Border Thinking
Marina Gržinić (Ed.)

DISASSEMBLING HISTORIES OF RACIAL VIOLENCE
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On the Publication Series

We are pleased to present the latest volume in the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna's publication series. The series, published in cooperation with our highly committed partner Sternberg Press, is devoted to central themes of contemporary thought about art practices and theories. The volumes comprise contributions on subjects that form the focus of discourse in art theory, cultural studies, art history, and research at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna and represent the quintessence of international study and discussion taking place in the respective fields. Each volume is published in the form of an anthology, edited by staff members of the academy. Authors of high international repute are invited to make contributions that deal with the respective areas of emphasis. Research activities such as international conferences, lecture series, institute-specific research focuses, or research projects serve as points of departure for the individual volumes.

All books in the series undergo a single blind peer review. International reviewers, whose identities are not disclosed to the editors of the volumes, give an in-depth analysis and evaluation for each essay. The editors then rework the texts, taking into consideration the suggestions and feedback of the reviewers who, in a second step, make further comments on the revised essays. The editors—and authors—thus receive what is so rare in academia and also in art universities: committed, informed, and hopefully impartial critical feedback that can be used for finishing the work.

We thank the editor of this volume, Marina Gržinić, for proposing this volume on “border thinking.” Migration, decolonial critique, and necropolitics (a line of discourse Gržinić has helped to shape over the last few years) have been central issues of much theoretical debate and artistic work at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna for a long time. In this volume, Gržinić brings together a heterogeneous set of authors who deal with many different topics, ranging from the refugee movement in Austria, to the Tunisian Revolution, to the establishment of new borders in Turkey and Hungary. Moreover, this book links discussions of old and new borders with ideas originating from a specific subset of the “former east” (i.e., south-central Europe). We are deeply indebted to Gržinić, an artist and theorist who has been professor for conceptual art practices at the academy for many years and has always emphasized the importance of raising a critical voice, for her impeccable editorial work on this volume. We would also like to thank the authors for their commitment. As always, we are grateful to all the partners contributing to the book, especially Sternberg Press.

The Rectorate of the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna
Eva Blimlinger, Andrea B. Braidt, Karin Riegler
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Introduction
From Border Thinking to Striking the Border

Marina Gržinič

This book has a precise history. It was conceived in the Studio of Conceptual Art at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, which I renamed Post-conceptual Art Practices (PCAP) immediately after being appointed as a professor at the academy in 2003, to open up the intrinsic relationship between art and politics. At the start of the new semester in the winter of 2015, I posed a not-so-rhetorical question: Are we capable of pulling out a narrative that is close to a counter-history of the refugee movement in Austria, which started with the Refugee Protest Camp in Vienna in 2012? It was politically necessary to pose this question, because in 2015 we had many students who were actively engaged with the Refugee Protest Camp in Vienna in 2012. They gave their time, ideas, engagement, empathy, and political convictions to the cause. In 2015 we also had some refugees studying with us, including some who had entered the study program after being granted asylum. In addition, we had students from “third” countries (meaning students coming from countries outside of the European Union), that is, a pejorative description from the EU institutional frame when looking over the walls of its “fortress.”

There were many different scholars who took part in the discussions, including art students, MA students in critical studies, doctoral candidates in philosophy, and post-doctoral researchers. Studying art in PCAP or being affiliated with the program means revealing the social and political line of contemporary art, where formally speaking the artwork can be a poem, text, or an image. What matters is that these works support and engage with antiracist, anti-homophobic, and anti-capitalist perspectives. It is important considering the border, both on the border and against the border.

The Refugee Crisis as the Crisis of Fortress Europe

Central to this book, Border Thinking, is the investigation of the refugee crisis in Europe that is increasingly presented as a crisis of European (and global) occidental capitalism, with its deadly structural racism, coloniality, dispossession, war, and oppressive social, political, and economic violence. In global neoliberal capitalism, borders seem to have disappeared, yet they are nonetheless present through deportations, segregations, marginalization, and criminalization.

Therefore, the question is how to think about these relations and how much the act of thinking itself is bordered; or, to question if it is possible to develop a border thinking that will aim to radically transform the sociopolitical and economic logics of the border that segregate and ghettoize people, lives, practices, histories, and thoughts. These harsh ills are becoming visible with the increasing number of refugees escaping the proxy war in Syria; with the complete destruction of Iraq and Libya, two states that were functional and...
secular and that currently suffer from militias, terrorists, and the deaths of civilians who are killed by the thousands, and where the only "secure enclaves" are the capitalist multinational "oases" for wild extractions of oil safeguarded by private military mercenaries. The outcome is that millions of people are forced to leave and that whole cities and regions end up in a state of absolute immobility. The old Western world, the bastion of whiteness and the force of colonialism and present coloniality, steadily and brutally continues its work of expropriation. The bloody face of neoliberal global capitalism makes austerity, precarity, privatization, and debt the only conditions of our lives, while engaging in (neo)colonial relations with those who (re)joined the big brave world of neoliberal democracy.

Europe is divided more than ever between the “former” West and the “rest” in the EU and Europe. At the center of the Western world, we see the old processes of discrimination, exploitation, and exclusion of those who are not refugees but rather full citizens of the EU and onto whom mechanisms of differentiation, marginalization, and exclusion are imposed. Currently there are right-wing populist parties and citizens, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, antiblack and anti-POC, homophobic squadrons that are pressing heavily to enter the national parliaments in Europe; and there are those who oppose such situations and try to change them, though the changes are minimal, because Fortress Europe and the EU bureaucracy constantly increase the system of ghettoization and seclusion.

Racism and the rhetoric of protection of “our” way of life is suffocating people that already have to deal with class-based exploitation. They are divided through the constructed category of race, and eviscerated and subjugated through racialization that imposes brutal divisions and criminalization based on skin color. Among all these trajectories of violent realities and brutalities, which includes people being killed because of their ethnicity, those who are ghettoized as citizens or will never become citizens and are just left to die, we face one of the worst crises of humanity imaginable, with millions in search of a better life elsewhere, fleeing war, poverty, and destruction by imperial, hegemonic war-states.

Thousands are trapped in countries bordering Fortress Europe, or are abandoned in Greece, which is being transformed into a threshold state of European (Western) democracy. Millions are held against their will in border states outside of Europe. Those in power—that is, hierarchical, imperial, connoted with a vicinity and servility to NATO and other regional military formations that work only for the interest of capital and processes of financialization—are fully subcontracting themselves to formalities, normativity, and “legalities” to such a degree that we need new expressions, terminologies, methodologies, and strategies for thinking and acting. What is going on today is not possible to understand accurately with the old, modernist, or even postmodernist concepts of agency, community, and democracy.

It is clear that in order to encircle these processes of ultra-exploitation, dispossession, and racialization that present themselves as the opposite, we need new methodologies, intervention politics, and different historical conceptualizations that will bring class, race, gender, and border thinking back to the center of political action. This should be a mixture of potentiality, and a radical engagement with proper history and praxis that will give a new dimension not only to the topic but also to the old ossified disciplines of Western Euro-centric epistemologies.

There are several focal points of investigation in this book. We can extract at least three common lines of research that appear through many of the writings. The first tackles life and its management and is conceptualized as the shift from biopolitics to necropolitics. The second line conceptualizes capitalism by rethinking how it formulates itself in the form of the state. The final focus is on racism as it enters into a new and perverted form that now reigns in neoliberal global capitalism.

The Shift from Biopolitics to Necropolitics

Nataša Velikonja, a Slovenian writer and lesbian activist, brilliantly stated that “Europe is boring” on the eve of the capitalist financial crisis in 2008.1 Then, with the crisis and the subsequent rescue of banks rather than people, Étienne Balibar proclaimed, “Europe is dead.”2 Though he did not reference Achille Mbembe’s essay “Necropolitics,” it is clear that in the last decade, life, its modes, and the social and political space of global capitalism, have been managed and organized by the logic of death. In “Necropolitics,” Mbembe discusses this new logic of capital and its processes of geopolitical demarcation of world zones based on the mobilization of the war machine.3 He claims that the concept of biopolitics—one of the major logics of contemporary societies, due to the war machine and the state of exception—should be replaced with necropolitics. Biopolitics is the horizon of articulating contemporary capitalist societies from the so-called politics of life, where life is seen as the zero degree of intervention of each and every politics into contemporary societies, but today capital’s surplus value is based on the capitalization of death (in Latin: necro) worlds.

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The term “biopolitics” (bio in Latin means life) was coined by Michel Foucault in the 1970s. For him the word meant to “make live and let die.” It is obvious that Foucault’s biopolitics, originating at the time of the Cold War, is a specific conceptualization of capitalist liberal governmentality exclusively reserved for the first capitalist world. It presented the liberal capitalism of the 1970s as “taking care”—but only of the citizens of first-world nation-states. What was going on in the second (the Eastern European) and third worlds was not at the center of the management of life in the first-world. The title of the 1973 James Bond film is an accurate description of biopolitics: Live and Let Die.

As with biopolitics, I propose a short definition of necropolitics in order to understand Mbembe’s conceptualization of it. The idea behind necropolitics is: let live and make die. Necropolitics presents a management of life for the global neoliberal capitalist world. It transforms the aim to “make live” into “let live;” but “let live” is a form of life that is far from the cozy structures of better life (“make live”). To let live means pure abandonment. You can live if you have the means (with the help of a lineage or pedigree of money and power) and all those who cannot live in the situation of pure abandonment by the neoliberal public capitalist structures are left to die, or in many other occasions made to die; for example, in New Orleans, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, and in many other places and times around the world.

Though Mbembe elaborated on necropolitics in order to describe the intensified subjugation of life in Africa to capital exploitation and governmentality of the social, political, and economic through the war machine (named the “postcolony” by Mbembe in 2010, proposing a view on Africa different from that of postcolonialism), necropolitics was palpably shaped throughout the world by the war on terror, launched by the United States (supported by the United Kingdom and NATO) as a response to the September 11, 2001, attack on the Twin Towers in New York.

Necropolitics precisely defines the forms taken by neoliberal global capitalist’s cuts in financial support for public health and social and education structures. These extreme cuts present intensive neoliberal procedures of rationalization, privatization (nation-)states, transformed themselves from imperial nation-states, multinational corporations, and organizations as sovereign subjects. When the Berlin Wall fell, the Westphalian principle disintegrated and new states proliferated in the so-called post–Cold War era. The old-world powers (colonial, occidental, and anti-Semitic), in an attempt to control the new and multiplification of nation-states, transformed themselves from sovereign subjects to war states (as brilliantly envisioned by Santiago López Petit). It was this logic that enabled the major international powers to maintain order and hegemonic control us. Moreover, how are we to reconcile the overarching political and social structures of global capitalism and turbo-powered neoliberalism with the autonomy (i.e., freedom) of conceiving art projects, which is seen so fitting to the current configuration of the originary biopolitical character of the paradigm of contemporary art? This question leads us toward a bizarre complicity based, on the one hand, on a struggle for rights that makes us even more “commodied subjects” (the therefore hopefully less dispensable), and, on the other, to retake a “license to kill,” performing necropolitics as the politics par excellence of the first world.

Nation-State, War State

The transformations that I have outlined—from biopolitics to necropolitics—lead us to another fundamental question when engaging with borders: How is the contemporary state constituted today within global capitalism, and what has changed and what has been lost? In the trajectory of capitalism’s development, we can grasp as well the notion of a transition from nation-state sovereignty to transnational institutions of power and war state politics. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, and enabled by it, came the disintegration of the Westphalian power principle. Established by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the principle of a nation-state’s sovereignty is recognized by international-relations scholars as the fundamental basis of the modern Western global system of states, multinational corporations, and organizations as sovereign subjects. When the Berlin Wall fell, the Westphalian principle disintegrated and new states proliferated in the so-called post–Cold War era. The old-world powers (colonial, occidental, and anti-Semitic), in an attempt to control the new and multiplification of nation-states, transformed themselves from sovereign subjects to war states (as brilliantly envisioned by Santiago López Petit).

5 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California, 2001).
control over the new states born into the post–Cold War world. This transition has curbed the sovereignty of nation-states, which prevailed until the 1990s, and more importantly it has considerably limited the sovereignty of the new nation-states constituted after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This allowed for the proliferation of numerous new states but without the old nation-state sovereignty and also implemented the transition of the old colonial, imperial nation-states into war states. Today, nation-states can no longer give amnesty, at least in theory, to those who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.7

In such a situation it is necessary to incorporate—in every art and cultural project and even more in every and each analysis that deals with the conceptualization of the state—three formations: the nation-state, the war state, and the racial state. Racism is also central to (re)constructing national history, by silencing histories of art and culture made by migrant intellectuals, and by silencing gay and lesbian groups and movements, and so on. Therefore it is necessary to include a systematic presentation of racism and anti-Semitism by silencing histories of art and culture made by migrant intellectuals, and so on. Therefore it is necessary to include a systematic presentation of racism and anti-Semitism.

In this change in sovereignty and hegemony that happened in the transition from nation-state to a new form of state, the war state, in global neoliberal capitalism enabled the old colonial and imperial powers of the West to stay in power without recourse to direct military intervention (this is used only when no other friendly mediation by major powers is effective, as for example in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and so on). It was necessary to use a certain “veil” to conceal this transition from nation-state to war state. It is at this point that, as stated by Pierre Hazan, global or transitional justice enters the equation.

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In the war state, the state apparatus exists only to maintain the illusion of social harmony, rather than actually taking care of the lives and needs of a proper population. Being characterized by its biopolitical features, manifest in the politics of taking care though systematically controlling the life of the population, the contemporary state is transformed into a necropolitical regime, where its politics is solely concerned with taking part in the war of transnational capital, leaving its citizens to fend for themselves.

The civilian mission of the old bourgeois, colonial Western European states at the core of today’s EU is not a benevolent attempt to help the other former Eastern European states to “progress”; it is the way in which the new regulation is made effective. Capital, within global neoliberal capitalism, specifically impinges on the legal and/or political barriers between states. The fact that we live in one world, as it is so often said, does not mean that we are exempted from borders, but that certain obsolete forms are removed so that the mobility of transnational capital might flourish, while at the same time new and other forms of borders are erected.

In this change from the nation-state to the war state, we have to take into account the missing link; that is, the racial state. In this case, however, the link is not missing as much as it is unspoken. As pointed out by Ann Laura Stoler, the racial state exists but is unnamed.8

Racialization

What is the racial state? Benjamin Stora talks of it as “ethnoracial regulation.” It is necessary to position racism as a central category within the parameters of the abstract state. The denunciation of racism is not adequate; nor is it sufficient to say that the repressive apparatuses of the state have ameliorated the harsh treatment of migrants, second- and third-generations migrant youths (as the war on terror that was launched in 2001 imposed radicalized discrimination procedures against those identified as Muslims), and refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore we need to recognize that we have a fully constructed racial state in the form of European and global capitalism. Today the nation-state rests upon a foundation of structural racism, and it is a racial state that has to be put at the center of the analysis. We have also to be alert to Ann Laura Stoler’s contention that “the racial states can be innovative and agile beasts, their categories flexible, and their classifications protean and subject to change. They thrive on ambiguities and falter on rigidities. [...] Racial formations have long marked differences by other names.”

In such a situation it is necessary to incorporate—in every art and cultural project and even more in every and each analysis that deals with the conceptualization of the state—three formations: the nation-state, the war state, and the racial state. Racism is also central to (re)constructing national history, by silencing histories of art and culture made by migrant intellectuals, and by silencing gay and lesbian groups and movements, and so on. Therefore it is necessary to include a systematic presentation of racism and anti-Semitism (as a genuine racism) within the genealogy of a contemporary neoliberal state and all projects that aim to counter racism.

I would argue that this process of racialization develops a racist basis for practices, structures, and discourses in the field of culture and art, and is being reproduced in the contemporary division of labor and in new forms of exploitation and expropriation. Racialization, which has colonialism at its core, is today enabled through new forms of neo-colonialism; that is, coloniality made operative on the level of knowledge, theory, and practice. Therefore this book in the most concise way rethinks forced racializations and enclosure and disclosure, exploitation, and expropriations of those who are seen as and made to be marginal in neoliberal global capitalism.

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9 Quoted in ibid., 125.
10 Ibid., 130.
Structure of the Book

The title of the book, Border Thinking, is not an unknown topic; the idea stems from postcolonial and decolonial studies. But why not reappropriate the border, recontextualize it, and remobilize it? It is obvious that the fields of theory, philosophy, and cultural studies are also racialized, where emancipations are only seen inside the Eurocentric agendas that marginalize the power of post-colonial studies.

Border Thinking comprises twenty-six contributions by thirty authors (theoricians, writers, artists, activists, curators, etc.). These authors do not share the same space of struggle, but their analysis, their views, their discourses, their visual materials, and their words form a space of struggle through transverse connections empowered by antagonistic encounters. Each contributor demonstrates what it means to take a political, theoretical, and artistic stance.

We could certainly point out that the place of management of refugees imposed by Fortress Europe and the machination of the EU is in Turkey. It is important to understand what is to be expected by the EU with all these violently and shamefully orchestrated procedures of total abandonment of the refugees. Göksun Yazıcı and Çetin Gürer were invited to take part in the project “Gezi Before and After” (2013–16), organized by the PCAP, at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna in 2016. Yazıcı and Gürer, along with other participants, spoke on the transformative potentials after the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and were invited to contribute to this book.

Border Thinking consists of theoretical analyses as well as artistic projects that are posited in parallel to theoretical analyses. These works are examples of interventional art-political works that use images and text to engage with political questions rather than being descriptive art works. These contributions enter directly into debates of border thinking by taking into account the division in neoliberal global work that goes along the line of a colonial/racial divide.

The structure of this five-part book follows a trajectory of what I describe as “intervention politics.”

Part 1 is titled “Exposing” and identifies the status of refugees, migrants, queer/trans people of color, and last but not least the humanities and subjectivities at state-border regimes in the global capitalist world, as well as looking inside different institutional, visual, performative, cinematic, and memory dispositives. The first part includes the following contributions: Göksun Yazici, in her contribution “Differential Inclusion of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Institutions of Migration Management and Temporary Protection Regulation,” talks about borders that do not aim to exclude but are used to control migration. Migration management is the new form of control and a new notion that has changed the exclusive nature of borders. Governments try to select migrants, not only in terms of those who are considered “regular” and “irregular,” but also in terms of migrants who are considered “qualified” and “unqualified.” In 2011, Turkey opened the borders for Syrian refugees without calling them refugees, and it established new institutions to manage migration. In this case, migration was not meant to be stopped, but to be managed. This new phenomenon, however, belongs to our age and not just to Turkey.

Rubia Salgado and Gergana Mineva, in their contribution “Stream of Memory,” echo the long history of hopes and disappointments connected with the intensification of processes of institutional and social racializations. The text is written in an anaphoric form, which means that each of the successive sentences repeats the phrase “we remember.” The result is a poetic-political litany of betrayals and promises to migrant communities in Austria, promises that are today made obsolete by the Austrian state and the EU. Therefore we remember historical events and constellations where participation and transformation of and for the migrant communities had promising emancipatory futures.

Stanimir Panayotov, in his essay, “Necropolitics in the East,” considers, as a point of departure, necropolitics in Eastern Europe, which he connects to a sort of racial-colonial silencing that was able to both maintain civic peace and suppress ethnic warfare (respectively in the capitalist West and in the Ottoman/socialist East). When ethnicity reveals itself as race, class is deployed as racialized, and peace is illuminated as property qualification, then it is no longer possible to maintain that racism is not a useful analytic category to analyze what is going on in the Balkans. Thus race becomes central for the study of necropolitics as well in the east of Europe and opens up the gates for its analytical and retroactive use.

Khaled Ramadan, in his contribution “Set City—Post-snuff Film and the New Age of Reality Cinematography,” reflects on ISIS, the Jihadist militant group in Iraq and Syria (also known as Islamic State) that produces videos of beheadings as a form of terror and propaganda. ISIS’s videos did not bring about a new filming technique, yet they did expand the political propaganda-film genre. These videos introduced a new era in the film arena—a contemporary category of violent visualization that challenges any Hollywood production, which

11 The concept of the project was conceived by Marina Gržinić with Betül Küpeli, Cansu Berksan, Esra Özen, Songül Sönmez, Reha Refik Taşçı, and Onur Serdar.
are commonly produced for profit, while ISIS’s video are strictly produced for political propaganda and for recruitment. The real death of the protagonist at the execution set gave birth to a new notion of political propaganda production, which Ramadan calls “reality cinematography.”

Betül Seyma Küpeli, in her artwork RESOURCE: IMMIGRATION?, questions the hyper-consumption of (im)migration as a new resource for art and culture presented at numerous international art exhibitions and events. Küpeli provides connections and poses questions on historical, political, and ideological levels about architecture, city planning, and artworks that take advantage of migration and refugees.

Part 2 is titled “Mobilization” and discusses who the (non-)individuals, (non-)communities, (non-)subalterns, and (non-)citizens are that can mobilize transformations of openly evident inequalities, exploitations, and disposessions. It includes the following contributions:

Fieke Jansen (Tactical Technology Collective), in her “Smarter Borders: Challenges and Limitations of Data-Driven Borders,” takes a critical look at borders. Questions to do with travel, migration, and the refugee crisis are no longer limited to the physical crossing of borders. Data about people is collected, stored, and analyzed before the individual even arrives at a border. Jansen presents examples of data being shared between airlines and border patrol, biometric data programs that track refugees across countries or social-media comments that can result in denial of entry. She questions the data practices, the actors, and motives behind it.

Musawenkosi Ndlovu, in his contribution “Borderless Global Public Sphere? Western and Southern News Media in Africa,” exposes the media expansions by dominant neoliberal global capitalist countries into Africa through programs such as CCTV Africa (China), SABC Africa (South Africa), E News Channel Africa (South Africa), and Africa News Network (South Africa). These expansions reproduce new defensive borders of “us” and “them.” It is not only that all of these international media are creating new borders, but they are based on internal social class distinctions. Africa is shaped by Western forms of exclusionary global capitalism, which reproduces itself at local-national and regional levels in Africa.

Jelena Petrović, in her contribution “What Does Freedom Stand for Today?,” argues that the simultaneous and paradoxical act of reproducing and resisting dominant social structures puts us in the position to rethink what the politics of liberation or what its revolutionary practices are today. Such social practices are revolutionary in that they are politically and socially transformative in a very concrete context. But what happens, she asks, when these facts become a romanticized version of possible futures and when the freedom is (ab)used as a key notion of the neoliberal society? Petrović therefore discusses the false choice between the meaning of legality and illegality when it comes to difficult questions of today’s global war on terror(ism) that creates a state of permanent crisis.

Marika Schmiedt conveys in her Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better Life! a political commentary on the asylum and refugee policies in Austria that are displayed in five posters. She centers her critique on the Refugee Guide issued by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior in 2016. The guide, as stated by Schmiedt, is “a ridiculous rule-of-conduct picture-book guide” that is supposed to provide guidance about rules and values in Austria, but on the contrary, it reproduces clichéd resentments. The only thing this guide delivers is that the EU will never manage to grow beyond its Eurocentric thought processes.

Maira Enesi Caixeta illustrates in “Racialized Dysphoria” the disconnection to her own blackness because of racism and colorism. This disconnection is called racialized dysphoria, or colonial detachment, and is described by Caixeta as a state of unease and as a feeling of not being comfortable in one’s body, a formulation often used in transgender contexts. She articulates autobiographically the procedure when “mixed” black people are being torn apart from their blackness in what she recognizes a very powerful colonial tool. It is rooted in colonial history of the white supremacist system. Its goal is to whitewash the “other” that as not being white is being presented as something bad and undesirable, as something to be eliminated.

Part 3 is titled “Get Down To” and seeks to get down to the bottom of obfuscated, veiled, normalized, rhetorical, and increasingly domesticated academic rationales, and therefore insists on the question: What kinds of bodies are abandoned and made superfluous along and with/in borders in neoliberal global capitalism, and under what conditions? It comprises the following contributions:

Shirley Anne Tate, in her “Border Bodies: Mixedness and Passing in Prison Break,” explores the runaway hit Prison Break, an American TV drama created by Paul Scheuring, which was broadcast on Fox from 2005 to 2009. The main character, Michael Scofield, who is played by Wentworth Miller, takes a key place in her analysis. UK-born Miller is black/white mixed race. His father is of African-American and Jamaican descent, which is already a mixed category because of enslavement histories, while his mother is a white American. Tate explores the positioning of Miller as the lead protagonist in all five series specifically because of his passing as white. The main question is what this might mean for skin color borders in “post-race” states. His passing as white makes us note that although whiteness is more than skin color, the recognition
as white still dictates which agents can transform injustice and subvert dispossession in the twenty-first century.

Tjaša Kancler, in their contribution “Interrogating Silences: Crisis, Borders, and Decolonial Interferences,” focuses on the European space as a bordered space to rethink the silenced colonial/imperial history of European migration politics and reconfiguration of internal and external borders in relation to the coloniality of gender, the control of subjectivity and knowledge, and politics of death today. The main idea here is to bring into discussion the ways in which the coloniality of power is challenged by queer/ trans*. The term “trans*” with an asterisk is being used as an umbrella concept to include many different gender expressions and identities, such as trans, transgender, queer, and so on, and emphasizes the heterogeneity of bodies, identities, and experiences that go beyond the imposed gender-binary social norms. This means that we have to re-conceptualize Europe and European city spaces differently.

Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, in her contribution “Toward a Construction of the History of a (Dis)encounter: The Feminist Reason and the Antiracist and Decolonial Agency in Abya Yala,” articulates, from a decolonial point of view, a construction of a genealogy of the relationship between feminist politics and black and indigenous antiracist struggles in Abya Yala. Abya Yala, which in the Kuna language means “land in its full maturity” or “land of vital blood,” is the name used by the ancient Kuna people to refer to the American continent before the arrival of Columbus. Espinosa Miñoso explores the late emergence of antiracist, decolonial, and ethno-racial movements and struggles in Latin America, understanding mestizaje (the process of racial mixture) ideology and the processes of broad Westernization as obstacles to overcome and face the racist imperial reason, even by feminism, in its attempt to decolonize such a reason.

Njideka Stephanie Iroh, in her poem “A Diva’s Dish Darling and You Wish You Had It,” deals with the politics of radicalization in current times, reflecting on social media (such as the narrative of resistance in hashtag culture), exotification, and body culture. Language remains a powerful medium of communication in its ever-changing form, utilized in mainstream media to belittle the realities of those constructed as other (no matter their social, political status, or their class).

Suvendrini Perera, in her contribution “Now, Little Ship, Look Out!,” reflects on the asylum boat as a go-between land and sea, origin and destination, freedom and unfreedom. She considers the asylum boat in the context of other illegalized voyages and trafficked bodies and through unfinished movements of slavery, empire, and capital. Perera uses the cryptic exclamation by Friedrich Nietzsche in his book The Gay Science (1882) as starting point: “We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us. […] Now, little ship, look out!” The quote is also used as an epigraph to Paul Gilroy’s formative remapping of global modernity titled The Black Atlantic (1993), in which Gilroy discussed the slave ship as the ambiguous artifact of modernity and mobility.

Breaks with the usual responses within the terrain of struggle are explored in Part 4, titled “Demasking,” which demands to know what are the ways and means of attacking contemporary genealogies of discrimination, while demasking past colonialism and anti-Semitism. It comprises the following contributions:

Zoltán Kékesi, in his “Transpositions: Jews, Roma, and Other Aliens in the Radical-Right Culture in Hungary,” contends that racist imaginations about different “Others” do not simply replace, but rather, reinforce each other. His paper is a case study on racism in contemporary Hungary, and examines cultural practices connected to an anti-Semitic memorial site. He discloses how public performances at memorial sites create—through references to symbolic topographies and radical popular culture—a constellation of anti-Jewish, anti-Roma, and anti-immigrant discourses. He addresses the topic of different Others, employing notions of “white places,” ethnic territories, borders, and (im)migration.

C.A.S.I.T.A. (Loreto Alonso, Eduardo Galvagni, Diego del Pozo Barriuso) in conversation with Juan Guardiola, in their contribution “Diffractions at Borders,” uncovers the complexities that happen and appear around the passage between Morocco and Spain and its representations, using Vallas de la frontera en Ceuta y Melilla 1985–2014 (Infographics) [Fences at the border in Ceuta and Melilla 1985–2014 (Infographics)] as a point of departure. This work appropriates a set of existing prints and facsimiles from the workshops of the Spanish Army Geographical Service, and uses printed images to intervene with them. The work was presented in 2014 as part of the exhibition “Colonia Apócrifa: Imágenes de la Colonialidad en España” [Apocryphal colony: Images of coloniality in Spain], which questioned the meaning, production, and diffusion of colonial images in the history of Spanish art from the fifteenth century to the present day.

Neda Hosseinyar’s Politics of Fear is a critical reflection of slogans found on posters from political campaigns by different political parties in the EU. All parties use direct Islamophobic and anti-Muslim content to communicate their different Far Right political positions. The parties that use such rhetoric and are exposed by Hosseinyar include the National Front (France), Lega Nord (Italy), Dawn—National Coalition (Czech Republic), National Democracy (Spain), Freedom Party of Austria, pro NRW (Germany), National Democratic Party of Germany, Swiss People’s Party, and Vlaams Belang (Belgium).
Aneta Stojnić, in her contribution “(Dis)embodied Subjectivities and Technologies of Control,” analyzes the technologies of control in the context of contemporary Europe. Taking into the account the genealogy of global changes that have led to the current mass migrations, commonly known as the refugee crisis, she looks at processes of dehumanization that precede the mechanisms of subjugation. Contesting the “post-human hype,” she examines possibilities of detecting new subjectivities and embodied politics against the framework of biopolitics and necropolitics. She exposes the potentialities of liminal bodies and liminal spaces.

Çetin Gürer, in his contribution “A Stateless People against the State: The Kurdish Autonomy as a Limitation of Nation-State Power,” analyzes democratic autonomy as a model to limit the power of the Turkish state and discusses the Kurdish movement in Turkey. The movement proposes democratic autonomy as a framework to establish a new democratic administrative structure for Turkey and at the same time to solve the Kurdish question. This model assumes a historical paradox between (nation-)state and society, and it stands for defending society against the state. In this sense, the democratic autonomy looks like a model that limits the Turkish state to three spheres: administrative-constitutively, politically, and within society.

The book concludes with Part 5, titled “Disconnecting,” that aims to disconnect from the obvious mischievous state of bloody laissez faire neoliberal global capitalism to disclose hidden neoliberal imperial regimes of coloniality, subjugation, and subordination. When breaking with such regimes, we (re)connect to other struggles, materialities, imaginaries, and futures, reestablishing changed theoretical, epistemological, critical, and political horizons. The last part includes the following contributions:

Miguel González Cabezas questions, in Plus Ultra, the motto of the Spanish government that includes the words “plus ultra” (“further beyond”), and refers to agreements signed between Spain and several countries in Africa in order to control refugees and migrant influx in the EU. This plus ultra, that is a hegemonic externalization of the (Spain/EU) border, started with a special collaboration with Morocco for the control of the Spanish borders and the European ones within it. Morocco, in return, received financial support. This control has been also implemented by other countries, such as Italy, and the most recent case has been the 2016 EU polemical agreement with Turkey.

Joshua Simon, in his contribution “Phantom Politics in Palestine-Israel: From Double Negation to Double Erasure,” explores the current condition of deadlock in Israel and the unique regime that has been established since the occupation of Palestinian territories. This condition in Simon’s analysis highlights several characteristics of contemporary models of neoliberal sovereignty that are presently widespread worldwide, especially since 2001. The condition of Israel-Palestine continues and intensifies through a mechanism of heightened and contradictory internal relations. This intense political reality—in which everything cancels out everything else—is seen by Simon as a form of hyper-neutral, where repetitions and contradictions seem to dictate the conditions for a heightened standstill.

Ilya Budraitskis, in his contribution “The Russian Revolution in Dreams and Reality,” reflects on the one-hundred-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution of 1917 on today’s post-Soviet Russia and Europe. Budraitskis envisions a crisis characterized not only as an economic and social crisis, but also as an ideological crisis of the ruling elite, which has no vision of the future or the social and political evolvement of the country. The lack of understanding by the ruling elite of its own place in the ongoing history, as well as the deepening gap between the ruling elite on one side and most of Russian society on the other, is now overshadowed by an imaginary continuity with the historical idea of “great Russia.”

Adla Isanović, in her contribution “Sarajevo, Rotten Heart of Europe,” discloses the major European commemoration in 2014 to mark the one-hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The commemoration was organized as a multidisciplinary festival that included a number of cultural, sporting, educational, and scientific events, all presented under the same banner: “Sarajevo, Heart of Europe.” This title was given to Sarajevo by EU states to present the city as the center of European concerns and emotions, though this is not the case. Isanović contends that the present social, economic, and political reality of Sarajevo today is the reality of pure abandonment of Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EU to the extent that it is possible to state that the proclamation of Sarajevo as a heart is rather that of a “rotten heart.”

Hiroshi Yoshioka, in his contribution “Hiroshima, Fukushima and Beyond: Borders and Transgressions in Nuclear Imagination,” reviews the history of Japan since 1945 with regard to the collective and ambivalent imagination about the nuclear disaster, by revisiting several important representations in artistic expressions as well as in the popular culture. Yoshioka examines a couple of recent examples of art projects closely related to nuclear issues, especially the photographic series Hiroshima by Miyako Ishiuchi, and the video/performance works Japan Syndrome by Tadasu Takamine, which focuses on the question of Fukushima.
From Thinking to Striking the Border

This publication brings together a whole spectrum of ways in which to think of the political, economic, social, and legal structures that are organizing the life and death of refugees and the life and death of citizens and noncitizens. It shows how these two distinctive categories are produced, while second- and third-grade citizens are left somewhere in between. It shows the imperial-geopolitical administration and the way media and technology work these days to produce a specific hyper-digitalization. Palpably present on one side are the narratives of deportation, evacuation, marginalization, racialization, and the ways of empowering, counter-attacking, and thinking radically against such policies on the other. Finally, we see that the border is a construction that rapidly changes the relation between the center and the margin, and that when looking from the border, the hegemonic and ossified center easily collapses.

Therefore logic of the interrelation of these five parts in the book is from thinking to striking. I refer to the notion of “striking the border” to mean to strike against the border in order to clash with the border and to eventually destroy it.

Striking the border was formulated inside the Transitional Social Strike Platform, which regroups different organizations, collectives, groups, and initiatives in Europe to try to find different ways of crossing the border and obstructing it (the platform meetings were held in Poznań in 2015, and London and Ljubljana in 2017). The border prevents freedom of movement and prevents the transnational connection of labor that counters militarized capital.

The Migrant and Migration

In conclusion, through all parts of the book a new subjectivity can be detected—this is the migrant who, though under huge processes of dehumanization, ghettoization, and exploitation, encapsulates powerful agency for changing the ossified, exploitative Europe. The migrant and migration present a force of crossing over the border that demands a radical change of all old-modernity notions of community, democracy, subjectivity, representation, organization, and labor. Strikingly powerful is the relation between migrants and refugees and the perversely violent ways in which the imperial powers relate to different managements of migration and of refugees.

The migrant today is the fundamental category through which to rethink the meaning of citizenship, non-citizenship, management of life, and management of death, as well as the relationship between governmentality and sovereignty. Central to all these notions is the colonial/racial divide, the processes of discrimination, ghettoization, and exclclusions directly connected to racialization, historical colonialism, and contemporary coloniality.

At the border, through the border, and beyond the border, here and now, we think of a revolt, shift, transformation, insubordination, reversal, radical change, and even a revolution.


Exposing
Differential Inclusion of Syrian Refugees in Turkey
Institutions of Migration Management and Temporary Protection Regulation

Göksun Yazıcı

People are not made to live in borderline situations; they avoid them or to try to flee them as quickly as possible. And yet man encounters them everywhere, sees and feels them everywhere. Let us take the atlas of the world: it is all borders. Borders of oceans and continents. Deserts and forests. [...] And the borders of monarchies and republics? Kingdoms remote in time and lost civilizations? Human migration? The borders to which the Mongols reached. The Khazars. The Huns. How many victims, how much blood and suffering are connected with this business of borders!

—Ryszard Kapuściński, Imperium

Ryszard Kapuściński, the famous journalist and historian who reported on the decolonization process of most African countries and birth of new nation-states, defines borders as both natural (borders of oceans and continents) and historical (the borders of monarchies and republics); however, he tends to naturalize the existence of borders. According to him, border defense creates an endless country in this world called cemetery: “There is no end to the cemeteries of those who have been killed the world over in the defense of borders.” These words are written in Kapuściński’s 1994 book, Imperium, which is a report from two different historical periods of Russia as the USSR and as a post-Soviet country.

In the 1990s Kapuściński witnessed the birth of new nation-states and their wars. This is the historical background of his definition of borders; it exclusively belongs to the nation-state. That is why he defines them as perfectly exclusive and bloody. His definition of border defense also reveals the characteristics of the 1990s. Although the period was called the age of globalization, the framework for basic concepts was still in the context of nation-state. Ten years after he wrote these words, the face of the world had changed. The term “globalization,” which explains the period and obscures it at the same time, did not destroy nation-states but it altered them and the functions of borders. Migration also has new content—new management features are added to the whole process to create new in-between spaces, new practices, new statuses, and so forth. It is not just about crossing borders, but it is more about a management process for both: for migrants and those managing the borders.

1 Although the word “man” could refer to the human race in general, we should be critical of a gender-neutral language that minimizes assumptions about the social gender.
3 Ibid., 57.
According to Kapuściński, this attitude toward borders is part of human nature. However, as post-structural philosophy has shown us, human nature has no essence but has historical content: it is historically constructed; it is not an ahistorical, eternal entity. In other words, human attitude toward borders reveals nothing but a new global-labor regime. Yes, people still try to avoid or try to flee their own countries under threatening circumstances in an attempt to reach safe and sustainable lives. Kapuściński sees borders as absolutely exclusive, absolutely human-proof; however, today we see that thousands of people are crossing borders.

Nowadays, borders do not aim to exclude people but are used to try to control migration. They are porous, and governments try to select migrants not only in terms of “regular” and “irregular” but in terms of “qualified” and “unqualified.” This essay aims to discuss the case of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. In 2011 Turkey opened borders for Syrian refugees without calling them refugees, and it established new institutions to manage migration. “Migration management” was the new term that changed the exclusive nature of borders. In the case of Turkey, migration was not meant to be stopped but to be managed. However, as we will see, this new phenomenon belongs to our time and not just to Turkey: migration management does not aim to stop but to slow down the speed of migration and to control it.

The difference between the terms “refugee” and “migrant” is quite controversial. Refugees are defined as people who have to migrate because of “political” reasons, such as war or other deadly political events, however, migrants are defined as people who are looking for better economic opportunities without having political problems. This division echoes the strict border between the economic and political that was drawn up by classical economics itself. Its aim was to “liberate” economy from political intervention while claiming that the economy is not political in order to hide class distinctions. However, like the feminist motto that suggests the private is political, class status is political, lack of better economic opportunities is political, and poverty political. In other words, the border between political and economic is political. That is why this essay will attempt to break down this border and the terms “refugees” and “migrants” will be used interchangeably, since political disasters destroy livelihoods and are therefore economic events, and because a lack of economic opportunity and class status are political events, too.

Although Turkey was proud of its “open-border” policy (the Turkey-Syria border was closed in March 2015), this case revealed that a border is never a local institution in this global world. As we need to think of the EU-Turkey refugee deal that extends EU borders toward Turkey and shifts the responsibility of bordering to a third country. Before starting to discuss the case, we need to define a basic term: “differential inclusion.”

Exclusive / Inclusive Border

As the labor regime changes, the definition of migration and borders changes as well. The idea of a migration regime emerges to open up a space for negotiating practices. It is obvious that a migration regime does not target the exclusion of migrants, but rather reduces them to their economic dimension and in so doing exploits them. In other words, the aim is not to close the border of rich countries but to build up a system of barriers that ultimately serves to include migrant work. Borders are characterized by an ambivalence that derives from their internal and external functions. The crisis of the nation-state continuously dislocates borders: “Borders are never purely local institutions, never reducible to a simple history of conflicts and agreements between neighboring powers and groups, but in fact are always global, a way of dividing the world into regions, therefore places, therefore a way of configuring the world or making it representable, as the history of maps and mapping techniques testifies. Borders are constitutive of the transindividual relationship to the world, or being in the world, when it is predicated on a plurality of subjects.”

In the global world, borders do not function for total exclusion, but for regulated inclusion: “Differential inclusion describes how inclusion in a sphere, society of realm can involve various degrees of subordination, rule, discrimination, racism, disenfranchisement, exploitation, and segmentation.” And what’s more, “differential inclusion registers the multiplication of migration control devices within, at and beyond the borders of nation-state (point systems, externalization, conditional freedom of movement, fast-tracked border crossing for elites, short term labor contracts) and the multiplication of status they imply. Link between migration control and regimes of labor management that create different degrees of precarity, vulnerability, and freedom by granting and closing access to resources and rights according to economic, individualizing, and racist rationales. New internal borders.”

Turkey’s open-border policy ended in March 2015, after it accepted almost three million Syrians. Accepting them into the country did not mean including them in the country; on the contrary, Turkey has its own limitations to define the refugee status, as will be discussed below, and was reluctant to see Syrians
as refugees. Turkey invented new institutions for migration management. In other words, Turkey became an experimental case for differential inclusion and its institution. Below, we are discussing how Turkey invented migration-management institutions, new legal frameworks, temporary protection, and a protection regime that help to include and exclude Syrians at the same time, and that resulted in differentiated inclusion.

Turkish Case: Institutions of Migration Management and Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR)

Turkey maintains a “geographical limitation” to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and denies refugees from non-European countries. In April 2013, Turkey adopted an EU-inspired new Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), which established a legal framework for asylum in Turkey and affirms the country’s obligations toward all persons in need of international protection, regardless of country of origin. Article 91 of LFIP envisioned the possibility of the implementation of a “temporary protection” regime in situations of a “mass influx” of refugees. Therefore LFIP for the first time introduced a legal concept of temporary protection under Turkish law and thereby provided the basic underpinning for Turkey’s de facto temporary protection practices with regard to refugees from Syria since March 2011. While the LFIP itself fully came into force in April 2014, it was not until October 22, 2014, that the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) was finally published.7

The LFIP also created Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) to take charge of migration. Turkey implements a temporary protection regime for refugees from Syria that grants them the legal right to stay as well as access to basic rights and services. DGMM is responsible for the registration and status decisions within the scope of the temporary protection regime, which is based on Article 91 of the LFIP and the TPR.

There is a problem regarding this temporary protection: Syrians refugees under temporary protection cannot apply for international protection, because they are “treated” as being accepted under protection anyway. So, they cannot apply to UNHCR for international protection if they have an AFAD card—which shows they are settled in Turkey and that Turkey is a safe third country. (Just to state that Turkey as a safe third country that provides protection is just a European dream that Europe invented for its own sake—and this point will be elaborated on later in this text.) Therefore the impossibility to apply for international protection while having temporary protection is the most controversial point of the temporary protection refugee deal between the EU and Turkey. This deal accepts Turkey as a secure and protective country that means there is no need for international protection. Most of the Syrian refugees who have tried to escape from Turkey—termed “irregular migrants”—are those that try to reach the Greek islands to apply for international protection.

That said, the provincial DGMM directorates have only recently become fully operational and have so far delivered only a small number of procedure and status decisions on international protection applicants. The UNHCR assumes a key role in Turkey as a “complementary” protection actor.9

The DGMM is the agency in charge of registering and granting status to refugees from Syria within the scope of the temporary protection regime. Turkey’s Disaster and Relief Management Agency (AFAD) is in charge of the camps set up for refugees from Syria, and also assumes a coordinating role regarding the provision of rights and services to the non-camp population of temporary protection refugees. UNHCR in Turkey assumes a limited supplementary role in relation to the population subject to the temporary protection regime. All nationals of Syria and stateless Palestinians originating from Syria are eligible for temporary protection in Turkey. In other words, the TPR entails ground for exclusion from temporary protection as well as the cancellation of temporary protection status.

In order to access temporary protection status, prospective beneficiaries must register with DGMM and obtain a Temporary Protection Identification Card. Persons benefitting from temporary protection are barred from making a separate individual “international protection” request. The LFIP provides three types of individual international protection status in accordance with Turkey’s “geographical limitation” policy on the 1951 Refugee Convention: 1. Persons who fall within the refugee definition in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention and come from a “European country of origin” qualify for refugee status; 2. Persons who fall within the refugee definition in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention but come from a so-called non-European country of origin are instead offered

9 For information on the 1951 Refugee Convention, see http://www.unhcr.org/3b662ca10.
10 Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention: “Definition of the term ‘refugee’ A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who: (I) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization; Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfill the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section.”
“conditional refugee” status under LFIP;” 3. Persons who do not fulfill the eligibility criteria for either refugee status or conditional refugee status under LFIP, who would however be subjected to death penalty or torture in country of origin if returned, qualify for “subsidiary protection” status under LFIP. The Turkish legal status of “subsidiary protection.”"

**Differential Inclusion: Limited Rights attached to Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR)**

**Shelter**

The TPR does not provide a right to government-provided shelter for “temporary protection beneficiaries.” However, Article 37 TPR authorizes AFAD to build camps to accommodate temporary protection beneficiaries. These camps are officially referred to as “temporary accommodation centers” and Article 24 TPR authorizes DGMM to allow temporary protection beneficiaries to reside outside the camp in provinces to be determined by the DGMM. It also commits that out of temporary protection beneficiaries living outside the camps, those who are economically needy may be accommodated in other facilities identified by the government.

**Freedom of Movement**

When the TPR was published on October 22, 2014, this regulation left the decision to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement of temporary protection beneficiaries if deemed necessary to the discretion of the temporary protection and DGMM. As per Article 10 TPR, in the temporary protection declaration decision, the Board of Ministers may choose to contain the implementation of temporary protection measures to a specific region within Turkey as opposed to nationwide implementation. As per Article 15 TPR, the Board of Ministers has the authority to order “limitations” on temporary protection beneficiaries to reside outside the camp in provinces to be determined by the DGMM. It also commits that out of temporary protection beneficiaries living outside the camps, those who are economically needy may be accommodated in other facilities identified by the government.

On August 29, 2015, a DGMM written instruction signed by the Minister of Interior was circulated to the governorates across Turkey, specifically ordering the provincial authorities in the institutions to carry out a range of measures to control and prevent the movement of Syrians inside Turkey."

**Health Care**

All registered temporary protection beneficiaries, whether residing in the camps or outside the camps, are covered under Turkey’s general health insurance scheme and have the right to access health-care services provided by public health-care service providers free of charge. People who are eligible for temporary protection, but have not yet completed their registration, have access only to emergency medical services and health services pertaining to communicable diseases as delivered by primary health-care institutions.

Temporary protection beneficiaries are only entitled to access health-care services in the province where they are registered. However, where appropriate treatment is not available in the province of registration or where deemed necessary for other medical reasons, the person concerned may be referred to another province. For emergency medical conditions, temporary protection beneficiaries can receive health-care services without any restrictions on location. It is important to point out that Syrian nationals who reside in Turkey on the basis of a regular “residence permit” and therefore are not registered as temporary protection beneficiaries, cannot benefit from free health-care services available to those under the temporary protection regime."

**Education**

Under Turkish law, “basic education” for children consists of twelve years, divided into three levels of four years each. All children in the Turkish jurisdiction, including foreign nationals, have the right to access basic education services delivered by public schools. All children registered under temporary protection have the right to be registered at public schools for the purpose of basic education. However, in practice there are continuing difficulties and shortcomings in the access of Syrian children to educational services. The children accommodated in the camps have unimpeded and virtually full access to basic education mainly at temporary education centers administered inside the camps, which are schools under the supervision of Turkish Ministry of Education, provide instruction in Arabic by Syrian teachers. On the other hand, 11 See “Types of International Protection,” last modified May 25, 2015, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/types-of-international-protection_917_1063_5781_icerik.

12 DGMM written instruction, no.55327416-000-22771, August 29, 2015, on “The Population Movements of Syrians within the Scope of Temporary Protection,” signed by Sebahattin Ozturk, Minister of Interior.

13 Derived from Article 27 TPR, December 18, 2014, AFAD Circular, no. 2014/4 on “Administration of Services to Foreigners under the Temporary Protection Regime”; and November 4, 2015, Ministry of Health directive on “Healthcare Services to Be Provided to Temporary Protection Beneficiaries.”
children of school age outside the camps have the option of either attending a public school in the locality, which teach the Turkish school curriculum and instruct in Turkish, or one of the many private schools run by Syrian charities, which are classified as temporary education centers by the Ministry of Education like the schools in the camps.14

The EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

Turkey and the EU confirmed the joint plan on November 29, 2015. On March 7, 2016, Turkey furthermore agreed to accept the rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece, and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. Turkey and the EU also agreed to continue “stepping up measures against migrant smugglers” and “welcomed the establishment of the NATO activity on the Aegean Sea.” At the same time, Turkey and the EU recognize that further swift and determined efforts are needed. This deal was the reaction against “irregular” migration of mostly Syrian refugees. According to IOM statistics, arrivals by sea and deaths in the Mediterranean from January 1 to December 21, 2015, are as follows.

Arrivals by sea and deaths in the Mediterranean: January 1–December 21, 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Arrival</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>150,317 (IOM est.)</td>
<td>2,889 (Central Medit. route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>816,752</td>
<td>731 (Eastern Medit. route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3,845</td>
<td>72 (Western Medit. and Western African routes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>971,183</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,692</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The refugee deal between the EU and Turkey determined how the EU decided to manage their “borders.” This deal was criticized by human- and refugee-rights activists, because it left no place for “irregular” migrants to apply for international protection, which is against basic human rights. Although some people went to stations and borders to welcome refugees, hostility against them and the rise of racism emerged later in the summer of 2015.


about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018.

7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.

8) The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession process as set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015. They welcomed the opening of Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during the Netherlands presidency. They welcomed that the Commission will put forward a proposal to this effect in April. Preparatory work for the opening of other Chapters will continue at an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member States’ positions in accordance with the existing rules.

9) The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be more safe. 18

**New Era: What Is Next?**

After the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, Turkey declared a state of emergency to “protect Turkish democracy,” however, the state of emergency targeted democratic opponents, especially the Kurdish democratic movement and progressives. Academics who were arrested signed a peace petition; the arrested writers and threatened progressive movements are clear signs of the undemocratic moves of the state of emergency. These moves created tension between the EU and Turkey. The Turkish government threatened the EU and demanded that they “open borders again to let Syrians cross EU borders.” 19

This statement showed that Turkey had always used Syrians as “leverage” against the EU, while it already accepted to be a guardian of its borders by EU-Turkey refugee deal. This also showed that Turkey never aimed to promote human rights or to help refugees. In November 2016, the Turkish government started to accept some Syrians as Turkish citizens, especially teachers and doctors. Since the Turkish government suspended almost six hundred thousand people after the coup attempt, Syrians are expected to replace these suspended people by being moved to empty places. In other words, Turkey uses Syrian refugees not only against EU but also against host communities, against people of the Turkish republic by, for example, changing the demography of Alevi and Kurdish areas especially. Although DGMM are calling some Syrians to apply for citizenship, this call has not been announced publicly because of potential reaction from Turkish citizens—especially by the Turkish middle class. However, granting citizenship to Syrians does not mean that they are also granting them basic rights, because under the state of emergency Turkish citizens have almost no democratic rights. Turkey has always tried to solve the “problem” of Syrian refugees either by creating temporary protection—which is one in its kind—or by accepting them as citizens, which means the Turkish government does not have to worry about the basic rights of refugees because Turkish citizens do not have them. However, the government never recognizes them as refugees, because recognizing them as refugees means that the Turkish state must become the protector of basic rights. When it becomes the protector of basic rights, it has to be democratic toward its own Kurdish, the Kurdish democratic movement, and other minorities. In other words, Turkey has its own democratic limitations for recognizing refugees with which most activists are struggling.

“Turkish hospitality” is a phrase used by the Turkish government with regard to Syrians in Turkey who are always referred to as “guests” and “brothers.” Since Syrian refugees were backed by Turkish government protection in domestic political discourse, nothing serious happened against them. This view of a “peaceful Turkey” for Syrian refugees is changing nowadays. It is not only the EU who is employing racist discourse against Syrians—see the rise of the right wing in many European countries—but racist discourse is also rising among Turkish people. In a field study by Istanbul Kemerburgaz University and Kent University, 224 Turkish people have been interviewed about Syrian refugees in Istanbul in the last few months of 2016. 20

According to this study, 72 percent of participants are disturbed by Syrian refugees when they see them in the streets; 83 percent of participants believe that Syrians brought new diseases; 91 percent of participants believe that they are unemployed because of Syrian refugees; 94 percent of participants think that rents are getting higher because of Syrians; 86 percent of participants believe that Syrians are mostly criminals or beggars; 74 percent of participants believe that Syrian children reduce the quality of education. Overall, 76 percent of participants do not like Syrians, 49 percent pity Syrians, 18 percent are afraid of Syrians, 14 percent are disgusted by Syrians, and 12 percent hate Syrians. Finally, 54 percent of participants want to organize anti-Syrian “go home” marches, and 55 percent of participants want Syrians to be sent to their countries before the war is over.

As seen in the high percentage of hostile answers above, the EU is not alone in developing racist discourse against Syrians. The superficial picture of a

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“peaceful Turkey for Syrians” drawn by the EU to make Turkey a safe third country that enables all “irregular Syrian migrants” to be sent to Turkey, is going to be disrupted soon. Not only because of a long state of emergency that brings undemocratic decrees for Turkish citizens, but also because of unhappy Turkish citizens who blame Syrian refugees for their unhappiness. Turkish citizens know that Syrians are supported by the Turkish state and that their protection is “state policy.” That is why they keep quiet about Syrians and those living in their country; however, as the above surveys show, the silence of Turkish citizens in their views toward Syrians is not free from hatred, disgust, or other unpleasant feelings. Like the United States and other countries in the EU, Turkish society is not immune to racism or hatred. For the moment, silence hides unpleasant feelings!

It is not only Syrians but also minorities, including political opponents, who are not secure in Turkey. Turkey as a safe third country that provides protection is just a European dream that Europe invented for its own sake.

To conclude, I have to draw attention to a new process for Syrians’ refugees in Turkey (it started in November 2016) that is called “exceptional citizenship.” This citizenship is exceptional because it is not asking Syrian refugees to have five-year residency permit to apply for citizenship—which is the regular process to become a Turkish citizen for any foreigner. This exception is not widely known because the government is aware that their voters do not want Syrians to be Turkish citizens. It is not for every Syrian under temporary protection. According to DGMM, doctors, teachers, engineers (educated and qualified ones), and investors are invited to apply for citizenship via SMS. This is an obvious discriminative process directed toward Syrians refugees, since the other groups that live under temporary protection live with plenty of difficulties—this is another face of differential inclusion! The estimated number for citizenship is around twenty thousand. This process is not well known in Turkey either. The Turkish government does not inform its citizens about it, since Turkish citizens might disturb and disrupt the process and this so-called peaceful co-existence. Whatever the reactions might be, the Turkish government grants citizenship for educated and rich Syrians without offering much protection for the rest of Syrian population in Turkey in terms of rights and freedom.

Literature


We remember that 17 years ago, just after the black-blue government—a coalition between the conservative ÖVP and the far-right FPÖ—was formed, Pierre Bourdieu sent a video message to Austria.1

We remember that 17 years ago the Lisbon Strategy was formulated. Its strategic aim was to make the EU a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based economic region.

We remember that it wasn’t until 15 years ago that Europe’s last existing colonial empire, whose capital was Lisbon, formally came to an end with the independence of East Timor.

We remember that 17 years ago the black-blue government could only gain access to the president’s offices through an underground passageway.

We remember the Thursday demonstrations in Vienna.

We remember that Bourdieu addressed progressive Austrians in his message. We remember we felt he was not addressing us; and yet he was.

We remember that 27 years ago George W. Bush declared a new world order.

We remember that 26 years ago Caetano Veloso wrote the song “Fora da ordem”: Something is out of order, out of the new world order.

We remember that in his video message 17 years ago, Bourdieu talked about Tony Blair and his comment on Blair’s position at that time during the meeting to formulate the Lisbon Strategy was: “On European matters he is even more reactionary than a right-wing French president.”

We remember neoliberalism being called a conservative revolution.

We remember criticism of neoliberalism not necessarily being a criticism of capitalism.

We remember an evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy seven years ago concluded that it had failed. We remember that the follow-up strategy Europe 2020 aims, among other things, at improving the legal framework for employment and making this more flexible.

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1 The style of this text was inspired by the book I Remember by Joe Brainard. It refers also to the poem “A Catedral de Colónia,” written by Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna. A first version of this text was written by Rubia Salgado in dialog with other maiz women* (maiz Frauen*), and published in the book Silent University: Towards a Transversal Pedagogy (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016). maiz is a self-organized integration center by and for migrant women established in Linz. This present version was reworked by Rubia Salgado and Gergana Mineva.
We remember that part-time working is a widespread phenomenon.

We remember that 17 years ago one quarter of working women in Austria were employed part-time.

We remember that 7 years ago 32 percent of women in Austria were employed part-time.

We remember that two years ago a record was set in Austria: the proportion of women working part-time was 48 percent.

We remember that, compared with Austrian women, migrant women are twice as likely to be living in poverty.

We remember asylum policy.

We remember the term “de facto refugee.” Löschnak was Austrian interior minister at the time and it was 25 years ago.

We remember a television report 12 years ago on the construction of high barbed-wire fences to seal off the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in order to prevent refugees from Africa getting through to EU countries via this route.

We remember that one of the men interviewed in this television report looked up into the camera and told the reporters and a whole lot of future viewers that much higher fences could be built and much deeper trenches could be dug. They would still find a way, they would still keep on trying and they would get through.

We remember the images of men taken prisoner, sitting on the floor with their arms and legs tied together.

We remember sitting in our apartment in front of the television set, unable to move our hands and feet for anger and shame.

We remember that 12 years later, the Austrian government ordered the construction of a border fence.

We remember Bourdieu’s advice regarding the black-blue government 17 years ago, not to dictate but to learn our own lessons.

We remember the shift to the Right.

We remember that 17 years after Bourdieu’s video message, the right-wing FPÖ became the second strongest party in the elections for the regional parliament in Vienna.

We remember that 17 years after Bourdieu’s video message, the candidate of the right-wing FPÖ almost became elected for president of Austria.

We remember when it was noted in the evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy seven years ago that in order to present the EU as an attractive region for investment and jobs, the member states would need to make a contribution, which would include a policy of active competition and reducing benefit payments.

We remember that in 2015, intellectuals argued that an explicit social policy was the only alternative for Europe.

We remember the EU’s policy of austerity.

We remember Greece.

We remember Spain.

We remember the multitude.

We remember the chain of equivalence.

We remember those who own no part of things.

We remember government from below.

We remember somos malas y podemos ser peores.

We remember social movements.

We remember repeatedly asking ourselves which movements intellectuals meant by this.

We remember Bourdieu thought then that intellectuals should ask themselves whether and how they had become collaborators with or accomplices to the developments in Austria.

We remember that social struggles were and are bureaucratized and institutionalized.
We remember that 17 years ago Bourdieu spoke in favor of effective symbolic actions to be developed collectively along with artists by engaging with the causes and manifestations of conservative hegemony.

We remember that I agreed with this then.

We remember that after the black-blue government was formed, the links between anti-racism, art and activism in Austria became more evident.

We remember wondering how the effect of symbolic actions against hegemony might be recognized.

We remember that Gramsci founded a party.

We remember that we had to try to create new structures of resistance and a new internationalism.

We remember that a disabled man who was active in an organization for rights for the disabled angrily blamed us for only writing about migrants and refugees.

We remember our discomfort.

We remember we told him he was right.

We remember the necessity of groups of political activists working together.

We remember that democracy is in crisis.

We remember carrying the word in the mouth. Cologne. Chewing.

We remember the poem “A Catedral de Colônia,” written by Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna 32 years ago.

As this cathedral is me
Atrocious—godless
Christian—Jew
Black—plebeian

As this cathedral is the living body of History
And the history of Me itself.3

We remember that it took six centuries to build the Cologne Cathedral.

We remember asking: Whose History?

We remember the cathedral of Cologne in 2015.

The Cologne Cathedral interrupts itself
fractures itself.4

We remember that there were no civil rights for Protestants in Cologne until the end of the eighteenth century.

We remember the deportation of the Jewish people from Cologne 592 years ago.

We remember Hitler proclaiming the “end of the democratic mass rape” in Cologne 83 years ago.

We remember the eternal carillons within the bullets of Krupp’s cannons.

And the cathedral is here
seductive
defeated
conqueror
devour
sphinx
white
out of snow
and blood
tempting
poets
lovers
prayers
cannons
armies
of angels
young
and old
demons
defending it
defending us
defending me*
We remember taking distance.

We remember chewing the borders between the perspectives of looking at Cologne and its cathedral: then and now.

We remember that since Bourdieu’s video message was sent, approx. 30,000 people have died in the Mediterranean Sea.

We remember that having to write “approx.” because there are no exact figures available is an immeasurable scandal.

We remember that the EU’s policy of austerity is the cause of social deprivation.

We remember that the struggles against inequality and discrimination were and are not always fought in a manner that respected gender equality.

We remember that despite all the mantras of there being no alternative, knowledge does exist about how this predominant, violent, murderous order might possibly be changed.

We remember that hardship is distributed very unevenly across the globe.

We remember that most of the people who live in poverty can be found in countries that are former European colonies.

We remember the economization of education.

We remember voices expressing the belief that education should develop in alignment with the transformation of society. It should keep pace with the rapid changes of our times and offer an appropriate response to new demands.

We remember globalization, knowledge society, employability, competitiveness, human capital, and other key concepts.

We remember that the commercial interests of the economy have the highest priority, even when disguised as promoting social cohesion and protecting the environment, as is formulated in the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 or in its current new edition.

We remember education being understood as a means of transforming social circumstances.

We remember the question: How can education be conceived and realized as an instrument of resistance?

We remember that Hanna Meißner defined agency as the capacity to respond to circumstances not only reproducing them.

We remember that education can open up possibilities of democratic action, not conditions of action.

We remember that acknowledging education’s inadequacy with regard to the aim of transforming society in the direction of a new hegemony does not mean that education cannot play any part in this process.

We remember that emancipatory- and critical-education practice is not reduced to simply exposing reality. It leads to organizing a practice of change.

We remember that critical-educational work also calls for structural change.

We remember reciprocal pedagogy and pedagogy of migration.

We remember that Stuart Hall mentioned 17 years ago that “the [white] English aren’t racist because they hate blacks but because without the blacks, they don’t know who they are.”

We remember the tireless effort to formulate questions which would interrupt and examine the processes of manufacture and reproduction of knowledge about the “others” and how they are different.

We remember during teacher training and development, repeatedly talking about the urgent need to examine and question knowledge about those who are learning with respect to how this functions in creating “others” and its discriminatory effects.

We remember Frigga Haug and the need to ask questions in which one contradicts oneself.

We remember asking ourselves: What counts as knowledge? When? Where? Why?

We remember the production of knowledge challenging ruling structures.

We remember the limits of our Western knowledge.

We remember the denial of knowledge through violent processes.
We remember Gayatri C. Spivak writing 27 years ago about permitted ignorance—an ignorance which would reinforce one's own position of power within the (post)colonial context.

We remember that three years ago maiz founded the University of the Ignorant.

We remember that we wrote then that everyone is ignorant as long as reserves of knowledge are administered and knowledge continues to be produced without any critical consideration of the knowledge's dimension of power and the violent processes of legitimizing or delegitimizing it and without applying the consequences resulting from this in practice.

We remember that since 2005 (some) migrants in Germany have been legally obliged to complete German and orientation classes.

We remember that Karin Jurschik made the film Zertifikat Deutsch eight years ago.

We remember that the Integrationsvereinbarung (Integration agreement) has been in force in Austria since 2006. Many migrants are obliged to take integration courses and pass tests.

We remember that in these integration courses, everyday topics with citizenship elements and topics to inspire essential European and democratic values must also be taught in addition to a basic knowledge of the German language.

We remember that maiz is the only organization in Austria that refuses to conduct integration courses and hold integration tests on behalf of the interior ministry, which caters to racist and repressive integration and migration policies.

We remember that since 2016, those granted asylum and subsidiary protection in Austria are obliged to attend values and orientation courses “governing coexistence in Austria.” Anyone who does not fulfill these prescribed integration obligations can expect sanctions.

We remember the cap imposed on the number of refugees.

We remember bolt cutters.

We remember the culture of welcome.
Literature


In this essay, I open with the question of how to account for necropolitics in Eastern Europe. The notion of necropolitics comes from the work of Marina Gržinić and Šefik Tatlić. Starting with their analysis and differentiation between biopolitics (Foucault) and necropolitics (Mbembe), and accepting the claim that the analysis of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has to start with necro-rather than biopolitics, my aim is to situate with their aid the dyad bio/necro in CEE.

Gržinić and Tatlić offer a notion of necropolitics: they literally expand the border of necropolitics. Consequently, necropolitics can retroactively serve analytical purposes in thinking about CEE since the rise of neoliberalism and the application of the “shock doctrine” (Naomi Klein), where CEE is itself revealed as a necropolitics. What is more, Gržinić and Tatlić’s toolkit suggests that a retroactive analysis of racialization can be unearthed.

Necropolitics should not be privileged in the field of area studies and confined within that framework (as is the “Cold War” discipline for the study of non-capitalist societies in the US). Therefore necropolitics can and should be applied to Latin America, too, as a laboratory of a “parallel regime of necropolitics.” How realistic is it to claim that the influence of US imperialism on Latin America was indeed a necropolitics is open to debate, yet a retroactive reading of necropolitics as the analytical tool par excellence to topoi other than CEE holds a promising potential for various research programs (at least for those orbiting around the decolonial option and/or dependency theory).

But is necropolitics not related to colonialism and race? And how to account for the analytic dismissal of race in CEE scholarship? A brief detour to “Balkanism” is needed here. Maria Todorova claims that Balkanism does not operate...
through race but through ethnicities.” In a recent discussion of Todorova’s ethnicity-privileging explanatory model (whereby race is a “misplaced racism”), Dušan Bjelić inadvertently opens space for the retroactive and regionalized use of necropolitics à la Gržinić:

In this internal European transaction between its West and its East, where-by the West for its part had to incorporate the East’s marginal histories into its own historical legacy, should not then by extension the reverse be true? Should not the West’s history of colonialism be the historical legacy of Eastern Europe and the Balkans also? Or does it mean something altogether different: that the Balkans “lack of colonial predicament” would define the EU’s historic legacy? Should we not theorize the former East European, Marxist and non-colonial states’ refusal to accept EU refugee quotas for non-white Muslims as racially motivated? Yet how can we speak of race and apartheid in relation to countries with no colonial and racial relations?  

Gržinić’s notions of necropolitics and/as racialization speaks exactly to Bjelić’s concern. So does Fatima El-Tayeb’s discussion of European “racelessness.”* While Gržinić’s analysis extends to a post-1989 world, this can be offset by deploying El-Tayeb’s critique of European race blindness to Balkanism and the Ottoman and communist past as well:

European theoretical framework […] constantly externalizes race, i.e. places it outside of the domain of what needs to be theorized. Accordingly, the continental European Left has produced no theory of racialization. Instead, class remains central—which is ironic since class is deeply racialized in Europe. This ongoing racial amnesia, which is made possible through the erasure of the history of European racism and the history of Europeans of color, makes unspeakable the processes of internal racialization and the ways in which they are inseparable from the aftereffects of European colonialism. In this way, neocolonial economic structures increasingly posit racialized communities as disposable populations. […] Europe, after all, is the only place that white people are native to; where they are not settler colonialists. This allows the continued claim that racist and colonialist oppression, while admittedly committed by (descendants of) Europeans, has no impact on Europe itself.*  

If Balkanism literature’s model disallows the conceptualization of racism because of the Balkans’ “lack of colonial predicament,”* then Gržinić’s necropolitics and/as racialization allows it to include a post-1989 analysis of the (neo)colonial predicament, while El-Tayeb accommodates the possibility to demarcate the methodological nationalism of Balkanism’s racial blindness lying dormant in Todorova’s model. The moral reticence in terms such as “ethnic cleansing” or “ethnic warfare” is here outdone by necropolitics.

### The Island

The most pretentious political project in European history that claims to secure—and often militarize—the (moral) border of thought is “liberalism.” The peculiar pretension of political liberalism is, more specifically, that the said border is maintained on the principles of universalized Enlightenment that have undergone cathexis. There is hardly anything left of this unscrupulous claiming of the humanist patrolling of the border of thought when faced with the spatial pornography of Lesbos and Lampedusa.

The securing of a peaceful European project extends to the vulgar management of the island today. Today the island can be conceptualized as both a site of social utopianism and political snuff. It is, I suggest, a paradigmatic space for deploying necropolitics in the East. The island becomes the dumping ground of Enlightenment: trapped between the island and the sea, migrants are transported between the state of emergency and the war state. An island is a duplicitous kind of “border.” Deleuze differentiated between two kinds of islands: continental islands, which are accidental, and oceanic ones, which are originary and essential. He states that “islands are either from before or for after humankind.” Neither kind of island is an authentic refuge for the human. In a state of emergency, the oceanic island in particular implies de-population: “Those people who come to the island indeed occupy and populate it; but in reality, were they sufficiently separate, sufficiently creative, they would give the island only a dynamic image of itself, a consciousness of the movement which produced the island, such that through them the island would in the end become conscious of itself as deserted and unpeopled. The island would be only the dream of humans, and humans, the pure consciousness of the island.”*  

Deleuze’s suggestion that humans could be, in reverse, “the pure consciousness of the island,” has become an unspeakably ugly satire: the humans using islands as makeshift zones of salvation today are pushed back to the state of the

9 Ibid., 9.  
10 Todorova’s phrase, as used by Bjelić.  
11 On the “war state,” see Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 66.  
13 Ibid., 10.
island's unconscious. The island is thus not a “zone” anymore, but a border: if the border gradually became the territory after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the pushback of migrants—today's Europe's others—signifies their stratified genderization and infantilization, whereby the border zones even of an island demonstrate that “the whole territory itself is the border now.” The militarization of the island as the border par excellence, as the avatar of an unthinkable type of utopian populace, is now in the hands of marine police: the unpeopled island is the island of the police. The moral liberal state offers itself as the guardian of a denuded dream of intransitivity. The island's consciousness remains depopulated at all costs.

As the paradigmatic topos of exercising necropolitics, the island offers a symptomatology of self-colonizing, racialized enlightenment. Let’s not forget that the EU was a kind of self-contained biopolitical island of the West. While the European project was safely held as a Western European idea, the reasons to fret over its tenability were next to nil. As soon as it opened to the “semi-periphery” after 1989 (with the notable former exception of Greece), there appeared troubles in maintaining a correspondence theory of truth concerning its two terms: patrolling the border of humanist liberal thought and securing the border of allegedly humanist states. Opening up to the “semi-periphery” retarded the liberal epistemology of correspondence (modeled on the idea that any statement of truth corresponds to an actual state of affairs), and questioned the parallelism between those terms.

The island and the sea became a two-tier protectorate of zoning the unthinkable: necropolitics as the repetition of death. Maurizio Albahari rehearses the necropolitical formula of Gržinić while describing the failure of such improvised correspondence theory between the border of liberal humanism and the one of the liberal state: “When it kills or let die, the state does so, explicitly or not, in the name and on behalf of a ‘population’ to be defended. Yet in doing so, it also reinforces its own legitimate and moral existence as sovereign, something else from society or ‘the nation,’ detached (but not extraneous or separate) and therefore a meta-pastor, or rather the meta-pastor—together with the church, at least in Italy. Symbolically and practically, borders become indispensable to nation and state, in mutually reinforcing relationship with this kind of sovereignty.”

Eastern Death

Necropolitics thus relies on the repetition of death. The point of a theory of repetition (of death), offered by Gržinić and Tatlić, is not only to manifest its bloody counterpart of the real but to offer a line of differentiation—literally a border. If one refuses to acknowledge that today there is a differentiation within the very category of life itself, because biopolitics has morphed into necropolitics, then one gives over the power to the masters of the unthinkable. For Gržinić this bifurcation of life is a double form of death, always extracting surplus value from populations: “Death from real massive impoverishment, and a symbolic death from capital interventions.” Here is the moment when the points of comparison with Foucault’s biopolitics differ. While biopolitics can be formalized as “make live and let die,” Gržinić’s necropolitics takes the formulaic expression of “let live and make die.” It is the laissez-faire of dying. As Albahari concludes: “These two modalities of power, to make live and let die, are not mutually exclusive. Rather, undemocratic, illiberal, coercive, and lethal modalities of power [...] are thought to be integral and necessary to liberal-democratic national and EU governance, at least in the current predicament.”

Gržinić’s above-quoted formula empowers us to say that the research on CEE’s transition to capitalism has to start with necropolitics. Understanding this double formula entails the continued exposure of biopolitics as a Western epistemological arsenal. The lines drawn between the postcolonial world and Eastern Europe are obvious when we juxtapose the postcolonial world’s form of “private indirect government,” and its coterminous expansion in Eastern Europe as a mere economic determinism. And the logic of this determinism is driven by privatization: the exploited resource of the postcolonial world become exemplary in Eastern European policy. In both cases there is the phenomenon of the privatization of violence through the economy. These are the Others of Western biopolitics, but they are not its main addressees. Gržinić’s suggestion is that biopolitics always contains the war “at home”: it “capitalizes and governs the conscience in the First Capitalist World.” This is the meaning of welfarism in the West before the EU expansion. As soon as biopolitics cannot be contained in the conditions of Western liberal governance, the conditions of the contained need to change, which inevitably produces a backlash against the newcomers (i.e., the post-1989 EU-accession countries) of welfarism. In turn, as soon as the newcomers of welfarism have to accom-

14 Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 59.
15 Maurizio Albahari, “Death and the Moral State: Making Borders and Sovereignty at the Southern Edges of Europe,” Working Paper, no. 136 (University of California, San Diego: The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2006), 28. It is noteworthy that Albahari asks the reader to keep in mind that there are two regimes of maintaining rescue, the Anglo-Saxon and the continental. The first reveals a disinterest in the affairs of the individual (even if that means rescue from death), while the second legally stipulates rescue. Albahari, “Death and the Moral State,” 11n20.
16 Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 22.
17 Ibid.
20 Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 37.
moderate their own newcomers (the “refugees”), their own conditions as those containing the biopolitical (but really necropolitical) sovereignty need to change. This is because the newcomers of welfarism treat their polity as some form of compromised welfare state to be defended, and therefore this necessity of change is termed “necropolitics.” Albahari, in his case study, demonstrates that “death, in addition to normatively being a prerogative of sovereignty, is essentially part of the machinery by which liberal-democratic society is supposedly defended, and its life and common good fostered.”

This indicates that the liberal state’s border of the unthinkable has been breached by nothing other than necropolitics. But how does the theory of necropolitics in the East/CEE helps us understand its conflation in practice with unthinkable? After 1989, the limits of un/thinkability for the EU project were not only “expanded.” The post-communist EU expansion of once unthinkable political others inevitably altered the limits of the unthinkable biopolitically, maintaining the elite club’s criteria of the thinkable (read: the admissible). Today’s internal colonization of hatred and decomposed solidarity in the semi-periphery—and the ideal of solidarity is manageable to the East mostly when it comes to the mobility of its goods to the West—ideally warrants “the fact that the former Eastern European countries flatly refused the EU required quota for accepting Syrian refugees [which] suggests a trend of self-ghettoization rather than de-ghettoization when it comes to the question of race.” To de-provincialize the Balkans requires much more than the mobility of capitals.

One wonders whether there really is a “return of the repressed” when it comes to race. Rather, the work on Balkanism needs the return of “class” as racialization to survey ethnicity-as-race as a continuity. Something of a merger between her own work and Gržinić’s necropolitics can be sensed in El-Tayeb’s proposal of “queering of ethnicity”: “A queering, or ‘creolizing’ of theory, if you will, that works on the intersections of concepts and disciplines, opens the potential of expressing exactly the positionality deemed impossible in dominant European discourses, namely that of Europeans of color.”

By queering ethnicity in Europe—here “queering” stands for the re-racialization of class, parading as it does in its homeostasis of unmarked racelessness—and more specifically queering ethnicity in the CEE/Balkans, one can recover class as a precious object of covert racial profiling that gives a special status of the “unspeakability” (as El-Tayeb’s describes it) of race. For it is this exact same unspeakability that licenses death as no longer “unthinkable” but as necropolitical condition of the liberal state. The contact zone between Gržinić and El-Tayeb that I identify is not an academic contest to mark CEE as colonial, but as racial colonial. For if the colonial analytic crumbles each time under silently racialized class and ethnicity, then what is the use of “de-provincializing Europe”?

To sum up, while Todorova’s de-provincializing project is still a tenable move, it should be supplemented by a theory of necropolitics to account for the way in which the waning of Western biopolitics changes the meaning of CEE’s “liberal states” from the get-go of the transition. While El-Tayeb claims that so-called raceless Europe fundamental racism (in Gržinić’s terms this will be “racialization”) rests on its own (self-)silencing—a racial muteness that informs an immutable racism—Gržinić complements this tenet with the claim of a “parallel colonial regime.” Thus, as a starting point of surveying necropolitics in the East we can couple both suggestions, and then the picture we get results in a sort of racial-colonial silencing that is able to both maintain civic peace and suppress ethnic warfare (respectively in the capitalist West and in the Ottoman/socialist East). When both silences are broken, what follows is racialization and racial (not ethnic) warfare. And when ethnicity reveals itself as a race (Bjelić’s suggestion), class is deployed as racialized, and peace is illuminated as property qualification, then it is no longer possible to maintain that racism is not a useful analytic category for the Balkans. Thus race becomes central for the study of necropolitics in the East and opens the gates for its analytical and retroactive use.

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22 I do not discuss it here, but my elaboration and understanding of “unthinkability” is heavily inspired by Jelisaveta Blagojević, “Unthinkable: Ethico-Political Fiction in the Present,” Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture 8, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 29–33.
25 Gržinić, Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 76.


On December 19, 2016, the art world witnessed a remarkably dramatic event when the gunman Mevlüt Mert Altıntaş assassinated the Russian ambassador to Turkey, Andrey Karlov, during his speech at the opening of the photo exhibition “Russia through Turk’s Eyes” at the Contemporary Art Center in Ankara. Two Turkish photographers and a videographer, Yavuz Alatan, Hasim Kilic, and Burhan Ozbilici, captured the assassination in progress, before, during, and after the incident, making the assassination of Karlov the first ambassador to be shot on Ultra HD video.

In the video of the assassination, Karlov can be seen collapsing to the floor after a third shot is fired by Mevlüt Mert Altıntaş, the policeman accused of killing the Russian ambassador. The camera then zooms out from close-up to a wide angle, framing the assassin and the assassinated in one picture, that also included a number of the artworks exhibited on the walls. Remarkably, no trace of blood could be seen in the video footage or in any of the photos of the crime scene. Nevertheless, the multiple-angle documentation immediately transformed the incident into a global media news sensation, and it became one of the most watched online videos of the year, competing with other similar videos of a similar brutal nature.

These types of dramatic video releases have become a new visual genre, and despite their graphic content they receive millions of clicks online and keep attracting the attention of the media as well as the general public. In the aftermath of the assassination, Alatan posted his photos on social media. A few days after he said, “I wish this hadn’t happened, and I hadn’t taken those photos.” Perhaps Alatan noted how his photos entered the mass culture category of visual violence and how he unconsciously risked promoting this brutal genre of visualization.
The Atmospheric Execution Film Set—Between Fiction, Documentary, Post-snuff Film, and Reality Cinema

One of the “masterpieces” of this category of visual violence entered the public realm with the release of the gruesome execution video of the Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh, whose plane came down in Raqqa, Syria, during a mission against the Islamic State (ISIS) in December 2015.

The captured pilot was placed in a metal cage and filmed being burned alive. Al-Kasasbeh's horrific atmospheric execution set was described by many commentators as a highly sophisticated cinematic production, exhibiting high technical capabilities in terms of visual narrative, and signifying a departure from the familiar videos made by jihadist organizations over the past ten years. Most published articles in both Arab and Western media about Al-Kasasbeh's execution were descriptive and nonanalytic, politically contextualizing the act while rapidly acknowledging and embracing ISIS's filmmaking skills.

Since the “spectacular” film was released by ISIS, we have not seen a similar production by this or any other group. However, analyzing the technicality and conceptuality of the film, we can confidently say it was a low-budget film, made by ordinary contemporary videographers who—like many good film amateurs—know the rules of depth and angle, and the process of pursuing an expressive directorship ranging from attention to the visual detail to the montage of a persuasive narrative.

However, despite the use of ordinary film principles, the film of Al-Kasasbeh did add a new classification to the motion-picture history as it maneuvered between fiction, snuff film, and documentary film. The film depicts the fictional practice that is implemented by a wide range of field professionals with one small difference—the conclusion results in a real homicide.

Execution footage and images of violent nature were made public from the onset of cinema, starting with Thomas Edison, the inventor of the motion-picture realm with the release of the gruesome execution video of the Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh, whose plane came down in Raqqa, Syria, during a mission against the Islamic State (ISIS) in December 2015.

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Execution footage and images of violent nature were made public from the onset of cinema, starting with Thomas Edison, the inventor of the motion-picture camera, who electrocuted/executed the elephant Topsy in 1903, as described in the book *Killing for Culture* by David Kerekes and David Slater.

About a century later, depicting murderous executions at a film set is now real, like in the case of ISIS’s film, which was shot with 4K equipment, scripted, and efficiently edited to be made available online for political purposes.

This does not mean that ISIS’s film brought about a new filming technique, but the film did expand the political propaganda film genre. It introduced a new era in the film arena—a contemporary category of violent visualization that challenges any given Hollywood production, mondo, snuff film, or “shockumentary film aesthetics,” which are commonly produced for profit, while ISIS’s film was strictly produced for political propaganda and for recruitment. Filmed in Ultra HD, ISIS’s film—with the real death of the protagonist at the execution set—gave birth to a new notion of political propaganda production, which I call “reality cinematography.”

Nonetheless, the amount of acclaim and the professionalism accredited to the making of the ISIS film has been much higher than the film deserves. It is therefore inappropriate that some commentators and filmmakers have called it “stunning and shocking,” while others were overwhelmed by the tight scenario and sequential scenes. Others were impressed by the long, medium, and short clips of the event from multiple angles and the combination of fast and slow scenes to highlight the ugliness of the burning process.

In this context, a few questions remain to be answered: Who benefits from embracing this type of violent production? By boosting this type of film, even in terms of technicalities, do we not risk sending a wrong signal to its producers, telling them to publish more?

In response to the video of Al-Kasasbeh, political and media commentator Chauncey DeVega published a 2015 article in *Daily Kos* titled: “Yes, ISIS Burned a Man Alive: White Americans Did the Same Thing to Thousands of Black People.” In the article, DeVega argues that violence is a human trait and that we cannot overlook what he calls the “violence master classes” undertaken in the United States during slavery time. DeVega’s article draws parallels between ISIS’s video and the practice of the “unique violence ritual,” the lynching of African-Americans, and how images of black people who were burned to death was a form of mass culture in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America. The violent past of lynching has continued to deepen the rift in American society between blacks and whites, resulting in one shared history with two different narratives. I shall return to DeVega’s argument later, but will first analyze ISIS’s video.

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8 Ibid.
Involuntarily Acting—Performance X

The well-researched twenty-two-minute propaganda film is in Arabic with English subtitles. Its execution set is carefully designed and well-studied as if every scene is done according to a script. Accompanying it is a photomontage and archival footage from different wars in the Middle East showing casualties and suffering. The subsequent sequence shows an interview with the captive pilot dressed in an orange outfit, similar to that worn by the prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Toward the end, the sequence closes in the morning, showing the pilot in his orange jumpsuit alone, carefully and silently walking and wondering among the rubble of bombed houses, checking the site and carnage most likely caused by missile strikes carried out by the pilot himself, as indicated by the narrator. He faces the location for the first time, not from a bird’s-eye view but from ground level. The pilot involuntarily performs his last march through the scenery toward the cage. The galvanized black metal cage is closed with no sign of a door. The relatively small cube-shaped cage is constructed in a way that will prevent the pilot from running freely inside it.

The sandy floor of the cage is soaked with gasoline and an X shape stretching from corner to corner is engraved in the sand. Most likely, the pilot was forced to stand in the middle of the X mark. Outside the cage, a long line is engraved in the sand. At the end of it there is a masked militant who is carrying a torch. Surrounding the scenery is a group of well-organized masked militants dressed in identical costumes and military gear, signifying the authority of an army and not paramilitaries.

Accompanied by real sound, the last sequence is quietly played in slow motion. The pilot inside the cage covers his face with his hands. In a jump cut, he suddenly removes his hands and looks directly into the lens and sees that the line in the sand is on fire, ignited by the militant. The flame approaches the pilot himself, as indicated by the narrator. He faces the location for the first time, not from a bird’s-eye view but from ground level. The pilot involuntarily performs his last march through the scenery toward the cage. The galvanized black metal cage is closed with no sign of a door. The relatively small cube-shaped cage is constructed in a way that will prevent the pilot from running freely inside it.

Regardless of the result and horrific methodology of the film, no one has presented a killing/execution film with such cinematographic style before. In terms of technicality perhaps it is the most well-made propaganda film known to the public.

Another example of violent testimonial videos in our digital age is the video diary The Last Day by Ricardo López, who was a known stalker of the Icelandic singer Björk. Over a nine-month period, López, the twenty-one-year-old Uruguayan-American visual artist made a seventy-hour video diary at his Florida apartment, wherein he mused about Björk while experimenting with letter bombs intended to kill the singer on the very same day he would commit suicide, so that their souls could meet in heaven. López decorated his apartment with a meticulous scenography, transforming it into a spooky film set (which looked like someone might be killed there). The scenery seemed to read like a visual statement, full of handwritings, banners, colors, and face makeup.

On September 12, 1996, López sent the package bomb to Björk’s house in London. He then returned home, delivered his final video testimony and filmed his own suicide. He shot himself in the mouth. Four days later, López’s body was discovered at his apartment, along with the seventy hours of video testimony he recorded. His video diary was to document, in his words, “My life, my art, and my plan,” a statement written on one of the videotapes. His violent video was a comprehensive performance testimony, written, directed, and played by López himself. As predicted, his message did not go unnoticed. Danish filmmaker Sami Saif bought all the tapes from FBI to use in his film chronicling the last days of the life of Ricardo López.

Although he was disconnected from reality, López was conscious about what to deliver to the public, and he knew exactly how to lure the media into his trap. Filming his own death on tape was enough to capture public attention—López’s mission was accomplished from day one. Both López’s suicide film and ISIS’s execution film were produced with solid knowledge of the outcome—their films would be seen and heard, in the same way previous productions of a similar nature were. López’s and ISIS’s films make up just a few of the many documentations of horrific events that mankind has witnessed.

9 The video used to be viewable online, but now this and similar videos are being removed.
13 This information was shared at a lecture held by Saif at Copenhagen Documentary Film School, in January 2006. The documentary film by Saif, The Video Diary of Ricardo López, was produced in Denmark by NewCom Entertainment, and DR TV, Danish Broadcasting Corporation, Denmark (2000).
The Lynching of African-Americans and the Mass Media of the Time

As stated in DeVega's article, the gruesome reality of so-called spectacular lynchings are another example of executions that were also photo documented, as described in W. Fitzhugh Brundage's book *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930*. Based on photography and history, Brundage describes how people cheered and children played during the lynching of African-Americans. For example, when James Irwin was lynched on January 31, 1930, after being accused of the murder of a white girl in the town of Ocilla, Georgia, he was taken into custody by a rampaging mob, his fingers and toes were cut off, his teeth pulled out by pliers and finally he was castrated. Irwin was then burned alive in front of hundreds of onlookers.

The lynching of African-Americans was documented for different purposes to aestheticize lynching for a variety of motives, including political reasons. The lynching events were photographed, exhibited, shared, printed, and distributed as postcards and posters. Although the horrific visual documentation will continue to haunt Americans and the rest of human society, as explained by DeVega, humanity has yet to learn how to deal with such visual experiences.

The Chronic Voyeuristic Relation and the Attitude of Anti-intervention

Leading American theoretician Susan Sontag wrote intensely on the consequences on the human mind after seeing images of a brutal nature, which included lynching. In her book *Regarding the Pain of Others*, Sontag confirms that humanity has not learned much since the spectacular lynching of African-Americans, because the proliferation of horrific politicized photographic images has established within people a "chronic voyeuristic relation": the more people are exposed to violent visual imagery, the more it fosters in them an attitude of anti-intervention.

Unquestionably, there will always be a dispute as to whether such images should be removed from public display in museum collections due to their graphic nature. However, the risk that they may become a source of inspiration will always exist, like in the case of the photo documentation of lynching-like situations involving captives imprisoned by American military forces at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003/4. Some of the photos from Abu Ghraib physically and aesthetically depict, almost paraphrase, lynching situations of African-Americans in the United States, with one small difference: the Abu Ghraib images were not meant to be published.

In recent years, individuals who work with human visual history and visuality, like myself, have often asked why such gruesome images do not play a significant role in helping humanity reduce situations of violence, torture, or execution, regardless of the context they have been produced, used, archived, or exhibited in. How can we use or consume these visual representations for learning and for building awareness without falling into the political propagandist trap of their producers? Some of us are determined to look at these visual representations from different and critical perspectives, trying to analyze and recontextualize them concurrently with contemporary history, ethics, and aesthetics, concocting a more constructive discourse. In this regard, here comes some sort of a closure, though not a definite answer.

In June 2015, Australian composer Christopher de Groot and theatre-opera director Suzanne Chaundy received funding from Creative Victoria to develop a one-voice opera, which was based on the video diaries of Ricardo López. The question is whether such a production will overcome the tendency to aestheticize videos of brutal nature as the attempt here is to generate an attitude of mass-intervention and to change the notion of "the more you watch, the less you feel."

This is certainly not The End.

22 Creative Victoria is a government body dedicated to supporting, championing, and growing the state’s creative industries, spanning arts, culture, screen, and design. See http://creative.vic.gov.au.
Literature


RESOURCE: IMMIGRATION? is a video-installation project in progress that tries to formulate a link to older works of mine on asylum politics, tracing the connections and posing questions on a historical, political, and ideological level. It relates directly to the theme of the 15th Venice Biennale of Architecture, which took place in 2016.

RESOURCE: IMMIGRATION? tries to analyze, in several stages, how architecture, city planning, and art can be viewed in terms of migration and refugees. The main aspect of the project deals with the hegemony of the regime of the exterior gaze that makes objects out of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants. On the other side, the critical gaze can never be neutral because there are contradictory or parallel aspects to it.

The words “criticism” and “crisis” have the same language roots with both leading to a kind of a change in which you can state: there is a crisis in post-democracy (where all the democratic institutions are in place, but nevertheless a small elite is taking advantage for its own interests), crisis in art, but there is also an interior crisis within criticism itself. The central topic of the Venice Biennale of Architecture carried the title “Reporting from the Front,” and it is remarkable how many of the pavilions did not have any discussion-based contributions. On that occasion it was clear that architecture is only related to architecture and that it is only about a nation’s self-representation and self-appraisal.

The German and Austrian pavilions are taken as special examples in my work to decipher the hegemony of the regime of the exterior gaze. Both pavilions offered the same reproductions of those kinds of “best-practice examples” of architecture that in the end always produce a debate on positivism and thus become apolitical. Without acknowledging the reasons for migration or having critical reflections, several forms of participating projects offered solutions that couldn’t work in the long run. Such highly problematic solutions have been on view now for a couple of years, especially since the 2012 refugee demonstrations took place, and when issues of migration became relevant also in the media—not only in Austria but in other European countries. In general, through the visual arts and in theater performances, refugees and migrants have become more and more objectivized and homogenized. In art projects, refugees and migrants are simplified and reduced to statistics and maps, with an almost theatrical staging.

Colonialism and coloniality, which are spreading internationally all around us in this time of global capitalism, have not been reflected on as part of the social or artistic agenda in post-democratic, neoliberal, and global capitalist countries.
The overproduction of exhibitions and projects in Europe and elsewhere try to reach a common platform in order to come to an understanding of migrants and refugees, all of whom cannot be reached easily because of their non-status, invisibility, and class differences. The capitalist structures, which reduce people to numbers inside the legal-administrative system, are therefore not only repeated in Germany’s asylum politics, but also in the German Pavilion at the biennial.

Nevertheless the Austrian Pavilion “represented” Syrian topics!
Mobilization
In 2016, a critical perspective on borders required us to look beyond the physical manifestations of borders and into proposed data practices. This essay focuses on the unique European situation where the Europe Union’s external borders and the Schengen Agreement are being tested by the high numbers of people and goods moving in and out owing to the influx of refugees, as well as recent terrorist attacks.

As a response to this border crisis, the European Commission has proposed to expand the mandate of the different border policies currently in effect within Europe, and to introduce a new “Smart Border Package.” This will include measures to enable increased collaboration between different border and law-enforcement agencies, the implementation of additional surveillance technology, and the creation of new databases.

This essay will explore some of the limitations of, and challenges for, the new proposed system, which has the potential to create a radically new border environment: one where data moves more freely than people; where data collection intrudes upon individual’s everyday lives; and where a border becomes a continuous space that extends beyond its physical location.

Calling for “Smart Borders”

In 2015, a New York Times article carried the headline: “Paris Attacks Force European Union to Act on Border Controls.” It described how EU interior and justice ministers had agreed to establish a new EU data system that would share the passport data of air travelers inside the Schengen Area. This decision was made shortly after it became evident that the Paris attackers were mostly European passport holders who had been able to slip in and out of Syria—and back into Europe—without being identified.

This story is just one of the many that have contributed to the current discourse around migration, terrorism, and borders, in which borders are generally portrayed as vulnerable, under-resourced, inefficient, or not “smart” enough. The assumption is that the lack of data sharing between different countries within the Schengen Area has enabled terrorists to enter Europe, and has left European nation-states vulnerable; and that “smart” data-driven borders will be more reliable and efficient, safer, less prone to human error, and able to prevent
terrorists from “slipping back in.” To understand how Europe’s border structures will change, what challenges smart borders pose, and what their limitations will be, I will first focus on the current governance structure of the European borders.

Borders and Travel in Europe

Borders are complex ecosystems that include both sea and land borders. These are governed by a range of policies, implemented by several agencies tasked with the responsibility to protect them. Europe’s borders are governed under the Schengen Agreement, which enables the abolishment of internal border checks between European nation-states and makes the Schengen Area function as one state for international travel.

Border ecosystems are impacted by, among other things, the geopolitical environment and the movement of both people and goods; in Europe, the current volume of people moving in and out of the area has been increasing, with further increases expected. The EU border consists of a “territory delineated by 7,400 km of land borders and 57,800 km of coastline (‘maritime borders’). Some 300 million people—just under half of them non-EU citizens—are estimated to enter and leave the EU every year.”¹ These high numbers of travelers are noticeable in Europe’s main travel hubs, like Paris’s Charles de Gaulle airport, where in the month November 2016 over 4.8 million people passed through.²

In recent years, Europe has been confronted with tension around the border. This is most noticeable on the shores of Greece and Italy. Refugees and migrants fleeing the war in Syria and Iraq and instability in countries such as Afghanistan and Eritrea have increased. In 2015, asylum applications filed in different EU member states doubled the number filed in 2014, rising to 1.3 million.³

How Are the European Borders Governed?

After signing the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the founding members created a joint database for the verification of both people and objects. Since then, the database has been upgraded and expanded. The EU borders are managed under the following programs: the European External Surveillance System (Eurosur), the European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), the Schengen Information Systems I & II (SIS I & II), and the Visa Information System (VIS). Where Eurosur aims to increase situational awareness of sea and land borders, the other data-bases are aimed at monitoring the movement of people and objects in and out of Europe. In addition, the European Commission is proposing a “Smart Border Package.”

Surveillance of Europe’s Waters and Borders

Eurosur was implemented in 2013 and is operated by Frontex. The “main purpose is to improve ‘situational awareness’ and reaction capability of the member states and FRONTEX is here to prevent irregular migration and cross-border crime at the EU’s external land and maritime borders.”⁴ Eurosur is a twenty-four-hour surveillance operation that covers the European sea and land borders using drones and satellite-tracking systems. The geographical scope of Eurosur does not stop at the European sea borders: its surveillance arm reaches far beyond the shores of Europe all the way to North Africa. The data collected through drones and satellites provides Frontex with real-time updates on the border situation, which it can share—on a regular as well as on a case-by-case basis—with individual member states, Europol, and other EU law-enforcement agencies. In 2015, the European Commission proposed to strengthen Frontex’s mandate by increasing its financial and human resources.⁵

⁷ Hayes and Vermeulen, _Borderline_, 18.
⁹ The Dublin Regulation, a European Law signed in 1990, decides on the EU member state who is responsible to process asylum-seeker applications. The regulation states that asylum seekers have to stay in the first European country they enter. Individuals seeking asylum in a different European country than the one they entered will be return to the first country of entry. The Eurodac database facilitates the implementation of the Dublin Regulation. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009R0604.
Managing Travel of People and Objects in Europe

EU border officials can make use of three large official databases for the registration, validation, and identification of travelers: Eurodac, SIS I & II, and VIS. In addition, the European Commission’s proposed Smart Borders Package will create two additional databases.

Eurodac is Europe’s fingerprint database for identifying refugees, used primarily to enforce the Dublin Regulation. The database is used to determine if refugees have already applied for asylum in, or illegally traveled through, another EU member state. Any individual eighteen years or over who applies for asylum status needs to provide fingerprints, which are then registered in the Eurodac database. In 2013, the mandate of Eurodac was expanded to give law enforcement access to its database. In 2016, the European Commission proposed to expand Eurodac to include facial-recognition data in a central database, and to lower the minimum age to six years and over.

SIS I & II is a database containing information on criminal activity, immigration violations, and various objects and missing persons. It is the EU’s border information management system, where authorities put in alerts on wanted or missing people and objects, and individuals with entry bans. Upon entering the EU, individuals are cross-referenced against this database. SIS II can be accessed by different authorities, including police officers, border-patrol officers, and law-enforcement officials.

The VIS database contains information, including biometrics, on visa applications, and aims to improve and centralize visa policies and application processes for the EU. To ensure that a non-EU national entering Europe is the legitimate visa holder, fingerprints are cross-referenced against the biometric data on the visa application and across the entire VIS database.

The “Smart Borders” Package

To make European borders safer and more efficient, the European Commission has proposed increased collaboration between the different agencies and European nation-states; the implementation of new surveillance technology; and the creation of new databases. Part of this proposal is the new Smart Borders Package, which will introduce two new databases: the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). The EES will primarily be used to monitor people who overstay. The system will collect and store data (identities and fingerprints) about third-country nationals and the date and place they enter and exit. This database will be shared with law enforcement and authorities in all EU member states, and with Europol. The RTP is the equivalent of the American Esta Waiver, in which all third-country nationals can be pre-vetted prior to crossing a border, providing speedy entry and exit. RTP requires fingerprints, identity information, and travel information.

Border Databases: What Are the Concerns?

There are many different concerns regarding Eurosur, Eurodac, SIS I&II, VIS, and the Smart Border initiative, ranging from questions around safeguards to human rights, lack of parliamentary oversight, the outsourcing of critical technological infrastructure, jurisdicitional problems, and questions of who has access to these different databases.

Data, the Right to Privacy, and Marginalization

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights acknowledges the limitations of individuals to understand the implication of data collection and its use at the borders. “The collection, use and storage of such data must be carried out in accordance with data protection principles, including the right to private and family life. The use of several databases at different stages of the border check increases the risk of data protection violations. Passengers may not always be aware of the type of data processed, the purpose of this processing or how to have their data corrected.” It is still unclear how Europe’s new Smart Border will inform people about the data-driven border.

Existing databases also raise privacy and data protection concerns. The European Commission stresses that Eurosur is not intended as a system to regulate the collection, storage, or cross-border exchange of personal data. As it pertains to Eurosur, the right to privacy is seen as a marginal issue. How-

11 Eticas, Big Data at the Border.
14 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, DIGNITY, 11.
15 Hayes and Vermeulen, Borderline, 36.
ever, not only could boats, and by proxy people, be identified by analyzing high resolution satellite and drone images, Frontex national coordination centers are allowed to process personal data, which could be combined with the drone and satellite surveillance data. This would leave refugees exposed to tracking from the point of departure to the point of asylum request, without being aware that this data was being collected, combined, and used.16

Expanding the mandate of Eurosur and Eurodac and providing EU law enforcement agencies access to the data collected, as per The European Commission’s proposal, would further stigmatize refugees. “Providing access is based on the assumption that refugees will be more likely to commit crimes than other travelers or European citizens.”17 Studies around predictive policing show that including specific demographic datasets perpetuates prejudices. For example, if additional police forces are send to patrol what is considered a “high crime area,” they will likely encounter crime, reinforcing the assumption that this is a “high crime area.” However, if police deployed the same amount of officers in a “low crime area,” the crime rates they report would also increase. Providing law-enforcement access to refugee registration databases could result in similar negative feedback loops.18

Technocracy and Oversight

The European Commission’s proposal to expand the mandate of the different border management systems is part of a larger political issue, where changes are presented in isolation and as a technical addition to existing policies. In 2012, Ben Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen argued that “these technical solutions are often presented as mere technical measures as if somehow separate from the EU’s border migration and border control policies (and thus less deserving of scrutiny or discussion) when they have moved ever closer to its core.”19 In 2013, the European Parliament raised concerns about the lack of parliamentary oversight over Frontex, and about how the Smart Borders Package would build up vast technical infrastructures for the mass processing of personal data.20

The European Parliament did not, however, address the collaboration with and subcontracting of commercial entities for certain functionalities needed for the creation and maintenance of border databases. In 2010, Didier Bigo and Julien Jeandesboz raised concerns about the relationship between the European Commission and defense contractors in the field of security. They stated that this relationship has passed well beyond mere dialogue: “Major defence and security companies have played a key role in the definition of the orientation and priorities of the EU’s research and development policy for security-related technical systems—and also turn out to be the major beneficiaries of this policy.”21

In 2013, the European Organization for Security (ESO), representing major security companies, published its objective on how the industry could best assist Europe in implementing Eurosur and assist Frontex. This entailed a vision on how the security industry could best invest in the development and production phase of the components needed for the implementation of Eurosur, and to better provide technical assistance to support the Commission and Frontex.22

This collaboration and subcontracting of technical functionalities, also known as “outsourcing,” is not unique to the defense industry: there is a growing governmental trend to outsource key tasks to commercial entities in many different areas. However, outsourcing raises troubling questions around oversight. “Latour states that the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they become.”23 The investment in the research, creation and implementation of technology for Eurosur and Frontex by industry has meant that knowledge on the technical part of Europe’s border systems is nested within industry, paid for by the EU. This has made “smart” border systems difficult to govern, as government and governmental bodies lack the necessary knowledge and skills to have proper oversight on these systems.

Moving into the Future

Even with these different databases in effect, the European Union feels the need to increase data collection around individuals entering and exiting the border, increase its technical border surveillance capabilities, and invest in the creation of centralized databases—all of which imply that the future of Europe’s borders lies in “predictive borders.”

Critics of the European Commission’s border plan have so far focused predominantly on the collection of data, the legal frameworks under which this is done, and how this could impact individuals’ rights to human dignity and privacy. This, however, misses the dimensions of the consequences of collecting and

17 Ibid.
19 Hayes and Vermeulen, Borderline, 12.
20 See Milt, “Fact Sheets on the European Union.”
23 Eticas, Big Data at the Border, 20.
storing large quantities of data and merging existing databases. To interpret large quantities of data, data needs to be modeled. Categorizing and scoring individuals is a way to model data in order to predict whether an individual is a legitimate traveler or should be subject to further investigation. The use of this kind of algorithmic “risk scoring” at borders, however, has inherent limitations and brings up some important concerns.¹⁴

Risk scoring combines intelligence, behavioral modeling, and data analytics. Behavioral modeling looks at the past to predict the future. In the case of borders, the border authority would need to define a low-risk traveler versus a high-risk traveler. To do this, historical data would be gathered on past travelers who meet these definitions. This data could include historical records of border crossings from the Eurodac, SIS I & II, or VIS systems, but also other intelligence sources on the traveler. This data would then be analyzed by an algorithm to find patterns, which would then be used to create behavior models for low-risk travelers versus high-risk ones.¹⁵

In the future when an individual applies for a visa or the RTP, it is most likely that in addition to their name being cross-referenced against no-fly lists and SIS II, they will also be given a risk score. Data such as passport number, name, age, sex, frequency of travel, when and how the ticket was bought, and their airplane seat number and meal preference, will be analyzed against behavior models.

Can Data Predict Reality?

One reason often given for the need for smart borders is that the terrorist, the person who overstays, and the migrant can be more easily found among the millions of travelers entering and exiting Europe. However there are a number of limitations in assuming that data-driven systems will find terrorists. As security expert Bruce Schneier explains, “The complexity of the problem highlights the limits of data mining and data surveillance as a deterrent for terrorist activity. According to [Bruce] Schneier, these limits can be summed up in three points: firstly, all detection systems have inherent error rates. [...] Secondly, the very nature of terrorist attacks make it difficult to establish patterns which can be useful to identify potential threats. [...] Thirdly, individuals who engage in terrorist activities are very wary when providing personal data and are constantly trying to avoid detection.”¹⁶

Schneier argues that it is difficult to identify terrorists or terrorist patterns, as every ill-intentioned traveler aims not to be identified and avoids creating recognizable patterns. And since terrorist behavior cannot easily be quantified in data points, a data system will then look for proxy data. “A proxy variable is an easily measurable variable that is used in place of a variable that cannot be measured or is difficult to measure.”¹⁷ Proxy data at borders could be travel patterns, ports of departure, or meal preferences. The problem with proxy variables is that it is assumed they are closely linked to the complex phenomena a smart system aims to score, but in fact they are by default something different.¹⁸

The Input Determines the Output

The output of an algorithm—in this case a risk score—is determined by what is put into the system. If the input, the database, is inaccurate or biased, the results will also be inaccurate or biased. To assess algorithmic systems you first need to examine the database, investigate what is collected at European borders, and examine what the limitations are in capturing human behavior in data, and what the risks are of excluding or over-representing certain groups in data sets.

In a 2016 interview for the Jim Bakkers Show, an Austrian policeman on the Austria-Slovenia border explained how after a day’s work collecting the fingerprints of refugees who crossed the border, the fingerprints are deleted almost instantly. “We are not allowed to save the fingerprints, we do what we’re asked to do.”¹⁹ The act of deleting fingerprints creates biases in the Eurodac database. Refugees end up getting registered in a different European country other than the first country of entry. Humans looking at the Eurodac database will know from experience that these sorts of things happen. An algorithm will analyze it as if the input was correct. “Machines learning algorithms are very good at repeating and finding patterns, and predicting the repetition. They do not ask the question, ‘Why?’ When you apply machine learning algorithms you are automating past practices.”²⁰

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Conclusion

The discourse in Europe around its border crisis has forced the EU to respond with a new plan to increase the security of its borders. The European Commission proposes to expand the mandate of existing policies and create a Smart Border Package. However in the desire to increase border authorities’ capabilities, it is crucial to be critical of the scope and implementation of these policies.

These “smart” systems will create borders that are continuous, and that interact with travelers prior, during, and post-border crossings, but they will operate outside of most travelers’ awareness. The European Commission’s border proposals should be questioned not only on their legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality, but also on how they came about, the involvement of parliamentary oversight, and the scope for public debate. Policies should be examined on their safeguards to political and civil rights, and measures to prevent systematic discriminatory practices.
The global-media sphere is experiencing new developments. First, these developments are the expansion of Western, Eastern, Middle Eastern, and Latin American media organizations into Africa. This expansion also includes the expansion of African media organizations themselves within the African continent. Second, there is a quantitative increase in content about Africa. Third, there is qualitative increase in positive reporting about Africa.

Africa-to-Africa expansion is symbolized by, for example, the South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) (re)launch of its twenty-four-hour news channel, SABC NEWS, on August 1, 2013. This relaunch, conceptualized within the African renaissance philosophy and decolonization of the African informational spheres, aimed at counteracting Western media “imperialism” and negative framing of the continent. Competing with SABC is another South African twenty-four-hour news channel E News Channel Africa (ENCA), which was launched in August 2012. ENCA’s signature magazine program Africa 360’s slogan, “Africa 360: See Africa like you have never seen it before,” describes what Africa-to-Africa channels are trying to achieve. Nigeria, for example, recently launched TVC news in July 2013, a pan-African news channel.

But Western media continues to grow in Africa: Africanews, an extension of Euronews, was launched on April 20, 2016. Bloomberg TV Africa was launched in October 2013. The African edition of Forbes magazine on September 29, 2011. CNBC Africa on June 1, 2007. CNBC Africa now has offices in strategic locations, in Africa’s bigger cities in terms of the continent’s political economy: Johannesburg, Cape Town, Nairobi, Lagos, and Abuja.

All the new channels are being launched into spaces still being dominated by CNN and BBC. Competition has forced CNN and BBC to fight in protection of their territory by increasing Africa-focused programming, such as CNN’s Marketplace Africa, Inside Africa, and African Voices, and, in June 2012, BBC’s Focus on Africa.

Chinese media institutions, too, are equally making significant inroads in the African continent. The English version of China Daily was launched in Kenya in December 2012. More visible of the Chinese media in the continent is CCTV News, a twenty-four-hour English news channel, carrying the programs Africa Live (Biz Africa), Talk Africa, and Faces of Africa.

Justifying Expansion into Africa

Justifications for expanding into the African media sphere are coalescing into a particular language or discourse of their own. Collectively, they critique the global media’s framing of Africa in the past. They have a discourse that holds
the view that global media's negative framing of Africa has, all along, been creating borders that made it impossible for people to fully understand Africa. These new media outlets are removing these borders to create a better understanding about Africa.

If, for example, the old ways of discoursing about Africa were as characterized by cultural insensitivity and riddled with negativities, the new scramble for African media sphere tries to be culturally sensitive, diplomatic, and introspective as shall be seen in the language that is used in the following quotation. If the old discourse constructed Africa as a “dark continent” of despair, primitive-ness, and in need of civilization, the new discourse crafts Africa as a place of hope, progress, and transformation:

Bloomberg is watching Africa bloom. This is the time for Africa. Three things have happened. You find Africa from the power of potential to the power of promise; now talking about the power of progression. Now these three things have happened in the ten years. This is the time that Africa is blooming.1

After decades of turmoil and uncertainty, a new Africa is emerging [...]. The old stereotypes are being challenged and a new, compelling narrative is being written. I am incredibly excited to be part of a new BBC programme that will provide solid coverage and analysis of Africa’s challenges and prospects.2

The above quotations admit that old stereotypes existed, that particular framing and negative images of Africa was the norm, and that global twenty-four-hour news channels are now reexamining their role in the discourse about Africa. It is, however, not only the old dominant twenty-four-hour news channels of the West that are using the same language associated with ethical reporting, fairness, and positive framing Africa, it is also the new channels of the south.

Tine Ustad Figenschou points to six core values that define Al Jazeera’s strategy. One of them is the following: “The Southern Perspective: A much higher proportion of stories from the developing world; consider the impact of any story on the developing world; avoid conventional ‘western’ political and cultural attitudes and assumptions; adopt an indigenous perspective.”3

China’s CCTV is very explicit in its justification for expanding into African media space and the reasoning fits snuggly into discourse regarding Africa-oriented expansion. It says: “CCTV News intends to strengthen news coverage in Africa. In so doing, CTV News wishes to promote communication and cooperation between China and African countries on politics, economy, trade and culture.”4

Decolonization

The foregoing justifications form part of the decolonization process. Decolonizing African media and cultural territories consists of the reconsideration of the Western cultural industries’ role in preserving colonial influences and legacy in the former African colonies. Although in the past, postcolonial states’ media were depending on Western-controlled news and entertainment organizations, this disadvantage is being corrected today, in attempts to control the narrative about Africa. These are other forms of having territorial control and sovereignty in the African informational and cultural spheres. In the past, the disquiet was principally articulated in two ways: quantitative and qualitative.

The quantitative dimension criticized the massive flow of news and entertainment products from Western countries to Africa. This flow was considered uni-directional. This was because news and entertainment products emanated from the Western “core” to the rest of the South. News and entertainment material coming from the South to the West was absent or scarce.

There was/is also a qualitative aspect in the critique of way that Africa was/is reported on in the West. The qualitative aspect critically questioned Western perspectives on reporting and content as well. Central to the critique was that Western news organizations mainly adopted a negative framework when telling stories about Africa. There were hardly any positive stories about the continent. Most of them were about military dictatorships, corruption, natural disasters, and other social ills.

These are the boundaries and borders that I referred to above. Both qualitative and quantitative aspects within the discourse of decolonization led to a strong call for the establishment of New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). NWICO put emphasis on the critical role communication plays in economic and social development.

Discussion

The language of decolonization, cultural sensitivity, and other justifications for expansion mask neoliberal market-oriented logic in the African-oriented expansion. All media companies expanding into Africa media space are not humanitarian ventures. Southern-based media (that are regional), as well as media of the Global North, are strategic and calculated capturing of African media markets for commercial ends. Africa-to-Africa media expansions threaten the growth of local media, as much as Western media. It is equally plausible that external regional media, employing similar liberal market-oriented tactics, could threaten the growth of local media of receiving countries. Old and new media are using their respective financial muscles to expand in the African media market.

First, there is the critical aspect of the competition that has forced old news players to adopt news business strategies. Africa-focused expansions are happening in the midst of, metaphorically, southward expansions in the international communication and global news. Southward expansion can be divided into two. It is first symbolized by continuity, reform, and reinforcement of the historically dominant international news channels of developed countries such as CNN International and BBC. In terms of continuity, reform and reinforcement, the historically dominant CNN International, for example, has transformed its business strategy by relying less on news agencies about Africa. News and magazine shows such as CNN’s Marketplace Africa, Inside Africa, and African Voices suggest that the network now reports on various aspects of Africa other than just hard news. CNN’s focus on Africa, against CNN worldwide declining ratings, has paid off commercially and in terms of audience share. It is now the most-watched international news channel in Africa.

Equally, BBC has ensured its continuity, reform, and reinforcement by keeping its spot as the second most-watched international news channel in the continent. BBC has gone on to establish exclusively Africa-focused program called Focus on Africa. BBC, too, has had to adjust or would be moved out of the African market by new global news players in the competition for the growing African middle-class audiences. The realization of Africa as a global-news market creates another dimension in the southward expansion. This dimension is epitomized by global-news channels of developed countries in the north that follow on the footsteps of CNN International and BBC. Some of these channels have a clear-cut Africa-focused agenda—with CNBC Africa being the prime example.

Second, Africa-focused expansions are happening in the midst of, metaphorically, southward and northward expansions in the international communication and global news flow scene. South-south and northward expansions are exemplified by the regionalization and broader globalization of media conglomerates of the Global South. Al Jazeera’s horizontal expansion or regionalization in the Middle East, its strong and determined presence in the African continent, and its northward expansion into rest of the world is an example here. The same can be said of CCTV’s expansion in the Asia-Pacific and then to the rest of the world. The increased growth of South Africa’s e.tv in the African continent first and then expansion throughout the world is another example.

Third, Africa-focused expansions are happening in the midst of transnational commercialization and commoditization of cultural identities and languages of the South in the international communication and global news flow scene. The commercialization and commoditization of identities and languages occur as a counterbalance and, at the same time, reinforcement of the hegemony of European colonial languages in other regions, particularly the English language. Commercialization and commoditization of identity and language are manifest in exploitation of particular sets of cultural and linguistic identities that are in specific geopolitical regions and/or diasporic communities for media-related commercial purposes. For example, France 24 has French, English, and Arabic channels; CNN has CNN Mexico, CNN en Español, CNN Arabic, and so on; Al Jazeera has Al Jazeera Balkans, Al Jazeera Türk, Al Jazeera America, and so forth. Interestingly, if not concerning, global-news broadcasters in the African media use English, French, or Portuguese—“colonial languages”—rather than indigenous or regional languages. Furthermore, the commercialization of identity through reinforcement of hegemony of the English language can be seen, for example, in the global growth of the Indian twenty-four-hour news channel NDTV 24x7 and its targeting of the Indian community in the diaspora.

It is rather disingenuous for media institutions in the north to simply say they rewriting the narrative about Africa. There are strong factors that, in part, force them to look for greener pastures in Africa. Some of these factors are restrained growth in their respective countries because of the crisis resulting from the economic meltdown; long-standing and strong competition in the already saturated national media market; radically declining levels of news media consumption by audiences, particularly young adults. For the majority of audiences of the Global North, “the media landscape now has all the characteristics of post-modernity: it is characterized by fragmentation, almost unlimited choice, and a diminishing sense of national conversation or shared political destiny;”5 On the other hand, for many Africans the media landscape is characteristically modern, dominated more by traditional broadcast radio and television and

less by newspapers and online media. The environment allows for growth of television. “While radio remains popular in Africa, TV is growing.”6 There is less by newspapers and online media. The environment allows for growth of with better-developed media industries—and similar to their Western counter- are expanding in their respective regions and to the world at large. Economies countries with relatively stronger economies and stronger political influences similarly marginalized in the global political economy. Those southern-based even the African renaissance. Southern countries were never homogenous or areted by common colonial languages), and globalization of local cultures or imperialism, South-South cooperation, geo-linguistic commonalities (usually cre- zation among the nations of the South, which can be masqueraded in the notions of reversal of cultural imperialism and is always negative, the growth of southern-based global news channels and mainstream news that is normally oriented toward negative happenings.7 The expansion of southern-based media conglomerates into African media space to explore African media space for growth. These have to do with audience size. Media conglomerates are entering Africa, which they now view as a region rather than a desperate conglomeration of countries. In terms of population size, African countries offer a huge market. The size of the cities and buying power cannot be underestimated—Lagos, Harare, and Abidjan combined have thirty-six million people as opposed to ten million peo- ple in cities like Paris, Rome, and Zurich.

As much as there are comparable patterns in the nature of global news (and entertainment) channel's transnational expansions, the Africa-oriented expansions are intriguing because for a very long time Africa had not been seen as primary investment region. For this article, there are oppositional factors that cause global news media to expand into African media and cultural spaces.

Conclusion

The expansion of southern-based media conglomerates into African media and cultural space could be seen as both the reversal of cultural imperialism and internationalization of the local cultures they carry. On the one hand, this can be true—although exaggerated in terms of scale and scope of cultural content being “reversed.” On the other hand, perceptions of reversal of cultural imperialism could be misleading. Some regional media have, arguably, potential to establish various new forms of media, cultural imperialism, or synchronization among the nations of the South, which can be masqueraded in the notions of counterbalancing the influence of Western media, reversing cultural imper-ialism, South-South cooperation, geo-linguistic commonalities (usually created by common colonial languages), and globalization of local cultures or even the African renaissance. Southern countries were never homogenous or similarly marginalized in the global political economy. Those southern-based countries with relatively stronger economies and stronger political influences are expanding in their respective regions and to the world at large. Economies with better-developed media industries—and similar to their Western counter- parts in developed capitalistic economies are employing these media capabili- ties for production of cultural programs for national, regional, worldwide, and diaspora consumption. In the African region, for example, it is largely South Africa and Nigeria, two of Africa’s economically powerful countries, that export their cultural products in the rest of the region.

The other important point is that as much as dominant southern countries can be exporting their own media products, they can also be a conduit for Western media and cultural imperialism. For example, South African media content, especially popular- and high-culture media products, is hardy “South African.” While we might cautiously speak of typically India’s Bollywood or Nigeria’s Nollywood movies and Latin America’s telenovelas in their respective regions and in the diaspora, it is difficult to speak of any enduring media product forms and formats that are idiosyncratically South African. Also, unlike in Latin America, Asia, Middle East, and North Africa, Africa-based regional media expansion scarcely foster any new forms of cultural and linguistic cooperation among developing African countries such as program exchange.

African-oriented expansion does not create space for the development of indigenous languages; it enhances the hegemony of colonial languages such as English, French, and Portuguese. Regionalization is biased in favor of powerful countries of the South and inimical to the spirit of NWICO through which southern countries collectively campaign for equal flow of international information. Although there are disadvantages, there are also advantages.

The first advantage is that if one of the main concerns in international commu- nication is that the representation of Africa in the global news media is biased and is always negative, the growth of southern-based global news channels and programs is forcing Western global channels to question their representation and framing of Africa. This is in terms of: cultural sensitivity, hiring local personnel, and in terms of expanding so-called magazine TV programs that could cover a wide scope of Africa and Africans, not just within realm of conventional mainstream news that is normally oriented toward negative happenings.’ Magazine programs on CNN’s African Voices and Marketplace Africa are now feature programs that speak of African urgency, success, innovation, and future prosperity.

Lastly, the sheer presence of business channels and programs such as Forbes Africa, Bloomberg TV Africa, CNBC Africa, and CNN’s Marketplace Africa tells

6 See “BBC to Launch Focus on Africa TV Programme.”
a big story about new perceptions of Africa as an investment destination rather than a place of disaster. Stereotypical images of starving Africans now increasingly coexist alongside robust reports on African financial markets, African CEO interviews, and so on. The parochial reporting and negative imaging that used to characterize Western news channels is slowly changing. But these changes should not be overemphasized.

Literature


What Does Freedom Stand for Today?

Jelena Petrović

We speak today about a crisis in contemporary social movements. This crisis has been produced in part by our failure to develop a meaningful and collective historical consciousness. Such a consciousness would entail recognition that our victories attained by freedom movements are never etched in stone. What we often perceive under one set of historical conditions as glorious triumphs of mass struggle can later ricochet against us if we do not continually reconfigure the terms and transform the terrain of our struggle. The struggle must go on. Transformed circumstances require new theories and practices.

—Angela Davis, The Meaning of Freedom, and Other Difficult Dialogues

The impossibility to change neoliberal systems that shape and oppress everyday life on all social levels, as well as the simultaneous and paradoxical act of reproducing and resisting dominant social structures (a side effect of contemporary emancipatory politics), put us in the position to rethink what the politics of liberation or its revolutionary practices of today are. The attribute “revolutionary,” means that those practices are politically engaged and socially transformative in a very concrete context. The fact is that all social revolutions have emerged outside of dominant ideological, economical, and political structures in order to cope with the unbearable conditions of common life in certain times. Each of them generated a new social order grounded in the radical imagination of everyday life. In other words, social revolutions always fought for freedom, social justice, and new liberating legality through “illegal” means. But what happens when all those facts become romanticized versions of possible futures and when the freedom is (ab)used as a key concept of neoliberal society?

Dealing with this question, my intention is to underline the false dichotomy between the meaning of legality and illegality when it comes to difficult questions on the contemporary total war on terror(ism) (WOT) that shapes the actual state of global crisis, and at the same time escapes the real political questions that we should face. Freedom appears at this point as a fundamental and arbitrary notion of neoliberal society, a notion that justifies the state of war (consisting of all recent and actual political, economical, social crises) and develops through it further “liberal” interests and inequalities. The actual means of democratic defense of humanity, such as: military interventions, austerity measures, refugee policies, humanitarian aid, migration laws, human rights, and so on, are discursively and ideologically based on the meaning of freedom. Those means (co)produce the neoliberal mechanisms of global governmentality, as well as the permanent state of crisis, conflict, and terror. Such inverted horizons of freedom exclude any critical way of thinking, educating, organizing, resisting, and living outside the neoliberal concept of legality today. The false choice between legal and illegal means of social resistance, of political
struggle for freedom opens up questions on the limits of political, theoretical, and artistic practices as well the question of resisting responsibility and revolutionary subjectivity. Following the red thread of recent theoretical and art-theory works, this text looks for the meaning of freedom, which is antagonistically contextualized by neoliberal and revolutionary understandings of contemporary permanent war today. The war that made people’s lives illegal.

The State of Permanent War

The prevailing apparatus of the neoliberal state, constructed through the model of arbitrary freedom and its manipulative liberal values, does not produce only class, race, gender, and many other social/economic/political/cultural diversifications through the oppressive politics of identity and its economy of brutal exploitation, but rather “human waste” (human-as-waste) through administrative and managing mechanisms of contemporary war: permanent and global. There are at least three theoretical cross-referential understanding of the meaning of “human waste”: symbolic, bio-political, and political-economic. The first two approaches re/produce social order that is achieved through inscription of pollution, danger, redundancy, and contamination into the Other by violent means of so-called social purification and protection (intervention). The difference is in the individual or collective constitution of humans-as-waste as a threat at the level of the population. The Marxist critique is based on a third political-economic approach that examines humans-as-waste as a byproduct of the capitalist mode of production.

Marina Gržinić’s definition of the war state shaped by force, violence, and fear is the most precise definition of the neoliberal state, a definition that goes beyond the historical meaning of the fascist state in order to underline “what the major logic of dominance in the world today is, and this logic is the logic of war.” According to Gržinić, the war state has elements of historical fascism, such as “a sovereign leader, people, death as the management of life,” but also has elements of present neoliberalism, such as individual freedom and autonomy as a crucial right. Referring to Santiago López-Petit, she explains the notion of postmodern fascism as a form of self-governmentality based on the self-management of a proper autonomy of differences for which the cohesive element is war. Such a war state twists the meaning of the capitalist nation-state in order to “sterilize the Other, evacuate the conflict from public space and neutralize the political” constantly demanding “a proliferation of unbelievable ‘freedom’ of particularities” for which the best example is the reconciling agenda of human rights that keeps strong borders of power between central and peripheral identities.

Following historical events, we can say that global or total war officially started in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, when the Bush administration launched an international military campaign known as the war on terror (or the war on terrorism). Led by the United States and the United Kingdom with NATO support, the war on terror was waged initially against al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations but soon expanded to include Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and so forth. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were transformed into occasions to abuse and manipulate collective grief, to reduce it to a national desire for vengeance for which freedom and democracy became exportable commodities: “commodities that can be sold or imposed upon entire populations whose resistances are aggressively suppressed by the military [...]. Bloodshed and belligerence in the name of freedom and democracy!” Appropriating the idea of freedom and democracy while making use of the permanent financial crises and fear of terror, the neoliberal means of war production prevent any radical possibility of political subjectivization against the war on terror or the possibility of confronting its permanency. Catherine Hass points out that contemporary war is necessarily a permanent one, because there is no intrinsic political, subjective goal that would determine its end, THE PEACE. The question that appears in the title of her PhD thesis “Qu'appelle-t-on une guerre? Enquête sur le nom de guerre aujourd’hui” (What does the term “war” stand for today?) testifies to this current state of war, its permanence and necessity, the purpose of which, as emphasized by Catharine Hass, is not the achievement of peace, because the differentiation between war and peace doesn’t exist anymore. Such contemporary global

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5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 59.
war, as a war without limits, is managed by other political conditions, such as: legal military intervention, arms-trade agreements in the name of freedom, and the defense of democracy and human rights.

The definition of “war state” as well as contemporary war today leads us to the conclusion that neoliberality of global capitalism is the formative ideology of the total war that produces a permanent state of economic, political and social crisis, as well “human waste.” Today, with the imperative of democratic citizenship, the self-righteous first world politics serves to justify and pacify repressive forms of the new final solution. By introducing a new binary opposition: illegal/legal, while claiming human rights as a tool of neoliberal systemic restructuration, this final solution offers false, but also the ultimate choice between the permanent war for global security (in other words, WOT) and any radical form of resistance to the neoliberal fist world society (preemptively signified as a terrorist or illegal one). Instead of such choice, we should point out the following questions: Who are all those illegal, undocumented, disallowed, non-belonging, non-xyz “bastards” who resist or just stay outside those legalized neoliberal oppressive structures? What if only “being illegal” can break through the repressive neoliberal system of the global inequality that we live in? Or simply: How can we (re)build an idea of social revolution, or make a radical collective change today beyond all those appropriated/abused notions of freedom, as well beyond recycled/emptied vocabulary that is coming from the history of previous revolutionary struggles and resistances?

What Is the Meaning of Freedom?

Is the question that Angela Davis posed in her writings after so many years of fighting, thinking, and resisting the repressive mechanisms in power structures of our contemporary world. Due to the most idealistic vain, such freedom is a permanent struggle—that refers to the term of permanent revolution which is a base for society emancipation and freedom gained through struggle/resistance/revolution etc.—a radically different future, a fundamental social precondition for an emancipatory collective transformation beyond slavery, colonialism, racism, patriarchy, capitalism, fascism, and so forth. But at the same time, through substantial historical events and material (post)ideological transformations of state, freedom became the most expensive word of the globalized neoliberal society. Today, the meaning of freedom is (ab)used as a fetishizing synonym for the law of those who have permanently established themselves within the neoliberal system of political and economic power. Envisioning revolutionary freedom through the larger collective claim for a new society (unity), requiring the radical emancipatory conception of complex community beyond existing power structures of the neoliberal state and its regulative and oppressive apparatus, Davis reminds that freedom is a process of becoming. In other words, it is a process “of being able to see and understand difference within unity, and resisting the tendency to reproduce the hierarchies embedded in the world we want to change.”

According to Robin D. G. Kelley’s introduction to Davis’s book, the idea that an across-the-board community of complexity and differences will be founded on justice and equality, as well the provision of education, health care, and housing and the abolition of the police and capitalist state is totally opposite to the idea of the neoliberal society. It is important to highlight that such an idea of neoliberal society, which appropriated the meaning of freedom, is not the recent one. Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and others proposed it as a capitalist mode of ultimate freedom after the Second World War. The Mont Pelerin Society (named after the hotel near Montreux, Switzerland, where the first meeting was convened by Hayek) was established in 1947 by famous economists, philosophers, and intellectuals, as well as eight winners of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (including von Mises, Hayek, Friedman) that proclaimed freedom as a ground value of the liberal state. Freedom of expression, free market economic policies, and the political values of an open society became markers of classic liberalism through this international organization. Marginalized during the Fordist era and the Keynesian welfare state, the Mont Pelerin Society subsequently became more and more influential, until after the 1970s when it became one of the most influential ideological and theoretical grounds of global regulatory reformation, which enabled the rise of neoliberalism under US hegemony. Referring to Lidija Radojević, such a process of market-oriented regulatory restructuring of social production changed the meaning and the role of the state in accordance with locally specific geographical and historical conditions. The neoliberal state was born with an aim to establish a proper institutional environment for structuring the behavior of its citizens and (re)producing simultaneously the state power as well the eternal border between legal and illegal—in order to make impossible any resistance to it.

9 Davis’s book, The Meaning of Freedom, consists of collections of public speeches, interviews, texts, and so on.
10 Freedom: The Most Expensive Capitalist Word is the title of the theater play based on the authors’ research trip to the world’s most isolated country—North Korea. The two authors, Maja Pelević and Olga Dimitrijević, question the idea of freedom in the era of ever-intensifying global surveillance, and face the existing propaganda and dominant stereotypes of the North Korean totalitarian regime and Western neoliberal democracies. See http://festival.bitef.rs/event/freedom -expensive-capitalist-word/.
11 Robin D. G. Kelley, foreword to Davis, Meaning of Freedom, 14.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
It brings us to the conclusion that all dimensions of everyday life within the neoliberal system today are reduced to market rationality, by means of individualized social relations that are formed through profitability, normativity, and competition. In other words, the neoliberal system (state) manages the notion of civic/civil subject and transforms the citizens and their knowledge and abilities into human capital—its initial investments. It also includes one's ability to strategically plan and organize one's own life—one's individual choice to estimate what is profitable, useful, and successful, as well as individual responsibility and self-care. Social differences and political paradigms created binary oppositions such as minority-majority, center/periphery, private/public, and universal/particular that have also an important place in civil/civic subjectivization. Culturalized systemic differences (established on traditional categories of ethnicity, gender, and class) produced a multicultural society in which those economic and political differences were fragmented and neutralized through the politics of diversity and the ideology of reconciliation and tolerance (human rights). The common signifier of those diverse communities—consisting of such civil subjects, is actually *homo oeconomicus*: an entrepreneur of him- or herself. 15

Owing to the fact that we are all fixed by this globalized neoliberal mode of social (re)production, which abused the idea of freedom against ourselves, we can say that past drives for freedom and historical means of emancipatory movements and revolutionary struggle do not function anymore. In such material-neoliberal conditions, freedom lost its historical, revolutionary meaning of collective struggle, because it was distributed to individuals as a commodity of identity (self)production. On the 51st anniversary of the establishment of the Black Panthers (1966), we can see how the embeddedness of revolutionary freedom in the globalizing, democratizing world functions as a global “cultural heritage,” consumption norm, aesthetic value, fashion, or very pale repetition of revolutionary rhetoric that doesn't make much sense in the material conditions that we live in. It appears rather as a lethargic feeling of misleading nostalgia. A few years ago, addressing the Occupy movement, Angela Davis said that what we need instead of such deceiving repetition of old revolutionary folklore, are new ideas and strategies for a revolutionary social change, for a radical future that will bring us out of this unbearable neoliberal lives: “More than once I have heard people say, ‘If only a new Black Panther Party could be organized, then we could seriously deal with The Man, you know?’ But suppose we were to say: ‘There is no Man anymore.’ There is suffering. There is oppression. There is terrifying racism. But this racism does not come from the mythical ‘Man.’ Moreover, it is laced with sexism and homophobia and unprecedented class exploitation associated with a dangerously globalized capitalism. We need new ideas and new strategies that will take us into the twenty-first century.” 16

Freedom as Radically Different Future

What does today’s art offer to understand and radicalize the meaning of freedom beyond the existing society, or more precisely, beyond the neoliberal state? Art definitely produces a glitch that calls for social imagination of a radically different future, and for an emancipatory reconceptualization of the community, as well for political (re)articulation of the most emergent issues of today. In other words, today’s art produces the politics of error that interrupts our social reality with a counter-historical urgency to face the present, shifting in-between the unspoken history and utopian/dystopian future. The politics of error is introduced here as a new concept, dealing with an impossibility to break through artistic or cultural institutional structures and ossified academic worlds, with rare exceptions. Such error, as a symptom of living contemporaneity, indicates dislocation and new location, visibility and presence of the invisible, possibility and freedom of experimentation, and many other transformative promises.

There are artworks or art projects that actualize, conceptualize, and imagine the politics of freedom beyond existing neoliberal, patriarchal, colonial modes of society. The red thread of singular meaning of these radically different futures could be traced through some of the following paradigmatic examples.

_Naked Freedom_ (2010) is a film/video work by artist-theoretician Marina Gržinić and Aina Šmid. They are a duo who create artistic situations for being, co-thinking and co-creating with others. The video starts with an Achille Mbembe quote: “What connects terror, death, and freedom is an ecstatic notion of temporality and politics.” 17 The film focuses on deregulation of social life within globalized capitalism through an attempt to be socially engaged, politically socially engaged, and radically free. Authors experimentally approach the mode of reconceptualization of the community. With reference to Soviet filmmakers Vertov and Eisenstein and their mode of political montage, Gržinić and Šmid put in question the usual means of art production (which is today socially twisted...

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16 Davis, _Meaning of Freedom, 18_.

and politically predictable). They problematize the issue of (neo)liberal (neo)colonialism through the discussion between Kwame Nimako and Gržinić, filmed at a workshop on education, development, and freedom held at Duke University, in February 2010. The discussion reveals the relocation of global borders and peripheries today and lost moments of possible radical communities, as well the instabilities and restrictions that have been already incorporated in new global narratives and impossible movements. Referring to the Nimako’s claim: “We are here (in the EU), because you were there (in Africa),” Gržinić said: “We are here (in the EU), because you want to go there (to Eastern Europe).” This opens up the question of complicity of understanding the whole set of (post)colonial relations within the common struggle (for “complex unity”) against the systematic violence and neoliberal legitimizing of oppression of global capitalism.

New World Summit (NWS) initiated by Jonas Staal uses the field of art to reimagine a space for a fundamental practice of democracy today. NWS was established as an artistic and political organization in 2012. Since then, it is dedicated to providing “alternative parliaments” that host organizations that currently are, or consider themselves, excluded from democracy. As it is stated by the project, NWS opposes the misuse of the concept of democracy for expansionist, military, and colonial gains to which the organization refers as “democracy” such as WOT. This concept rejects the model of the nation-state and accepts of an ideology of self-governance at all levels of society through the discipline of performing the stateless democracy. So, relating to the art practice or more precisely to the form or to the morphology of art, this project reintroduces the notion of revolutionary realism as “the kind of reality that becomes possible through a revolutionary practice, but [is] not yet present.” According to Staal, revolutionary realism rejects the script “that define[s] what is realistic and what is utopian, what proper citizenship is and what the terrorist act is. Revolutionary realism focuses on shaping new possible realities once we have rejected the forms that structure our current performance, in this case specifically controlled within the stage of nation-state.”

The materiality, form, and morphology of such an ideology is in a process of permanent transformation of both art and politics through the practice of stateless democracy.”

Another form of state appears within the art-theory field, as well within the global politics of power relations and that is “state within state” or better known as deep state (coming from the Turkish term Derin Devlet). Karen Mirza and Brad Butler, through their artistic practice, particularly their project titled The Museum of (Non)Participation, which represents the process of investigation of the terms and conditions of images, objects, collaboration, dialogue, and the social. In 2012, with China Miéville and the art-activist group Mosireen, they made a science-fiction-inflected protest “training film” called Deep State, which starts from different moments of political resistance and struggle, particularly those that took place in Egypt in 2011 (so-called revolutionary struggles to achieve “democracy and freedom”). The deep state is not possible to prove; it has special interests and generates relationships of real power, and it makes fundamental decisions that “often run counter to the outward of impression of democracy.” This film, through popular protests and legislated acts of violence and containment, traces the fluid and invisible influences that impact the state. Through a vivid montage of newly filmed and archival footage, which put into continuum past, present, and future, the film follows the clashes between the rioter (running for freedom) and the deep state (unregulated by democracy). The process of disappointment, loss and limitation of utopian visions within existing contemporary democratic society is at the same time the process of liberation from the deep state (the state of dictatorship). This film not only puts existing narrations of protesting and resistance into question, but also the notions of democracy and freedom within the neoliberal capitalist state that stands against deep state (loosely synonymous with the shadow government) as the only possible option of the postmodern world where history has ended.

The politics of glitch or the aesthetics of error is present in many artworks dealing with the meaning of freedom. Looking into the bare images of Margareta Kern’s animation work To Whom Does the World Belong,” we face the political montage that uses stop/slow motion animation, drawings, voice, poetry recordings, video documentation, sounds, and silences, and this produces an inner voice that directs us, occupies our thoughts, and reorients our actions, while simultaneously creating the syncretic experience (aesthetics) of affect production. A voice can be heard signaling the end of trading at a stock exchange, lines of poetry are drawing the contours of a woman’s body, a body that is being dragged along a street in Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011. Society defeated, a woman beaten-up by the police on one side, the neoliberal state and contemporary patriarchy on the other all feature in an image that has traveled the world. The war to end dictatorship soon turns into the war on terror. It becomes a permanent, necessary, and constituent agent of the survival of freedom.

21 Ibid., 7.
23 Ibid.
neoliberalism, which lurks in the background of this image. (Non)framing political acts by the media, such as a failed revolution and a permanent war, thus co-produce a social actuality by placing the actual (visible) in place of the real (invisible). Using the political montage of the affect—the necessary glitch in the process of image animation—Kern does not just draw us in, but rather drags us into the world to which we belong. This political spectacle of a scratched frame, of an animation suspended in the moment of aesthetic glitch, is at the same time the red thread of this work—the thread that unravels the body of the state, economics, and art. Documentary records chronicling global social circumstances in the era of neoliberalism overlap with the animation, which performs a forensic deconstruction of those images, fragmenting them to frame the real, invisible, and empty places of a necessary political subjectivation. Contemporary society’s revolt against the state are glimpsed in the animated documentary records of the protests: against tuition fees (England, 2010), against budget cuts on healthcare (Spain, 2012), against dictatorship (Egypt, 2011), and so forth. The revolt, which demands freedom, social rights (labor, healthcare, and education rights), and human dignity (equality) is here condensed into frames that do not show, but (re)produce the status quo of everyday politics. The voice of each individual political subject within the collective body of revolt, the interrupted, cut-up voice of animation questions if it is at all possible to produce effective images of revolt, protest, and revolution in the world of today.

Beyond theoretical thinking about limits and promises of a social utopia, as well as beyond aesthetic questions about unpresentable universality of great events and its images, there are creative processes and practices that involves excess/resistance, freedom, and yet non-existing political as well as artistic singularity. Jean-Luc Nancy points out that the term “singular” in Latin—singuli—already announces its plurality: “The singular is primarily each one and, therefore, also with and among all the others. The singular is a plural.” Despite this paradox, the notions of singularity and plurality are not opposite; they co-determine each other: each singularity is always another in a plurality of “being-with” others. The key point is that being can only relate to being-with-one-another, in terms of being-in-common, to create a radically different community. In that sense, artistic practices that appear today as singular insights into the world of the neoliberalism (as an ultimate form of oppression today) or as singular ruptures that politicize the space and time (by not accepting the neoliberal meanings of freedom, as well as the neoliberal dichotomy of (il)legality, particularly when it comes to the resistance), co-create another singularity through being-with others that calls for radical change. They co-create another singularity that has potential to break through societal and political as well post-ideological social orders of the present and the past; this singularity shows the future beyond multiplied classes and identities of today’s neoliberal, patriarchal, and colonial reality.


Literature


Human Dignity Is Violable
No Fundamental Right to a Better Life!

Marika Schmiedt

*Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better Life!* (2016) consists of five posters that respond to the asylum and refugee policies in Austria and comment on the refugee guide issued by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior (www.refugee-guide.at).

The refugee guide, which is supposed to provide information about the rules and values in Austria, uses statements that harbor clichéd resentments. Instead of mirroring prejudice and intolerance, the brochure should serve as an aid to those who seek refuge. The only thing this ridiculous rule-of-conduct picture-book guide conveys is that we are a prejudiced people and that, despite globalization, we’ll never manage to grow beyond Eurocentric thought processes. The politics of misanthropy now privileges the cultural and social aspects over the biological. Culturalization is consequently the present form of racialization. To develop a politics of humanity and dignity, it is imperative to insist that the right to asylum is not a question of hospitality; it is a fundamental human right and knows no quantifiable limit!
Fig. 13
Marika Schmiedt, Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better Life!, 2016. The poster reads: “The doctor is not treating ANY asylum seekers! The lawyer is not defending ANY foreigners! The bar is free of asylum seekers!”

Fig. 14
Racialized dysphoria (colonial detachment) describes the disconnection to my own blackness due to racism and colorism. Dysphoria describes a state of unease, and also a feeling of not being comfortable in one's body, a term often used in transgender contexts. I use the term to describe how racism affects the way I felt in my own body.

I must have been about four years old. I remember being an outspoken child; I liked playing outside, I liked the sun, I made friends easily, and always got along very well with every child in the various nurseries I came to be in. I didn’t know what race or ethnicity was, which I believe is normal for a four-year-old. Luisa (which is not her real name) was the only black girl besides me in this summer nursery. Maybe I felt so comfortable around Luisa back then, because I could recognize a bit of myself in her. I believe representation, and recognizing yourself in terms of people that look similar to you, is always something that secures a certain feeling of belonging. I believe nonwhite children need that even more than white children in Europe, since representation of race or ethnicity in European countries like Austria privileges white children anyway.

As Luisa and I played outside, three little girls asked me if I wanted to join them in playing hide and seek. “Ja klar!” (“Of course!”), I said. One of the girls looked at me, and a certain dominance took over her little blue eyes and she said, “Du darfst nur mit uns spielen, wenn du aufhörst mit dieser Schwarzen zu spielen.” Three girls, not older than five, told me I could only play with them if I stop playing with the black girl. They of course did not refer to her as black; they used the n-word. I cannot remember what happened after that, but I remember feeling sad about them using a word I did not fully understand but was clearly derogatory to refer to another child because of her skin color. I was something between white and black, therefore I had more value to them, and because of the light shade of my skin they wanted to play with me but not with Luisa. On that day I learned that some skin colors and ethnicities were perceived as better than others. I instantly knew that wasn’t fair.

So elementary school was about to start for the first time ever and I was really excited. I looked so cute: my hair was a bit longer so it got bigger and puffier; I had a little afro that I really liked. I wore a little fake fur jacket and a backpack that my mothers bought me from Brazil. It was a blue school backpack with animals printed on it. And it was the first thing I got mocked for in school.
Everybody started asking me where this backpack was from and why it looked so weird. I always answered that it’s not weird, and it is from Brazil. I told them that it’s a country and that I’m from it. Then they said my backpack was ugly. I asked my mom to buy me a new backpack; she said that I asked with so much angst in my eyes that she couldn’t deny buying a new “regular” one for me. In this very young age the construct of me being the “other,” the strange one, the Ausländer (a negative term for foreigners) was getting clearer and clearer to me. I was six, and I already felt like I didn’t belong. They started making fun of my curly hair and then eventually started calling me the n-word. The day I came home after school, when my classmates called me the n-word for the first time, both my mothers got really upset. The situation did not really change, even after my mothers talked to the teachers. I can’t remember what they told my mothers, I just know that I got transferred to another school.

Analyzing Teenage Trauma

Episode 1
The Straightening Iron
Linz, 2009

I had already spent a lot of time having a big problem with my naturally curly hair. I came to build up a deep hatred toward it and always wore it up, sometimes I pulled on it, trying to get the curls away, but my hair always bounced back to its natural texture. I was fifteen when my mom finally let me buy a straightening iron. I remember being very excited about it, after years of trying to work out ways to make my hair appear less curly, by blow drying it with a round brush, for example. I remember feeling an enormous relief when running the iron through my curly hair, and it coming out as straight as my peers’ hair. I felt pretty for the first time since starting school. I gained new confidence in myself, simply because my hair was now straight and I appeared less “foreign.” When one does not fit the criteria of what is perceived to look like “the norm,” those who are different from the majority of people around them tend to strive to assimilate to the majority. People who try to assimilate in a new place feel less alienated. The process of assimilation leaves the one who undergoes it feeling constantly dissatisfied in that “to become white,” for example, is impossible.

Episode 2
Sunblock
Linz, 2010

Only one year after I got my first straightening iron, I decided that I no longer wanted to have milchkaffee- (caffe latte-) shaded skin. White peers always referred to it as being the perfect brown shade, but this was not a compliment to me. I felt like going pale because I connected fairness with class and “being classy.” Again, I did not connect my skin color to blackness since I already had detached myself from it mentally. I connected it instead to something undesirable for me, something “cheap,” and that was the last thing I wanted to be. There is this extreme regime of racialized sexism, classism, and double standards in Western society. Everything that is constructed to be the “other” or the “exotic” tends to often be sexualized (ergo: desired), and everything sexualized tends to often be demonized (tempting, something “forbidden,” something that is actually not supposed to be). This shows how little desire is actually linked to love, and fetishism has nothing to do with love at all. Sexual desire has nothing to do with respect or appreciation; desire in this case is lust, and lust is not love. Being deemed sexual also means being deemed “cheap” in a sexist and classist society, which results in objectification and dehumanization of, in my case, a young black/Latina female body. So being perceived as exotic and sexual did not resonate with what felt safe to me as a sixteen-year-old. I began using sunblock with an SPF of 50+; not even my mothers, who had fairer skin than I, used this type of sunblock. People started noticing and asking me why I used it, and I told them that I didn’t want to tan. I even lied to friends, telling them I had a sun allergy. In my head, I was about to become what I subliminally always desired to be: white.

Episode 3
Bleach and Sweet 16
Linz, December 2011

The age of sixteen meant a lot to me. Influenced by popular US media, I dreamed of being a young woman, sophisticated, strong, and beautiful by the age of sweet sixteen. My idols were the Olsen Twins, Hilary Duff, and I fancied just about everything that had to do with rich, white girls with blonde hair. I made the decision to not just straighten my hair, but to bleach it platinum blonde. It was a one-year process. I did it by myself and lost half the length of my hair. When it was wet, it wouldn’t even bounce back to its natural curly texture, from the amount of damage I did to it.

At that time, I reached a very low point in my life because of depression and an eating disorder (which I will analyze later) that led to a mental breakdown.
and hospitalization. The reason I’m pointing this out is that it was at this exact time that I looked as white as I ever could. My skin still bothered me and I even considered ordering bleaching kits off the internet. Skin-bleaching products are officially forbidden and not openly sold in Europe.

I somehow didn’t order it and never got to do it and I must admit it is a scary thought, even back then, but even scarier are the facts that back then, I didn’t once question why I wanted to alter my skin tone, and that I actually didn’t care about the medical consequences that it would have brought me. I was in a state of complete detachment from my body. I did not see my body as my own; I saw it as something I had to modify, as a battlefield, as something that belonged to those looking at it, as something to be judged and defined by others, the predominately white gaze.

Analyzing Racialized Trauma and Puberty as a Trigger for Eating Disorders

_Bulimia Nervosa and Anorexia Nervosa and Being a Black/Latina Girl in Europe_
_Linz, Summer 2007_

I decided to start my first diet when I was eleven years old. I had read enough “women’s magazines” about dieting and working out, so I made my first meal plan: two apples for breakfast, one slice of bread with cheese for lunch, and clear soup for dinner. No sweets, nothing fried, two hundred calories a day maximum. I knew it was extreme, and my mom didn’t like it, but I actually didn’t care. I had put my mind to lose as much weight as possible. I discovered so-called pro-ana websites, where predominately anonymous online users would keep a diary of their eating patterns and workout regimens, along with selfies showing the progress of their weight loss. Self-loathing was a demand: “1. You shall hate every gram of fat on your body, 2. you shall hate food, 3. don’t quit working out even if you pass out, 4. the goal is to be thinner than everyone around you, 5. bones are beautiful and to be shown, 6. your body is your battlefield.”

This seemed like the perfect setup for an already ostracized feeling black/Latina girl hitting puberty. It didn’t seem wrong to me; I firmly believed that thinness was the gateway to happiness and recognition. Anorexia nervosa looked like a lifestyle that I desperately wanted to achieve, something that connected my body to discipline and hard work. “Thinspiration” or “thinspo” are videos and pictures of emaciated models and girls, predominantly white and upper class. Being thin seemed like a step toward success. Of course, there was a certain secrecy to it. You were not allowed to talk about pro-ana or pro-mia (the bulimic version of pro-ana) in public or to your friends and family. There even was advice given to delete your internet history after browsing pro-ana/mia websites.

So, during summer break I had enough time to stabilize my anorexic eating behavior, until one time I binge ate. I hadn’t eaten in a day and in the middle of the night I woke up, walked downstairs to the kitchen, and ate every sweet thing I could find. My jaw was hurting from chewing so compulsively and I couldn’t stop eating until I felt sick. I knew exactly what I had to do, so I went to the bathroom and “purged” what I had devoured. A deep feeling of shame and failure took over and I cried myself to sleep again. These binges started to happen more and more frequently and I started losing interest in everything I once liked.

Back to school after summer break, my weight loss was topic number one in class. Everyone admired my slimmed-down body; the girls started asking me how I became so thin. I felt successful even though I was ashamed of what I was doing. I didn’t tell anyone my bathroom secrets; I answered that I only ate fruits and vegetables every day. Everyone believed me. I felt recognized for the first time. By being thinner, my breasts, which had naturally grown bigger for me than for my peers, and my hips, which were wider than the other girls’ hips, began to shrink. I appeared younger and the boys stopped making fun of me. I became more quiet; my goal was to disappear, to blend in completely.

Analyzing Reconnection and Self-Recognition

_The Power of the Words “You Are a Beautiful Black Girl”_
_Linz, Summer 2012_

I was seventeen years old and I had decided that there had to be more to me than my eating disorder. I had lived with it since I was twelve, always relapsing, and I felt like I had to decide whether to start living normally again, or keep on relapsing and feeling suicidal. It really was like this: I just got up on one morning, binged and purged as usual and while I was flushing the toilet I thought, “Mir reicht’s!” (“That’s it!”). I have been unhappy for the longest time I could remember, and I felt like there had to be another way, that there had to be some purpose to life.

1 See http://pro-ana-lifestyle.weebly.com/anas-letter.html. (Site discontinued.)
I cut my hair short, after deciding I no longer wanted to bleach and damage it. I had also dyed it black again and stopped compulsively using sunblock. I decided to go to the Afro shop nearby and get my hair braided. When I told my then-boyfriend about my hair plans, he started laughing at me. But since I was slowly feeling more secure about myself and shifting my energy away from losing weight, I didn’t care. He wasn’t a good boyfriend to me anyway.

When I first entered the Afro shop, I saw all the different hairpieces hanging off the walls; it was colorful, loud, and messy, and I really liked it. I scheduled an appointment and went home excited. The day finally came, and I sat for four hours while Beatrice (fictional name) the shop owner, and her sister braided my hair. It was unusual, it hurt a bit, but I still enjoyed it. I felt like I was doing something good to myself. I wasn’t even aware of the Afro-cultural aspect of the hairstyle, since my idea of blackness was so limited, but somehow sitting there getting my hair done in that exact fashion felt right to me. Maybe I felt the connection subliminally?

I went home after they were finished and I loved how fresh my scalp was feeling and how long the braids were. I truly felt beautiful and I was enjoying myself. It was starting to get dark outside when I reached home and a nice summer breeze was in the air. Marcela (fictional name) was sitting outside on a bench. Marcela is a very close friend of my mothers and she used to take care of me when I was a child—I got to know her when I was seven. She has been and still is to this day the only African-Brazilian person I grew up around. Marcela was talking on the phone as she saw me walking by. When she saw me wearing my braids, smiling, waving at her, she ended her call and hugged me very tight. She looked at me, her eyes full of joy and slightly teary, and she said, “Voce esta linda, nega.” She called me a beautiful black girl (nega can be endearing and is used a lot in Brazil). It all started making sense to me: “Eu sou negra tambem?” (Am I black too?), she nodded and said, “Sim. Como eu tambem. Nos somos negras tambem e somos lindas. Estas tranças combinam perfeitamente com voce porque trançando-o, nos cuidamos do nosso cabelo.” (Yes, like me as well. We are black too and we are beautiful. These braids fit you so perfectly because braiding it is how we take care of our hair.) My light skin didn’t mean I could not be black, since being black is an identity based on heritage of culture and genetic makeup.

By reconnecting oneself with blackness, one is dismantling a history of erasure and whitewashing. By auto-affirming that I was black, I felt like I finally inhabited my body. I remember running to my mom, showing her the braids, and proudly saying, “Mom, I am black. I am black!” It was the start of a journey of diaspora reconnection. Nobody had ever called me black before in this matter, so directly, without a “mid-term” or anything fetishizing, just referring to me as black. It felt extremely empowering.

Detaching mixed black people from their blackness is a very powerful colonial tool. To whitewash mixed people fuels the idea of the “other” (that is, other than white) as being something bad and undesirable, thus upholding colonial structures through a seemingly superficial matter; the outer appearance of a human being. This happens especially in a black context, and it goes back to the history of slavery. Enslaved black women, who worked on plantations, were often raped by their white masters. Children who emerged from these atrocities were usually lighter skinned, and because of that they had to be kept inside the master’s house as “house slaves.” This created a clear hierarchy between skin tones that lasts until this day. What takes place nowadays is that lighter-skinned black people try to sever themselves from their blackness in order to conform to what is deemed good in Western society. It is still perfectly normal to deny one’s blackness.

To call myself black when it is part of my heritage is both an identity and a political statement. To be able to identify myself as Afro-Latina woman in a place like Austria is crucial for my mental well-being, because it sets an end to the fight I was having against the truth of my own ancestry. 2

Get Down To
The runaway hit *Prison Break* (directed by Paul T. Scheuring) ran for four seasons (2005–9) on US and UK television and the much-anticipated season 5 has been aired from April to May of 2017. Using an escape plan tattooed onto his body, the lead character, Michael Scofield (Wentworth Miller), saves his innocent brother, Lincoln Burrows (Dominic Purcell), from the electric chair by breaking out of Fox River State Penitentiary with other inmates, aided by his love interest, Sara Tancredi (Sarah Wayne Callies), the prison doctor. Michael is the mastermind throughout as they take down “The Company” in their bid for freedom. This essay speculates on Miller, the lead protagonist who is of black/white “mixed race” ancestry, who is being passed as white and what this might mean for border bodies within “post-race” scopic regimes. This is important because “civil society represents itself to itself as being infinitely inclusive, and its technologies of hegemony (including cinema) are mobilized to manufacture this assertion not to dissent from it [...]. Films can be thought of as one of an ensemble of discursive practices mobilized by civil society to invite, or interpellate, blacks to the same variety of social identities that other races are able to embody without contradiction.”

The US’s “tragic mulatto” stereotype means that cinematic and televisual strategies represent the ontological status of black/white mixed-race people in relation to alienation, dishonor, violence, and non-whiteness. Miller’s whitening is significant as his body is only readable through blackness because the only grammar through which mixing has been known is deficit, psychic dysfunction, and societal malfunction. As a tragic mulatto his body exists within a “libidinal economy” related to the political economy, (hetero)sexuality, and the unconscious.

UK-born Miller’s father is of African-American and Jamaican descent, which are already mixed categories because of enslavement histories, and his mother is a white US American. He claims British and American citizenship, can claim Jamaican citizenship, and at the time of his birth in 1972 he would have been the nation’s “half-caste.” At birth his black/white “mixed-race” body provided a psychic and surface border to whiteness connected to centuries of anti-African descent racism, and now it connects to twenty-first-century neoliberal post-race racialization within continuing negro-phobia. Such body bordering should make it impossible for him to be read as white on-screen but does not. His being passed as white emphasizes that whiteness is more than skin color, but skin’s recognition as white dictates who can transform racist injustice and subvert dispossession in “post-race” United States/United

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2. Ibid., 7.
Libidinal Economies of Mixing as Problem and Opportunity in the United States and the United Kingdom

For Frank Wilderson, libidinal economy is not only linked to “forms of attraction, affection and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction, and the violence of lethal consumption [...]. It is the whole structure of psychic and emotional life [...] inclusive of [...] a structure of feeling [...] it is a dispensation of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.”

Seen from the libidinal economy of suffering the “mulatto” body is pathologized and used as a tool of “racial” hygiene, a warning against physical mixing. Through the grammar of suffering (s)he becomes antihuman if the human is read as unmixed. (S)he is a product of modernity as (s)he appears as a new ontology, a “new race” with marginality and the tragedy of unbelonging being his/her ontological condition. Irrespective of white kinship within societies structured by racial dominance, there is no guarantee of being part of the national body occupied by those designated white. In the United States, according to Naomi Zack, the “proscriptive white kinship schema reinforces and perpetuates ordinary ideas about physical races as natural entities” rather than seeing that the “white breeding schema of family identity is a form of social technology.”

Since the landmark 1967 Loving v. Virginia court case, which ruled that inter-racial marriage was legal in all of the United States, transracial intimacy appears to have been normalized. However, the multiracial movement exists within a twenty-first-century “post-race” states where everyone is (not) white.

The 2000 United States census was the first time people could self-identify with more than one race, and in the 2010 census the multiracial group had grown by 32 percent to nine million. Since 2000 multiracial groups have increased by 50 percent, whereas the US population overall increased by 9.7 percent. In the 2010 census four groups were over one million: white and black (1.8 million); white and “some other race” (1.7 million); white and Asian (1.6 million); white and American Indian and Alaska Native (1.4 million). Since the 2000 census, the black and white population grew by 134 percent (1 million) and white and Asian by 87 percent (750,000). Black/white mixedness continues to be problematized even though it is fast increasing.

There is a view in the United Kingdom that mixed-race people are the new faces of a multicultural nation; for example, Jessica Ennis-Hill’s global iconicity as citizen body in London’s 2012 Olympic Games. In terms of aesthetics, there is a preference for lighter skin and straighter hair among white people in the United Kingdom and the United States. For example, in Glamour magazine’s November 2011 readers’ choices of the top fifty most attractive men, the only two black men chosen were Ashton Merrygold and Marvin Humes from the boy band JLS. Their darker-skinned band mates, JB and Oritsé Williams, were conspicuously absent. The twenty-first-century skin politics is one in which the acceptable face of blackness is a black/white mixed-race one. This new “mulatticity” illustrates its link to colonialism and enslavement’s “chromatocracy,” thus it is a fantasy that black/white mixed-race aesthetic value indicates the end of racism in the United Kingdom/United States and racial equality.

In the “multiracial/tolerant” UK and the post-Obama US, the body politics of the Racial Contract’s libidinal economy dictate that “globally and within particular nations [...] white people, Europeans and their descendants, continue to benefit from the Racial Contract, which creates a world in their cultural image, political states differentially favouring their interests, an economy structured around the racial exploitation of others, and a moral psychology (not just in whites sometimes in nonwhites also) skewed consciously and unconsciously toward privileging them, taking the status quo of differential racial entitlement as normatively legitimate, and not to be investigated further.”
The contract constructs a white world through an epistemology of ignorance, “a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made.” Here, ignorance denotes a will to silence knowledge of white privilege, antiblack racism and “color-blind” ideology. This produces “unknowledges” that “sometimes […] are consciously generated, while at other times they are unconsciously generated and supported [...] but they work to support white privilege and supremacy.” Unknowledges undergird governance of border bodies through state and societal processes, structures and affects even while black/white mixed-race bodies have “post-race” iconicity.

Black and white mixing has also long been considered a problem in the United Kingdom. Mark Christian’s analysis of “The Fletcher Report” (1930) shows British problematization of transracial intimacy. This eugenicist report constructed black/white half-caste children as “genetically abnormal” and their transracial families as poverty ridden and immoral. Media moral panic and stereotyping of the black/white mixed-race population were the report’s legacy. World War II prompted more moral panic because of the interaction of mobilized white British women and black colonial mobilized men because of the fear of “half-caste children.” In 1942 the British Colonial Office was anxious about the future UK population because of the sexual invasion of black soldiers.

By 1947 black/white mixed-race orphans were the nation’s “lonely picaninny.” In the 1950s, the wartime extra-legal anti-miscegenation regime evolved into ban of black people in public spaces, which was aimed at minimizing heterosexual transracial intimacy.

In 2006, Trevor Phillips, Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, desired a future Britain of more racial equality, less racial discrimination, and real integration of its diverse people. Problematizing mixed-race Britons, he erased mixed-race multiplicity creating one minority group based on being “not quite white.” He outlined the negatives as more than average mixed-race familial and individual dysfunction: lone parenthood, family breakdown, drug treatment, and identity stripping because they are “marooned between communities.” For Phillips, black and white kinship means identification as black in order to not be “identity stripped.” Paradoxically, white kinship marked on border bodies is advantageous within “chromatocratic” UK/US societies even though the tragic mulatto speaks of anxiety and trauma, as we see in Fletcher, Phillips, and in the film The Human Stain (2003), starring Miller. In this movie, Miller plays the young Coleman Silk, a black mixed-race man passing as white, who becomes a renowned professor but has to quit his job because he is accused of antiblack racism. His history is only revealed once he dies and his sister appears.

10 Ibid., 18.
11 Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists, 2–4.
13 Mark Christian, “The Fletcher Report 1930: A Historical Case Study of Contested Black Mixed Heritage Britishness,” Journal of Historical Sociology 21, nos. 2/3 (June/September 2008): 213–41. This report was researched and written by Muriel Fletcher between 1928 and 1930, supported by the Association for the Welfare of Half-Caste Children and the University of Liverpool. The Fletcher Report cemented the derogatory term “half-caste” into the social perception of Liverpool that had a well-established black community by the end of World War I.
14 Ibid., 234.
15 In the first wave there were 125,000 volunteers, mostly Jamaican, who joined the RAF (Royal Air force), worked in munitions factories and in forestry in Scotland. By 1942 there were 3 million American troops 130,000 of whom were African-American. The British government responded with measures to curb the flow of nonwhite soldiers. From these policies we can see the emergence of Britain as a modern racialized state. See Hazel Carby, “Postcolonial Translations,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 2 (2007): 213–34.
16 Ibid., 213–34.
17 For Robert Carr, the picaninny “is always distinguishable from the term ‘child’ reserved here primarily for white, therefore, human and therefore developed, people of the master’s(s) race.” Carr, Black Nationalism in the New World, 80.
18 For the first time, more than half of all ethnic minority Britons are British born, but even more significant is the astonishing rise in the numbers of mixed-race Britons. In 2001 they numbered 674,000. New projections based on the census suggest it will grow to 950,000 in 2010, and 1.24 m in 2020. By the end of that decade, they are almost certain to overtake those of Indian origin to become the single largest minority group in the country. I welcome this, but as with all the changes we face it is not an uncomplicated prospect. The mixed-race Britons are young, and they show the highest employment rate of any minority group. But they also exhibit the highest rates of lone parenthood and family breakdown, in some cases three times the average. The suffer the highest rates of drug treatment. We don’t yet know why this is so, though many people talk now of identity stripping children who grow up marooned between communities.
19 Directed by Robert Benton, it grossed US $24.86 million.
21 A legal, governmental, and spatial order in which “race” does not necessarily mean physical variations coded on the body but an impersonal discursive ordering that is reviving the old imperial system. See Robert Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (London: Routledge, 2004).
colonial politics, which generates the racial epidermal schema,” means that black/white mixed-race people experience racism’s negative affects because of the mixing that paradoxically illustrates tolerance. As in colonialism, libidinal economies within extra-legal anti-miscegenation regimes speak of “proper” white sexuality and family life as a requirement of citizenship.” Black/white mixed-race dysfunction, the tragic mulatto, and the lonely picaninny are discursive constructs of white racial hygiene. Black/white mixed-race border bodies are placed outside of the nation as family because of antiblack racism and national intolerance. 24

These border bodies “can only provide the terrain upon which the ‘host’ nation can make its claim to tolerance, civilization and indeed modernity itself.”” Kinship ties do not bind border bodies to whiteness because of the “white breeding schema of family identity.”” If there is transracial intimacy, children experience a repression of love that is “pathological and may be suffered by both designated blacks and designated whites in order to maintain the white breeding schema.””

As a result of hypodescent, “the one drop rule,” black ancestry makes one black.” This mark of race still continues in the idea that identification must be with “one’s Black side of the family” even though post-structuralist, postcolonial thinking has shown us that identity is shifting, never fixed in a once-and-for-all way,” race is a social construct,” culture is hybrid,” and racialized performances are performative.” Locating black/white mixed race as a minority group through ethnic monitoring statistics and affectively as border bodies transports enslavement’s blood quantum into the twenty-first century. Thus, black/white mixed-race families and subjects cannot signify core national values as the “heteronormative family and its gendered practices is already ‘raced,’ and already scripted as ‘white,’ and Christian and it is this that establishes the standards to which the nation’s ‘others’ should aspire.”” Thus, libidinal economy keeps the nation white and makes clear that transracial intimacy has never been just about affect but about power, maintaining white racial dominance, disciplining bodies, and managing life. Anti-black racism was enshrined within hetero-sexual intimacy because “the inferior other becomes a fundamental project for the establishment of the superior self whose superiority is a function of what it is.”” What recognition does Miller being passed as white instantiate?

Being Passed as White and Recognition of Mixedness

Frantz Fanon inserts into Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s derivative reflections on corporeal schema a decolonizing analysis of the coloniality of power, being and knowledge through discussing racism’s colonial hold on black and white psyches.” The historico-racial schema shows that white colonial discourses on racial difference and their accompanying structuration and institutionalization of white racial dominance, cultural consciousness, social practices, and knowledge production, created “the black (wo)man” as inferior other and “the white (wo)man” as superior. We become ourselves in the eyes of others as they recognize us through a racialized process. Black essential difference was the foundation for the racial epidermal schema, which ensures that the black (wo)man was known as deviant, hypersexual, incapable of intellectual thought, and dangerous, without complexity, subjectivity, and personhood. The “white gaze renders the black body ontologically truncated, fixed like an essence,”” it operates as “a form of bodily fragmentation, ‘visual mutilation’ and reduction.”” Transracial intimacy does not escape this racialized recognition because “the autobiographic subject, the genealogical society, their modes of intimacy and their material anchors emerged from European Empire as a mode and maneuver of domination and exploitation and continue to operate as such: [...] Thus the intimate couple is a key transfer point between, on the one hand, liberal imaginaries of contractual economies, politics and sociality and on the other liberal forms of power in the contemporary world [...]. If the intimate couple is a key transfer point within liberalism this couple is already conditioned by liberalism’s emergence and dispersion in empire.””

22 See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto, 1967).
27 Ibid., 40.
30 Ifekwunigwe, Scattered Belongings, 20.
33 Lewis, “Welcome to the Margins,” 52.
34 Lewis Ricardo Gordon, Her Majesty’s Other Children: Sketches of Racism from a Neo-colonial Age (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 70.
35 Tate, Black Skins, Black Masks.
37 Ibid., 153.
Thus, “love, intimacy and sexuality are not about desire, pleasure or sex per se, but about things like geography, history, culpability, and obligation; the extraction of wealth and the distribution of life and death; hope and despair; and the seemingly self-evident fact and value of freedom.” Miller has been passed as white and his body comes to speak for and to all whites. Passed as is different from passing for as it implies a different scopic regime, a dissection that looks over while overlooking racial difference, an envisaging that wilfully refuses otherness.

Everyone passes as “the subject is never what they image themselves to be nor are they simply self-evidently there.” As Miller shows, passing is not inherently transgressive but “must be understood in relationship to forms of social antagonism.” Thus we can ask more meaningful questions: “How are differences that threaten the system recuperated? How do ambiguous or hybrid bodies get read in a way which further supports the enunciative power of those who are telling the differences? In what ways is passing implicated in the very discourse around tellable differences?” Passing as white or as black does matter politically. For example, Rachel Dolezal’s passing as black illustrated passing as white momentarily destabilizes white superiority as new subjects emerge. This is the case for Miller in his real life as a gay, black/white mixed-race man who speaks about the overt racism he experiences irrespective of his celebrity, while as an actor we see his body being passed as white. This passing as resists the racialized scopic regime of essential difference and the disturbance border bodies cause to white knowledge/power/being. There is a shoring up of whiteness with each disturbance by border bodies as differences and ambiguities are re-incorporated. In the realm of fiction, being passed as white can momentarily alter the systematization of racial difference. However, there is the overwhelming desire to call border bodies to account racially through the accumulation of knowledge on/of racial ambiguity so misrecognition ceases to occur. Whiteness pauses on Miller’s racial ambiguity, on his border body, and imagines itself as unmarked norm. Thus, “acts of passing become mechanisms for the recreation of [white] nation space.”

Whiteness and Black/White Mixed-Race Dispossession in Twenty-First Century “Post-race” States

Miller as white establishes a “third space,” or “critical thirding,” that moves past racial binaries while being imbricated by them. This produces the tension between Miller’s performance of whiteness and the normative performativity of bi-racialization. The empathetic identification of the audience with Miller as white momentarily destabilizes white superiority as new subjects emerge. However, empathetic identification is part of the process where “blackness provided the occasion for [white] self-reflection as well as for an exploration of terror, desire, fear, loathing and longing […] the role of feelings in securing domination [is important in the] obliteration of the other through the slipping on of blackness.”

Being passed as works because the nation gets something back. Miller is caught within the national “post-race” libidinal economy, in which his body bridges black and white consumers because of the social, economic, and cultural capitals of skin color, class, and celebrity. There is an extension from his black/white mixed-race body to white bodies through recognition so that post-racial white guilt and shame because of racism is transformed to white pleasure at white tolerance. Miller’s body stands in for all black/white mixed-race people, his body is the fungible material through which white domination is maintained because mixedness proves UK/US tolerance. His border body is caught in this “post-race” libidinal economy, and his dispossession is complete even as a celebrity.

The term “celebrity” derives from the nineteenth century and is capitalism’s product because of the evolution of public visibility through the mass media. While democratized, fame is racially ordered. Adulation, identification, and emulation with/of the famous are key elements in celebrity culture. Fame gives Miller’s border body material, social, cultural, affective, and psychic value because we desire fame, stars, and “celebrification,” so as fans we celebrate the...
famous and co-create celebrities’ fame through fandom.6 We reach out for Miller in order to engage in a healing process directed by the self, based on developing “intimacy” with him. Thus, we can see how Miller’s border body becomes a site of pleasure. His celebrity body produces cannibalistic affective attachment as fans pass through it to remake themselves. Such attachment to black/white mixed-race corporeality illustrates the social, political, cultural, affective, and psychic value of his border body for white identification and passing as “post-race.” His border body has been made to stand in for the white norm while being racially branded as black because of hypodescent. His body produces a different matrix of corporeality, power, gender, race, class, sexuality, and celebrity in which the body does not speak him but speaks back to our very imaginings of him as white. Pleasure in his whitened body is deeply melancholic as it replays corporeality as the basis for the consumption, production, and representation of the black/white mixed-race celebrity body in the United Kingdom and the United States.

This brings to mind catachresis,7 the act of reversing, displacing, grasping, and transforming the value-coding apparatus, thus, pointing to the Derridean idea that originary incompleteness is part of all meaning systems. Miller’s body is always subject to slippage as there are no “true” examples of black/white mixedness and he is allowed into the circle of representation only as subaltern.8 As subaltern, being passed as white speaks the constituting of racial difference by the white world and black/white mixed-race border bodies as unified object. Miller’s being passed as white onscreen does not transform the value coding apparatus of race but shows whose body can extend to whiteness. His passing has a positive outcome for the white self and nation as it enables catharsis. The emotional discharge of white racist shame produced by the empathetic identification with the body of the black/white mixed-race man as those racialized as white pass through it. This is a peculiar race performativity of “the opposite” as whiteness looks at Miller and envisages him as nonthreatening as he is consumed as racialized object.9

56 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Derrida, Politics of Friendship.
Literature

Ahmed, Sara. “‘She’ll Wake Up One of These Days and Find She’s Turned into a Nigger’: Passing through Hybridity.” Theory Culture and Society 16, no. 2 (1999): 87–106.


If we recall the initial narrative of the crisis in 2008, the general level of costs for reproduction of the system grew because of the rise of petroleum price and raw materials, while the war on terror increased the public debt and the banks could not cover the whole set of credits. Then the fall of Lehman Brothers in the United States created a domino effect on the financial markets, and all these had a direct impact on our lives. But we can also say that this was actually the moment in which the very concept of crisis entered into crisis.

If reaching the limit, according to the Marxist analysis, was a potential to overcome capitalism, we see that the idea of crisis as a “passage toward” today has a different meaning. We are witnessing a phenomenon in which capital is beyond its limit: the valorization of capital is operating nowadays independently of real production, which creates “bubbles” because it produces an immense accumulation of fictitious capital through financial mechanisms, without the necessity of real production. Santiago López Petit says that this means we cannot talk anymore about real economy and financial economy. The bubbles are no more than an aberration, but they are a permanent character of the financial accumulation regime. In this context, the relation capital/work as opposing political force is today equivalent to the relation capital/debt, as Marina Vishmidt argues, acquiring an unprecedented role by almost eclipsing the theory of work-value. According to Achille Mbembe, the nation-states are becoming agencies for collection of debt in the name of global oligarchy investments and international financial industry, which is politically inexpungable.

By extending the debt over the whole societies, this became a mechanism of subjection and control of our lives by capitalist governance. Through individual debt, public deficit, and public debt, lives of entire populations are mortgaged and expropriated.

The extortion of public debt interests, depredation, expropriation of goods, and common wealth operate today through the process of accumulation by dispossession and simultaneous negation and violation of human rights. The accumulation is now possible neither with real inversions nor with the creation of new productive capacities, and while it works simultaneously, as Mbembe describes it, through and across different scales of race, the principal consequences are the material and existential precarity of populations, or as Judith

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Butler puts it, our dispensability. These recent transformations, following Paul B. Preciado, as well point to the articulation of a set of new micro-prosthetic devices for the control of subjectivity with new molecular biological techniques and media networks. As he writes, we are facing a new kind of capitalism that is hot, psychotropic, and punk—but we have to add by referring to Frantz Fanon—in the zones of being, while also being cold, bureaucratic, necrotoxic, and heavy metal in the zones of non-being. Thus, the crisis no longer describes an exceptional period, something temporal or episodic, but it has rather became the norm—the fabric of social life—of our existence. This new necropolitical mode of life, as Marina Gržinić argues, means pure abandonment. The surplus value of capital today is based and generated from (the worlds of) death.

In the last number of years, the arrival of refugees and migrants, mostly from countries in war and military conflict zones (Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, Kurdistan, Ukraine, etc.), to the EU through African, Mediterranean, and Balkan routes has increased. Thousands of people are dying as they cross the militarized borders of Fortress Europe, which continue to build new walls in France (Calais), between Hungary and Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey, Slovenia and Croatia, Austria and Slovenia, while Germany is negotiating with Turkey the blockade of the routes toward the EU and deportations in exchange for liberalization of visas for Turkish citizens. Similar to EU-Turkey agreement are the current negotiations with African countries (Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali) to intensify the control of the EU's external borders and cut the possibility of crossing the Mediterranean Sea. The system of asylum is paralyzed and inefficient, and refugees and migrants are trapped on their way, detained in different internment camps, prisons, and border centers, experiencing the situation of systematic abandonment, intensified processes of racial discrimination, and death. In this situation, migration as well is defined in terms of crisis to be managed. Calling the current reality a “refugee crisis” or “migrant crisis” rather than the crisis of European politics of systems of production of truth, human rights, citizenship, nation-states, and colonial epistemology of sex-gender binaries, points to the depoliticization that occurs today.

Instead of a Europe without borders, as Tatjana Greif has stressed, we have a Europe of “concentration camps,” racist raids, deportations, sealed and militarized borders, walls and barbwire, and an increasingly sophisticated system of control.

To rethink the silenced colonial/imperial history of European migration politics and reconfiguration of internal and external borders through the West-East relation of repetition, together with coloniality of gender, the control of subjectivity, and knowledge, or the most extreme forms of exclusion and politics of death today, I suggest to point toward a number of multiple, heterogeneous, entangled, and complex processes within one single colonial capitalist historical reality. As a former Eastern European, from former Yugoslavia (Slovenia), who migrated to Western Europe before Slovenia joined the European Union (first to Italy and then to Spain), not quite white and not quite trans, who still inhabits this symbolic East because of a reiterated reproduction of racialization processes, I think it is necessary to search for decolonial ruptures, modulations, and interferences that continuously morph the grid, its point system, coordinates, and preestablished channels and threads, moving in new directions. This means that we way perceive borders changes and with this change we have to conceptualize Europe differently as well.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Aníbal Quijano, one of the founding members of the research group Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality, introduced a new concept called “coloniality” as being the indispensable underside of modernity from the sixteenth century onward. Quijano has defined the term as implemented the so-called principle of the ‘deficiency’ of a certain geographical region called former Eastern Europe, where it is seen as such by its Western counterpart. [...] But when the color of the skin is a border, then within the discrimination processes, we have to recontextualize ourselves, so to speak, every moment, both while entering the public as well in the private context, because it is not the same—we can still hide ourselves within a system of mimicry.” From “The System of Racism/White Supremacy,” a conversation between Jade Sentongo Kafero and Sheri Avraham, Marina Gržinić, Marisa Lobo, and Ivana Marjanović, in Utopia of Alliances, Conditions of Impossibilities and the Vocabulary of Decoloniality, 117. The term “trans” with an asterisk is being used recently as an umbrella concept to include many different gender expressions and identities, such as trans, transsexual, transgender, gender queer, etc. The asterisk emphasizes the heterogeneity of bodies, identities, and experiences that goes beyond the imposed gender-binary social norms. Trans* is a concept introduced by its protagonists out of rejection of the terms coming from the pathologizing medical discourse. The asterisk as well points out coming from the pathologizing medical discourse. The asterisk as well points out that while our struggle is common, we recognize that there is not just one interpretation of what does it mean to be trans, transsexual, or transgender. Both terms, queer and trans*, have to be rethought from the decolonial positionality.
a matrix of power that operates through four interrelated domains: the control of economy, the control of authority, the control of gender and sexuality, and the control of subjectivity and knowledge.12 If the critique of capitalism from the Eurocentric point of view privileges some economic relations over others, without negating the incessant accumulation of capital on global scale, Quijano has conceptualized the intersectionality of multiple, heterogeneous, global hierarchies, and forms of domination and exploitation: racial, sexual, political, economic, spiritual, and linguistic. Emphasizing its structural, constitutive, and not derivative relations, by claiming intersectionality, these are analytical methods introduced previously by black feminists (Combahee River Collective, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Audre Lorde, and Patricia Hill Collins, among others) and developed further by and with feminists of color (Chela Sandoval, Chandra Mohanty, Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherrie Moraga, etc.) to point to their historical, theoretical, and practical exclusions.

According to Madina Tlostanova, through such analysis we can understand how the West determines one single norm of humanity, and in relation to it legitimates a single knowledge of economic and social system, spatial, and temporal models, values, and cultural norms. The coloniality, which operates as an active process, reconfirms differences between societies, subjects, and knowledge(s), while destroying lives to save modernity and capitalism.13

If post-socialism in such a framework of analysis is not at all postcolonial, this means that we have to modify the basis of our analysis and its paradigms, as an active process, reconfirms differences between societies, subjects, and knowledge(s), while destroying lives to save modernity and capitalism.13

It is within these processes, where the colonial history of European colorblindness is inscribed, though the concept of race has its geographic and intellectual origin in Europe. While racism is silenced or presented as a marginal problem (as well by the social movements, like it happened with 15M or the Slovenian uprising), we have to emphasize that racialization is the main logic of global capitalism, which regulates and differentiates the social, political, and economic space.14 This is today a process of colonial capitalist differentiation, as Gržinić argues, between the first- and second-class citizens (racialized citizens, LGBTQI, sex workers, disabled people, etc.); and noncitizens (refugees and migrants, who are violently discriminated against on a global scale). These brutal processes of selection of migrants, in terms of racial, class, gender, sexual, and religious categories construct us as differentiated subhuman(s) through different processes of dehumanization.15

Pointing to the geo- and body-political aspects of the organization of European space, Kwame Nimako and Gržinić expose the following thesis in a conversation during the workshop “Education, Development, Freedom” at Duke University, Durham, organized by the Centre for Global Studies in February 2010, and filmed for the video Naked Freedom:

Kwame Nimako: “We are here (in EU) because you were there (in Africa)”
Marina Gržinić: “We are here (in EU) because you want to go there (in Eastern Europe)?”

This is developed further around two important questions that need to be taken into consideration. As Nimako emphasizes, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, former Eastern Europe was subjected to the process of political reorganization, integration, and subordination to the Western model of society and servitude; this consisted in reimplementing directives and legislation already active in the EU. Such relation we can name, following Gržinić, the relation of repetition. It is a repetition of Western Europe’s political and economic model, of its structures of government and governmentality, its modes of life and modes of death, the institutional and migration control, its system of knowledge (theory) and aesthetic regimes (art), activism, and so on.16 This specific process of coloniality through repetition also functions through a suppression of “local” histories, knowledge, and practices of resistance. Likewise, while Western Europe is also naming itself “former,” it seems that it does not have to be responsible

12 See Género y descolonialidad [Gender and decoloniality], ed. Walter Migno et al. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Signo, 2008).
16 See Gržinić, “100 Years of Now,”
for or conscious of its historic and contemporary colonial and fascist regimes of power. Moreover, by claiming the division West/East “obsolete” after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the repetition and multiplication of Occident/Orient division is escalating. As Gayatri Spivak explains, “Terror in this guise is not a monopoly of some Muslim fundamentalists. It is the preserve of whatever entity—including our democracies—convinced that its enemy is by definition the enemy of “humanity,” “civilization,” and even “God” himself—a theological enemy.”

The second issue Nimako points out is the process of zonification. We can say that European politics of segregation transformed former Eastern Europe into a border-zone in the way that the territory of former socialist countries functions as a buffer zone to control and block migrations from Africa and Asia, while migrants from former Eastern European countries are at the same time subjected to control, discrimination (employment), and processes of deportation from the “former” Western Europe.

The countries of the former Eastern Europe, which became subsidiary states, peripherialized in their servile relation to the EU politics, show, on the one hand, contempt toward “those below them” in processes of constant hierarchization, and, on the other, intensified servitude toward European colonial/imperial centers. Ethno-nationalism and differentiation with labor division on a global scale are today presented as “liberation” from what was suppressed during decades of communism and socialism. To ethno-national constructions, European abstract universalism as a form of cosmopolitanism is being counterposed. Correspondingly, the West needs the East to project itself as a free space, as a space of hospitality culture and respect for human rights, while it points to former Eastern Europe as a pathologic space, still not quite European, where racism, fascism, and homo-transphobia prevail as essential characteristics of the region. This dominant imaginary is today being questioned through the protests organized by refugees and migrants as well as other leftist activist groups.

The EU insists on following the Dublin Regulation that imposes the peripherialized countries of Europe to embrace the criminal procedures of Western Europe over migrants. These procedures consist not in the protection but in the selection of migrants for the interest of the labor market in northern Europe. While in Greece, Spain, Hungary, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and so on, the police, military, and paramilitary groups brutally attack refugees and migrants, in the north of Europe they talk about “human” capital for capitalist accumulation, covering up their own brutal attacks on migrants and their technocratic organization of necropolitics. Today, the two poles of European politics, ethno-nationalist, and technocratic operate at the same time, subjugating migrants and refugees to paternalist assimilation, extreme conditions of exploitation, racist identification, violation, torture, deportation, and death.

When we say migrants or refugees we have to ask ourselves how these categories are being formed by hegemonic politics through the processes of production of “Other(s),” reducing the complexity by situating us in the historic context, outside of geographic and political frames. At the same time, the EU migratory control apparatus regulates the selection of bodies in relation to belonging to determined ethno/national, racial, or religious group, as well as gender and sexuality by reproducing oppressive sexual norms that aregendered, racialized, and classist.

To challenge the colonial formulation of gender classification, María Lugones’s work is crucial here. On the one hand, because she developed a critique of Quijano’s understanding of sex as biological, of his failure to see that within the concept of gender the idea of sexual or biological dimorphism (man-woman dichotomy), heteronormativity and the patriarchal distribution of power are inscribed. On the other, her analysis of gender within coloniality reveals that eurcentrism and racism are embedded in the universal notions of the gender-binary system. Along these lines she exposes how gender and sexual diversity are filtered through a colonizing binary gaze and presented as naturalized ideas of “sex” and “gender,” both operating as Eurocentric categories. The European colonial expansion, which started with conquest of America and by progressively introducing the first regulations and punishment laws, prohibition of homosexuality, and multiplicity of gender expressions, disclose gender and sexuality as technologies for categorizing colonized subjects and organizing their subsequent removal, reeducation, or genocide. What we are witnessing in the current context of old-new forms of European migration politics and the relaunching of Western hegemony (supremacy) is also, referring to Jín Haritaworn, how “the sign of diversity moves from the racialized body (who becomes the ‘migrant homophobe’) to the sexualized one (who becomes the ‘injured homosexual’ in need of protection from the ‘migrant homophobe’).”

While the former Western Europe, its politics of racialization and discrimination, now integrate within its borders those “Other(s)” who were discriminated in the past (e.g., women, LGBTQI, etc.), and who in many contexts continue living

22 See María Lugones, “Colonialidad y género: Hacia un feminismo descolonial” [Coloniality and gender: Toward a decolonial feminism], in Mignolo et al., Género y descolonialidad.
without the full recognition of their rights—as Gržinić argues, it produces at the same time its nonwhite population, migrants, refugees, and LGBTQI of color, as Other(s).24

A recently developed critique, put forward by various authors from the former Yugoslavia, interrogates a linkage between “Europeanisation” and “gay emancipation,” showing how certain forms of gay activist engagement are elevated to a measure of democracy, progress, and modernity while relegating homotransphobic attacks to the status of non-European “Other(s),” who are inevitably positioned as appertaining to the patriarchal past that should be left behind. As Piro Rexhepi writes in his text “From Orientalism to Homonationalism: Queer Politics, Islamophobia and Europeanisation in Kosovo,” this separation serves the purpose of creating and strengthening a local liberal European-oriented elite, which then acts as local interlocutors that, in advocating Europeanization and the solution to violence directed toward queer communities, become vehicles of EU expansionism.25

Taking into the analysis the body-political aspects of migratory control, we see that coloniality, as Tlostanova states, has as its central element the idea of classifying humankind and the ontological marginalization of non-Western and not quite Western people. In all cases, modernity justifies violence and the negation of the human rights of those who are labeled as not quite human (i.e., not quite European, not quite Soviet, not quite Christian, not quite white, not quite women, not quite heterosexual, not quite queer, not quite trans).26 In this sense, the extent to which the body as a culturally intelligible construct, and the modern/colonial techniques in and through which bodies are positioned and transformed, are in fact inextricably entangled.

By shifting the geography of reason and the Western progressive narrative we see that, as Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso points out, “the future already was.”27 This situation points to the fact that knowledge that is socially ignored, silenced, and/or not recognized as knowledge is related to the position of enunciation, as Grada Kilomba questions, “Who can speak? Who is acknowledged to have the knowledge?”28 and to the ways of understanding how class divisions, racialization, ableism, sex-gender binary, and heteronormativity are constructed, are in fact inextricably entangled.

Thus, a decolonial turn with its ongoing attempt to push for a conceptual de­naturalization, aims at undermining the fundamental logic of modernity and its disciplines, in need for assertion of rights (also epistemic) of the “wretched.”29 To undo the discourse imposed by the state and capital on refugees and migrants, on our bodies, and the criminalization of resistance, we have to change the terms of conversation and search for new ways to fight the current necropolitical regime. Changing the terms of conversation means to think about the movement of refugees and migrants—which makes visible the extreme brutality and crimes of the European border and migratory regime, as well as the European integration politics based on hierarchic inclusion/exclusion—as a movement of liberation that is opening a space for all of us. It is a call to radically transform, rather than to seek change within the existing social structures. Those who want to transform the system are the ones who lost all, but don’t have anything else to lose. Those are people against whom Europe is building walls, barbed-wire borders, concentration camps, and the contemporary logics of crisis. Against the depoliticization and humanitarian discourse, refugees and migrants in their pluriversality are opening up a political space for a real emancipation, by creating a critical exteriority and by configuring the space for production of practices and relations that make possible a decolonial line of flight through which subjectivity and desire flow. The question is how can we from the fractured focus (dwelling in the border), which is our common experience, continue to build alliances in order to dismantle the colonial logics of power, and to strengthen our networks of resistance and solidarity in Europe, the Global South, and East.

26 See Tlostanova, “Post-Soviet Imaginary.”
In this essay, I attempt to advance, from a decolonial point of view, a construction of a genealogy of the relationship between feminist politics and black and indigenous antiracist struggles in Abya Yala. I explore the late emergence of antiracist, decolonial, and ethno-racial movements and struggles in Latin America, understanding *mestizaje* (the process of racial mixing) ideology and the processes of broad Westernization as obstacles to overcome and face the *racist imperial reason*, even by feminism, in its attempt to decolonize such a reason. Finally, I analyze the toll that feminism in Latin America has paid by insisting on the country’s fragmented view and in its treatment of oppression centered on gender.

In the introduction to the 2014 book *Tejiendo de Otro Modo: Feminismo, epistemología y apuestas descoloniales en Abya Yala*, which I edited with Diana Gomez Correal and Karina Ochoa Muñoz, we consider the complicated relationship between feminism and the struggles of indigenous people and African descendants in the place known by its colonial name as Latin America. Through a memory-building exercise we remember how, since the end of the 1980s onward, indigenous and African descendants’ struggles began to take shape, increasingly challenging the nation-state with their demands for autonomy (political, cultural organizational, and epistemological) and with their critique of Eurocentric discourse of institutions, the international agenda of rights, the world of development, and the politics of local and international urban social movements that insist on the nation-state’s universalist views and ideals of “good” centered on individual agency and consumerism.

Over the course of our work, we remembered the continent-wide campaign centered on the five hundredth anniversary of indigenous, black, and popular resistance juxtaposed against the official celebration the Eurocentric discourse has called “the discovery of America.” We recall the 1990s as a decade marked by the Zapatista insurrection in Mexico, and the processes initiated in a good part of the region—Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela—that happened thanks to the great mobilization and countrywide awakening of indigenous and African descendants’ landless peasant movements of peoples, and as well popular and urban movements. Finally, we recognize a part of feminism being present and accompanying these processes.

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1 My thanks go to Dulce Reyes Bonilla and Daniella Avila for their assistance with the content editing of the first English version of this text.

2 Abya Yala, which in the Kuna language means “land in its full maturity” or “land of vital blood,” is the name used by the Kuna people, an ancient Native American nation who used to inhabit the land known today as northwest Colombia and southeast Panama, to refer to the American continent before the arrival of Columbus.—Trans.

However, to keep from idealizing those processes, we acknowledge the difficulties and obstacles that have plagued these attempts of articulation between feminism and indigenous, black, and popular struggles. While we recognize the attempts toward the mutual recognition between feminists and women from indigenous and African movements, we also notice that the problems and dangers of trying to construct an agenda of common interests have become more evident. History shows the impossibility of a more equitable and horizontal listening to each other and the impossibility of feminism to abandon its pretense to produce a universal truth about gender-based oppression and the ways to reverse it.

Thus, articulations, complicity and alliances between women of indigenous, Afro-descendants, and popular movements’ origin with feminists were not always easy. This was due, among other things, to the feminists’ class and racial backgrounds, and although a ranking inside the feminist movement have shown that there were women descendants of native and African peoples, coming from the working class, the fact is that the great majority of feminists have been white-mestiza, urban, university educated, coming from the middle and upper classes. As it has been denounced and analyzed by black feminists and women of color in the United States (hooks, 2004; Lorde, 2003), these origins have conditioned their interpretations of women’s oppression as well as the basic postulates of a program of liberation and development, that is, the strategies that could end this oppression bringing it toward the type of society to which we aspire. Saying this, the differences between feminists and organized women of subaltern groups are palpable. The latter therefore have not been attracted to or summoned by the feminist struggle, a struggle that they have seen quite far from their reality.

Although more and more voices of indigenous and African-descended “women” are capable of recognizing, observing, and making visible the sexism that operates in their communities and in their political organizations, there continues to be a border and a complicated relationship between feminism and “women” from organizations and/or communities and indigenous and African movements. To me, this has to do with some other reasons I would like to return to later in this essay.

The fact is that with the expansion of feminism into wider spaces of society, and the incorporation of racialized subjects and marginal communities, these problems were no longer expressed only in the relationship between movements but within the feminist’s ranking or classification system. Disagreements arose about the unequal relationships “between women.” Experiencing symbolic and epistemic violence, racism, meritocracy, and other forms of management and passing over of sites of prestige and power, as well as the management of word and representation within Eurocentric feminist activism, has scarred many of us, and has propelled us to search for explanations that have allowed us to understand and account for our lived experiences. This was an experience of oppression that was systematically denied to us by feminism in its traditional form, one that did not allow us to see and analyze oppression in its right dimension.

And it is from there that several of us in Abya Yala have denounced and theorized these problems within feminists’ organizations and in the wider movement. The first indictments based on class differences were formulated since the mid-1980s by the Latin American popular feminism that was committed to Marxism and left-wing politics against the privileges and prerogatives enjoyed by some women and reflected in the organization itself in terms of defining central issues, strategies, alliances, and forms of representation. Later, during the 1990s, these differences were formulated by the autonomous feminism movement in terms of the relationship with the state and the processes of institutionalization and bureaucratization of the feminist agenda. Parallel to this history, in the 1980s, the power of a black movement in Brazil emerged in the public scene from where the first voices of black women were ready to fight for their place within the mixed antiracist movement and within the feminist movement. The African-Brazilian movement will be paradigmatic in this history, ushering race consciousness and a broad struggle against institutional racism. African-Brazilian feminism became a pioneering force in the region in opening up thinking about the relationship between gender, race, and class.

In Brazil, a country of African descent, the self-identified black women’s movement was nurtured by the black feminists’ intellectual production in the United States. Their dialogue, since the 1980s, has allowed them to grow some theoretical-methodological tools to better think of their own reality.

4 Tejiendo de otro modo, 22. The two references that appear in the middle of this quotation refer to bell hooks, We Real Cool: Black Men and Masculinity (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Audre Lorde, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (London: Rivers Oram Press/Pandora List, 2003). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

5 I always use quotation marks when referring to women to point out how problematic (how inadequate) the term is when used in non-Western, nonwhite contexts.


7 We should refer here to the theoretical and activists productions of black positions such as Luisa Bairo, Leila Gonzales, Sueli Carneiro, and Jurema Werneck, among others.
The Difficulties of Producing a Decolonial and Antiracist Consciousness and the Influences of Black Feminists and Feminists of Color in the United States and in Abya Yala

It is impossible to deny the great influence that black and women of color feminism in the United States has had on antiracist feminists in Latin America and elsewhere. This is surely, in reference to the decolonial analysis, what I call the “geopolitics of knowledge,” or, even better, a “political economy of knowledge.” Concerns about the historical impossibility of Latin American feminism to produce a theory of its own to reflect on its own geopolitical configuration has already been expressed by authors such as Breny Mendoza,10 Mayra Leciñana,11 and, in my own work; this was the reason that motivated me with a group of students and activists to carry out an independent research on the production of knowledge within the gender and sexuality studies in Latin America.12

Our status as satellite countries of European and later US colonialism defines us as receivers, instead of producers of knowledge. This has enabled black and women of color feminist thinkers, despite their status of being subaltern in US academia, to achieve a certain level of reception and to become a voice of reference for racialized and “Third World” women. Such has been the importance of this thinking about the relation between race and gender in Latin America that we have had to face the awkward situation when local voices, contributing similar arguments, are replaced by representatives of European and Anglo North America. Thereafter continues the long tradition that systematically ignores local contributions while impeding the development of a theory of our own that is rooted in our own positions. This problem becomes obvious in a field of research such as the decolonial turn that has condemned the colonization of knowledge, and yet when it comes to thinking about the relationship between coloniality and gender classification, the intellectuals and researchers of coloniality as well turn to the interpretations developed by voices from black, Chicana, and feminists of color in the United States, assuming that they also represent those of subalterns in Latin America and the Caribbean.13

I believe that the decisive influence that black and women of color feminists in the United States has had on the development of antiracist struggles in our region is due to certain conditions that have allowed a much earlier historical appearance of this thought in the United States rather than in Latin America. I propose that some of the conditions for the emergence of feminist antiracist activism and theories in the United States and Latin America might have something to do with what Antonio Guimarães explained as the historical construction of different models of state racism at a global level.14 Following Guimarães’s hypothesis, the existence of a model of racial segregation, as in the United States, would allow the early emergence—within the temporality marked by the configuration of nation-state and coloniality—of an awareness of “racial oppression” in the United States that is different from what happens in Latin American countries where a type of “assimilationism” where race, derived from the strategy and ideology of mestizaje,15 prevented or delayed the appearance of an awareness of racial oppression and of a politics deriving from it.

The ideology of mestizaje has installed the idea of the possibility of settling conflicts between different opposed cultural and epistemic traditions, though to do this it was necessary to abandon the local, native epistemologies and to replace them through the Latin American nation-state modern colonial matrix. Through a discourse that hides more than they show, “plagued by euphemisms...”


10 Breny Mendoza, “Los feminismos y la otra transición a la democracia de América Latina” [Feminisms and the other transition to democracy in Latin America], in Rebelides ilustradas [Enlightened rebels], ed. Maria Antonia García de León (Barcelona: Libros de Revista Anthropos, 2009).


12 Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso and Rosario Castelli, “Colonialidad y dependencia en los estudios de género y sexualidad en América Latina: el caso de Argentina, Brasil, Uruguay y Chile” [Coloniality and dependence in gender and sexuality studies in Latin America: The case of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile], in Feminismos y Poscolonialidad: Descolonizando feminismo desde y en América Latina [Feminisms and postcoloniality: Decolonizing feminism from and in Latin America], ed. Karina Bidascea and Vanesa Vázquez Lapa (Buenos Aires: Godot, 2011).

13 See Breny Mendoza, “La epistemología del sur, la colonialidad del género y el feminismo latinoamericano” [The epistemology of the south, the coloniality of gender and Latin American feminism], in Tejiendo de Otro Modo, 91–104.


15 There is a wide range of work that analyzes the mestizaje as discourse of the Creole elites in Latin America, including those written by Breny Mendoza, Mary Louise Pratt, and Peter Wade, among others.


17 Ibid.
that veil reality instead of presenting it,”” national elites offered to nonwhite populations a mystifying discourse of integration while broadly whitewashing to turn us into the type of advanced and developed nations that would emulate Europe. This process of whitening has been fundamental to the formation of both the dominant classes and the middle class and urban-working class formed under the ideals of modernity. Communities of resistance were systematically subjected to extermination and exclusion or, if not, forced to forget their origin and to ascribe themselves to the modern Western ideal through the proposal of integrative mestizaje (the process of race mixture).”

It should be said that the predominantly bourgeois and white/mestizo origin of feminism in Latin America has been a given, but also has a compromised relationship with emancipatory ideals of progress, equality, individual, and sexual freedom. This has involved the production of a Eurocentric view that cannot observe the effects of racism as an episteme on which the Latin American liberation program itself is based and our contemporary forms of our political and social organization. And so has been difficult for feminism in Latin America to admit to its complicity with the expansion of the modern colonial view, racism, and the racialized gender system that derives from it.

This historical particularity has differentiated us from what has occurred in other geopolitical contexts such as in Africa and the United States, where constitutive racism was evident because of direct experiences of segregation and the apartheid.”” Because of this, a first contemporary movement of antiracist feminists in the United States had a chance to emerge from the early 1970s, thanks to the combination of two strong movements that appeared simultaneously in that decade: the feminist movement and the civil-rights movement, later radicalized in black nationalist movements, many of them adhering to Marxist analysis. It is from the experience of activism in these two movements and the Marxist militancy that the voices of black and women of color feminists emerged in the United States.

The change that inaugurates this subaltern feminism of racialized working-class “women” in the United States was only possible because they managed to conceptualize and introduce the concept of race as a historical category that plays a crucial role in capitalist accumulation and expansion and that makes it possible to understand the oppression suffered by a large number of “women,” an oppression the Eurocentric feminist theory has failed to account for.

Black and women of color feminists, encouraged by the experience of separatism, nationalism, and black and Chichano revolutionary militancy, imbued by radical and revisited Marxist theory, could effectively relate to class and race. This relationship created, in the subaltern subject—produced by the expansion of capital and through a colonizing expansion—a racialized subject that was here to justify white superiority and that which the Marxist thought could not fully theorize because of its strong commitment to the program of modernization.

This political subject produced from a race consciousness disputed both the epistemic Eurocentrism and the expansive colonialist project of Europe, was already denounced by key authors of the mid-1930s Negritude movement, such as Frantz Fanon” and Aimé Césaire. From there, it was possible to start thinking about a “difference” in regard to the European subject of emancipation in connection with the political program of international socialism. This difference or specificity will be thematized by black feminists who will carry out a work of revision of the basic premises that explain the subjugation of women within the patriarchy—premises that had been formulated and sustained by bourgeois white feminism, even the one committed to the class struggle.

For Latin American feminism, on the other hand, we have needed more time for voices of racialized women and feminists that are aware of racist and sexist oppression to appear. Furthermore, much has been needed for Latin American feminism as a whole to become aware of the necessity to articulate concern for racism. Although at the beginning of the 1990s we witnessed the birth of a Latin American movement of black women led by black feminists, many of which, by the way, were lesbians, such a movement has developed in direct challenge to the interests and sensibilities of the local mainstream feminists.

As I have pointed out in a previous paper, it is a fact that despite the permanent consumption in Latin America of feminist theories produced in the United States and Europe, the critical production developed by the Third World fem-

18 See Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso “El futuro ya fue: Una crítica a la idea del progreso en las narrativas de liberación sexo-genéricas y queer identitarias en Abya Yala” [The future already was: A critique of the idea of progress in the sex-gender and queer identity liberation narratives in Abya Yala], in Andar étnico decolonial [Decolonial erotic walking], ed. Raul Moarquech Ferrera-Balanquet (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Signo, 2015).
19 See Guimarães, “El mito del anti-racismo en Brasil.”
22 During this period, different organizations of black women have emerged in the region, including the House of African Women in the Dominican Republic and the Latin American Network of African Women.
23 Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, “Los desafíos teórico-políticos del feminismo latinoamericano en el contexto actual” [The challenges of the theoretical-political practices of Latin American feminism in the current context], in Crisis y movimientos sociales en nuestra América: Cuerpos, territorios e imaginarios en disputa [Crisis and social movements in our America: Bodies, territories and imagery in dispute], ed. Mar Daza, Raphael Hoetmer, and Virginia Vargas Yuderkys (Lima: Programa Democracia y Transformación Global (PDTG), 2012).
The emergence of gender awareness is quite new in the history of broad social movements in Latin America. We have witnessed how, over time, feminist discourse in Latin America has succeeded in making an impact at the level of legitimacy in Latin America. 24

On the Limits of a Theory Centered on Gender Oppression and Its Negative Implications in a Unified Struggle

The emergence of gender awareness is quite new in the history of broad social movements in Latin America. We have witnessed how, over time, feminist discourse in Latin America has succeeded in making an impact at the level of ideas in certain spaces of broad anticapitalist, popular, and ethnic-racial movements. This can be observed in some analyses that originate from such discourses and where we see a growing concern to do with sexist oppression. The discourse on rights by the state, achieved with difficulty, is here thanks to the pressures of the feminist movement and the systematic work of feminism on the level of the state, through NGOs and the development agenda. It also has to do with years of work and entering communities of popular and leftist feminism. Part of the work of autonomous and radical feminists in Latin America has been to maintain and commit to what has been considered “other struggles” that have taken place on the continent.

Finally, we should affirm the influences of academic feminism in terms of its expansion in Latin American universities and the emergence of positive action programs through which indigenous and African-descendant women have been able to access professional studies on gender and sexuality. All of this has contributed to the expansion of feminist ideas and to a certain level of popularization of feminist ideas and interpretations about gender oppression (or of women as women).

As a result of these broad anticolonial, anti-imperialist, and antiracist movements in Latin America, we started to incorporate, timidly, but much more rapidly than we were willing to admit, a concern for the reproduction of hierarchical relations between women and men and between genders and despised sexualities and those that are seen as normative bodies, which are part of the communities and the movements themselves. But we should be suspicious of the kind of truth about “gender” that Latin American feminism continues to advance in its expansion, trying to explain it as a kind of historical interpretation that is defined as “a common oppression against women by the fact that they are women.” In spite of the attempt from different fronts of feminist theorization to show the deep issues of a fragmented and universalist conceptualization of oppression, the feminist reason in Latin America persists, while moving forward, in proposing an homogenizing analysis.

Here it is important define the concept of “reason” in relation to feminism and the way I am conceptualizing it. I argue that there is a universal feminist reason that consists of a set of principles in which feminists of all times and of the most diverse contemporary currents in the United States as well as in Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Africa partake. This reason has been characterized by its commitment to occidental modernity and, therefore, with coloniality being the hidden face of modernity. 25

24 Ibid., 217.
25 According to the characterization developed by Mario Blaser, I say that there are at least three issues that are substantive to the modern myth and that the feminist program reproduces: “The great separation between nature and culture, the colonial difference between modern and non-modern, and a linear, unidirectional temporality that runs from the past to the future.” See Mario Blaser, Un relato de globalización desde el Chaco (Popayán: Universidad del Cauca, 2013), 24. These ideas are developed more closely in my text for the book (An)danzas de los feminismos descoloniales y anti-coloniales en Abya Yala [Endeavors of decolonial and anticolonial feminisms in Abya Yala], ed. Karina Ochoa, Maria Teresa Garzón, Yuderks Espinosa Miñoso, Aura Cumes, and Breny Mendoza (Madrid: Akal, 2017).
The limits of such theorization are expressed daily in Latin American feminist strategies—which are focused on gender, or what others call “the feminine condition”—that pretend to influence all women in groups and communities to which they belong through social, cultural, and economic circumstances. As I have pointed out before, this assumption is productive for women who enjoy class and racial privileges, while benefiting from a politics that leaves unchanged those areas of social life in which these same women occupy hierarchical positions and are part of those dominant groups that have historically exercised power.

This has direct consequences on the type of feminist politics that takes place and on the type of value it places on the racialized “women” of marginal urban and peasant communities. When they are required to overlay a gender alliance over class and race alliances, they do not hesitate to decide with which they will side. They know that choosing gender alliance proposed by feminism means losing, since the cost required is a willingness to abandon or to relegate historical antagonisms that define them as part of a community or as a type of people. Once they reach those goals that are announced as “common goals,” they will be left alone again to face the harsh reality of a life condemned to historical forms of institutional and state violence—conditions they face daily.

This awareness of resistance and survival as people, community, and ethnic-racial group or class is the one that intervenes in considering the pros and cons of whether to call themselves feminists. These are the cautious reasons why, with or without a great theory that supports them, they know that feminism is not their place, and that while the feminist proposal can open up some questions regarding their own resistance and liberation, it is nevertheless not their fight.

Once I was told by Julia Ramos, an Aymara leader of the Bartolina Sisa Confederation of Bolivia, the reason for her decision not to call herself a feminist. She said: “I will not save myself alone.” This was not just about the name, but about the objectives of the struggle. While for the consensual feminist ideology the struggle is a gender-centered struggle and it is done “among women,” racialized women and feminists think and make the effort to theorize oppression in a complex, multidimensional, and defragmented way. For us it is fundamental that we have a common struggle with the men of the community, because we know that their bodies, as much as ours, are produced by the matrix of oppression existing for exploitation and violence.

Such a position can still not be assimilated by the great majority of mainstream currents of Latin American feminists produced within the colonial matrix and the Eurocentric gaze. Insofar as the antiracist and decolonial thinking in the continent is strengthened and deepened, we encounter strong resistance against abandoning the centrality and productivity of gender as a dominant category to explain oppression. Latin American feminism today may be more willing to pay attention to racism and the effects of colonialism, though its view of racism remains superficial, particularistic, and, above all, fragmented and summarized. Their understanding and treatment of racism and the modern colonial capitalist world system maintain the view that the dominant categories of oppression were of a different nature and historical matrix. In the end, even the most well-meaning feminism continues to think of these issues as separate issues, as an addition to gender domination and thus less fundamental for women’s struggles.

As long as we are unable to change this point of view of oppression in Latin American feminism, it will be doomed to be the struggle of a few; what is more, it will be the struggle for the emancipation that will only benefit a small number of people, and not against the widening oppression of racialized subjects, regardless of gender.

Translated from the Spanish by Marina Gržinić

26 See Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, “Y la una no se mueve sin la otra: descolonialidad, antiracismo y feminismo; Una triyeja inseparable para los procesos de cambio” [And the one does not move without the other: Decoloniality, antiracism, and feminism; Inseparable threesome for the processes of change], Revista Venezolana de Estudios de la Mujer 21, no. 46 (2016).
27 This is what I have named gender racism, when it becomes the principal category of feminist analysis: “An impossibility of feminist theory to recognize its privileged place of enunciation within the modern colonial matrix of gender.” In Espinosa Miñoso, “Y la una no se mueve sin la otra,” 50.
Literature


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We're doing well.
We found a well in the middle of the desert and we're growing flowers.

They say the struggle is real but the lines are blurred—What language do we speak?
The fastest growing language in the world.
Fitting the aesthetic of mainstream visions as they appreciate the wild, flicking braids for their photo and video shoots. Internalizing and mocking realities by channeling their very own inner diva. Don't believe her, leave her.
Alone. She is grown.
Ask her first.
Ask.
That's all it takes.
But.
You narrow it down to performativity. Performing the reduction of these exquisite femmes to the buttocks. That ass. That big juicy ass. Oh, yes.
Who needs them when anyone else just gotta do some squats. Boom! Booty pops.
Celebrating curvaceousness is apparently not innocent.
And I'd like a portion of lips, but hold the racism.
Or. She is Mother Earth. Reproduction. Nurturing.
They are sick and tired. Her bosom raised a nation.
You've had it?
Listen, nobody wants to hear what you're really going through sweetheart ...
Your analysis has no place on this here dance floor. You're a party stopper.
You're not representing the struggle 24/7. Chill. Relax my love ... You can create your own heaven right here on Earth and for what it's worth, this party is deep and spiritual.
Steer away from it all ... hollow as you are, because you've clenched your fist one too many times. Yet they've turned to you for your rhymes, your voice.
Shining that light on you and now look: you're the diva. Leave her and best believe her when she tells you: "I'm tired.
As you define my being, my existence as intersectional and cannot think outside of your gender parties and racializing races. On your mark. Get set.
Biological-izing all femininity and womanhood. Measuring the mix. Dividing the diversity.
Classifying a class, putting us in our place. Hungry, Fat, Poor, Rich, Struggling, Unemployed, Hustle.
Trace it. Trace the line. Take a ruler. Measure it. Be a ruler but hold the colonization.
I ain't on your frequency, tune in to another station."
A monkey in heels or a thug. She came out of prison, straight out of prison.
That's the only explanation for her look. She's tattooed. Oh. Bet you didn't know she sued. Yes. She sued a policeman for calling her the n-word. She's what you would call fierce for all the reasons you do not know. Camera in the face of the displaced. Their obstacles are live, as in: Stream. You can watch them overcome hurdles from the comfort of wherever the heck you are. Willingly or unwillingly they have cameras in their faces.
Joining my sisters and siblings on the margins as we barge into your sitting rooms, your computer screens, your memes, do they know what it means?
D'you know whattamean? Who's on your team?
Have you got the time to listen while you type and speak the fastest growing language in the world?
10 second attention span.
Lives have become trending topics.
They say the struggle is weak. No, weekly.
We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us. [...] Now, little ship, look out!

—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science

In Isaac Julien’s film installation Western Union: Small Boats (The Leopard) (2007), we face the in-between in its multiple dimensions. Julien’s images of Libyan migrants, “clandestines” as they are called, who have voyaged to contemporary Sicily, are layered with strong visual echoes of the transatlantic slave trade and at the same time layered against the visuals of Palermo in Luchino Visconti’s 1963 film, The Leopard. What links these three historical phases is the topic of adaptation, the struggle to become new people, and of being between histories, between times, between places, between elements; bound up in the movements of humans, goods, and capital. An emblematic image of a figure looking out from the slave dungeon on the West African coast speaks of the possibility, at least, of the movement from darkness into the light, from the confinement of land to the open sea, with all of its unknown promises and terrors.

This is the exhilaration and warning that animates the Nietzschean epigraph above. The same epigraph is also one of the points of departure in Paul Gilroy’s foundational text The Black Atlantic, with its remapping of Western modernity from the vantage point of the Middle Passage: the instant of embarkation, the leaving behind the limits of the known, and those bearings that signify the border between land and sea. The passage speaks of terror, but also of possibility in the instant of being unmoored, of casting away, in all its ambiguities.

The frameworks I have been working with for the last few years center on the ocean as a space through which bodies move and are transported, on the technologies that enable this movement, and the shifting geographies, economies, and ecologies these movements in turn produce. The ocean becomes visible not simply as a surface, capricious, unknowable, elemental, over which these operations take place, but as made up of multiple historical and political currents and flows; of ecologies of complex media; oceans as characterized by depths as well surfaces, as sites constituted by sedimented layers, by spectral genealogies, iconographies, and epistemologies as well as constituted by changing geographies, within which multiple forms of the traffic and movement of labor and commodities take place.

1 http://curvetube.com/Isaac_Julien_Western_Union_Small_Boats/y79qUovY37U.video.


Julien, whose early work focused on the African-American diaspora has more recently has begun to imagine voyaging across time and across place. *Ten Thousand Waves* (2010) is an immersive film installation whose starting point was the 2004 Morecambe Bay scandal in which twenty-three Chinese migrant laborers from Fujian province drowned in the rising tides as they picked cockle off the coast of northwest England. In Julien’s installation images of Mazu, the sea goddess of southern China, floats between scenes of past and present, threading together these historical and contemporary voyages for survival, an aspiration summed up in the phrase “better live,” with its multiple resonances—as in “better live than dead;” or the perennial aspiration of migrants who are in search of better lives.

The installation centers on a poem that Julien commissioned from Wang Ping:

We know the [death] tolls ...
We know the methods: walk, swim fly,
metal container, back of a lorry, ship’s hold
We know how they died: starved, raped,
dehydrated, drowned, suffocated, homesick,
heartsick, worked to death, working to death
We know we may end up in the same boat.  

The installation puts contemporary African and Chinese migrants who are looking for better lives in the same boat, locating them within the framework of the movement of global capital, despite their historical differences. If I return to Western Union, the title alludes to the disembodied mobility of capital across space, seemingly free of the complicated business associated with the movement of bodies, in all their materiality: the intractable corporealities that must be squeezed into the holds of boats, stacked into the cavities of airplanes; their inconvenient need to inhale and exhale, and their unrelenting routines of ingestion and excretion; the inconvenience of bodies that are given to drowning, freezing, starving, suffocating, and an infinite number of ways of not arriving, of failing to comply with the aspiration/injunction, “better live.”

I begin with this discussion of Julien’s work to introduce the notion of the passage as a process. My interest is in the processes and the modalities of illegal passages or flights, and the media and technologies that enable them—what I have elsewhere termed “survival media.”

Critical Genalogies

Faced by the daily toll of deaths in the Mediterranean, the European Union recently sought to dissociate itself from the violence in which illegal migrants are caught by invoking a selective history of the slave trade, and to take on the mantle of abolitionism. In this narrative, migrants and refugees becomes subjects the EU aspires to “rescue” from their traffickers by the use of military force, by “bombing the boats.”

This EU narrative echoes the stance taken by the Australian government. For at least the last decade, Australia has managed to combine the rhetoric of “saving lives” with ever more hardline military tactics of deterrence and punishment. Implicit in Australia’s actions is the same rationale articulated by the European Union: that is, one that places states in the role of opposition to that of demonized “people smugglers” as the contemporary heirs of slavers, whereas, in fact, states themselves are deeply implicated with those they term “people smugglers.” In place of this self-serving, selective, and ahistorical narrative adopted by the governments of Australia and Europe, what can be learned from critical genealogies of the Atlantic slave trade, focused on the technologies, practices, and artifacts of a traffic that, in the movements of empire, labor, capital, and value that it set in place, is constitutive of today’s geopolitical, economic, and globalized racial order? Even as we refuse to gloss over or ignore the specific forms of horrific violence inflicted on those abducted and forcibly rendered into slavery, how can we consider its connection with people now impelled into flight by starvation, war, and insecurity, forces produced by these same logics of empire and colonization? “Choice” or “agency” as deployed by the group of academics who protested the EU position are, I submit, inadequate terms in which to describe the forces that drive many people into desperate acts of escape. Rather, many of those now in flight explicitly invoke the conditions produced by these same forces of colonization and empire in the age of the slave trade as responsible for their present dislocation and dispersal.

Martina Tazzioli notes in a recent commentary in the journal Radical Philosophy that knowledge production about the movements of illegalized migrants is couched largely in the mode of enumeration—of counting (border deaths in

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particular), of sorting (for example separating the “genuine refugees” from the bad “economic migrants”), and channeling; and through the entwined, not opposite, technologies of security and humanitarianism, where surveilling/monitoring on the one hand and rescuing/protecting on the other operate within a governmentality that encompasses states, transnational bodies, and NGOs alike.* Apart from such forms of knowledge-making, how might critical genealogies of transportation, trafficking, the enforced and violent movement of bodies, and the technologies that enable them, reframe an understanding of contemporary refugee passages?

In a stirring piece on the afterlife of slavery, Stephen Dillon identifies the artifacts of contemporary punishment and imprisonment—such as manacles, shackles, bars, coffles, the holding pen, the barracoon—as forms in which slavery leaves its marks in the present on racialized bodies. In Dillon’s words, a “necropolitics of slavery haunt the biopolitics of neoliberalism” and its landscape of incarceration and impoverishment of racialized populations; indeed, the logics and technologies of slavery “not only haunt but also possess the present.”7 Is it possible to extend Dillon’s argument from the prisons of settler colonies in North America to globalized economies, and their complex relation to illegalized passages and the traffic of peoples; to the drag and pull of cheap labor and human capital to the fringes of the global north, their imbrication in global orders of value and waste, war and peace, living and dying? In the technologies of transport, trade, exchange, warehousing, corralling, enclosing, detaining, punishing, and killing that make up today’s illegalized passages, slavery’s pasts seem to be reflected back as if in some submarine mirror. In such returns, today’s desperate migrations sound the possibilities of untapped historical depths, even as they track new geographies across the frontiers of the global north.

While terminologies of “haunting” and “afterlife” are widely used in writings on slavery’s role in the present,* critical genealogies of sea trafficking also reflect back on our still-unfolding understanding of the era initiated by the Atlantic slave trade. Michelle Wright critiques the use of “middle passage epistemologies” as promoting a static understanding of today’s diasporic complexities.* Can thinking middle passage epistemologies in the context of contemporary globalized diasporas forced by war, displacement, grinding poverty, hunger, and impelled by global demands for labor and human capital, reflect back on our understandings of the former?

Disposable Lives

In the spectral genealogies with which I began, lives are weighed in the balance and found disposable, valueless. A story cited in a 2015 article published in the Guardian tells of a woman aboard a passage across the Mediterranean begging for water for her child to drink. The captain of the boat responds to her plea by flinging the infant into the sea where, he said, there was plenty of water.8 Other incidents tell of asylum seekers being dropped into the sea far from the coast, directed to sink or swim, or abandoned on boats without food or water as the crew make their escape. In the Bay of Bengal in 2015, as many as eight thousand Rohingya refugees from Myanmar were stranded in the bay and along the edges of the Indian Ocean, left to drift or die, with Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia adopting turn-back policies for boats that Australia itself had put in place some years ago. These covert and overt policies are directly implicated in the avoidable deaths and deliberate killings of refugees and illegal migrants.

As the historian Marcus Rediker writes, “The slaver is a ghost ship sailing on the edge of modern consciousness.”9 Such accounts have prompted a number of commentators to recall the case of the Zong massacre in 1781, a notorious incident in which slaves were thrown overboard by the crew when the ship ran out of drinking water on the middle passage between Accra, in what is now Ghana, and Jamaica. After arriving in Jamaica, the ship’s owners made an insurance claim for their lost property, that is, the lives of potential slaves. The case became notorious and is often taken to have inspired J. M. W. Turner’s famous painting, originally known as The Slave Ship. The Zong incident represented a landmark case in which the value of slave lives as property was first brought before the law.

It is against the backdrop of the Zong that Saidiya Hartman writes of the contemporary relationship between death, profit, and capitalism:

> Today we might describe it as collateral damage. […] Death wasn’t a goal of its own but just a by-product of commerce, which had the last effect of making negligible all the millions of lives lost. Incidental death occurs

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9 Michelle M. Wright, Physics of Blackness: Beyond the Middle Passage Epistemology (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 2015).
11 Rediker, Slave Ship, 14.
when life has no normative value, when no humans are involved, when
the population is in, effect, seen as already dead. Unlike the concentration
camp, the gulag, and the killing field, which had as their intended end
the extermination of a population, the Atlantic trade created millions of
corpses, but as a corollary to the making of commodities. [...] Death was
simply a part of the workings of the trade.12

The lives of the cockle pickers of Morecombe Bay are part of this same pattern of
the “workings of the trade,” disposable lives tossed in the tidal movements
of global labor. Their unfinished passages are caught up in capital’s unpredict-
able ebbs and flows. Julien’s Ten Thousand Waves compulsively restages
their unfinished passages in that instant of their dreams of return and
their inundation.

Gazing at Turner’s painting, the visual theorist Nicholas D. Mirzoeff, too, reflects
on that instant of suspension between the living death of the slave ship and
the moment of fleeting freedom from it: “In turbulent water, an African body
thrown off the slave ship is suspended between life and death, between the
beginning of enslavement and a temporary freedom. The fish, birds and the sea
monster Typhon swarm around them. What if, I wonder, they are not eating
but trying to support them, to keep the weighted body at the surface? These
little fish and gulls are not flesh eaters. Those are the slavers.”13

Oceanic Ecologies

Let us end by staying in this state of suspension, the in-between of life and
death, slavery and freedom; remaining within the incomplete passage by refer-
encing the work of an artist whose point of departure is the disposable body,
flung into the water as worthless, excess, and without value.

The series Watery Ecstatic by the African-American artist Ellen Gallagher draws
on the myth or oral tradition of Drexciya, the undersea continent peopled by
the unborn babies of slaves who were tossed or fell overboard during the
Middle Passage. The dying women gave birth in the water, where their children
formed a new population under the ocean’s surface, comingling with fish,
bones, weeds, and coral. The layers of waste and sediment accumulate and spread
out underwater to form an invisible land of the lost and drowned merpeople,
eventually connecting all the continents under the sea. In Gallagher’s images
of this unseen world in the depths of the ocean, a ghostly, fragile, and exquisite
community lies hidden among seaweed, fish, coral, and other marine life.
Gallagher enjoins us to consider movements under the surface, in the unknown
depths, after the moment of casting out; to think about the voyage as a
continuation of movement, not as salvage of that which was cast away as waste,
but of the making of another order of value, as potential for something other,
for other lives.

The myth of Drexciya reminds me of the narrative of Amal Basry, an Iraqi refugee,
one of the few survivors of SIEV X, a boat mysteriously destroyed on its way
to Australia. As more than three hundred of her fellow passengers drowned
around her, Basry stayed afloat in the water for twenty-three hours, clinging to
the body of a dead woman, fending off the sharks, speaking to the dead and
dying, recording everything she saw, like a camera in the water. In the months
and years after her rescue, Basry returned again and again to how she wit-
nessed three infants who died in the moment of their birth, who were being born
dying as their mothers drowned in the water; the infants floated in their
death, like dead birds in the water. She was witness to the scene in the water, to
the dead woman and the floating infant bodies, to the people she saw just

12 Hartman, Lose Your Mother, 31.
before the boat sank, people she witnessed writing letters to the angel of the ocean, which they then cast into the water, shortly before they themselves were cast into it. Although she survived, Basry never left this scene in the water. In her narrative, documented by the author Arnold Zable, she addresses her interlocutor: “My brother, I am not like I was before […]. I think I lost something in the ocean I want to go back to the ocean. I want to ask the ocean, what did I lose? Is there something the ocean has to tell me?”

Against the necrogeographies that block and terminate refugee passages, I want to consider these as traces of oceanic ecologies in which the expendable bodies of the drowned and castaway interpenetrate with oceans, in all their complex affectivities and charged materialities, in watery “corpo-graphies,” to borrow Joseph Pugliese’s beautiful phrase. Refugees write letters to the angels of the ocean, or entrust the waves with messages in bottles. Oceans, invested with these poetics of hope and survival, become custodians for refugee stories and bodies, living and dead. In these fragile, watery zones of other lives, the ocean is not only a death zone. Through motley, evolving tactics, through contingent media of survival, refugees re-world the submarine, the seascapes, and border geographies through which they move. They fashion new points of transition and embarkation, sound new depths, make other passages.

Literature


Wright, Michelle M. *Physics of Blackness: Beyond the Middle Passage Epistemology*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2015.


Demasking
In the mid-1990s, radical Right groups in Hungary established a memorial site to remember the so-called Tiszaeszlár affair—the first anti-Jewish trial in the late nineteenth century in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The trial, in which Jews were falsely accused of the murder of a non-Jewish girl in the village of Tiszaeszlár, was held from 1882 to 1883 and signaled the beginning of anti-Semitism in the country. For proponents of early anti-Semitism, the Tiszaeszlár case became a symbol of the “threat” coming from Jewish immigration from the east—from Austrian Galicia and the Russian Empire—as well as from the recently emancipated local Jewish communities. The image of the dead girl, Eszter Sólymosi, was meant as “an enduring reminder for the Christian nations” of Europe. In the 1930s and ‘40s, the Tiszaeszlár case reemerged from the margins of cultural memory and entered radical nationalist discourse.

Although the gravesite that was erected more than a century after the case is actually empty, it houses an image that has circulated from picture to picture, from discourse to discourse from 1882 onward. The establishment of the memorial site relied on a long tradition of anti-Semitic imagination, created before 1945, recreated in the national socialist exile after 1945 and transmitted to emerging radical Right groups after 1989. In the course of this long history, the image of Sólymosi transformed according to different concepts of the nation and the changing notions of Others. Nonetheless, the transformation of her image tells us about territorial imaginations, ethnic borders, and transgressing aliens.

Setting the Scene

The oldest image depicting the girl is the reproduction of a painting, also lost like the body itself. It presents the figure of a girl standing in the foreground, barefoot, with the path under her feet leading to the scene of her death, a synagogue, depicted in the background. Her clothes refer to her humble birth and peasant parentage. The bag she carried on that fateful day indicates the sequence of events that led to her disappearance. In the public imagination, these details became iconographic signs of her. On the other hand, the simplicity of the painting’s style corresponded to the simple life it represented. Both

Transpositions
Jews, Roma, and Other Aliens in the Radical Right Culture in Hungary

Zoltán Kékesi

1 The article presents excerpts from a book project I have worked on as a research fellow at the Center for Jewish History, New York, in 2014/15, and as a visiting researcher at the Centre for the History and Culture of East Central Europe, Leipzig, in 2016.
the dead girl and the painting needed to be “sounded” in order to acquire meaning and arouse emotions: only words, only discourse, could give this image the power to travel through space and time, and to create bonds between people.4

The painting was exhibited for the first time at the international anti-Jewish congress held in Dresden in 1882. At the conference, where delegates from the Austro-Hungarian empire and Germany gathered to discuss their political program and to establish an international movement in Europe, speakers stood before the busts of the Austrian and German emperors, the monarch of Saxony, and the painting of the girl.5 The manifesto of the congress, drafted by Hungarian delegate Győző Istóczy, proclaimed that for the “European nations” any coexistence with the Jews was impossible. “Europe,” it said, “belongs to the Christian people.” For many of the delegates, this entailed demanding the ending of Jewish immigration from the east, the annulment of Jewish emancipation (introduced in 1867 in Austria-Hungary and in 1871 in the German empire), and the resettlement of Europe’s Jewish communities in non-European territories, either in Palestine (then ruled by the Ottoman Empire), at the margins of Eastern Europe (in the Russian empire), or in “Africa’s vast inner lands,” as Istóczy formulated.6

In post-emancipation Austria-Hungary and Germany, the image of the “eastern Jew”—or, as mostly referred to before 1900, the Polish, Russian, or Galician Jew—already had a long history: it permeated the public debates on Jewish emancipation from the beginning.7 As a product of both the non-Jewish and Jewish imagination, it was deeply embedded in the history of Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s relationship to its eastern neighbors, especially to Poland and Russia, and in the attitudes of the assimilated (or, at least, acculturated) Jews of Germany and Austria-Hungary toward the less or not assimilated Jewry of the neighboring countries—or of their own. Prejudices against Polish, Russian, or Galician Jews intensified at the time of the congress in Dresden and the Tiszaeszlár case because of fear of mass migrations owing to the Russian pogroms of 1881 and 1882. Istóczy himself depicted the Russian pogroms as legitimate self-defense of the Russian people and made a reference to the Tiszaeszlár case because of fear of mass migrations owing to the Russian pogroms in the context of allegations that interpreted the anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia as an attempt to undermine the power of the monarchy by forcing the mass immigration of Jews into its territories.8 Russophobic sentiments became more apparent in Istóczy’s later articles, published during the 1900s. Concerned about the emergence of pan-German and pan-Slavic ideologies, and about the so-called question of national minorities within the country (that is, the consequences of the suppression of mostly Slavic ethnic groups), he started to see Hungarians (a people of non-Indo-European origin) as being isolated and threatened in the midst of a transnational conflict described in thoroughly racialized terms.9

The speech, which at the congress unveiled the painting, introduced a pattern of emotional responses that has persisted, despite many transformations of the symbolic meanings attached to the image. The speech was delivered by Géza Ónody, a representative in the Hungarian parliament and member of the delegation, who read a chapter of his book Tisza-Eszlár in der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Tiszaeszlár in the past and the present) that was due to be published.10 In this primal scene of what would become a cult image, the speaker described the way the painting should be viewed, understood, and cultivated:

Speaking about Russian Jews in (Austria-)Hungary, using the term muszka (a slightly derogatory Hungarian term for Russian), as Istóczy did repeatedly in his speeches, might have had anti-Russian undertones as well. The “immigration question” and the Tiszaeszlár case were addressed from the beginning in the context of allegations that interpreted the anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia as an attempt to undermine the power of the monarchy by forcing the mass immigration of Jews into its territories.11 Concerned about the emergence of pan-German and pan-Slavic ideologies, and about the so-called question of national minorities within the country (that is, the consequences of the suppression of mostly Slavic ethnic groups), he started to see Hungarians (a people of non-Indo-European origin) as being isolated and threatened in the midst of a transnational conflict described in thoroughly racialized terms.12

4 For the notion of the “sounding” of images, see W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 74, 188.
7 See Győző Istóczy, Die Wurzeln des Bösen [The roots of evil] (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2003), 661.
8 Géza von Ónody, Az orosz-zsidó bevándorlás kérése a képviselőházbann [The question of Russian-Jewish immigration in the parliament], 12 roprirat, June 15, 1882, 11–12.
9 See Győző Istóczy, A magyar nemzetet megillető hely az európai népesség alatt [The place of the Hungarian nation in the European family of peoples] (Budapest: Buschmann, 1908).
spectators should imagine the terrible death that the girl suffered at the hands of Jewish men, surrounded by a hostile race, left by her own people. The spectators should imagine that the girl in the image begins to speak, addresses us, calls for our help, and tells us about her agony. They should empathize with the mourning mother and see the girl as a daughter: it is a parental relation that is projected onto the image. For to defend or avenge one's own child is commonly understood as a justification for violence. Being sympathetic with the mourning mother is thus a precondition for a morally justified violent response. Certainly, part of this emotional setting usually involves—throughout the later history of the image—a male subject speaking for the image and telling the story of Sólymosi’s death. In this emotional setting, the symbolic position of the patriarchal subject is open, inviting the storyteller and the viewer to fill it.

Awakening the Dead

In 1933 István Milotay, a prominent journalist and founding figure of counter-revolutionary press in interwar Hungary, reviewed the anti-Jewish memoir In 1933 István Milotay, a prominent journalist and founding figure of counter-revolutionary press in interwar Hungary, reviewed the anti-Jewish memoir produced by József Bary, an investigator in the Tiszaeszlár case, published posthumously. This memoir, which documented the events leading up to the 1921 Tiszaeszlár trial, was a controversial work in interwar Hungary, reviewed by Milotay. In his article, Milotay explored the emotional impact of the memoir, noting that the story of Sólymosi, the female protagonist, was particularly compelling. Milotay argued that the memoir was part of a broader cultural and political context, reflecting the anti-Semitic sentiments of the time.

By 1933 Hungary had been turned into a right-wing authoritarian state that rejected the liberal traditions of the late nineteenth century. Subsequent to the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the regime was founded on counterrevolutionary politics, territorial revisionism, and ethnic nationalism. It called for the restoration of the “Christian nation,” implying the repeal of liberal policies that in post-1867 Hungary instituted Jewish emancipation and facilitated Jewish integration and progress. Thus, the educational bill of 1920 ended equality for Jewish Hungarians, restricting their access to higher education. For the decades to come, anti-Jewish arguments and atrocities became common. Similar to other European countries (both inside and outside of the eastern part of Central Europe), the combination of anti-communist and anti-Jewish racism came to be prevalent. The belief in a worldwide Jewish conspiracy offered explanations for just about everything: Jews were made responsible for losing the war, the revolutions, and the devastating territorial losses as well. Besides its anti-Jewish connotations, the concept of the Christian nation had geopolitical implications, too. It suggested that Hungary belonged to the “Christian West,” as opposed to the barbarian East, and reformulated earlier notions about Hungary being Europe’s easternmost border region (traditionally interpreted in relation to the Ottoman Empire). Furthermore, it implied that Hungary’s “natural borders” and its supremacy in the region should be restored so that it could fulfill its historical mission to defend Europe against the East—meaning, around and after 1920, mainly Soviet Russia. In addition, imagining Hungary as a Christian nation established a powerful culture of national self-understanding based on suffering and sacrifice.

In Milotay’s 1933 article, Sólymosi reawakens as a furious ghost from the past and as a symbol of the present: “And now, after fifty years, she rises from her unknown grave and, on the pages of this gruesome book, she opens her eyes and raises her arms, asking for our help [. . .]. Thus she stands before us, as if she would be a symbol of our own innocent Self, abandoned by all.” For Milotay and other Hungarian national socialists, the image of the dead girl ceased to be just a “reminder” of the “Jewish threat.” Rather, it referred symbolically to the nation itself, imagined as an ethnic body subjected to hurt, mutilation, and murder. The slaughter of the innocent girl stood for the “mutilated” or “bleeding country,” as post-Trianon Hungary was commonly called. InMilotay’s metaphor,
Cleansing the City

Ten years later, during the war that Hungary entered in order to reclaim its territories lost in 1920, journalist Lajos Marschalkó was working on a book about the Tiszaeszlár case. There, he imagined an ethnic-Hungarian community against and without Jews: “In our defensive fight against the Jews,” he concluded, “we cannot leave behind one single Hungarian […] we should hold the ghost hand of Eszter Sólymosi and embrace all Hungarians.”

His book was launched on June 1, 1944, on the “the first National Book Day without Jewish writers and Jewish publishers,” as he reported.

From March 19, 1944, following the German occupation and the establishment of the Sztójay government, Budapest had undergone a process of rapid racial restructuring. In early April that year, as a response to an Allied air raid, Jewish Hungarians in Budapest were ordered to leave their homes for the first time. In the cellars where “there is nothing that could divide us,” ethnic belonging was reasserted.

In his article about the air raids, Marschalkó spoke about “Jewish bombs” that “tear and rip the bodies of our children.” In a second article, he accused the “Jewish masters of America” and the “Negro bombers” of aimed attacks on Hungarian children, connecting the dead children symbolically to Eszter Sólymosi.

In a later report, he again envisioned “child murdering, dark-skinned Negroes and Jewish pilots” behind the air raids. His articles relied on a long tradition of combining anti-black and anti-Jewish racism and created a composite image of “abnormal” masculinities, a threatening mixture of effeminate-manipulative and supermasculine-barbaric manhoods. Eszter Sólymosi’s image had thus the potential to evoke and combine the image of different aliens, and helped create a changing constellation of different racisms. In 1944 readers of Marschalkó’s articles could see posters on the streets of Budapest depicting women and children as victims of the air raids alongside the racialized images of African-American and Soviet soldiers.

Finding a Place

In post-Socialist Hungary, with the establishment of the memorial site, the cult of Sólymosi received a designated, sacred place, leading to the introduction of annual commemorations. Participants in the pilgrimages to Tiszaeszlár navigate through a landscape that is both real and symbolic. Certainly, the symbolic geography has changed profoundly since the late nineteenth century. The river Tisza, flowing just outside Eszlár, originates in the northeast, in today’s Ukraine. For Eszlár’s location within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, this meant that the river connected the village directly to what was then Galicia, enabling readers could easily decipher the connection between the Christian blood for which the Jews supposedly sacrificed Sólymosi, and the image of the Christian nation, supposedly sacrificed by the Jewish people following the belief in a Jewish conspiracy. Since its reawakening in the 1930s, the image of Sólymosi has spoken the post-Trianon language of loss and national suffering.

would suspend class and ideological differences and a new community would arise.” For him and many other Hungarian national socialists, it was this new, ethnically defined, manly community that post-occupation racial policies had to bring about.

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18 Lajos Marschalkó, Tiszaeszlár (Debrecen: Magyar Nemzeti Könyv- és Lapkiadó Vállalat, 1943), 214.
19 Marschalkó, “A magyar könyv napja” [The day of the Hungarian book], Függetlenség [Independence], June 1, 1944, 2.
20 For a detailed account, see Tim Cole, The Holocaust City (New York: Routledge, 2003), 81–130.
21 Marschalkó, “Magyar nagypéntek” [The Hungarian holy Friday], Függetlenség, April 7, 1944, 3.
22 Marschalkó, “Magyar feltámadást!” [Hungarian resurrection], Függetlenség, April 9, 1944, 1.
24 Marschalkó, “A hajmási vérvád” [Ritual murder in Hajmás], Függetlenség, April 15, 1944, 5.
27 On spatialization and performative practices in relation to Hungarian radical cultures, see Nemzet a mindennapokban [The nation in everyday life], ed. Margit Feischmidt (Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2014).
transregional communication and transit among Jewish (and non-Jewish) communities. Thus, around 1882, Tiszaeszlár could be symbolically located in unsettling proximity to a region regarded by anti-Semites as the “European mass depository of Jews.” For them, Galicia was from where the Jews flooded the country, and the region around Tiszaeszlár was the area most exposed to this influx.

The symbolic geography in which Tiszaeszlár is located today follows different notions of borders and ethnic landscapes. Radical Right discourse often refers to Tiszaeszlár as a place “close to Olaszliszka,” a village in the same region that was the site of the murder of a non-Roma Hungarian man in 2006 and became, for the radical Right, conterminous with “gypsy crime” and “racial violence against Hungarians” (meaning against non-Roma). Locating Tiszaeszlár in relation to Olaszliszka implies that the region today is associated in right-wing media with “racial conflicts” between the Roma and non-Roma population. Locating Tiszaeszlár on the symbolic map of anti-Roma discourse extends the meaning of the commemorations at the memorial site. At the same time, it potentially transforms the appearance of militant groups at the memorial site into a demonstration against the local (and non-local) Roma population. All the more so because for radical communities (Hungarian National Front, Pax Hungarica, Conscience 88, different branches of the Hungarian National Guard, and several others) commemorations at the memorial site offer a way to practice and publicly expose militant masculinity.

Indeed, the post-Socialist cult of Tiszaeszlár combined anti-Jewish and anti-Roma sentiments from the beginning. In 1997, Far Right rock band Egészséges Fejbőr (Healthy scalp) released the song “Remember!,” which connected the story of Sólymosi to that of a confrontation between Roma and non-Roma Hungarians in 1993 in Kecskemét, another town in eastern Hungary, in which a young non-Roma man, a member of the radical Right community, died." The band originates in the skinhead subculture of the late 1980s and came to be one of the hits of the more recent radical consumer culture of the 2000s and 2010s. “Remember!” has been frequently used at annual commemorations in both Tiszaeszlár and Kecskemét, connecting anti-Jewish and anti-Roma discourse through symbolic geography, public performances, and popular culture. Cultural products such as this song, and the associated commemoration rituals, indicate the central significance of anti-Roma racism for the creation of exclusionary (white) identities in contemporary Hungary. Since the late 1980s, racist discourses against Jews and Romans (and, more recently, non-European immigrants), have produced a constellation in which racist imaginaries about different Others do not simply replace, but rather, reinforce each other.

Pilgrimages to Tiszaeszlár end in nearby Tokaj, a wine-growing area, which figures as another, more traditional, element in the construction of national-ethnic landscape. It embodies age-old culture connected to the land (or territory) and evokes the lost grandness of premodern times. At the same time, it is a site for social rituals—for consuming Tokaji, telling stories about “the king of the wines, the wine of the kings,” and singing and reciting poems and hymns from the national canon. For the performers, all of these rituals mean preserving traditions, recreating the ethnic community, and reinforcing the bond among members of radical nationalist culture. Social drinking, talking, and performing in the wine cellar is a way to experience and express feelings of pride, pleasure, and melancholy. Furthermore, Tokaj is the site for a Triannon monument, first erected in 1934, demolished after 1945, and reconstructed in 2013. Thus, by touring the site participants of the commemoration connect Tiszaeszlár and Triannon both symbolically and spatially, reaffirming the historical connection that ties the emergence of the cult to the post-Trianon culture of loss and melancholic national self-constitution. Without the latter, the story of Eszter Sólymosi couldn’t evoke the image of the bleeding nation. That is, symbolically, participants return at the end to the “original loss.”

Commemorations in Tiszaeszlár take place on the anniversary of Sólymosi’s disappearance, entering the symbolic calendar of the radical Right. Both the memorial site and the annual acts of remembrance evoke the voice of parental mourning: the epitaph on the tomb invokes the imagined voice of the mother: “To the memory of my dear daughter, your mother.” Similarly, speeches often enact parental intimacy while recalling the memory of the girl, “our little Eszter.” On the tombstone one finds a picture that resembles an old photograph, a portrait showing the outlines of a head, but not the face, connoting “fading” in order to present the picture as the material trace of a lack, or the leftover of the lost object of love. If one asks with W. J. T. Mitchell “What do pictures want?” one could say that the image of Sólymosi—an object of love—calls for reassuring emotional ties and repeating and reexperiencing communal loss.

28 Önody, Tisza-Eszlar in der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, 156.
32 See for example the commemoration held on April 6, 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYGIG7CFZVg.
Of course, it asks for more. Once tied emotionally, one is committed to testify and tell the true story of Sólymosi’s death. The same way as her death is linked symbolically to the fate of the entire ethnic community, the speaker (predominantly male) is linked, by way of telling, to the authors he conjures up, to the (male, white) ancestors who once unearthed and passed on Sólymosi’s story (Istóczy and Ónody, Bary, Marschalkó, and others), establishing a tradition to rely on. Thus, the act of retelling recreates bonds that tie the speaker and his or her audience to an imagined community, a cultural tradition, and a regime of historical truth. Certainly, it summons the image of the Other and the phantasma of threat as well, and calls for restoring the community and defending it from Others. Both the self and the Others can be seen as protagonists emerging from, inhabiting, and haunting a changing landscape of territorial imaginations and ethnic borders.

Literature


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Diffractions at Borders


Juan Guardiola: In 2014, I had the opportunity to curate the exhibition “Colonia Apócrifa: Imágenes de la colonialidad en España” (“Apocryphal Colony: Images of Coloniality in Spain”) for the Museum of Contemporary Art of Castilla y León (MUSAC). This exhibition attempted to question the meaning, production and diffusion of colonial images in the history of Spanish art from the fifteenth century to the present day. One of the works produced specifically for this exhibition was your work, C.A.S.I.T.A., titled Vallas de la frontera en Ceuta y Melilla 1985–2014 (Infografías) ([Fences at the Border in Ceuta and Melilla 1985–2014 [Infographics]]). This work appropriates a set of existing prints and facsimiles from the workshops of the Spanish Army Geographical Service, to intervene in them with printed images. How was the work born and what was the production process like?

C.A.S.I.T.A.: This work arises from the need to address the problems crystallized in the strait (of Gibraltar) between Spain and Morocco. Concretely, the work identifies the fences at Ceuta and Melilla as crucial elements that solidify many of the political, social, and cultural layers that are currently in place in the geopolitical plans for the strait.

On one hand, 1985 is the year Spain entered the European Union (EU) and marks the beginning of a gradual process of social and economic transformation for the country as well as for its borders, which gradually became more highly protected places, as they became the EU’s first line of protection, losing their local character and becoming an EU interest. The strait is undoubtedly one of the key entrances to the EU from North Africa. Control and security measures have gradually and substantially increased from 1985 to the present day.

On the other hand, 2014—the year the work was produced—was also one of the most conflictive years, with tensions growing between migrants and the police in several states. Also that year, owing to the lack of application of the most basic of human rights, some of the most regrettable photographs from around the world emerged of police violently stopping the entry of migrants who had tried to jump a high double fence between Morocco and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. In doing so, the police violated the basic principles of the 1951 Refugee Convention, because they mistreated or injured migrants when they have managed to climb the highest part of the fence. The police forces tried to prevent them from reaching Spanish soil.

The fence at Ceuta is an eight-kilometer physical barrier that separates the autonomous city of Ceuta and the neutral zone that separates Spain and Morocco. Similar conditions can be found at the fifteen-kilometer...
fence at Melilla. The Ceuta border fence consists of two parallel six-meter fences topped with barbed wire, with regular watch posts and a road running between them to accommodate police patrols or ambulance services if needed on the Spanish side, and there is a third two-meter-high fence on the Moroccan side. The fences contain extremely dangerous devices: concertina wire, blades, hawthorn wire, sharp cables, and special wire mesh to make it even harder for migrants to scale the fence. The fences are also equipped with high-intensity lights, surveillance camcorders, night vision equipment, underground cables that connect a network of electronic noise, and motion sensors. From 2008 to 2014 alone, the Spanish government, with EU support, spent more than seventy-two million euros to build, fortify, and maintain the fences of Ceuta and Melilla, incorporating all kinds of elements that cause injuries to those trying to jump to the Spanish side. To this amount, we must also add the millions of euros invested in previous decades. Providing this data seems important to us as it gives us a materiality that is very determinant of and contradictory to the positive, honorable, intangible, symbolic rhetoric of production generated around what the EU means and its values and standards of life. We used the EU’s corporate blue and yellow colors to create the infographic drawings of the fences in the piece to cause a shift in the use of EU symbols and highlight the most obscure policies, which contradict the values proclaimed by various EU treaties.

JG: In 1985, Spain and Portugal signed the European Economic Community Accession Treaty as a result of them joining the EEC, the predecessor of the EU, and the need arose to draw up laws on the transit of non-EU citizens. Spain has traditionally been a country of emigration and legislation output has focused on this area. The Organic Law of 1985 was the first attempt to regulate emigration, but it was strongly criticized for its police-style treatment of the migratory phenomenon. The deficiencies of this law were subject to appeal based on unconstitutionality, and the transformation of migration in the late 1980s and 1990s revealed the need to draft a new law adapted to the new circumstances. Current immigration law known as the Ley Orgánica of 2000, amended in 2003 and 2009, on “Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spanish and their Social Integration,” is the Spanish rule that regulates the entry and stay of non-EU citizens in Spanish territory, as well as the rights and freedoms that are recognized. The new law introduced integration policies, expanded the rights of migrants, and established a principle of equality with Spanish citizens.

The law was passed by all parliamentary parties except the Peoples’ Party, which argued this would effectively mean a “call” resulting in a massive influx of migrants. The Peoples’ Party won the following general elections by a majority and amended the law significantly, in many cases going back to the solutions of the 1985 law, which is why it is truly considered a counter-reform.

Since the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) policy in 2005 by the EU, border “management” and “security” activities have moved to territories far from conventional state boundaries. What is officially termed the “external dimension” of European border policy is actually a process of border stretching by way of border “fractalization.” In this way, the Mediterranean has ceased to be the natural border, which has been moved to the south of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. In other words, the border of the European Union has been outsourced to thousands of kilometers to the south of the strait. This strategy of control is also reflected in your prints. What strategies of representation operate in your work?

C.A.S.I.T.A: We use a series of prints in our work originating from reproductions of those in the workshops of the Spanish Army Geographical Service, which anyone can buy. The prints are panoramic views of maps from the Spanish Army’s atlas of the 1959–60 Spanish-Moroccan War (known as La Guerra de Africa in Spanish). We intervene with printed images, superimposing infographic images of the fences currently found at Ceuta and Melilla, which separate Spanish territory from the Moroccan one. We try, in the work, to generate different levels of complexity with the representation.

At the moment, when we appropriate the series of nineteenth-century Spanish Army facsimile prints, we are pointing to a very concrete representational paradigm. The panoramic depictions of war that were created through prints at that time were realistic—images understood to be objective—while charged with the aesthetically romantic thought of their recent past, which contributed greatly to reinforce the epic, the saga, and the heroic nature of nation-states in armed conflict at that time. With the history painting and its print versions, there comes a time when new nationalisms, those that will set the political agendas of the twentieth century and new colonial cycles, are exalted and shaped. These printed images are deceptive as they are intended to provide objectivity through realism as a witness to the veracity of the history of those who have written that history as victorious. According to Walter Benjamin, only historians capable of inspiring hope are those who are “firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious.”

As such, they are images that idealize their imperialist rhetoric. Through these images, romanticism seeks to convey a de-ideologized depiction of the events surrounding the Spanish–Moroccan War, naturalizing the victors’ version. The elegance of the line of the lithographic technique, the beauty of the panoramas of the chosen landscapes, the
subtleties of the vegetation on the hills and mountains, and the gray and black qualities of the sea on coasts near the battlefields hide the brutality of the violence suffered by those who lived through the war and the culture imposed upon them. Today something similar occurs with the infographics spread by the police and the media about the surveillance and control equipment, which form part of the fences of Ceuta and Melilla. These infographics are also considered objective images, however, while simultaneously harmless or neutral, the infographic technique eliminates the footprints of the events, the wounds, and the suffering of migrants jumping the fences. Infographics merely represent, technically, the types of materials, measurements, angles of inclination, and the wonder of construction engineering in an attempt to fascinate the viewer from a technological perspective, through a representation of rationality, clarity, and accuracy. Thus, both the historical prints of the nineteenth century and the infographics of our day—supposedly objective representational systems—are completely void of empathy and conceal and justify state violence, violence exercised by the EU.

The fences at Ceuta and Melilla are architectural models of neoliberal exclusion, control and surveillance. As spatial and functional models, they are test prototypes on the processes of segregation of certain bodies, subjects. They can then be replicated in other spaces and in other contexts, with other scales and functions, such as airports, customs, border crossings, police stations, or foreign national detention centers. At the same time, they are spaces of prevention and testing for all the logics on control and surveillance that must keep the EU shielded from “infection” and “invasion” (using certain conservative rhetoric). During the production process of the work, we did a lot of research on different systems and new technologies—some using satellites being developed to view the earth—and on borders and hotspots of conflict. Infrared shooting techniques provide us with images of migrants walking through the desert toward the fences at Ceuta and Melilla. The migrants look almost like tiny cells, small moving dots that are almost impossible to identify as people, as human beings. This is precisely one of the effects produced by these images: the migrants’ identity is erased, leading to indifference and lack of empathy by those who are monitoring them. We are witness to processes, which make these facts and bodies abstract.3

If certain images from a specific type of war photojournalism have contributed to the victimization of the people represented and the processes of desensitization of the population due to overuse and saturation, then infrared photographs or infographics accelerate the lack of empathy with the reality produced in the places they record or intend to represent. These images and representational methods have the effect of diffracting what physically happens to the bodies trying to cross the border. Therefore, pointing out, interpreting and subverting, with our work of art, how these instruments of reality production operate through these types of images, as well as how new acquisition and visualization technologies would be appropriate. With the work, we have created a place in which intersecting perspectives of times and contexts, separated by more than one hundred years, offer us an architecture of impossible, ghostly landscapes with aberrant perspectives of terrible events. We’ve gotten used to these methods of reality production through images since the first war in Iraq, where we saw the green night-vision images of the first bombing for the first time on February 21, 1991. These images gave credibility to discourses that present civilian casualties as “collateral damages” resulting from the “surgical bombing” of chemical weapons factories or depots on the basis of the putative accuracy of these same images, thereby reducing among Western populations any solidarity with the victims of the catastrophes generated by such acts of war.4

In the nineteenth century, tents erected by soldiers of both armies

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3 To see the video of infrared images from the Spanish military police taken close to the fences at Ceuta and Melilla: http://www.libertaddigital.com/esp/2013-12-17/la-guardia-civil-aborta-un-asalto-de unos-mil-inmigrantes-a-melilla-1276506669/.

4 See “CNN ganó el respeto del mundo tras la Guerra del GolfoExpansión,” YouTube video, 4:57 min., posted by “Expansión,” June 2, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k52Z4sX7wO.
Spain joined this colonial movement in 1859 when it declared war on the sultanate of Morocco. From 1860, the *Atlas of the War of Africa* was published regularly in order to make the Spanish public aware of the peninsular armed forces' military activities. At the same time, the publication of maps and plans of the occupied and besieged areas allowed Spanish citizens to become familiar with a totally unknown territory and topography. The first war took place in Castillejos and shortly thereafter, following the battle of Tetuán (March 23, 1860), the end of the war was declared. Borders in your "post-prints" are situated in a no-man's-land between the previous limits of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco and the present ones located in the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and they cause us to reflect on our history. History is a social science whose object is the study and interpretation of humanity's past. As a product of a subjective narrative, history can generate a true or fictional account depending on the writer's own interests. On the other hand, historical facts are often interpreted, distorted, and reoriented according to the historical period in which they are narrated. The history of Spain is not alien to this process of construction, and one prime example can be found in a unique, historical event within the context of Spanish colonialism.

In 1859 the Spanish–Moroccan War took place between the kingdom of Spain and the sultanate of Morocco, and was the consequence of nineteenth-century Western colonialism. The violence toward the neighboring territory—promoted by Spanish military officers in Africa to cause suffering to the civilian population, which continued during the Rif War, and culminated in the establishment, by force, of the Spanish protectorate over Morocco—was the seed that gave rise to the use of indigenous regular forces by the troops that revolted during the Spanish Civil War; and which continues today with the occupation of the Sahara after an unsuccessful process of decolonization. This story of violence comes up time and time again like the contemporary infographics on the nineteenth-century prints of *Fences at the Border in Ceuta and Melilla 1885–2014 (Infographics)*. What other elements can we find in your method of superimposing images?

C.A.S.I.T.A: As we previously explained, all representational methods that we use in the work do indeed involve the identification and, above all, the overlap, of different times, spaces, representational techniques, symbolic fictions, aberrations of perspectives, and landscapes. But there is another superimposition—the name of our collective and the names of its members over another name, that of the Spanish Army Geographical

JG: Since the creation of the Spanish nation-state in 1492, the border between Spain and Morocco has experienced many changes. After the “reconquest”, the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon established a series of military settlements in the North Africa intended to be the first line of defense and to provide support against the attacks of Berber pirates. The enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla date back to this period (1415 and 1497, respectively) and they have retained the same status until the present time, which currently makes them the only EU territories on the African continent. During the nineteenth century, European nations began to colonize Africa, a process that culminated in the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. The Berlin Conference, which regulated European colonization and trade in Africa, is usually referred to as the starting point of the scramble for Africa.

5 The way the film *Les sauteurs* [Those who jump] by Moritz Siebert, Estephan Wagner, and Abou Bakar Sidibé (Denmark, 2016) addresses the topic is quite interesting.


are reminiscent of the rickety shops and structures used by migrants in the Moroccan territory, which are close to the fences at Ceuta and Melilla, where people congregate, waiting for the best moment to jump the fences.

Through the work we also identify the nineteenth-century colonial occupation and armed conflict between Spain and Morocco—involving another war—which the media and the EU never defined as such and that continues between the EU police forces and migrants so as to prevent their entering the EU territory. The British National Front (NF), for example, speaks of the “soft or light touch” treatment of migrants or those applying for political asylum in the United Kingdom.” Sara Ahmed carried out a study on hatred and hate policies. Although she understands there is a clear difference between fascism and neoliberalism, she calls on us to recognize that deep down the difference between both is not absolute because of the changes in the immigration policies of EU nations that have been taking place in recent decades. That the British government has turned the narrative of “soft or light touch” into a rule is evidence of this, as the hardening of asylum policies has been justified on the grounds that Britain cannot be “soft,” since this would call into question its own strength as a state.

Thus, in reference to Ahmed, we can state that the UK has ended up giving credit to the NF as it tries to prevent “others” from attempting and finally entering European nations to have a life with “easy comforts” and to prevent in essence that the body of the nation be a feminized body “penetrated or invaded by others,” following rhetoric of the NF. The changes made on immigration policies in 2015 by David Cameron’s government confirm that these rules will become harsher, with reductions on the time migrants may receive unemployment benefits or increased restrictions, which would allow for migrants to study in the UK based on income levels. In this regard, we must also add to this the uncertainty that has arisen from Brexit. In other EU states, these types of policies are also spreading or their application is being seriously investigated.

5 The way the film *Les sauteurs* [Those who jump] by Moritz Siebert, Estephan Wagner, and Abou Bakar Sidibé (Denmark, 2016) addresses the topic is quite interesting.

Service, the institution that holds the rights to reproduce the facsimile prints we have used. Like most contemporary artists, we never explicitly sign the works we make—on the media or material elements—except on this one occasion. In fact, anyone who knows our history knows that as an art collective, although we also work as individual artists, we have spent a lot of time working on the possibilities of blurred authorship in contrast to artistic individuality to generate collaborative cultural-creation and production methodologies. Thus, the gesture of superimposing our names over the Spanish Army is another allusion to the need we have to open and explore ways of working, producing, and living together with collaborative systems. We believe that the future lies in these critical collaborative productive methodologies. In a way, this act also advocates the necessity in and the importance of being involved as citizens in the reordering of officialist history and public institutions in a highly critical moment of crisis for a system that, for the majority, is becoming more and more unjust.

Through the work, we also recognize a key concept in our previous works, that is, transparency. The infographic drawings allow us to see the panoramas of the nineteenth-century prints thanks to a grid of lines and, above all, transparent spaces. Transparency allows us to represent this intangible presence that can be sensed but not seen clearly. It is that form of the structure of power—which does not allow itself to be identified and appears in the guise of other dialogues—that tries to blend in with the landscape, to camouflage itself with an idyllic past; transparency is a strategy, a form, an image.

The relationship between transparency and control regimes has been a key concept in our work since 2006 when we started the project El Ente Transparente: El Trabajo Transparente (Earning a living: The transparent entity), where we reflected on how the conditions of the recent shift in the model of productivity—with the incorporation of the immaterial capitalist universe into the Fordist world of material production—accentuate the discomfit of both the social body and individual bodies and their subjective possibilities. We approach the concept of work in a broad context of productive methodologies. Thus, the gesture of superimposing our names over the Spanish Army is another allusion to the need we have to open and explore ways of working, producing, and living together with collaborative systems. We believe that the future lies in these critical collaborative productive methodologies. In a way, this act also advocates the necessity in and the importance of being involved as citizens in the reordering of officialist history and public institutions in a highly critical moment of crisis for a system that, for the majority, is becoming more and more unjust.

In one of our last productions Asamblea de Máquinas (Assembly of machines) which was produced for ARTBO in Bogota, Colombia, in 2015, we examine the subject of economic, political, and subjective production, from the perspective of appliances, technological devices, and machines, putting ourselves in their skin, assuming their logic, and going beyond that which has traditionally been recognized as human. In the work Fences at the Border in Ceuta and Melilla 1985–2014 (Infographics), we want to examine these complex structures for access to production and the systems of representation and legislation that dictate who are “dispensable” and who are allowed “to earn a living.”

JG: In my opinion, your work reflects on concepts such as internal colonialism, sovereignty, and migration through a critical reading of Spanish immigration law. In contrast to dictatorships or absolute monarchies, sovereignty in a democracy resides in the civilian population. Democracy today, however, far from being participatory, has become a system of power distanced from citizens. Social citizenship is the status granted to full members of a community, that is, the set of civil, political, social, cultural, and other rights derived from there that society attributes to its citizens. This right or juridical status entails a differential, exclusionary dimension, as it constitutes a privilege not afforded to anybody outside the community. This is one of the paradoxes of the concept of citizenship that, while representing integration and equality, also implies inequality, especially in the case of refugees—(non)citizens without rights—which colonialism has generated. An increase in the migrant population has brought economic growth, improved individual wealth, provided the labor market with more flexibility, reduced the rate of structural unemployment, maintained demography, and contributed to the surplus in public treasury (according to a report from the Spanish Government’s Economic Office). Despite all these benefits, the regularization process for migrants continues to be just as precarious, long, and confusing, with queues outdoors under subhuman conditions that undermine the dignity of the person. This same waiting scenario can be seen in relation to the hundreds of migrants who, in their attempt to enter to live in Europe, are detained and held in foreign national detention centers until their probable deportation. No crime has to be committed: simply not having one’s residence card in order is enough to be locked up in the centers. For this reason, detention centers

large body of literature on the contemporary forms of power and the development of a certain understanding of labor. See http://www.ganarselavida.net/ganarseLavida/ELPROYECTOen.html.


8 The transparent entity also represents the spirit of the surplus, of the excess, of what has been wasted nowadays. It has to do with Georges Bataille’s notion of excess, of the capitalist system’s programmed necessity for constant profit, with the Marxist notion of added value, both concepts being typical of the societies of control, which, since defined by Gilles Deleuze, have given rise to a

9 We find the meaning that Michel Feher gives to the word “dispensable” quite appropriate, in that it refers to subjects that aren’t allowed to have a social existence. See Michel Feher, Yates McKee, and Gaëlle Krikorian, eds., Nongovernmental Politics (New York: Zone Books, 2007). See also https://vimeo.com/80882516.
are not exactly prisons, but something quite different. The media and humanitarian organizations have exposed how these places are governed by laws from outside of the states in which they operate, and that these places operate with total opacity, systematically violating the fundamental rights of the individual.

Translated from the Spanish by Raymond Kuh

Literature


Politics of Fear

Neda Hosseinyar

The project Politics of Fear intends to give a critical analysis of the repeated use of Islamophobic and anti-Muslim slogans that expose existing fear of and discriminatory structures toward people with Muslim backgrounds. The project recontextualizes this content by shifting its meaning from a national to transnational right-wing and extreme right-wing contexts.

The work presents campaign posters used by different Far Right political parties in Europe such as: the National Front (France), Lega Nord (Italy), Dawn—National Coalition (Czech Republic), National Democracy (Spain), Freedom Party of Austria, Pro NRW (Germany), National Democratic Party of Germany, Swiss People’s Party, and Vlaams Belang (Belgium).

Politics of Fear is part of an ongoing research project dealing with the topic of cultural racism. The project focuses on this interaction of elements such as culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, and identity in Islamophobic discourse.

1) National Democracy (Spain): Behave or Get Out! Against the High Rates of Foreign Crime
2) Swiss People’s Party: Maria Instead of Sharia!
3) Spain 2000: No to the Mosque
4) The National Democratic Party of Germany: We Clean Up!
5) Pro NRW (Germany): Against Islamization and Alienation!
7) Lega Nord (Italy): Because We Like Women without Veils!
Taking into account the genealogy of global changes that have led to the current mass migrations, commonly known as the “refugee crises,” I will look at the process of dehumanization and desubjectivization that precede the mechanisms of subjugation and of othering. I intend to analyze the technologies of control participating in such process in the context of Europe today and beyond in order to address the questions: What is the human? Who creates borders? Who decides whom should live and whom must die? Contesting the “post-human hype,” I will question the new subjectivities and embodied politics that could emerge under the above-mentioned conditions. Within the discursive framework of biopolitics and necropolitics, as well as concepts of performativity, I will examine the potential and the political and revolutionary possibilities of liminal bodies, liminal spaces, and new radical subjectivities created by these reconfigurations in, as Gilles Deleuze phrases it, a “society of control,”1 addressing the manifestations and representations of the body and the corporeal as sociocultural, political, psychological, physiological, and virtual entities.

Who Is the Human?

To understand the newly established power relations implied by the above-mentioned shifts and changes, we need to critically reexamine the question of the human, especially in relation to the actual “post-humanist” discourse that seems to abandon humanity as a category of the past. At the beginning of her book The Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti declares: “Not all of us can say, with any degree of certainty, that we have always been human, or that we are only that. Some of us are not even considered fully human now, let alone at previous moments of Western social, political and scientific history. Not if by ‘human’ we mean that creature familiar to us from the Enlightenment and its legacy.”2

However, I would argue here that it is precisely the colonial construction of the notion of human that stays problematic in a large portion of post-humanist discourses. While it claims to overcome the anthropocentric positions of the old humanities, the post-humanist position often lacks a clear relation to ont-historical formations in doing so. It is crucial to understand that the human is not some kind of a homogenous block that can be just overcome with a theoretical paradigm shift. Therefore, I find it necessary to introduce a decolonial perspective into this debate as well as the shift from biopolitics to necropolitics to question who has the position and the privilege to proclaim the human as obsolete and what are the politics that are revealed in such a theoretical and practical move? In other words, who can decide on the status of humanity?

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We can make the analogy with decolonial position that states, as argued by Aníbal Quijano, that the darker side of modernity is the colonial matrix of power and say that the darker side of post-humanism is de-humanization. To understand how these processes function, I will here briefly address the shift from biopolitics to necropolitics. Necropolitics was conceptualized by Achille Mbembe in 2003 in order to define the transformations of the regulation of life within the extreme conditions of the war machine produced by contemporary capitalism. The term “necropolitics” emphasizes the governmentality of death. According to Mbembe, because of the war machine and the state of exception, biopolitics as one of the major logics of contemporary societies is no longer a sufficient way to explain current forms of governmentality and power. Unlike biopolitics that governs from the perspective of the production and regulation of life, necropolitics regulates life from the perspective of a production and regulation of death.

Necropolitics, therefore, refers to life reduced to its bare existence; in other words, to life at the verge of death. The form of capitalism that was established under such a process and condition is the necrocapitalism. Necrocapitalism presents contemporary forms of organizational accumulation that involves dispossession and subjugation of life to the power of death. According to Mbembe, necropolitics as a contemporary form of subjugation of life to the power of death essentially reconfigures the relations between the resistance, the victim, and the terror. Necropower as a form of governmentality goes one step further from biopower: “Technologies of destruction have become more tactile, more anatomical and sensorial, in a context in which the choice is between life and death. If power still depends on tight control over bodies (or on concentrating them in camps), the new technologies of destruction are less concerned with inscribing bodies within disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them, when the time comes, within the order of the maximal economy now represented by the ‘massacre.’”

The age of necropolitics is characterized by production and localization of the death-worlds where whole populations are brought to the life under the condition of death and whole societies are reduced to the status of the living dead. Necrocapitalism and necroeconomy produce and exploit this form of life on the verge of death. Although Mbembe articulated this concept to explain the process in the context of the third world, necropolitics today also operates within the context of the first capitalist world. These relations are important to understand because they define the social, political, and economic reality of neoliberal global capitalism. In the first capitalist world, there is a life with a style (biopolitics), and outside of the first world, the process of necropolitics is happening, and death is the major regulator of life. However, it is crucial to understand that biopolitics and necropolitics are not separate processes, but quite the contrary: they are connected and together explain the complex power relations today.

This becomes quite evident in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers at EU borders, or as put forward by Marina Gržinić: “The new proposed measures to control the external borders of the Schengen agreement may be seen as those lines of division that will regulate the process and politics of death. Those who will be stopped at the EU frontier are already the living dead: those who have nothing to lose, not even life. The EU’s improved and coordinated immigration policy is obsolete, as it is nothing more than a policy enabling the setting up of a system to select, reject, and ultimately kill.”

The sharp cut between those who can choose to be post-human and those who are, on the contrary, considered subhuman becomes brutally obvious in this situation. The privileged biopolitical human of the first world can proclaim the post-human condition and declare the situation in which all matter equally matters, but the same regime does not work for the whole world. On the contrary, the necropolitical human can be treated as already a living dead because it has been brought to the level of a subhuman—the one who is not human enough. It is precisely through these processes, which are grounded in racialization, that dehumanization is being enforced. The technologies of control by which they are enforced, regulated, and maintained are present on every possible level of existence in the form of governmentality that Deleuze calls a society of control.

Following Deleuze we can trace the passage from Michel Foucault’s disciplinary society to the society of control in terms of the dealing with the mass/individual pair.” According to Deleuze, disciplinary society didn’t see any incompatibility between these two poles and operated by recognizing an individual as a singular entity and an administrative numeration that designates her position in the mass. As Deleuze further explains, the governmental structure in disciplinary society constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body (masses them together) and at the same time gives shape to each member of that body (individualizes them). On the contrary, in a society of control the administrative numeration is no longer at stake, but what we have instead is the more complex conception of a code, which leads to further uncoupling of the mass/individual pair and recognition of individuals as “individuals.” As stated by Deleuze:

7 Deleuze, “Societies of Control,” 5.
The code is a password, while on the other hand disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become "dividuals," and masses, samples, data, markets, or "banks." Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, since discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold as numerical standard, while control relates to floating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies.\(^9\) This transition toward data banks is crucial in understanding how the contemporary digital modes of control operate on the level of dehumanization. I would argue that the individual is being transformed into the dividual and dehumanized in a twofold process. On the one hand we have the body that is being inscribed into the digital regimes of control (divided and translated into multiple data), while on the other hand the digital is being inscribed into the body. As argued in Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos's text "Erase Them! Eurodac and Digital Deportability," when refugees are fingerprinted at the borders of fortress EU, their bodies are immobilized because of the speed of this digital information, which is at once, in a matter of seconds, sent to all the border crossings inside Europe: "Digital deportability is the result of the permeability of Europe's borders, making deportation at any given moment a constant threat within the slick space of the data flow. It is not the migrants themselves who circulate here, but rather the 'embodied identity of migration,' as the sum of their 'data doubles.'"\(^9\)

In other words, by translating a dividual body into digital data (via fingerprints) the border is digitally inscribed into the body. The body is thus forced to carry the border in itself and is prevented from free movement. This presents a specific form of digital dehumanization that is being performed by an algorithm and imposed through a violent and oppressive process that is masked and normalized as regulative of data collection in a society that has already been made compliant under such regulations by earlier disciplinary procedures. We can understand this as yet another symptom of the mode of governmentality that Deleuze articulated in terms of the society of control already in 1992:

"The conception of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is not necessarily one of science fiction. Félix Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one's apartment, one's street, one's neighborhood, thanks to one's (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person's position—licit or illicit—and effects a universal modulaton."\(^9\)

What About the Subject?

The processes discussed above are directly connected to questions of subject and subjectivity. Therefore, I will here take a detour to analyze why it is necessary to precisely go back to this question (what about the subject?). I will consider the concept of a subject in terms of shifting the source of meaning from the individual to the structures, processes, and ideologies, meaning that the individual is not the source but the product of those structures.

I will deal, therefore, with the government of one's self (subjectivation) and with the government of others (subjectification). Subjectivation and subjectification are distinguished technologies of domination of the self and of technologies of self. I find it important to emphasize the link between subjectivation and subjectification, or of their relation to the actual reality, as it is not a matter of some kind of abstract meta-theoretical philosophical problem but the question of real historical circumstances. Therefore, I believe that from the question "What is the subject?" it is necessary to make a shift toward the question "Which subject?" Philosophically, the question "What is?" implies one unified answer, while the question "Which?" implies a multiplicity of possible meanings that need to be actively analyzed and interpreted.\(^10\)

Julia Kristeva uses the phrase "subject in process" (sujet en procès) to suggest the tension between a subject as a passive (subjected to) and an active (subject that acts). In other words, the subject in process is both included in the process and produced by it. We can similarly observe what is proposed by Jacques Lacan when he makes a clear distinction between the subject and the ego. The ego is a product of the mirror stage and as such belongs to the registry of the imaginary, while the true subject of the human behavior is the unconscious.\(^11\) The entry of the subject into the symbolic order (i.e., the moment when it falls under the law of language) leads to subject splitting.

If the subject is located in the unconscious, then there is always a difference between the "I" that utters and the "I" behind the uttered message. In other

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8 Ibid.
In order to understand the processes of subjectification in such political conditions, and in the light of the technologies of control, I refer to Agamben’s theorization that places the subject between the substance and the apparatus. Agamben suggests a general division of all beings into two major classes: 1) living beings or substances; and 2) apparatuses in which beings are captured. This means that, on one hand, we have ontological theory of living beings and, on the other hand, the economy of apparatuses that govern them. Agamben explains what Foucault meant by the apparatus: “By the term ‘apparatus’ I mean a kind of a formation, so to speak, that at a given historical moment has as its major function the response to an urgency. The apparatus therefore has a dominant strategic function […] The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge.”

The strategic function of the apparatus is key because it is directly connected to the manipulation of the power relations. This means that it is possible to influence those relations through concrete rational interventions into specific apparatuses. In other words, the apparatus is always inscribed in the relations of power and knowledge and produces its own limitations. Agamben expands Foucault’s already vast understanding of apparatus, stating that it encompasses “literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings.”

He thus places the subject between those two great classes that are the apparatuses on one side and living beings on the other: “I call a subject that which results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses. Naturally, the substances and the subjects, as in ancient metaphysics, seem to overlap naturally, but not completely. For example, the same individual, the same substance, can be the place of multi-

16 Ibid.
18 Marina Gržinić citing Santiago López Petit, “Reivindicación del odio libre para una época global” (2008) argues that reality has gone totally capitalist.
14 As stated by Gržinić, “in reference to López Petit, capitalism has become equal to reality, where globalization as a total process creates a network of interrelated relations that combines simultaneous reterritorialization and derterritorialization as well as integration with fragmentation.”
16 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 2.
22 Ibid., 3.
23 Ibid., 15.
ple processes of subjectification: the user of cellular phones, the web surfer, the writer of stories, the tango aficionado, the anti-globalization activist, and so on and so forth.”

Agamben further shows that proliferation of the apparatuses is a sign of the latest stage of capitalism, and is followed by a “proliferation in processes of subjectification.” However this does not mean that subjectification has been erased; on the contrary, it is being disseminated while exposing “to the extreme the masquerade that has always accompanied every personal identity.” The question is: How can we think about subjectification in the last stage of capitalism?

If there is no subjectification outside of the apparatus than some kind of counter-apparatus to the dominant formations of power would need to be constructed. Agamben here suggests a concept of profanation of the apparatus, which means “the restitution to common use of what has been captured and separated in them.” Profanation as a counter-apparatus would require a new form of subjectification that would reconfigure the difference between subjectification and desubjectification. Namely, with a rapid proliferation of apparatuses we have come to the point where processes of subjectification and desubjectification have become mutually exclusive, where the dominant mode of governmentality no longer relies on the production of subjectivity but on the process of desubjectification.” I argue that this process is directly connected with the process of dehumanization. Bodies that are turned into data at the borders of the Schengen zone present one of the darkest and most brutal realizations of Deleuze’s anticipation of a society of control. As necropolitical already living dead, they are being existentially and ontologically incorporated into the same apparatus, the same digitalized hi-tech society that in fact dehumanizes them—turns them into bodies stripped of any political subjectivity. A similar process can be observed in the proliferation of death-toll statistics that are presented in a way that exactly normalizes deaths at the borders. The death of the already living dead is not perceived as a loss of human life but as a data entry.

Coda

Today, the processes of neoliberalism, fascism, and racism are the realities of Europe, in which the global power relations are reflected. The division between citizens, noncitizens, and refugees (as the lowest category of noncitizens) has sharpened the processes of fascism and racialization to their extremes and is spilling out on both sides of the borders of fortress Europe. Therefore, there is a need for the total political re-subjectification or reembodiment of the political subjectivity. I argue that this possibility opens only in the liminal
Literature


A Stateless People against the State
The Kurdish Autonomy as a Limitation of Nation-State Power

Çetin Gürer

In 2014, the world suddenly discovered a local armed force that was able to successfully resist ISIS. The group, which was the Syrian wing of the Kurdish armed forces, prevented ISIS from capturing the city of Kobanî after three months of intense battles and thereby managed to stop the expansion of ISIS in Syria for the first time in the five years of civil war. This resistance in Kobanî made the Kurdish forces and also the Kurds in general more visible and acknowledged in the world. 1 Despite being one of the largest autochthonous people in the Middle East without a state of their own, the Kurds have been neglected for a long time internationally. Their mere presence has been systematically denied and repressed by the states in which they live; their language, culture, and social values have continuously been assimilated and criminalized.

Another reason for the international interest in Kurds is the originality of the autonomy model in the north of Syria (Rojava, West Kurdistan), which was first declared in 2012 and has been further developed since and in mostly Kurdish-inhabited region in Turkey (Bakur, North Kurdistan). 2 The theoretical framework of the Rojavan self-governance model, called “democratic autonomy,” was developed by the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in the early years of his imprisonment in Turkey. This concept proposes a model of self-governance for Kurdish people that rejects the need for a nation-state and instead is based on direct democracy, public participation, and plurality.

Drawing on original texts of the movement, this essay aims at giving an in-depth analysis of the theoretical framework of this model of democratic autonomy, which Öcalan and the Kurdish political movement have strongly insisted on from 2000 onward. Thereby, I first discuss the importance of this model in the context of one of the key questions of political philosophy: How to limit the power of the state? I address how the critique and rejection of the nation-state is expressed within this movement of a people who has throughout history never had their own nation-state in the modern sense, and in which way the model of democratic autonomy proposes an alternative. Thereby, I will consider the political practices of the Kurds in Turkey that have developed a de facto local self-governance like the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, in spite of the Turkish state.

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1 For example, Even Elizabeth Griffin, a columnist of the well-known magazine Marie Claire, wrote a piece about the YPG’s Women Fighters in 2014 titled “These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS: It Is Time You Know Who They Are.”
2 Among those specifically internationally interested are Janet Biehl, David Graeber, and Norman Peach.
theoretical background: limiting the power of the state

since the birth of the modern state in Europe, Western political philosophers have dealt with the question of how to limit state power. thinkers like Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Baron de Montesquieu attempted to define modern state power with theories of sovereignty and at the same time produced arguments on how to limit the power of the modern state. using the notions of "state of nature" versus "civil society," they started discussing sovereignty, state, and power from the sixteenth century onward. Hobbes and Locke described the state of nature as a permanent state of war, in which violence is the driving force, whereas in "civil society" the individual's right to use violence is handed over to the sovereign (state) so that peace would reign. however, these theorists saw an important potential threat in the renunciation of the right to use violence and the delegation of this right to a sovereign. because what would happen if that sovereign as the sole authority arbitrarily decided to use violence against its own people? this question provoked the debates around both inviolable rights and the limiting of sovereignty, power, and government. historically, these debates reached their peak after the American and French revolutions, finding in constitutionalism a practical answer to how to limit state power.

even though individuals delegate certain rights to the sovereign and thus contribute to the transition from state of nature to civil society, they still possess several rights that are neither delegable nor inviolable. these are natural rights that are acquired by birth. one of the most fundamental natural rights is the right to life. accordingly, no sovereign may own such limitless powers with which it could extinguish the individual's right to life. another innate natural right is the right to property. this right to property was most clearly expressed by locke. according to locke, the main condition for property is labor. individuals own property only to the extent to which they transform nature though their labor. consequently, the right to property is regarded as a basic principle of liberalism. in that sense, a sovereign state may not make use of its legitimate right to violence in order to extinguish the individual's right to property.

in his book limited government: a comparison (1974), carl j. friedrich states that there are two significant roots that play a role in the rise of the idea of limiting the state power. one is the medieval heritage of a natural law doctrine. the royal bureaucrats, the barons, the free towns, and above all the church limit the state power. the second root is specifically the Christian doctrine developed secularized versions of natural law. after the French Revolution, when the unity of the country was reestablished, these groups promoted the idea of the separation of power. the second root is specifically the Christian doctrine of personality shared by medieval and modern constitutionalism. its central idea is that there should be a balance between two tendencies in a society: on the one hand, there is a need for the individual to have his or her own

Rights and freedom, and, on the other hand, the need for a state and government. these two tendencies shaped the need to a certain system of limiting state power in order to protect the individuals and minorities against any despotic exercise of political authority.

Jean Bodin, who is one of the first theorists of sovereignty, defined it as an absolute, permanent, and indivisible power. the sovereign is the center of power that holds both the origin of power (auctoritas) and its use (potestas) at the same time. according to him, although sovereignty itself is indivisible, the use of power can be shared with other parties. similarly, the absoluteness of sovereignty does not mean that it is also limitless. for him, there are three components that limit sovereignty: divine and natural laws, basic laws, and economic issues (the right to property).

In contrast to Bodin, Thomas Hobbes does not formulate particular arguments about limiting power, since he assumes that the absolute power of sovereignty also determines its own limits. however, this approach does not help but exalt the absolute power of the sovereign. in fact, Hobbes believes that the sovereign cannot surpass the boundaries of its power, because it is absolute and thus no other power is beyond it. therefore, limiting its own power would mean eliminating itself. to share, divide, or delegate power contradicts its own nature. the sovereign holds the absolute rationality. all its actions are faultless and rational. accordingly, it is impossible for the sovereign to endanger the existence of society, even if it would like to. the sovereign cannot strive for justice or righteousness because the sovereign itself is the justice and the righteousness.

The first thinkers we see who propose concrete solutions to the problem of limiting state power are Locke and Montesquieu. both philosophers point out the necessity of division of power in order to avoid absolute power from being ruled with only one hand. this division of power, called "separation of powers," forms the base of debates about constitutionally limiting of the government and the power of the modern state. Locke argued that legislative and executive powers should function separately and independently from each other. however, in Locke's understanding there is no independence of the judiciary, because he regards the judiciary as a subordinate function of executive power.

4 Ibid., 13.
5 Ibid., 14.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 243.
9 Ibid., 244.
10 Ibid.
It was Montesquieu who first clearly distinguished between judicial, executive, and legislative power contributing greatly to the concept of the separation of powers.

Montesquieu defined these separate powers through their relation to the law. The legislative branch is in charge of making laws, the executive branch applies these laws, and the mission of the judiciary branch resolves any disputes that occur in their execution. According to Montesquieu, these three branches of power must exist independently in separate hands in order to ensure a situation of political freedom in which all members of society feel safe and without fear.

As Friedrich points, these aforementioned debates build the basic idea of modern constitutionalism "which rests upon the distrust of power." Liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not go further with regard to the limitation of state power than the separation of powers on the level of the constitution and accepted this as its final solution. It is difficult to say if the liberalist theorists of the twentieth century, such as Jürgen Habermas, contributed anything beyond "constitutional limitations" to that debate. However, it must be said that there are new supranational and international institutions established after World War II that are acting as effective actors to limit and control state power beyond national constitutions. The global concerns are the other new players that affect national state power.

The concept of democratic autonomy developed by the Kurdish movement presents a new model to further limit state power without rejecting the mechanism of liberal theory. This approach claims that constitutional mechanisms are necessary, but not sufficient to limit the state power. Instead, the most effective way to limit state power is by organizing, strengthening, and defending the society against the state, and this can only be done by adopting a system of participatory citizenship and direct democracy through establishing citizen assemblies (yurttaş meclisleri). This proposal, which I will discuss in more detail below, distinguishes democratic autonomy from liberal models and highlights its libertarian, communalist basis.

Historical Background—Kurds as a Stateless People

What is being called the "Kurdish problem" today is a phenomenon that begins with the separation of Kurdistan into different nation-states at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this respect, there have been no structural changes for Kurds in the twentieth century so far. They remain a people without a legal status (except in Iraqi Kurdistan nowadays), which continues its struggle for cultural and political recognition in Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

In Turkey, the denial and assimilation of Kurds started in 1924. It was the year when the official second constitution of the new Republic of Turkey was written that legally denied the existence of the Kurdish people. As a result of this denial, the Kurds in Turkey were exposed to systematic violence and assimilation, which led to numerous Kurdish uprisings in the first years of the new republic. Throughout the history of the republic, Kurds have attempted twenty-eight armed revolts, some of them aiming for independence, while others aim for recognition of their cultural and political rights.

The most extensive last armed revolt against the Turkish state was started by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1984. This uprising, which the Turkish state has not been able to suppress until today, has been the longest revolt and claimed the largest number of losses. The PKK is an armed organization, which was founded in the mid-1970s by a group of Turkish and Kurdish students, who had separated from the Turkish socialist youth movement. The PKK was officially founded during a meeting in the village of Fis, Diyarbakır, in 1978. The ideology as well as the military strategy of the PKK was highly influenced by the Cold War atmosphere of the time. Taking up a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the group argued that Kurdistan was colonized, and they took up arms to establish an independent united Kurdistan. Hence, in its analysis and its guerilla strategy, the PKK did not differ from the typical national liberation movements of the time. Vladimir Lenin’s approach to the right to self-determination, Mao Zedong’s people’s war theory, and Karl Marx’s socialism were the main influences on the PKK’s ideology and military strategy. Accordingly, the armed struggle starting from the rural areas would push back the forces of the colonalist (Turkish) state. The people would gain awareness through guerrilla propaganda and subsequently push the Turkish state out of their lands through a people’s uprising, which would lead to independence. Eventually, a socialist society governed by the working class would be established in Kurdistan.

More than thirty years after the beginning of the armed revolt, the original goal of a unified, independent Kurdistan has still not been achieved, and in this time the PKK has made significant changes in its demands and goals. Nonetheless, through this revolt the PKK contributed highly to substantial achievements, including making the Kurdish issue public, achieving a national conscious-
ness, the Kurds in Turkey becoming a political actor and even gaining some cultural rights. While the Kurds have maintained their support for the armed struggle, the strategies, methods, and practices of their struggle have multiplied. Especially since the beginning of the 1990s, Kurds have achieved presence in the Turkish parliament by founding legal political parties. At the same time, they have become organized in the realm of civil society through the establishment of various NGOs, and made Kurdish people’s demands for rights and freedom public by developing local, national, and international media networks. Finally, they have extended the space of democratic struggle and gained power on the local level by winning several municipalities in the region. 16

The first years of the new millennium constitute a crucial phase of transformation in the Kurdish political struggle. In 1999, Öcalan was captured by a joint operation of international intelligence agencies in Nairobi, Kenya, and handed over to the Turkish state. Subsequently, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and has been serving time on an island in the middle of the Marmara Sea ever since. It was in these years that Öcalan developed this model of democratic autonomy. For the first time, in his defense at the Turkish court in 1999, Öcalan clearly states his rejection of the idea of independency or a separate Kurdish state. Instead, he suggests that concepts such as “democratic republic,” “democratic confederalism,” “democratic nation,” and “democratic autonomy” all condemn secession and emphasize the importance of mutual peaceful cohabitation between the Kurds and Turks in Turkey, as well as radically criticizing the state, power, and the nation-state. Öcalan’s new approach was a crucial turning point and fundamental transformation in both his thinking and the demands of the Kurdish movement. 17

State versus Society

In their Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” 18 This famous statement tells us that change in society can be achieved through the struggle between existing classes in a society and that this struggle is the main reason for historical progression. Öcalan, a self-designated Marxist, uses a similar dialectic approach in his writings after 1999. However, unlike Marx he sees the main struggle in human history to be between state and society. For him, the main antagonism between state and society leads to an unfinished struggle, which acts as the driving force of social change.

Öcalan explains this main antagonism by differentiating between “natural society” and “state society.” According to him, natural society is the original form of human existence. Human beings emerge and gain their existence with natural society. A hierarchic state society developed as an anti-thesis to this. 19 Öcalan’s notion of natural society corresponds to the sociological and anthropological term “primitive society,” which describes a society that lives in harmony with nature, is based on a simple division of labor, and has a non-hierarchical, communal character. For Öcalan, in natural society there is “no privilege, class, hierarchy, or exploitation.” 20 Nevertheless, he does not glorify or romanticize natural society in his analysis, for he knows that there is not much left of natural society today. All that is left of natural society are the tiny traces and the knowledge of it, which lets us assume that natural society was a nonexploitative, non-repressive, and cooperative society that was based on the constitutive power of women and existed in accordance with the natural environment. According to Öcalan, the suppression of women is the first form of the enslavement that is linked directly with the formation of the hierarchical state society. Therefore, Öcalan’s critique of state is also a critique of patriarchy. Hence, the women’s liberation in the Kurdish movement is being seen as a constituent part to build the democratic autonomy.

As Öcalan does not consider historical process as linear, and he does not assume the transition from natural society to hierarchical state society as inevitable. Although state society has become far more dominant than natural society today, this does not mean that natural society has completely disappeared. In the course of human history, the values of natural society have been suppressed, concealed, and forgotten. However, they continue to exist, at least potentially. For Öcalan, the goal of the political struggle is to uncover, act as a reminder of, and reanimate the principles of natural society.

According to Öcalan, the first state society in world history existed in form of the Sumerian city-states (4000–2000 BC). In these states, in which shamanic priests formed the ruling class, centralized power and empowered men therefore set the base for patriarchal societies. Öcalan expands this critique of state, beginning with the Sumerian city-state to the modern state of our time. For him, the ultimate form of state society is capitalist society. In his view, capitalist society expanded the form of expropriation of the Sumerian city-states to the whole planet. Although state society might seem to have won a historic victory with the establishment of capitalism, the struggle between natural society and state society has not yet come to an end.

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15 For an in-depth analysis, see my own study Demokratik Özerklik Bir Yurttaşlık [Democratic autonomy as a heterotopia of citizenship] (Ankara: Notabene, 2015).
16 Ibid., 134. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.
18 Abdullah Öcalan, Bir Halkı Savunanmak [Defending a people] (İstanbul: Çetin Yayınları, 2004), 21.
19 Ibid., 16.
20 Ibid., 21.
State versus Democracy

Öcalan assumes that state society represents power, hierarchy, and exploitation, while natural society stands for equality, democracy, and statelessness. Therefore, the struggle between the state and society is at the same time a paradox and struggle between state and democracy. For him, state and democracy are two phenomena that exclude each other. Therefore, democracy cannot be reduced to the state and to governing the state. Öcalan summarizes: “The more state, the less democracy; or the more democracy, the less state must be regarded as a golden rule.” This clearly shows Öcalan’s objective to critique an understanding of democracy that is tied to the state and therefore to free both society and democracy from the state. He argues that it is practically impossible to build a democratic system without distinguishing the notion of democracy from the state. In this regard, his understanding of democracy is as a “stateless democracy.” Such a concept of democracy points toward a society where the people directly govern themselves without the need for representatives, which eliminates the separation between rulers and the ruled, and enables the demos to actually autonomously determine its own future by participating in a decision-making process.

Since Öcalan understands democracy as the direct government of the people by the people without any representatives, it cannot be limited to a certain social group or class. Hence, expressions like “proletarian democracy” and “bourgeoisie democracy” harm the comprehensiveness of the notion of democracy. Therefore, Öcalan’s concept of democracy contradicts the debates of “class democracy.” His criticism of class democracy follows a similar logic found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s critique of the politics of identity. For Hardt and Negri, “revolutionary politics has to start from identity but cannot end there. The point is not to pose a division between identity politics and revolutionary politics.” If a revolutionary political movement gets stuck on an identity problem, the source of the problem, namely, the divergence of identities, will continuously be reproduced. Consequently, instead of being a tool of liberation, identity becomes a medium of captivity. Similarly, the struggle for democracy cannot be limited to or reserved for one specific class or identity. On the contrary, the struggle must be inclusive and overcome and destroy class differences. Since democracy is a regime, which should expand freedom and strengthen equality, it must not rely on social inequalities. Therefore, the people’s democracy cannot function with categories like peasants, workers, or slaves, nor can it approve of the socioeconomic system that generates them.

Stateless democracy, as a system where the people govern themselves, should not be mistaken for a state of chaos and anarchy. It should rather be seen as a system based on the virtue of citizenship, in which people participate voluntarily, and in which the principle of the delegating and withdrawing powers is effective without strict bureaucratic rules.” Such a model of democracy overcomes the given liberal democracy with its radical critique regarding participation, self-government, and the state. To make this function, certain social institutions need to be established, and how well these institutions function determines the quality of the democracy. Öcalan thinks that the most important institutions are “a congress at the highest level, and local communes, cooperatives, NGOs, human rights associations, and municipal organizations at the grassroots level.”

Defending Society against the State

In all these debates, the key question for Öcalan is how to defend society against the state. No matter how strong the state has subjugated society over the course of history, society maintains its quest for autonomy and its struggle for independence from the state.

In the context of the democratic autonomy, in order to defend society we must first acknowledge that society exists independently from the state and that this independence must either be preserved or regained. In other words, the strong “ontological link” between state and society, which developed with modernity, must be torn apart, and the identity of state and society must be abandoned. Any society has the capacity to survive without the state. The Democratic Society Congress (DTK) supposes that the state has always been in a tense relationship with society. This historical contradiction is rooted in the divergence between the state as an instance to centralize the power and society trying to stay autonomous. While the state constantly attempts to subjugate society by centralization and the concentration of power, society, in turn, permanently resists it. This conflict is a permanent one, for the state and society pursue different interests (centralization and autonomy). In that regard, defending society against the state means defending society as an autonomous, separate form of existence independent of the state and its tendency to centralize all powers and competencies.

Another dimension of defending society against the state in the concept of democratic autonomy is the reunion of society and politics; in other words, to remove politics from the monopoly of the state and return it to society.

21 Ibid., 124.
22 Ibid., 123.
24 Öcalan, Bir Halkı Savunmak, 124.
25 Ibid., 123.
26 Ibid., 127.
Conclusion

To a great extent, these grassroots institutions of democratic autonomy are the devices for limiting and undermining the power of the Turkish nation-state. Owing to the increase in hegemonic activities, especially from 2009 onward, the Turkish state faced a crisis of its legitimacy in the Kurdish region in Turkey. For the people, these self-established, self-run institutions have become more important than those of the state. As soon as these self-ruling institutions managed to solve the people’s problems, they began to take over the function of those of the state and therefore gave an impression of a dual power. The state has started to hollow out and redefine the lines it had drawn in the name of citizenship, rights, and the public sphere. It is precisely because of this effect and the legitimacy of form of politics that the Turkish state has directly attacked the achievements of the Kurdish movement since 2009. State bureaucrats are appointed in unlawful, antidemocratic ways especially to replace the democratically elected administration of local municipalities. There is great danger that this illegitimate method of appropriation will lead to the loss of each of these widely established self-governing institutions of the Kurdish movement. However, the importance, strength, and effect of these institutions have not been lost completely; at least they live on in people’s minds as positive experienced knowledge.

Democratic autonomy suggests a communal self-governance model in order to bring together society and politics. Thanks to this model, politics, or the ability to govern oneself—which had once been withdrawn from the realm of society—can be regained. For this reason, democratic autonomy may function as a model for all groups, especially the Kurds, whose existence is endangered by national states to protect and defend themselves. This model provides an opportunity for all of the oppressed peoples to establish their own alternative economic, cultural, and governmental institutions in order to get involved in politics. In this way, intervention of the state into society will be limited, because society will be able to govern itself direct through these institutions, without a representative government structure.

Citizen assemblies (köy meclisi and mahalle meclisi) are the cornerstones of democratic autonomy. These institutions, which are established at the local level, serve to enable self-governance and self-defense. Communes and assemblies present the local base of society that is organized in a confederal manner. While communes refer to a small organization of people, mainly made up of citizens from a village or an individual street, assemblies exist at the level of neighborhoods, which are made up of several communes, districts, towns, and provinces. This grassroots organization empowers society against the state, while society solves its own problems and meets its own needs with its own competences without being dependent on the state. However, the structure of councils is not solely organized according to size. Additionally, all sorts of ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender-related groups as well as NGOs, professional unions, and so on, organize themselves as assemblies. This means that different social groups, which are often being pushed out of the political sphere, are denied representation and participation by the nation-state, are able to participate in the political decision-making process.

In the Turkish part of Kurdistan, citizen assemblies first assembled in 2005. In every Kurdish province and district, legal associations were founded with the name “free citizen initiatives.” Over time these associations transformed into the self-governing institutions such as neighborhood assemblies or communes. A neighborhood assembly is at the same time a local authority where people find solutions to individual problems, a space where people can go every day to socialize and a center where political education is provided. Participation in the work of the assemblies is voluntary. Each neighborhood council consists of at least seven people and has an individual administration that deals with a practical agenda. The founding and operating principles of the assemblies are based on democracy, ecological responsibility, and gender equality. Literally as a fundamental, constitutive approach that everyone agrees on, decisions and activities of the assemblies cannot contradict these principals.

28 Ibid., 18.
Literature


Disconnecting
Plus Ultra is the national motto of Spain meaning “further beyond.” Since 2006 the Spanish government signed several agreements with governments of several countries in Africa, and started a special collaboration with Morocco for the control of the Spanish borders and the European ones within it. This externalization of border control has also been implemented by other countries, such as Italy, and the most recent case has been the EU polemical agreement with Turkey. For practical purposes this means that border control is extended further away than the geographical border, creating a space beyond the juridical control of the European liberal “democracies.” But Spain was not only the model for the border externalization; it was also a model for the construction of walls, playing an important role in the fabrication of the fences for other EU countries.
I wanted to tell the boxers that the only chance to beat the referees who are against you or against the country is to win by knock-out.

—General Idi Amin Dada speaking with delegates from Uganda’s national boxing team in Barbet Schroeder’s *Idi Amin Dada—Self Portrait*, 1974

There are many reasons for the current condition of deadlock in Israel. As much as it is specific to the unique regime that has been established since the occupation of Palestinian territories, this condition highlights several characteristics of contemporary sovereignty models, which are widespread worldwide, especially since 2001.

Today, deprived of any macro-politics through the collapse of political parties and unions, we are left with phantom-political entities like NGOs who rely on funding abilities rather than analysis, organization, and solidarity. Lingering on micro-political strategies from twenty-five years ago seems today to be the only option leftist politics is committed to.1

Hyper-neutrality

Basically, the aim here is to map the problems. Focusing the attention on this cartography will help to outline the different contradictions that enable the situation to continue and proliferate. In this respect, this essay is concerned with a specific form of dialectics—the dialectics of hyper-neutrality.

The epigraph above introduces how power is managed in the state of Israel: brutal and shameless and at the same time assuming the position of a victim; it involves rational violence that is inflicted both as a pedagogical and as a redemptive tool; it operates within an either/or dichotomy that defines each

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1 As Maurizio Lazzarato puts it, micro must always be thought with macro, and vice versa. With authoritarian governments throughout the Middle East suppressing political activities outside religious institutions and with different EU and US-led “civil society” initiatives, NGOs have come to dominate leftist politics in the Middle East. This caused a disastrous brain drain in leftist political parties throughout the region prior to the 2011 uprisings called the Arab Spring. The book *Nongovernmental Politics* proposes the NGO as a model of engagement in politics without aspiring to govern. Although fruitful as a proposal for “another” kind of politics, the reality of its achievements is reliant on sovereign power. See Michel Feher, Yates McKee, and Gaëlle Krikorian, eds., *Nongovernmental Politics* (New York: Zone Books, 2007). For a problematization of the humanitarian position in Israel-Palestine, see Eyal Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza* (London: Verso Books, 2011).
side by its other that constitutes its negation. At the same time, this dichotomy delineates an all-inclusive notion of the conflict in which religious, military, economic, social, national, and diplomatic tensions serve as different facets of the same conflict. This formation offers itself as negation and therefore promises for the counterpart an erasure of its negation, but never a negation of negation.

The condition of Israel-Palestine continues and intensifies through a mechanism of heightened contradictory internal relations. This intense political reality in which everything is cancelled out is proposed here as a form of hyper-neutrality, where repetitions and contradictions seem to dictate the conditions for a heightened standstill.

Disproportionate Power Relations

In Jean Luc Godard’s film _Notre Musique_ (2004), the renowned Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish asks the Israeli journalist Judith Lerner (played by the French/Israeli actress Sarah Adler), who had come to Sarajevo to interview him, “Do you know why we Palestinians are famous?”

Darwish continues: “We are famous because you are our enemy. [...] The interest in us stems from the interest in the Jewish issue. The interest is in you not in me. So we have the misfortune of having Israel as an enemy because it enjoys unlimited support. And we have the good fortune of having Israel as our enemy because the Jews are the center of attention. You’ve brought us defeat and renown.”

This statement could have been held as truth for some time, but now it seems it is no longer accurate. If we were to take Protective Edge, the last Israeli military operation in Gaza from the summer of 2014 as a point of departure, we could see how the international community does not care for Palestinians at all. Two thousand people were killed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) over fifty days of fighting and nothing much happened. NATO, for example, did not even consider denouncing or threatening Israel, though it proved extremely easier to act in the Ukraine after the Malaysian airplane was shot down by pro-Russian militias. In several occasions in the past few years, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, chose to use the devastating tragedy of the Syrian people to explain to Israelis why they have to be aggressive in defending themselves, otherwise their fate will be similar to that of massacred Syrians. Israelis should not expect the international community to come to their aid, he said. While this scenario may sound like a mere disingenuous manipulation, it does have currency in Israeli politics. Moreover, one can take from Netanyahu’s analysis a horrifically realistic conclusion that Protective Edge has proved—the Palestinian-ians, like the Syrians, when faced with such mass killing should not expect that the international community will do much to help them.

Twenty years ago, after the first Gulf War, the Middle East crisis was the place where states in the northern hemisphere such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Scandinavian countries were looking for a stature of world power. But today, the Israeli occupation in Palestine is just one of the many conflicts in the region from West Africa to Iraq; from Sunnis and Sunnis, to Muslims and Christians, to Kurds and Yazidis, to Israelis and Palestinians—also for neighboring Arab countries Israel is no longer the center of attention. As time goes by, Israel-Palestine conflict becomes just another malignant and cureless violent conflict along this territory of the imploding Middle East. What still makes the situation in Israel and Palestine unique (and in this sense so effective and useful for world powers still) is the way this conflict is set and managed within a disproportionate power relation.

The two predominant economic theories on the Israeli Left, saw the occupation as either “costing too much money” or as a “money maker.” The Oslo years presented an economic logic that was critiqued by Israeli scholars Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler as a globalized new world order based on agreements for offshoring industries and outsourcing security—according to this logic, there was much more economic potential in peace than in war. But this logic was no longer relevant by the year 2000 when it became obvious that the Israeli military-financial nexus relied on the occupation for its information technologies. This meant that the occupation was to Israel’s economic advantage as a beta for high-tech research-and-development operations. This logic was celebrated by Dan Senor and Saul Singer, and critiqued by Eyal Weizman.

Jeff Halper, of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), coined the phrase “matrix of control” when he compared the occupation to a game of immobilization. He writes:

2 These quotes by Darwish are based on an interview he gave to Helit Yeshurun, publisher and editor of the literary review _Hadarim_ (published in Hebrew, _Hadarim_ 12, 1996). The interview was translated to the French and published in _Revue d’Études Palestiniennes_ [Journal of Palestinian studies], no. 9 (Autumn 1996). It appeared in English in the _Journal of Palestine Studies_ 42, no. 1 (2012). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.


the Japanese and East Asians have a game called “Go.” Unlike the Western
game of chess, where two opponents try to “defeat” each other by
taking off pieces, the aim of “Go” is completely different. You “win” not by
defeating but by immobilizing your opponent by controlling key points
on the matrix. This strategy was used effectively in Vietnam, where small
forces of Viet Cong were able to pin down and virtually paralyze some
half-million American soldiers possessing overwhelming fire-power. In
effect Israel has done the same thing to the Palestinians on the West Bank,
Gaza and in East Jerusalem. Since 1967 it has put into place a matrix,
similar to that of the “Go” board that has virtually paralyzed the Palestinian
population. The matrix is composed of several overlapping layers."

With this in mind, the above-mentioned hyper-neutrality is manifested through
immobilization and paralysis. The internal dynamics of such deadlock brings
to mind a possible resolution in the form of implosion. Having silenced any op-
opposition and being militarily unassailable, the idea here is basically that the
Israeli government will dismantle itself through the internal contradictions of
its own actions."

The fact that US dependency on Saudi oil has diminished in recent years has
made the US reevaluate its interests in the Middle East. In turn, this has
compromised Israel’s strategic position. As it no longer falls within the core US
doctrine for control and influence over the Middle East, Israeli governments
in recent years have had to pull strings in Washington, DC, much harder and to
lobby more aggressively. The unlimited support once gained without much
discussion now demands bullying. This process has caused, among other things,
real division among American Jews and between American Jews and Israeli
officials. One of the manifestations of this break can be observed in the different
approaches to the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement.6

If we were to go back to Protective Edge and see it in the light of biopolitical and
capitalopolitical logic that it entails, we can observe that Palestinian civilians are
not the only ones who are regarded as acceptable collateral damage. For now,
the most extensive report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) presents these numbers: 2,189 killed, of whom
1,486 are believed to be civilians, including 513 children (323 boys and 190 girls,
70 percent under age 12) and 269 women, 557 have been identified as mili-
tants, and 146 are of unknown status. This is a tremendous human tragedy on a
personal as well as social scale. At the same time, this is also a disastrous politi-
cal problem. With such a scale of mass killing, any possible agreement between
Israelis and Palestinians is simply pushed a generation at least down the line.
But then, in addition to this tragedy, we should ask ourselves: In what way was
this new problem supposed to provide a solution? For the Israeli settler-led
government it is obvious that this is exactly the solution, as it sees no point in

any agreement. At the same time, we have to scale this tragedy in relation
to its target—or to put it differently, this new problem was a solution for some-
thing. What was the problem that this mass killing was supposed to solve?

Neoliberal Sovereignty

With Protective Edge we can recognize a model of sovereignty that, for lack
of a better word, we can call neoliberal sovereignty.7 While escalating the tar-
geting of civilians in Gaza and intensifying its use of firepower, Israel was
operating in what seemed like a contradictory manner. It initiated and accepted
all ceasefire proposals throughout the fighting. This, together with the sud-
den withdrawal of ground troops with no clear military results, raises questions
as to what exactly the fighting was about. It seems that the battle did not
aim to insure the security and well-being of Israelis in towns and settlements
neighboring the Gaza Strip. Although these were declared by the Israeli
government as the initial goals for the military campaign, it was the security,
reassurance, and well-being of another public that was the concern of this war.
With a month-long disruptive shooting of primitive missiles by Hamas from
Gaza and a twenty-four-hour shutdown of Israel’s only international airport, the
government’s actions suggest a different constituency than that of tax-paying
citizens. The military’s operations attempted to secure and reassure bondholders
and to make sure they felt that the government takes care of the well-being
of their investments. As Michel Feher explains, this basic shift from taxpayer to

perspectives/the-matrix-of-control/

7 Groys claims that the dismantling of the USSR by the party leadership was in
accord with dialectical materialism. Noam Yuran, in a brilliant reading of this passage
from Groys, finds that its true meaning lies in what it says about capitalism, which
is that capitalism cannot do what the Soviet leadership did. Because capitalism

does not have a sense of its own negation, it cannot think its opposite.

8 For the BDS movement, see https://
bdsmovement.net/. In this context it is
important to expose the gap that is created
between Israeli Jews and Jews around the
world. In addition to theological differences
that can be outlined, Judaism can be seen
as a cultural identity, on the one hand, or
as an ethnicity in a nation-state. This means
that the experience of being a minority
and personifying cosmopolitanism are
deprived from Israelis who can no longer
occupy the historical position of the Jew,
but rather instrumentalize its history for
their purposes.

9 In a series of lectures on the neoliberal
condition at Goldsmiths, University of
London, in 2016, philosopher Michel Feher
portrayed a model of sovereignty that
operates following the logic of the
 corporation. See http://www.gold.ac.uk
visual-cultures/guest-lectures/.
bondholder is the shift of neoliberal sovereignty. Unlike the liberal scenario of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century politics, in which the site of politics takes place between government and citizens, neoliberal politics is concerned with the power relations between government and holders of the external debt. All governments are preoccupied with this matrix of power relations surrounding their external debt. The model here is Germany after Versailles.

Ensuring external investors that Israel is safe was the actual objective of the operation, not the safety of its citizens. Managing the conflict by excessive use of power, while signaling to a potential exit strategy, was the way this risk was managed. But the solution for potential investors is the problem for the citizens.

The realization that politics takes place between government and bondholders is shared also by boycott movements. These operate as activist-resignation movements, choosing withdrawal as political strategy. The BDS movement for example, does not have an Israeli addressee. It has already come to terms with the understanding that Israeli citizens cannot influence their government and change its policies. In this respect, the analysis of the BDS is extremely poignant and merciless. The BDS therefore aims to shame and intimidate potential investors and existing ones, so that they will pull their businesses out of Israel. This is supposed to cause the external debt to increase, downgrading Israel’s credit ratings and making the interest it pays for its debt to skyrocket. This, they feel, is the place where the Israeli government feels it needs to answer. This form of sanction touches neoliberal sovereignty where it really hurts. In this respect, the BDS is a form of neoliberal protest. It is an extreme symptom of post-Oslo Palestinian dependency on the international community, or better said, individuals with international stature. Because it is actually based on individual moral positions and not on a political project of strategizing new Jewish-Arab subjectivities, the BDS reflects the collapse not only of a Jewish-Arab common political project, but also a Palestinian project of solidarity.10

With this scheme of sovereignty and protest, the situation in Greece becomes the model for neoliberal activism. If only international economic and financial institutions would assume absolute control over the external debt of the country, like they have in Greece, then they could force their policies on this country from the outside. But if we apply the Greek predicament of neoliberal statehood to Israel, we might have an opposite effect than the one intended by the BDS movement. This is simply because any external debtor would want the occupation to continue. What makes Israel a special case is it being a war state, like the United States and Russia. Under this logic, its business is war, meaning that for Israel, the moneymaker is the occupation itself. The occupation is the safe investment. At the end, any solution based on this current economic condition is in itself a problem. Ultimately, the solution suggested by the call for BDS poses a problem similar to that of the Oslo accords—a series of agreements that benefited the settler movement, construction companies, ex-military officials, and big industrialists who were able to maintain their contracts with the Israeli military as they left Israel for cheaper labor in neighboring countries; all this at the expense of the Palestinian and Israeli working class.11 Being dependent more and more on its military industries, Israel is gradually becoming an economy that relies on one product—military technologies. These are the bedrock of Israel’s information industries.

The State of Bartleby

The Israeli Right has been so efficient with cracking down on opposition at home and abroad that its victory leaves it with no rivals. Now it has only enemies. The situation is such that for those wishing to act in solidarity with the Palestinians, there is no available project other than to join the call for a cultural and economic boycott on Israel. As a movement, the BDS relates to the activist line of engaging with politics. By that I mean that this is not an organization or a political movement, but a movement of individuals that acts directly under a project toward an aim. On the tactic level, this may prove to be efficient, but on a strategic level, as dialectics would have it, the outcome would be very different from the cause it aims at. This is not a revolution/counterrevolution scenario but rather a symptomatic condition to the direct-action mode of neoliberal political engagement. Being that there are objective conditions (resources, employment, judicial system, media, military, and so on), which the direct action has no control over, we see how time and time again the result of a tactical victory is a strategic defeat (be it in Israel, Egypt, or the Ukraine).

The Bartleby model of passive and non-conflictual resistance is offered by neoliberal protest through boycott. This form of withdrawal delineates political activism within patterns of individual consumerism. Interestingly enough, it is exactly the neoliberal state that has become a kind of a Bartlebian machine, which is to any request by its citizens replies with the same answer: “I would prefer not to.” In Israel, this Bartleby model has become a form of managing rhetoric that becomes associated with them as individuals. In the past, this kind of thinking was collectively deliberated and determined. But the way the abundance of voices maps onto the wider strategy of public engagement here has had the unintended consequence of crowding out collective work.12 See Mezna Qato and Kareem Rabie, “Against the Law,” Jacobin, no. 10 (Spring 2013): 75–78.

10 “Gone are the days when solidarity formations worked with Palestinian communities in the diaspora, the PLO, and kindred Palestinian political parties,” write Mezna Qato and Kareem Rabie. “Instead, and in part because there is no longer a Palestinian representative body,” they explain, “increasingly, the movement seems composed of constellations of well-known figures—academics, artists and poets, journalists, activists, and Twitterers—who generate thinking and

the conflicts that arise from the occupation. No annexation and no two states, no one-state solution, and no return to the 1967 ceasefire lines."

The logic of Bartleby, when applied by the war state, becomes a vicious and cruel mechanism of erasure. "Hamas is conducting massive self-genocide," said Naftali Bennett, Israeli Minister of Economy, to Wolf Blitzer on CNN (July 16, 2014). With Protective Edge, what Israel was proposing was again double erasure—it attempted to flatten and erase Gaza while erasing its responsibility for these actions. This corresponds with the cultural kernel of Israel as a state of displace refugees. Being Israeli entails erasing one's previous identity. Israel is not a migrant state—languages are silenced, the “old-country” becomes an enemy state, the birthplace is deep behind enemy lines. In a way, the only thing Israelis do have is erasure. And this is exactly what they force on the Palestinians. The Israeli project of Palestinian politicide involves exactly this double-erasure: first the refugees, and then the erasure of any Palestinian collective-political project. The pathologies caused by these multiple double-erasures abound.

Strategy and Apocalypse

"Having despaired of the world, of the fear, of the blood, the only refuge left to us was the earth. We buried ourselves alive," wrote Israeli-Palestinian playwright and theater director Amir Nizar Zuabi in an op-ed published in Haaretz during Protective Edge. Zuabi projected the reality of the tunnels in besieged Gaza onto the physical and mental experiences of Israelis and Palestinians. He finished the article with these words: "And an entire people will rise to the surface of the earth, pale and faded, blinded by the sun that beats down on the land. And we will stand in silence, waiting for our eyes to adjust to the light. And as we stand there in silence, the fear and anxiety will gradually creep into our heart, that while we were finding refuge in subterranean Gaza, the land above took its own life, was left behind and emptied out." He says that the process of erasure, therefore, not only has an effect on the Palestinians but also on the Israelis themselves.

In his investigation of the construction of enmity between Jews and Arabs, Gil Anidjar poses the question:

Beyond the horridly all too familiar and inescapable “cycle of violence,” what is it that maintains the distance and kindles the enmity between the Arab and the Jew? What purposes are served by, what are the reasons for, the naturalization of the opposition, of the enmity between Arab and Jew, one that, as prominent narratives would have us believe, goes back to ancient biblical times, the ineluctable legacy of “the Middle East,” a region and a land eternally ravaged by war and conflict? How did the ostensible markers of Arab (an “ethnic” marker) and Jew (a “religious” one) come to inscribe themselves so forcefully on modern discourses of the most varied kind—political, religious, cultural, and so forth—even when accompanying distinct or even opposed political agendas, caveats and sophisticated critiques and debunkings?"

From the British invasion of Palestine during World War I and their dissection operations of Jaffa during the Great Arab revolt, to the Italian bombing of Jaffa during World War II, to the 1948 Nakba and 1967 occupations, to the first and second US wars in Iraq, to the two Israeli wars in Lebanon, and to the recurring attacks on Gaza and the recent bombings of Syrian cities by Assad’s government, “ urbicide” is the term best applied to this century-long war against Arab urban life. This period of modernization and nation building in the region, is the era of imperialism. During this time, Arab urban life has been under an intensifying attack. One should recognize that within this also lies a theological meaning, especially with regard to the repeated bombing of Gaza by Israel.

13 The notion of self-inflicted tragedy on the side of the Palestinians is shared also by others from the Left as well. For example, Hakan Topal, who wrote: “Hamas knows that their stupid rockets do not provide any tactical advantage; nonetheless they fire them anyway. War, blood, and defeat is simply a show of force for Hamas. Its rockets do not carry any war heads. They are empty statements for the Palestinians themselves. Hamas promises a future without peace, a state without content, a religion without ethics.” Hakan Topal, “The Overlooked Besieged Alternative in the Middle East,” Public Seminar, October 13, 2014, http://www.publicseminar.org/2014/10/the-overlooked-besieged-alternative-in-the-middle-east/.
14 Israel’s ongoing armament with a fleet of nuclear submarines in recent years draws on remarkable historical trajectories. It has been reported that the German federal submarine subsidies to Israel settle a 1953 German-Israeli reparations agreement for $500 million for the crimes of the Nazis that had been attributed to East Germany in the agreement, but were never paid. After 1989, it was unified Germany who took upon itself to pay the sum attributed to the DDR with nuclear submarines, that have been supplied to Israel since the 1990s.
16 Gil Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), xiii. Anidjar extends on this enmity in a long footnote in which he provides a genealogy of the dichotomy. He explains that in Israel, nationality (“Arab” or “Jew”) is a category distinguished from citizenship (“Israeli”)—both Arab and Jew are divorced from religious meaning here and come to denote an ethnicity. Anidjar quotes Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin in saying: “Palestinian history and Palestinian national identity are part of the discussion of Zionist history, essential parts of the context of responsibility. The definition of Palestinian rights and the definition of Jewish rights are one and the same. This is the context of responsibility that Zionism has created […] A bi-national perspective leads to […] the definition of a common Jewish-Arab space.” In this context, we can say that the two communities already constitute the same society. See Anidjar, 163–64.
the Israeli nuclear project and subsequent policies are based—that is, a device is most effective when you do not use it. And so we are now faced with a possible devastating outcome of the condition of hyper-neutrality. Netanyahu’s continued threats to bomb Iran, together with the de facto annexation of Palestinian territories means that the only way Netanyahu and Israel are able to do any good is to not do anything at all.

Israeli theology scholar Ofri Ilany has claimed that the bombings of parts of the holy land by the state of Israel have become not only acceptable, but to some extent literally part of Israeli sovereignty. This new situation can testify to the ongoing political project of double-erasure through politicide and urbicide, but it also creates a skewing of historical time in relation to the political conflict; up until the 1990s, the mainstream project was basically focused on 1967 and that is what both the PLO and the Israeli “peace camp” were fighting for. Since the 2000s, the conflict expanded to 1948—this conceptualization is mainly identified with the Israeli Right and with Hamas politics. Now, through the operations of ISIS in Syria-Iraq, we are already returning to 1917, the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Parallel to this, mainstream Zionist reasoning leaves any pragmatic rationalization for its extensive use of violence (the Holocaust was one example used often in the past, and another was the claim that Israel is a tiny territory surrounded by enemies). Now it is almost official doctrine that the biblical divine promise of the holy land to the Israelites is the premise for the existence of the state of Israel and the reason for all its actions. With this, the land itself changes its function—the flattening of Gaza seems to literalize this new form of politics.

The disengagement plan and subsequent withdrawal from the Gaza settlements by Israel in 2005 were key moments where the two main Zionist camps of security reasoning (Holocaust), on the one hand, and of biblical reasoning (holy land) on the other, were confronted. In each camp there is a spectrum of ideas—the biblical one has on one side an anarchic strand that calls for freedom of religion, and on the other is a logic of full Israeli sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem. The security camp is promoting the logic of agreements and subcontracting of policing to the Palestinians but is not reluctant to use doomsday military technologies. The settlements and the Israeli nuclear project were supposed to achieve both camps’ worldviews. After the Israeli withdrawal in 2005, and once Hamas took over power in the Gaza strip, the balance of power within Zionist hegemony shifted. The events were proof that the biblical camp that divines promise also holds for security reasoning. Here we can see how someone like the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, performs the contradictions and tensions of the two camps and their extremes; the plan to use nuclear weapons against Iran and the de facto annexation of the occupied Palestinian territories and the speeches on annihilation and divine promise.

But Netanyahu is also a product of Cold War game-theory politics. This school of thought sees a lot of potential for maneuver within nonaction. That is the difference between George Bush senior and George Bush junior. One left Saddam Hussein in power and the other did not, unleashing a restructuring of power relations and violence in the Middle East that is yet to be contained in any foreseeable order. This game-theory school of thought is also the one on which 17 In this context, the US wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003) and the destruction of ancient Syrian cities since the civil war began in 2011, show an intensification of urbicide patterns throughout the region, patterns that seem to have begun parallel to the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf in 1911. 18 This point relates as well to the question of Talmudic diaspora Judaism versus biblical Israeli Judaism. 19 Abstraction of the actual land is one scenario. Another would conceive of the actual land as the object of worship for the Jews today. After the Israelites had to accept an abstract non-visual monotheistic divinity, the holy land became their object of worship. See for example: W.J.T. Mitchell, "Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness," Critical Inquiry 26, no. 2 (Winter, 2000): 193–223.
Literature


The one-hundred-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution of 1917 occurs in post-Soviet Russia in the crisis moment of its history. This crisis should be characterized not only as economic and social, but also as an ideological crisis of the ruling elite, which has no vision of the future, or any intent on aiding the social and political progress of the country. The lack of understanding by the ruling elite of its own place in history, as well as the deepening gap between those ruling on one side and the majority of people in Russian society on the other, is now covered by an imaginary continuity with the historical idea of “great Russia.” This type of history as an “eternal present,” without ruptures and contradictions, is one that always repeats itself—it became a pure form of this ideological crisis.

In January 2014 the world held its breath and observed the opening of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. The spectacular opening ceremony, “Dreams of Russia,” was not simply a technical triumph but also a marvel (a dream form) of national-history building. The depicted historical events acquired a certain mutual continuity, building a chain of bright and majestic images told through a vision dreamed by a young girl.

It must have been difficult for the modern Russian state to find a better form to invent its own place in history, one without any contradictions and conflicts, than the reconstruction of a dream. It is precisely in a dream space, which Freud called “the dream work,” that it is possible to realize the most cherished of repressed desires. The place of authentic history is taken up by an imagined history in which dreams form a “logical connection by approximation in time and space.” Freud compared the energy of dreams to an artist portraying all the poets who, in reality, had never been assembled together on the summit of Parnassus in a single group. The restless dream state in which slumbering Russian society continues to dwell remains the strongest substance with which the Putinist state connects the disparate, and successfully resolves the agonizing issue of its own legitimacy.

Indeed, it was precisely according to a Parnassus-like principle that the program of historical exhibitions of recent years have been constructed and organized by the combined forces of church and state, and in particular the exhibitions

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1 This text was commissioned and published in 2015 in WdW Review. See http://wdwreview.org/desks/the-russian-revolution-in-dreams-and-reality/. It has been slightly reedited for this book by the author.
2 This pessimistic view on perspectives of the Russian economy was confirmed by the experts, despite some small growth after the Russian financial crisis that was the result of the collapse of the Russian ruble beginning in the second half of 2014. See, for example, Pavel Koskin, “Why the Russian Economic Crisis Is Far from Over,” Russia Direct, January 17, 2017, http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/why-russian-economic-crisis-far-over.
devoted to the Romanov and Rurik dynasties. The series of exhibitions “Russia—My History” started in 2013 as the joint project of the Orthodox Church and the government of Moscow. “Russia—My History” includes several cycles of Russian history. The Rurik dynasty tells about the formation of the Russian state system, and the history of reign of one of the oldest dynasties in Europe, the Rurik (or Rurikids), which was founded by the Varangian prince Rurik, who established himself in Novgorod around the year AD 862. The Romanov dynasty shows all the vicissitudes of history that Russia passed through during the three-hundred-year reign of this royal family. The exhibition “The XX Century: From the Great Upheaval to a Great Victory, 1917–1945” contains the most important events of the twentieth century; the participation of the Russian empire in World War I, the events of the civil war, and periods of collectivization and industrialization as well as the victory and losses of the Russian people in World War II. In 2017 new multimedia exhibitions of the events of Russian political history from 1945 to the present were added. All of the exhibitions are presented today as part of the permanent pavilion in Moscow’s VDNH Park. These exhibitions are accompanied by quotes by Vladimir Putin, foreign affairs minister Sergey Lavrov, and Patriarch Kirill I.

Though they belong to different epochs and often find themselves antagonistic toward one another, they greet, in unison, the museumgoers rushing to an appointment with their own history. It is in this harmony, created by the fantasy of the Russian state, that the pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet epochs of Nikolai II, Stalin, and Putin, respectively, all rub shoulders. This imagined unity is bound by one thing only: the displacement of the revolution, a historical explosion that must be consigned to oblivion and have an anathema pronounced upon it. Countering the revolutionary threat in Russia is one of the pillars of the present reigning ideology, accompanied by a strategy of repressive work on the past that is trying to criminalize the 1917 events and remove it from actual social memory.

The displacement of the revolution acquires special significance in 2017 with the centenary of the second Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution was a pair of revolutions that dismantled the Tsarist autocracy and led to the eventual rise of the Soviet Union. The Russian Empire collapsed with the abdication of Emperor Nikolai II, and the old regime was replaced by a provisional government after the first revolution in February (March in the Gregorian calendar; the older Julian calendar was in use in Russia at the time). In the second revolution—the October Revolution (November in the Gregorian calendar)—the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, and the soviet workers overthrew the provisional government in Petrograd and established the Russian SFSR, eventually shifting the capital to Moscow in 1918. In December 2016 Putin especially stressed this in his annual address to the federal assembly (that consists of both houses of parliament). He pointed out that one of the main tasks of the coming year was the “objective evaluation” of the events of 1917 not just for historians but for the society as a whole. He stated that lessons should be learned—by which he meant that they need to find a way to ensure there would be no repetition of the revolution in the future. Vladimir Medinsky, who lays claim to the role of chief ideologue of the “historical policy” of the current regime, outlined the main points of these “lessons.”

They include recognition of the continuity of historical development from the Russian empire, through the USSR to contemporary Russia; recognition of the tragedy of social schism; understanding the error of relying on the help of foreign allies; and condemnation of the ideology of revolutionary terror. The culmination of this government program, according to Medinsky, should be the inauguration of a monument to the “reconciliation of the civil war” in Crimea. In Medinsky’s view, “a visible and powerful symbol erected where the civil war ended will be the best way to demonstrate that it really has ended.” In this construction, Crimea plays not just the role of the symbol of historical integrity, but a central element of the actual identity between the government and the people. After the events of 2014, the political climate in Russia has been designed as the “Crimean consensus,” where questions regarding annexation are approved by all political and social groups. Those who are not ready to justify this action are proclaimed in the media as “national traitors” and expelled from the healthy body of the nation.

So the main lesson that society, in accordance with this plan, should draw on is not only that the revolution was terrible but also that it was superfluous. It turns out that the 1917 revolution had no constitutive meaning (even though one pays one’s dues by mourning its unnecessary sacrifices); it was not the end of an old era and the beginning of a new one, because “fortunately” both eras are united in the logic of the existing state whose monument will be the reconciling “Parnassus” of Crimea.

In this way, the “objective evaluation” that Putin expects from historians comes down to proving that the revolution was the result of a foreign conspiracy.
and the extremist ideology of a bunch of malefactors. It is already clear that the old myth that financial support from the German general staff was the main reason for the Bolsheviks’ success is once again gaining power. Among historians, Boris Mironov, a professor from Saint Petersburg University, stands out. In his sweeping work *The Standard of Living and Revolutions in Russia 1700–1917*, aided by a massive quantity of anthropometric data, he attempts to prove that the weight, height, and quantity of calories consumed by the majority of the population in prerevolutionary Russia was inexorably rising.4

According to Mironov, even World War I did not prevent the Russian peasants from enjoying their abundant diet. Poverty and the exploitation of peasants in the Russian empire are part of a myth that implies the revolution was nothing other than the result of the active role of “Russian radicals.” Mironov constitutes a particularly impressive example of how a vulgar materialist analysis can be successfully combined with an equally vulgar conspiracy theory. The revolution took place only because the conspirers were not rendered harmless in time. So the “lesson” of the revolution is intended, first of all, for the police. Again returning to Freud, one can compare it to the “censorship” function of the dream, a function that includes a repressive crackdown on any sanctioned interventions of the unconscious.” Freud says that “dreams are the removal of disturbing stimuli by way of hallucinated satisfaction.”5

Before us is a new model, striking in its coherence and base nature, of the “normalization” of the revolution with which Russia will greet its centenary. Outside the limits of this model, there is nothing but a tinkling of tacit approval. The liberal opposition, for all its hatred of the existing regime, is remarkably ready to accept this version of events: one must liberate oneself from the revolution. Such liberation from the revolutionary legacy is seen by the Russian liberals as a necessary part of the program of “de-Sovietization,” which proposes the dismantling of “Soviet” institutions and monuments symbolizing revolutionary violence against citizens.

The functionaries of the Russian Communist Party (KPRF), who almost vanished from the public sphere, are also ready to accept the lessons of the revolution proposed by Putin and Minister Medinsky. If liberals choose to disavow the revolution and also display a willingness to demolish statues, then the communists choose to preserve monuments while renouncing revolution. Buried alive in the monuments and symbols of the Brezhnev era, and being presently entirely devoid of political meaning, the memory of the revolution morphs into an organic, seamless part of the conservative, anti-revolutionary, ruling-class project in Russia.6 This emerging consensus of consigning anything reminiscent of the revolution to oblivion is connected with the displacement of politics in contemporary Russia.

In *Echoes of the Marseillaise* (1990), Eric Hobsbawm presents a substantial picture of the transformation of interpretations of the French Revolution in the subsequent two centuries. The great revolution of the eighteenth century remained an incomplete project, but its significance and meaning was constantly subject to redefinition while still remaining at the center of political discussion and of utmost significance at each new historical turning point. According to Hobsbawm, “In the year of its bi-centenary the French Revolution was no jolly old holiday at which millions of tourists gathered […] for it represented a set of events so powerful and universal in their influence that they had transformed the world in many ways and roused […] forces which continue this work of transformation.”7

These “roused forces” that revealed new elements of the revolutionary legacy, became manifest in the uprisings of the nineteenth century and the Paris Commune, in the struggles of the communists in the 1920s, the resistance during World War II, and the students protests in May 1968.8

The recognition of the French Revolution during each of these periods was in constant flux but nevertheless remained a territory within which one could continually reevaluate the main protagonists and parties. Yet there was an unchanged appreciation that this was a large-scale event after which nothing could remain as it was before. The revolution remained on its path as memory, preventing society from falling into slumber, time and again marking points of discord, and thus creating obstacles to the installation of any post-political consensus. Toward the end of the 1980s, when French intellectuals registered the crisis of mass movements, traditional political parties, and the devaluation of political meaning, “the fidelity to the event” (in the words of Alain Badiou) of universal revolutions9—both the French and the Russian—remained a constant horizon of hope that history would continue on its path and that the sacrifices had not been in vain.

11 A law for the de-Sovietization of Ukraine in 2016 is such a case. Soviet names of cities and towns were removed and changed.
12 A large number of existing “revolutionary” monuments from the Soviet time were established during Brezhnev’s period of zastoi (“stagnation”), especially in the time from 1967 (on the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution) and in 1971 (on the one hundredth anniversary of Lenin’s birth).
14 The volatile period of civil unrest in France during May 1968 was punctuated by demonstrations and massive general strikes as well as with the occupation of universities and factories across the country.
Today in Russia the sense of ideological deadlock and a deep political crisis are felt more acutely, dramatically, and with greater pessimism than in France on the eve of the bicentennial celebration of the French Revolution in 1989. The desire to bury the revolution by erecting a preposterous monument of “reconciliation” on its tomb is a desire sealed by fear. An attempt is being made to persuade us that violence and terror are the only results when society reawakens, and is, in fact, the main lesson we are all obliged to learn from the revolution. Yet what happened in 1917 is already impossible to expunge, not only from the past but also from the future. Revolutionary events, anathematized or hidden under lock and key, probably have not yet had the moment when they can be revealed and grasped.

Translated from the Russian by Giuliano Vivaldi

Literature


The commemorative year 2014 was an occasion for some EU member states to carry out a major European commemoration to mark the one hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the World War I, in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. For a moment, in the summer of 2014, Sarajevo was brought into focus by the mass media and internationally. The commemoration was organized as a multidisciplinary festival that included a number of cultural, sporting, educational, and scientific events, all presented under the same banner: “Sarajevo, Heart of Europe.”

This title was given to Sarajevo by EU states that wanted to present the city as suddenly being in the center of European concerns and emotions, even though this is not the case. In fact, the EU despises Sarajevo, not only because the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie on June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo (the capital of the Austro-Hungarian province of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time), is considered to have sparked the World War I, but also because Sarajevo is today seen as a kind of the retrograde post-socialist Islamic center (rather than as the “Jerusalem of Europe,” which was the case before the 1990s). Naming it the heart of Europe is paradoxical given the fact that this region has been completely abandoned by the European Union. It was abandoned during the horrendous war in the 1990s (where Sarajevo was under siege for the longest time in modern history, and where some of the worst crimes were committed against humanity throughout the country, with mass executions and genocide in UN safe zones, as seen with the Srebrenica’s genocide, among others). The city is abandoned today, left to poverty and misery produced by the regime in power. Sarajevo, “the heart,” is actually seen by former imperial and colonial forces as a kind of a ticking emotional bomb.

My analysis aims to unpack these celebrations from the perspective of those who have been silenced and erased from the picture. I want to contextualize these memorial events in relation to necropolitics, tactics of de-historicization, and of humanitarianism. I want to reconsider what is the social, economic, and political reality of Sarajevo today. I argue that this reality is a reality of pure abandonment of the city and Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EU to the extent that it is possible to state that the proclamation of Sarajevo as a heart is rather that of a “rotten heart.” Necropolitical reality is the reality of Sarajevo today.

My main argument is that the dominant and systematic de-contextualization, de-historicization, and de-politicization of persistent racializations of the region and the current historical revisionism of remembrance, or, rather its
erasure, are in service of the normalization of death, of necropoliticals, that works along the ongoing coloniality and growing fascistic politics that are all central to global neoliberal governmentality and Europe today.

Relating Politics of Visibility to the Coloniality of Power, Capitalism, Necropolitics, Tactics of De-historicization, and Humanitarianism

To understand the politics of in/visibility of Sarajevo and the whole region we need to analyze and contextualize it in relation to the coloniality of power and current forms of capitalism, and their tactics and strategies of discrimination that are de-historicization and humanitarianism.

The concept of coloniality of power articulates the interrelation among modern forms of exploitation and domination (of power). Coloniality identifies and describes the living legacy of colonialism in contemporary settings that has survived formal colonialism and became integrated in succeeding political and social orders (defining culture, labor, nature, gender, subjectivities, and knowledge production, too). As Aníbal Quijano articulates it, coloniality as a Eurocentric project is based on the (inferior/superior) racial classifications of world populations (into ranks, places, and roles in society’s structure of power), where the idea of race is a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination that are being imposed. In Quijano’s words, “The model of power that is hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality,” and this is closely related to the coloniality of knowledge that refers to the practice of holding Western concepts as universal (a process that is closely related to the constitution and the elaboration of European modernity/rationality). In short, as Quijano argues, the intellectual concept of the process of modernity, which produced Eurocentrism as “a perspective and concrete mode of producing knowledge,” was made globally hegemonic, colonizing and overcoming previous or different knowledge, and “gives a very tight account of the character of the global model of power: colonial/modern, capitalist, and Eurocentered.”

Humanitarianism enters the discussion to maintain an illusion of social care and to enable the maintenance of hierarchy on a global scale. It establishes, or more precisely maintains, an asymmetry and inequality of positions—of those (weaker) who are determined to receive and those (powerful) who are intervening and acting since they are “obliged” to provide assistance and give (life or death). In contemporary settings, humanitarianism intensifies necropoliticals, when governing over death becomes one of the main governmental activities of neoliberal global capitalism.

In the context of ex-Yugoslav countries, these tendencies, together with the brutal and systematic de-historicization (on which Marina Gržinić, Boris Buden, and Rastko Močnik have written extensively) and the ideology of transitology (presented as process of “normalization” of the violent suspension of socialism and introduction of bloody neoliberal capitalism in the 1990s) are functions of neo-colonialism (which occurs under the mask of a democratization of former as it is named totalitarian Eastern European countries).

Practices of othering are deeply interwoven with the logic of the ideology of transitology (that I described in the previous paragraph as “normalization” of the violent suspension of socialism and introduction of bloody neoliberal capitalism in the 1990s). Those who accept the standards of modern development (fast modernization that includes a thorough implementation of neoliberal global capitalism) are seen as “normal” post-socialist or former Eastern European states. All the others that failed for different reasons to quickly embrace hyper-economic rationalism are seen as supposedly underdeveloped and therefore (historically, politically, culturally) “abnormal.” Within the narrative of transition, the fate of ex-socialist and ex-communist societies in such discourse is that they will always be perceived as outdated, backward, always at loss (losers), sometimes even as a failed state (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina), not only in terms of politics but also culturally. The same applies to ex-colonial states. Each of these societies is considered to take on the role of the loser, desperately trying to catch up with the West.

Systematic de-historicization is a strategy used in the case of so-called countries in transition. Transition failed because it was never supposed to succeed, but in that process we have forgotten from where we started. By “evacuating memory,” neoliberal capitalist governmentality prepared ground for the necessary humanitarian action of normalization and the transnational capital.

As Agamben, Gržinić, Buden, and Močnik have recognized, former Yugoslavia...
in the 1990s was the “bloody messenger of the new nomos of the Earth.””
Already for this reason, it is important to look at what is happening in the country now, and what role the politics and cultures of remembrance play in it. Also, how did Europe commemorate the centenary in Sarajevo and what does this tell us?

“Sarajevo, Heart of Europe”

I argue that practices and forms of knowledge production and of visibility linked to the memorial events in Sarajevo are in the service of de-contextualization, de-historicization, and de-politicization that are at the core of current neoliberal governmentality.

Although some European countries have organized programs of commemoration, and virtual memorizations (the construction of virtual environments for educational purposes on memory) of the centenary of the World War I were launched in their countries, the idea of a common European commemoration in some European capitals was not welcomed (if we exclude summits of EU heads of state and government). However, it appears that some EU member states were willing to carry out the first major common commemoration to mark the one hundredth anniversary of the start of World War I and the “end to a century of war” in Sarajevo—the city that brings to mind the outbreak of the World War I. This included the establishment of the special foundation called “Sarajevo, Heart of Europe,” by the French Mission du Centenaire, joined in 2013 by six other EU member states (Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Spain, Belgium, and Italy) and the city of Sarajevo, to organize various cultural, sport, and educational programs within this framework to commemorate a century of European history. As the initiators explained, it was Europe’s duty to speak up and deliver a message of solidarity, peace, and reconciliation one hundred years later."

These European countries have been working together to place Sarajevo once again at the center of European concerns. Sarajevo, Heart of Europe, was organized as a multidisciplinary festival, included a number of events. A huge number of exhibitions, movies, and large-scale performances were produced to transmit the above-mentioned message and to reflect on this past."

Apart from this European program, there were also a number of other cultural projects and interventions. For example, some movies were produced that reflected on the assassination and on the commemoration by reputable directors. Also, there were a huge number of other Austro-Bosnian initiatives and local and international exhibitions that dealt with these topics. Included exhibitions of art and design, but also the display of archival materials, and so forth. It seems that everyone had something to say about the assassination, the war, and the centenary. Actually, this was also an opportunity for a number of cultural institutions and individual artists to receive some money to put toward their work—mostly from European, but also (although small) from local funds. This does not apply only to the local scene. A number of international institutions and individuals produced and presented their artworks for the centenary as well.

Two central commemorative events, with EU funding, were held in Sarajevo on June 28, 2014. These were: a concert by the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra and the huge epic spectacle titled “A Century of Peace after the Century of Wars.” Both events were produced to mark the end of a century of war, to optimistically and naively conclude that the worst is behind us, and to send a message of peace, love, and solidarity to the world.

Concert by Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra at Vijećnica

The major event was held at Vijećnica, the former city hall and national library that was built during the Austro-Hungarian rule, but destroyed during the siege of Sarajevo in 1992. Vijećnica has been renovated in stages over the past fifteen years, funded by donations from several European countries and the European Commission. On June 28, 2014, Vijećnica was again symbolically opened, but this time to bring together the diplomatic core and the ruling elite, as part of an event that was organized to mark this centenary. As a matter of fact, there were several official openings of this building (inaugurated on Europe Day, May 9, 2014, and it was opened for general public on July 17, 2014, without any special significance of the chosen date).

12 These include: the Sarajevo Grand Prix, under the patronage of the Tour de France; exhibitions: “Share—Too Much History, More Future,” “Human Dignity,” “Never Ending Stories,” “Preview O2S14: Outsourcing to Sarajevo,” “Resonance: From the Chemin des Dames to Sarajevo,” “Images of a Lost World: Pictures and Stories of Balkan Sephiad Life,” “Connecting Museums—A Shared History,” “Through Their Eyes,” “Carnivaling for Peace,” “Making Peace”; theater plays: Hotel Europe, Connecting Theatre—Bolero; omnibus “The Bridges of Sarajevo,” and the film program “Connecting Film”; concerts: “Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio in Concert,” “Three Cultures,” “Alta Voce Concert;” and other events such as special one-day live broadcast by France Inter and France Culture, etc. See centenaire.org/sites/default/files/references-files/dp_sarajevo_en_version_bd.pdf.
13 For example, the film Death in Sarajevo (director: Danis Tanović; writers: Bernard-Henry Lévy and Tanović, 2016); and the collective documentary One Day in Sarajevo (director: Jasmina Żbanić, 2015).
The program of the concert by the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra was “European,” and included pieces by famous Austrian, German, and French composers, followed by the EU anthem and anthem of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The direct enjoyment of the concert was reserved for elites (more international and less local), while the local population was left on, on the other side of the river bank, to enjoy it on an outdoor screen (or eventually watch it on TV) that was installed in a parking lot. Thus, at a safe distance from the elite. The concert was broadcast by the European Broadcast Union, directly to European audiences as well.

Although, the nature of these events was confusing because it was not clear if we were celebrating or mourning something, or how we were to deal with this past, the message from Vijecnica, the symbol of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia, was clear. What was celebrated and promoted at Vijecnica was the cultural superiority and survival of the so-called European values and European identity.

The values often referred to as distinctly European are: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, solidarity, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities. However, as we can see in the past and present, these values are reserved only for some forms of life and some Europeans. In reality, discourse on European values (as a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, and experience) is employed in order to reproduce the differences between us and them, and is employed in the racialization of the Other (which is represented in terms of unpleasant cultural differences that are condemned as being harmful for the so-called European values). Such discourse is the foundation of the project that erases the whole history of European colonial dominance in the world, as well as the links to racism, fascism, and capitalism within it.

It should also be mentioned that among a huge number of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—there is a perception that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was on a civilizing mission, and that the EU continues that mission today. There is a kind of a “mourning” linked to the fantasy that we would have been much better, would have been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Europe), if we had stayed under their rule.

Between the lines of this colonial narrative on the civilizing mission of this central event, there was a promise that maybe one day, although it seems so impossible, this region would join Europe, would be recognized not as “junk” or “barbarian,” but as a part of this elite club too. However, this integrating, civilization process is not expected to go through critical re-articulation of the past and present. Capital is supposed to civilize us/them.

“A Century of Peace after the Century of Wars”

Apart from this event, the EU has also thought of the “folk” in Sarajevo and has invested one million euros in the epic spectacle for the broad masses of people called “A Century of Peace after the Century of Wars,” held a few hundred meters from Vijecnica at the bridge next to the place where Gavrilo Princip (a young Bosnian Serb) assassinated Franz Ferdinand and his wife on June 28, 1914. The bridge is today called Latin Bridge, although from 1918 to 1992 it was named Princip’s Bridge.

At the site of assassination, there is a museum called the Sarajevo Museum 1878–1918, and it displays what Sarajevo was like during the Austro-Hungarian period (also its presentation stresses the “civilizing mission” of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Sarajevo’s development).16 Prior to that the museum was called the Museum “Mlada Bosna” (named after the organization to which Princip belonged), and the narrative of the museum was different. In front of the museum, from 1956 to 1992, there were the plaque and footprints marking the exact spot from where Princip fired his shots. Written on the plaque was the following: “From this place, on 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, expressed with his shot the people’s revolt against tyranny and their centuries-old struggle for freedom.” At beginning of the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, the plaque and the footprints were removed by authorities in Sarajevo. In front of the museum today there is a new plaque with a text that doesn’t include previous “ideological” messages.

In 2014, from this very site, the message that had to be sent was that after a century of war, it was time for a century of peace (with the idea that the worst is behind us) and that should now celebrate peace and love. The public who were targeted for this event was local. It had to be epic and spectacular, with a clear and unquestionable message—that of peace and love from Bosnia to the rest of the world.

It was a grand, multidisciplinary open-air show combining dance, music, theater, and video, bringing together more than two hundred artists from nine countries. This one-hour-long show, directed by local, well-known director Haris Pašović. Based on the common theme of war songs that spanned the century, it addressed the wars of the twentieth century through three acts: 1) before 14 The concert program by the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra (conducted by Franz Wesler-Möst) was as follows: Joseph Haydn, Emperor String Quartet, variations on a national anthem; Franz Schubert, Symphony, no. 7 in B minor, D759; Alban Berg, Three Pieces for Orchestra, op. 6; Johannes Brahms, Schicksalslied for Choir and Orchestra, op. 54; and Maurice Ravel, La Valse.

15 It was coproduced by the East West Center and the Mission du Centenaire.

the war; 2) during the war; 3) an ode to life. Lyrics and imagery were a total mix of everything and anything: local and international poets, French chansons, Turkish songs, Greek mythology, a Russian Cossack choir, Dalmatian Klapa singing, black angels, Auschwitz camp detainees, and even a film that shows the delivery of twin babies—all of this was mixed up to send a message that tolerance and life are beautiful, in contrast to war that is grotesque and awful. Finally, this pathetic and empty spectacle concluded with songs and reunions of the Serbian and Bosnian pop-folk stars Šaban Šaulić (singing a song “Vjerujem u ljubav” [I believe in love]) and Dino Merlin (singing “Je li Saraj’vo gdje je nekad bilo” [Is Sarajevo where it once was]), accompanied by a huge shining heart rising over the bridge where the spectacle took place. Both events were organized to obscure the local disputes and the European silence over the past and present of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The assassination, which has been presented as the event that triggered World War I, is a subject of antagonism and dispute in Bosnia (just as other historical events and their legacies that dominate the sphere of public remembrance and have different interpretations (e.g., the 1992–95 war and World War II). Although narratives about the role of Princip were less disputed before the 1990s, today they are replaced with new and diverse ethno-national interpretations. These ambiguities show that culture is in the center of identity politics and struggles. Huge ethno-nationalist efforts have been invested to control national narratives and the culture of remembrance through continuous historical revisionism and controlled memorization by right-wing regimes since the 90s. Simultaneously, the concept of the culture of remembrance, as related to the idea of truth and reconciliation, was promoted as integrative aspect of the “transitional justice” in the process of the so-called normalization of transitional societies.

However, today, in line with the process of de-historicization, new politics and cultures of ignorance actually aspire to liberate our societies from history in order to clear the pathway for capitalism’s profit. This tendency is linked to the new idea that reconciliation is achievable if we forget the past and focus on economic development. In fact, who needs transitional justice and truth anymore, since these chapters are closed and these societies are now integrated in global capitalism?

It should be stressed that while disputes over Gavrilo Princip in the local community are presented as related to the question of national awareness, in the current form of capitalism, in this shift from nation-state to war state, sovereignty has changed too. Bosnia is a country where sovereign power of the so-called international community is institutionalized in the figure and the office of the High Representative and the Peace Implementation Council, who have the rights and the power to intervene (or not) and govern as they wish, no matter what is the will of the people. The council only takes into account what benefits global neoliberal capitalism, regardless of what will happen with the local community, the people, and their lives.

What Was Evacuated from and to Sarajevo in 2014 and Why?

As remembrance is always a matter of political struggles, it is important to look at which perspectives and narratives were excluded in 2014. What was erased and silenced in Sarajevo in 2014?

I can state that in the last few years, ethno-nationalistic ideology and neoliberal capitalism have taken over all of the social, political, and economic reality in Bosnia. Therefore in the summer of 2014, we were not supposed to question the system and what the transition and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina took from us. Much was “forgotten” while remembering the outbreak of World War I. In fact, a few months prior to these “spectacles” in February 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina (including Sarajevo) was at the center of the world’s attention because of the wave of the biggest social uprisings in the postwar period. Furthermore, in mid-May 2014 (thus, two months prior to these spectacles), huge floods devastated a major part of the country and once again confirmed that citizens were totally abandoned—all of that had to be erased. What was on stage was necropolitics.

Although it would be important to critically reflect on the similarities and differences between 1914 and 2014, on changing sovereignty, and new/old orders, such critical reflections were far away from the spectacles of the EU regime of power. We have to remind ourselves that in 2014, the Mediterranean was already a huge mass grave for refugees and migrants trying to reach Europe—the Europe that denies colonialism as being the cause of the production of the so-called refugee crisis, while, at the same time, messages of love, solidarity, and peace were being sent from Sarajevo by the organizers of the celebration, which means they were also being sent by Austria and the EU. The result was that discussions on the crisis of Europe, on the legacies of colonialism, racism, the past, and current fascisms were silenced.

(Dis)placement of the Rotten Heart of Europe

Although Europe has invested huge efforts to present racist politics, conflicts, and fundamentalism as categories that do not belong to its heritage today, its treatment of refugees clearly shows that the idea of racist and fascistic superiority of Europeans and of European culture, and of “pure” Europe, is not only alive but is actually institutionalized—through official representatives and poli-
cies. What continues to be ignored is the fact that just as the historical fascism was closely related to the capitalism in the previous century (and the colonial past), contemporary fascistic politics are directly related to the current state of capitalism and its coloniality of power. Actually, there are much more similarities between historical fascism and our contemporary fascism than Europe is currently willing to recognize. Although fascism in different societies has its specificities, its major task has been to grow and secure national capitalism (from inner and/or outer enemies). Furthermore, racism and fascistic politics are now uniting Fortress Europe under a “war on migrants” in order to protect its purity, capital, and the current order of things.

A common European past was not recalled in Vienna, Berlin, or some other European cities, but in Sarajevo—the capital of the “failed state” and the heart of “wild and bloody Balkans”—thus, far enough from the European center. Sarajevo is a perfect site, if we want to close our eyes to the rise of racism, fascism, and the legacies of colonialism all around Europe and the world. Ironically, Sarajevo was proclaimed the heart of Europe but it was not named the European Capital of Culture (the EU explained that a city whose state is not an EU member cannot be named the European Capital of Culture). It was just not possible to name it “European” or a “cultural capital” because that would be too much.

Therefore, the metaphor of the heart was more appropriate, suggesting that Sarajevo is part of Europe, actually its most important part, though still not European enough. Furthermore, the heart inside the Western tradition relates to emotions, and this might also suggest that Sarajevo is a big pot of emotions (or rather an emotional bomb, as the sovereign power sees it through colonial lenses). The true nature of the European “concern” for Sarajevo (being at/in the heart of Europe) was again revealed two days after the closing of the major commemoration; what remained after the mass media, the EU elite, international diplomats, intellectuals, and international artists had left was a void and silence.

What is obviously in crisis are the so-called European values and democracy (reserved for Europeans only, or rather for some forms of life) that depart from the racist presumption of the European cultural superiority. Racism is at the heart of Europe and its policies. Actually, it is exactly the fascistoide politics toward migrants and the Other that are reuniting Europe today.

Instead of these de-contextualizing cultural projects and spectacles that participate in silencing the relation between necropolitics and current practices of visibility, the living legacies of coloniality, erasure of memory, and of our contemporary horror, we desperately need practices and “new visibilities” (Gržinić) that will contextualize and politicize all that has been swept under the carpet of the so-called culture of remembrance.

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**Literature**


Hiroshima, Fukushima, and Beyond Borders and Transgressions in Nuclear Imagination

Hiroshi Yoshioka

What I attempt to do in this essay is to focus on several different images and narratives related to nuclear power, radiation, explosion, and nuclear disasters in the context of postwar Japan. They include visions inspired by atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the diffusion of a legend hiding a possible atomic bombing, and images representing both the hopes and fears about nuclear experiments and construction of nuclear power plants during the period of postwar economic growth after the 1950s. And today we find various images and narratives related to the Fukushima nuclear crisis caused by the earthquake and tsunami in 2011.

My argument is not so much about nuclear issues but about the domain of imagination and fantasy, which I believe is as important as the real politics. Many people in Japan in the 1950s who longed for industrial development were convinced that nuclear power would be okay because it would be used for peaceful purposes and because experts assured it was technically safe, although they were all still haunted by nightmarish memories of the nuclear attacks exerted on the nation only a decade before. Their mind was, in a way, split into two totally different perceptions of nuclear power. We can say a kind of psychological “border” was set in people’s mind, a border dividing the “good” nuclear energy from the “bad” one. In the realm of imagination, however, this border is sometimes transgressed in unexpected ways, and we find such transgressions in images in popular culture as well as in works of art.

Earlier Representation of Hiroshima in Art and Popular Culture

Images of nuclear power are found in a large number of artworks such as paintings and novels, as well as in works in popular culture such as comics (manga), animation, films, and many other forms. Since it is not my intention here to list all of them, I would like to mention only a few that represent Hiroshima in a strong and direct way, and have more or less determined which dominant images and narratives about Hiroshima exist today.

The Hiroshima Panels by Iri and Toshi Maruki is perhaps one of the most well-known paintings depicting the horrifying consequences of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The artists had started to work on it in 1950 and completed it in 1982, over a period of thirty-two years. They used the Japanese painting style called nihonga, and the work has the format of folding panels, a traditional form for Japanese painting. The work belongs to the Maruki Gallery in Saitama Prefecture, which was established in 1967 to house this piece that, at the time, was still in progress.
The A-bomb victims depicted in the panels not only include Japanese citizens but also Koreans and Americans (who were war prisoners), and the panels also represent scenes from the nuclear contamination of the Daigo Fukuryū Maru. Images depicted in the panels give the viewer such strong emotional effects that he or she can hardly think quietly, but the main intention of the work is not to blame the decision of the United States to drop atomic bombs, but to show the truly hellish outcomes caused by nuclear explosions, no matter whether they were attacks or accidents. The core message of this work is a universal one: the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

We find that the work has the style of Jigoku-e (vision of hell), a traditional genre of painting that depicts torments in the Jigoku, or hell, the lowest world in Buddhist cosmology where sinners are supposed to go after death. We understand that the unspeakable agony following atomic bombings was represented as an updated version of a genre in the traditional Buddhist painting because it was perhaps the best way to make images be understood by a wider public. In so doing, however, it may have weakened its historical aspect. By presenting images as a modern Jigoku-e, it may look as though atomic bombings were a universal punishment on human beings for their sins, instead of an atrocity that happened at a particular historical time under particular political conditions.

Perhaps a more widely known work describing Hiroshima after the bombing is neither a painting nor a novel but a manga. It is a comic book titled Hadashi no Gen (Barefoot Gen) written by Keiji Nakazawa (1939–2012), who experienced the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, which killed his father and his brother.

The work can easily be read by readers of all ages because of its manga format, and it is regarded as one of the anti-war classics of the genre. At the same time, it sometimes stirs up political controversies because of its direct expressions. Recently, there was a case in which the education board in a local city of Matsue (Shimane Prefecture) decided to remove these comics from an open-shelf area in the library of public elementary and junior high schools in the city because it was thought the comics contained inappropriate language and that the images were too graphic for young pupils. The comics also depicted a barbaric mass murder committed by the Japanese army, and the characters call the Emperor Shōwa a “murderer” because the war fought under his name finally led to the atomic bombings.

The paintings by Iri and in Yoshi Maruki and the story comics by Nakazawa, like many other earlier works on the subject of Hiroshima, contain harsh accusations of the cruelty of the atomic bombings. Most of these works are done by victims (like Nakazawa) or by first-hand witnesses (like Maruki). Their expressions are so direct and strong that many viewers cannot help but cry. On the other hand, we should note that these works have not always been treated in the same way as other paintings or manga. They are regarded as something special because of their direct relation to the subject, and this has sometimes kept general audiences away. What I mean by the expression “nuclear imagination” is not only related to works such as these but to the much wider range of works and cultural images reaching a greater number of people, where imagination about nuclear issues sometimes functions in an unconscious way.

“Nuclear Imagination”

One of the reasons I think it is significant to focus on imagination in relation to nuclear issues is that it could allow more people to join in the discussion. Discussing nuclear issues requires quite a lot of technical knowledge. However, regardless of how and what we imagine about nuclear energy, many of us feel we have something to say about it. I believe this is also a crucial part of discussions about nuclear issues.

In seventeenth-century Europe, scientific thinking originally meant democratic thinking—thinking independently from religious authorities. But in the age of the industrial revolution, with specialization of scientific knowledge, science itself often functions as an authority, and is often used by political leaders to coerce people into remaining silent. That is what happened in the period when nuclear power plants were first introduced in Japan in 1960s. Those who feared nuclear energy by naturally associating it with the atomic catastrophe were denounced as outdated and unscientific. Experts against the construction of nuclear power plants were labeled radical leftists. Both were regarded as obstructing economic growth, which was at the top of the agenda of postwar Japan.

This is why I find it very important to focus on collectively shared images and narratives. Imagination is the faculty that allows us to integrate fragmented perceptions and pieces of knowledge into a single, widely shared symbol, image, or figure. Such a figure often shows ambiguity, containing contradictory

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1 This is the name of the Japanese fishing boat exposed to fallout from the nuclear weapon experiment by the United States at Bikini Atoll, in 1954.
2 In ancient times, Jigoku-e was often used to teach illiterate people not to commit a sin by showing how they would be tormented after death.
3 I should add that manga is a form of popular art quite common in Japan, which is read by all generations. To some extent it can be regarded as equivalent to film in Western cultures.
feels in it such as hope and fear, attraction and disgust, or inclusion and alienation. It is also amazing to see how people invent and spread alternative stories and legends as a sort of psychological defense to avoid facing a nuclear menace, which can be considered as the other side of nuclear imagination.

A-Bomb on Kyoto

1 Legend of Protection

Kyoto is one of the most popular historical cities in Japan where you find a lot of old temples, Shinto shrines, and other historical buildings. One of the reasons that the city has been preserved with all these cultural heritages, most of which are built of wood, is the fact that there were fewer air raids by the US forces in the last months of the Pacific War (1945–52). The city did experience some air raids but they were on a much smaller scale compared to those in other major cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. In spite of its vulnerability, Kyoto somehow survived the furious attacks from shell bombs that destroyed most of the big Japanese cities.

It is hard to believe Kyoto was just lucky. There is a popular explanation why the city was not attacked in the same way as Tokyo or Osaka. I am from Kyoto and as a child I heard the story told by many adults, including my family, school teachers, people on TV, and so on. The story says that the United States refrained from attacking Kyoto because of its historical importance. They valued culture in Kyoto and wanted to keep it, even in time of war. I believed this story that was told by my elders very seriously and very often. Some told the story in a cynical way, saying that though it was culture, not people, that America intended to save; we survived anyway because of their decision. This story planted a feeling of gratitude toward the United States for having exempted the city from destruction. To give a little more detail, the story tells of a particular American scholar, Dr. Langdon Warner, who proposed that people working in the headquarters of the US army not to bomb Kyoto. We actually find monuments honoring Warner for this in several places in Japan.

According to the historian Morio Yoshida, however, there had existed rumors even before the end of the war that America would not attack Kyoto and other historical cities because of their cultural importance. It is surprising to know that Japanese people somehow believed in the kindness of their enemy they were supposed to hate and who saw them as “brutal savages.” It was shortly after the war when the story about Warner started being publicly mentioned in major newspapers, and it came to be known to many people in Japan. In my childhood, in the 1960s, it seemed to be one of the standard popular stories about Kyoto.

2 Kyoto as an A-Bomb Target

In the 1990s, when people in the United States were allowed access to secret information about the Pacific War, it became clear that Kyoto was one of the primary targets of the atomic bombing. I was really shocked when I first saw the planned center of explosion on a map, because it was only three kilometers from my mother’s house. Yoshida argues there were several reasons for choosing Kyoto. From a geographic point of view, Kyoto is a basin surrounded by hills. That means the attack would be more effective because the radioactive air produced by an A-bomb would stay longer. It would be psychologically effective, too, as the city is the old imperial capital of Japan and was thought by many as a symbol of Japanese culture. Finally, there lived a number of intellectuals who could scientifically estimate the overwhelming power of the bomb and persuade the government to surrender.

This is the true reason for fewer air raids in Kyoto. Just like Kyoto, the city of Hiroshima also had fewer air raids before the atomic bombing. We now know from the documents that the US war office ordered not to attack A-bomb target cities with normal bombing because it would make it hard to measure the exact destruction caused by the atomic bomb itself. This is how Kyoto was saved.

Why, then, did they finally choose Hiroshima and Nagasaki instead of Kyoto? The reason is related to one of the reasons why they originally picked Kyoto as a target. Destruction of Kyoto would be too effective, especially in a psychological sense. It would be too devastating for the Japanese nation if the United States annihilated the cultural symbol of Japan. The United States feared that by dropping an A-bomb on Kyoto the Japanese would keep a strong anti-American feeling after the end of the war for a long time and could become politically closer to the Soviet Union.

It is important to know that the legend of saving Kyoto has survived even after the facts about Kyoto as an A-bomb target were revealed. It is confined in the historical imagination of the general people. The legend is still heard and people seem to like thinking that Japanese culture is worth being saved by Americans, even in the time of war. When I recently discussed this topic in a college class, some students told me they heard the story from parents or teachers and they themselves had believed it until they took my class. As for me, after I knew the truth, I started feeling as if I lived in a parallel world, while in another world Kyoto was destroyed in a moment in the summer of 1945, and my mother

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was killed at the age of fifteen and I was not born. That’s sad, but I believe this imagined situation is more suitable and even more encouraging when living and thinking in the nuclear age, than believing in a heartwarming legend.

Mutation and Ambivalence

1 Godzilla

In the world of popular science-fiction films, we often see nuclear imagination in the form of a monster. Unlike such monsters depicted in Hollywood movies, those produced through in Japanese films have characteristically had ambivalent meanings. The idea of mutation and enlargement caused by nuclear radiation fascinated the audience, with its mixed feelings of horror and empowerment. Gigantic monsters that have mutated by radiation are both victims of and menaces against civilization, gods and devils, or saviors and destroyers. Godzilla is one of the most popular monsters of this kind created in postwar Japan. It is impossible to think about this favorite monster of mine without thinking about nuclear experiments and the fear of radiation.

The first Godzilla appeared in a 1954 film. In the film, however, the monster was not affected by nuclear radiation itself but was an ancient sea creature awakened by an underwater hydrogen explosion experiment, in a similar way as its predecessor in film, the monster in the 1953 American sci-fi movie The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms. But the film Godzilla was advertised as an “unexpected child of the nuclear age” to attract an audience who associated the appearance of the monster with the fate of human beings, who have reached the stage of civilization that is affected by nuclear technology. It is clear that people associated the image of Godzilla with nuclear energy itself. In the early 1950s, nuclear power plants existed in the US and USSR, yet people in Japan knew about nuclear power mainly from images of the explosions that happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and from experimental explosions done by the United States, the USSR, and United Kingdom.

But the reference to nuclear technology was not the only thing we find in Godzilla. At the same time, the monster was accepted as a latest version of the traditional gigantic Yokai, or demon, in the indigenous, animistic understanding of nature. In Japanese mythology and folklore, we find a gigantic supernatural being called Daidarabotchi, which was imagined to be as big as a mountain. Legend says that what people think is a mountain range is actually the body of a sleeping Daidarabotchi. It is believed that it wakes up in the night and starts wandering around while people are asleep. I don’t have space here to give further details on this myth but I will look at one recent example to see how this type of imagination is still alive in people’s minds. In the animated film

Princess Mononoke,” there is a gigantic “forest spirit,” or Daidarabotchi. It is misleading to call it simply “a demon” because the spirit is neither good nor bad in nature. Rather, it is supposed to be an apparition of the pure power of nature, which has existed long before humans and is beyond the judgment of good or evil, as decided upon by humans.

So we can look at Godzilla from two different aspects: on one hand, it is a monster symbolizing the nuclear age, representing the dark, uncontrollable side of modern technology. On the other hand, however, Godzilla was an updated god of the ancient animistic world. As the result of this ambivalence, the image of nuclear technology was somehow neutralized, naturalized, and depoliticized. The monster came from the people’s unconscious, from those who welcomed the peaceful use of nuclear power for national industry, while being obsessed by a curse of the ghosts of those who died in war, especially those killed by nuclear explosions. In the mid-1950s, the government urged the nation to forget about the political controversy about the “Nichbei Ampo Joyaku (US-Japan security treaty)” and to concentrate on business and industry.

A lot of Godzilla films have been produced since then. As the monster has become more popular, first among Japanese audiences and later (since the Hollywood version in 1998) worldwide, it seems to have lost its ambivalent character. In a Godzilla series produced in Japan, the vision of the monster seems to have lost its direct association with nuclear technology and has become simplified as a kind of guardian of Japan (or of Earth) against invaders from the outside (or from outer space). In a 1998 American version, Godzilla was interpreted as a typical Hollywood monster, a threat to a human being who will end up conquering it. I won’t discuss them in detail, but maybe it is worth mentioning briefly the latest Godzilla film made in Japan, which is titled Shin Godzilla. This film is still very new and the evaluation of it is not yet settled. But here I only pay attention to one point: What does this latest incarnation of the monster represent?

In the last scene of the film, Godzilla is frozen solid after a coagulating agent is injected into its mouth (the research team in the film found out that Godzilla’s blood works as a cooling system, and they theorized that through the use of a coagulating agent, they could trigger a reaction and cause it to freeze). It is a
surprising ending for a long-term Godzilla fan like myself to find it defeated in such an unusual way, considering the monster remained intact with missile attacks from the US Air Force. The reason is clear. What this Godzilla represents is actually Fukushima Daiichi, the damaged nuclear power plant we still cannot control, or know what’s going on inside it even today. In spite of this fact, the Japanese government, leading politicians, and the media have propagated an image of it as if the plant is already under control. Many of us have been made to believe that Fukushima is okay now. The message of the film is: No, it’s not okay! The film seems to camouflage the topic of Fukushima crisis by using the image of Godzilla: it talks about Fukushima without mentioning it; if the nuclear crisis was mentioned directly in the title and theme of the film, it would not attract as many moviegoers in Japan. With this film, we can at least say that Godzilla is once again associated with the nuclear crisis.

2 An Innocent “Atom”: Astro Boy by Osamu Tezuka

Another hero representing nuclear energy in Japanese pop culture is Astro Boy, the comics and animation series by Osamu Tezuka. Astro Boy is in many ways the opposite of Godzilla, especially in their relationship to nuclear energy. Godzilla is a monster whose internal mechanism is unclear. We don’t know, for example, why the monster is able to emit a radioactive ray from its mouth. We don’t know its intention, or whether it has any intention at all. On the other hand, Astro Boy is a robot created by a human scientist. Though he looks like a young, innocent boy, he has an enormous power generated by a super-small-sized nuclear reactor embedded inside his body. Since he is a robot, all of the mechanisms are logical, and his electronic brain generates consciousness and emotion that makes the Astro Boy a friend of human beings.” Astro Boy is good-natured, has a strong sense of justice, and is ready to fight against evil humans and robots, though it destroys evil robots but never kills humans, perhaps under “Three Laws of Robotics,” by Isaac Asimov.

Astro Boy was created in the 1960s when people hoped for economic growth based partly on nuclear power. He represents the positive and promising side of nuclear technology. I should add that the English title, Astro Boy, is not a direct translation of its original Japanese title: Tetsuwan Atom (Iron arm atom). With the original name, the association to nuclear technology is very obvious. A lot of combats fought between a super hero and a monster in sci-fi cartoons or animations in the 1960s and ’70s in Japan were those between the “good” and “bad” nuclear powers, as both are empowered—either driven by or mutated by—nuclear energy.

Nuclear Imagination Today

Finally, I will briefly mention two artistic projects that have recently attempted to respond to the Fukushima crisis, which occurred in 2011.

1 Presence of the Past: Hiroshima by Miyako Ishiuchi

Miyako Ishiuchi is not an artist who started with the subject of Hiroshima or nuclear issues. Her earliest works are photographs taken of ruined buildings in the city of Yokosuka, a city where a US navy base has been located. Through her youth, she was strongly attracted to the crumbling walls and rusted doors of restaurants, amusement centers, and brothels that soldiers used to visit during the period of occupation after the Pacific War. As a small girl, the artist was forbidden and afraid to visit that area. When she got a little older, she decided to go there, which was by then partly deserted, with a camera. But she says she did not intend to photograph the past but the present—the way those places look like now, with all their memories. She has maintained this attitude all through her photographic works since then.

The same intention led Ishiuchi to photograph scars on human bodies. She feels scars are “beautiful” even though they are normally supposed to be kept secret. By photographing scars without showing faces and any personal identities, and showing them as photographic images in books and shows, she liberates scars from individual bodies and makes them into something shared by viewers. By showing them publicly, scars start to belong to the universe, instead of a particular person, she says. Since I was deeply impressed by Ishiuchi’s approach to photography, I invited her to participate in an interview, which was published in the first issue of the critical journal Diatxt, I edited in Kyoto.” At that time Ishiuchi had started photographing articles left by her mother who had just passed away. Again, it is not any past or memories of her late mother, but the presence of such intimate belongings, such as lipstick or lingerie. With this work she was nominated to represent Japan at the Venice Biennale in 2006.

The subject of Hiroshima came to the artist in quite an unexpected way. When she started working on Hiroshima around 2007, Ishiuchi told me she had never been interested in the subject of Hiroshima and that she had actually never been to the city. I can understand how she felt. Hiroshima is of course a name known all over the world as a place where an unimaginable misery caused by nuclear bombing occurred. The image of Genbaku Domu (Atomic Bomb

10 Unlike in the Christian countries, robots with consciousness and emotion mean no threat in Japanese culture.

Dome, which is the common name for Hiroshima Peace Memorial) has been so widely published and stays in the imagination of many.

At the same time, we can point out that the name and images of Hiroshima have been used and interpreted in a particularly fixed way, more or less. It is without a doubt that Hiroshima is important for antinuclear politics, but we can also say that the name Hiroshima itself confines our imagination. That’s why Ishiuchi had never been interested in the city as a photographer. But once she was invited to Hiroshima and looked at the Atomic Bomb Dome, she found it so small and beautiful, something totally different from what she had seen in media before. She thought she should do something about Hiroshima and she started photographing the clothes of atomic-bomb victims.

The intention of these photographs is to show the beauty of these clothes, not the misery caused by the atomic bomb. I honestly was surprised to see these images for the first time, because I had never imagined that girls in Hiroshima, at eight o'clock in the morning on August 6, 1945, wore such colorful blouses and dresses. In most stories, TV dramas, and films focusing on Hiroshima, the victims are described as wearing shabby wartime uniforms. Looking at Ishiuchi’s Hiroshima, the viewer suddenly knows his or her stereotypical perception about the past was wrong, by understanding that even in the last period of the Pacific War, girls in Hiroshima liked to dress themselves up as much as they could. This understanding brings Hiroshima back to the present time. I highly appreciate Hiroshima as a work expanding our nuclear imagination, because the work shows these clothes don’t belong to the past but are present and in front of us.

2 Nuclear Crisis and the Japanese Mind: Japan Syndrome by Tadasu Takamine

Tadasu Takamine is an artist who combines social and political questions with his own private or intimate subjects in a unique way. In Lover from Korea, Takamine decided to live in a cave that is one of the old mines in the northern part of Kyoto. The mine had been used to mine manganese, and especially during the time of the Pacific War a lot of Korean workers were forced to work hard labor there. Takamine mixed his view of the relation between Korea and Japan as two countries with his personal relation to his Korean girlfriend, and presents the history of nations superimposed with his straightforward individual feeling about Korea.

After the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and the Fukushima disaster, Takamine had a solo show at Mito Art Tower in Ibaraki, the area also affected by the disaster. The show was titled “Tadasu Takamine’s Cool Japan.” There he combined images of people’s fear of the nuclear crises with a controversial phrase “cool Japan,” which is used to promote Japanese pop culture. Takamine showed several different aspects of Fukushima crisis in the exhibition.

There he developed a series of video works titled Japan Syndrome. The title reminds us of “China syndrome,” a phrase that describes serious nuclear meltdowns. Takamine’s video does not directly refer to the nuclear disaster itself, but to how people talk about it in their everyday situations. This performance/video was created in a quite interesting way. First, the artist recorded interviews he made with people in towns in various parts in Japan, asking questions about nuclear radiation from Fukushima. For example, in one interview he asked a shopkeeper where a certain fish came from. When the shopkeeper answered that it was from Chiba, Takamine asked, “I wonder if it is safe because Chiba is close to Fukushima.” Then the shopkeeper answered: “It is perfectly safe. It passed the inspection, of course!” The artist made a transcription from such conversations and let professional actors to reenact the scenes onstage.

Watching Takamine’s Japan Syndrome, the layers of feelings people have about the influence of radiation on their life is noticeable. Apart from the direct victims of Fukushima who were forced to evacuate, the majority of people in Japan find it hard to judge how serious this invisible menace is to their own life. Some make an ominous prediction that it will be the end of the country, while others say it will be perfectly alright as we have already experienced much more serious exposure to radiation because of nuclear testing and have survived. Japan Syndrome is not simply a documentary of people’s voices about the nuclear issue; because it is interpreted and played by actors, we can see more clearly how people suppress their fear by saying, “It’s okay, it’s safe”—without evidence that this is true. It seems the shopkeeper says what he does in order to sell his fish by assuring customers. But from the uneasy tone in the actor’s voice as he plays the shopkeeper, we see how the shopkeeper is trying to reassure himself with his own words.

Another distinguished insight I find in this work is that Takamine combines the nuclear issue with a question about the Japanese nation—about the way people understand their own country. Hence the title Japan Syndrome, I guess. The nuclear imagination I find in this work by Takamine implies an association between nuclear issues and Japanese society. The work seems to say that it...
was the character of Japanese society that has allowed for the construction of so many nuclear power plants on areas with high danger of earthquakes and tsunamis. Especially during the age of "Japan's economic miracle" (in the late 1950s and the and '60s), the whole nation was encouraged to believe in the bright future opened up by nuclear power, and most people thought they would be ostracized if they objected to that collective hope."

It is not even seven years since Fukushima. But many people in the country are made to feel as if the crisis has already passed, and that it was a problem only for the direct victims. Most people seem to lose sight of the fact that the whole country, at least for several months after the Fukushima disaster, were also concerned about the effects of the nuclear disaster all over Japan. In art and pop culture, however, we still observe the activity and development of nuclear imagination, which can widely be shared and discussed by those living inside and outside the country.

16 This association between the nuclear problem and national mentality reminds us of the conclusion of the final investigation report written by Kiyoshi Kurokawa, the chair of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company. The report published in 2012 is available at: https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/fukushima/naic_report.pdf

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Ilya Budraitskis is a historian and curator based in Moscow, Russia. He is on the editorial boards of several print and online publications, including Moscow Art Magazine, Openleft, and LeftEast. In the past, he has worked as the scientific assistant and curator at the State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia. From 2013 to 2015, he was head of the Multimedia Library at the National Center for Contemporary Art (NCCA) in Moscow. With Ekaterina Degot and Marta Dziewanska, Budraitskis coedited and authored the book Post-Post-Soviet?: Art, Politics and Society in Russia at the Turn of the Decade (University of Chicago Press, 2013). His book Dissidents among Dissidents (FMP press, Moscow) was published in 2017.

Maira Enesi Caixeta (b. 1994, São Paulo) is poet and singer who studies at the Studio of Conceptual Art (Post-conceptual Art Practices) at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. Her work revolves around topics such as antiracism, migration, and clinical depression from a female, queer, and black perspective. Her short story “Wind der Veränderung?” (Wind of change?) was published in Stimme, no. 101 (2017).

C.A.S.I.T.A. is a Madrid-based artistic collective whose permanent members are Loreto Alonso (b. 1969, Burgos, Spain), Eduardo Galvagni (b. 1969, Comodoro Rivadavia, Argentina), and Diego del Pozo Barriuso (b. 1974, Valladolid, Spain). C.A.S.I.T.A. reflects on collaborative strategies in the processes of cultural creation and production. Since 2006 the collective has been developing the project “Ganarse la vida: El Ente Transparente” (Earning a living: The transparent entity). In 2016 they participated in the exhibition “ATLAS of the Ruins of EUROPE” at CentroCentro Cibeles in Madrid, and in 2014/15 they participated in the exhibition “Apocryphal Colony: Images of Coloniality in Spain” at MUSAC in León, Spain. www.ganarselavida.net

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Miguel González Cabezas is a Spanish artist and researcher who graduated with a fine art honors degree from the University of Salamanca, Spain, and is currently completing his master program in Critical Studies at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. He spent a semester studying in the Studio of Conceptual Art (Post-conceptual Art Practices) at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. His main focus is in the social protests and public space. In 2014, he exhibited in the Adora Calvo Gallery, Salamanca, and has also been involved in solo and group exhibitions in Vienna, Zamora, Kuwait, Berlin, and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. In collaboration with Mirjam Bromundt, he has recently published in the book Wespennest no. 171: Back to the USSR, which looks at media discourse after the October Revolution and the Indignados Movement in Spain. www.miguelpgonzalezcabezas.com

Marina Gržinič is a philosopher, theoretician, and artist who lives in Ljubljana, Slovenia, and works in both Ljubljana and Vienna. Since 2003 she has been the professor in charge of the Studio of Conceptual Art (Post-conceptual Art Practices) at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. She has been involved in video art since 1982. In collaboration with Aina Šmid, she has produced more than thirty video-art projects, a short film, numerous video and media installations, internet websites, and interactive media work. She has been published extensively and has given lectures worldwide. http://grzinic-smid.si
Njideka Stephanie Iroh is a London-born black Çetin Güer studied sociology and political tradition of Oral His*_Her*_Our_story Njideka's poetry is inspired by the African migrant self-organizations since 2006. ment in (trans)national, black, POC, and the embodiment of knowl edge. Her poli- tical work has been fostered by her involve- ment in (trans)national, black, POC, and and intervention, she into the field of youth, technology, and change. She has also created self-learning resources, like the Data Detox Kit and Digital First Aid Kit, which enable users to navigate the landscape of data and technology on their own terms. Janssen's main interest is in understanding and visually representing the new spaces, gray areas, and changing dyna- mics that technologies bring to the world. Njideka's poetry is inspired by the African tradition of Oral His*_Her*_Our_story—"her", "our", our story and thus shares rhythm, rhyme, and knowl- edge beyond the written word. She is the co-creator of the curatorial project the bodies of Knowledge—Multiplying Marginalised Subjectivities of Utopia through Art and Storytelling, which received the SHIFT 2015 grant in Vienna.

Juan Guardiola (b. 1985, Madrid) is the current director of the Centro de Arte y Naturaleza (CDAN, Center for Art and Nature) in Huesca, Spain. As an independ- ent curator, he has developed profes- sional experience working in centers such as the Artium Museum in Vitoria-Gasteiz, MACBA in Barcelona, and Casa Asia in Madrid. He has curated numerous exhibitions including “Colonia Apócrifa” “Filipiniana,” and “India Moderna.”

Çetin Güer studied sociology and political science at the University of Hamburg. He received his doctorate in political science in 2015 at the University of Ankara. He is currently based in Bremen, Germany, and works at the Zentrum für Arbeit und Politik, University of Bremen.

Neda Hosseiniyar is an Iranian artist living and working in Vienna. She graduated with a BA in painting from the University of Fine Arts Yazd, Iran, and is currently completing her study at the Studio of Conceptual Art (Post-conceptual Art Practices) at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. In her artistic practice, which includes installation, painting, print, video, and intervention, she intends to give a critical reflection on social and political discriminatory structures. Selected projects and artistic activities include a lecture given at the symposium "Fragments of Empire," Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, and participation in an international radio symposium “LaPublica,” in Tabakalera, Donostia-San Sebastián, Spain.


Fieke Jansen is a researcher, writer, trainer, and profiling for Tactical Tech in Berlin. She has been working on the intersection of technology, activism, and art since 2000. With Nishant Shah, Janssen coauthored the book Digital Alternatives with a Cause (2011), which is an attempt to introduce into the field of youth, technology, and change. She has also created self-learning resources, like the Data Detox Kit and Digital First Aid Kit, which enable users to navigate the landscape of data and technology on their own terms. Janssen’s main interest is in understanding and visually representing the new spaces, gray areas, and changing dynamics that technologies bring to the world.

Adla Ivanovic is an artist and researcher who lives and works in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She is an associate professor at the Academy of Fine Arts of the University of Sarajevo, where she teaches multimedia. She holds a PhD from the postgraduate school ZRC SAZU, Ljubljana, Slovenia (doctoral program Comparative Studies of Ideas and Cultures). She has been a visiting lecturer at the International University Sarajevo, the Academy of Performing Arts Sarajevo, and the School of Arts—University of Nova Gorica, Slovenia. She has engaged in a number of local and international projects in the fields of art and culture, and has presented the results of her research at international colloquiums and publications.


She is the author/editor of seven books, including Reaches of Empire: The English Novel from Edgeworth to Dickens (1992); Australia and the Insular Imagination. Beaches, Borders, Race and Bodies (2009), and Survival Media: The Politics and Poetics of Mobility and the War in Sri Lanka (2016).
Jelena Petrović is a feminist scholar, theorist, and art worker. She is the coauthor of texts, events, and projects related to (post) Yugoslav subjects—particularly with regard to (post) Yugoslav history, art theory, and feminism. She completed her PhD at ISH Ljubljana Graduate School of Humanities (2008). From 2008 to 2015 she was an active member of the new Yugoslav art-theory group Grupa Spomenik (Group memorial). She is the cofounder and member of the feminist curatorial collective Red Min(e)d (2011–ongoing). Since 2014, she has been teaching at the Academy of Fine Arts and Design, University of Ljubljana, and from 2015 at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna (appointed as the Endowed Professor for Central and South Eastern European Art Histories, 2015–17).

Khaled Ramadan (born in Beirut) is an artist, filmmaker, curator, and cultural writer. He is coeditor of the book Truth in Time of War (Aljazeera, 2017). He is the former director of the film institute BMAF, in Oman. He has worked as senior adviser for the Maldives Ministry of Culture, the Danish Arts Council, the Manifesta Foundation, the Nordic Institute for Contemporary Arts Council, the Manifesta Foundation, the Nordic Institute for Contemporary Arts (NIFCA), and as an external consultant for the Prince Claus Fund. Ramadan was appointed curator of the Maldives Pavilion at the 55th Venice Biennale, research curator of the 3rd Guangzhou Triennial, and cocurator of Manifesta 8, together with Chamber of Public Secrets, which he cofounded. He contributes regularly to international magazines on topics such as art, media, aesthetics, and social activism.

Rubia Salgado works in adult education, on cultural projects, and as a writer in self-organized contexts. The focus of her activities lies in the field of critical educational and cultural work in migration societies. She is currently working on research and development projects in the field of adult education for migrants as a teacher (German as a second language, literacy skills, political education, and educational projects in the cultural field). She is a cofounder and staff member of maiz, an independent association organized by and for migrant women with the aim of improving the living and working conditions of migrant women in Austria and bringing about changes to unjust social conditions. Since 2015 she has been involved in the association das kollektiv in Linz.

Marka Schmiedt is a visual artist, activist, and filmmaker. Since 1999 she has carried out research with survivors (witnesses) of the persecution of the Roma and Sinti people (from the Holocaust to the present). Her artistic work focuses on addressing the situation of ethnic Roma before and after 1945. Schmiedt is academic lecturer in youth and adult education. She has produced numerous films, including Eine lüstige Gesellschaft (An undesirable society, 75 min., 2001), Roma Memento: Zukunft ungewiss? (Roma memento: Uncertain future?, 55 min., 2012), and Warum die Wunde offen bleibt (Why the wound remains open, 80 min., 2016). In the film from 2016 Schmiedt addresses the discrimination of Sinti, Romani, and Yenish people in terms of historical, biographical, psychoanalytical, and linguistic/discursive reasons.

Joshua Simon is a curator and writer based in Tel Aviv-Jaffa. He is the director and chief curator at MoBiV: Museums of Bat Yam. He is the cofounding editor of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa–based magazine Maayan. From 2011 to 2013 he was a fellow at the Vera List Center for Art and Politics, The New School, New York. His recent book includes Neomaterialism (Sternberg Press, 2013), and he was the editor of Ruti Sela: For the Record (Archives Books, 2015). Recent curatorial projects include “Rooe Rosen: Group Exhibition,” Tel Aviv Museum of Art (cocurated with Gilad Melzen), 2015–16; and “The Kids Want Communism,” a yearlong project at MoBiV in collaboration with State of Concept, Athens; Transiz, Prague; Galeria Sluč, Ljubljana; Free/Slow University of Warsaw; V CRC, Kiel, 2016–17. His writings have been published in Afterall, Springerin, frieze, and e-flux journal. Simon holds a PhD from Goldsmiths College, University of London.

Aneta Stojnić is a Belgrade-born theoretician, artist, and curator. She is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Media and Communications (FMK) in Belgrade. In 2015 she was a postdoctoral researcher at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, affiliated with the conceptual art studio (Post-
Firstly thanks goes to the contributors of the book for their thoughts, texts, and art projects, and for their deep commitment while preparing the contributions until the very final stages of the book production.

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Last but not least, thanks go to my students from the Studio of Conceptual Art (Post-conceptual Art Practices (PCAP)), students from the MA in Critical Studies, and to the students that I am a mentor for their PhD in philosophy at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. I would also like to acknowledge the many post-doctorate researchers or researchers at large who are staying and studying with us on the program. For the past year, we have engaged in a process of studying and discussing art, politics, and theory, of the aspects that form the basis from which this book was conceived.
Border Thinking: Disassembling Histories of Racialized Violence aims to question and provide answers to current border issues in Europe. Central to this investigation is a refugee crisis that is primarily a crisis of global Western capitalism and its components: modernization, nationalism, structural racism, dispossession, and social, political, and economic violence.

In this volume, these notions and conditions are connected with the concept of borders, which seems to have disappeared as a function of the global neoliberal economy but is palpably reappearing again and again through deportations, segregations, and war. How can we think about these relations in an open way, beyond borders? Is it possible to develop border thinking for a radical transformation, as a means to revolutionize the state of things? To do this, we must reconsider what is possible for the social and the political as well as for art and culture.