signified, a prevocalic and inexpressible “sign” or “word” that can stand outside of, initiate, and control the process of figurative language: “We must, therefore, come to that word of man, to the word of a living being endowed with reason, to the word of the image of God, not born of God but made by God; this word cannot be uttered in sound nor thought in the likeness of sound, such as must be done with the word of any language; it precedes all the signs by which it is signified, and is begotten by the knowledge which remains in the mind when this same knowledge is spoken inwardly, just as it is. For the sight of thought is very similar to the sight of knowledge. For, when it is spoken through a sound or through some bodily sign, it is not spoken just as it is, but as it can be seen or heard through the body” (Augustine 2002a, 188). The eruption of what can be signified neither through voice nor bodily expression is a frustrating predicament for a religious thinker who desires to express the inexpressible and approach the ineffable. However, although discursive reasoning alone cannot comprehend and articulate the inexpressible, poetry, according to Augustine, has the power to express what resists entering the symbolic order of understanding and signification. The importance of music and the aesthetic euphoria it entails has long been noted by critics to have played a significant role in Augustine’s conversion (Meyer-Baer 1953, 224–30 and Brennan 1988, 267–81), while, as Pahlka has shown, his theory of verse and meter has poetry operate as a mediator “between the human and the divine” in a process whereby “meter makes words imitate the Word” (Pahlka 1987, 58, 66). Indeed, according to Augustine, verses “imitate eternity” (aeternitatem imitantia): “So terrestrial things are subject to celestial, and their time circuits join together in harmonious succession for a poem of the universe” (Augustine 2002b, 6.11.29). But as Pahlka continues to note, according to Augustine this enterprise is fraught with peril: “The peril, of course, is that the pleasures of the senses can lead as easily to damnation as to salvation. As Augustine had said, ‘I ought not to allow my mind to be paralyzed by the gratification of my senses, which often leads it astray’” (Pahlka 1987, 133). Looking back on this early work, Augustine was horrified that he had concentrated on transient and material things. Writing with regret for his youthful error, he describes himself as having been deaf to the truth which he represents as a melodia interior (Augustine 1919, 1:194). It was only when he listened to this interior melody or endophony that he was led above the pleasures of the senses. The mathematical and philosophical principles that Augustine developed in the De Musica in order to lay out the science of music and enable one to appreciate the nature of good music are, indeed, as complicated as they are impressive, but his magister seeks to gradually lead his pupil, particularly in the course of Book Six, to a consideration of higher things. In delineating the correct aesthetic response to music and metre in
the *De Musica*, Augustine insisted that while it is acceptable to find pleasure in creation, the soul must rise above the pleasures of the senses and find supreme enjoyment in contemplation of the One.

Augustine’s influence on Donne’s poetry and thought has been well documented. A recurrent theme in these studies is that the poet followed Augustine in attempting to steer clear of the pleasures of the senses and direct his emotional and intellectual energies towards the spiritual (Barry Craig 2006, 97–116). It is this anxiety not to concentrate on corporeal pleasures that underpins Donne’s tendency to knit the physical and the spiritual with “subtile knot[s]” (“The Extasie,” 64). Bound as they are with the spiritual, the senses are inevitably directed towards the apprehension of spiritual truths and divine mysteries. Augustine’s stress on a pre-symbolic, pre-vocalic form of cognition calls for a type of understanding that is felt rather than thought and articulated. The end of Augustine’s quest is a moment of absolute silence during which he feels what he understands but is unable to produce conceptual, rational understanding. It is this cognitive phenomenon that Donne’s poetics prompts the reader to undergo. His metaphorical structures open up rifts in the rational continuum of signification, which rifts are the products of the violent clash between opposites. The rifts opened up by such poetics give rise to *signifying*, which encourage the union of the somatic and intellective cognitions. We may term the cognitive locus of unarticulated sensorial reception to which the mind turns in order to grasp what lies beyond its conceptual grasp the *signifying rift*. What falls within the signifying rift does not exist in the symbolic domain of cognition, as existence is a product of thought and language, while the newly formed object lies beyond the grasp of discursive reasoning. The ignited flask of powder that would burn for a day, or the “shapelesse flame” and the Lady (or Love) in “Aire and Angells,” point precisely at the impossibility of ever apprehending rationally and conceptually what has been conjured up, as the newly formed entity corresponds to an intermediary term: the signifying, which is located between existence and non-existence, in the rift opened up by its bifurcated imperatives to synthesize antitheses. The signifying rift is that which resists symbolization absolutely, and like a magnetic field it attracts the discharge of the cognitive enunciative urges triggered by the poet’s metaphorical conjunctions, drawing into its lacuna both the intellective and somatic cognitions. In a nutshell, Donne’s metaphors open up signifying rifts in which mind and body merge in order to perfect their impoverished cognitive and experiential capabilities.

The view that the body is not necessarily the prison of a superior spiritual soul or mind echoes some of the main tenets of the Pauline doctrines and Protestant theology. Paul’s well known distinction between *sarx* (flesh: for the most part morally negative) and *soma* (body: for the most part morally neutral) allows for the body to be seen as a potentially creative force. Thus, evoking Paul’s authority, Donne preaches that “the resurrection of the body denotes that our prayers should not bee meerely mentall, but conjoinned with
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corporal action: for shall we not with Saint Paul hope to see God even with the same eyes? [...] make all thy powers powre forth the prayse of him that made thee” (Donne 1650, 192–3). Donne is not merely defending genuflection here. Rather, his stress is on the senses, for he believes that he will see God “with the same eyes,” one of the powers of the body with which we ought to praise God. We should praise God with all our powers, that is, with both our reasoning and sentient faculties. Given the Pauline insistence on a form of praise that requires mind and body to be conjoined, it is no surprise that Protestant thinkers would emphasize the role of the senses in our salvation.

In Melanchthon’s natural philosophy, for instance, the body plays a central role in human regeneration. As Kusukawa has shown, Melanchthon’s natural philosophy was integral to Lutheran reformation theology. According to Melanchthon, Kusukawa noted, the study of “the soul, the senses, appetites, affections and the will” demonstrates “how natural philosophy might help a theologian” (Kusukawa 1995, 82). In Melanchthon’s own words, “The theologian who does not know those most erudite discussions on the soul, on the senses, on the causes of volition and affections, on knowledge and on the will, lacks a great instrument. He who teaches dialectics will be behaving insolently if he does not know those divisions of causes which are taught only in natural philosophy (in physicis)” (Kusukawa 1995, 82). Melanchthon adhered to the Lutheran sheer distrust of human reason as a means to discover theological truths, which for Melanchthon meant that humans necessarily need the senses in order to recognize, however obscurely and tenuously, spiritual natures. For this reason, he preserved the scholastic distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition (Melanchthon 1988, 261). Of these two kinds, Melanchthon claims that intuitive knowledge of God is not available to humans due to the fall. He nevertheless points out that human reason alone cannot discover universal and theological truths. As a result, the protestant reformer argues that lapsarian humanity necessarily needs the internal senses of the organic soul (Melanchthon 1988, 277–8).

In Melanchthon’s view, then, not all emotions are inherently corrupt and corrupting forces to be rejected: “it is absolutely certain that in no way are all emotions bad by their own nature” (Melanchthon 1988, 251).

Although Melanchthon did not portray the somatic as an inherently corrupt agent, his writings appear to privilege the intellectual and the spiritual over the somatic: Reason must keep the senses in check, and control and direct them towards spiritual pleasures. On many occasions, Donne reverses this logic, allowing for the senses to drive the fallen mind towards the contemplation of theological truths, the kind of which it would otherwise be unable to encounter. “I say againe, that the body makes the minde,” Donne asserted emphatically in Problems and Paradoxes, and continued to stress that “the soule it seemes is enabled by our body, not this by it” (Donne 1633, 25). Augustine’s conversion process is resoundingly pertinent here, as it exemplifies Donne’s otherwise paradoxical statement: Augustine’s senses enabled his soul to recognize spiritual truths, which, in turn, played a
significant role in his conversion. Donne goes even as far as to characterize the body in terms traditionally used to describe God in order to attribute to the body hierarchical primacy: “God is Alpha and Omega, first, and last: And his Alpha and Omega, his first, and last work is the Body of man too” (Donne 1953–1962, 8:97). As we have seen, for Donne divine grace is the ultimate form of glorification in this life, but, like Augustine, he upholds the idea that there is a human activity that can lead us close to the divine: verse. Moreover, Augustine’s insistence on a mode of aesthetic response to artistic creation wherein we should be cautious not to find ourselves trapped in the worship of corporeal pleasures, is echoed in the poet’s tendency to inject the physical into the spiritual and vice versa. But the poet marked a shift of emphasis from a form of dualism that may evidently lead to the view the somatic is necessarily accompanied with abjection and mortality to an ontological outlook wherein the body, like the soul, is originally pure and free of sin; a dualism wherein the soma is the means by which the rational mind is enabled to experience Love, and thereby to expand its experiential and cognitive horizons. For both Augustine and Donne, poetry is a mode of transcendence, but whereas the former’s attitude towards the body and the aesthetic reception of art is tinged with ambivalence, and even with terror at times, the latter often celebrates the somatic and its perceptive abilities, without nevertheless ever underestimating the danger of leading the senses astray, as “Dull sublunary lovers” do: “Dull sublunary lovers love / (Whose soule is sense) cannot admit / Absence, because it doth remove / Those things which elemented it” (“A Valediction: forbidding mourning,” 13–16). Concentrating on corporeal pleasures, this type of lovers is unable to enjoy the highest glories of spiritual pleasure, which can be ensured only through an ideal union between mind and body, between the spiritual and the corporeal.

Poetry’s ability to heal fallen dualism, however transiently and imperfectly, is fundamental to Donne’s poetics because it is not simply an idea that affects the meaning of his poetry on the surface. It is embedded in his language, encouraging his reader to experience a form of thinking wherein intuition and intellection, body and mind, converge. Virtually every modern edition of Donne’s poetry is populated with references to Platonic ideas, particularly when it comes to the body and its relation to the mind. This tendency may give the impression that Donne’s poetry is Neoplatonic in complexion.20 Yet, it would be inaccurate and even misleading to infer that he unequivocally embraced a single line of thought. Donne was an eclectic in his dualism and theology: He borrowed from various strands of thought, including the Platonic, Pauline, Augustinian, Protestant and Ockhamite, but he also injected into these intellectual traditions his own thought and art. Donne’s belief that somatic cognition can make the human mind undergo and under-stand (i.e. encounter but not fully comprehend) what resists entering the symbolic order of signification has significant consequences for our understanding of his literary output. We may never be able to arrest the signifying drift of his metaphorical conjunctions, but the effect is registered
upon the reader’s sensorial perception. There is a pictographic enactment of an endophonic “speaking picture” or melodia interior that the discursive mind cannot utter and deliver for reflective scrutiny. The conceits’ imperative to synthesize antitheses produces signifying rifts, which, in turn, give rise to the mysterious significandi that Augustine could not convey in any meaningful way through analytic discourse. A metaphor is therefore potentially a metaphora (transference) of the mind to the body, an ecstasy, or relocation, of intellectual reasoning to somatic cognition. The silent speaking that such a cognitive process triggers, the endophonic polyphony that results from the union of somatic and intellectual cognitions, is much more expressive and powerful than the rational mode of cognition alone. Donne uses coincidentia oppositorum in order to introduce signifying rifts into the rational continuum of signification, thereby enabling a type of cognition wherein the reader is encouraged to confront, and make sense of, “the evidence of things unseen.” The somatopsychic reading that Donne’s poetry requires may thus be said to perform a re-enactment of the philosophical undercurrents of Spenserian allegoresis: The reader thinks allegorically in the sense that his/her reading experience and cognitive processes spring from the tangled encounter of the corporeal and the spiritual, the concrete and the abstract. There is a homology between allegoresis, metaphoresis, and reading experience; between the making of allegories, the making of metaphysical poetry and the making of readers.

NOTES

1. For discussions focusing on Augustine’s theory of faith and reason, see Rist 2001, 26–39; Fleteren 1973, 33–71; and Cushman 1950, 271–94.
2. References to Donne’s poems are to Grierson’s edition and are cited by line numbers. For more information on Donne’s reflections on the inadequacy of the expressive abilities of fallen language to provide a glimpse of the highest glories, see Ettenhuber 2011a, esp. 205–24.
4. For Donne’s knowledge of Cusanus, see Cunnar 1990, 330; and Coffin 1937, 73.
5. References to Cusa’s De Docta are cited by chapter and margin numbers.
7. “They see the soule is nothing else in other Creatures, and they affect an impious humilitie, to think as low of Man. But if my soule were no more than the soule of a beast, I could not thinke so; that soule that can reflect upon it selfe, consider it selfe, is more than so.”
8. For Donne’s attitude toward the authorship of his works, see Dobranski 2005, 119–49. For a book-length study of Jonsonian authorship, see Loewenstein 2002.
9. For more information on Donne’s view of a non-bodily mode of vision, of an intuitive from of apprehension, as the only means to behold God in his essence, see Ettenhuber 2011a, esp. 205–24.

10. I borrow the term “make senseness” from Machon 2009, 14.

11. For more information on Teskey’s and Fish’s views, see Chapter 3.

12. Herz, for instance, notes that the poem “would have had a simpler critical history without its final three lines, which seem to deny its earlier assertions and radically change its voice. It is now aphoristic and dismissive where it had earlier seemed to adore and desire” (Herz 2006, 107).

13. For the varied responses to the problems introduced by these lines, see Roberts 1990, 43–64. See also Di Pasquale 1999, 151–2; Empson 1995, 115–8; and Herz 1990, 27–31.

14. It should also be noted here that although Aquinas’s conception of angels is based on Aristotle’s theory about the existence of separate substances as the moving forces of the heavens, this should not lead to the conclusion that the medieval philosopher embraced Aristotle’s arguments uncritically. For more information on Aquinas’s theory of angelic substance in relation to Aristotle’s philosophy, see Doolan 2012, esp. 18–20.

15. It should be noted here that, according to early modern cognitive theory, the “imaginative and judging power” is a power of the body, or, more accurately, of the organic soul and body composite, not of the mind. For more information, see Chapter 1.

16. There are many illuminating studies of Augustine’s theory of language. Already by 1957, R.A. Markus wrote that Augustine’s theory of signs “received a good deal of attention” (Markus 1957, 60). That “good deal of attention” is, of course, much greater now.

17. “Ita caelestibus terrena subjecta orbis temporum suorum numerosa successione quasi carminis uniuersitatis adsociant.”

18. For more information on this point, see Kusukawa’s “Introduction” to Melanchthon’s Orations on Philosophy and Education (Kusukawa 1999, xxii–xxiv).

19. For an informative and nuanced account of the various seventeenth-century positions on passions, see James 1997.

20. For more information on Donne’s non-Platonic understanding of the mind-body problem, see also Ettenhuber 2011a, esp. 224–5.

REFERENCES


Thinking· (of) Feelings


5 The Intelligent Body on the Stage and the Wonder of Tragic Pleasure

O, why should nature build so foul a den,
Unless the gods delight in tragedies?
   Marcus in Titus Andronicus (Shakespeare 2005, 4.1.58–59)

in its high
Cothurnal Sceans, a lofty Tragedy
Erects their thoughts, and at once doth invite
To various Passions, Sorrow and Delight.

   Chamberlayne 1659, 151

Lamenting is altogether contrary to rejoicing, every man saith so, and yet is it a peec of joy to be able to lament with ease, and freely to poure forth a mans inward sorrowes and greefs.

   Puttenham 1970, 47

I graunt that sorowe and delight are contrarie, yet may a contrarie sometimes be the cause of his contrarie [...] so delight many times may spring, of sorrowe.

   Gosson 1582, 5v–r

“The search for a definition of tragedy”, Stephen Booth noted, “has been the most persistent and widespread of all nonreligious quests for definition” (Booth 1983, 81), while Robert Watson assertively concluded that “[d]efining tragedy is impossible, because the word has meant different things at different times” (Watson 2003, 298). The pyramids of theories erected to define this most problematic of literary genres are too big to climb here in a brief introduction. Even voluminous collections of essays dedicated to the purpose can hardly offer comprehensive overviews of some of the most influential approaches. A major problem that virtually all definitions of tragedy attempt to solve is the reason why we find pleasure in the dramatic representation of an event which in real life is painful and repellent. This problem is as old as it is vexed, finding its first expression in what is considered to constitute the first piece of sustained literary criticism: Aristotle’s Poetics and his theory of “catharsis.” Defined by Aristotle as the cleansing
or purging of the excessive passions of pity and fear, catharsis grounds the moral significance of tragedy in material, bodily terms. In *Politics*, moreover, Aristotle teaches that catharsis is achieved through music, the primary conduit of which is the sensate body (Aristotle 1998, 8.1342a5–16). Much of the early modern efforts to demonize theatre and the counterarguments propounded by theatre supporters are rooted in the conflicting theories of Plato and Aristotle: Whereas for the former the emotions experienced during performance create harmful habits, for the latter they can be purged or cleansed (Barish 1981, esp. 5–37, 80–190).

The genre’s connection to the primordial and the sensual stretches back to the birth of tragedy. We can trace the intimate relation between the bodily, passionate realm and tragedy in the genre’s etymological roots, as the word “tragedy” means “goat-song” (τράγος goat + ὄδη ode, song). The genesis of tragedy took place in the cult of Dionysus: Tragedies were performed during a festival dedicated to the Greek God, above all in the City Dionysia, in the theatre in the sanctuary of Dionysus Eleuthereus under the Acropolis in Athens before the statue of Dionysus. Tragedy came into being from the leaders of the dithyramb and developed from satyr play, a boisterous drama with a chorus of satyrs: naked, hedonistic, goatish followers of Dionysus. The dithyramb was a hymn to Dionysus, probably once consisting of solo improvisation and choral refrain in a procession escorting Dionysus into the city (Sourvinou-Inwood 2005, 7–24; and Seaford 2005, 25–38). Dionysus represents, as Nietzsche so famously proclaimed in the *Birth of Tragedy*, the festive, animalistic, passionate realm, which stands in contrast to the Apollonian spiritual world of “clear and luminous appearances” (Porter 2005, 72). As Watson succinctly summarized it, “[t]he desperate Renaissance struggle to reconcile the beautiful aspirations of the mind with the fierce demands of the body corresponds to the battle which Nietzsche identified as the essence of tragedy: between Apollo (the god of civilization, rationality, daylight) and Dionysus (the god of frenzy, passion, midnight)” (Watson 2003, 299). The identification of Dionysus with passions, appetites and animal drives was commonplace during early modernity. In his translation of Plutarch’s (c.45–c.120) *Moralia* (an important source for Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy’s connection to the Dionysian cult), for instance, Philemon Holland (1552–1637) draws our attention to this connection (Plutarch 1603, 1358). It is this perennial battle between the sensual and the intellectual, the corporeal and the spiritual, that tragedy is supposed to bring to equilibrium by purging or cleansing the harmful passions of pity and fear.

The body is also the very medium of dramatic representation, regardless of whether this representation is enacted on the stage or on the imaginary plane of the individual reader. As Aristotle notes, “since the representation is carried out by men performing the actions, it follows, in the first place, that spectacle is an essential part of tragedy” (Aristotle 1968, 6, 1449b31–33). Indeed, nobody no theatre, but just how the early modern body was and/or
is to be performed has been the subject of rigorous critical scrutiny, particularly when it comes to the Shakespearean corpus. The body is thus, as in the case of allegoresis and metaphoresis, not something that can be explained away, but intrinsic to the very origin (Dionysus), medium (representation) and end (effect) of the genre. As Tanya Pollard has it, “Early modern theorists of tragedy defined the genre especially through its effects on audiences,” particularly in relation to our physical response to pain (Pollard 2013, 85). In Sidney’s words, tragedy and body are firmly connected: “the high and excellent Tragedy [...] openeth the greatest wounds, and sheweth forth the Ulcers, that are couered with Tissue: that maketh Kings feare to be Tyrants, and Tyrants manifest their tiranicall humors” (Sidney 1595, F4v). Attending to the body and sensory perception is thus vital to our understanding of both the period’s approaches to performance production and the theoretical and ideological undercurrents of the creation and reception of early modern tragedy.

The chapter’s division into two main sections reflects its concern with these two intimately related aspects of contemporary tragic dramaturgy. In the first section, I focus on instances across various plays and dramatists that demonstrate the body’s ability to convey meanings that can contradict the rational mind’s judgments and will. I explore this ontological outlook in three contexts: the body’s ability to signify the opposite meaning of discursive reason and articulation; its ability to intuit future contingents; and its ability to understand its surrounding world, exercise judgements and prompt an action against the rational mind’s judgments. In the second main section, I discuss how early modern playwrights used the phenomenon of the intelligent body in order to cause a sense of wonder in the audience. Here, I argue that early modern playwrights turned to the body and corporeal cognition in order to produce sensually stimulating and highly affective tragedies, a style that encourages performance to be an experience in its purest definition: to feel, suffer, undergo. This style of performance production, I argue, arouses tragic pleasure, opening new vistas of thought against which to reconsider Aristotle’s theory of catharsis and the paradox of tragic joy. I conclude the chapter with a consideration of the complications that arise from the relation between real-life persons, actors and the intelligent body.

The language of early modern tragedians may sometimes produce an alienation effect on modern audiences, for whereas we tend to assume that the sole agent of action is a unified and domineering “I,” early moderns often transferred the agency of the personal “I” to impersonal, material, bodily organs (see Chapter 1). As Christopher Tilmouth has noted in his overview of Catherine Belsey’s observations on the semiotic arguments that underpin early modern notions of the self, “the first-person I of a Shakespearean soliloquy can never ‘be fully present in what it says of itself’ [...] Faustus, Hieronimo and their like adopt a series of fractured, discontinuous voices in striving to signify themselves. [...] early modern dramatic agents are fractured beings” (Tilmouth 2013, 13).

Such instances do
not suggest, in Caroline Walker Bynum’s words, a “psychosomatic unity” (Bynum 1995, 11), but a psychosomatic dissonance, the human subject as a bisected but bisubjective being. Rather than mere tropes of metonymy that point at a clash between two rational positions spurred by the intellectual mind — the anachronistic stance of modern audiences — such forms of language use are often underwritten by the ontological phenomenon of the intelligent body. In this framework, the staged body’s semantic import is not always the effect of the conscious mind’s workings upon the body, but the product of its own cognitive processes. The view of the body as the mind’s instrument is thereby reversed. In this style of dramaturgy, as will see, it is not the audience that create the meanings of the body’s language. Rather, the cognitive and emotional states conveyed by the body as a really distinct cognitive entity are generated through a pre-linguistic mode of communication (e.g. gestures, sweat, trembling etc.) shared by audience members and actors alike. On a more local level, the dissonance produced by the conflicting semantic imports of body and mind appears to be problematic in performance and can, if not detected and staged properly, lead to inaccurate conclusions of flawed and/or unrealistic representation; to what T.S. Eliot, writing on Renaissance drama, regarded as “faults of inconsistency, faults of incoherency” (Eliot 1951, esp. 111, 114, 116), or to what William Archer would deem unrealistic and, therefore, unnatural (Archer 1923).

THE ALEGORICAL BODY ON THE EARLY MODERN STAGE

It is common to invoke Montaigne, Thomas Wright (1561–1623), John Bulwer, Thomas Heywood (1573–1641) and Hamlet’s instructions to the visiting players in order to argue for the importance of fitting word to action, for the body as a locus of signification that gives expression to the actor’s lines (Lieblein 2009, 117–35; Weimann and Bruster 2008; Dawson 1996, 31–47; and Roach 1985). “The gesture of man,” as Thomas Wilson (1523/4–1581) has it, “is the speache of his bodie.” It “is a certaine comely moderacion of the countenaunce, and al other partes of mans body, aptely agreeyng to those thynges whiche are spoken” (Wilson 1553, 118r–7v).9 “Gestures,” in this context, are seen, according to François Hédelin (1604–1676), as “expressing the sense of each word” (Hédelin 1684, 150). Nevertheless, the meaning of the uttered word and the semantic import of somatic expression do not always go hand in hand. Bulwer, for instance, who acknowledges an intellectual debt to Montaigne (Bulwer 1644, 5), draws attention to the idea that

Sometimes differing words, which visibly grow on one root of action, goe for Synonima’s in gesture: and we shall sometimes see contrarietie of pathetcall [i.e. emotional] expression, in identity of posture […]
there is a proper contrariety of expression, and this seems to be a
naturall and paraphrasticall gesture [...] what which is expressed by
words, the contrary is shewn by the gesture [...] if the motions of the
Hand doe dissent from the expressions of the Tongue, it may contra­
dict and convince the tongue of vanity; for so we may commend even
when we doe reprove, if the gainsaying Hand should have a contrarient
motion.10

(Bulwer 1644, 3, 138, 183 and 136 [Chironomia])

In instances like these, Bulwer insists that the “speaking organs” (Bulwer
1644, 3 [Chironomia]) can produce not only meanings that are synony­
mous to the semantic import of verbal discourse, but they can also gener­
ate a language that contradicts discursive expression. Antiphrastic gestures
appear to be motivated by the body itself rather than the mind, for, as
Bulwer notes, such actions are unavoidable unless one practices enough
to tame his or her bodily substrata: We cannot “evade” gestures that “do
move in opposition to their [i.e. words] meaning; for without judgement
and advice, which should set in order and support the thought into the
Hand, that is ever ready to maintaine that trust that the Tongue endeav­
ours to obtaine, Truth wants her warrant, and is so absurdly crost, that
the efficacie of Speech is utterly defac’d, and all the credit that such lan­
guage amounts unto, is the pittance of a doubtfull faith” (Bulwer 1644,
136 [Chironomia]). The “contrariety of expression,” Bulwer writes, “seems
to be a naturall and paraphrasticall gesture” (emphasis added), formulat­
ing a theory for a somatic language where the antiphrastic meanings of the
body’s expressions redefine discursive meaning.11 We may term Bulwer’s
observation that the body may appear to contradict verbal expression
somatic dissonance.

The body’s ability to signify meanings other than the ones the subject
thinks s/he conveys aurally points at a strange connection between per­
forming and allegorical bodies. George Puttenham (1529–1590/91) dis­
cusses this connection, arguing that a courtier “could dissemble his conceits
as well as his countenances, so as he neuer speake as he thinkes, or thinke
as he speaks [...] for so as I remember it was concluded by vs setting foorth
the figure Allegoria, which therefore not impertinently we call the Courtier
or figure of faire semblant, or is it not perchance more requisite our courtly
Poet do dissemble not onely his countenances & conceits, but also all his
ordinary actions of behauiour” (Puttenham 1970, 299–300). Puttenham
notes here that “allegoria” is not only defined as a figure whereby one
speaks verbally other than what s/he thinks, but as a figure where one con­
veys meanings somatically which do not correspond to what s/he thinks.
Due to their ability to signify meanings through their somatic dispositions
which are not synonymous to what they think, both courtiers and poets can
be called, according to Puttenham, allegorical human beings. In Spenser’s
allegorical project, as we have seen, the body of the allegorical character
is invested with the ability to contradict the meaning of the very idea it is supposed to have embodied and figured forth, suggesting an ontology and a poetics wherein mind and body figure as two distinct cognitive agents. In *The Arcadian rhetorike* (1588), Abraham Fraunce (c.1558–c.1593) echoes Puttenham’s comments on the connection between real-life persons and allegorical characters: “Ironia is a Trope, that by naming one contrarie intendeth another. The speciall grace whereof is in iesting and merie conceipted speaches. This trope continued maketh a most sweet allegorie, and it is perceived by the contrarietie of the matter it selfe, or by the manner of vterance quite differing from the sense of the wordes” (Fraunce 1588, A7v–r). Fraunce extends the antiphrastic potential of the material body from the specific context of allegories to encompass real life, as the manner in which we speak may convey the opposite meaning of what we actually say. Like the allegorical body, the performing body may speak one thing at the same time that the mind thinks the opposite.

Allegorical bodies and somatic dissonance pervade the early modern stage. The art of dissimulation, for instance, which occupies a central locus in virtually every early modern play, requires the spectator to focus on the body as a speaking subject that can convey meanings which contradict the meanings of uttered words. The end of dramatic representation, “the purpose of playing,” Hamlet so famously proclaimed, “is to / hold as “twere the mirror up to nature, to show virtue / her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very / age and body of the time his form and pressure” (3.2.20–24). Note Hamlet’s stress on the body and its correlatives—“nature,” “feature,” “image,” “body” and “form”—which foregrounds the body as the primary locus of dramatic representation and reception. In his “Mousetrap,” Hamlet put theory into praxis, his purpose being not so much to watch the players acting as to see the king’s body performing in order to read the semiotics of his spontaneous and unmediated somatic response: “I’ll observe his looks, / I’ll tent him to the quick. If a but blench,/ I know my course” (2.2.598–600). Hamlet’s play-within-the-play underlines the idea that on the early modern stage there is a second order drama in which the body is the main protagonist. As Francis Bacon has it, “the Lineaments of the Body will discouer those Naturall Inclinations of the Minde, which Dissimulation will conceale, or Discipline will suppresse” (Bacon 1627, 212). Thus, in George Chapman’s (1559/60–1634) *Two wise men and all the rest fools*, Vulcano tells Acuto: “what care I for thy telling? [...] This is a graue man, and his vere countenance speakes truth” (Chapman 1619, Ev). And as Wright writes, “because wise men mortify their passions and crafty men dissemble,” the only way to discover their inclinations is “by some effects and external operations” (Wright 1986, 165). These external operations, which include gestures “in the hands and the body,” are motivated by the body itself: because they “are not corrected by modesty and virtue it seemeth the subject letteth them range according to their natural inclination” (Wright 1986, 183). Yet, however unruly the body may prove to be in instances of dissimulation, in order
to fully appreciate its cognitive capabilities and psychology it is instructive to turn to the notion of somatic dissonance during moments in which the body does not bespeak the mind’s true inclinations, but conveys its own will and cognitive imperatives, to instances “when the Mind and the Body make contrary Assignations,” as Andrew Marvell has it (Marvell 2003, 1:148). To this end, we may turn, first, to the “foreboding body.”

In Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy, Bel-Imperia arranges her rendezvous with Horatio for her “father’s pleasant bower” (Kyd 1996, 2.2.42). As the couple proceed into the garden, a setting dominated by the vegetative, organic trope, Bel-Imperia’s body warns her that entering may not be as safe as she and Horatio think it is: “I follow thee, my love, and will not back, / Although my fainting heart controls my soul” (2.4.6–7). At the outset, Kyd introduces us to the dichotomy between mind and body, as heart (organic soul) and soul (intellect) figure as two really distinct cognitive entities. With its subtle yet distinct assumption of dualistic epistemology, the opening of the play has already suggested the material body not as plenum of passive matter but as an independent and active cognitive agent:

> When this eternal substance of my soul  
> Did live imprisoned in my wanton flesh,  
> Each in their function serving other’s need,  
> I was a courtier in the Spanish court (1.1.1–4).

Don Andrea’s opening statement signals the play’s underlying psychology, but as Christopher Crosbie noted, the third line presents to the modern observer an apparent contradiction: “If Kyd figures the relationship between soul and body as antagonistic, as one of prisoner to prison, then how can the wanton flesh serve the soul?” (Crosbie 2008, 12). Crosbie argues that these lines suggest an Aristotelian psychology. Within this framework, “Kyd’s contemporaries almost certainly would have assumed “each” as referring to the capacities intrinsic to the soul’s substance that function cooperatively within the confines of the material body” (Crosbie 2008, 13). Yet, Kyd does not claim a single tripartite soul —vegetative, organic, and intellective — but two distinct cognitive systems, “Each in their function serving other’s need.” Thus, the relationship described in line three is not between soul and flesh but between the “function” of “each” aspect of human nature, a formulation that lays its focus both on the real distinction between an “eternal” soul and a material, mortal body, as well as on the fact that each of these aspects of human nature perform their own processes. Bel-Imperia’s physico-psychological state in the rendezvous scene reflects this ontological outlook. Her reluctance to enter the bower is as mysterious and inexplicable to her as it is to Horatio: “I know not what, myself; / And yet my heart foretells me some mischance” (2.4.14–15). This sense of fear for what lies in the future is not the product of some conscious reasoning process, but the outcome of the sensate, cognitive body. The material body rebels
against the conscious mind’s reliance on its cognitive capacities which can
detect no rational justification for not entering the garden, producing a dissonance between the somatic and the discursive modes of cognition and
signification. Bel-Imperia is thus confused, as she has found herself torn
between the imperatives of two conflicting cognitive systems. Convinced by
Horatio that “fair fortune is our friend,” Bel-Imperia refuses to follow her
heart and follows Horatio instead into the garden, where they indulge in an
erotic word-play until Lorenzo, Balthazar, Serberine and Pedringano enter
disguised, “hang him [Horatio] in the arbour,” and “stab him” (2.4. Stage
directions after lines 53 and 55).

In Bacon’s thought, the body’s ability to prefigure future events, to pro-
duce what he calls “primitive divination” — a type of foresight that per-
tains to “the general senses (OED, 1), the first born children and animals”
(OED, 1a) — is connected to his notion of “prenotional thinking,” a type
of somatic cognition that takes place prior to the activation of discurs-
ive reasoning (Bacon 1605, 46v). Similarly, in his “Of Prognostications,”
Montaigne writes that “there remain among us some means of divination,”
including “bodily traits” (Montaigne 1958, 27). In his gloss on Milton’s “He
the faultring measure felt,” Patrick Hume (fl.1695) explains: “He found his
Heart kept not true time, he felt the false and intermitting Measure; the
natural description of our Minds foreboding ill, by the unequal beatings of
the Heart and Pulse discovered” (Hume 1695, 261). Hume’s “foreboding” is
a deliberate pun on the material body’s ability to know future contingents,
as the body adjusts its physiology in order to transmit to the conscious mind
the sense of fear for some future mishance, demonstrating how somatic
cognitive processes are really distinct from the mind’s discursive modes of
cognition. And in Michael Drayton’s (1563–1631) Eng-lands heroicall epis-
tles, Matilda says to King John: “No sooner I, receiu’d thy letters heere, / Before I knew from whom, or whence they were, / But suddaine feare my
bloodlesse vaines doth fill,/ As though diuining of some future ill; / And in a
shyuering extasie I stood, / A chyllie coldnes runnes through all my blood”
(Drayton 1597, 13v–r). Once again, the body modifies its physiological pro-
cess to provoke a sense of fear which the cognitive processes of the analytic
mind cannot comprehend.

We can trace the idea of humans’ ability to forebode the future via our
organic or animal faculties to the view that animals are in possession of
such powerful sensory faculties that they can intuit events yet to come. As
Agrippa noted in his Three books of occult philosophy, in a chapter under
the title “How Auspicia’s are verified by the light of Naturall instinct,” “Now
they are verified by the light of naturall instinct, as if from this, some lights
descend upon four-footed beasts, winged, and other Animals, by which they are able to presage to us of the events of things: which Virgil seems to be sensible of, when he sings, “Nor think I Heaven on them
such knowledge states, / Nor that their prudence is above the fates.” Now
this instinct of nature, as saith William of Paris, is more sublime then all
humane apprehension, and very near, and most like to prophecy. By this
instinct there is a certain wonderfull light of divination in some Animals natu-
urally” (Agrippa 1651, 117). Agrippa’s account of the natural ability of ani-
mals to have an intuitive cognition of the future runs for another six pages,
providing a panorama of examples to corroborate his thesis. Early moderns
stressed the ability of animals to foresee the future repeatedly, many of them
acknowledging debt to Cicero (106BC–43BC). Even bees, Edward Topsell
(1572–1625) writes, “are so excellent in divination, that they even feele afor-
hand, and haue a sense of raine and cold that is to come” (Topsell 1608, 73).
There was even a term for prophecies drawn from an ass’s head: “The pre-
science which they gathered from the head of an Asse,” Heywood remarked,
is called “Kephaleomanteia” (Heywood 1624, 402). What is important for
our historical understanding of the early moderns’ attribution of foreknowl-
edge to the body is that the souls of animals were considered to share their
properties with humans’ organic or animal soul (Paster 1993, 135. See also
Chapter 2). The assumption that the human sensitive soul is jointed with the
soul of animals reinforces the idea that humans too may possess the ability
to know, through their animal instincts, future events.

By investing the body rather than the mind with the ability to intuit future
events, early modern tragedians appear to be responding to the mantic
elements of ancient Greek tragedies, particularly as they were received,
revived and represented by Seneca. Seneca’s Thyestes, for instance, draws
our attention to the human ability to prophesy:

The mind gives indications of a grief to come,  
prophet of its future pain.  
Sailors know a major storm is coming  
when the calm waters swell without a wind.  
Madman, what are you imagining?  
What griefs or storms? Be trustful in your heart  
towards your brother. At this point, whatever happens,  
either your fears are groundless, or too late.  
Poor me! I do not want to feel this way:  
but terror wanders in me and my eyes  
gush with sudden tears. There is no cause.  
Is it grief or fear? Or does great pleasure  
make me cry? (Seneca 2010, 5.957–69)

Thyestes cannot identify the cause of his unease. His physiological constitu-
tion responds by shedding “sudden tears,” while he is unable to tell whether
this is a warning for some ensuing calamity or a sign for future pleasure. Ulti-
merately, however, Seneca assigns this prophetic ability to the mind, not to
the body itself: “The mind gives indications of a grief to come, / prophet of
its future pain.” Thyestes’ mind thinks things without being aware of itself
thinking them. In contrast to this intellectualist approach, Kyd’s Bel-Imperia
ascribes the ability of human foreknowledge to the sensate body, as it is her “heart” that contradicts her rational soul’s will to enter the garden — “I follow thee, my love, and will not back, / Although my fainting heart controls my soul.”

Investing the body with the knowledge of future contingents was a commonplace dramatic device amongst early modern playwrights. To cite an example that resonates with Bel-Imperia’s “primitive divination,” we may turn to Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*. Here, Aaron kills Bassianus (Saturninus’ brother) and hides his corpse in a pit with the intention of framing Martius and Quintus (two of Titus Andronicus’ sons) for the murder. As they enter the dark woods, Aaron guides Martius and Quintus “to the loathsome pit” (2.3.194). Unable to see in the darkness, Martius falls into the pit in which Bassianus’ corpse is hidden, while Quintus exclaims: “What subtle hole is this, / Whose mouth is covered with rude-growing briers / Upon whose leaves are drops of new-shed blood [...] A very fatal place it seems to me” (2.3.198–200, 202). Pictured by Quintus and Martius as “this unhallow’d and blood-stained hole” (2.3.210), then as a “fell, devouring receptacle, / As hateful as Cocytus’ misty mouth” (2.3.235–6), and finally as “the swallowing womb / Of this deep pit” (2.3.239–40), the pit reveals the dark recesses of evil. The “loathsome,” “subtle hole,” whose opening is “misty” and cluttered with “rude-growing briers” imbrued in drops of blood, transforms the scene into a giant vagina that threatens to swallow everyone around its vicinity, literally reversing the process of giving birth and life.14 These passages echo Tamora’s words, uttered a few lines earlier, and draw a replicating symmetry between the deadly vagina and the Queen’s reproductive organs, which are described as the barren place to which she has been sent: “A barren detested vale you see it is; / The trees, though summer, yet forlorn and lean,/ Overcome with moss and baleful mistletoe. / Here never shines the sun, here nothing breeds / Unless the nightly owl or fatal raven,/ And when they showed me this abhorred pit” (2.3.93–98). This description is rich in allusions to the killing of her son and the sterility of her womb, which only death can now accommodate. The sentiments of vengeance which Tamora projects onto her reproductive organs are materialized into the figure of the vagina/pit turning into a death-trap. The demonic portentousness of the pit is further highlighted by Lavinia’s own ironic protestations, made before her captors. Fearing rape, she begs of Tamora “one thing more/ That womanhood denies my tongue to tell: / O, keep me from their worse than killing lust, / And tumble me into some loathsome pit” (2.3.173–76). Speaking a language of chaste circumlocution, Lavinia asks to die rather than to be sexually defiled, but her inadvertent pun upon the word “tumble,” meaning, as Eric Partridge records, “To copulate with (girl or woman), to cause to fall backward,” ironically prophesies the circumstances of her later violation (Partridge 1990, 210). And “just ten lines later,” Albert Tricomi adds here, “Lavinia is dragged off the stage to her rape, and the pit, just alluded to, becomes the central image upon the stage”
(Tricomi 2004, 236). Later on, when Lavinia opens her mouth a river of blood pours from her lips. As Paster maintains here, her mouth can be read as a violated, bleeding vagina: “In a precise and wholly conventional metonymic replacement of mouth for vagina, the blood flowing from Lavinia’s mutilated mouth stands for the vaginal wound that cannot be staged or represented” (Paster 1993, 98).

The description of the pit by Quintus and Martius does not suggest a simple equation of womb and tomb, for intra-fictional characters and extra-fictional audience are made to confront, in a disturbingly vivid way, the female genital organ as a living creature, as a carnivorous and blood-stained living thing. Eros and Thanatos, the Freudian drives of sexual reproduction, life, and death, are conflated into the single figure of a bloody, deadly vagina in order to craft an utterly repulsive organism. Although Freud denied having been acquainted with the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche before he formulated the groundwork of his own ideas, his theories nevertheless strongly resemble aspects of the German philosophers’ writings. Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy, expounded in The World as Will and Representation, describes a renunciation of the will to live that corresponds on many levels with Freud’s death drive. Similarly, the life drive parallels much of Nietzsche’s concept of the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy (Zilboorg 1950, xxvii). The confluence of these theories in the figure of the vagina is sensually rather than intellectually perceived. Quintus’s body refuses to follow Martius into the revolting womb, modifying its physiological processes so as to communicate to his conscious mind an inexplicable sense fear: “I am surprisèd with an uncouth fear. / A chilling sweat o’erruns my trembling joints; / My heart suspects more than mine eye can see” (2.3.211-3). Martius’s fall seems to have been fated from the moment he returns to the stage: “My sight is very dull, whate’er it bodes,” says Quintus, and Martius responds, “And mine, I promise you” (2.3.195-6). Evidently, Quintus does not understand why his body rebels against his intention to approach the pit, drawing a real distinction between the somatic and intellectual systems of cognition. The body forebodes death, literally fleshing out a meaning which the mind appears unable to comprehend through its analytic and logical processes of cognition. To Quintus’s mind, there is no obvious reason to be scared, and yet his body “trembles” and ejects “chilling sweat,” adjusting its physiology in order to transmit to his conscious mind an alien sense of fear for what he is unable to see and know via the comprehensive capabilities of the rational mind. There is a split between what the body’s eye sees, perceives and understands, and what the mind’s eye is able to comprehend. The fact that Quintus, along with the audience, is able to formulate and perceive via his sensate body the prodigality of the killing vagina draws attention to the idea that the total effect of tragedy is an aesthetic phenomenon in which the tension between Eros and Thanatos, the constituent components of tragedy, collapses into a unity (womb as a living death-trap) that is aesthetically communicated to the audience.
Another example comes from John Webster’s (c.1578–c.1638) *The Duchess of Malfi*. Here, Bosola offers apricots to the Duchess, a fruit she much desires, in order to read into her somatic reactions and find out if she is pregnant: “[Aside] Good, her colour rises […] how greedily she eats them!” Bosola observes, “A whirlwind strike off these bawd farthingales, / For, but for that, and the loose-body’d gown, / I should have discover’d apparently / The young springal cutting a caper in her belly” (Webster 2009, 2.1.132, 146–51). Immediately after Bosola’s asides, and no matter how much the Duchess craved apricots, her body cannot digest them, making her sick: “This green fruit and my stomach are not friends — / how they swell me! […] O, I am in an extreme cold sweat! […] Lights to my chamber: O good Antonio, / I fear I am undone” (2.1.153–8). The body emerges here as a cognitive entity capable of figuring Bosola’s machinations out and of prefiguring the tragedy yet to come, actively modifying its physiology by swelling and ejecting “cold sweat” in order to transmit to the Duchess’ conscious mind (and to the extra-fictional audience) the fear that she is being led to her death. Likewise, when Antonio’s nose starts bleeding, he fails to realize that this is a somatic manifestation that operates as a warning for ensuing danger: “My nose bleeds: / One that were superstitious would count / This ominous; — when it merely comes by chance” (2.3.41–43). In the face of Antonio’s rational judgment, the body proves an unmistakable prophet, for as soon as Antonio leaves, Bosola finds the incriminating birth note that the former accidentally dropped and which leads straight to the tragedy of *The Duchess of Malfi*. Both the Duchess’s and Antonio’s bodies tried to warn them, but the cognitive processes of their rational minds appear incapable of comprehending their bodies’ perceptive abilities.

The list of examples could be significantly extended, but it should already be long enough to suggest the shared understanding of the body as a knowledgeable material entity whose language can be antiphrastic to the conscious mind’s will and intentions. Rhetorical, descriptive tension is thereby displaced upon somatic cognition in a style of dramaturgy where the body both produces and appreciates its own language, a language shared by audience members and actors alike through the traces of organic memory, or *memoria sensitiva*, as scholastic and early modern philosophers would have it (see Chapter 1 and Charalampous 2013, esp.543–4). Early modern writers were particularly attuned to the idea that the human condition expressed by a certain somatic disposition can be transmitted to another person. As Agrippa writes, “how much also the countenance, gesture, do affect the sight, imagination, and Animal! spirit, no man is ignorant […] So a mild, and cheerfull countenance of a Prince in the City, makes the people joyfull: but fierce, and sad, terrifies them: so the gesture, and countenance of any one lamenting, doth easily move to pitty: So the shape of an amiable person, doth easily excite to love” (Agrippa 1651, 106). Likewise, Montaigne notes that “a continual cougher irritates
my lungs and throat” (Montaigne 1958, 68). The idea that physiological processes can operate as a network of sympathetic relations was popular in folk culture as well. In *The Fart*, for instance, an anonymous French farce, we read:

The truth is, truly, to say true,  
My wife, she farted next to me,  
So long, so loud, so lustily  
That my own asshole quakes with fear.  
To think of that fart’s play by rear (Anon. 2011a, 105).

This is the claim the husband, Hubert, makes about his wife Jeanette’s flatulence. Later, when the lawyer represents his position to the arbitrating judge, he says:

He formall makes a complaint  
Against this fart, which all did taint  
Inside his house, it was so foul,  
And startled him, and caused his bowel  
To shrivel back, as if to hide  
Somewhere within his own inside (Anon. 2011a, 108).

This is folk tradition, farce, and populist, one which draws on a rich vein of humorist writing that goes back thousands of years. Thomas Wright offers an account of the body and its semiotics that resonates with Agrippa’s, Montaigne’s and the anonymous dramatist’s claims: One’s passion, Wight noted, “proceedeth from the heart and is blown about the body, face, eyes, hands, voice, and so by gestures passeth into our eyes [...] and as it is qualified, so it worketh in us” (Wright 1986, 212). In a similar way, Wright continues, an actor’s “countenance speaketh with silent voice to the eyes; with all the universal life and body he seemeth to say ‘Thus we move because by the passion thus we are moved, and as it hath wrought in us so it ought to work in you’” (Wright 1986, 214). An actor’s somatic disposition can cause a collective response in the audience, as it appeals to a somatic mode communication shared by audience members and actors alike.

Failing to detect and perform the physico-psychological state produced by somatic dissonance threatens to reduce highly complicated dramatic persons to unconvincing and unrealistic characters. Richard’s wooing of Lady Anne in *Richard III* is another case in point, which shifts our attention from the forebodings of the body to its involvement in moving the subject to a change of cognitive and emotional position by imposing on the conscious mind its own will and cognitive imperatives. Here, Richard receives a barrage of insults from Lady Anne as a response to his attempts to win her love. Blaming him for her husband’s and King Henry VI’s deaths,
Anne figures as an embodiment of wrath itself. Each attempt to appease and win her favour seems to enrage her even more. She inveighs against Richard, calling him, among many other more elaborate and descriptive characterizations, “Foul devil,” “Villain,” a Godless creature worse than beasts and a “diffused infection of a man” (1.2.50, 70–71, 78). This creative frenzy of Shakespearean insults runs for more than a hundred lines of dialogue (1.2.34–174), and all Anne seems to desire is revenge (1.2.62, 87, 133, 137). It makes perfect sense for Anne to react in this aggressive fashion, especially when the wounded body of Henry lies exposed in the coffin and foreshadows the scene. What does not make sense is her sudden metamorphosis from a sworn avenger into a wooed flatterer. Anne’s “Would they [her eyes] were basilisks to strike thee dead” (1.2.150) is shortly followed by scornful looks (stage directions after 1.2.158) at Richard’s implorations. The next time she talks, her flaming desire for revenge seems to have magically quenched, her new outlook standing in sharp contrast to her previously raving mindset: “Though I wish thy death, / I will not be thy executioner” (1.2.173–4). What is more, what sounds like an offensive invitation on Richard’s part — “after I have solemnly interred / At Chertsey monast’ry this noble king,/ And wet his grave with my repentant tears -/ I will with all expedient duty see you” (1.2. 201–4) — Anne welcomes “With all my heart — and much it joys me, too,/ To see you are become so penitent” (1.2.207–8). Mourning has turned into mirth within the span of a few lines, threatening to produce a sense of detachment (even scorn) in the audience and a feeling of an utterly unrealistic and unnatural dramatic representation.22 This sense of unrealism is reinforced by the fact that Richard is one of the most notoriously deformed characters on the early modern stage, which is repeatedly stressed not only in this play but throughout the tetralogy.23

This scene has attracted a considerable amount of commentary, much of which has turned, surprisingly enough, to Richard’s deformed body as a viable means to win Lady Anne’s favour (Plasse 1995, 11–26; and Torrey 2000, 141–2). Despite their different inflections, a common premise around which such interpretations revolve is the focus on Richard’s rhetorical competency and protean changeability,24 even as the Lady, just before yielding to her wooer’s implorations, exclaims: “Out of my sight! Thou dost infect mine eyes” (2.3.148). The benefits of these approaches notwithstanding, shifting attention to Anne’s body and the notion of somatic dissonance will shed new light on the performance of this problematic scene.

Richard fences the Lady’s accusations off strategically by reading into her body and making her conscious of her somatic figure and its semantic import. Following an exchange of witty wordplay, Richard referees: “But gentle Lady Anne, / To leave this keen encounter of our wits / And fall something into a slower method […]” (1.2.114–6). The lexical register of the passage suggests that Shakespeare quickened the pace of their conversation to give expression to the intensity of passion with which
The semantic import of “keen encounter” is valenced. Thus, Richard’s call for a slower pace operates as an incentive for a somatic re-composition, as a calmer and more controlled tempo will soften the muscles of the body and thereby assuage the Lady’s anger. Richard’s appeal for a calmer tone of dialogical exchange is also signalled by calling her “gentle Lady Anne.” This is the only time in the entire play that Richard calls her by her full name, directing her attention to the fact that she is a lady and should act graciously and gentler. A careful listener of her body’s language, Richard is also a competent manipulator. When the Lady “looks scornfully at him” (stage directions after 1.2.158), he is able to read her psychological disposition on her lips and modify her physical gestures in order to change her cognitive and emotional position: “Teach not thy lip such scorn for it was made / For kissing, lady, not for such contempt” (1.2.159–60). Richard is staging Anne’s body to alter her psychological state, calling for a performance that requires the Lady to be constantly conscious of her actions. This sense of self-awareness promotes a physico-psychology that stands in contradistinction to the meanings of the words she utters verbally, as the passion with which her discourse is supposed to be invested is countered by a somatic mode of expression that evacuates her words of the intensity of that passion. As Thomas Blount (1618–1679) describes this process, “if she frowned, he would both move her to mirth, and deny that she could be angry in earnest; if she were sad, he would conform his speech and action in that soberness to her humor, as might beguile her passion, by way of false confederacy” (Blount 1654, 18). In a similar way, Richard “beguil[e]s her passion” by modifying her somatic signs.

At a key moment, Richard hands his sword to the Lady and offers his breast. Coordinating with the evacuation of the passion to which her verbal discourse is supposed to give expression, this gesture motivates her bodily thinking to cause the much-discussed and often-condemned change in her position:

[He kneels and offers her his sword]
Lo, here I lend thee this sharp-pointed sword,
Which if thou please to hide in this true breast
And let the soul forth that adoreth thee,
I lay it naked to the deadly stroke
And humbly beg the death upon my knee.
He lays his breast open; she offers at it with his sword
Nay, do not pause, for I did kill King Henry;
But “twas thy beauty that provoked me.
Nay, now dispatch: “twas I that stabbed young Edward;
But “twas thy heavenly face that set me on.
She drops the sword
Take up the sword again, or take up me (1.2.162–71).
This passage is populated with sexual innuendos. As Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen have remarked, Richard’s “set me on” “has connotations of sexual arousal like “provoked,” while “take up me” is invested with “connotations of “possess me sexually/make my penis erect” (Bate and Rasmussen 2008, 3n.189–90. See also Jowett 2000, 169n.166, 168). These connotations of sexual arousal echo Richard’s previous proposal to join the Lady in her “bedchamber” (1.2.112), and are figuratively pictured in his offering of his “sharp-pointed sword,” a popular metaphor during the period for the penis. Kneeling before her, Richard raises his sword, “Which if thou please to hide in this true breast.” Richard’s vocabulary is carefully chosen, using the verb “hide” instead of, for example, “stab,” and the more ambiguous “this” in “this true breast” instead of the subject-specific “my.” This is the only time in the whole corpus of his works that Shakespeare uses “hide” instead of the dominant “stab,” which suggests an intentional shift in language use. This lexical choice leaves space for considerable interpretation and, as a result, for performance alternatives. In her edition of the play, for instance, Janis Lull argues that “Richard has probably been pointing the sword at his own breast” (Lull 1999, 68n.201). Much virtue in “probably,” as another two alternatives are also probable. In his production of the play, Lawrence Olivier, who acted the role of Richard, does not unease his sword until the moment he says “I lay it naked to the deadly stroke.” And in their adaptation, Laura Hubbard and Hilary Wartinger have Richard pointing the sword at Anne’s breast. The latter two alternatives seem to be more appropriate, as the first one does justice neither to Richard’s sexual innuendos nor to the puns on “hide” and “this,” whose ambiguous meanings suggest a performance that reflects this intentional semantic ambiguity. Thus performed, holding his sword (phallus) raised up to her breast, Richard is implicitly asking Anne to “hide” it between her breasts. In this performance, the verb “hide” retains its conventional semantic import — i.e. to conceal an illicit, shameful or illegal action and/or object — at the same time that its counterpart meaning (to stab) maintains its force. But however the scene is performed, the sexual puns are unmistakable. It is this connection that prompted Anne, Sher, and Downie to enact “a continuous piece of erotic violence” with the sword in order to justify Anne’s capitulation (Hankey 1988, 113). The “naked sword” was a very common metaphor for an exposed penis. The pun on death for orgasm, evoked by the “deadly stroke” that follows the “naked sword,” was also commonplace. As Judith Haber has noted, the “phallic orgasm/death is constitutive of conventional tragedy” (Haber 2009, 75), while Wendy Griswold remarked that the “Renaissance convention of orgasm as a little death is taken very literally in revenge tragedy” (Griswold 1986, 80; see also Stanivuković 2009, 51; Pollard 2003, 115; and Daileader 1998, 92). Accordingly, Richard’s language implies that at the Lady’s “stroke” his aroused penis will ejaculate (between her breasts or upon his knee?). As in the case of Quintus, Eros and Thanatos are conflated, for at the same time that the sword figures as a phallic symbol, it is also
the means for killing Richard. With his aggressive sexuality, Richard has cornered Anne and made her see that revenge is a kind of sexual consummation, thus implicating her in a murder-sex analogy. At once attracted to and repulsed by this act, Anne is literally disarmed. What the Lady’s mind cannot comprehend via its analytic, rational mode of cognition (death as sexual consummation), her body perceives and triggers a baffling emotional and cognitive experience. As a result, it is Anne who lies “exposed” before Richard, through a gesture that, by appealing to somatic cognition, comes to reconfigure, or “paraphrase” to use Bulwer’s vocabulary, the meaning of the words uttered on the level of rhetoric. As we will see in the next section in more detail, this disarming cognitive experience that is triggered by the synthesis of antithetical emotions underpins the impulses of tragic joy.

This analysis complicates the reciprocal relation between mind and body, for it is no longer straightforward as to whether the physiology of the body precedes or succeeds the psychological and emotional disposition to which it gives expression. In early modernity, the view that physical traits and signs operate as causes for psychological states rather than as manifestations of them was commonplace. As Thomas Wilson noted, it is the disposition “of the mynde [that] folowes the constitucion of the bodie,” not the other way around (Wilson 1553, 61v). Richard’s physico-psychological manipulation of Anne may thus be said to operate as a dramatic and spectacular representation of Wilson’s ontological outlook and Donne’s “I say againe, that the body makes the minde” (Donne 1633, 25). This idea is also inherent in the period’s science of physiognomy. The diagnoses of contemporary physiognomers produced what Michael Torrey has identified as “ambivalence of physiognomical discourse” (Torrey 2000, 126). To a significant extent, this ambivalence stems from the contemporary theory that physical signs of malignity and/or of any other somatic indicator of a negative characteristic should operate as planes for self-knowledge and self-transformation. As Martin Porter has it, “a main theme in the history of physiognomy was the way in which it was so often understood to be a part of self-knowledge, or, in the case of hermeticism, self-transformation” (Porter 2005, 307). The fact that people can overcome impulses to which they appear to be inclined, led Thomas Hill (c.1528–c.1574) to assert that the physiognomical verdicts he offered in his book apply more readily to “the brutish sort,” who are driven by “their sensuall will and appetites” rather than the intellect (quoted in Torrey 2000, 132). According to this logic, physical traits are a cause but not always a sign for the interiority they envelop. As Torrey observed in his discussion of Bacon’s writings on physiognomy, deformity is redefined “as a cause rather than a sign (which can be ‘more deceivable’)” (Torrey 2000, 137). Thus, even as early moderns acknowledge that physiognomical discourse may falter, they nevertheless agree on the notion that the physiology of the body is a cause for the psychological state it represents.

The idea that the body may impose on the subject certain emotions towards a given stimulus which the rational mind cannot comprehend was
regularly rehearsed on the early modern stage. This physico-psychological outlook is notoriously evoked by Shylock in his attempt to justify the reason why he would refuse to accept money in exchange for not extracting his pound of flesh from Antonio’s body:

You 'll ask me why I rather choose to have
A weight of carrion flesh than to receive
Three thousand ducats. I 'll not answer that,
But say it is my humour. Is it answered?
[...]
Some men there are love not a gaping pig,
Some that are mad if they behold a cat,
And others when the bagpipe sings i’ th’ nose
Cannot contain their urine; for affection,
Mistress of passion, sways it to the mood
Of what it likes or loathes (4.1.39–42, 46–51).

Likewise, in the *Changeling*, Beatrice confesses that she can give no rational explanation to Alsemero regarding her displeasure at the sight of De Flores: “Your pardon, sir, ’tis my infirmity, / Nor can I other reason render you [...] Such to mine eyes is that same fellow there” (1.1.110–1, 115). Alsemero generalizes Beatrice’s physico-psychological state to encompass all humans in a way that is starkly reminiscent of Shylock’s infamous speech:

This is a frequent frailty in our nature.
There’s scarce a man amongst a thousand sound
But hath his imperfection: one distastes
The scent of roses, which to infinites
Most pleasing is, and odoriferous;
One oil, the enemy of poison;
Another wine, the cheerer of the heart
And lively refresher of the countenance.
Indeed this fault (if so it be) is general (1.1.117–25).

Alsemero rationalizes Beatrice’s aversion to De Flores by suggesting that emotional, cognitive states can be the products of somatic cognitive processes and whims. Lucretius (c.99–c.55) had offered a similar account of such irrational reactions by drawing an analogy between humans and animals: “Forms and colors too are not all equally suited to the senses of all; indeed certain of them are too acrid to the eyes of certain animals. Consider how ravening lions cannot endure the sight of the cock [...] Their immediate reaction is to flee” (Lucretius 2001, 4.708–12). In this context, an emotional and cognitive state can both originate and terminate in the sensate body, the conscious mind figuring as a mere receptor of the cognitive body’s imperatives and wills. To inhabit a body is to inhabit a foreign cognitive entity, a material, alien self attached to one’s own self.
Seneca’s influence on early modern tragedians has been well documented (Boyle 1997, esp. 141–210; Miola 1992; Braden 1985; Charlton 1946; Lucas 1922; and Cunliffe 1893). His dramaturgical style has helped to bring the dismembered body to the center of the early modern stage, making revenge and blood spectacles. As Thomas Nashe (1567–c.1601) famously wrote in the preface to Robert Greene’s (1558?–1592) Menaphon, “Seneca let bloud line by line and page by page, at length must needes die to our stage” (Greene 1589, *3). In Seneca’s view, the body is a dungeon which the soul is forced to occupy, a mere prison of a superior rational soul which will regain its bliss after physical passing. Seneca’s theory of the mind-body relationship is expounded in his treatise on emotions, the De Ira, where cognition is considered a trial in which passion and reason constitute judges of differing temperament who are considering the proof presented to them (Staley 2010, esp. 66–84). Seneca’s dualism is Stoic in its conception. Reason is the right and just advisor. Passion, on the other hand, leads to catastrophe: “Often therefore reason persuades (suadet) us to be patient, passion to be vindictive” (quoted in Staley 2010, 84). Gregory Staley argues that Seneca presents “this psychological process as a tragedy,” asserting that the “plot of a Senecan tragedy is thus the plot of the human soul” (Staley 2010, 83). However true this may be for Seneca’s tragic dramaturgy, early modern tragedians present us with a much more complicated and fascinating story of the body and its relation to the mind, one that understood the somatic as an autonomous and intelligent cognitive agent. Of course, this is not to displace the importance of the Senecan strain of thought in early modern tragedy or the various other traditions that early modern tragedians had inherited — i.e. Platonic, Aristotelian, Averroist, Pauline, Thomist, etc. — in favor of an exclusive interest in a particular metaphysical and psychological theory, but to add yet another ontological outlook which had a profound influence on contemporary literary writers. In some cases, the body is represented on the early modern stage as a negative other indeed; in other cases, as a mere mechanical extension or, alternatively, as a transparent, porous envelope that suggests its intimate union with the mind. But elsewhere, early modern writers present us with a dualism wherein the body is invested with its own cognitive capabilities and intelligence. At once physical and arcane, as we will see in the following section, the body’s responses to situations and events cut right through the heart of the ideological and philosophical undercurrents of receiving and creating tragic dramaturgy.

**MAKING SENSE OF UNUTTERABLE PAIN: THE WONDER OF TRAGIC PLEASURE**

Angry with the failure of his virtuous youngest daughter Cordelia to respond as he desires in a love test, Lear divides his kingdom between her two malevolent sisters. In contrast to her sisters’ pompous speeches about their love toward their father, Cordelia prefers to “Love and be silent” (1.1.57), for
her “love's / more richer than [her] tongue” (1.1.72–73). Early on in the play we are thus introduced to a central dilemma: the inability of verbal discourse to convey powerful emotions. In order to prove herself a loving daughter, she asserts her love as being truly beyond words and thus actually unspeakable, enacting Goneril’s “sir, I love you more than words can wield the matter [...] A love that makes breath poor and speech unable” (1.1.55, 60). As a result, when it is her turn to speak up, her reply is a terse “Nothing, my lord” (1.1.87). Rebell ing against Lear’s decision to disinherit Cordelia on the basis of her verbal response, Kent advises the king to reconsider: “see better, Lear, and let me still remain / The true blank of thine eye” (1.1.103–4). Kent implores Lear to see rather than listen, directing both Lear’s and the audience’s attention to Cordelia as a visual object. Played off against a context in which Lear refuses to “see,” — “avoid my sight [...] Out of my sight [...] nor shall ever see / That face of hers again” (1.1. 124, 158, 263–4) — Kent’s advice to Lear is to base his insight on his sight rather than on verbal discourse. As Jay Halio has observed, “Lear’s failure to see is wilful in the extreme. It is not only that he lacks foresight and cannot see people clearly or assess their motives accurately; he will not. Both Cordelia and Kent try to correct his vision [...] The disasters that follow are thus the direct result of wilful blindness” (Halio 2005, 14. Emphasis original). But what is it exactly that Kent urges Lear to see in/on Cordelia? We are perhaps too preoccupied with our foreknowledge that Cordelia is Lear’s most faithful and loving daughter to realize that the tension between sight and insight is vital to the successful performance of this scene. An audience that is not predisposed, or that is less well-versed in the history of the play, may find Kent’s and/or Lear’s reactions quite odd, 28 unless in her speechlessness Cordelia’s body speaks out what her aural discourse does not have the power to convey: “my love’s / More ponderous than my tongue [...] I cannot heave / May heart into my mouth” (1.1.77–78, 91–92). In contrast to her sisters, Cordelia’s love is not in her words but in her heart, grounding the powerful overflow of emotion in material, bodily terms. This style of performance requires a somatic disposition reflective of her emotional state, even as the semantic import of “nothing, my lord” may suggest otherwise. In his refusal to see, Lear values verbal discourse and thus dooms Cordelia. By contrast, in his refusal to trust verbal articulation, Kent praises her: “Thy youngest daughter does not love thee least, / Nor are those empty-hearted whose low sounds / Reverb no hollowness” (1.1.151–3). The empty-heart edness or “hollowness” that Cordelia’s low sounded “nothing” may imply is countered by Kent’s in-sight that her somatic language is more truthful than flattering and empty words. “Low sounds” (e.g. humble, reserved speech/voice) and intense, full-hearted bodily expression are thereby vital to the successful performance of the scene, for it is through Cordelia’s somatic dissonance that the conflict between Lear and Kent is generated. The failure to bring somatic dissonance to the fore in this crucial scene will be at the cost of the tragedy’s dramatic tension and character construction. As in the case
of Bel-Imperia, Quintus and Lady Anne, Cordelia’s body calls for a manipulation so as to be able to transmit to both intra- and extra-fictional audience members the sense of conflict dramatized between Lear and Kent.\textsuperscript{29}

The staging of the body in \textit{King Lear} finds its apogee in the final scene of the play. Here, in sharp contrast to the play’s opening scene, Lear fixates his eyes on Cordelia’s dead body, harkening to listen to a corpse, which, in his mind, lies suspended somewhere between life and death.\textsuperscript{30} It is a body devoid of spirit and yet still potent of agency: “she’s dead as earth […] This feather stirs. She lives […] Cordelia, Cordelia: stay a little. Ha? / What is’t thou sayst? […] Do you see this? Look on her. Look, her lips. / Look there, look there” (5.3.236, 240, 246–7, 286–7). Lear’s overwhelming sense of irrevocable loss transcends the powers of language to describe verbally the experience he is undergoing. Like Cordelia’s love, Lear’s suffering is unutterable. This predicament drives him into a discourse that verges on the limits of sanity and madness. The problem of articulating experiences that are, on the whole, unspeakable, arises from the fact that the act of immediate perception is primarily located in the body. Lear displaces this somatic enunciatory urge upon Cordelia’s body and renders it a speaking/thinking thing, constructing a type of “\textit{Eidolopoeia},” defined by Richard Rainolde (c.1530–1606) as “that part of this Oracion, whiche maketh a persone knowne though dedde, and not able to speake […] when a dedde manne talketh” (Rainolde 1563, lv). Here, there is a clash of two images: Cordelia’s dead body and the living image of that body which Lear constructs. Cordelia’s body is thereby suspended in an intermediary locus where life and lifelessness are fused into the dead yet still performing body we witness. There is an uncanny feeling of an ever present absence which Cordelia’s speaking corpse embodies, while the void of silence is filled with what remains inexpressible and unheard: Lear’s tragic suffering and his daughter’s words. Here lies a central paradox, inherent in any attempt to talk about the unspeakable, about that which does not exist, for to start analysing inexistence is a gesture towards admitting to the fact that inexistence exists, that the unspeakable is always already spoken. At the same time, however, Cordelia’s unsaid words, coupled as they are with the emotional impulses of the inexpressibility of Lear’s tragedy, bear a certain effect on our sensory faculties which are stirred by the absence of the sensitive stimuli we are yearning to receive. Lear’s “Ha?”, an inarticulate somatic expostulation, automatically stimulates the auditory faculty of our sensate bodies, while his “Do you see this? Look on her. Look, her lips. / Look there, look there” stimulates our visual faculties and implicates us in a process where our eyes scan Cordelia’s body to see signs of movement and life. But we never receive the auditory and visual stimuli we are made to seek. A split is thereby opened up in the whole sequence of signification by the scene’s bifurcated imperatives to synthesize antitheses. The result is the emergence of an aesthetic phenomenon that resists symbolization absolutely, and which can thus be studied only in its effects on the body. Although the existence of inexistence does not make sense conceptually, it nevertheless makes sense aesthetically.
By harkening to hear the unheard with Lear, we are prompted to share the tragic subject’s unutterable pain. Our desire to see and/or hear a sign of life clashes with our subsidiary awareness that Cordelia is dead and that Lear “knows not what he says” (5.3.270). We are thus caught in a state where we get to sympathize with Lear, emulating his pain via a process in which our desire to see Cordelia alive again is stirred at the same time that it is lacerated. Like Lear, we “know when one is dead and when one lives” (5.3.235), yet we are made to desire to hear Cordelia’s voice and see a sign of life. Our desire to listen to Cordelia’s unheard words in order to discharge our emotional and cognitive enunciatory urges transfers the processes of understanding to the sensate body. As they become tangible images of loss and inarticulacy itself, Cordelia’s unheard words and unseen movements thrust themselves into the perceptive faculties of the sentient body of the individual audience member. This scene brings about the quality of understanding through the body as the audience is in pain not so much because we pity Lear, but because we are made to share his pain through a process in which we immerse ourselves in a pre-linguistic mode of perceiving whereby the unheard hurts more than the heard and the unseen more than the seen. And like Lear’s, our emotive response is so powerful that it cannot be fully expressed by means of discursive articulation. As Michael Schoenfeldt has noted, “characters in Shakespeare’s plays continually voice the need to express their inner suffering,” but it is often the case that “the weight of a heart surcharged with emotion” can find “no safe outlet” (Schoenfeldt 2009, 34. See also Schoenfeldt 2007, 143-64). Key to this aesthetics is the early modern dramatists’ concern with a pre-discursive, somatic response to creating and receiving performance, which enables both performers and audience members to tap into primordial, preverbal communication processes. The inability to transfer our sensate response to Lear’s tragedy into the symbolic mode of understanding triggers a sense of bafflement and admiration in the audience, which is often reflected in critical commentaries. Jan Kott, for instance, writes that “King Lear gives one the impression of a high mountain that everyone admires but no one particularly wishes to climb” (Kott 1974, 127), while Margaret Webster confessed that Lear “seems to me baffling from the very beginning” (Webster 1942, 221). Indeed, as we will see later in more detail, early modern writers insisted on the idea that a successful tragedy is meant to cause unutterable sorrow and trigger the sense of wonder in the audience.

Another instance of a Shakespearean dead body still performing comes from Henry Jackson’s comments in 1610: “Desdemona, killed in front of us by her husband, although she acted her part excellently throughout, in her death moved us especially when, as she lay in her bed, with her face alone she implored the pity of the audience” (quoted in Dawson 1996, 36-37). Here we have the idea of an audience listening to the character’s “face alone,” which has the ability to “implore the pity of the audience,” a type of somatic communication more powerful than verbal discourse as it
appeals to the immediacy of affective perception. To recall Wright’s exposition of an actor’s approach to dramaturgy and role-playing: “‘thus we move because by the passion thus we are moved, and as it hath wrought in us so it ought to work in you’” (Wright 1986, 214). Similarly, in Webster’s *The Duchess of Malfi*, standing over the Duchess’s and her children’s corpses, Ferdinand appears unmoved by any feeling of remorse, answering Bosola’s “here begin you pity” (4.2.255) with a cruel “The death of young wolves is never to be pitied” (4.2.257–8). This cruelty is immediately transmuted into unbearable sorrow: “Cover her face: mine eyes dazzle: she died young” (4.2.262). His rapid change in position may strike the audience as quite odd, especially when he starts accusing Bosola for his own actions (4.2.271–6). This change is not the product of some consciously rational form of cognition, but the result of immediate sight: “Fix your eye here,” Bosola urges Ferdinand, who replies with a stern “Constantly” (4.2.260–1). The outcome of this encounter is Ferdinand’s “Cover her face: mine eyes dazzle.” This pre-linguistic mode of perceiving both originates and terminates in the sensate body, causing the rapid change we witness in the character’s position. The “dismal sight” (4.2.264) of the Duchess’s and her children’s corpses, along with Ferdinand’s sudden change in position and emotional state, constitute a reversal that is meant to “dazzle” the audience, to cause a sense of wonder and astonishment.

The emphasis on the “unutterability” of tragic sorrow may be said to sit uncomfortably with the sometimes intensely emotive and memorable forms of expression that the protagonists find to articulate their experience, as in, for instance, Marcus’s lamentation at the sight of mutilated Lavinia in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus* (2.4.11–57) or Lear’s discourse in the storm and madness scene (3.2). By finding powerful discursive means to express and communicate their tragedy, nevertheless, the protagonists point precisely at the idea that however emotive discourse can be, it only heightens the tragic character’s sense of irrevocable loss and intensifies the sense of pity, fear and wonder in the audience. It operates as reminder that tragic sorrow and pain can never be fully arrested by entering the symbolic order of signification and understanding. Thus, in Shakespeare’s *Richard III*, Queen Elizabeth, incensed with Richard for decimating her family, complains that words which cannot stimulate sensual perception are ine(a)ffective, and seeks advice from Queen Margaret on how to sharpen her language: “My words are dull. O quicken them with thine!” In response, Queen Margaret advises her: “Thy woes will make them sharp and pierce like mine” (4.4.124–5). In seeking to articulate her sorrow, Elizabeth is not seeking to discharge her emotional state into the symbolic order of signification in order to diffuse her pain. Rather, she seeks to make both her intra- and extra-fictional audiences emulate her sorrow through a language that has the power to “pierce” and cause pain. And the more emotive and powerful a tragic speech is, the more it reinforces the sense of wonder in the audience, an emotional and
cognitive state which early modern writers considered, along with pity and fear, to be a constituent component of tragic dramaturgy.\footnote{33}

To make a tragedy, Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–1375) tells us, is “to make a lamentacion Of vncouth sorowes […] to wepe and to waile” (1494, ciiiiv), while for William Touris (d. c.1505–1508), a “tragedie to tell, no tongue may be able, / So restles is the rage thereof most vnquiet, / Wth al mischiefe abounding, wretched & miserable / In soule and body, theyr paynes are so complete” (Touris 1578, M.viiir). The pain-ridden emotions of “vncouth sorowes” that the early modern tragedians communicate to their audiences, which “to tell, no tongue may be able,” are meant to cause a sense of admiration, amazement and wonder. The Italian critic Antonio Sebastiano Minturno (1500–1574) writes that “the business of the tragic poet is to put his reader in a condition of astonishment” (Minturno 1940, 292). A successful tragedy, according to Hédelin, is not so much the product of plot construction but of a performance style invested with and expressive of such powerful emotions that may “dazzle” the audience: “for that which has so clearly set him [Corneille] above all the Poets of his time has not been the Plot, or Regularity of his Plays, but the Discourses, and the noble ways of Expressing those violent passions which he introduces, even so far, that we see very irregular actions in them so accompanied with ingenious and pathetick Expressions, that the fault could not be perceiv’d but by the Learned Observers, the beauty of the Thoughts and Language dazling the understanding of all the rest of the Audience” (Hédelin 1684, 13). William Painter (c.1540–1595) registered his reaction to a tragedy with a similar sense of wonder: “the entire discourse of this pitifull tragedie […] shall driue you into no lesse wondre and amaze” (Painter 1567, 246v). For Heywood too, a successfully performed tragedy aims “to mooue the spirits of the beholder to admiration” (Heywood 1624, B4v). And as John Dryden (1631–1700) writes: “The end of Tragedies or serious Playes, sayses Aristotle, is to beget admiration, compassion, or concernment; but are not mirth and compassion things incompatible? and is it not evident that the Poet must of necessity destroy the former by intermingling of the latter? that is, he must ruine the sole end and object of his Tragedy to introduce somewhat that is forced in, and is not of the body of it: Would you not think that Physician mad, who having prescribed a Purge, should immediately order you to take restringents upon it?” (Dryden 1668, 28). Dryden’s comments capture the mind-boggling effect of tragedy: the simultaneous stimulation of the feelings of “mirth and compassion.” At the same time, Dryden introduces a third element: the sense of admiration or wonder which accompanies these feelings.

As Dryden notes, the roots of the idea that tragedy triggers a sense of admiration and wonder stretch back to Aristotle’s works. “The marvellous [\(\theta\\nu\omega\mu\alpha\varsigma\tau\omicron\nu\)]”, Aristotle writes in his Poetics, “must [\(\delta\varepsilon\epsilon\)] be represented in tragedy” (Aristotle 1995, 24, 1460a10–12). Wonder is caused by the unexpected and rapid reversal in the fortunes of the tragic character (“peripeteia”; see Aristotle 1995, 9, 1452a4–7, 11, 24 and 1460a17; and
Aristotle 1926, 1.11.24). Wonder, in turn, provokes the desire to understand (Aristotle 1975, 1.1, 980a21–27; and Aristotle 1926, 1.11.24) and both wondering and desire for understanding cause pleasure (Aristotle 1926, 1.11.23; and Aristotle 1995, 4, 1448b4–19). For Aristotle, we receive pleasure “even if the object of imitation is not in itself pleasant” (Aristotle 1926, 1.11.23), “for we enjoy looking at the most accurate representations of things which in themselves we find painful to see” (Aristotle 1995, 4, 1448b10–12). Aristotle’s assertion that we receive pleasure from the dramatic representation of a painful event anticipates Kant’s (1724–1804) notion of “negative pleasure”: “since the mind is not simply attracted by the object, but is also alternately repelled thereby, the delight in the sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i.e. merits the name of a negative pleasure” (Kant 2007, 76). Wonder, in Aristotle’s works, is triggered when the feelings of pity and fear are aroused, and this process gives rise to tragic pleasure. The origins of aesthetic pleasure are summed up in the Rhetoric:

Again, generally speaking, understanding and wondering give pleasure, as wondering involves a desire to understand, so that a thing [e.g. peripeteia] that rouses wonder [e.g. as a result of conjoined feelings of pity and fear inherent in peripeteia] is a thing in connection with which we feel desire [...] Now since both understanding and wondering give pleasure, the things that rouse them must also give pleasure, even if its object does not itself give pleasure. For the pleasure is not just pleasure in the object; [...] The same is true of sudden changes of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from danger [i.e. peripeteia], as all such things rouse wonder.

(Aristotle 1926, 1.11.21–25)

In Aristotle’s philosophy, then, tragic pleasure is rooted in the experience of wonder and in the subsequent desire to understand the ideological and/or moral impulses of that feeling. A source of pleasure, the marvellous resists fixed rational exegeses because its very nature is elusive: “The marvellous is a source of pleasure, because everyone will add something as an agreeable extra” (Aristotle 1995, 24, 1460a17–18). As the object of pleasure eludes conceptual specificity, it transports the cognitive subject into a bewildering mode of thinking in which no single exegesis will ever be formidable enough to fully explain its properties and effect, for it is the object, not the subject, as Longinus insists, that has the “upper hand” (Longinus 1965, 100). Longinus’s assertion that the poet does not stir the sense of wonder in order to persuade the audience but in order to trigger an indeterminable emotional and cognitive state (Longinus 1965, 100) reflects Aristotle’s view of the audience’s reactions after the end of the tragedy, as it is this indeterminability that will always be spurring the production of commentaries. Wonder, in both Aristotle and Longinus, triggers in the audience the desire
to understand, without nevertheless being ever able to fully comprehend
the object of pleasure, for the pleasure rooted in wonder rests in the inability
to familiarize oneself with the cognitive object by stabilising its signifying
properties. In responding to suffering sympathetically through pity and
fear, a spectator of tragedy does not only receive pleasure because s/he has
come to recognize the importance of reacting to injustice with acts of justice
(the standardized rendering of Aristotle's theory of tragic drama), but also
because s/he cannot fully comprehend the cognitive object s/he confronts.35

To understand, in this context, is to understand (i.e. not fully comprehend)
and undergo a cognitive/emotional experience that lies beyond
conceptual reach. As it challenges the limits of rational perception, tragic
sensation forces the mind to rise above itself: “in its high / Cothurnal Sceans,”
to recall William Chamberlayne’s (c.1619–1689) words, “a lofty Tragedy /
Erects their thoughts, and at once doth invite / To various Passions, Sorrow
and Delight” (Chamberlayne 1659, 151). Arrested in a state of anticipating
dreadful events to happen, all of which culminate in a final tragic episode,
most commonly the death of the protagonist, the audience anticipate the
discharge of the emotional and cognitive enunciatory urges into the symbolic
framework of understanding. However, instead of being discharged, these
enunciatory urges only intensify as the drama progresses towards the tragic
death of the protagonist. The promise of discharge is thereby always sus­
pended. Our anticipation of discharge becomes a desire for the pleasure that
accompanies that discharge. This desire is nevertheless pleasurable in itself
because the anticipation of pleasure involves the very feelings it promises to
bring about. At the same time, it moves audiences into a quest for learning,
which, Aristotle insists, is pleasurable. As long as this discharge, along with
the pleasure it entails, is suspended, so long the desire for that pleasure is
experienced, and so long we undergo the pleasure of desiring that pleasure.
As Aristotle noted, it is the “desire to understand” (Aristotle 1926, 1.11.21.
Emphasis added), not understanding per se, that gives pleasure. In his edi­
tion of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, George A. Kennedy translated the passage from
Aristotle’s Rhetoric as follows: “And to learn and to admire are usually plea­
surable; for in admiration there is desire, so the admirable is desirable [ ... ]”.
Here, Kennedy omits the “to learn” that follows “desire,” explaining in a
footnote: “‘Desire to learn’ in the Greek text, but perhaps a misunderstanding
by a scribe” (Aristotle 2007, 91n205. Italics original). However, a trans­
lation that is more faithful to the Greek original retains the nature of the
wonderful and the admirable as referring to a cognitive object that can never
be fully understood by means of the rational, analytic mind, for, as Aristo­
tle asserts, the “wonderful depends on the irrational [ἀλόγον] for its chief
effects” (Aristotle 1926, 24, 1460a12–14). Hence, it is the desire to under­
stand rather than understanding itself that is pleasurable and wonderful. The
greatness of an artistic work, Longinus insists, is measured against its ability
to keep audiences across the centuries in wonder, and thereby implicate them
in an endless quest for knowledge and understanding (Longinus 1965, 17).
Aristotle’s connection of catharsis with the wonderful and the pleasure it entails, suggests that catharsis is not to be understood either as purging or as cleansing, but as a bi-conditional physico-psychological state. The marvelous requires that pity and fear retain their emotional and cognitive effect on the audience, whereas catharsis, in its traditional conceptualization, requires that these feelings be eradicated or balanced through a re-establishment of the moral/social order and recognition/approval of correct and just actions. When the tragedy of *Oedipus Rex* comes to its end, for example, catharsis may be said to occur in its medicinal, traditional sense because order has been re-established, but what will keep audiences coming back to re-view the drama, and what will keep them talking about it and “adding something as an agreeable extra,” is the sense of wonder and admiration that was triggered through the conjoined feelings of fear and pity. No longer harmful passions, fear and pity become objects of study and incentives for learning and, therefore, for pleasure. In this sense, they are cleansed and/or purged. Purgation and cleansing co-exist in a reciprocal relationship whereby the viability of the one term does not necessarily preclude the viability of the other.

Failing to recognize the nuances of Aristotle’s theory of tragic experience may lead to the inaccurate conclusion that early modern tragedians often instantiate an anti-Aristotelian understanding of tragic effect. Heather James, for instance, writes that Shakespeare tends to adopt an “anti-Aristotelian idea of tragedy: the plot builds up sympathy, frustration, and outrage but effects no catharsis” (James 2001, 382). This conclusion lends itself more readily to *King Lear*, perhaps the most notoriously problematic tragedy in relation to catharsis (Stampfer 1960, 1–10). Such conclusions, nevertheless, rest on a misunderstanding of catharsis as a mere pain killer which gives pleasure only because it has relieved the patient-audience of physical-aesthetic pain. At the end of *King Lear*, Edgar (Albany in the Quarto) calls for us to “speak what we feel, not what we ought to say” (5.3.300). Edgar’s concluding “we” applies not only to the surviving characters but to the members of the audience, appropriating *King Lear* as a tragedy that follows, rather than diverges from, Aristotle’s conception of catharsis and tragic pleasure. Stephen Halliwell is partly right when he writes that in Aristotle’s theory of tragic experience, there is “no divorce between thought, or understanding, and feeling, since to feel in the right way towards the right thing just is one integral dimension of understanding their human sense and meaning” (Halliwell 1992, 254). What we feel/think, nevertheless, cannot enter the symbolic order of understanding as it transcends the powers of aural language to fully convey the tragic experience, not the least because it was primarily provoked via aesthetic means. Thus, James tells us what one ought to say and Halliwell what one ought to feel/think, but to speak what we feel about *King Lear* is to speak as long as the tragedy causes wonder and admiration through the conjoined feelings of fear and pity. And this is cathartic and pleasurable.
Several critics have stressed the early modern tragedians’ preoccupation with a mode of language that returns human perception back to its primitive roots, articulating a theory for a tragic language in which “words are razors” (*Titus Andronicus*, 1.1.311) and thus capable of inflicting aesthetic pain. Turning to the language of the body *per se* brings into view how somatic cognition can often take precedence over, redefine and contradict aural discourse. On the early modern stage we witness bodies that reveal dissimulation; bodies that forebode; bodies whose semantic imports contradict the meaning of the words as well as the psychology and the will of the conscious mind; bodies that are devoid of spiritual souls and yet still perform; bodies whose cognitive imperatives and wills alter the positions of characters; bodies whose whims and judgments cannot be grasped by the rational mind. At once physical and arcane, the corporeal mode of cognition which is triggered by this style of performance implicates the discursive mind in an endless quest for knowledge as a means to discharge the cognitive and emotional enunciatory urges into the symbolic order of understanding. Thus, in their most “Cothurnal Sceans,” early modern tragedians coordinate the impulses of the sensate body with an Aristotelian understanding of the tragic effect of conjoined horror and fascination, sorrow and delight, to produce tragedies which give pleasure because they represent “aweful” events in a highly “aeffective” style. The view that early modern tragedy confronts the auditor with a spectacle that is primordial and beyond rational comprehension has significant consequences for our understanding of the theoretical and ideological undercurrents of the genre, as it renders elusive, even illusive, the attempt to bring the physical and the spiritual, the Dionysian and Apollonian, to a complete equilibrium by discharging the former into the latter. In this understanding of tragic dramaturgy, tragedies facilitate the establishment of ethical polity by inviting us to embark on a perennial enterprise of enquiry and learning. Thus, tragedy reasserts and so operates as a cure for one of its constitutive premises, because the moment that one believes to have deciphered and stands in absolute control over the meaning of strange and/or “aweful” events, it is the moment that the seeds of tragedy have been planted. This principle applies to the reading/viewing process, for the moment we believe we have fully explained and stabilized the emotional/cognitive undertones of the tragic event, it is the moment that we efface “high Cothurnal Sceans,” divesting tragedy of its main properties and ceasing the quest for learning and pleasure. And this is, in a sense, tragic.

**REAL-LIFE PERSONS, STAGED CHARACTERS, AND THE INTELLIGENT BODY**

This analysis of the ways in which early modern playwrights staged and represented the ontological phenomenon of the intelligent body may appear to construe a paradox regarding the ontology emerging from the very of act
of acting: the actor, who can be regarded as representing the very Cartesian idea of the body as a mere tool/machine to be used and performed, communicates to the reader/audience the opposite ontology of the performing and cognitive body. Thus, critics tend to produce commentaries that either hold the Cartesian and phenomenological outlooks in an uncomfortable unity or stand firmly against either one of the two. Gordon Braden, Erica Harth and Sheetal Lodhia, for instance, argue that theatre is connected to the Cartesian cogito, which insists upon a kind of detached theatricality (Braden 1985; Harth 1992; and Lodhia 2009, 135–61), whereas Leanore Lieblein argues for a phenomenological “body-subject” whose gestures and signs are expressive of interiority and capable of producing meanings (Lieblein 2009, 127). Anthony Dawson holds a middle ground, noting that passions “complicate the dualism that we have inherited from Descartes and that we might assume was in play in the Renaissance,” for “the rhetoric of the passions suggests a less rigid definition of the relation between matter and spirit.” He then goes on to assert that “Renaissance acting theory looks ahead to the split characterized by Descartes; the insistence on mastery over the body’s motions as a route to interiorized personhood becomes an agent of dualism.” In an attempt to find a common ground to accommodate both the Cartesian and the phenomenological outlooks, he proceeds to remark: “Conceiving of the actor’s body as a rhetorical instrument means investing it first with agency, linking it with will, and hence with subjectivity. It is expressive of character and interiority and, in the actor’s hands, it is instrumental” (Dawson 1996, 35, 36, 40). Early modern playwrights, however, complicate Dawson’s model, as their dramaturgical style is underpinned by a split between mind and body wherein the latter is invested with will and cognitive capabilities independent of the former. This conceptual framework allows for the emergence on the early modern stage of an exterior interiority (thinking body) and an interior interiority (mind). In order to gain a more accurate understanding of early modern theatre, we should thus read Dawson’s thesis in reverse: The body’s interiority is not necessarily linked to the conscious mind, nor is it a mere instrument in the actor’s hands. Instead, the body possesses its own interiority (subjectivity, will, cognition), while actors become the instruments of their own bodies and of the foreign bodies (i.e. the body of the character they impersonate) they embody. In inhabiting bodies other than their own as if they were their own, and thereby experiencing the foreign interiority of the body they wear, actors become emblematic of a real-life person’s experience of itself as a bisubjective being torn between an interior (mind) and exterior (body) interiority.

Actors have repeatedly stressed that an in-sight into the body of the character they are impersonating is vital to the performance of their roles. Playing the role of Richard III is, David Garrick (1717–1779) confessed to Hannah More in a letter: “a trial of breast, lungs, ribs, and what not” (quoted in Hankey 1988, 37). In his experience of performing the role of Richard, David Troughton described his character’s somatic disfiguration
and the techniques he developed to reconstruct Richard’s physiological outlook, and concluded: “In pain all his life? What an insight into a character. Here was one very simple explanation for Richard’s malevolence” (Troughton 1998, 74).\(^3\)\(^9\) Paul Jesson is also a studious interpreter of Henry VIII’s physical traits: Due to his height, Henry was “towering intimidatingly over everyone else,” while, to his surprise, Jesson also “discovered that his [Henry’s] voice was, in fact, high-pitched” (Jesson 1998, 118–9). Similarly, Maxine Doyle tells us that “the performer playing Macbeth was having real difficulties accessing the psychology of Macbeth before he kills Duncan […] But as soon as he discovered this room, with spikes all over the walls he was instantly able to find something that opened that up for him […] the space offers up more possibilities for the performer to interpret their role beyond the immediate and beyond the studio. It offers both physical and psychological dimensions” (quoted in Machon 2009, 68). Here, fused with the architectural sensuality of the space, the visceral experience of the body allows for such intangible elements as character psychologies to be made tangible. Accordingly, it is the actor that is the instrument of his or her sensate body and not vice-versa: actors use their bodies in order to be used by them. As Derek Jacobi has it, “[d]uring the course of rehearsal I want to find out what those words mean, how I’m feeling and saying them, what I’m doing” (Jacobi 1998, 194). What we see on the stage is not an actor who uses his/her body just like a mechanic is using a screwdriver, but the result of a long process of inhabiting a body that is at once familiar and foreign. This ideological framework draws actors and real-life persons to close ontological proximity, for a non-dramatic individual’s body, like an actor’s body, is, in Phineas Fletcher’s (1582–1650) words, “A forrain home, a strange, though native coast” (Fletcher 1633, 1.34).

NOTES

1. References to Shakespeare’s works are to Wells and Taylor’s edition.
2. For a succinct and critical discussion of the various theories promoted to solve this problem, see Eagleton 2003, 153–77.
3. For succinct overviews with a focus on the reception of the notion of catharsis on the continent during the period, see Nutall 2001, esp. 1–28; Reiss 1999, 229–47; Aldridge 1949, 76–87; and Wasserman 1947, 283–307. Concise accounts of the reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in the Renaissance are supplied by Rorty 1992; Herrick 1930; and Cooper 1924.
4. For a discussion of the problematic definition of “catharsis” in secondary literature, see Lear 1992, 315–40. It should be noted here that Anthony D. Nutall is at odds with Martha Nussbaum concerning whether Aristotle’s theory suggests that it is the passions that are purged and, therefore, rendered beneficial or, alternatively, if the body itself is purged, which denotes a discharge and eradication, rather than purification, of these passions. As Nutall put it, according to Nussbaum, “Aristotle is no longer speaking about ‘catharsis of emotions’ but about ‘catharsis through emotions’” (Nutall 2001, 12). These two views may
be said to stem from the problematic translation of catharsis as either cleansing or purging, for the former term indicates a purification process whereby emotions are cleansed whereas the latter is suggestive of a complete eradication of those emotions. As Alexander Nehamas writes, Aristotle’s definition of tragedy is “most often read as concerning either the elimination or, more plausibly, the purification of pity and fear” (Nehamas 1992, 293).

5. For contemporary definitions of tragedy as a goat-song and its relation to the Dionysian cult, see Virgil 1546, xviii-xviii; Puttenham 1970, 34; Heywood, 1612, D2v-r; Blount 1661, R5v; and Rymer 1678, 12-13.

6. See also Rich 1578, *iiiir; Cooper 1578, N4r; Hall 1598, 4; Marston 1598, B1v; Rowlands 1600, C5v: Re-issued in 1605 under a different title; Du Bartas 1603, 3; and Bacon 1619, 107–15.

7. (on the issue of the audience’s emotional response to early modern drama in connection to catharsis, see also Rist 2013).

8. It should be noted here that whereas Belsey argues that continuous interiority is not essential to early modern subjectivity, Tilmouth goes on to show that for Montaigne, “in contrast to Belsey, interiority proves both essential to and generative of some sense of self,” even as this self does not “make for a unified subjectivity” (Tilmouth 2013, 15). Tilmouth articulates here “a continuously changing interiority which, to Montaigne, is no mere linguistic mirage” (Tilmouth 2013, 14). Ultimately, Tilmouth’s thesis is that early modern inwardness is not to be seen as self-authorizing, but “an experience situated at the boundary between the person and those to whom he relates, within the dialogic domain of intersubjectivity” (Tilmouth 2013, 16). On this point see also Selleck 2008.

9. The pagination of the original text is erroneous: 116, 119, 118, and 117.

10. “What” in the original, but probably a mistake by the scribe.

11. Bulwer seems to be drawing attention here to the etymology of “paraphrastic” rather than to its conventional meaning, because if “paraphrase” is taken to mean “rewording of something written or spoken by someone else, esp. with the aim of making the sense clearer” (OED, 1a), then somatic expressions cannot introduce “contrariety.” Nevertheless, prefix “para-” can be used to signify both “relation” and “alteration”: “in compounds ancient Greek παρά has the same senses as the preposition, along with such cognate adverbial ones as ‘to one side, aside, amiss, faulty, irregular, disordered, improper, wrong’; it also expresses subsidiary relation, alteration, comparison” (OED). Unless a mistake by the scribe, Bulwer seems thus to be appealing to several senses of the prefix so as to signify gestures that accompany phrases and introduce contrariety may alter the phrases’ discursive meanings. According to the context, then, the line reads: the semiotics of the body “paraphrase” or invest words with new meanings by being antiphrastic to their semantic import.

12. References to Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy are to Bevington’s edition.

13. See, for instance, Cooper 1578, M6v; Covell 1595, K2v; Leroy 1594, 32v; Montaigne 1958, 27; and Shakespeare 2005, 3.4. 84–86 (Richard III).

14. On this point see also Kahn 1997, 56. Daniel Kane sees the vaginal symbolism of the pit as “so obvious as to be almost comical” (Kane 2001, 13). See also Wynne-Davies 1991, esp. 135–6.

15. See also Kahn 1997, 54, where she discusses the deliberate alignment of the hole with female genitalia: She suggests that Quintus’s reference to “the swallowing womb” and his description of the hole as “covered with rude-growing
briers / Upon whose leaves are drops of new-shed blood / As fresh as morning dew distilled on flowers” (2.3. 199–201) cast the hole specifically in terms of the rape of a virgin, through imagery that suggests violent deflowering.

16. Tina Mohler also calls attention to Quintus’s inexplicable sense of fear, arguing that “the appearance of an anxiety that cannot be explained through recourse to the plot authorizes us to seek its source outside the narrative logic of the play.” For Mohler, anxiety replaces desire in a dialectics where “it is anxiety itself that draws both brothers into the pit, acting as if it were a continuation of the desire evinced by the first set of brothers” (Mohler 2006, 34–35).

17. References to Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi are to Brown’s edition.

18. For a succinct discussion of the early modern playwrights’ use of staged pregnancy in order to transmit to audiences the sense of pain, see Pollard 2013.

19. See, for instance, King Richard II, 2.2.6–13; Romeo and Juliet, 3.5.54–56; Richard III, 2.3.42–43; and Thomas Middleton and William Rowley’s The Changeling, 5.2.38–41 (Middleton and Rowley 1998). See also Pannen 2010, which provides a wealth of examples where the body appears to be in possession of the ability to intuit the future study.

20. A translation of the farce is also provided by Jody Enders (Anon. 2011 b).

21. In similar lines of thought, Allison P. Hobgood’s “Feeling Fear in Macbeth” and Allison K. Deutermann’s “Hearing Iago’s Withheld Confession,” in Shakespearean Sensations (2013), explore the audiences’ sympathetic receptiveness to staged emotion, and the seductiveness of surrendering to overwhelming sensation. See also in the volume’s second section, Tanya Pollard’s and Hillary M. Nunn’s essays, which explore strategies through which early modern playwrights shaped the responses of audience members via the somatic.

22. As Donald R. Shupe complains, for instance, “despite the considerable virtuosity of Richard’s performance, the wooing scene has often been questioned on grounds of credibility” (Shupe 1978, 28). And as John Jowett explains in his edition of the play, due to Anne’s problematic “change of heart,” the “episode has been variously augmented” (Jowett 2000, 168 n.164.1–171).

23. For a comprehensive overview of the ways in which Richard’s deformity is explicitly referred to as a revelatory sign, see Torrey 2000, 123–53. Also, already by 1680, in a letter to Edward Tayler, Nahum Tate compiled a list of quotations from Shakespeare’s tetralogy to stress the deformity of Richard’s body (see Vickers 1995, 1:292–4).

24. Protean changeability and the tactical use of deceit are parts of Machiavel’s repertoire, and Richard’s possession of these skills reflects the broader influence of The Prince upon the English stage. It is in this context that, in “The Wooing of Lady Anne: A Psychological Inquiry,” Donald Shupe attempts to justify the psychological premises of the scene by appealing to what he calls, drawing on studies by psychologists, “High Mach” (Richard) and “Low Mach” (Lady Anne) personality types. The outcome of such an encounter, as Shupe has it, is that the “High Mach” Richard “enjoys an advantage from the start. Anne’s hatred of Richard and the untimely situation in which the wooing occurs create ambiguity, confusion, and, most importantly, an atmosphere of charged emotionality which not only favors Richard, the Machiavellian, but also makes possible Anne’s rapid shift from detestation to acceptance of his suit” (Shupe 1978, 35–36). For a discussion of Richard’s connection to stage Machiavels, see Mauss 1995, 35–54; and Strong 1982, 193–220.
25. Richard's focus on the body rather than on words as a means to read into the psychological disposition of the character has a prehistory. In Richard Duke of York, King Edward attempts to woo Lady Gray, who, like Lady Anne, demonstrates unyielding resistance. This Richard performs the office of an intrafictional audience, his comments operating as stage directions. While witnessing the encounter, Richard concludes that “The widow likes him not” (3.2.82). To reach this diagnosis, Richard reads Lady Gray’s body-language: “She knits her brows [...] Her looks doth argue here replete with modesty [...] The widow likes it not, for she looks very sad” (3.2.82, 84, 110). An audience within an audience, Richard calls attention to the physiology of the body and its signs as a source for information.

26. This idea was popularized during modernism by William James’s famous example of the bear (James 1884, 188–205).

27. For a discussion of physiognomy’s ability to acknowledge discrepancies between the implications of appearance and the reality of character and conduct, see Berland 1997, 193–218.

28. In his adaptation of the play in 1681, “The History of King Lear Reviv’d with Alterations,” Nahum Tate altered the opening scene so as to compensate for what he had perceived in Shakespeare’s original as “indifference” on Cordelia’s part: “’Twas my good Fortune to light on one Expedient to rectifie what was wanting in the Regularity and Probability of the Tale, which was to run through the whole A Love betwixt Edgar and Cordelia, that never chang’d word with each other in the Original. This renders Cordelia’s Indifference and her Father’s Passion in the first Scene probable” (Vickers 1995, 1:295. Italics original). Also, as Duncan Fraser pointed out in “Much Virtue in ‘Nothing’: Cordelia’s Part in the First Scene of King Lear”: “At this stage we cannot really accuse the two elder daughters of hypocrisy, any more than we can accuse Lear of being stupid because he does not take into account, or understand, the characters of Goneril and Regan: hard though it is to keep in mind, when we know the outcome of the play so well, it must be remembered that everybody — Lear, Regan, Goneril, and the rest of the court — expects Cordelia to fall in with the demands made upon her” (Fraser 1978, 4–5).

29. For more problematic scenes in which the notion of somatic dissonance is vital for their successful performance, see, for instance, in Richard III, Queen Elizabeth’s rapid change in position, 4.4. 150–363. In Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, in order to gain the people’s votes Coriolanus has to show them his war wounds. He intellectually knows that that he must show his body, but he is emotionally repulsed by this act, appearing before the people clothed in a gown.

30. For an overview of the different approaches to Cordelia’s “resurrection” and a discussion of it in a materialist-religious context, see Benson 2007, 436–53. For a book-length study that focuses on the corpse as an animated agent in various contexts, such as religion, natural philosophy and medicine, see Zimmerman 2005; and Cregan 2009.

31. In the Quarto version of the text, this line reads: “He knows not he sees” (emphasis added), scene 24 (5.3), 289. The Quarto text lays focus on the spectacle, thus emphasising the illusionistic effect Lear is undergoing, whereas the Folio points at the disjunction between aural discourse, the source of consciousness and reasoning, and knowledge. Despite their different inflections, the two renderings of this line denote the inter-changeability between seeing and saying,
visualising and knowing, underlining how sensual perception and understanding are, in this scene, conflated.

32. Similarly, in the climactic spectacle of violence in Cyril Tourneur’s (attributed) *The Revenger’s Tragedy*, the avenger props open the victim’s eyes so that he can see his crimes and the corruption surrounding him (Tourneur 2008, 3.5.145–51). For more instances in which bodies devoid of rational souls appear to be in possession of agency and cognition, see Thomas Middleton’s *The Second Maiden’s Tragedy* and Philip Massinger’s *The Duke of Milan*. For an account that discusses these plays in relation to the corpse’s paradoxical life, see Zimmerman 2005, 90–127. See also Rutter 2012, 102–27.

33. (for a book-length study on wonder in Shakespeare, see Cohen 2012)

34. For a discussion that connects the cognitive pleasure taken in the representation of painful or ugly objects with the pleasure taken in mimesis, see Halliwell 1992, 241–60.

35. In his edition of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, D.W. Lucas concludes that there is nowhere any hint that Aristotle has a conception of the power of literature to extend our comprehension of life (Lucas 1968, 72–73). Contrary to this position, Martha Nussbaum argues that Aristotle’s theory can be taken to cover a whole range of possibilities, from simple to much more complex responses to works of art (Nussbaum 1986, 288; and Nussbaum 1992, 261–90). See also Halliwell 1992, esp. 247–56.

36. In his discussion of the element of wonder in tragedy, for example, James Vincent Cunningham argues for this conventional view: wondrous events “astonish the spectator so that he stands for the moment stone-still, but at the same time they demand explanation, and with this explanation his emotion subsides and order prevails, as on the stage at the close of the play order prevails in the state” (Cunningham 1960, 224).

37. This incidence joins a number of other Shakespearean moments where actors break out and address the audience directly. See Escolme 2006.

38. David Hillman, for instance, argues that in writing *Troilus and Cressida* Shakespeare reclaimed writing as a visceral act: “Both within the play and in the cultural milieu that produced it, *Troilus and Cressida* enacts a restoration of words, and of the ideals created out of them, to their sources inside the body” (Hillman 1997a, 296). See also Hillman 1997b, 81–106; and Hillman 2007. Albert Tricomi has similarly observed that Shakespeare relinquishes metaphor’s natural prerogatives so as “to unite language and action in an endeavour to render the events of the tragedy more real and painful” (Tricomi 2004, 227). Tricomi provides a number of examples to corroborate his thesis, arguing that “the metaphoric impact of the tragedy can only be realized by forcing the metaphors to take on dramatic life” (229). Likewise, Claudia Corti finds that in Shakespeare’s *Coriolanus*, “the major transitions are played out in silence, and where emotions and passions reach such a degree of intensity that the play refuses to be contained within the boundaries of spoken language, transmitting its ‘moments’ instead through an iconic theatrical discourse made up of gestures, facial expressions, and body movements. It is the body, in this play, that bears a continuous meaning onstage” (Corti 2010, 57).

39. For an overview of actors who have stressed the importance of Richard’s bodily form as a window to understanding how to perform the role, see Plasse 1995, 23 n.2.
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The Intellig·ent Body on the Stage


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Pre-fallen Adam enjoyed extraordinary intelligence and understanding. As opposed to Cusanus’s Idiota who arbitrarily names creations new to his sight, Adam, notes the poet in the *Tetrachordon*, “had the wisdom giv’n him to know all creatures, and to name them according to their properties, no doubt but had the gift to discern perfectly [...] and apprehend at first sight” (Milton 1959, 692). And as we read in the *De Doctrina*, “indeed without very great wisdom [Adam] could not have given names to the animate beings so instantaneously” (Milton 2012, 309). Thus, the epic’s Adam gave names to animals intuitively: “I nam’d them, as they pass’d, and understood / Thir Nature, with such knowledg God endu’d / My sudden apprehension” (Milton 2007, 8.352-4). Eve’s knowledge and thought, however, were confused, not the least because of Satan’s ingress into her imagination through her “vital Spirits” (8.465–77). In turn, Adam’s understanding and judgment were clouded by his passionate love for Eve. This understanding of the Fall resulted in the dichotomy between the pre- and post-lapsarian human conditions, encouraging the rejection of emotions and sensory experiences as signs and tainted artefacts of the Fall. But as William Poole and Katharine Fletcher have argued, these “catastrophizing tendencies [...] common in orthodox seventeenth-century commentaries offer a woefully limited view of human moral and epistemological capability after the fall” (Fletcher 2013, 114). According to Poole, Milton’s narrative does not hold the two states to be dichotomous: “the mind is degraded, but not utterly so” (Poole 2005, 145). Fletcher adds here that “by avoiding strict dichotomy, Milton presents a holistic notion of human capability, an extension of *felix culpa*, which encompasses the very ‘flaws’ which make man fallen” (Fletcher 2013, 114). Fletcher, moreover, cites various critics who have stressed the benevolent nature of emotions and sensory experience even in pre-fallen anthropology, including Christopher Tilmouth’s observation that “the passions guide Adam and Eve to God and their intuitive worship of him through wonder, love and sensuous revelry” (Fletcher 2013, 115; and Tilmouth 2007, 190–2), and Lee A. Jacobus’s description of an epistemology which “‘credits sensory experience in Heaven, Hell and on Earth,’ showing that while for Milton, sensory perception is not sufficient in itself, it is not a detestable or unreliable guide for knowledge”
Milton’s Prophetic Mission

Fletcher then proceeds to demonstrate that although Milton does not “deny the deceptive potential of sensory perception,” his exploration nevertheless “allows that its inherent unreliability is can itself lead to true inner vision” (Fletcher 2013, 127–8). This chapter hopes to complement these studies by showing how by appealing to sensory cognition, Milton encourages us to listen in his poetry to a type of music that echoes the music of the angelic choir. Milton’s song, I argue, has therefore the ability to drive us closer to the divine, as it has the power to suspend the effect of fallen dualism: tainted understanding.

For Milton, fallen anthropology is marked by discord and dualism, which will collapse into perfect monism after our physical passing on the day of Atonement. In this ideal state, human understanding is enhanced. Reason, Raphael tells us in Paradise Lost, is either “Discursive, or Intuitive” (Milton 2007, 5.488). The former type of reasoning belongs to humans whereas the latter is an angelic property, for “discourse,” according to the angel, “Is oftest yours [i.e. humans], the latter most is ours [i.e. angels] / Differing but in degree, of kind the same” (5.488–90). In its glorified existence in heaven, human discursive cognition will rise to the status of angelic, intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition is to be conceived of as akin to God’s perfect intuitive cognition, whose knowledge of past, present and future contingents is not the product of intellectual exercise and effort, but of unmediated understanding (Hunter 1978–1980, 3:74–76). Nevertheless, as Roy Flannagan notes in the Riverside edition of Paradise Lost, in using “often” and “most” in the passage quoted earlier, Milton “allows both angel and humankind at least occasional discursive and intuitive thinking: Angels are sometimes discursive, humans sometimes intuitive” (Flannagan 1998, 491n.149). Intuitive reasoning, the union of the intellectual and sentient faculties, is possible, however fleetingly and imperfectly, to humans in this life. It is no surprise then that Michael advises Adam that if the knowledge they acquired in paradise is matched by corresponding deeds of charity, “then wilt thou not be loath / To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess / A paradise within thee, happier farr” (12.585–7). According to Michael, dualism is a temporary severance that can be healed in the fallen world and even lead to a higher state of happiness than the one the first-created enjoyed in paradise. The best that we can do in our fallen state, then, is to transform the discord of sin into a pure and sinless form of dualism, a dualism wherein the divided parts are stitched together in a harmonious relationship which mirrors, however faintly and imperfectly, the perfect and complete form of monism that will take place after redemption in heaven.

It is in the light of Milton’s dualism and desire for the harmonious reconciliation of mind and body that we should examine his poetry, mature as well as early. His view of the diapason as a faint echo of the music of the spheres and his attempts to combine music and poetry are well known. As Erin Minear has noted, “Milton associates nonverbal music with the dissolution of boundaries, the melting of distinct things into one another. In his
poetry, this kind of music enables a collapse of temporality [...] he finds a melting of distinctions deeply desirable in some cases — particularly when the distinction involved is the gap separating earth and heaven, or the temporal divide between Paradise and the fallen world” (Minear 2011, 165–6). But we need still need to explore the ways in which the poet put theory into praxis, particularly in a poem where Urania, the heavenly muse that represents the celestial music of the spheres, is summoned to sing through him (i.e.1.1–26). The ability of poetry’s music to heal fallen dualism, to transform discord into harmony, is fundamental to Milton’s poetics because it is not a theory that affects the meaning of his poetry only on the surface, but it is embedded in his language, encouraging his reader to experience a form of thinking wherein the division of intuition and intellection, body and mind, are fused into the undifferentiated unity of intuitive reasoning. Music alone cannot have this effect on its listener because it does not trigger our discursive, rational modes of cognition. And poetry alone lacks the strong aesthetic import of music. As Milton writes in Paradise Lost: “Eloquence the Soul, Song charms the Sense” (2.556). When combined, music and poetry can thrust us into a cognitive state through which we come understand ideas that lie beyond the limits of discursive reasoning. As Milton has it in “Ad Patrem,” by “wedding our sweet songs to the smooth-voiced strings [...] , the stars and the vaults of both the hemispheres will make their music in reply. My fiery spirit which whirls round the hurtling spheres is already singing, as it flies among the starry choirs, a deathless melody, an indescribable song” (Milton 1997, 159. Emphasis added). It is only by understanding how Milton targets aesthetic perception through a musical language whose primary conduit of reception is the sensate body, and how this intuitive, aesthetic response penetrates and is assimilated with the discursive meaning of the same language, that we can start to draw a more accurate portrait of the complexity and significance of Milton’s poetry. Since his early years, Milton was driven by the desire to unite rational cognition and the passionate, organic aspects of human nature. The twin poems “L’ Allegro” and “Il Penseroso,” probably written as early as in 1631, constitute an early instance of this desire. As its title indicates, “L’ Allegro” is filled with the energy of youthful passion and images in which the body and its parts figure prominently. The poet bids Melancholy away and invites Euphrosyne, one of the three Graces and Goddess of Joy and Mirth. He likes the “busy hum” and vivacity of populated cities (117–8), where he can enjoy a “mask, and antique pageantry” (128), and see a play by Jonson or “sweetest Shakespeare fancy’s child” (132-3). The poem eulogizes the sensual, organic pleasures, what the narrator in “Il Penseroso” calls “vain deluding Joys” (1). The narrator of “Il Penseroso” exorcizes the joys that his counterpart seeks and welcomes Melancholy instead, whom he associates with wisdom and rational thinking (11–12). His favorite time is during the night, when he can reflect on philosophy (85–92). In his pastime, he prefers grave tragedies over masques and comedies (97–100). On the face
of it, “L’ Allegro” and “Il Penseroso” figure as opposites, the one representing the organic, sentient sphere and the other standing for rational thinking and pensive contemplation. This contradistinction between the two poems is reinforced by the gendered preposition “La” in the case of “L’ Allegro,” which is feminine and hence associated with the sensual, passionate aspect of human nature, and the “Il” of “Il Penseroso,” which is male and associated with the intellect and rational thought.

As we read further into the poems, however, this seemingly antagonistic texture gives way to union, both semantically and aesthetically. The narrator in “L’ Allegro” starts her poem at dawn, praising the song of the lark and the “din” of the rooster as harbingers of daylight. Having enjoyed the pastoral pleasures during the day, her evening strolls in the city, and a comedy at night, she retires. The narrator of “Il Penseroso” begins where “L’ Allegro” has left us, praising the nightingale for its music, which he associates with Melancholy and nightfall. As soon as daylight begins to break, he withdraws to hide “from day’s garish eye” (141). As they compose a twenty-four-hour experience, the two poems merge to complete the cycle of a single day. This underlying sense of chronological unity is integral to the poems’ architectonics and content. Both of the narrators take pleasure in music: the song of the lark is evoked by “L’ Allegro” and the music of the nightingale by “Il Penseroso,” while Orpheus figures prominently in both of the poems, which close by eulogising music.

A significant oddity in “L’ Allegro” is the invocation of “Lydian airs” and “immortal verse” in a poem that is supposed to ban Melancholy and avoid anything pensive or grave: “And ever, against eating cares, / Lap me in soft Lydian airs,/ Married to immortal verse” (135–7). The Lydian mode was associated during the period with everything that the narrator seems to have banished. Nicolas Poussin (1594–1665), who copied almost verbatim the concept of musical modes from Venetian musicologist Gioseffe Zarlino (1517–1590), writes that “the Lydian Mode lends itself to tragic subjects because it has neither the simplicity of the Dorian nor the severity of the Phrygian” (quoted in Plett 2004, 323). Plato’s accusation of the Lydian mode as poisoning the Greeks with drunkenness, effeminacy and inactivity is intimately related to his condemnation of tragic drama as a genre that makes the citizens of his ideal republic sentimental and weak. As Lodowick Bryskett tells us, “this wanton and lascivious kind of musike, which is now a dayes most pleasing, and resembleth the Lydian of old time, which Plato so abhorred, as he would not in any sort admit it into his Common-weale, lest it should infect the mind of men and women both” (Bryskett 1606, 147). John Playford (1623–c.1686), in his A breefe introduction to the skill of musick, writes that “the Lydian Mood was used to grave, full, solemn Musick, the Descant or Composition being of slow time fitted to sacred Hymnes” (Playford 1654, 18). And according to Alexander Ross (1591–1654), there are “three sorts of musick, to wit, the Lydian, the Doric, and the Phrygian; the first was mournfull, and for funeralls; the second masculine, and for warres;
the third effeminate, and for marriages” (Ross 1647, 19). Thus, Dorothy Koenigsberger found that “the Lydian mode was grave” (Koenigsberger 1979, 203). At the same time, however, the Lydian mode was also often thought to be soft and merry. “The Lydian,” Claude Victor Palisca has found, “described as gentle, convivial, and relaxed by Plato, was considered jovial and pleasant by Gaffurius, although he also mentioned its use in dirges and lamentations in earlier times” (Palisca 2013, 106). Despite this dual association of the Lydian, the former type (jovial and pleasant) appears to have dominated our readings of the poem (see Carey’s note in Milton 1997, 143). It is no surprise, then, that Erin Minear argues that although in Milton’s “L’ Allegro” the “Lydian Airs are ‘married to immortal verse,’” the speaker’s “description focuses on the traditionally subservient partner in this marriage.” It is thus “difficult,” she continues to note, “to imagine phrases like ‘wanton heed,’ ‘melting voice,’ and ‘giddy cunning’ being applied to the movements of immortal verse” (Minear 2011, 178). But Lydian Airs and immortal verse need not be mutually exclusive, for the Lydian was thought to be appropriate for grave subjects too, such as tragedies and sacred hymns. The invocation of “Lydian airs” in “L’ Allegro” evokes thus a sense of incompleteness in the narrator, as she desires what the narrator in “Il Penseroso” represents: the intellectual pleasures of the tragic, pensive, rational form of cognition and contemplation.

Without “Il Penseroso,” “L’ Allegro” is incomplete. But so is “Il Penseroso” without “L’ Allegro.” “Il Penseroso” opens the poem by banishing the organs of fancy as offering only “deluding joys” (1), which render the mind “idle” (5), and casts the son of Hypnos out, the God of dreams that works on Fancy (6–10). The poem ends, however, with an invitation to Hypnos: “Entice the dewy-feathered Sleep; / And let some strange mysterious dream / Wave at his wings in airy stream / Of lively portraiture displayed, / Softly on my eyelids laid” (146–50). The organs of fancy provide the narrator with the means to unite heaven and earth, thrusting him in an ecstatic state where what lies “below” communicates with what lies “high”: “There let the pealing organ blow, / To the full-voiced choir below, / In service high, and anthems clear, / As may with sweetness, through mine ear, / Dissolve me into ecstasies, / And bring all heaven before mine eyes” (161–6). Milton puns on “organ” here to evoke the sensual aspect of human nature, an association that is reinforced by the stress on sensory perception: “through mine ear [...] before mine eyes.” What “Il Penseroso” needs to be exalted into the beatific vision he seeks is what he is supposed to resent: the organic sphere of the human composite.

The idea of uniting the sentient with the intellectual in order to undergo the sublime experience of the beatific vision is also inherent, as we have seen, in “L’ Allegro,” where he envisions the marriage between “Lydian Airs” and “immortal verse.” This drive for union is reinforced by the fact that the Lydian mode was associated with the diatonic octave species from F up to F an octave above, divided at C to produce two segments: F–G–A–B–C and
C–D–E–F. As Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638) has it in his Templeum musicum, “the Lydian Mood doth take his course between F. And f. is divided in c. And endeth in f” (Alsted 1664, 79). The octave has an important melodic function in Milton’s thought and poetry. He singled out the octave or diapason as the perfect concord because it forms a faint echo of the “harmony which exists between Heaven and Earth” (Spaeth 1963, 63). The miracle of the octave is that it dissect wholeness into two audibly distinguishable parts, yet remains recognizable as the same musical note. When “do” high, for instance, is combined with “do” low the two notes create a perfect octave which produces a perfect concord and is recognisable as a single note. What Milton seeks to achieve in the companion poems is this union between “L’ Allegro” (body, female) and “Il Penseroso” (mind, male), the collapse of dualism into undifferentiated monism.

Milton’s attempt to unite opposites extends beyond the mere play of meaning, as he attempted to unite the two poems through the musicality of his language in order to produce an octave that would bring mind and body, intellect and corporeality, together in a harmonious relationship. The respective openings of the poems set their tone. In “L’ Allegro” we read:

Hence loathed Melancholy,
Of Cérberus, and blackest Midnight born,
In Stygian cave forlorn
‘Mongst horrid shapes, and shrieks, and sights unholy (1–4).

“Allegro” signals that our reading tempo should be fast and lively. The language of the poem, however, resists such a pace. The poem opens with a trochaic tetrameter (or trimeter). “Hence” ends with the sound “ns,” which can hardly offer a smooth and speedy transition to the sound “l” of the next word. This momentary halt just before articulating the sound “l” prompts the reader to land a rather heavy accent on the first syllable of “loathed,” stressing the content word so as to reflect the strong emotion with which it is invested. The elongated sound “o” in “loathed” fades away slowly as we carry on to the sound “thd,” which is held to a momentary halt as we try to connect it to the “M” sound of the following word, repeating the pattern of the previous conjunction. This pause may encourage the reader to stress the “Me” of “Melancholy,” which bursts out of our lips almost instinctively. The unstressed syllable “Ian” that follows slows our reading pace down as it requires a momentary stop before articulating “choly.” Operating as a pun on “holy,” this final duet of syllables catches the reader by surprise, as we are encouraged to stress a word whose semantic import contradicts the meaning that the line is supposed to convey. The connection of melancholy with holiness is made particularly pronounced in “Il Penseroso,” a poem whose religious overtones render melancholy holy indeed. Another reading of “choly” in “L’ Allegro is,” of course, to be found in the Greek etymological roots of “melancholy”: µέλανος (melanos, black) χολή (choly, bile). The reader is
thus caught at a provocative poetic conjunction where “holy” and “choly” (bile) are fused in “Melan-choly,” at once wishing and withholding its banishment. Even if we choose to stress “la” in “Melancholy” and read the line as a trochaic trimeter, the reading is made even more hypotonic, slower and pensive, almost a lamentation. Moreover, if the stress on “la” may be said to conceal the semantic import of “holy” in “choly,” the fourth line’s “unholy,” which rimes with “Melan-choly,” ensures that the connection is made. The silent preposition “Of” of the next line lets the accent fall on the “Ce” of “Cerberus,” while this word’s unstressed vowels extend the chronological span of our reading. At the same time, Milton invests the phrase that follows (“blackest midnight born”) with a staccato quality, the consonants with which each of these words begins and ends forcing the reader to adopt a performance in which the flow of articulation is abruptly disconnected. This staccato rhythm carries its force onto the fourth line, where the poet’s two “and” require a measured pace that echoes the effect of the second line. Milton appears to be holding the reins of our reading pace in a poem that is supposed to be jolly and injected with energy. The discursive meaning of the words is supposed to ostracize melancholy, but the pensive reading tempo and the pun on melancholy welcome melancholy. Discursively, the narrator of “L’ Allegro” banishes melancholy. Aesthetically, she welcomes her.

The opening of “Il Penseroso,” on the other hand, instead of promoting a slow, pensive reading as the title of the poem suggests, pushes the reader into a lively and fast-singing cadence:

Hence vain deluding Jóys,
The broód of Fólly without fáther bréd,
How little you bestéad,
Or fill the fixed mínd with áll your tóys (1-4).

Even visually, the opening of this poem is to be contrasted to the multisyllabic words of “L’ Allegoro.” The closing consonant “n” in “vain” is effortlessly assimilated with the sound “d” in “deluding.” Similarly, the sound “g” in “deluding” is seamlessly transferred to “joys,” unravelling a string of words whose endings and beginnings operate as connecting nexuses between them, thereby promoting a lively reading tempo. This assimilation process is carried onto the second line, where the offbeat “of” is combined with “folly.” The unstressed “without” helps speed the reading pace up, while the line is constructed of monosyllabic and disyllabic words, encouraging an energetic reading pace. The third line is similarly composed of short words, and so is the fourth line, whose assonance creates a playful internal rhyming pattern (fill-fixed and all-toys). The opening of “Il Penseroso,” as in the case of “L’ Allegro,” promotes a reading pace whose emotional impulses contradict the discursive meaning of the words. We are reading “L’ Allegro” in “Il Penseroso” and vice versa, creating an uncanny feeling where, like the octave, two opposing elements fuse into undifferentiated unity.
In Spenser’s mathematical stanza, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the idea of the octave is analogous to an anamorphic image, where two entities share the same space and elements, yet both exist in their own right. Anamorphosis and music coordinate in Spenser’s mathematical stanza to articulate an ontological outlook where the material body seems “partly circulare, / And part triangulare”; partly an earthly thing but “no earthly thing is sure” (see Chapter 3).

In a similar way, we may picture Milton’s twin poems as formulating an anamorphic image. We may think of “L’ Allegro” now as “Il Penseroso” and now as “L’ Allegro,” but during the act of reading we feel/think “L’ Allegro” in “Il Penseroso” and vice versa. This writing style disarms the reader both cognitively and emotionally, as we attempt to make sense of a poetics in which our intellectual awareness is conflated with a conflicting aesthetic response, triggering a sense of cognitive and emotional excitement and exaltation as we attempt to apply a rational continuum of signification and give verbal expression to a cognitive experience that is impossible to grasp via the conceptual apparatus of the intellect. This style of writing follows the impulses of the **signifying rift**. For Donne, as we have seen, the ideal state of being is made possible through the transference of rational thinking to the sentient body in order for the intellect to grasp what only sense can make and comprehend, as in the case of a mere spark burning for a whole day. Similarly, Milton thrusts the reader into a mode of thinking whereby intuition and intellection are con-fused, but whereas in Donne the signifying rift is the result of a clash between two opposing images, in Milton’s poetry intuitive reasoning is enabled through a musical language whose emotional import contradicts the semantic import of the words that have produced that musicality and aesthetic response. Whereas Donne directs the reader’s cognitive and emotional enunciatory urges at the comprehension of a specific object (image), which is the product of a conflict, our intellectual and aesthetic responses to Milton’s poetics trigger an intuitive form of reasoning whereby one state of being (i.e. mirth) is injected into the other (i.e. melancholy) and vice versa. At the same time, this state of being is predicated on a process in which the one mode of thinking (rational, discursive) is injected into other (somatic, intuitive). In this light, Milton’s use of the word “extasies” in the context of “organs” and the religious exaltation of the beatific vision assumes its full signification: As mind and body dislocate to merge, we undergo an elated cognitive experience. Through the ecstasy that this psycho-physical type of cognition triggers, we come to encounter, in Raphael’s words, “what surmounts the reach / Of human sense” (5.571–2).

The two poems may appear to be antagonistic on the surface, but they move towards unity both thematically and aesthetically. Nevertheless, it is in *Paradise Lost* that Milton found, as Marvell so famously noted, the theme that corresponds to his grand style: “Thy Verse created like thy Theme sublime” (Marvell 2007, 53). The theme of the twin poems is not as intellectually challenging as the justification of “the wayes of God to men” (1.26), nor is the aesthetic reaction that they trigger as powerful as the emotional
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sway that the tragedy of the first created (and Lucifer) can elicit. In *Paradise Lost*, Milton found the subject that matches his sublime poetics, a subject that revolves around the encounter of heaven and hell and the place of humans in it. In order to appreciate more fully the complexity of Milton’s poetry, it is, therefore, instructive to turn to his more mature and ambitious epic poem.

As Urania is the heavenly muse who produces the octave and operates as the link between heaven and earth until the second coming — “till one greater Man / Restore us, and regain the blissful Seat, / Sing Heav’nly Muse” (1.4–6) — Milton composes pieces of verse in her praise whose architectonics produces a musical poetry analogous to the harmonious vision she represents:

Hail holy Light, offspring of Heav’n first-born,
Or of th’Eternal Coeternal beam
May I express thee unblam’d? since God is Light
And never but in unapproached Light
Dwelt from Eternity, dwelt then in thee,
Bright effluence of bright essence increate (3.1–6).

As Diane Kelsey McColley has noted here, “if one emphasizes the pronouns in the third line and speeds up ‘express,’ and if one reads ‘effluence’ flowing as two syllables, these lines are syllabically regular […] Like unbroken polyphony the passage participates in eternity; like *musica espressiva* it joins heaven and earth through the disciplined yet deeply engaged and virtuosic voice of the human ‘I’” (McColley 1997, 176, 177). What is compelling to observe, however, is that Milton composes musical verses for Satan that are even more melodious and enchanting than the ones he sings for Urania. At the end of Satan’s first grand speech, the poet sings:

So Spáke th’Apostáte Ángel, thóugh in páin,
Váunting álóud, but ráckt with deép despáre (1.125–6).

The stressed vowels of the first phrase’s content words are rhythmically assonant, while the stress on “Apostate” echoes the alliteration of, and rhymes with, “So Spake.” The pairing of “though” with the offbeat “so” links the two phrases separated by comma and fine-tunes the melody of the line. “Pain” retains the assonance of the content words and playfully repeats the sound of its preposition “in.” The offbeat syllable in “vaunting” brings the two lines together as it echoes the fading sound of “in pain.” The musicality of this line flirts with the sound “d” to create a sense of continuous consonance, which closes with the alliteration of “deep despair.” The stress on the second syllable of “despair” does not only consummate the lines’ musicality by repeating the previous line’s assonance, but it also encapsulates the whole sense with which the reader is left by the end of this
song: There is air (music, harmony, hope) in Satan’s despair. Moreover, “pain” rhymes with the previous line’s “Heav’n,” constituting the first rhyming couplet of the epic:

and in th’ excess of joy
Sole reigning holds the Tyranny of Heav’n.
So spake th’ Apostate Angel, though in pain,
Vaunting aloud, but rackt with deep despare (1.123–6).

Milton’s melodious language brings “heaven” and “pain” together, inviting the reader to become a compeer in the joys that this type of despair entails. Although Urania is not invoked by her name here, or by any discursive allusion to her as in “Hail holy light […],” the meaning of what she represents (harmony, music, the octave) is nevertheless present. The poet’s seemingly redundant “The meaning, not the Name I call” (7.5) becomes a reading advice which assumes a rather unsettling significance: Even when the semantic import of discourse does not signal Urania’s presence, Milton may invest the architectonics of the language that has constructed that semantic absence with a musicality whose aesthetic import makes her presence felt. The passage under discussion is by no means an isolated case. As Neil Forsyth has observed, Milton “deliberately gives his best poetry to Satan, on whose side the language of classical epic turns out in strength” (Forsyth 2003, 9–10). When we confront such instances, our aesthetic response to Milton’s music is in conflict with the semantic import of the same language that has triggered that aesthetic response, creating a type of discordia concors whereby emotional euphoria meets intellectual aversion. The result of this encounter is the emergence of a cognitive phenomenon that, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, follows the impulses of Donne’s signifying rift. But this is not an image, as in the case of Donne, where contraries meet to fuse the physical and the spiritual. What is tantalizing to observe is that Milton is encouraging us to experience the union of evil and good, of heaven and hell. In this way, Milton is encouraging us to create good out of evil, to combine the low (hell) and the high (heaven) into a perfect concord (octave) that has the ability to thrust our perception into an intuitive type of reasoning whereby intellection and intuition, mind and body, combine to produce an exciting, exalting cognitive phenomenon whose product cannot be conceptually arrested and articulated. Thus, we come to listen to a type of music that echoes the music of the angelic choir. Indeed, as Erin Minear has noted in her discussion of the angels’ song in 3:365–75, “Milton makes no attempt to describe the form or sound of the angelic song. We are simply told: ‘they sang,’ and we are told, at length, what they sang” (Minear 2011, 241). But this is precisely the point, for it is impossible to describe verbally the sound and aesthetic content of the angels’ songs. To recall the poet’s words in “Ad Patrem,” the “starry choirs” produce “a deathless melody, an indescribable song,” the kind of which we can also produce by “wedding our sweet songs
to the smooth-voiced strings” (Milton 1997, 159). Accordingly, Milton claims that he is able to transmit this indescribable aesthetic content through his own combination of music and poetry as his “fiery spirit which whirls round the hurtling spheres is already singing” (Milton 1997, 159). For fallen humanity, this exalting cognitive experience can occur through the attempt to make sense of the coincidence of opposites, that is, by surpassing the contradiction and dualism that characterizes the fallen world.

For Milton, intuitive reasoning, the mode of thinking that elevates the human discursive mode of cognition to angelic understanding, is intimately related to sublime experience:

Hee ended, or I heard no more, for now  
My earthly by his Heav’nly overpowerd,  
Which it had long stood under, streind to the highth  
In that celestial Colloquie sublime,  
As with an object that excels the sense,  
Dazl’d and spent, sunk down (8. 452–7. See also, 5.483–8; 10.1013–5)

For Horace, a poet’s ultimate goal is “to achieve the sublime” (Horace 1965, 79). Lucretius associated the sublime with divinity (Sedley 1998, 13). Ovid admired Lucretius’ *On the Nature of Things*, prophesying that “Sublime Lucretius and his poem will expire / one day when there’s an end to how things are” (Ovid 2003, 1.15.23–24). Monica Gale has demonstrated that Virgil was influenced by the Lucretian sublime (Gale 2000), while Seneca read “with great pleasure” the description of the discovery of vast reservoirs of subterranean water which greeted the visitors “not without a thrill of awe/horror” (Seneca 2010, 5.15.1–2). It is in this context that Marvell situated Milton when he registered his reaction to “Thy verse created like thy theme sublime” with a translation of the Lucretian *horror ac voluptas*: “At once delight and horror on us seize” (Hardie 2002, 20). Milton himself alludes to Lucretius’ account of Phaethon as he tests his own capacity for sublime flight (Quint 2004, 847–81). In this light, it is no surprise to read in Sedley’s analysis of the sublime that “Milton has long been celebrated as the supreme instance of the English Sublime. In the same year that Boileau’s translation of Longinus appeared (1674), Andrew Marvell introduced a ‘sublime’ *Paradise Lost* to readers of its second edition” (Sedley 2005, 82; see also Moore 1990). In the musical pieces he composes for Satan, Milton is exploiting the emotional response that the tragic event of Lucifer’s fall from glory can trigger in order to create a composite aesthetic experience where the sense of wonder inherent in tragic joy is reinforced by a musical language which joins heaven and hell, joy and pain. As in “L’ Allegro” and “Il Penseroso,” the reader is caught in an emotional and cognitive process where we are made to synthesize antitheses, but in *Paradise Lost* we are not caught by surprise because we are reading “L’ Allegro” in “Il Penseroso,” mirth in melancholy (and vice versa), but because we are reading heaven in hell.
The dualism of the fall, the des-pair (i.e. disunion) of fallen ontology, is re-paired through a poetics that transforms discursive thinking into intuitive reasoning, a form of cognition that takes place by uniting the intellect and sense perception in order to make sense/sense of Milton’s poetic conjunctions. The inability to ever fully comprehend our emotional and cognitive experience produces an inexpressible, sublime type of joy that reflects the unfallen angel’s delight when they hear God’s words: “Thus while God spake, ambrosial fragrance fill’d / All Heav’n, and in the blessed Spirits elect/ Sense of new joy ineffable diffus’d” (3. 135–7). Such a cognitive experience has the power to elevate thought and suspend even hell:

Thir Song was partial, but the harmony  
(What could it less when Spirits immortal sing?)  
Suspended Hell, and took with ravishment  
The thronging audience. In discourse more sweet  
(For Eloquence the Soul, Song charms the Sense,)  
Others apart sat on a Hill retir’d,  
In thoughts more elevate, and reason’d high  
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will and Fate,  
Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledg absolute,  
And found no end, in wandring mazes lost (1.552–61).

It is perhaps this passage that T. S. Eliot had in mind when he confessed: “I cannot feel that my appreciation of Milton leads anywhere outside the mazes of sound” (Eliot 1975, 263). The song of the fallen angels is composed of a discourse that brings “eloquence” (intellect, rational soul) and “sense” (sentient faculties, body) to a harmonious unity, one that has the power to suspend hell and elevate understanding. If the partial song of the angels can produce a harmony that suspends hell, Milton’s song, which combines heaven and hell through the merging of “eloquence” and “sense,” has the power to suspend the effects of fallen humanity: dualism and tainted understanding. As he composes a poetics which “good of evil shall produce, / And evil turn to good,” Milton brings “forth Light out of darkness!” (12. 470–3). He injects air (music, harmony, hope, light, life) into discord and des-pair (fall, dualism, darkness, death). From the very beginning of his epic, Milton had signaled that he was going to act as the reader’s redeemer. By inviting Urania to inspire him until the Atonement, Milton assumes the office of the mediator between heaven and earth, between Urania and humans.

When God explains why he will condemn Satan and the fallen angels but show mercy to Man, he pronounces:

The first sort by thir own suggestion fell,  
Self-tempted, self-deprav’d: Man falls deceiv’d  
By the other first: Man therefore shall find grace,  
The other none: in Mercy and Justice both,  
Through Heav’n and Earth, so shall my glorie excel,  
But Mercy first and last shall brightest shine (3.129–34).
Logical problems abound here, notably the question of how those angels who were corrupted by Satan could be said to be “self-deprav’d.” Forsyth discusses various orthodox rationalizations of the problem, but his own reading stresses another aspect of the passage, the extent to which Satan acts as an enabling agent for the forgiveness of the human race: “Like his great opponent in the poem, the Son, he is, in an important sense, sacrificed for the good of mankind” (Forsyth 2003, 17). Such a line of argument would open the way for a splendidly blasphemous interpretation of the poem in which Satan is a Christ-like, albeit unwitting, redeemer in a universe where discord and division are ultimately creative forces. Forsyth refuses to commit to this possibility fully, arguing that the poem flirts with but finally draws back from such a radical worldview. Indeed, to argue that Satan is Christ-like is far-fetched. Yet, this should not deter us from pursuing the idea that discord and division can be creative forces. At any rate, Satan is, at best, as much a hero as the Judas of the canonical gospels, who contributed towards Christ’s glorification through his betrayal. And if the analogy between the Son and Satan is blasphemous and/or far-fetched, the idea that Milton assumed the role of the redeemer is not. After all, he opens the poem by asking Urania to sing through him until Christ’s second coming.

The subject of Milton’s prophetic persona has been widely addressed by Miltonists. Some of the most influential critics tend to view Milton as a primarily didactic poet/prophet inclined to inflict punishment: “We are not warned,” Stanley Fish insists, “but accused, taunted by an imperious voice, one which all but sneers in passing judgment: ‘you have made a mistake, just as I knew you would’” (Fish 1967, 9). The poem’s music is also often seen as demonic and dangerous, and the poet, along with the reader, strives to work against it (Minear 2011, esp. 231–8). But Milton is not the evil, vengeful teacher that sneaks into our imaginations in order to scold us for being tainted by sin and/or for falling into the trap of his demonic scheme. Nor is he working against the designs of his own demonic melodies. Such portraits do not do justice to Milton’s dazzlingly ambitious sense of prophetic mission. Above all, Milton is a poet who wishes to take us with him on a heavenly flight. He encourages us through his musical poetry to join him in his “adventrous Song, / That with no middle flight intends to soar / Above th’ Aonian Mount, while it pursues / Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhime” (1.13–16). This sublime flight and arguably hubristic sense of prophetic mission is intended to recreate harmony and a life without sin, however fleeting this experience may be. He aspires to “justifie the wayes of God to men,” thereby claiming to have gained access to the ways in which God thinks and acts. The twin poems “L’ Allegro” and “Il Penseroso” constitute an explicit instance of Milton’s early attempts to “attain,” as “Il Penseroso” has it, “To something like a Prophetic strain” (173–4). In calling for Urania to sing through him and claiming to justify the ways of God to men, Milton appears to have assumed this role in Paradise Lost. Milton is not, in Blake’s words, “of the Devils party without knowing it” (Blake 1975, 17),
but acutely aware of his designs and their implications: he sings melodiously for Satan in order to make intuitive reasoning possible, for unless we are able to synthesize antitheses, to produce concord out of discord and good out of evil, our “immortal mind,” in the words of “Il Penseroso,” will remain a prisoner of “this fleshly nook” (91–92) of sin and discord. In a poetics where falling (i.e. “do” low) and ascending (i.e. “do” high) merge to form an undifferentiated unity (i.e. diapason), we are prompted to soar by falling. Paradise is lost but it is regained at the same time, for within *Paradise Lost* we may experience a form of thinking that elevates human understanding so as to hear an echo, however faintly, of the perfect song of the spheres.

NOTES

1. References to Milton’s *Paradise Lost* are to Lewalski’s edition.
2. For more information on Milton’s theory of the mind-body relationship, see Charalampous, forthcoming.
3. References to Milton’s “Ad Patrem” and shorter poems are to Carey’s edition.
4. For Milton’s frequent pun between the musical and atmospheric senses of “air,” see Steggle 2001, par. 12; and Ricks 1963, 106.
5. As Emily R. Wilson writes, “Milton’s epic draws heavily on the tragic tradition and includes tragic elements that cast shadow over the final books. Tragic ‘notes’ are struck in *Paradise Lost* which continue to resonate beyond their proper time” (Wilson 2004, 166). See also, Coiro 2010, 59–67.
7. The technical musical pun on “suspended” has been widely discussed, as has the question of in what sense the devils’ song is “partial”: possible overtones of the word include “biased,” “incomplete,” or “polyphonic.” See Buhler 1999, 1–17. For “suspended,” see Ricks 1963, 79. And Forsyth argues that “the word ‘suspended’ means ‘riveted the attention of the audience’ (*OED* 5a), but also what the text does: as Thomas Newton pointed out in 1749 (Leonard ad loc), the parenthesis ‘suspends as it were the event’” (Forsyth 2003, 272). It is nevertheless highly unlikely that Milton’s intended meaning is not the word’s primary meaning: “To debar, usually for a time” (*OED* 1”), especially when one considers that Milton is using this word in the context of music and harmony, and in a language that expresses some degree of admiration “when Spirits immortal sing.”

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Each great nerve-centre has its own peculiar consciousness, its own peculiar mind

Lawrence 1961, 135

The possibility of cognition in matter became a fundamental debate of the eighteenth century, with ramifications for many forms of medical, scientific, philosophical and literary enquiry. Among the most notorious expositors of the idea that matter can think, in the eyes of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) at least, was John Locke (1632–1704), who famously postulated that although matter cannot generate thought on its own, God can nevertheless superadd thought to it. For many of his critics, this theory bordered on monist materialism as it could not exclude the idea that our minds are material and therefore incapable of independent existence (Yolton 1983, 14–28; Barresi and Martin, 2000, 49–60). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), on the other hand, upheld the more conservative substance dualism of mind and body. A notorious opponent of monist materialism throughout his career, particularly as it figured in the writings of Epicurus and Hobbes, Leibniz argued that mind and body do not act upon each other. The mental and the physical, for Leibniz, form two distinct realms, but not in a way conducive to the Cartesian substance dualism or the view that there exists a thinking substance on the one hand and an extended substance on the other. Rather, he postulated the doctrine of pre-established harmony, which he summed up in a letter to Clarke: “The soul does not disturb the laws of the body, nor the body those of the soul; and [...] the soul and the body [...] only agree together; the one acting freely, according to the rules of final causes; and the other acting mechanically, according to the laws of efficient causes. [...] God, foreseeing what the free cause would do, did from the beginning regulate the machine in such manner, that it cannot fail to agree with that free cause” (Alexander 1956, 85). According to this doctrine, although mind and body do not causally interact, God has made them coordinate perfectly, to coexist that is in a preordained and perfect synchrony so that both act as if they causally interacted. Leibniz, then, developed the theory of psychophysical parallelism, whereby mind and body act alongside one another separately. We have two ways of understanding the world: through the material body
and through the mind. For Leibniz, the former way of cognizing is confused whereas the latter is distinct, but both can be clear: “There must be an internal sense, in which the perceptions of these different external senses are found united. This is what is called the imagination, which comprises at once the notions of the particular, which are clear but confused, and the notion of the common sense, which are clear and distinct” (Leibniz 1989, 187). An idea is clear when we can distinguish it from other ideas, though we may not know the reasons why they are distinct. An idea is distinct when we arrive at an understanding of all its parts and their combinations, so that it can be explicitly distinguished from all other ideas. For Leibniz, then, the distinction between the two forms of cognition is one of degree, not of kind, as both matter and spirit, both body and intellect, are capable of cognition.

The beginning of the eighteenth century also witnessed an important correspondence between Clarke and Anthony Collins (1676–1729), which arguably marked a shift from the traditional substance dualism and materialist monism to emergentism. For Clarke, the soul is immaterial and, therefore, naturally immortal, promoting the unity of consciousness as his own version of the traditional argument for the immateriality of the soul:

That the Soul cannot possibly be Material [...] is demonstrable from the single consideration, even of bare Sense or Consciousness it self. For Matter being a divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay actually separate and distinct parts, ‘tis plain, that unless it were essentially Conscious, in which case every particle of Matter must consist of innumerable separate and distinct Consciousnesses, no System of it in any possible Composition or Division, can be any individual Conscious Being: For, suppose three or three hundred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given distance one from another; is it possible that all those separate parts should in that State be one individual Conscious Being? Suppose then all these particles brought together into one System, so as to touch one another; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Composition whatsoever, become any whir less truly distinct Beings, than they were when at the greatest distance? How can their being disposed in any possible System, make them one individual conscious Being? I f you will suppose God by his infinite Power superadding Consciousness to the united Particles, yet still those Particles being really and necessarily as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be themselves the Subject in which that individual Consciousness inhere, but the Consciousness can only be superadded by the addition of Something, which in all the Particles must still it self be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whose Power of thinking is undeniably one Individual Consciousness, cannot possibly be a Material Substance.

(Clarke 1738, 730)

Clarke’s argument for the immateriality of the soul rests on the fact that matter is divisible, and because consciousness is indivisible, it follows that it
is also immaterial and, therefore, naturally immortal. Despite his insistence on the immateriality of the soul, Clarke held that the soul is also extended, thereby siding with More in his claim that the soul is both extended and indivisible. Whereas God is unextended in space, thought and consciousness are located in the sensorium, in a specific part of the brain. Since the soul moves and operates on the body, and since such acts require substantial presence, the soul must be substantially present in the body (Vailati 1993, 387–403).

Clarke’s theory of an immaterial, indivisible and extended soul/consciousness triggered the response of Collins, who found it absurd to argue that an extended substance is immaterial and indivisible. For Collins, all finite extended things must consist of parts. He challenged Clarke’s thesis on various fronts, but perhaps most importantly he argued that thought is the result of the activity of the brain’s particles, that “it may follow from the Composition or Modification of a Material System consisting of actually separate and distinct Particles,” although “separately they may not have the Power of Thinking” (Clarke 1738, 757–8). The first example he provided to corroborate his thesis was the scent of a rose:

And Matter of Fact is so plain and obvious, that a Man cannot turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material Systems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one, nor in any one of the Particles that compose them, when taken apart and considered singly. That a Rose, for example, consists of several Particles which separately and singly want a Power to produce that agreeable Sensation we experience in them when united; And therefore either each of the Particles in that Union contributes to the Individual Power which is the external Cause of our Sensation; or else God Almighty superadds the Power of producing that Sensation in us upon the Union of the Particles. That this may be the Case of Matter’s Thinking. Those Particles which compose the Brain may under that Modification, either have the Power of Thinking necessarily flowing from them, or else may have the Power of Thinking superadded to them by the Power of God, though singly and separately they may not have the Power of Thinking.

(Clarke 1738, 757–8)

If we isolate the particles of the rose, then these individual particles do not have the power to produce scent, but through their unification emerges out a genuinely new power or quality. “In like manner,” Collins continues, “it may be conceived that there may be a Power in all those Particles which compose the Brain, to contribute to the Act of Thinking, before they are united under that form; though, while they are disunited, they have no [...] Consciousness” (Clarke 1738, 787). This configuration of qualities in a material system to produce something new is known as emergentism. As John Barresi and Liam P. Dempsey have observed, Collins’s suggestion paved the
way for a new way of conceiving the relation between thought and matter, one that was distinct from Descartes’ substance dualism, Hobbes’s materialism and Locke’s suggestion of divine super addition (Dempsey 2009, 53). In Dempsey’s words, “The unity of experience appealed to by the substance dualist may perhaps lie in a mode of activity of matter, in the harmonic synchrony of the motion of its parts. Going beyond purely mechanical interactions, such a unity of activity may result in the subjective experience of a unity of consciousness even if, in fact, its material base is complex and variegated [...] the general tendency [in the eighteenth century] was not toward a thoroughgoing materialism but toward a new sort of property dualism” (Dempsey 2009, 54). Although the idea that consciousness emerges out of the material brain’s activity was almost universally accepted during the period, the intuitive knowledge of our conscious subjectivity and brain objectivity persisted because of what John Perry has called the “experience gap”. Dempsey provides a concise restatement of Perry’s thesis: “The gap between conscious experiences and neurophysiology appears so radical that the identification of the two seems absurd. In fact, contemporary arguments for property dualism are often coached in terms of the experience gap” (Dempsey 2009, 54). This intuitive repugnancy towards monist materialism contributed to the preservation of the idea of an immaterial and immortal agent capable of independent existence, even as it was widely recognized that this agent is the product of the brain’s activity.

Collins is considered to be among the first British emergentists, but we may trace the history of British emergentism even further back: in Milton’s *Paradise Lost*. “[O]ne first matter all,” Raphael comments,

Indu’d with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and in things that live, of life;
But more refin’d, more spiritous, and pure,
As neerer to him plac’t or neerer tending
Each in thir several active Sphears assignd,
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportiond to each kind. So from the root
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
More aerie, last the bright consummate floure
Spirits odorous breathes: flours and thir fruit
Mans nourishment, by gradual scale sublim’d
To vital Spirits aspire, to animal,
To intellectual, give both life and sense,
Fansie and understanding (Milton 2007, 5.472–86)

The vital/animal spirits and the intellect are as distinct, qualitatively and substantially, as “green stalk” and “flours and thir fruit [scent],” even as they are all produced out of the same material (seed). Ontological monism (the idea that everything is created out of a common matter), therefore,
does not inexorably lead to materialist monism. As Sugimura concludes here, the continuity from the corporeal to the spiritual “masks a necessary discontinuity — namely, the transition from the material to the immaterial.” Thus, “Raphael’s description of prime matter has already loaded within it a preexistent, nonmaterial power.” In this way, Sugimura notes, Milton “plants seeds of immateriality within the supposedly material primitive organism” (Sugimura 2009, 52). Milton appears thus to be anticipating Collins here, as he is using the example of the scent of a flower to argue for a type of dualism wherein the producer and the product, the source and the outcome, may be substantially distinct.

Whether one advocated an emergentist ontological outlook or held a thorough materialist position, the suggestion that the body could think independently of the conscious mind occupied a central position in contemporary cognitive psychology, giving rise to a new form of dualism which we may term cognitive dualism. In *Eighteenth-Century Vitalism*, Catherine Packham found that the supposition of a “vital principle” or life-force in matter, prevalent during Romanticism, recurred throughout eighteenth-century literary art, natural philosophy and medicine to counter the inadequacy of mechanism for an understanding of natural life. Here Packham concludes that vitalism “re-posed the relationship of the subject to the body by emphasising the limits of mind’s control over the body and the autonomy of the body as a self-directing, self-controlling entity” (Packham 2012, 10). Peter Hanns Reill had reached a similar conclusion, noting that the body “was seen as containing an immanent principle of self-movement or self-organization [...] and goal-directed living forces” (Reill 2005, 7). But what are the implications of the assertion that bodies are autonomous, self-directing and self-controlling entities that contain goal-directed living forces over which the mind has no control? This view suggests a form of intelligence on the body’s part, the kind of which, as the examples that follow bear witness, was articulated by contemporary writers and scientists in varied forms.

In Kant’s aesthetics, the free play of imagination and understanding is, arguably, precognitive, that is, it happens pre-conceptually without the involvement of the conscious, discursive mind (Guyer 2006, 162–93). Quite characteristically, Paul Guyer has argued that for Kant “the harmony of the faculties produces pleasure because it [...] represents a state in which a general cognitive objective [...] is fulfilled without the guarantee ordinarily provided by the subsumability of intuitions under concepts” (Guyer 2006, 162). Robert Whytt (1714–1766) proposed that a life principle in matter co-ordinated the vital functions of essential organs and ensured the unconscious responses of the body to external stimuli. It was a model in which the role of the mind as the over-seeing and conscious governing function was displaced by a physiology of co-ordinated, unconscious and independent bodily regulation: a displacement of the thinking mind by the body’s own powers, with a strong emphasis on the nervous system and the “nervous self” (Bassiri 2013, 425–48. See also Packham esp. 5–20; and French 1969).
In his account of the Great Plague of London (1720), Nathaniel Hodges presents us with bodies suffused with a consciousness of their own: “None of them [doctors] having been ever able to discover any Signs of Corruption in their [patients’] Blood, which as conscious of itself blushed for their Fatal mistake, and in this Distemper commonly appeared more florid than at other Times” (Hodges 1720, 103). Here, Hodges is encouraging us to view the workings of the internal organs as cognitive actions that bring to light the self-knowing and self-regulatory activities of the human body, as well as its ability to assess a given situation and respond to it intelligently and meaningfully without the involvement of the conscious, discursive mind. Similarly, in her celebrated *A treatise on the art of midwifery*, Elizabeth Nihell observed that women, not men, should practice midwifery, because they have an “intuitive guide within themselves [...] with a strong instinctive influence on the mind and actions of the sex” (Nihell 1760, 98–99). Nihell’s account points at the need to study the differences between the cognitive abilities of female and male bodies, the former being invested with an intuitive guide or instinctive intelligence that enables women to perform the duties of a midwife more competently than men. And Robert Jackson (1750–1827), Scottish physician-surgeon, reformer, and inspector-general of army hospitals, reached the following conclusion: “It may be inferred, that there resides, in the structure and constitution of organic bodies, a certain instinctive, though unconscious intelligence or faculty” (Jackson 1804, xviii). The author of an article which appeared in *The Tatler* in July 1709 wrote that “the spleen is not to be cured by medicine but by Poetry. Apollo, the Author of Physic, shone with diffusive rays, the best of Poets as well as of Physicians; and it is in this double capacity that I have made my way; and have found sweet, easy, flowing numbers are oft superior to our noblest medicines” (Anon 1774, 281). This account suggests a model in which the role of the mind as the overseeing and conscious governing function is displaced by a physiology of independent bodily regulation, a regulation governed by our aesthetic response to poetry and its music. And “Her eyes sparkled with a thousand intelligent emotions,” Elizabeth Gunning said of Emeline in *The Packet* (Gunning 1794, 180), while Francis Gentleman observed that “motion and utterance are regulated by a cultivated knowledge of life, and self born intelligent feelings” (Gentleman 1770, 108).

By the first half of the nineteenth century, the term “organic intelligence” had already become commonplace, finding its way into some of the period’s most prestigious medical journals, including *The Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal*, *The Medico-Chirurgical Review*, and *The Dublin Journal of Medical Science*. David Kerr, for example, observed that the vessels of his patient’s thigh had “a sort of organic intelligence [...] which appears to be more in accordance with the laws of animal economy” (Kerr 1834, 102). And the author of “Remarks on Stannering” tells us that M. Magendie (probably François Magendie, 1783–1855, a pioneer of experimental physiology) attributed the malfunction of vocal organs to “a deficient action of the
organic intelligence” (Soit 1840, 446). What distinguishes these accounts from eighteenth century cognitive psychology is that we may observe a shift from a theological anxiety to assert a dualistic ontological outlook to thorough materialism. In her essay on “Unconscious Cerebration,” Frances Power Cobbe (1822–1904) provides a concise account of the shift from substance dualism to a new type of materialist approach that advocates the existence within us of two intelligences, the conscious and the unconscious:

When we place the phenomena of Unconscious Thought on one side, and over against them our Conscious Selves, we obtain, I think, a new and vivid sense of the separation, not to say the antithesis, which exists between the two; close as is their mutual interdependence. Not to talk about [...] the recognition of the fact that our brains sometimes think without us, seems to enable us to view our connexion with them in quite a new light. So long as all our attention was given to Conscious Thought, and philosophers eagerly argued the question, whether the Soul did or did not ever sleep or cease to think, it was easy to confound the organ of thought to the Conscious Self who was supposed alone to set it in action. But the moment we marshal together for review the long array of the phenomena of Unconscious Cerebration, the case is altered; the severance becomes not only cogitable, but manifest.

(Cobbe 1872, 333)

Although Cobbe adopts a materialist position, her language is still marked by cognitive dualism, posing a separation, even antithesis, between the unconscious and conscious cognitive processes that the brain performs. “Let us then,” Cobbe continues, “accept cheerfully the possibility, perhaps the probability, that science ere long will proclaim the dogma, ‘Matter can think.’ [...] Admitting that our brains accomplish much without our conscious guidance, will help us to realize that our relation to them is of a variable — an intermittent — and (we may therefore venture to hope) of a *terminable* kind” (Cobbe 1872, 333–4). The term “unconscious cerebration” was first introduced by William Benjamin Carpenter (1813–1885) in 1854 and was adopted, challenged and developed by many highly influential physiologists and theorists, including F.W.H Myers (1843–1901), William James, Pierre Janet (1859–1947) and Boris Sidis (1867–1923), whose theories of the “subliminal self,” “double mind” and “unconscious consciousness” helped them to explain a series of phenomena (Trigoni 2014a, 55–69). Although the term unconscious cerebration was perhaps the most popular, no single term became dominant. Rather, there was a proliferation of terms, including, among the ones we glanced at above, “reflex thought,” “latent thought,” “latent consciousness,” “obscure perception,” “the hidden soul,” “reflex action of the brain,” “unconscious psychical activity,” “unconscious psychical processes,” and “unconscious sensual and volitional processes” (Ryan 2006, 280). Despite their different inflections and variations
in detail, these terms aimed at describing the same phenomenon: cognitive processes that take place inside the body but outside conscious thought.

Victorian literary artists digested ideas about the intelligent body and circulated them through their works for the consumption of the general populace. For Robert Louis Stevenson (1850–1894), unconscious thinking is the ultimate source for creative writing: “I am still ‘a slow study,’ and sit a long while silent on my eggs. Unconscious thought, there is the only method: macerate your subject, let it boil slow, then take the lid off and look in—and there your stuff is, good or bad” (Stevenson 1917, 361). Herbert Spencer had described his approach to creating art in very similar terms: “The conclusions, at which I have from time to time arrived [...] have been arrived at unawares — each as the ultimate outcome of a body of thoughts that slowly grew from a germ. [...] Little by little, in unobtrusive ways, without conscious intention or appreciable effort, there would grow up a coherent and organized theory” (Spencer 1904, 1: 462–3). Spencer’s insistence on a thinking process devoid of conscious intention occupies a central role in Vanessa Lyndal Ryan’s _Thinking without Thinking_ , where she shows how the cognitive psychology emerging from Spencer’s notion of non-deliberate thinking echoes some of the mental science of the period. Spencer was not, of course, alone in analyzing and practicing notions of unconscious mentality. Ryan’s study includes a constellation of influential Victorian novelists who adopted the notion of a thinking unconscious which, by definition, performs complicated forms of cognition independently of but parallel to the conscious mind (Ryan 2012).

The most significant theorist of somatic perception in the twentieth century was probably Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose _Phenomenology of Perception_ has established him, for many, as the preeminent philosopher of the body. Ponty’s theory of the body is complicated and impressive, but the underlying principle of his thought is that we think through our bodies. This inevitably entails a denial of the Cartesian ontology and cognitive psychology, as it insists on the intimate union of mind and body. But this union should not automatically lead to the conclusion that the conscious mind is the sole thinking agent while the body is a porous envelope that simply enables thought. According to the French philosopher, there are two distinct ways of understanding the world around us: the intentional one, which is essentially conscious and reflective, and the motor-intentional one, which involves a somatic set of preparation to deal with cognitive objects, and whereby the body understands and is capable of responding to meanings without the need for the conscious mind’s involvement. He writes, for instance, that “my body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my ‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying’ function” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 140–1). There is thus a distinction in Ponty’s thought between the conscious mind thinking through the body and the body thinking. Solomon Levy Long went as far as to assert that “the body is intelligent, much more so than the mind” (Long 1928, 23), while Elizabeth Towne (1865–1960) advised her reader
that “your body is intelligent and must be treated considerately if you would have it work well and grow strong at it” (Towne 1905, 71). W.B. Yeats wrote an essay entitled “The Thinking of the Body” (Yeats 2007, 212–3), and D.H. Lawrence concluded: “Each great nerve-centre has its own peculiar consciousness, its own peculiar mind, its own primary precepts and concepts, its own spontaneous desires and ideas [...] there is a blood-consciousness which exists in us independently of the ordinary mental consciousness” (Lawrence 1961, 135. See also Trigoni 2014b, 302–21).

Today, bolstered by work in cognitive science on the central role of non-deliberate thought in complex as well as everyday decisions, the concept of the intelligent body is again gaining recognition. Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber formulated the problem of the body’s cognitive abilities in the following way: “Where matters become interesting (and contentious) is over such issues as whether unconscious processes are routinized and inflexible — in a word, stupid — or whether they can be seen as sophisticated, flexible, and adaptive — in a word, intelligent” (Allen and Reber 1999, 314). This dilemma, however, is not idiosyncratic to modern-day cognitive science and philosophy. Rather, it stretches back to the first mind/body dualist William of Ockham, early modernity and Descartes’ critics. Until recently, Allen and Reber continue to note, the cognitive sciences have been dominated by the former perspective (i.e. “unconscious processes are routinized and inflexible”), which is the outcome, to a significant extent, of the Cartesian and Lockean traditions. Nevertheless, Allen and Reber continue to note that “there exists ample evidence that human phenomena we would like to label ‘smart’ are not always accessible to, or have their origins in, conscious contents or procedures. These phenomena range from the most basic perceptual processes to the learning of complex systems and the production of creative ideas” (Allen and Reber 1999, 314). But just like the traditions of Descartes and Locke contributed to the emergence of a body that is, in Allen and Reber’s terminology, “stupid,” the notion of the intelligent and autonomous body has a history too, one that spiralled its way forward into time to reemerge in different shapes. Thus, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson found that at least 95 percent of our thinking is unconscious, per “the rule of thumb among cognitive scientists,” assertively concluding that while “the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 13, 3). Medical practitioner Oron Frenkel has similarly noted that researchers studying the placebo effect should adopt an “alternative account based upon a theory that the body understands and is capable of responding to meanings without the need for any conceptual or linguistic content” (Frenkel 2008, 58). Research into unconscious intelligence and the notion of an autonomous and intelligent body is still emerging. But this book has attempted to demonstrate that this ontological outlook has a long, complicated and fascinating history, one that stretches at least as far back as the first mind/body dualist William of Ockham and early modern cognitive psychology and literary art. This persistent return to somatic cognitive
abilities points at the need to draw out, in Foucaultian terms, the Genealogy of the intelligent body and to study the complex and shifting network of relations between power, knowledge and the body which produced, and still produce, historically specific forms of bisubjectivity.

NOTES

1. Leibniz's theory of perception has enjoyed the attention of many excellent studies. See, for example, Garber 2009; Woolhouse 1994; and McRae 1976.

2. The article also appeared, in part, in The Medico-chirurgical Review, 33 (1840), 489–91, under the title “Remarks on Stammering by a Sufferer.”

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