BLUEPRINT
FOR A HIGHER
CIVILIZATION

by
henry flynt

multipla edizioni, milano
1. Introduction

This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It summarizes the results of my activities, the consistent outlook on a whole range of questions which I have developed. The first essay, On Social Recognition, noted that the official social philosophy of practically every regime in the world says that the individual has a duty to serve society to the best of his abilities. Social recognition is supposed to be the reward which indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution (Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the individual has a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond this, he will undertake the most important tasks posed by society for his own private gratification. He will not attempt to benefit society, or to gain the recognition which would necessarily result if society were to utilize his achievements.

The second essay, Creep, discussed the practices of isolating oneself; carefully controlling one's intake of ideas and influences from outside; and playing as a child does. I originally saw these practices as the effects of certain personality problems. However, it now seems that they are actually needed for the intellectual approach which I have developed. They may be desirable in themselves, rather than being mere effects of personality problems.

I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still consider it "necessary" to believe in God; but the Soviet government has managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled Philosophy Proper, The Flaws Underlying Beliefs, and Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls. The question of whether a given belief is valid
depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my "immediate experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase 'a realm beyond my experience' could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it, I imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also.

The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that an activity may perfectly well employ false statements and still have objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capacities that are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to pre-scientific irrationalsim. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get you to believe that superstitions are truths, but to exploit non-true material for rational purposes.

The other initial subject of investigation I chose was art. The art which claims to have cognitive value is already demolished by my philosophical results. However, art at its most distinctive does not need to claim cognitive value; its value is claimed to be entertainment or amusement. What about art whose justification is simply that people like it? Consider things which are just liked, or whose value is purely subjective. I point out that each individual already has experiences, prior to art, whose value is purely subjective. (Call these experiences "brend.") The difference between breed and art is that in art, the thing valued is separated from the valuing of it and turned into an object which is urged on other people. Individuals tend to overlook their breed, and they do so because of the same factors which perpetuate art. These factors include the relation between the socialization of the individual and the need for an escape from work. The conditioning which causes one to venerate "great art" is also a conditioning to dismiss one's own breed. If one can become aware of one's breed without the distortion produced by this conditioning, one finds that one's breed is superior to any art, because it has a level of personalization and originality which completely transcends art.

Thus, I reject art as an intellectual or cultural modality. In rejecting truth, I advocated in its place intellectual activities which have an objective value independent of truth. In rejecting art, I do not propose that it be replaced with any objective activity at all. Rather, I advocate that the individual become aware of his just-likings for what he is, and allow them to come out. If I succeed in getting the individual to recognize his own just-likings, then I will have given him infinitely more than any artist ever can.

We are not finished with art, however. Ever since art began to disintegrate as an institution, modern art has become more and more of a repository for activities which represent pure waste, but which counterfeit innovation and objective value. A two-way process is involved here. On the one hand, the modern artist, faced with the increasing gratuitousness of his profession, desperately incorporates superficial references to science in his products in the hope of intimidating his audience. On the other hand, art itself has become an institution which invests waste with legitimacy and even prestige; and it offers instant rewards to people who wish to play the game. What is innovation in modern art? You take a poem by Shelly, cut it up into little pieces, shake the pieces up in a box, then draw them out and write down whatever is on them in the order in which they are drawn. If you call the result a "modern poem," people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas they would not have been awed otherwise. This sort of innovation is utterly mechanical and superficial. When artists incorporate scientific references in their products, the process is similarly a mechanical, superficial amalgamation of routine artistic material with current gadgets.

Now there may be some confusion as to what the difference is between the products which result from this attempt to "save" art, and activities in the intellectual modality which I favor. There may be a tendency to confuse
activities which are neither science nor art, but have objective value, with art products which are claimed to be “scientific” and therefore objectively valuable. To dispel this confusion, the following questions may be asked about art products. 1. If the product were not called art, would it immediately be seen to be worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to “carry” it? 2. Suppose that the artist claims that his product embodies major scientific discoveries, as in the case of a ballet dancer who claims to be working in the field of antigravity ballet. If the dancer really has an antigravity device, why can it only work in a ballet theater? Why can it only be used to make dancers jump higher? Why do you have to be able to perform “Swan Lake” in order to do antigravity experiments? To use a phrase from medical research, I contend that a real scientist would seek to isolate the active principle—not to obscure it with non-functional mumbo-jumbo.

Both of these sets of questions make the same point, from somewhat different perspectives. Given an individual with a product to offer, does he actively seek out the lady art reporters, the public relations contracts, the museum officials, or does he actively dissociate himself from them? Does he seek artistic legitimation of his product, or does he reject it? The objective activities which I have developed stand on their own feet. They are not art, and to construe them as art would make it impossible to comprehend them.

A definition of the intellectual modality which I favor is now in order. Until now, this modality has involved the construction of ideas such that the very possibility of thinking these ideas is a significant phenomenon. In other words, the modality has consisted of the invention of mental abilities. The ideas involve physical language, that is, language which occurs in beliefs about the physical world. Such language is philosophically meaningless, but it has connotations provided by the psychological trick involved in believing. The connotations are what are utilized; factual truth is irrelevant. Then, the ideas cannot be reduced to the mechanical manipulation of marks or counters—unlike ordinary mathematics. Also, logical truth, which happens to be discredited by my philosophical results, is irrelevant to the ideas.

But the defining requirement of the modality is that each activity in it must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful independently of whether it produces emotional gratification.

We can now consider the following principle, “spontaneously and without any prompting to sweep human culture aside and to carry out elaborate, completely self-justifying activities.” Relative to the social context of the individual’s activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. In the light of The Flaws Underlying Beliefs and the brand theory, however, the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be standardized.

The modality I favor is best exemplified by “Energy Cube Organism,” “Concept Art,” and the “Perception-Dissociator Model.” “Energy Cube Organism” is a perfect example of ideas such that the very possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena with the thinking of contradictions. It led to “Studies in Constructed Memories,” which in turn led to “The Logic of Admissible Contradictions.” With this last writing, it becomes obvious that the activity has applications outside itself.

“Concept Art” (published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963) uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader’s mental reactions. It led to “Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories,” and this led in turn to “Subjective Propositional Vibration.”

The “Perception-Dissociator Model” (published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5) was intended to exploit the utilization that humans are the most advanced machines (or technology) that we have. I wanted to build a model of a machine out of humans, using a minimum of non-human props. Further, the machine modelled was to have capabilities which are physically impossible according to present-day science. I still think that the task as I have defined it is an excellent one; but the model does not yet completely accomplish the objective. The present model uses the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs to produce its effects.

“Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories” and “Studies in Constructed Memories” together make up Mathematical Studies (1966). In this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its potential applications in conjunction with science, “Subjective Propositional Vibration” investigates the logical possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader’s mental responses. “The Logic of Admissible Contradictions” starts with the experiencers of the logically impossible which we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the
logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are "admissible." The theory investigates the implications of admitting some contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of many-valued numbers is also presented.

The "Perception-Dissociator Model" led to "The Perception-Dissociation of Physics." Again, here is an essay whose significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it impossible for physicists to "construct the object from experience." Finally, "Mock Risk Games" is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not generated a series of applications as the other activities have.

To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities having objective value, together with each individual's brood. Consider the individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of the most socially important tasks, these institutions have always rewarded the wrong things, as I argued in On Bridal Recognition. But in addition, the institutions as now organized are obstacles specifically to my intellectual modality. In fact, society in general has the effect of a vast conspiracy to prevent one from achieving the kind of consequential intellectual play which I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is presumably not inherent in my intellectual modality; but under present social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence.
2. The Flaws Underlying Beliefs

We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my "immediate experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in order for the phrase 'a realm beyond my experience' to have any meaning. Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion 'There is a realm beyond my experience' is true if it is meaningful, and that is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it.

Aristotle's Organon was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, and Supplement D of Carnap's Meaning and Necessity shows that hypotheses about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so." This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a substantive assertion.

The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. The only possible approach for this paper is an internal critique of common sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to aspects of themselves.

As an example of the application of our initial result to specific
questions of belief, consider the question of whether the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced Empire State Building does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it depends on the very assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a definitional trick.

We start by taking questions of belief seriously as substantive questions, which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing about nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that belief-assertions are not substantive.

Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts. We understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal formulation. Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may close my eyes and imagine a table, independently of any consideration of "reality." Two different types of experiences can be distinguished, non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a non-mental experience. The "attitude" which is involved is not a proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief-assertion.

The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that although the problem originally seems to center on "nonexperience," it turns out to center on "language." Philosophical problems exist only if there is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: Are linguistic expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word 'table' is supposed to denote an object, a stable entity which continues to exist even when I am not looking at it. Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that refer to experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? In other words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more immediately than in the case of nonexperience, that this question is caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. Is there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and nonexperiences? Is there an expression, 'Empire State Building,' which is related to an object outside one's experience, the Empire State Building, and which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the Empire State Building or not? However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned before, the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language.

In summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, made in the natural language. This assertion is true if it is meaningful. It is too true; it must be a definitional trick. Beliefs stand or fall on the question of whether there is language. There is no way to get outside the definitional trick and ask this question in a way that would be substantive. The question simply collapses.
3. Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls

We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs.

Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation whatever?

It is apparent that fearful beliefs suggest many topics for speculation. This essay, however, will concentrate exclusively on one topic, which is by far the most important. Given that people once held the belief about a fearful belief. Two beliefs which are exactly analogous to the one about blasphemy are the belief that if I jump out of a tenth story window I will be hurt, and the belief that if I attempt to walk through a wall I will bruise myself. Given that I am able to dispense with the belief about blasphemy, it follows that, in effect, I am able to walk through walls relative to medieval people. That is, my ability to blaspheme without being struck by lightning would be as unimaginable to them as the ability to walk through walls is today. The topic of this essay is whether it is possible to transfer my achievement concerning blasphemy to other fearful beliefs.

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I am told that “if you jump out of a tenth story window you really will be hurt.” Yet the analogous exhortation concerning blasphemy is not convincing or compelling at all. Why not? I suggest that the nature of the “evidence” implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to see if it does not represent an epistemological swindle. In the cases of both blasphemy and jumping out of the window, I am told that if I perform the action I will suffer injury. But do I concede that I have to blaspheme, in order to prove that I can get away with it? Actually, I do not blaspheme; I simply do not perform the action at all. Yet I do not have any belief whatever that it would be dangerous to do so. Why should anyone suppose that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate my disbelief? Why should the credulous person be able to put me in the position of having to accept the dare that “you have to do it to prove you don’t believe it’s dangerous”? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legendarium.

The exhortation continues to the effect that if I did utter blasphemy I really would be struck by lightning. I still do not find this compelling. But suppose that I do see someone utter a blasphemy and get struck by lightning. Surely this must convert me. But with due apologies to the faithful, I must report that it does not. There is no reason why it should make me believe. I do not believe that blasphemy will cause me to be struck by lightning, and the evocation of frightful images— or for that matter, something that I see—would provide no reason whatever for sudden credulity. There is an immense difference between seeing a person blaspheme and get struck by lightning, and believing that if one blasphemes, one will get struck by lightning. This difference should be quite apparent to one who does not hold the belief. (In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I live is so profoundly secular that its secularism cannot be demolished by one “lightning.”)

In general, the so-called evidence doesn’t work. There is a swindle somewhere in the evidence that is supposed to make me accept the fearful belief. Upon close scrutiny, each bit of evidence misses the target. Yet the whole conglomeration of “evidence” somehow overwhelmed medieval
people. They had to believe something that I do not believe. I can get away with something that they could not get away with.

It is not that I stand up in a society of the faithful and suddenly blaspheme. It is rather that the whole medieval cognitive orientation had been completely reoriented by the time it was transmitted to me. Or in other words, the medieval cognitive orientation was restructured throughout during the modern era. In the process, the compelling conglomeration of evidence was disintegrated. Isolated from their niches in the old orientation, the bits of evidence no longer worked. Each bit missed the target. I do not have a head-on confrontation with the medieval impossibility of blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently.

The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that "if I try to walk through the wall I will fall and will bruise myself" is also discardable. I am sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a fearful belief is not a matter of head-on confrontation, but of restructuring the entire situation, of restructuring evidence, so that the conglomeration of evidence is disintegrated into isolated bits which are separately powerless. Only then can one slip by the impossibility. I cannot exercise my freedom to walk through walls until the whole cognitive orientation of the modern era is restructured throughout.

The project of restructuring the modern cognitive orientation is a vast one. The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. In this connection it is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic of science as Carnap rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition meaningful if it had any empirically verifiable proposition as an implication. But consider an appropriate ensemble of scientific propositions in good standing, and conceive of it as a conjunction of an infinite number of propositions about single events (what Carnap called protocol-sentences). Only a very small number of the latter propositions are indeed subject to verification. If we sever them from the entire conjunction, what remains is as effectively blocked from verification as the propositions which Carnap rejected as meaningless. This criticism of science is not a mere technical exercise. A scientific proposition is a fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially testable meanings with an infinite number of untestable meanings and inveigles us to accept the whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the very beginning of Philosophy and Logical Syntax that Carnap recognized this quite clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it. For us, however, it is essential to be assured that science can be dismantled just as the proof can be dismantled that I will be struck by lightning if I blaspheme.

We can suggest some other approaches which may contribute to overcoming the modern cognitive orientation. The habitual correlation of the realm of sight and the realm of touch which occurs when we perceive "objects" is a likely candidate for dismantling. (The psychological jargon for this correlation is "the contribution of intermodal organization to the object Gestalt."

From a different tradition, the critique of scientific fact and of measurable time which is suggested in Lukács' "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" might be of value if it were developed. (Lukács also implied that scientific truth would disappear in a communist society—that is, a society without necessary labor, in which the right to subsistence was unconditional. He implied that scientific quantification and facticity are closely connected with the work discipline required by the capitalist mode of production, and that like the price system, they constitute a false objectivity which we accept because the social economic institutions deprive us of subsistence if we fail to submit to them. Quite aside from the historical unlikelihood of a communist society, this suggestion might be pursued as a thought experiment to obtain a more detailed characterization of the hypothetical post-scientific outlook.)

Finally, I may mention that most of my own writings are offered as fragmentary beginnings in the project of dismantling the modern cognitive orientation.

Someday we will realize that we were always free to walk through walls. But we could not exercise this freedom because we structured the whole situation, and the evidence, in an enslaving way.
4. Philosophical Reflections I

A. If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the mindless animals?

Such questions tempt one to engage in a sort of philosophical anthropology, using in part the method of introspection. Beliefs could be explained as arising in an attempt to deal with experienced frustrations by denying them in thought. The origin of Christian Science and magic would thereby be explained. Further, we could postulate a primordial anxiety-reaction to raw experience. This anxiety would be lessened by mythologies and explanatory beliefs. The frustration and the anxiety-reaction would be primordial non-cognitive needs for beliefs.

Going even farther, we could suppose that a being which could apprehend the whole universe through direct experience would have no need of beliefs. Beliefs would be a rickety method of coping with the limited range of our perception, a method by which our imperfect brains cope with the world. There would be an analogy with the physicist's use of phantom models to make experimental observations easier to comprehend.

However, there are two overwhelming objections to this philosophical anthropology. First, it purports to study the human mind as a derivative phenomenon, to study it from a God-like perspective. The philosophical anthropology thus consists of beliefs which are subject to the same objections as any other beliefs. It is on a par with any other beliefs; it has no privileged position. Specifically, it is in competition not only with my philosophy but with other accounts of the mind-reality relation, such as behaviorism, Platonism, and Thomism. And my philosophy provides me with no basis to defend my philosophical anthropology against their philosophical anthropologies. My philosophy doesn't even provide me with a basis to defend my philosophical anthropology against its own negation.

In short, the paradoxes which my philosophy uncovers must remain unexplained and unresolved.

The other objection to my philosophical anthropology is that its implications are unnecessarily conservative. An explanation of why people do something wrong can become an assertion that it is necessary to do wrong and finally a justification for doing wrong. But just because I tend, for example, to construe my perceptions as confirmations of propositions about phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability.

B. There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between beliefs and non-credulous mental activity.

Is my fear of jumping out of the window a belief? Strictly speaking, no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require propositional thought.

Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations (relative to my field of vision) as "the same object" a belief? Apparently, but this is very ambiguous.

Is my identification of tactile and visual "pencil-perceptions" as aspects of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through different senses) a belief? Yes.

It is possible to subjectively classify bodily movements according to whether they are intentional, because drunken awkwardness, adolescent awkwardness, and movements under ESS are clearly unintentional. Then does intentional movement of my hand require a belief that I can move my hand? Definitely not, although in rare cases some belief will accompany or precede the movement of my hand. But believing itself will not get the hand moved!

Is there any belief involved in identifying my leg, but not the leg of the table at which I am sitting, as part of my body? Maybe—another ambiguous case.

Are my emotions of longing and dread beliefs in future time? Is my emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily— the object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it.
C. At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other evidence. Our ‘‘immediate experience’’ is mediated; it is a derived phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our subjective standpoint.

1. But Alten does not seriously defend the claim that he does not distinguish between immediate and non-immediate. The claim that there is no distinction would be regarded as demented in every human culture. Every culture supposes that I may be tricked or cheated: there is a realm, the non-immediate or non-experienced, which provides an arena for surreptitious hostility to me. Every culture supposes that it is easier for me to tell what I am thinking than what you are thinking. Every culture supposes that I will hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only way of forming a model, but to construct a model of the relation between the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon.

2. Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative phenomenon, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it is the archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy exposes. ‘‘I cannot tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I cannot now perceive it.’’

D. In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain self-vitiating ‘‘nodes’’ in the logic of common sense. These nodes include the concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they are self-violating nodes in the logic of common sense. As a result, I have concluded that it is probably futile to debate the abstract validity of my analysis of these nodes. It does indeed appear as if I am debating over an abstract joke, and it is not apparent why I would attribute such great importance to a joke.

‘‘Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls’’ represents my present approach. The advantage of this approach is that it makes unmistakable the reason why I attribute so much importance to these philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation of why the life-world is subject to being undermined.

When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day scientific common sense. Walking through walls is understood as it would be pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside the point. What I am advocating—to skip over the intermediate details and go directly to the end result—is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive orientation such that one doesn’t even engage in scientific hypothesizing or have ‘‘object perceptions,’’ and thus wouldn’t know whether one was walking through a wall or not.

At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a hair’s-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental incompetence or death—but still, there is all of a hair’s-breadth. I magnify this hair’s-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization.

E. I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two circumstances in conflict. The ‘‘fact’’ that we are talking is one of the two circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other circumstance being the self-violating ‘‘nodes’’ I have mentioned. To repeat over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes.

Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking suggests, we do not ‘‘see’’ language. (That is, we do not experience an objective relation between words and things.) The language we ‘‘see’’ is a shell whose ‘‘transcendental reference’’ is provided by self-deception.

F. Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in ‘‘The Flaws Underlying Beliefs’’ is admissible and thus loses its philosophical force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of contradictory qualities. (But ‘‘He left an hour ago’’ begins to be a borderline case.) Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to classify.) The contradiction in ‘‘The Flaws Underlying Beliefs’’ has to do first with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don’t see something, yet act as if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter sense, to rescue every cheap superstition.
5. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FLYNTIAN MODALITY

1. STOP ALL "GROSS BELIEVING," SUCH AS BELIEF IN OTHER MINDS, CAUSALITY, AND THE PHANTOM ENTITIES OF SCIENCE (ATOMS, ELECTRONS, ETC.).

2. STOP THINKING IN PROPOSITIONAL LANGUAGE.

3. STOP ALL SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHEORIZING. DO NOT CONSIDER YOUR "SIGHTINGS" OF THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING AS CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS THERE WHEN YOU ARE NOT LOOKING AT IT—OR FOR THAT MATTER, AS CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS THERE WHEN YOU ARE LOOKING AT IT.

4. STOP ORGANIZING VISUAL EXPERIENCES AND TACTILE EXPERIENCES INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. STOP ORGANIZING SO-CALLED "DIFFERENT SPATIAL ORIENTATIONS OR DIFFERENT TOUCHED SURFACES OF OBJECTS" INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. THAT IS, STOP HAVING PERCEPTIONS OF OBJECTS.

5. STOP BELIEVING IN PAST AND FUTURE TIME. THAT IS, LIVE OUT OF TIME. STOP FEELING LONGING, DREAD, OR REGRET.

6. STOP BELIEVING THAT YOU CAN MOVE YOUR BODY.

7. STOP BELIEVING THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY OBJECTIVE MEANING.

8. YOU ARE NOW FREE TO WALK THROUGH WALLS (IF YOU CAN FIND THEM).
6. Some Objections to My Philosophy

A. The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language. (See Philosophical Investigations, §420.) Statements which imply that other people have minds work perfectly well in the context for which they were intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (§§ 402, 412, 119, 116.)

For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, and the Empire State Building (when I am not looking at it) are all things which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt "in a real one." (§303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein’s theorem, see Norman Malcolm’s memoir.) The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language.

Chapter 8: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs

In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discarding any given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just what, specifically, have been discarded. Now if the reader will consider the entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, psychoanalysis, Tibetan mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, comparative linguistics, Ongonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each with his own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential language", and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of knowledge are difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are incomplete and confused.

What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of "knowledge": have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so "basic" (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and of not having it.

Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered", beliefs formulated in "natural laws", beliefs "about substance", and the like. Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is ("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The non-strange character of one's "perceived world" is associated with beliefs "about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's "perceived world" is not part of what is "essential" in these beliefs.

Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict sense—and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply "that there are spatially distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a visual - "moving" - hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs.
Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring" may seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs "about the objectivity of referring", but they are not "objective referring"; and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs.

Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself have minds" may seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is associated with the belief "that others have minds", but it is not "other humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not part of what is essential in believing "that others have minds", points I anticipated in the second chapter.

Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form "If x, then y will follow in the future", especially if y is something one wants, and x is something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the switch, and the light goes on? They object so strongly because they fear "that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge". They say, for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the light will come on." As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about the necessity of such knowledge for survival", it is just more beliefs of the same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions.

By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their formulations, which I have been discussing, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to deny that he has the experiences. Now I am not denying that he has the experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's usually because one has beliefs.

The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a result, those who want to talk about experiences (my use) and still use English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to use such belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being the introduction of my use of 'experience' in the third chapter. Thus, some of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to experiences, language with which they are very strongly associated and which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by announcing when the language is used for that purpose.

It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by
suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stuck with English in this book is of course (I) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazyl) to learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper.

Chapter 7: Summary

The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to "doubt" question it, or to take a long time to decide whether it is right; one can "question" (not believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the ascription may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is objectively wrong"). I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right.

Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to be "true or false", to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you to believe something. for example, to believe "that there is a table behind you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to continuing not to think; or only imagining—for example, "visualizing yourself with your back to a table"), you are going to have to have the attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it.

As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language"); if you don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not therefore valueless.

So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, "obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical problems (for example, 'Could an omnipotent god do the literally impossible?'), 'Are statements about what I did in the past while alone capable of intersubjective verification?' arising from them? And again, one begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be "Why bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving myself". Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one "naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so
(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived.

In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy; just as Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt in a real case. Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as inescapable as impossible to doubt in a real case as any belief we may have today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs" shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It is perfectly possible to project a metaphysical outlook on experience which is totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred percent certainty that the Empire State Building exists; the point is that we need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs" shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural sciences, involve outright self-deception.

These discoveries have consequences far more important than the technical issues involved. It is by no means trivial that I do not have to pray, or to fast, or to accept the moral dictates of the clergy, or to give money to the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to doubt in a real case, as in my essay "Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls." I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these consequences.

A reply to the Wittgensteinian attitude which is technically adequate can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in the aphorism that "the meaning is the use" (as an explication of the natural language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bendy descriptive linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic than the level on which his philosophical discussions were conducted.

Wittgenstein held that philosophical or metaphysical controversies literally would not arise if it were not for bad philosophers. They would not arise because there is nothing problematic about sentences, expressing Wittgenstein's inherited beliefs, in ordinary usage. This rhetorical maneuver is the inverse of what it seems to be. Wittgenstein doesn't prove that the paradoxes uncovered by "bad" philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary language; he defines the philosophers' discussions as a misuse of ordinary language because they uncover paradoxes is ordinary language propositions. Wittgenstein waits to see whether a philosopher uncovers problems in ordinary language propositions; and if the philosopher does so, then Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as inadmissible.

Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to this position, we would not encounter such problems if we would use ordinary language properly. But what does this position amount to? The philosopher's question has not been proved improper; it has been defined as improper because it leads to problems. The reason why "the proper use of ordinary language never leads to paradoxes" is that Wittgenstein has defined proper use as use in which no paradoxes are visible. Wittgenstein has not resolved or eliminated any problems; he has just refused to notice them. Wittgenstein attempts to pass off, as a discovery about philosophy and language, a gratuitous definition to the effect that certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him are inadmissible, a gratuitous ban on certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him. His purpose is to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish intellectual dishonesty.

B. In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if

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there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the middle of the argument by a play on the words "subject" and "object."

When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be "proved" that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, etc. from immediate experience, then all these phenomena would be trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it would be trivial. We ask how I know that the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it. If the answer is that I know through immediate experience, then subjective reality has been collapsed to my subjectivity. The dilemma for transcendental arguments is that they propose to overcome the gap between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself, yet they do not want to conclude that appearances exhaust reality.

There are two special assumptions which are smuggled into supposedly assumptionless transcendental arguments. First, there is the belief that there is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly, there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with crossed fingers.)

Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step such as the following, for example. We can have "real knowledge" of particular things only if there is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they describe; thus there must be such a relationship. This argument is plausible only if the reader can be trusted to overlook the alternative that we don't have this "real knowledge."

In the way of supplementary remarks, we may mention that transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental arguments are supposed to prove.
Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)

This monograph defines philosophy as such—philosophy proper—to be an inquiry as to which beliefs are "true," or right. The right beliefs are tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as corresponding to non-tautological propositions.

Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is also an unavoidable activity in the sense that the notion of a belief, and the notion of judging the truth of a belief, are intrinsic to common sense and the natural language. Philosophers may not have achieved convincing results in philosophy proper; but the question of which beliefs are right is continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which philosophers have dealt with it.

All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be helpful to examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs.

It is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy non-cognitive needs.

To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "I could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is true I don’t want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions being considered here are admitted self-deceptions.

A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for non-cognitive reasons follows.

1. Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn’t stand to live if I didn’t believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don’t want to know it."

2. One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example.

3. The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for ethical reasons.

4. Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity.

5. A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called "theologizing," in recognition of the archetypal activity in this category.

When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific method such as A. d’Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he believed in the "real existence of a real absolute objective universe—a common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who discovers it bit by bit." The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is improbable, because he must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then their interest in science cannot be cognitive.
The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not be satisfied by that belief's negation. But inside a science's circumscribed area of inquiry, the scientist can welcome the establishment of either of two contradictory propositions; in other words, his non-cognitive need can be satisfied by either proposition. It is in this sense that he can impartially test or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a single alternative is welcome.

6. Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had made valid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways—once as scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige.

7. The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is provided by the person who holds a fearful belief which is widely considered to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized.

This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this monograph.

(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without change.)

Part I: The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems

Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts

In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, formulations of them (for example, 'Other persons have minds' as representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or false).

To make this book as engaging as possible, I would like to start right into the solution of the problem, to begin with the material in the next chapter. However, it effects, I think, a considerable clarification and simplification of the presentation of the solution if I first introduce certain concepts in an extended discussion. Then, when they enter into the solution they won't have to be just suggested in a condensed explanation which has to be repeated over and over. Thus, this chapter will be a properly philosophically neutral introduction of the concepts, an introduction which doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it.

The first concept is a new one, that of "explanation". Explanation of a familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is wanted that the expression "mean". To explain: I will be discussing philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their "meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which the "meanings", uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of
which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents (and non-referents), then the new expressions must clearly have referents. Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. (I will not say here just how I use 'connotation'. What the connotations of an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are supposed to be like.) "Finding", or constructing, an expression (with its use) supposed to be acceptable to oneself as a replacement, of the kind described, for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced will be said to be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the "explication". Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the same thing, any explication will be as good as any other.

I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of Rudolf Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very problematic 'definition'. For him, explication is a scientist’s, or philosopher of science’s, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of "work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an expression is suggested, as an explication for ‘thing having a mind’ (if supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other "overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for ‘thing having a mind’, since ‘thing having a mind’ presumably has the connotations for the reader “that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt behaving, or having certain brain electricity—the mind is observable only by the thing having it”, and the explication doesn’t deserve these connotations; the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the proposed explication. It doesn’t make any difference if there’s a causal connection between having a mind and the other things, because the expression ‘thing having a mind’ itself, and not the supposed effects of having a mind, is what is under discussion.

As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be slightly less relevant to the reader’s philosophical problems than it would be otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical problems.

Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the explications for ‘thing having a mind’ mentioned above.

The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for ‘true statement’. ('Partial' because the explication, although much clearer than the explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.)

Well, what is a "statement"? How do what are usually said to be "statements" state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language you don’t read, so you won’t assume that it’s obvious what it means. What does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just about the marks in the book, or what seem (?) to be the rules of their arrangement, or the like, won’t answer these questions. In fact, I expect that when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won’t seem easy ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important connotations of ‘true statement’, and, more generally, of ‘statement’, as traditionally and commonly used, is that a ‘statement’ is an ‘assertion which has truth value’ (is true or false) (or “has content”, as it is sometimes said, rather misleadingly). That is, the ‘verbal’ part of a statement is supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is related. (The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are interested in.) Thus, if ‘true statement’ is to be explicated, ‘assertion having truth value’ and ‘is true’ (and ‘has content’ in a misleading use) have to be explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication
for 'true statement' deserves the connotations which were suggested with 'assertion having truth value' and 'is true'. One important conclusion from these observations is that although 'sentences' (the bodies of sound or bodies of marks such as 'The man talks') are often said to be 'statements', would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate 'statement' by simply identifying it with 'sentence' (in my sense); something must be said about such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify 'statement' with 'sentence', the latter being explicated in terms of the ('formal') rules for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value.

In explicating 'true statement' I will use the most elegant approach, one relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest way to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to 'apply' 'table' to the thing. It is supposed that 'table' has been 'interpreted', that is, that it is 'determinate' to which, of all things, applications of 'table' are (to be said to be) 'true'. (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 'determinate' which, of all things (events), are 'occurrences of the word 'table'' are expressions 'equivalent to' 'table'). The word 'determinate' is the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one can 'apply' the word to the thing by pointing out 'first' the word and 'then' the thing. 'Point out' is restricted to refer to 'ostension', pointing out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to 'directing attention to things not in one's presence' as well. The assertion is 'true', of course, if and only if the thing to which 'table' is applied is one of the things to which it is determinate that the application of 'table' is (to be said to be) 'true', otherwise 'false'. It should be clear that such a pointing out of a 'first' thing and a 'second', the first being an interpreted expression, is an assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further suggest 'interpreted expression' as an explication for 'name'; with respect to this explication, the things to which equivalent names ('occurrences of a name') may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is how a name has referents: I have not said, for example, whether the relation between name and referents is an 'objective, metaphysical entity', which would be getting into philosophy proper.

The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that what one wants to say are 'statements', namely sentences used in the context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the 'simple' kind; thus an explication for 'true statement' can be found. To do so, first let us say that the 'complex name' gotten by replacing a sentence's 'main verb' with the corresponding participle is the 'associated name' of the sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: 'The table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one man while the other man talked'; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be invented. Now what we would like to say does, in using a sentence to make a statement, is to so to speak 'assert' its associated name; this "asserting name" being 'true' if and only if it has a referent. However, one doesn't assert names; names just have referents— it is statements that one makes, "asserts", and that are 'true' or 'false'. How, then, do we explicate this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. In other words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying 'having a referent' to it. For example, the sentence 'Boston is in Massachusetts' should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'.

Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even more unnatural. Second, it may seem natural enough to speak of interpreting "simple names" (Fries' Class 1 words), but not so natural to speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex
names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything about what the “meaning” (intension), as opposed to the referents (and non-referents), of a name is. I might say that a thing can’t have an intension unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous word “determinate”, because I haven’t said anything about how names get referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in some form must have the central role in it.)

“Statements”, then, can be regarded as assertions of the “simple” kind which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have described. I could thus explicate ‘true statement’ as referring to those true “simple” assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of ‘true statement’ having to do with the method of applying the first member to the second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it is more elegant to explicate “true statement” as referring to all true assertions of the “simple” kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of the two explications the reader prefers.

So much for the preliminaries.

Chapter 3: “Experience”

I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical language to a language with which my philosophy can be explicated. This terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expounding my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. I will, I think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right.

First, consider the term “non-experience”. Although the concept of a non-experience is intrinsically far more “difficult” than the concept of “experience” which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, presupposed in all “natural languages” and throughout philosophy, is so taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are perceivable objects—for example, a table (as opposed to one’s perceptions of it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distances of objects from oneself); minds other than one’s own; causal relationships (ordinarily understood); referential relationships (the relationships between names and their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the second chapter); unperceivable “things” (microscopic objects (of course, viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge. (To simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.)

Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one can not know whether there are any—this is not a non-belief but a complex belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is presumably a connotation of “other minds” for the reader, as explained in the second chapter.

In the history of philosophy, the concept of non-experience comes first. Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a perception, or experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one’s eyes (assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by having a “visual-table-experience”. The theory goes on to say that these perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in one’s mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First,
saying that perceptions of objects are in one’s mind is not saying that they are, for example, visualizations, imaginations, such as one’s visualization of a table with one’s eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental".

The theory that they are in the mind is a belief. This point leads directly to the second source of confusion. Does the English word ‘table’, as ordinarily used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity external to one’s perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one’s perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to the reader, then he probably uses ‘table’, ‘perceived table’, and ‘table-experience’ as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the perceptions.

Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term ‘experience’ is important here because with it philosophers finally made a start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionably knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not know whether it’s a true perception of a table, whether there’s an objective table there; or whether it’s an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one’s experiences not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that there is no question as to whether one has one’s experiences or what they are like. One doesn’t believe (that one has) one’s experiences; to try to do so would be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, “thinking” that one doesn’t have one’s experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say cannot really be doubted without losing one’s sanity (for example, some philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hypocrisy which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One does not have other-persons’-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one’s table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as will be shown).

I have explained the current use of the term ‘experience’. Now I want to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing ‘non-experience’ I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of the term, in the case of ‘experience’ I am going to suggest a new use for the term.) As I explained, the concept of non-experience preceded that of experience, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the former. What I am interested in, however, is not ‘experience’ as it implies ‘perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind’, but as it refers to that which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not something one believes exists. I am going to use ‘experience’ to refer, as it already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use ‘experience’ is completely neutral with respect to relationships to non-experiences, is not an antonym for ‘non-experience’ as conventionally used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy between ‘experience’ as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences or in particular the realm where they could be, and ‘experience’ without these connotations.

Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be obvious that although my term ‘experience’ was introduced last, it is intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I have used the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition to explain my term, but this doesn’t mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, especially, the theory of knowing about non-experiences. Even if the reader’s conceptual background does not involve the concept of non-experience, and especially the modern Western theory of knowing about non-experiences, he ought to be able to understand, and realize the “primacy” of, my term ‘experience’. The term should be supra-cultural.

I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term ‘experience’.
As I have said, it is “intrinsically” the simplest term, but I can not define it by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including the traditional term ‘experience’, the antonym of ‘non-experience’, is based on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes incorrectly said, “ontologies”) differ. Even such a sentence as ‘The table is black’ implies the formulation ‘Material objects are real’ (to the materialist), or ‘So-called objects are ideas in the mind’ (to the idealist), or ‘Substances and attributes are real’, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of ‘experience’, about its referents, there is about my English, for example, when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be dropped from ‘experience’. There can be this new term, the philosopher is not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or other natural language, but by having referents.

As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my ‘experience’ because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the most important in this book. The fact that although it is the “simplest” and least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my ‘experience’ he is likely to precisely misunderstand the rest of the book as an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It’s good that this isn’t what I’m trying to say, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this realm would have to be a non-experience.) If he is lucky he will just find the book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may already realize what I’m going to say.

Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution

Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to explore all its implications; that will come later.

However, in the hope that it will make the main “argument” of this chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous version of it, which should give the “intuitive insight” behind the main argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief—a contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The “necessity”, but inconsistency, of skepticism “shows” my conclusion in an intuitively understandable way.

To get on to the definitive version of my “argument”. I will say that one name “depends” on another if and only if it has the logical relation to that other that ‘black table’ has to ‘table’: a referent of the former is necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity depends on ‘non-experience’, since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For example, ‘Other persons having minds’, the associated name of the formulation ‘Other persons have minds’, certainly depends on ‘non-experience’. Thus, anything true of ‘non-experience’ will be true of the associated name of any formulation of a belief.

In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of ‘non-experience’), showed the connotations of the expressions ‘non-experience’ and ‘experience’ (traditional). What I did not go on to
show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's experience (used in my, "neutral", sense unless I say otherwise). Could there be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in the last chapter. (Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it without appealing to other beliefs). If there could be, if such awareness were just an experience, the distinctness of experience from experience (traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concept of experience (traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into experience. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience (traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in one's experience—a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as they are supposed to be understood. And for "understanding" 'non-experience' (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an experience (traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands 'non-experience'—and "non-experience"—"non-experience"; but here one is, using "non-experience" and "non-experience"—to say so (which certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible for there to be no-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the concept of non-experience, it collapses. (A final point for the expert. This tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences about names, which show contradictions — that one must not assume that one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say so (does assume it)—with explicit stratification.)

My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' (traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves 'experience' (traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest, it shows that one who "accepts" the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no explanations at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is an important point about method which should be brought out. If all "non-experiential language", "belief language", is inconsistent, how can I show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as "all formulations of beliefs are false".

Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable explication which was true; in short, the belief would have a true formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a formulation of a belief—leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made. The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of
the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. (Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to be a "table".""

Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be discussed here.

The unenlightened reader may react to all of this with a lot of "Yes, but..." thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of linguistic arguments, he may tend to regard my result as a mere (if embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how well the reader understands that.) And there does remain a lot to be said about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these matters.
Part II: Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems

Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts

In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by discussing believing itself, as a ("conscious") mental act. Although I will be talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of the book, like the last part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify "common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects.

I should say immediately that "belief", in its traditional use as supposed to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of non-experience", has no explicatio at all satisfactory, has been discredited. This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for "belief" in the use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of consciously having a belief", of what is "in one's head" when one says that one "believes a certain thing". Further, I will, for convenience in distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief "that others have minds", for example, or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be "about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely about experiences; I will not be trying to talk "about the realm of non-experience, the relation of beliefs to it"). I expect that it is already fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his "beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of "act of consciously believing", although I will need to make a few comments about that too. What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, use of a word ("belief") salvaged from the unexplicable use of the word, rather than rejecting the word altogether.

There is a further point about terminology. The reader should remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that perceptions are in the mind", one can make a distinction between mental and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an "imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by "imagined" I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I use 'imagined' because saying 'mental-table-experience' is too much like saying 'table in the mind' and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining like a (non-mental) table-experience). In other words, an imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience; all right, but it is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a (non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined-imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an imagined-experience, which way you want to look at it. If this terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences".

I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, not perceived by oneself, behind one now", or anything else. Well, in the first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed statement, such as 'There is a table behind me'. This is not all one does, however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not be, at all like the claim "that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is "consciously, deliberately" self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience", I
don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving".

I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as mentioned above. The attitude is "peripheral", is a matter of the way one is attentive. Saying that the attitude is "conscious, deliberate", is a little strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brain washing; what I am trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; with respect to English the attitude is a "vague, elusive" thing, very difficult to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by saying that it is the attitude "that such and such". (The reader must not think I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a (non-mental) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief "that there is a table behind me". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic expression, it will be on an imagined-experience such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself (to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is a (non-mental) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked the question, one stops believing "that there is a table behind one", and starts believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a non-experience", a different matter (different belief).

If one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression (which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a referent". With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's attention in believing would be primarily on the expression "There is a table behind me", pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent". Unexplicable expressions, then, function as principal components of beliefs.

(This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse the reader it can be skipped.) I will now describe the relation between the version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in the version involving language, the attention is on something which is "regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove", and correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, referents of expressions-which, for the more critical person, may make believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in the version of the belief not involving language, has something which functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving "language" one takes note of an "expression" not having a referent, since a referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for awareness of the referent to be part of one's experience corresponds to the attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's experience corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving language consists of being attentive to an imagined-experience and having the attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief.

Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of "attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive", so that I am calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the
experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is "self-deceiving", is a "(conscious) self-deception experience", because when aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just about has to be a "(conscious)" self-deception experience to transform mere taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to be a "belief". The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be "self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more than to say that the attitude is "self-deceiving".

In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention some things often associated with believing but not "essential" to it. First, one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and believes "that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing table", one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be "evidence for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic expression 'x', one may give attention to a referent of 'imagined-\(x\)' experience', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to imagined-x-experiences, such that x-experiences are supposed, said, to be "analogous to the referent of 'x'". In the latter case the x-experiences will be mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of 'There being a table behind one'. An example of imagined-x-experiences (such that x-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be "analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as Being".

Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", "arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive justification, the kind involving the citing of experience supposed to be evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them, inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has four legs; therefore "(it is more probable that)" any other table has four legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a lesser, weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, then one already had the belief "implicitly" (it was a conjunct of a belief one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it.

I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it is ironic that "believer", without qualification, has been used by believers as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny "the existence of non-experience", to "cause non-experiences to vanish", so to speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental experiences, "perceived objects". My position is not skepticism of any kind, is not, for example, the belief "that there is a realm where there could either be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere "decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies "the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit.

What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions dependent on 'non-experience', and pointed out that those who expect to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right
philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)).
1. Perhaps the most diseased justification the artist can give of his profession is to say that it is somehow scientific. LaMonte Young, Milton Babbitt, and Stockhausen are exponents of this sort of justification. The law which relates the mass of a body to its velocity has predictive value and is an outstanding scientific law. Is the work of art such a law? The experiment which shows that the speed of light is independent of the motion of its source is a measurement of a phenomenon crucial to the confirmation of a scientific hypothesis; it is an outstanding scientific experiment. Is the work of art such a measurement? The invention of the vacuum tube was an outstanding technological advance. Is the work of art such a technological advance? Differential geometry is a deductive analysis of abstract relations and an outstanding mathematical theory. Is the work of art such an analysis?

The motives behind the "scientific" justification of art are utterly sinister. Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a pedantic pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his "scientific music", intends nothing less than the suppression of the culture of "lower classes" and "lower races."

It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to the "scientific" justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters all existing "scientific" laws of art, and yet is more important to the audience than all the works that "obey" the laws.

2. The artist or entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to win public acceptance for it, to advertise and promote it, to sell it, to force it on people. If the public doesn't accept it at first, he is disappointed. He doesn't drop it, but repeatedly urges the product on them.

People have every reason, then, to ask the artist: Is your product good for
me even if I don’t like or enjoy it? This question really lays art open. One of the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to defend art without referring to people’s liking or enjoying it. (Functions of art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is “Do you like it?” Once the scientific justification of art is discredited, the artist usually has to admit: If you don’t like or enjoy my product, there’s no reason why you should “consume” it.

There are exceptions. Art sometimes becomes the sole channel for political dissent, the sole arena in which oppressive social relations can be transcended. Even so, subjectivity of value remains a feature which distinguishes art and entertainment from other activities. Thus art is historically a leisure activity.

3. But there is a fundamental contradiction here. Consider the object which one person produces for the liking, the enjoyment of another. The value of the object is supposed to be that you just like it. It supposedly has a value which is entirely subjective and entirely within you, is a part of you. Yet the object can exist without you, is completely outside you, is not you or your valuing, and has no inherent connection with you or your valuing. The product is not personal to you.

Such is the contradiction in much art and entertainment. It is unfortunate that it has to be stated so abstractly, but the discussion is about something so personal that there can be no interpersonal examples of it. Perhaps it will help to say that in appreciating or consuming art, you are always aware that it is not you, your valuing—yet your liking it, your valuing it is usually the only thing that can justify it.

In art and entertainment, objects are produced having no inherent connection with people’s liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find their value in people’s liking them. To be totally successful, the object would have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another’s product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to “be oneself” for other people, to “express oneself” for them.

4. There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of these experiences, by comparing and contrasting them with art. I have coined the term “brend” for these experiences.

Consider all of your doings, what you already do. Exclude the gratifying of physiological needs, physically harmful activities, and competitive activities. Concentrate on spontaneous self-amusement or play. That is, concentrate on everything you do just because you like it, because you just like it as you do it.

Actually, these doings should be referred to as your just-likings. In saying that somebody likes an art exhibit, it is appropriate to distinguish the art exhibit from his liking of it. But in the case of your just-likings, it is not appropriate to distinguish the objects valued from your valuing, and the single term that covers both should be used. When you write with a pencil, you are rarely attentive to the fact that the pencil was produced by somebody other than yourself. You can use something produced by somebody else without thinking about it. In your just-likings, you never notice that things are not produced by you. The essence of a just-liking is that in it, you are not aware that the object you value is less personal to you than your very valuing.

These just-likings are your “brend.” Some of your dreams are brend; and some children’s play is brend (but formal children’s games aren’t). In a sense, though, the attempt to give interpersonal examples of brend is futile, because the end result is neutral things or actions, cut off from the valuing which gives them their only significance; and because the end result suggests that brend is a deliberate activity like carrying out orders. The only examples for you are your just-likings, and you have to guess them by directly applying the abstract definition.

Even though brend is defined exclusively in terms of what you like, it is not necessarily solitary. The definition simply recognizes that valuing is an act of individuals; that to counterfeit the likes of the community to the likes of the individuals who make it up is an ideological deception.

5. It is now possible to say that much art and entertainment are pseudo-brend; that your brand is the total originality beyond art; that your brend is the absolute self-expression and the absolute enjoyment beyond art.

Can brend, then, replace art, can it expand to fill the space now occupied by art and entertainment? To ask this question is to ask when utopia will arrive, when the barrier between work and leisure will be broken down, when work will be abolished. Rather than holding out utopian promises, it is better to give whoever can grasp it the realization that the experience beyond art already occurs in his life—but is totally suppressed by the general repressiveness of society.

Note: The avant-garde artist may raise a final question. Can’t art or entertainment compensate for its impersonality by having sheer newness as a
value? Can't the very foreignness of the impersonal object be entertaining? Doesn't this happen with Mock Risk Games, for example? The answer is that entertainment's newness is also subjective. What is entertainingly strange to one person is incomprehensible, annoying, or irrelevant to another. The only difference between foreignness and other entertainment values is that trend does not have more foreignness than conventional entertainment does.

As for objective newness, or the objective value of Mock Risk Games, these issues are so difficult that I have been unable to reach final conclusions about them.

2.


One day a little boy got up and looked at his toys, appraised them and decided they were of no value to him so he did them in. Seeing that others were blindly and blissfully enjoying theirs he offered them a long and "radical new theory" of "pure recreation" for their enjoyment but before he let them in for this highly secret and "revolutionary theory" they should follow his example and partake of a little 20th C. iconoclast. From those that balked he removed the label "avant-garde" and attached the label "traditionalist" or if they were already labeled "traditionalist" he added one more star. If they accepted they got a "hip" rating with gold cluster and if they comprehended the worth of his theory well enough to destroy their own art they would be awarded assignments to destroy those works whose designers were no longer around to speak out in their behalf.

Now about this hip radical new theory of pure recreation.—Well-alright simply what people do anyway but don't realize it but it seems that what people "do anyway and don't realize it" will not be fully appreciated until "what people do in the name of art" is eliminated. If art can be relegated to obscurity, if someone can get John Coltrane to stop blowing, if someone can smash up all the old Art tatum records as well as all the existing pianos, if someone can get all that stuff out of those museums, if someone can only burn down all those concert halls, movie houses, small galleries as well as rooms in private houses that contain signs of art, if someone can do in all the cathedrals and monuments bridges etc., if someone can get rid of the sun, moon, stars, ocean, desert trees birds, bushes mountains, rivers, joy, sadness inspiration or any other natural phenomenon that reminds us of the ugly scourge art that has preoccupied and plagued man since he can remember then yes then at last Henry Flynt, sorry!

[Henry Flynt]

will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whoooppeeee
[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved]
3.

letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62

Dear Henry,

perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas—those most admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage & Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding “new” ideas has not shown too much more than that it has become established as a traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can’t be avoided that this is an academic approach which presupposes a history to react against—what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have only had a few good ones. (I suppose none of this is very clear and I can’t seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand way—but what I mean by “new ideas” is not only what you might call “Concept Art” but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms more than any specific content or forms). Once one is committed to attempt these efforts—and tries it for a while—one becomes aware that if one wants “experience” one must repeat himself until other new things occur: a position difficult if not impossible to accept with large “idea” ambitions. So one remains idle, repeats things, or finds some form of concentration and duration outside the art—jazz, chess, whatever. I think that today art is a form of art history. I don’t think entertainment solves the problem presented by avant gart art since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is now hard to get—i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with “just liked” things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art (some body of stuff to react against—to be thought of as opponent or memory or however). As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and when avoiding “given” structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. If I need concentration, which I do, I can’t think of anything on my own as good as chess.

One accepts language, one accepts logic.

Best regards,

Bob Morris

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FROM "CULTURE" TO VERAMUSEMENT

Boston-New York

PRESS RELEASE: for March-April, 1963

Henry Flynt, Tony Conrad, and Jack Smith braved the cold to demonstrate against Serious Culture (and art) on Wednesday, February 27. They began at the Museum of Modern Art at 1:30 p.m., picketing with signs bearing the slogans DEMOLISH SERIOUS CULTURE! / DESTROY ART! / DEMOLISH ART MUSEUMS! / NO MORE ART! / DEMOLISH CONCERT HALLS! / DEMOLISH LINCOLN CENTER!; and handing out announcements of Flynt’s lecture the next evening. Benjamin Patterson came up to give encouragement. There was much spontaneous interest among people around and in the Museum. At about 1:50, a corpulent, richly dressed Museum official came out and imperiously told the picketers that he was going to straighten them out, that the Museum had never been picketed, that it could not be picketed without its permission, that it owned the sidewalk, and that the pickets would have to go elsewhere. The picketer who had obtained police permission for the demonstration was immediately dispatched to call the police about the matter, while the other two stood aside. It was found that the Museum official had not told the truth; and the picketing was resumed. People who care about the rights of pickets generally should recognize the vileness of, and oppose, the notion that picketing can only be at the permission of the establishment being picketed. (As for previous picketing of the Museum, it is a matter of record.) Interest in the demonstration increased; people stopped to ask questions and talk. There was a much greater demand for announcements than could be supplied. Some people indicated their sympathy with the demonstrators. The demonstrators then went on to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Because of the unexpected requirement of a permit to picket on a park street, they had to picket on Lexington Avenue, crossing 82nd Street. As a result they were far from the fools lined up to worship the Mona Lisa, but there was still interest. Finally, they went to Philharmonic Hall. Because of the time, not many people were there, but still there was interest; people stopped to talk and wanted more announcements than were available. The demonstrations ended at 3:45 p.m. Photos of the pickets were taken at all three places.

On Thursday evening, February 28, at Walter DeMaria’s loft, Henry Flynt gave a long lecture expounding the doctrine the Wednesday demonstrations were based on. On entering the lecture room, the visitor found himself stepping in the face of a Mona Lisa print placed as the doormat. To one side
was an exhibition of demonstration photos and so forth. Behind the lecturer was a large picture of Vladimir Mayakovsky, while on either side were the signs used in the demonstrations, together with one saying VERAMUSEMENT—NOT CULTURE. About 20 people came to the lecture. The lecturer showed first the suffering caused by Serious-Cultural snobbery, by its attempts to force individuals in line with things supposed to have objective validity, but actually representing only alien subjective tastes sanctioned by tradition. He then showed that artistic categories have disintegrated, and that their retention has become obscurantist. (He showed that the purpose of didactic art is better served by documentaries.) Finally, in the most intellectually sophisticated part of the lecture, he showed the superiority of each individual’s veramusement (partially defined on the lecture announcement) to institutionalized amusement activities (which impose foreign tastes on the individual) and indeed to all “culture” the lecture was concerned with. After the lecture, Flynn told how his doctrine was anticipated by little known ideas of Mayakovsky, Driga Vertov, and their group, as related in Ilya Ehrenburg’s memoirs and elsewhere. He touched on the Wednesday demonstrations. He spoke of George Maciunas’ FLUXUS, with which all this is connected. Several people at the lecture congratulated Flynn on the clarity of the presentation and logicality of the arguments. Photos were taken.

5.

Statement of November 1963

Back in March 1963, I sent the first FCTB PRESS RELEASE, about FCTB’s February picketing and lecture, to all the communications media, including the New Yorker. It is so good that the New Yorker wanted to use it, but they didn’t want to give FCTB any free publicity; so they finally published an inept parody of it, in the October 12, 1963 issue, pp. 49-51. They changed my last name to Mackie, changed February 27 to September 25, the Museum of Modern Art to a church, changed our slogans to particularly idiotic ones (although they got in ‘NO MORE ART/CULTURE’ later on), and added incidents; but the general outlines, and the phrases lifted verbatim from the FCTB RELEASE, make the relationship clear.—Henry Flynn

6.

Henry,

Received your note this morning. I had written down a few things about the lecture the very night I got home but decided they were not very clear so I didn’t send them. Don’t know if I can make it any clearer... actually I keep thinking that I must have overlooked something because the objection I have to make seems too obvious. You spend much time and effort locating Veramusement, stating clearly what it is not, and stating that it is, if I get it, of the essence of an awareness, rather memory, of an experience which cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be located or focused by external activities. And, in fact, as you said, may cut across, or “intersect” one or another or several activities. You have discredited activities-like art, competitive games—pseudo work or unsatisfactory recreation by employing arguments which are external to “experiencing” these activities (e.g. chess is bad because why agree to some arbitrary standard of performance which doesn’t fit you)...well it seems to me that Veramusement could never replace any cultural form because it has no external “edges” but rather by definition can occur anywhere anytime anywhere (By the way I want to say here that its existence as a past tense or memory I find objectionable—but I can’t at the moment really say why...) It seems that you have these two things going: Veramusement, that has to do with experience, and art, work, entertainment, that have to do with society and I don’t think that the exposition of how the two things are related has been very clear. George Herbert Mead, an early Pragmatist (don’t shudder at that word, but I can see you throwing up your hands in despair) talked about this relation as a kind of double aspect of the personality (which he called the “‘me’ and the ‘I’...can’t remember his book, something like Mind, Self, and Society). I thought you presented the lecture very well, but towards the end I was getting too tired to listen very carefully and I am sorry because this was the newest writing. I would like very much to read this part, i.e. that which dealt with the evolution of work, automation and the liberation from drudgery—send me a copy if you can.

Best regards,

Bob Morris

3/6/63
Henry 3/12/1963

Jazz Cage "Folk Music" Communism (anti-art?)

I've been along this road too.
Yes I certainly do see the harmfulness of serious culture. My favorite movies are plain documentaries.

"Veramusement" questions: the way you set it up it sound like veramusement is IT. Some kind of Absolute good state or activity, -ie- ATHLETICS are out.
--now my brother is a healthy athlete--he enjoys nothing so much as swimming or playing tennis all day (he likes to use his body--and he likes the form-competition)

Is this "wrong"
Should he stop--

or wouldn't your "creep theory" which lets each person be himself and relish in himself--by extension from this--shouldn't the atheletic person be allowed to be himself? --too.

I think you were opening up the world to the people at the lecture--

making them move free--

"" " ready to be themselves

I think you were right in not giving examples!

however
your absolute--statements and "come on"--and blend with the communist ideas--(My mind was pretty tired by then and I didn't follow how the veramusement--was tied to communism)--this IT kind of talk--can only sho people off and let them wait for the next revision or explication.

people off--and let them wait for the next revision or explication.

Walter DeMaria

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8. Dear Henry, March 18, 1963

As I said before, my main reactions to yr lecture & ideas is that I'm for Henry Flynt but not for his ideas. I think the spirit you show in carrying on yr crusade is admirable and exciting. However, I am not against art and think that any artist who would say that he is or think that he is would be masochistic enough to need psychiatric care. Since you make no claims to being an artist this does not refer to you. However, I do call myself a poet and do think of myself as one. I like art, culture, etc. and do not yet feel that I am being screwed by it. Until I do, I will not need to turn to anti-art movements.

All best wishes.
Yours,
Diane Wakoski

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9. "Dear Mr. Flynt...Since I may be depending on organized culture for my loot & livelihood I can wish you only a limited success in your movement...Cornelius Cardew" [from a postcard of June 7, 1963]
2/22/1963
Jack Smith and Henry Flynt demonstrate against the Museum of Modern Art, February 22, 1963
(photo by Tony Conrad)
9. The Perception-Dissociation of Physics

From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the touch emit infrared light. It is just that the range of human receptors is too limited for them to register the tactile effect of light or the visual effect of moderate temperatures.

Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along the human sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light reflection and emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the discussion.

Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and even philosophical. However, the psychology involved always has to do with experimentally demonstrable aspects of perception. The philosophy involved is always scientific concept formation, the relating of concepts to experiments. Sooner or later it will be clear that our only concern is with experiences that would cause a physicist to modify physics.

Throughout much of the discussion, we have to assume that the human physicist exists before the sight-touch split occurs, that he continues to exist after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore, we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of touches; and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us "touch" includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is
a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation between the two becomes completely chaotic. A totally blind person does not directly experience any incomprehensible dislocation, nor does a person with psychogenic tactile anesthesia (actually observed in hysteria patients). Let us define such a change. Consider the sight-touch correlation identified with closing one’s eyes. The point is that there is a whole realm of sights which do not occur when one can feel that one’s eyes are closed.

Let $T$ indicate tactile and $V$ indicate visual. Let the tactile sensation of open eyes be $T_1$ and of closed eyes be $T_2$. Now anything that can be seen with closed eyes—from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct sunlight—can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be $V_1$, and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be $V_2$. If there are sights seen only with closed eyes, they will be $V_2$; we want disjoint classes. We are interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined: let us denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1)$, $(T_1, V_2)$, $(T_2, V_1)$, $(T_2, V_2)$. In reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden. Let us designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following notation. Consider a rectangular array of “places” such that the place in the $i$th row and $j$th column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of regularities in our present world.

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
T & p \\
V & p
\end{array}$$

So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the present world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is excluded, meaning that at the moment, a $V_1$ is defined as lasting from the time the eyes open until the time they next close.

We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a 2x2 array, there are 16 ways it can be filled with $p$'s and $f$'s. That is, there are 16 imaginable states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the present state of $p$ to another state such as $f$. However,

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
T & p \\
V & p
\end{array}$$

we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is excluded. We aren’t interested in changing to a state having only $f$’s, which amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of $f$'s leaves one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to open-eye sights); such an “impairment” is of little interest. Of the remaining changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are changes in the place of the one $f$; the change to the state having only $p$’s; and finally

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
T & p \\
V & p
\end{array}$$

In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are $[T_i]$ and $[V_j]$. The number of classes in a partition, $m$ for touch and $n$ for sight, is its detailedness. The detailedness of the product partition $[T_i] \times [V_j]$ is written $m \times n$. This detailedness virtually determines the $(mn)^2$ imaginable states, although it doesn’t determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a composition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state lasts for a finite time. A function would be a general rule for rewriting states. A 2x2 rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, from $(a, b)$ to $(c, a)$.

But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change changes, and states having only $f$’s. We are unenthusiastic about “impairing” changes, changes to states with rows or columns of $f$’s. Of the remaining changes, some merely forbid, replacing $p$'s with $f$'s. The rest of the changes are the most perception-dissociating ones.

As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave the forbidden concurrence permitted; or else they merely leave permitted successions forbidden—for example, in order to open your eyes in the dark you might have to open them in the light and then turn the light off. These secondary changes are of secondary interest.

If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and
apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will (observable as electrochemical impulses along efferent neurons). If a change occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a formerly forbidden concurrence, is it T or V that conflicts with the command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn’t get the sight to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes close anyway?

Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole change series occurs. Let p’s be black dots and f’s be white dots, and imagine a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can’t be conveyed in ordinary English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braile, everybody is subjected to the same changes. If the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect everything—everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference point in the “world.” The question of “whether the anomalies are really outside or only in the mind” comes to have less and less scientific meaning. If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don’t seem to be either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if the asserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions of observed regularities which would acquire primary importance if the changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our interest is in the physicist’s side of the boundary. To complete the investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even harder part is making it happen.

However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet satisfactory. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say “I see a book in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.” These assumptions may not be justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, “I don’t even know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don’t even know whether I think. I see a book; I don’t even know whether this sensation is visual.” In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may literally force himself to re-see that book as a pencil, and in time this compensation may become habitual and “pre-conscious.” In this case, if the physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a temporary psychological malfunction.

These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are actually learned, “unconscious” interpretations of raw data which by themselves don’t look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is confronted with normal sensations again. The subject finds that the old familiar sensation of a table looks quite wrong, and that he has to make an effort to see the table which he knows is there.

Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give him a quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Tell the subject that he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem simultaneous.

This criticism of the changes defined earlier is important, but it may
not be insurmountable. Although Stratton became used to his trick
eyeglasses, the image continued to seem distorted. There is some stability to
our identification of our perceptions. Also, the physicist in our earlier
scenario might ultimately adapt to the changes. He might realize that it is
possible separately to identify sights and touches. Only the sight-touch
correlation is unidentifiable; and the concept of such a correlation might
become an abstract concept of physics just as the concept of particle
resonance is today.

Time is inseparably involved in our discussion; so we must decide what
happens to time as a distinct physical category, and as a sense, in
perception-dissociation. Here, we will simply distinguish three sorts of time.
First, there is subjective concurrence, which we have already begun to
discuss. Secondly, there is the physicist's operational definition of time.
There must be two repeating processes, which to the best of our knowledge
are causally independent, so that irregularities in one process aren't
automatically introduced in the other. If the ratio of the repetitions of the
two processes is constant, we assume that the repetitions divide time into
equal intervals. Eventually the physicist arrives at a concept of time as a real
time line along which movement can be both forward and backward (Feynman).

One effect of perception-dissociation relating to this sort of time would be
to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile
clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished
manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten,
our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will.
"The future" is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional
futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The
empirical importance of Alten's idea is that it raises the question of what the
perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of
futurity.

We now come to some considerations which will help us develop the
state descriptions, and which also show that from one point of view, the
states are actually necessary for the operational definition of physical
language. Let parallel but separated sheets of clear plastic and colored plastic
be mounted in lighting conditions so that the subject can't see the clear
plastic. He touches the clear plastic, but from what he sees, he believes he is
touching the colored plastic. The lighting is then changed and his error is
exposed. In some sense, the sight-touch concurrence identifying an object
was a mere coincidence. Next, we produce another colored sheet for the
subject to touch, and we are able to convince him that this time the
object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence.

The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which
resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes.
To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the
concept of "matter," a concept which is not really either visual or tactile.
The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight
and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the
physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its
immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot
be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures.
Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual "reading" of
the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our
experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying
concordences, and the physicist is supposed to tell us how to avoid being
fooled.

We find, then, that there is nothing the physicist can appeal to, in
testing object-identifying concurrences, that doesn't immediately rely on
other object-identifying concurrences, the very concurrences which are
suspect. It is as if the physicist proposed to prove that clicks come from a
certain metronome by manipulating a detecting device that outputs its data
as sounds. But suppose the physicist proves that the clicks come from the
metronome by showing (1) that the metronome has to be stopped or
removed to stop the clicks, and (2) that the clicks stop if the metronome is
stopped or removed. The physicist proves that the object-identifying
concurrency is not a coincidence by demonstrating that certain related
concordences are forbidden. We suggest that the physicist ultimately handles
touch-sight concurrences in just this way. The operational basis of the
physicist's activity comes down to our states. (But note that the physicist
has tests, which do not rely directly on his hearing, to determine whether the
clicks come from the metronome! ) One way to develop our states, then,
may be to develop substates which express the differences between those
object-identifying concurrences that are coincidental and those that aren't-the differences illustrated by the plastic sheet experiment.
10. 1966 Mathematical Studies
   Q. Introduction

   Pure mathematics is the one activity which is intrinsically formalistic. It
   is the one activity which brings out the practical value of formal
   manipulations. Abstract games fit in perfectly with the tradition and
   rationale of pure mathematics; whereas they would not be appropriate in
   any other discipline. Pure mathematics is the one activity which can
   appropriately develop through innovations of a formalistic character.

   Precisely because pure mathematics does not have to be immediately
   practical, there is no intrinsic reason why it should adhere to the normal
   concept of logical truth. No harm is done if the mathematician chooses to
   play a game which is indeterminate by normal logical standards. All that
   matters is that the mathematician clearly specify the rules of his game, and
   that he not make claims for his results which are inconsistent with his rules.

   Actually, my pure philosophical writings discredit the concept of
   logical truth by showing that there are flaws inherent in all non-trivial
   language. Thus, no mathematics has the logical validity which was once
   claimed for mathematics. From the ultimate philosophical standpoint, all
   mathematics is as "indeterminate" as the mathematics in this monograph.
   All the more reason, then, not to limit mathematics to the normal concept
   of logical truth.

   Once it is realized that mathematics is intrinsically formalistic, and need
   not adhere to the normal concept of logical truth, why hold back from
   exploring the possibilities which are available? There is every reason to
   search out the possibilities and present them. Such is the purpose of this
   monograph.

   The ultimate test of the non-triviality of pure mathematics is whether it
   has practical applications. I believe that the approaches presented on a very
   abstract level in this monograph will turn out to have such applications. In
   order to be applied, the principles which are presented here have to be
developed intensively on a level which is compatible with applications. The
results will be found in my two subsequent essays, "Subjective Propositional
Vibration" and "The Logic of Admissible Contradictions."
1. Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories

1.1 Post-Formalist Mathematics

Over the last hundred years, a philosophy of pure mathematics has grown up which I prefer to call "formalism." As Willard Quine says in the fourth section of his essay "Carnap and Logical Truth," formalism was inspired by a series of developments which began with non-Euclidean geometry. Quine himself is opposed to formalism, but the formalists have found encouragement in Quine's own book, *Mathematical Logic*. The best presentation of the formalist position can be found in Rudolph Carnap's *The Logical Syntax of Language*. As a motivation to the reader, and as a heuristic aid, I will relate my study to these two standard books. (I will help if the reader is thoroughly familiar with them.) It is not important whether Carnap, or Quine, or formalism--or my interpretation of them--is "correct," for this essay is neither history nor philosophy. I am using history as a bridge, to give the reader access to some extreme mathematical innovations.

The formalist position goes as follows. Pure mathematics is the manipulation of the meaningless and arbitrary, but typographically well-defined ink-shapes on paper 'w,' 'x,' 'y,' 'z,' 'w,' 'x,' 'y,' 'z,' and 'c.' These shapes are manipulated according to arbitrary but well-defined mechanical rules. Actually, the rules mimic the structure of primitive systems such as Euclid's geometry. There are formation rules, mechanical definitions of which concatenations of shapes are "sentences." One sentence is '{(x) (xx)} \downarrow (x) (xx)}'. There are transformation rules, rules for the mechanical derivation of sentences from other sentences. The best known transformation rule is the rule that \( \psi \) may be concluded from \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi \supset \psi \); where \( \supset \) is the truth-functional conditional. For later convenience, I will say that \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi \supset \psi \) are "impliers," and that \( \psi \) is the "implicant." Some sentences are designated as "axioms." A "proof" is a series of sentences such that each is an axiom or an implicant of preceding sentences. The last sentence in a proof is a "theorem."

This account is ultra-simplified and non-rigorous, but it is adequate for my purposes. (The reader may have noticed a terminological issue here. For Quine, an implication is merely a logically true conditional. The rules which are used to go from some statements to others, and to assemble proofs, are rules of inference. The relevant rule of inference is the modus ponens: \( \psi \) is the tenetional of \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi \supset \psi \). What I am doing is to use a terminology of implication to talk about rules of inference and tenetional. The reason is that the use of Quine's terminology would result in extremely awkward formulations. What I will be doing is sufficiently transparent that it can be translated into Quine's terminology if necessary. My results will be unaffected.) The decisive feature of the arbitrary game called "mathematics" is as follows. A sentence-series can be mechanically checked to determine whether it is a proof. But there is no mechanical method for deciding whether a sentence is a theorem. Theorems, or rather their proofs, have to be puzzled out, to be discovered. In this feature lies the dynamism, the excitement of traditional mathematics. Traditional mathematical ability is the ability to make inferential discoveries.

A variety of branches of mathematics can be specialized out from the basic system. Depending on the choices of axioms, systems can be constructed which are internally consistent, but conflict with other. A system can be "interpreted," or given a meaning within the language of a science such as physics. So interpreted, it may have scientific value, or it may not. But as pure mathematics, all the systems have the same arbitrary status.

By "formalist mathematics" I will mean the present mathematical systems which are presented along the above lines. Actually, as many authors have observed, the success of the non-Euclidean "imaginary" geometries made recognition of the game-like character of mathematics inevitable. Formalism is potentially the greatest break with tradition in the history of mathematics. In the Foreword to *The Logical Syntax of Language*, Carnap brilliantly points out that mathematical innovation is still hindered by the widespread opinion that deviations from mathematical tradition must be justified—that is, proved to be "correct" and to be a faithful rendering of "the true logic." According to Carnap, we are free to choose the rules of a mathematical system arbitrarily. The striving after correctness must cease, so that mathematics will no longer be hindered. "Before us lies the boundless ocean of unlimited possibilities." In other words, Carnap, the most reputable of academicians, says you can do anything in mathematics. Do not worry whether whether your arbitrary game corresponds to truth, tradition, or reality: it is still legitimate mathematics. Despite this wonderful Principle of Tolerance in mathematics, Carnap never ventured beyond the old ink-on-paper, axiomatic-deductive structures. I, however, have taken Carnap at his word. The result is my "post-formalist mathematics." I want to stress that my innovations have been legitimized in advance by one of the most reputable academic figures of the twentieth century.

Early in 1961, I constructed some systems which went beyond formalist mathematics in two respects. 1. My sentential elements are physically different from the little ink-shapes on paper used in all formalist systems. My sentences are physically different from concatenations of ink-shapes. My transformation rules have nothing to do with operations on ink-shapes. 2. My systems do not necessarily follow the axiomatic-deductive, sentence-implication-axiom-proof-theorem structure. Both of these
possibilities, by the way, are mentioned by Carnap in "Languages as Calculi." A "post-formalist system," then, is a formalist system which differs physically from an ink-on-paper system, or which lacks the axiomatic-deductive structure.

As a basis for the analysis of post-formalism systems, a list of structural properties of formalist systems is desirable. Here is such a list. By "implication" I will mean simple, direct implication, unless I say otherwise.

1. A sentence can be repeated at will.
2. The rule of implication refers to elements of sentences: sentences are structurally composite.
3. A sentence can imply itself.
4. The repeat of an implicant can imply the repeat of an implicand: an implication can be repeated.
5. Different implicants can imply different implicands.
6. Given two or three sentences, it is possible to recognize mechanically whether one or two directly imply the third.
7. No axiom is implied by other, different axioms.
8. The definition of "proof" is the standard definition, in terms of implication, given early in this essay.
9. Given the axioms and some other sentence, it is not possible to recognize mechanically whether the sentence is a theorem. Compound indirect implication is a puzzle.

Now for the first post-formalist system.

"Illusions"

A "sentence" is the following page (with the figure on it) so long as the apparent, perceived ratio of the length of the vertical line to that of the horizontal line (the statement's "associated ratio") does not change. (Two sentences are the "same" if and only if their associated ratios are the same.)

A sentence Y is "implied by" a sentence X if and only if Y is the same as X, or else Y is, of all the sentences one ever sees, the sentence having the associated ratio next smaller than that of X.

Take as the axiom the first sentence one sees.

Explanation: The figure is an optical illusion such that the vertical line normally appears longer than the horizontal line, even though their lengths are equal. One can correct one's perception, come to see the vertical line as shorter relative to the horizontal line, decrease the associated ratio, by measuring the lines with a ruler to convince oneself that the vertical line is not longer than the other, and then trying to see the lines as equal in length; constructing similar figures with a variety of real (measured) ratios and practicing judging these ratios; and so forth.

"Illusions" has Properties 1, 3-5, and 7-8. Purely to clarify this fact, the following sequence of integers is presented as a model of the order in which associated ratios might appear in reality. (The sequence is otherwise totally inadequate as a model of "Illusions.") 4 2 1: 4 2; 5 4 2 1; 4 3 1. The implication structure would then be

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4 ← 4
5 ← 2
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The axiom would be 4, and 5 could not appear in a proof. "Illusions" has Property 1 on the basis that one can control the associated ratio. Turning to Property 4, it is normally the case that when an implication is repeated, a given occurrence of one of the sentences involved is unique to a specific occurrence of the implication. In "Illusions," however, if two equal sentences are next smaller than X, the occurrence of X does not uniquely belong to either of the two occurrences of the implication. Compare "the".
where the occurrence of ‘i’ is not unique to either occurrence of ‘the’. Subject to this explanation, “Illusions” has Property 4. “Illusions” has Property 8, but it goes without saying that the type of implication is not modus ponens. Properties 3, 5, and 7 need no comment. As for Property 2, the rule of implication refers to a property of sentences, rather than to elements of sentences. The interesting feature of “Illusions” is that it reverses the situation defined by Properties 6 and 9. Compound indirect implication is about the same as simple implication. The only difference is the difference between being smaller and being next smaller. And there is only one axiom (per person).

Simple direct implication, however, is subjective and illusive. It essentially involves changing one’s perceptions of an illusion. The change of associated ratios is subjective, elusive, and certainly not numerically measurable. Then, the order in which one sees sentences won’t always be their order in the implications and proofs. And even though one is exposed to all the sentences, one may have difficulty distinguishing and remembering them in consciousness. If I see the normal illusion, then manage to get myself to see the lines as being of equal length, I know I have seen a theorem. What is difficult is grasping the steps in between, the simple direct implications. If the brain contains a permanent impression of every sensation it has received, then the implications objectively exist; but they may not be thinkable without neurological techniques for getting at the impressions. In any case, “proof” is well-defined in some sense—but proofs may not be thinkable. “Illusions” is, after all, not so much shakier in this respect than even simple arithmetic, which contains undecidable sentences and indefinable terms.

In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap distinguishes pure syntax and descriptive syntax; and says that pure syntax should be independent of notation, and that every system should be isomorphic to some ink-on-paper system. In so doing, Carnap violates his own Principle of Tolerance. Consider the following trivial formalist system.

“Axiom”

A “sentence” is a member of a finite set of integers. Sentence Y is “implied by” sentence X if and only if Y=X, or else of all the sentences, Y is the one next smaller than X. Take as the axiom the largest sentence.

Is the pure syntax of “Illusions” isomorphic to “Order”? The preceding paragraph proved that it is not. The implication structure of “Order” is mechanical to the point of idiocy, while the implication structure of “Illusions” is, as I pointed out, elusive. The figure

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Axiom  Theorem
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where loops indicate multiple occurrences of the same sentence, could adequately represent a proof in “Order,” but could not remotely represent one in “Illusions.” The essence of “Illusions” is that it is coupled to the reader’s subjectivity. For an ink-on-paper system even to be comparable to “Illusions,” the subjectivity would have to be moved out of the reader and onto the paper. This is utterly impossible.

Here is the next system.

“Inference”

Explanation: Consider the rainbow halo which appears to surround a small bright light when one looks at it through fogged glass (such as eyeglasses which have been breathed on). The halo consists of concenicient circular bands of color. As the fog evaporates, the halo uniformly contracts toward the light. The halo has a vague outer ring, which contracts as the halo does. Of concern here is what happens on one contracting radius of the halo, and specifically what happens on the segment of that radius lying in the vague outer ring: the outer segment.

A “sentence” (or halo point) is the changing halo color at a fixed point, in space, in the halo; until the halo contracts past the point. Several sentences “imply” another sentence if and only if, at some instant, the several sentences are on an outer segment, and the other sentence is the inner endpoint of that outer segment.

An “axiom” is a sentence which is in the initial vague outer ring (before it contracts), and which is not an inner endpoint.

An “inference” is a sequence of sequences of sentences on one radius satisfying the following conditions. 1. The members of the first sequence are axioms. 2. For each of the other sequences, the first member is implied by the non-first members of the preceding sequence; and the remaining members (if any) are axioms or first members of preceding sequences. 3. All first members, of sequences other than the last two, appear as non-first members. 4. No sentence appears as a non-first member more than once. 5. The last sequence has one member.

In the diagram on the following page, different positions of the vague outer
ring at different times are suggested by different shadings. The outer segment moves "down the page." The figure is by no means an inperseq, but it is supposed to help explain the definition.

**Inperseq Diagram**

"Sentences" at time:
1. \( a_1 \rightarrow b \)
2. \( a_2 \rightarrow c \)
3. \( a_3 \rightarrow c \)
4. \( a_4 \rightarrow b \rightarrow c \rightarrow d \)
5. \( a_5 \rightarrow b \rightarrow c \rightarrow d \)
6. \( a_6 \rightarrow e \)
7. \( a_7 \rightarrow f \)
8. \( a_8 \rightarrow g \)

"Actions" at: \( a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7 \)

In "inperseqs," a conventional proof would be redundant unless all the statements were on the same radius. And even if the weakest axiom were chosen (the initial outer endpoint), this axiom would imply the initial inner endpoint, and from there the theorem could be reached immediately. In other words, to use the standard definition of "proof" in "inperseqs" would result in an uninteresting derivation structure. Thus, a more interesting derivation structure is defined, the "inperseq." The interest of an "inperseq" is to be as elaborate as the many restrictions in its definition will allow. Proofs are either disregarded in "inperseqs"; or else they are identified with inperseqs, and lack Property 8. "Inperseqs" makes the break with the proof-theorem structure of formalist mathematics.

Turning to simple implication, an implicand can have many implicors; and there is an infinity of axioms, specified by a general condition. The system has Property 1 in the sense that a sentence can exist at different times and be a member of different implications. It has Property 4 in the sense that the sentences in a specific implication can exist at different times, and the implication holds as long as the sentences exist. It has Property 3 in that an inner endpoint implies itself. The system also has Properties 5 and 7; and lacks Property 2. But, as before, Properties 6 and 9 are another matter. Given several sentences, it is certainly possible to tell mathematically whether one is implied by the others. But when are you given sentences? If one can think the sentences, then relating them is easy—but it is difficult to think the sentences in the first place, even though they objectively exist. The diagram suggests what to look for, but the actual thinking, the actual sentences are another matter. As for Property 9, when "theorems" are identified with last members of inperseqs, I hesitate to say whether a derivation of a given sentence can be constructed mechanically. If a sentence is nearer the center than the axioms are, an inperseq can be constructed for it. Or can it? The answer is contingent. "Inperseqs" is indeterminate because of the difficulty of thinking the sentences, a difficulty which is defined into the system. It is the mathematician's capabilities at a particular instant which delimit the indeterminacies. Precisely because of the difficulty of thinking sentences, I will give several subvariants of the system.

**Indeterminacy**

A "totally determinate inperseq" is an inperseq in which one thinks all the sentences.

An "implied-indeterminate inperseq" is an inperseq in which one thinks only each implicand and the outer segment it terminates.

A "sententially indeterminate inperseq" is an inperseq in which one thinks
only the outer segment, and its inner endpoint, as it progresses inward.

Let us return to the matter of pure and descriptive syntax. The interest of "Illusions" and "Inferences" is precisely that their abstract structure cannot be separated from their physical and psychological character, and thus that they are not isomorphic to any conventional ink-on-paper system. I am trying to break through to unheard of, and hopefully significant, modes of implication; to define implication structures (and derivation structures) beyond the reach of past mathematics.

1.2 Constructed Memory Systems

In order to understand this section, it is necessary to be thoroughly familiar with "Studies in Constructed Memories," the essay following this one. (I have not combined the two essays because their approaches are too different.) I will define post-formalist systems in constructed memories, beginning with a system in an M*-Memory.

"Dream Amalgams"

A "sentence" is a possible method, an A_q, with respect to an M*-Memory. The sentence A_q "implies" the sentence A_p if and only if the a_qth M*-assertion is actually thought; and either A_q = A_p, or else there is cross-method contact of a mental state in A_q with a state in A_p.

The axioms must be chosen from sentences which satisfy two conditions.

The mental states in the sentences must have cross-method contact with mental states in other sentences. And the M*-assertions corresponding to the sentences must not be thought.

Explanation: As "Studies in Constructed Memories" says, there can be cross-method contact of states, because a normal dream can combine totally different episodes in the dreamer's life into an amalgam.

"Dream Amalgams" has Properties 1-5. For the first time, sentences are structurally composite, with mental states being the relevant sentential elements. Implication has an unusual character. The traditional type of implication, modus ponens, is "directed," because the conditional is directed. Even if P \rightarrow Q is true, P \rightarrow Q may not be. Now implication is also directed in "Dream Amalgams," but for a very different reason.

Cross-method contact, unlike the conditional, has a symmetric character. What prevents implication from being necessarily symmetrical is that the implicand's M*-assertion actually has to be thought, while the implicator's M*-assertion does not. This, implication is both subjective and mechanical. It is subjective, in that it is a matter of volition which method is remembered to have actually been used. It is mechanical, in that when one is remembering, one is automatically aware of the cross-method contacts of states in A_q. The conditions on the axioms ensure that they will have implications without losing Property 7.

As for compound implication in "Dream Amalgams," the organism with the M*-Memory can't be aware of it at all; because it can't be aware that at different times it remembered different methods to be the one actually used. (In fact, the organism cannot be aware that the system has Property 5, for the same reason.) On the other hand, to an outside observer of the M*-Memory, indirect implication is not only thinkable but mechanical. It is not superficial because cross-method contact of mental states is not necessarily transitive. The outside observer can decide whether a sentence is a theorem by the following mechanical procedure. Check whether the sentence's M*-assertion has actually been thought; if so, check all sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; if not, check all the sentences which imply the sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; etc. The number of possible methods is given as finite, so the procedure is certain to terminate. Again, an unprecedented mode of implication has been defined.

When a post-formalist system is defined in a constructed memory, the discussion and analysis of the system become a consequence of constructed memory theory and an extension of it. Constructed memory theory, which is quite unusual but still more or less employs deductive inference, is used to study post-formalist modes of inference which are anything but deductive.

To aid in understanding the next system, which involves infall in a D-Memory, here is an

"Exercise to be Read Aloud"

(Read according to a timer, reading the first word at O' O", and prolonging and spacing words so that each sentence ends at the time in parentheses after it. Do not pause between sentences.)

(event_1) All men are mortal. (17")
(Sentence_1 = event_2) The first utterance lasted 17" and ended at 17"; and lasted 15" and ended 1" ago. (59")
(event_2) The second utterance lasted 42" and ended at 59"; and lasted 50" and ended 2" ago. (1' 31")
(S_3=event_4) The third utterance lasted 32" and ended at 1' 31"; and lasted 40" and ended 1" ago. (2' 16")

Since '32' in S_3 is greater than '2' in S_2, S_3 must say that S_1 (=event_2) ended 30" after S_2 began, or something equally unclear. The situation is not a real infall, but it should give the reader some intuitive notion of an infall.

"Infalls"

A "sentence" is a D-sentence, in a D-Memory such that event_j+1 is the first thinking of the jth D-sentence, for all j.

Two sentences "imply" another if and only if all three are the same; or else the three are adjacent (can be written S_{j+1}, S_j, S_{j-1}), and are such that S_j+1 = x_{j+1} \cdot x_j \cdot x_{j-1} \cdot S_j \cdot S_{j-1} is the implicand. The function of S_{j+1} is to give the duration \delta_j = x_{j+1} \cdot x_j of S_j. S_j states that event_j, the first thinking of S_j, ended at a distance \delta_j into the past, where \delta_j is smaller than S_j's own duration. The diagram indicates the relations.

In this variety of D-Memory, the organism continuously thinks successive D-sentences, which are all different, just as the reader of the above exercise continuously reads successive and different sentences. Thus, the possibility of repeating a sentence depends on the possibility of thinking it while one is thinking another sentence—a possibility which may be far-fetched, but which is not explicitly excluded by the definition of a "D-Memory." If the possibility is granted, then "Infalls" has Properties 1-5. Direct implication is completely mechanical; it is subjective only in that the involuntary determination of the \delta_j and other aspects of the memory is a "subjective" process of the organism. Compound implication is also mechanical to an outside observer of the memory, but if the organism itself is to be aware of it, it has to perform fantastic feats of multiple thinking.

"Dream Amalgams" and "Infalls" are systems constructed with imaginary elements, systems whose "notation" is drawn from an imaginary object or system. Such systems have no descriptive syntax. Imaginary objects were introduced into mathematics, or at least into geometry, by Nicholas Lobachevsky, and now I am using them as a notation. For these systems to be nonisomorphic to any ink-on-paper systems, the mathematician must be the organism with the M*-Memory or the D*-Memory. But this means that in this case, the mathematics which is nonisomorphic to any ink-on-paper system can be performed only in an imaginary mind.

Now for a different approach. Carnap said that we are free to choose the rules of a system arbitrarily. Let us take Carnap literally. I want to construct more systems in constructed memories—so why not construct the system by a procedure which ensures that constructed memories are involved, but which is otherwise arbitrary? Why not suspend the striving after "interesting" systems, that last vestige of the striving after "correctness," and see what happens? Why not construct the rules of a system by a chance procedure?

To construct a system, we have to fill in the blanks in the following rule schema in such a way that grammatically correct sentences result.

**Rule Schema**

A "sentence" is a(n) __________.

Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences __________ the third.

An "axiom" is a sentence that __________.

I now spread the pages of "Studies in Constructed Memories" on the floor. With eyes closed, I hold a penny over them and drop it. I open my eyes and copy down the expressions the penny covers. By repeating this routine, I obtain a haphazard series of expressions concerning constructed memories. It is with this series that I will fill in the blanks in the rule schema. In the next stage, I fill the first (second, third) blank with the series of expressions preceding the first (second, third) period in the entire series.
"Haphazard System"

A "sentence" is a duration D-sentences \( \Delta \) (\( \mathfrak{D} \)) convey these "\( \phi^* \)-Reflection," or the future Assumption voluntarily force of conviction for conclusion the Situation or by ongoing that this system? be given telling between the Situation 1.

Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences is/ was contained not have to the acceptance that a certain and malleable study what an event involves material specifically mathematics; construct accompanies the rest, extra-linguistically image organism can fantasy not remembering \( \Phi^* \)-Memory, the future interval defined in dream the third.

An "axiom" is a sentence that internally D-sentences, just as the "\( \Phi^* \)-Memory" sentences \( \mathcal{A}_{\alpha_1} = \mathcal{A}_{\alpha_2} \).

In the final stage, I cancel the smallest number of words I have to in order to make the rules grammatical.

"Fantasied Amnesia"

A "sentence" is a duration or the future force of conviction for the Situation or this system given Situation 1.

Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences have the acceptances that a certain and malleable study extra-linguistically can fantasy not remembering the future interval defined in the third.

An "axiom" is a sentence that internally just sentences \( \mathcal{A}_{\alpha_2} \).

It becomes clear in thinking about "Fantasied Amnesia" which its metamathematics is dual. Describing the construction of the rules, the metamathematics, by a systematic performance, is one thing. Taking the finished metamathematics at face value, independently of its origin, and studying it in the usual manner, is another. Let us take "Fantasied Amnesia" at face value. As one becomes used to its rules, they become somewhat more meaningful. I will say that an "interpretation" of a haphazard system is an explanation of its rules that makes some sense out of what may seem senseless. "Interpreting" is somewhat like finding the conditions for the existence of a constructed memory which seemingly cannot exist. The first rule of "Fantasied Amnesia" is a disjunction of three substantives. The "Situation" referred to in the second substantive expression is either Situation 1 or else an unspecified situation. The third substantive expression apparently means "this system, assuming Situation 1," and refers to "Fantasied Amnesia" itself. The definition of "sentence" is thus meaningful, but very bizarre. The second rule speaks of "the acceptance" as if it were a written assert. The rule then speaks of a "malleable study" as "fantasying" something. This construction is quite weird, but let us try to accept it. The third rule speaks of a sentence that "sentences" (in the legal sense) a possible rule. So much for the meaning of the rules.

Turning to the nine properties of formalism systems, the reference to "the future interval" in the implication rule of "Fantasied Amnesia" indicates that the system has Property 2; and the system can perfectly well have Property 8. It does not have Property 6 in any known sense. Certainly it does have Property 9. It just might have Property 1. But as for the other four properties, it seems out of the question to decide whether "Fantasied Amnesia" has them. For whatever it is worth, "Fantasied Amnesia" is on balance incomparable to formalist systems.

My transformation rule schema has the form of a biconditional, in which the right clause is the operative one. If a transformation rule were to vary, in such a way that it could be replaced by a constant rule whose right clause was the disjunction of the various right clauses for the variable rule, then the latter would vary "trivially." I will say that a system whose transformation rule can vary non-trivially is a "heterodeterminate" system. Since I have constructed a haphazard metamathematics, why not a heterodeterminate metamathematics? Consider a mathematician with an M-Memory, such that each \( \mathcal{A}_\alpha \) is the consistent use of a different transformation rule, a different definition of "imply," for the mathematics in which the mathematician is discovering theorems. The consistent use of a transformation rule is after all a method--a method for finding the commitments premises make, and for basing conclusions in premises. When the mathematician goes to remember which rule of inference he has actually been using, he "chooses" which of the possible methods is remembered to have actually been used. This situation amounts to a heterodeterminate system. In fact, the metamathematics cannot even be written out this time; I can only describe it metamathematically in terms of an imaginary memory.

We are now in the realm of mathematical systems which cannot be written out, but can only be described metamathematically. I will present a final system of this sort. It is entitled "System Such That No One Knows What's Going On." One just has to guess whether this system exists, and if it does what it is like. The preceding remark is the metamathematical description, or definition, of the system.
1.3 Epilogue

Ever since Carnap's Principle of Tolerance opened the floodgates to arbitrariness in mathematics, we have been faced with the prospect of a mathematics which is indistinguishable from art-for-art's-sake, or amusement-for-amusement's-sake. But there is one characteristic which saves mathematics from this fate. Mathematics originated by abstraction from primitive technology, and is indispensable to science and technology—in short, mathematics has scientific applications. The experience of group theory has proved, I hope once and for all, the bankruptcy of that narrow practicality which would limit mathematics to what can currently be applied in science. But now that mathematics is wide open, and anything goes, we should be aware more than ever that scientific applicability is the only objective value that mathematics has. I would not have set down constructed memory theory and the post-formalist systems if I did not believe that they could be applied. When and how they will be is another matter.

And what about the "validity" of formalism? The rise of the formalist position is certainly understandable. The formalists had a commendable, rationalistic desire to eliminate the metaphysical problems associated with mathematics. Moreover, formalism helped stimulate the development of the logic needed in computer technology (and also to stimulate this paper). In spite of the productiveness of the formalist position, however, it now seems beyond dispute that formalism has failed to achieve its original goals. (My pure philosophical writings are the last word on this issue.) Perhaps the main lesson to be learned from the history of formalism is that an idea does not have to be "true" to be productive.

2. Studies in Constructed Memories

2.1 Introduction

The memory of a conscious organism is a phenomenon in which interrelations of mind, language, and the rest of reality are especially evident. In these studies, I will define some conscious memory-systems, and investigate them. The investigation will be mathematical. In fact, the nearest precedent for it is perhaps the geometry of Nicholas Lobachevski. Non-Euclidian geometry had many founders, but Lobachevski in particular spoke of his system as an "imaginary geometry." Lobachevski's system was, so to speak, the physical geometry of an "imaginary," or constructed, space. By analogy, my investigation could be called a psychological algebra of constructed minds. It is too early to characterize the investigation more exactly. Let us just remember Rudolph Carnap's Principle of Tolerance in mathematics: the mathematician is free to construct his system in any way he chooses.

I will begin by introducing a repertory of concepts informally, becoming more formal as I go along. Consider ongoing actions, which by definition extend through past, present, and future. For example, "I am making the trip from New York to Chicago." Consider also past actions which have probable consequences in the present, "I have been heating this water" (entailing that it isn't frozen now). I will be concerned with such actions as these.

Our language provides for the following assertion: "I am off to the country today; I could have been off to the beach; I could not possibly have been going to the center of the sun". We distinguish an actual action from a possible action; and distinguish both from an action which is materially impossible. People insist that there are things they could do, even though they don't choose to do them (as opposed to things they couldn't do). What distinguishes these possible actions from impossible ones? Rather than trying to analyze such everyday notions in terms of the logic of counterfactual conditionals, or of modalities, or of probability, I choose to take the notions at their face value. My concern is not to philosophize, but to assemble concepts with which to define an interesting memory system.

What is the introspective psychological difference between a thought that has the force of a memory, and a thought that has the force of a fantasied past, a merely possible past? I am not asking how I know that a verbalized memory is true; I am asking what quality a naive thought has that marks it as a memory. Let Alternative B be that I went to an East Side restaurant yesterday, and Alternative W be that I went to a West Side one. By the "thought of E" I mean mainly the visualization of going into the East

Note

Side restaurant. My thought of E has the force of memory. It actually happened. W is something I could have done. I can imagine I did do W. There is nothing present which indicates whether I did E or W. Yet W merely has the force of possibility, of fantasy. How do the two thoughts differ? Is the thought of E involuntarily more vivid? Is there perhaps an "attitude of assertion" involuntarily present in the thought of E?

Consider the memory that I was almost run down by a truck yesterday: I could have been run down, but wasn’t. In such a case, the possibility that I could have been run down would be more vivid than the reality that I wasn’t. (Is it not insanity, when a person is overwhelmed by the fear of a merely possible past event?) My hold on sanity here would be the awareness that I am alive and well today.

In dreams, do we not wholeheartedly "remember" that a misfortune has befallen us, and begin to adjust emotionally to it? Then we awake, and wholeheartedly remember that the misfortune has not befallen us. The thought that had the force of memory in the dream ceases to have that force as we awake. We remember the dream, and conclude that it was a fantasy. Even more characteristic of dreams, do I not to all intents and purposes go to far places and carry out all sorts of actions in a dream, only to awaken in bed? We say that the dream falsifies my present environment, my sensations, my actions, my memories, the past, my whole world, in a totally convincing way. Can a hypnotist produce artificial dreams, that is, can he control their content? Can the hypnotist give his subject one false memory one moment, and replace it with a contradictory memory the next moment?

I will now specify a situation involving possible actions and remembering.

Situation 1. "I could have been accomplishing G by doing A_{31}, or by doing A_{32}, ... or by doing A_{3n}; but I have actually been accomplishing G by doing A_{31}". Here the ongoing actions A_{3i}, i = 1, ..., n, A_{3i} ≠ A_{3h} if i ≠ h, are the possible methods of accomplishing G. (The subscripts are supposed to indicate that the methods are distinct and countable, but not ordered.) The possible methods cannot be combined, let us assume.

In such a situation, perhaps the thought that I have been doing A_{31} would be distinguished from similar thoughts about A_{32}, ..., A_{3n} by the presence of the "attitude of assertion". Since the possible methods are ongoing actions, the thought that I have been doing A_{31} has logical or probable consequences I can check against the present.

Now A_{21} is actual and A_{22} is not, so that A_{31} simply cannot have material contact with A_{32}. An actual liquid in A_{21} could not require a possible jar in A_{22} to contain it. The only "connection" A_{31} could have with A_{32} would be verbal and gratuitous. Therefore, in order to be possible methods, A_{21}, ..., A_{2n} must be materially separable. A liquid in A_{21} must not require a jar in A_{22} to contain it. If it did, A_{21} couldn’t be actualized while A_{22} remained only a possibility.

Enough concepts are now at hand for the studies to begin in earnest.

2.2 M-Memories

Definition. Given the sentences 'I have actually been doing A_{31}', where the A_{3i} are non-combinable possible methods as in Situation 1, an "M-Memory" is a memory of a conscious organism such that the organism can think precisely one of the sentences at a time, and any of the sentences has the force of memory.

This definition refers to language, mind, and the rest of reality in their interrelations, but the crucial reference is to a property of certain sentences. I have chosen this formulation precisely because of what I want to investigate. I want to find the minimal, elegant, extra-linguistic conditions, whatever they may be, for the existence of an M-Memory (which is defined by a linguistic property). I can say at once that the conditions must enable the organism to think the sentences at will, and they must provide that the memory is consistent with the organism’s present awareness.

Definition. The "P-Memory" of a conscious organism is its conscious memory of what it did and what happened to it, the past events of its life. I want to distinguish here the "personal" memory from the preconscious.

Definition. An "L-Memory" is a linguistic P-Memory having no extra-linguistic component. Of course, the linguistic component has extra-linguistic mental associations which give it "meaning"—otherwise the memory wouldn’t be conscious. But these associations lack the force of a mental reliving of the past independent of language. An L-Memory amounts to extra-linguistic amnesia.

Assumption 1.1. With respect to normal human memory, when I forget whether I did x, I can’t voluntarily give either the thought that I did x, or the thought that I didn’t do x, the force of memory. I know that I either did or didn’t do x, but I can create no conviction for either alternative. (An introspective observation.)

Conclusion 1.2. An L-Memory is not sufficient for an M-Memory, even in the trivial case that the A_{3i} are beyond perception as internal bodily
processes are. True, there would be no present perceptions to check the sentences I have actually been doing $A_0$ against. True, the L-Memory precludes any extra-linguistic memory: "feelings" which would conflict with the sentences. But the L-Memory is otherwise normal. And Assumption 1.1 indicates that normally, eigtr precisely one of a number of mutually exclusive possibilities has the force of memory; or else the organism can give none of them the force of memory.

Assumption 1.3 I cannot, from within a natural dream, choose to switch to another dream. (An introspective observation. A "natural" dream is a dream involuntarily produced internally during sleep.)

Conclusion 1.4. An M-Memory could not be produced by natural dreaming. It is true that in one dream one sentence could have the force of memory, and in another dream a different sentence could. But an M-Memory is such that the organism can choose one sentence-memory one moment and another the next. See Assumption 1.3.

Assumption 1.5. Returning to the example of the restaurants, I find that months after the event, my thought of E no longer has the force of memory. All I remember now is that I used to remember that I did E. I remember that I did E indirectly, by remembering that I remembered that I did E. (My memory that I did E is becoming an M-Memory.) The assumption is that a memory of one's remembering can indicate, if not imply, that the event originally remembered occurred.

Conclusion 1.6. The following are adequate conditions for the existence of an M-Memory. 1. The sentences are the organism's only memory of which method he has been using. 2. When the organism thinks 'I have actually been doing $A_0$', then he artificially dreams that he has been doing $A_0$ and is now doing it. 3. When the dream ends, he does not remember that he had remembered that "I have been doing $A_0$". That is, he does not remember the dream; and he does not remember that he thought the sentence. These conditions would permit the existence of an M-Memory or else a memory indistinguishable to all intents and purposes from an M-Memory.

What I have in mind in Conclusion 1.6 is dreams which are produced artificially but otherwise have all the remarkable qualities of natural dreams. There would have to be a state of affairs such that the sentence would instantly start the dream going.

So much for the conditions for the existence of an M-Memory. Consider now what it is like as a mental experience to have an M-Memory. What present or ongoing awareness accompanies an M-Memory? Conclusion 1.6.2 already told what the remembering is like. For the rest, I will informally sketch some conclusions. The organism can extra-linguistically image the $A_0$. The organism can think 'I could have been doing $A_0$'. When not remembering, the organism doesn't have to do any $A_0$, or he can do any one of them. The organism must not do anything which would liquidate a possible method; render the action no longer possible for him.

Assumption 2.1. A normal dream can combine two totally different past episodes in my life into a fused episode, or amalgam; so that I "relive" it without doubts as a single episode, and yet remain vaguely aware that different episodes are present in it. Dreams have the capacity not only to falsify my world, but to make impossible believable. (An introspective observation.)

Conclusion 2.2. The conditions for the existence of an M-Memory further permit material contact between the possible methods, the very contact which is out of the question in a normal Situation 1. The dream is so flexible that the organism can dream that an (actual) liquid is/was contained by a jar in a possible method. See Assumption 2.1. Thus, the $A_n$ do not have to be separable to be possible methods.

I will now introduce further concepts pertaining to the mind.

Definition. A "mental state" is a mental "stage" or "space" or "mood" in which visualizing, remembering, and all imaging can be carried on.

Some human mental states are stupor, general anxiety, empathy with another person, dizziness, general euphoria, clearheadedness (the normal state in which work is performed), and dreaming. In all but the last state, some simple visualization routine could be carried out voluntarily. Even in a dream, I can have visualizations, although here I can't have them at will. The states are not defined by the imaging or activities carried on while in them, but are "spaces" in which such imaging or activities are carried on. By definition.

Conclusion 3.2. An M-Memory has to occur within the time which the possible methods require, the time required to accomplish G. By definition.

Definition. An "M-Memory" is an M-Memory satisfying these conditions. 1. $A_n$ for the entire time it requires, involves the voluntary assuming of mental states. i.e. n. 2. The material contact between the possible methods, the cross-method contact, is specifically some sort of contact between states.

Conclusion 3.3. For an M-Memory, to remember is to choose the mental state in which the remembering is required to occur (by the memory). After all, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the $A_n$; required things you are doing while you remember.

By now, the character of this investigation should be clearer. I seek to stretch our concepts, rather than to find the "true" ones. The investigation may appear similar to the old discipline of philosophical psychology, but its
thrust is rather toward the modern axiomatic systems. The reasoning is
loose, but not arbitrary. And the investigation will become increasingly
mathematical.

2.3 D-Memories

Definition. A “D-Memory” is a memory such that measured past time
appears in it only in the following sentences: “Event occurred in the interval
time which is $x_j \cdot x_{j+1}$ long and ended at $x_j$, and is $y_j$ long and ended $x_j$
ago,” where $x_j$, $y_j$, and $z_j$ are positive numbers of time units (such as hours)
and “AF means “after a fixed beginning time.”” $x_0 = 0; x_j > x_{j+1};$ and at any
one fixed time, the intervals $[z_j, z_{j+1}]$ nowhere overlap. $y_j \cdot z_j < y_{j+1}$. For an
integer $m$, the $m$th sentence acquires the force of memory, is added to the
memory, at the fixed time $x_m$, $j = 1, ..., t$, where the number of sentences
$f(t)$ is written as a function of time AF. Then $f(t) = m$ when $x_m < x_{m+1}$,$\ldots,$
$< y_{m+1}$. The sentences have the force of memory involuntarily. The organism does
not make them up at will.

Let me explain what the D-Memory involves. Event is assigned to an
abnormal “interval,” a dual interval defined in two unrelated ways. The
intervals defined by $y_j$ and $z_j$ are tied to the present instant rather than to
a fixed time, and could be written $[N-z_j, y_j, N-z_j]$, where ‘$N$’ means “the time
of the present instant relative to the fixed beginning time.”

Conclusion 4. The intervals $[N-z_j, y_j, N-z_j]$ nowhere overlap. Proof: By
definition, the intervals $[z_j, z_{j+1}]$ nowhere overlap. If $j \neq k$, $|z_j - y_j| \not\subset [k_k],
|a_k, b_k| = 0$. This fact implies that $g_k \not\subset [a_k, b_k]$. $N-z_k < N-z_k < N-z_k < N-z_k < y_j < y_k$. Then
$N-z_k < N-z_k < N-z_k < N-z_k < y_j < y_k$. $N-z_k = y_j$. $N-z_k = y_j$. At
any one time, the organism can think of all the sliding intervals, and they
partly cover the time up to now without overlapping.

Suppose you find the deck of cards

$$
\text{event} \quad \text{j} \quad \text{E} \quad \text{j} \quad \text{A} \quad \text{G} \quad \text{U}
$$

($j = 1, \ldots, n$ and $z_j$ is a positive number of days), and you have no
information to date them other than what they themselves say. If you
believe the cards, your mental experience will be a little like having a
D-Memory. Then, the definition does not require that $y_j = x_j \cdot x_{j+1}$. Again, it is
not that two concepts of “length” are involved, but that the “interval” is
abnormal. Of course this is all inconsistent, but I want to study the
conditions under which a mind will accept inconsistency.

Assumption 5.1. With respect to normal human memory, it is possible
to forget what day it is, even though one remembers a past date. (An
empirical observation.)

Assumption 5.2. This assumption is based on the fact that the sign
‘CLOSED FOR VACATION. BACK IN TWO WEEKS’ was in the window of
a nearby store for at least a month this summer; and the fact that a
filmmaker wrote in a newspaper, “When an actor asks me when the film will
be finished, I say ‘In two months,’ and two months later I give the same
answer, and I’m always right.” Even in normal circumstances, humans can
maintain a dual and outright inconsistent awareness of measured time. In
general, inconsistency is an normal aspect of human thinking and even has
practical value.

Imagine a child who has been told to date events by saying, for
example, $x$ happened two days ago, and a day later saying again, $x$ happened
two days ago—and who has not been told that this is inconsistent. What
conditions are required for the acceptance of this dating system? It is
precisely because of Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 that a certain answer cannot
be given to this question. The human mind is so flexible and malleable that
there is no telling how much inconsistency it can absorb. I can only study
what flaws might lead the child to reject the system. The child might “feel”
that an event recedes into the past, something the memory doesn’t express.
An event might be placed by the memory no later than another, and yet
“feel” more recent than the other. I speculate that if anything will discredit
the system, it will be its conflict with naive, “felt,” extra-linguistic memory.

Conclusion 5.3. The above dating system would be acceptable to an
organism with an L-Memory.

Conclusion 5.4. The existence of an L-Memory is an adequate condition
for the existence of a D-Memory. With extra-linguistic amnesia, the
structure of the language would be the structure of the past in any case. The
past would have no form independent of language. Anyway, time is gone for
good, leaving nothing that can be checked directly. Without an
extra-linguistic memory to fall back on, and considering Assumptions 5.1
and 5.2, the dual temporal memory shouldn’t be too much to absorb.

As I said, the real difficulty with this line of investigation is putting
limits on anything so flexible as the mind’s capacity to absorb inconsistency.

Now the thinking of a sentence in a D-Memory itself takes time. Let
$\delta(S_j)$ be the minimum number of time units it takes to think the $j$th
D-sentence. This function, abbreviated “$\delta_j$,” is the duration function of the
D-sentences.

Conclusion 6.1. If \( \delta_{j} > z_{k} \), the memory of the interval defined by \( y_{j} \) and \( z_{k} \) places the end of the interval after the beginning of the memory of it, or does something else equally unclear. If \( \delta_{j} > y_{j} \), the entire interval is placed after the beginning of the memory of it. When \( \delta_{j} > z_{k} \), let us say that the end of the remembered interval falls within the interval for the memory of it, or that the situation is an “infall.” (Compare “The light went out a half-second ago.”)

Conclusion 6.2. If \( \delta_{j} > x_{j+k} \), then \( S_{j+k} \) is added to the preconscious before \( S_{j} \) can be thought once. The earliest interval during which the \( j \)th sentence can be thought “passes over” the \((j+k)\)th interval. Let us say that the situation is a “passover.” (Something of the sort is true of humans, whose brains contain permanent impressions of far more sensations than can be thought, remembered in consciousness.)

Conclusion 6.3. If there are passovers in a D-Memory, the organism cannot both think the sentences during the earliest intervals possible and be aware of the passovers. Proof: The only way the organism can be aware of \( \delta \) (\( S_{k} \)) is for event \( j+1 \) (\( h \) a positive integer) to be the thinking of \( S_{k} \). If the thinking of \( S_{k} \) takes place as the \((j+1)\)th event, then the organism gets two values for \( \delta(S_{k}) \), namely \( x_{j+1} \) and \( y_{j+k} \). Assume that only \( x_{j+1} \) is allowed as a measure of \( \delta(S_{k}) \). Since \( \delta(S_{k}) = y_{j+k} \), there is no passover. If the thinking of \( S_{k} \) takes place as the \((j+2)\)th event, then \( x_{j+2} \) \( y_{j+k} \) \( \delta(S_{k}) \) could be greater than \( x_{j+1} \). But since \( S_{j} \) goes into the preconscious at \( x_{j} \), \( S_{k} \) is not actually thought in the earliest interval during which it could be thought. See the diagram.

\[
\begin{align*}
S_{j} &\quad \text{event } j+1 \\
S_{j} &\quad \text{event } j+2 \\
S_{j+1} &\quad \text{event } j+1 \\
S_{j+2} &\quad \text{event } j+2
\end{align*}
\]

Conclusion 6.4. Let there be an infall in the case where event \( j+1 \) is the thinking of \( S_{j} \). \( \delta(S_{j}) = x_{j+1} \) and \( \delta(S_{j}) > z_{k} \), \( S_{j+k} \) gives \( \delta(S_{j}) \), so that the organism can be aware of it. It is greater than \( x_{j} \). Thus, the organism can be aware of the infall. However, the infall will certainly be no more difficult to accept than the other features of the D-Memory. And the thinking of \( S_{j} \) has to be one of the events for the organism to be aware of the infall.

### 2.7 \( \Phi \)-Memories

I will conclude these studies with two complex constructions.

**Definition.** A \( \Phi \)-Memory is a memory which includes an M* -Memory and a D-Memory, with the following conditions. 1. The goal \( G \), for the M*-Memory, is to move from one point to another. 2. For the D-Memory, “event” becomes a numerical term, the decrease in the organism’s distance from the destination point during the temporal interval. “A 3-inch move toward the destination” is the sort of thing that ‘event’ here refers to. 3. The number of \( A_{j} \) equals the number of D-sentences factorial. The number of D-sentences, of course, increases.

Consider the consecutive thinking of each D-sentence precisely once, in minimum time, while the number of sentences remains constant. Such a “D-paragraph” is a permutation of the D-sentences. Let \( \mathcal{R}^{m} \) be a D-paragraph when the number of sentences equals the integer \( m \). There are \( m! \) \( \mathcal{R}^{m} \) s. When \( f(t) = m = 3 \), one of the six \( \mathcal{R}^{m} \) s is \( \mathcal{S}_{3} \), thought in minimum time. Assume that the duration \( \Delta \) of a D-paragraph depends only on the number of D-sentences and the \( \delta_{j} \). We can write

\[
\Delta(\mathcal{R}^{m}) = \sum_{j=1}^{\delta_{j}} \delta_{j}
\]

The permutations of the D-sentences, as well as the D-paragraphs, can be indexed with the \( a_{j} \) just as the possible methods are.

**Definition.** A \( \Phi \)-Memory is a \( \Phi \)-Memory in which the order of the sentences in the \( \mathcal{R}^{m} \) has the meaning of ‘I have actually being doing \( A_{j} \)’ assigned to it. The order is the indication that \( A_{j} \) has actually been used; it is the \( \mathcal{R}^{m} \)’s \( \mathcal{M}^{*} \)-assertion. ‘I have actually been doing \( A_{j} \)’ is merely an English translation, and does not appear in the \( \Phi \)-Memory.

Conclusion 7. Given a \( \Phi \)-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not only will there be a gap in the awareness of when what events occurred; it will be forgotten which method has actually been used.

This conclusion points toward a study in which deformations of the memory language are related to deformations of general consciousness.

**Definition.** A \( \Phi^{*} \)-Reflection, or reflection in the present of a \( \Phi^{*} \)-Memory, is a collection of assertions about the future, derived from a \( \Phi^{*} \)-Memory, as follows. 1. There are the sentences ‘Event’ will occur in the
interval of time which is \( x_j - x_j \) long, and begins at twice the present time \( A \), minus \( x_j \) \( A \); and which is \( y_j \) long and begins \( z_j \) from now. If event \( j \) was a 3-inch move toward the destination in the \( \Phi^* \)-Memory, the sentence in the \( \Phi^* \)-Reflection says that a 3-inch move will be made in the future temporal interval. 2. The \( a \)th permutation of the sentences defined in (1) is an assertion which has the meaning of 'I will do \( A \)' and the organism can think precisely one permutation at a time. The \( A_{y_j}, x_j, y_j, z_j \), and the rest are defined as before (so that in particular the permutations can be indexed with the \( a \)).

Conclusion 8. Given that the \( \Phi^* \)-Memory's temporal intervals \( [x_j, x_j] \) are reflected as \( [2N-x_j, 2N-x_j] \), the reflection preserves the intervals' absolute distances from the present. Proof: The least distance of \( [x_j, x_j] \) from \( N \) is \( N-x_j \); the greatest distance is \( N-x_j \). Adding the least distance, and then the greatest distance, to \( N \), gives \( [2N-x_j, 2N-x_j] \).

I will end with two problems. If a \( \Phi^* \)-Memory exists, under what conditions will a \( \Phi^* \)-Reflection be a precognition? Under what conditions will every assertion be prescience or foreknowledge? By a "precognition" I don't mean a prediction about the future implied by deterministic laws; I mean a direct "memory" of the future unconnected with general principles.

Finally, what would a precognitive \( \Phi^* \)-Reflection be like as a mental experience? What present or ongoing awareness would accompany a precognitive \( \Phi^* \)-Reflection?
The energy cube organism is a conscious organism which is nothing but energy confined to a cubical space. It rests on a rectangular energy slab, in a stationary, colorless liquid, separated from the slab by a thin film of liquid. It has been on the slab for an indefinitely long time. There are in fact two infinite bodies of the liquid, alternating with two infinite empty spaces; the four volumes are outlined by two intersecting planes which just miss being perpendicular. The slab is poised, at a slant, on the faces of the upper body of liquid, near where they meet. There are no other objects in the bodies of liquid. The slab, liquid, and spaces are the energy cube organism’s entire cosmology. (See the illustration.)

ILLUSTRATION
The energy cube organism can continuously change position, continuously and instantly moving the liquid from its path into its wake so as to make no current in the liquid. For almost as long as it has been on the slab, the organism has devoted itself to crossing the slab, from the slab’s edge on one face of the liquid to its edge on the other.

The energy cube organism has a conscious memory (by which I mean strictly a memory of what it did and what happened to it, the past events of its existence). The memory consists of symbols which are given “meaning” by their extra-linguistic mental associations—in human terms, it consists of language. The complete memory contains tens of thousands of partial memories, which the organism can only have one at a time. Going through the partials—which it does as if they were the phonemes of one long word—constitutes its one complete memory. Each partial is a memory of the difference in the organism’s minimum distances from the destination edge, at the beginning, and at the end, of some interval of time. Call the difference its “progress.” The total of time intervals in all the partials completely covers the interval from the earliest remembered event to the most recent remembered event. As time passes, more partials are added to the complete memory. The production of partial memories is an involuntary process of the organism.

The memory is temporally dual. The interval for each partial is an interval of fixed time, defined by its duration, and the distance from the fixed time when the energy cube organism appeared on the slab up to the interval’s end. But it is also a sliding interval, defined by its duration, and a constant distance from the present instant back to the interval’s end. When partials are added to the memory, each of the former intervals exactly covers the time not already covered, up to the absolute time when the partial is added. But the latter intervals, while they never overlap, can have gaps between them. The intervals generally are of different durations. The energy cube organism lacks any independent extra-linguistic memory, any mental reliving of the past, which could conflict with the dual temporal memory. There is no form to the past other than that of the memory’s language. (See the graph.)

The order of the partials in the complete memory is a linguistic phenomenon which indicates the method the organism has been using to move itself—and thus the order (with its extra-linguistic associations) is the memory of the method. A single method” is everything to be done by the energy cube organism to move itself, throughout the entire time it takes to reach the destination edge. There are different possible methods, and each could get the organism across; but the methods cannot be combined in any way. Every order of all partials signifies a different possible method. These
possible methods are in no special order. When a partial is added to the
memory, the number of possible methods is increased by a factor equal to
the new number of partials.

Now the complete memory is obtained by going through the partials—in
any order! Any order gives the memory. This feature, which can be
precisely characterized in terms of the memory language, is perhaps the most
remarkable feature of the whole cosmology. An approach to this feature in
human terms is to say that when the organism goes through the partials, (it
dreams that) it has been using the method indicated—and is presently using
it. It (does not remember the dream, and) does not remember going through
the partials. It has no other memory of which method it has been using.

The organism moves itself by mental exertion, teleports itself. The
"possible methods" are mental routines. These routines draw on the
following standard mental resources. The organism can assume at will many
"mental states." By "mental state" I refer to a mental "stage" or "space" or
"mood" in which visualizing, remembering, and all imaging can be carried
on. Some human mental states are general euphoria, stupor, general anxiety,
dreaming, dizziness, empathy with another person, and clearheadedness, the
normal state in which work is performed. These states are not defined by
specific imagings, but are "spaces" in which imaging is carried on. The
organization changes its state by changing from one form of energy to another,
gravity, magnetism, electric energy, radiated heat, or light. In these states,
the organism has an unlimited capacity to image; in human terms, to
visualize. There are visualized regions of colored liquids. Call them "fluid
colors." There are visualized glowing surfaces, and there are black regions or
"holes." There are visualized "covers," "lattices," and "shells," which are all
formed from transparent planes, spherical surfaces and the like. Call them
"projected surfaces." The fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. There are
"channels," which are strung-out series of fluid colors. There are
"reservoirs," which are clusters of fluid colors. A channel can be closed or
open. Two channels can cross each other. There are pairs of channels such
that earlier members of each channel flow into later members of the other-called "screw-connected" channels. Fluid colors often occur on or
within projected surfaces. Projected surfaces can be growing or held. A
visualization can be at the forefront of attention, or in the back of the mind.
That is, states have depth, and visualizations can be at different depths. The
state as a whole can be "frozen" or "melted." A human approach is to say
that a "frozen" state is set or fixed; while a "melted" state is fluid—the state
itself flows. A state can be projected into "superstate," gaining an abnormal
amount of mental energy and becoming superdizziness or superanxiety, for
instance.

Most interesting, states in different possible methods can have contact
with each other. A human approach is to say that dreams are so flexible that
the organism can dream that an actual state is/was in contact with a state in
a possible method. One sort of cross-method contact is for states to be
"interfrozen"—more easily frozen because they are somehow mixed. They
can also be "intermelted."

I will describe a method, as the organism would be conscious of it in
remembering. For concreteness, I will refer to the different states with the
names of human states rather than with letters. Channels are generated in a
frozen stupor, and become fixed at the forefront of attention of euphoria
intermelted with a possible state. The screw-crossed channels erode crevices
in a held lattice, which breaks into growing sheets (a variety of covers). The
sheets are stacked, and held in a frozen dream thawed at intervals for
reshuffling of the stack. The dream becomes interfrozen, and proceeds in a
trajectory which shears, and closes, open channels. If no violation of the
channels cross-mars the melt, the stack meshes with the sharp-open channels.
The dream becomes interfrozen, and mixed clear-headed states compress the
closed channels which were not fixed at the dream's surface. A fused
exterior double-flesh (a certain maximally "glowing surface") is
expand-enveloped by euphoria, which becomes dizziness; and oblique
lattices are projected from the paralinear deviation of guided open channels
in it. Growing shells are dreams into violet sound-slices (certain synthetic
"fluid colors") by the needed jumped drag (a generic state), a crossfrozen
dream. Channels in a growing anxiety enspiral concentric shells having
intermixed reservoirs between them, during cyclic intersection of the anxiety
in superstate. And on and on. Time is here the time it takes to carry out the
successive steps of the routine.

The energy cube organism language, the symbols constituting the
partials, are themselves mental entities. A partial is a rectangular plane
glowing surface, which has two stationary plane reservoirs on it, and has a
triangular hole in it. As a mental entity, in other words, a partial is a
visualization like those which are part of the methods. The perimeter of the
triangular hole equals the organism's progress in the corresponding time
interval. Absence of the hole indicates zero progress.

The fluid colors in each of the reservoirs on each partial memory are
primary colors, and are mixed together. Speaking as accurately as possible
in human terms, in each reservoir there is precisely one point of "maximum
mixture" of the primary colors. The primary colors are mentally mixed in
any way until the right amount of mixture is reached. There is a scale of
measurement for amounts of mixture of the colors. There is a scale for
vertical distances on the surface—for how far one point is below another. The
difference in amounts of mixture at the two points of maximum mixture corresponds to the length of the first temporal interval; and the difference between the maximum possible amount of mixture and the lesser of the two amounts of maximum mixture on the surface corresponds to the distance from the fixed beginning time to the interval's end. The vertical distance between the two points of maximum mixture corresponds to the length of the second temporal interval; and the vertical distance from the middle of the surface to the point nearer it corresponds to the constant distance from the present instant back to the interval's end. The middle of the surface represents the present, and the upper half represents the future; the reservoirs are all in the lower half. For each partial it is necessary to determine (1) the number of units of duration per unit difference in amounts of mixture; and (2) the number of units of duration per unit difference in vertical distances. The average glow per unit area of each glowing surface (excepting the hole) is correlated with a pair of numbers constituting this information.

Finally, turning all the partial memories upside down—and reflecting the first temporal memory in the present instant, so that the intervals' absolute distances from the present are preserved—gives the precognition of the organism's future course of action, tells what progress will be made when and by which method.

The Representation

This essay accompanies a representation of the energy cube organism's memory—hence its title. The way to picture the memory, naturally, is to make something that looks like the partials. I have represented the partials by rectangular sheets of paper of different transparencies with mixtures of inks of primary colors on them and holes cut in them; together in an envelope, which bears the injunction not to have more than one sheet out at a time. Three of the tens of thousands of partials are represented.

ORIGINAL 1961 VERSION

Foreward

I have refrained from editing the Original Version except where absolutely necessary. It is full of inconsistencies and inadequate explanations, but I have flagged only two major ones, by placing them between the signs X and X. Part of the fourth paragraph is flagged because a sequence of units is not analogous to a sequence of inflected words; it is rather more like permutations of letters which form words ('rat', 'tar', 'art'). Most of the seventh paragraph is flagged because I promise to define intervals by their lengths and ends, but instead give their beginnings and ends.

In the fourth paragraph, there are two different versions of the correspondence between possible methods and sequences of units, and of why any sequence is acceptable. Passages belonging exclusively to the "multiplex" version are set off by the sign $. Passages which belong exclusively to the "style" version and which should be deleted if the "multiplex" version is used are placed between slashes. The "style" version is the main version. In the fifth paragraph, a notion appears which is interesting, but unconvincingly explained. It is not clear whether this notion relates only to the "multiplex" version, or whether it would relate to the "style" version if the word "multiplex" were omitted. The passages suggesting this notion are placed in brackets.

1. Energy cube organisms are conscious organisms which are cubical spaces containing only energy. The particular energy cube organism of concern here has, for an indefinitely long time, been in a body of liquid, "resting on" a rectangular energy slab also in the body of liquid; the organism's "bottom" face is separated from the slab by only a very thin film of the liquid. The "universe" the organism and slab are in is made up of four infinite triangular right prisms, prismatic spaces, as defined geometrically by two intersecting planes almost perpendicular to each other. The prismatic spaces defined by the vertical acute dihedral angles, are finite bodies of a stationary, colorless liquid—the "upper" body of liquid being what the organism and slab are in. The two opposite shorter edges of the slab are at the faces of the body of liquid, the planes, near their intersection; the slab is "slanted," so that the edges are at slightly different distances from the line of intersection. The organism and slab are the only "objects" in the bodies of liquid. (See the illustration.) The organism can move (the energy cube can
continuously change position) without creating currents in the liquid. For almost as "long as it has been in the liquid, the organism has devoted all its "intelligence," all its "energies," to moving across the slab, from one of the shorter edges to (any point on) the other.

2. The organism's conscious, distinct memory is entirely concerned with, is entirely of, its efforts to cross the slab. (I am using 'memory' narrowly to refer to an organism's memory of its past. I am counting its "general information," for example knowing a language, not as part of its memory but as imagings not memories. Thinking the sequence 1, 2, 1, 2 is not in itself remembering.) The total memory consists of a large number of units (tens of thousands), of which the organism can be attentive to precisely one at a time. "Total recall," the total memory, involves considering, having, all units in any succession, which the organism can do very rapidly. Now from one point of view, the memory consists of its content; from another, it consists of symbols, just as human memories often consist of language. In describing the memory, I will go from considering primarily the content, what the memory is of; to considering the specific character of the units, specific symbolism used in the memory, and specific content. Each unit is first a memory of the amount of progress made toward the destination edge in a particular interval of time. The amount of progress is the difference between the minimum distance of the organism from the destination edge at the beginning of the interval, and the minimum distance at the end of the interval. The total of intervals, in the total of units, cover the "absolute" interval of time from the earliest to the most recent remembered event; as time passes, more units are added to the memory.

3. Now the memory is temporally dual: the interval of time for each unit is first, an interval of "absolute" time, defined by its duration, and the "absolute" time of its end (stated with respect to an "absolute event" such as the appearance of the organism on the slab); and secondly, an interval defined by its duration, and how far from the present instant its end is. It is like remembering that so much progress was made during one year which ended at January 1, 1000 A.D.; as well as remembering that so much progress was made during one year which ended 1,000 years ago. In the second temporal memory, the absolute time of the end of the interval to which the progress is assigned changes according as the absolute time of the present instant changes. For example, it is like remembering "that so much progress was made during one year ending 1,000 years ago," and, 100 years later, remembering "that so much progress was made during one year ending 1,100 years ago"; and in general, always remembering "that so much progress was made during one year ending 1,000 years ago." Both temporal memories are in their own ways "natural," the first being anchored at an "absolute beginning," the second at the present instant. When a unit is added to the memory, the interval of time of the first temporal memory is added at the end, exactly covers the time not already covered, up to the absolute time when the unit is added; so that the total of intervals of the first temporal memory exactly cover, without overlap, the absolute total time. In contrast, although the intervals of the second temporal memory do not overlap at any time, there can be gaps between them; so that when a unit is added to the memory, the interval for the second temporal memory may be placed between existing intervals and not have to cover an absolute time which they have left behind, that is, not have to be placed farther back than all of them. Intervals of both temporal memories are of different sizes, a "natural complexity." (See the graph.) Incidentally, the condition for coincidence of the two temporal intervals of a unit is: if the two intervals are of the same duration, they will coincide at the absolute time which is the sum of the absolute time of the end of the first interval, and the distance from the present instant of the end of the second interval. The two temporal memories complement each other; aside from this comment I will not be concerned to "explain" the duality with respect to when the amounts of progress were made, whether when they were "really" made stayed the same and changed, or whether the memory is inconsistent about it, or what.

4. I will now turn to the aspect of the memory concerned with the method the organism has used to move itself. Methodologically, the memory is a multiplex symbol. A "single method" is everything to methods by the organism, to move itself, throughout the total time it takes to reach the destination edge; so that the organism could not use two different "single methods," must, after it chooses its method, continue with it alone throughout. The organism has available different (single) methods, has different methods it could try. The different sequences, of all units, are assigned to the different (single) methods available to the organism to signify them; are symbols for them. (Thus, the number of available methods increases as units are added to the memory.) Now all this only approximates what is the case, because contrary to what I may have implied, which method is used is not a matter of "fact" as are the temporal intervals and amounts of progress. As I have said, having all units in any succession constitutes the total memory, total recall (="factually")-different sequences of all units are each the total memory, total recall; but, as language, the total memory in different styles (like words in different orders in a highly inflected language); and the matter of method (which might better be said to be "manner") corresponds to the matter of style, rather than factual content of language. Different styles exclude each other, but not what is said in each other's being true. Thus it is that the number of available
methods can increase; and that any sequence of all units can constitute the total memory, total recall ("factually"), although different sequences signify different methods used. As an indicator of the method used, the whole memory is a multiplex symbol. Names for each of the methods are combined in a single symbol, the totality of units. In remembering, the organism separates any single name by going through all the units in succession, and that name is the complete reading of the multiplex symbol, the complete information about the method used. I will not be concerned to "explain" the matter of the increasing number of available methods; or the matter of any sequence of all units constituting the complete reading, the total memory, total recall, but different sequences signify different methods used.

5. I will give just an indication of what the available methods [and their relations through the multiplex memory] are like. Throughout this description, there has been the difficulty that English lacks a vocabulary appropriate for describing the "universe" I am concerned with, but the difficulty is particularly great here, in the case of the methods [and their relations through the multiplex memory]; so that I will just have to approximate a vocabulary with present English as best as I can. The methods, instruments of autokinesis, are all mental, teleportation, result in teleportation. The "consciousness" available to the organism to be combined into methods are infinitely many. It has available many states of mind (as humans have non-consciousness, autotranquil trance, dizziness, dreaming, clear-headed calculation, and so forth), corresponding to different forms its energy can assume. To give this description more content I will differentiate its states of mind by referring to them with the names of the human states of mind (rather than just with letters). It has available an indefinite variety of contents, as humans have particular imagings, in its consciousness states of mind. I will outline the principal contents. There are "visualized" fluid regions of color (like colored liquids), first-order contents. There are "visualized" radiant surfaces, and non-radiant surfaces or regions ("holes"), the intermediate contents. The second-order contents are "projective" constructs of imagined geometric surfaces, "covers," "lattices," and "shells." Fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. They can occur in certain series, "channels"; and in certain arrays, "reservoirs." A channel can be "closed" or "open," two channels can be "crossed," or "screw-connected" (earlier members of each channel flowing into later members of the other). First-order contents (fluid colors) often occur on or within second-order ones (projective surfaces). Second-order contents can be "held" or "growing." States of mind have depth, "deeper" being "farther from the forefront of attention": and contents can be at different depths. A state of mind as a unity can be "frozen," which is more than just unchanging (in particular having its contents stationary or held). It can be projected into "superstate," remaining a state of mind but being superenergized. [Most interesting, states of mind, in different methods signify by different symbols combined in the multiplex methodological memory, can have contact with each other; for example be "interfrozen."] A partial description of a method will give an idea of the complexity of the methods. Channels are generated by a frozen non-conscious state, and become fixed in the surface layer of an [inter] melted trance. The screw-crossed channels erode crevices in a held shell, which breaks into growing sheets (certain covers). The sheets are stacked, and held in a frozen dream thawed at intervals for reshuffling. The dream becomes melted, and proceeds in a trajectory which shears, and closes, open channels. If no violation of the channels cross-mars the melt, the stack meshes with the sharp-open channels. The dream becomes [inter] frozen, and mixed calculation states compress the closed channels which were not surface-fixed in it. A fused exterior double-flash (a certain maximally radiant surface) is expand-enveloped by a trance, which becomes dizziness; and oblique lattices are projected from the paralinear deviation of guided open channels in it. Growing shells are dreamed into violent sound-slices (certain fluid colors) by the needed jumped drag (a certain consciousness), a [cross] frozen dream. Channels in a growing trance ensipal concentric shells having intermixed reservoirs between them, during cyclic intersection of the trance in superstate. I will not say more about the available methods, because in a sense the memory does not: a sequence of units is a marker arbitrarily assigned to a method to signify it, like an arbitrary letter, say 'q', assigned to a certain table to signify it; it no more gives characteristics of the method than 'q' does of the table. In fact, the available methods and sequences do not have any particular order; one cannot speak of the "first" method, the "second," or the like.

6. I will now concentrate on the character of the memory as a mental entity, and the rest of the symbolism used in it and specific content. A unit is a rectangular plane ("visualized") radiant surface (1 -the terminology is that introduced in the last paragraph), which has two stationary plane reservoirs (1) on it, and has a triangular hole (1) in it. The triangular hole is a simple symbol not yet explained: its perimeter equals the amount of the organism's progress, the difference in its minimum distances from the destination edge, in the interval the unit is concerned with. Absence of the hole indicates zero perimeter and no progress.

7. As for the symbols for the temporal interval. The colors in each of the two reservoirs on each unit are primary, and are mixed together. Speaking as accurately as possible in English, in each reservoir there is
precisely one point of "maximum mixture" of the primary colors. (The rest
of the reservoirs are not significant: the primary colors are mentally mixed in
any way to get the right amount of mixture, as pigments are mixed on a
palette.) For the first temporal memory, these points are two points on a
scale of amounts of color mixture. For the second memory, the points are
two points on a scale of vertical distances from the imaginary horizontal line
which bisects the rectangular surface, divides it into lower and upper halves.
The units are marked in their lower halves only; because for the second
memory the imaginary dividing line represents the present instant, distances
below it represent distances into the past, and distances above it distances
into the future (lower and upper edges representing equal distances from the
present). Now a scale is required so that it can be told what temporal
intervals the interval on the amount of mixture scale and the interval on the
distance scale represent. The parts of the scale which may vary from unit to
unit and have to be specified in each unit are the "absolute" time
corresponding to the maximum possible color mixture, the number of units
of absolute duration per unit difference in amounts of mixture, and the
number of units of absolute duration per unit difference in distances from
the imaginary dividing line. The markers arbitrarily assigned to the triples
of information giving these parts of the scale are average radiances per unit
areas of the units (excepting the holes). *

8. A final aspect of interest. Not too surprisingly, the transformation
which is inverting all units gives, if one considers not the first temporal
memory but its reflection in the present instant, the organism’s preconceived
course of action in the future, specifically, what progress will be made when.

The Representation

With this background, it is not surprising that the method of
representation I have chosen is visual representation of the units, the
"visualizations." Units are represented by rectangular sheets of paper of
different transparencies with mixtures of inks of primary colors on them and
holes cut in them, together in an envelope. Only one sheet should be out of
the envelope at a time. A sheet should be viewed while placed before a white
light in front of a black background, so that the light illuminates the whole
sheet as evenly as possible without being seen through the hole, only the
black being seen at the hole. The ultimate in fidelity would be to learn to
visualize these sheets as they look when viewed properly; then one could
have the memory as nearly as possible as the organism does. I have
represented eleven of the tens of thousands of units in the total memory.

12. Concept Art

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Concept art is first of all an art of which the material is concepts, as the
material of e.g. music is sound. Since concepts are closely bound up with
language, concept art is a kind of art of which the material is language. That
is, unlike e.g. a work of music, in which the music proper (as opposed to
notation, analysis, etc.) is just sound, concept art proper will involve
language. From the philosophy of language, we learn that a concept may as
well be thought of as the intension of a name; this is the relation between
concepts and language. * The notion of a concept is a vestige of the notion of
a platonc form (the thing which e.g. all tables have in common: tableness),
which notion is replaced by the notion of a name objectively, metaphorically
related to its intension (so that all tables now have in common their
objective relation to table). Now the claim that there can be an objective
relation between a name and its intension is wrong, and (the word) concept,
as commonly used now, can be discredited (see my book, Philosophy
Proper). If, however, it is enough for one that there be a subjective relation
between a name and its intension, namely the hesitant decision as to the
way one wants to use the name, the hesitant decisions to affirm the names of
some things but not others, then concept is valid language, and concept
art has a philosophically valid basis.

Now what is artistic, aesthetic, about a work which is a body of
concepts? This question can best be answered by telling where concept art
came from; I developed it in an attempt to straighten out certain traditional
activities generally regarded as aesthetic. The first of these is structure art,
music, visual art, etc., in which the important thing is "structure." * My
definitive discussion of structure art is in my unpublished essay Structure
Art and Pure Mathematics; here I will just summarize that discussion. Much
structure art is a vestige of the time when e.g. music was believed to be
knowledge, a science, which had important things to say in astronomy etc.
Contemporary structure artists, on the other hand, tend to claim the kind of
cognitive value for their art that conventional contemporary mathematicians

* The extension of the word "table" is all existing tables; the intension of
"table" is all possible instances of a table.
claim for mathematics. Modern examples of structure art are the fugue and total serial music. These examples illustrate the important division of structure art into two kinds according to how the structure is appreciated. In the case of a fugue, one is aware of its structure in listening to it; one imposes relationships, a categorization (hopefully that intended by the composer), the sounds while listening to them, that is, has an (associated) artistic structure experience. In the case of total serial music, the structure is such that this cannot be done; one just has to read an analysis of the music, definition of the relationships. Now there are two things wrong with structure art. First, its cognitive pretensions are utterly wrong. Second, by trying to be music or whatever (which has nothing to do with knowledge), and knowledge represented by structure, structure art both fails, is completely boring, as music, and doesn't begin to explore the aesthetic possibilities structure can have when freed from trying to be music or whatever. The first step in straightening out e.g. structure music is to stop calling it music, and start saying that the sound is used only to carry the structure and that the real point is the structure—and then you will see how limited, impoverished, the structure is. Incidentally, anyone who says that this of structure music do occasionally have musical value just doesn't know how good real music (the Goli Dance of the Baoulé, Cans on Windows by La Monte Young; the contemporary American hit song Sweets for My Sweets, by the Drifters) can get. When you make the change, then since structures are concepts, you have concept art. Incidentally, there is another, less important kind of art which when straightened out becomes concept art: art involving play with the concepts of the art such as, in music, the score, performer vs. listener, playing a work. The second criticism of structure art applies, with the necessary changes, to this art. The second main antecedent of structure art is mathematics. This is the result of my revolution in mathematics, presented in my 1966 Mathematical Studies; here I will only summarize. The revolution occurred first because for reasons of taste I wanted to de-emphasize discovery in mathematics, mathematics as discovering theorems and proofs. I wasn't good at such discovery, and it bored me. The first way I thought of to de-emphasize discovery came not later than Summer, 1960. It was that since the value of pure mathematics is now regarded as aesthetic rather than cognitive, why not try to make up aesthetic theorems, without considering whether they are true. The second way, which came at about the same time, was to find, as a philosopher, that the conventional claim that theorems and proofs are discovered is wrong, for the same reason I have already given that 'concept' can be discredited. The third way, which came in the fall-winter of 1960, was to work in unexplored regions of formalist mathematics. The resulting mathematics still had statements, theorems, proofs, but the latter weren't discovered in the way they traditionally were. Now exploration of the wider possibilities of mathematics as revolutionized by me tends to lead beyond what it makes sense to call mathematics; the category of mathematics, a vestige of Platonism, is an unnatural, bad one. My work in mathematics leads to the new category of concept art, of which straightforward but traditional mathematics (mathematics as discovery) is an untypical, small but intensively developed part.

I can now return to the question of why concept art is art. Why isn't it an absolutely new, or at least a non-artistic, non-aesthetic activity? The answer is that the antecedents of concept art are commonly regarded as artistic, aesthetic activities; on a deeper level, interesting concepts, concepts enjoyable in themselves, especially as they occur in mathematics, are commonly said to have beauty. By calling my activity art, therefore, I am simply recognizing this common usage, and the origin of the activity in structure art and mathematics. However, it is confusing to say things irrelevant to the emotional enjoyment of (real) music, and the intellectual enjoyment of concepts, the same kind of enjoyment. Since concept art includes almost everything ever said to be music, at least, which is not music for the emotions, perhaps it would be better to restrict art to apply to art for the emotions, and recognize my activity as an independent, new activity, irrelevant to art (and knowledge).

Concept Art Version of Mathematics System 3/26/61[6/19/61]

An element is the adjacent area (with the figure in it) so long as the apparent, perceived, ratio of the length of the vertical line to that of the horizontal line (the element's associated ratio) does not change. A selection sequence is a sequence of elements of which the first is the one having the greatest associated ratio, and each of the others has the associated ratio next smaller than that of the preceding one. (To decrease the ratio, come to see the vertical line as shorter, relative to the horizontal line, one might try measuring the lines with a ruler to convince oneself that the vertical one is not longer than the other, and then trying to see the lines as equal in length; constructing similar figures with a variety of real (measured) ratios.) [Observe that the order of elements in a selection sequence may not be the order in which one sees them.]
S.2, s.6, and s.7 imply the theorem: melt, mold, and cool lens used in last step to form negative, and make lens from s.7; using negative and lens in an enlarger, make two prints, an enlargement and a reduction—enlargement and reduction together constitute the theorem.

Concept Art: Innperseq (May - July 1961)
A "halpoint" iff whatever is at any point in space, in the fading rainbow halo which appears to surround a small bright light when one looks at it through glasses fogged by having been breathed on, for as long as the point is in the halo.
An "innpoint" iff a halpoint in the initial vague outer ring of its halo.
An "innperseq" iff a sequence of sequences of halpoints such that all the halpoints are on one (initial) radius of a halo; the members of the first sequence are innpoints; for each of the other sequences, the first member (a consequent) is got from the non-first members of the preceding sequence (the antecedents) by being the inner endpoint of the radial segment in the vague outer ring when they are on the segment, and the other members (if any) are innpoints or first members of preceding sequences; all first members of sequences other than the last [two] appear as non-first members, and halpoints appear only once as non-first members, and the last sequence has one member.
13. Exhibit of a Working Model of a Perception-Dissociator

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

To construct a model of a machine a thousand years before the machine itself is technologically feasible—to model a technological breakthrough a thousand years before it occurs.

(Analogies: constructing a model of an atomic power plant in ancient Rome; chess-playing-machine hoaxes of 19th-century Europe as models of computers; Soviet Cosmos Hall at Expo 67 as model of anti-gravity machine.)

To construct the model almost entirely from the visitors coming to see it, so that each visitor regards the others as the model.

What the hypothetical perception-dissociator will do is not possible now:

Physically alter the world (relative to you); sound disappears; sights and touches are dissociated; other people unconsciously signal you. Physically, “psychoelectronically” induce conditioned reflexes in your nervous system. Physically break down your sense of time.

[INVITATION]

Because of your interest in technology and science, you are invited to visit EXHIBIT OF A WORKING MODEL OF A PERCEPTION-DISSOCIATOR

Sponsored by (legitimate sponsor) Open continuously from (date) to (date) At (lunar colony or space station)

"The perception-dissociator is a machine which is the product of a technology far superior to that of humans. With it, a conscious organism can drastically transform its psychophysical relation to objects and to other conscious organisms... The exhibit spotlights the technical interest of the perception-dissociator, giving the visitor a working model of the machine which he can use to ‘transform’ himself."—from the Guidebook

It isn’t possible for this exhibit to be open or public, because of the nature of the model. You have been invited in the belief that you will be a cooperative visitor. Come alone. Don’t discuss the exhibit at all before you see it; and don’t discuss it afterwards except with other ex-visitors. Come prepared to
spend several hours without a break. There will be absolutely no risk or
danger to you if you follow instructions.

TO THE DIRECTOR

Exhibit requires two adjacent rooms, on moon or other low-gravity
location, so that humans can easily jump over each other and fall without
being hurt. First room, the anteroom, has "normal" entrance door leading in
from "normal" human world. Is filled with chairs or school desks. At far
corner from normal door is two-step lock, built in anteroom, connecting
rooms. Normal door on hinges leads from anteroom into first step of lock.
Sliding panel door leads into second step; and smooth curtain with slit in
middle leads into the exhibit hall. Another sliding door leads from lock's
first step directly back out to normal human world, bypassing anteroom.
Shelf required in first lock to check watches and shoes.

Exhibit hall large and empty with very high ceiling (Fuller dome?).
Room must be strongly lighted, so that objects in front of closed eyes will
cast highly visible shadows on eyelids. Room's inner surfaces must be
sound-absorbing, and moderate noise must be played into room to mask
accidental sounds; thus humans will cease to notice sound. Floor must be of
hard rubber or other material that will not splinter, and will not be too hard
to fall and crawl on.

Exhibit open continuously for days. Invite people who will seriously
try to play along—preferably engineers; and invite many of them, because
is better to have many in exhibit. Sample invitation enclosed. Attendants
working in shifts must be at two posts throughout. Try to keep surprising
features of exhibit secret from those who have not been through it.

Procedure. Visitor arrives and enters anteroom. Entrance attendant
gives him a Guidebook and sends him to sit down and start reading. Then
visitor goes to lock. Lock attendant must try hard to see that no more than

one visitor is in lock at a time. If lock is empty of visitors, attendant lets
entering visitor into first step, checks his watch and shoes, and sends him
alone into second step and on to exhibit room. When visitor comes out of
exhibit hall for any reason, he must be gotten into first step, and then
attendant sends him out the exit. When a visitor comes out, he just goes out
and doesn't go back in.
GUIDEBOOK

EXHIBIT OF A WORKING MODEL OF A PERCEPTION-DISSOCIATOR
(CONCEIVED BY HENRY FLYNT)

READ THIS GUIDEBOOK AS DIRECTED-Straight Through OR AS
OTHERWISE DIRECTED. DON'T LEAF AROUND.
READ PAGES 2-3 BEFORE YOU GO IN TO SEE THE EXHIBIT.

Introduction. The perception-dissociator is a machine which is the
product of a technology far superior to that of humans. With it, a conscious
organism can drastically transform its psychophysical relation to objects and
to other conscious organisms. When the organism has transformed itself,
sound disappears, time is immeasurable; and the relation between seeing and
touching becomes a random one. That is, the organism never knows whether
it will be able to touch or feel what it sees, and never knows whether it will
be able to see what it touches or what touches it. The world ceases to be a
collection of objects (relative to the physically altered organism). Further,
the machine induces a pattern of communication in the organism's nervous
system, an involuntary pattern of responses to certain events, to help the
organism cope with the invisible tactile phenomena. A dimension is added of
involuntarily relating to other organisms as unconscious signalling devices.
The transformation induced by the machine is permanent unless the
organism subsequently uses the machine to undo it.

The perception-dissociator is not conscious or alive in any human sense.
The components of the machine that the user is aware of are: (1) Optical
phenomena that are seen—"sights." (2) Solid or massive phenomena that are
felt cutaneously—"touches." If the user tries to touch a sight, he may not be
able to feel anything there. If he looks for a component that touches him, he
may not be able to see it.

(Keep reading)
In other words, from the beginning the machine has properties that the entire world comes to have to the transformed organism.

The exhibit spotlights the technical interest of the perception-dissociator, giving the visitor a working model of the machine which he can use to "transform" himself. Nothing is said about the purpose of the perception-dissociator in the society that can make one. The model is sophisticated enough that it can run independently of the visitor's will, and can affect him. In fact, the visitor may be hurt if he doesn't follow the instructions for using the machine.

When you have absorbed the above, go to the entrance and be admitted to the exhibit. You must check your shoes, and your watch (if you have one), with the attendant. As you enter, turn this page and begin reading Page 4.

DO NOT TALK OR MAKE ANY OTHER UNCALLED-FOR NOISE.

Be prepared for the touch of pulling your feet out from under you from behind. Don't resist; just fall forward, break your fall with your arms (and retrieve this Guidebook). The floor is not hard and the gravity is weak, so the fall should leave you absolutely unhurt.

AVOID ALL TOUCHES (EXCEPT FLOOR AND YOURSELF) UNLESS DIRECTED OTHERWISE. (You have been directed not to resist having your feet pulled out from under you.) IN EFFECT, IF YOU BUMP INTO A SOLID OBJECT OR STEP ON ONE, DRAW BACK. REMEMBER THAT YOU AVOID TOUCHES BY YOUR TACTILE SENSES ALONE. Whether your eyes are open or closed makes no difference. It is not necessary to avoid sights unless you touch something.

There may be the touch of being pushed forward at your shoulder blades. Don't resist; just move forward.

As for the sights in this model, it happens that they will be humanoid. All the human appearances other than you in the exhibit hall are sights from the machine. This is just the way the model is; don't give it a thought. Sights may appear or disappear (for example, at the curtain) while you are looking.

I am referring to the components of the model with the names of the components of the perception-dissociator.

As soon as you understand the above and are prepared to remember and follow the instructions, go immediately to Page 6.
You will now begin the first phase of perception-dissociation by the machine. Throughout this phase, you walk erect.

Instructions for operating the machine and for protecting yourself from its operation will be given both in English and in an abbreviated symbolism. It is important to master the symbolism, because later instructions can't be expressed without it.

u means you
s, s1, s2, s3 mean different sights from the machine
t, t1, t2, t3 mean different touches from the machine
\( a \) means a's eyes are open or a opens its eyes
av means a's eyes are shut or a shuts its eyes
\( ab \) means a blows on b's hand
\( ab \) means a pushes b, typically from behind
(a holds Guidebook under arm or elsewhere)
\( a \) means a jumps over b, crossing completely above b (weak gravity should make this easy)
\( ab \) means a rapidly waves both hands in front of and near b's eyes so that moving shadows are cast on b's eyes (a "shadows" b)
\( a \) means a pulls b's ankles back and up and immediately lets them go, so that b falls forward (a "tackles" b)
\( b \) means a jumps and falls on b, or a steps on b
\( a \) means a rapidly moves aside

() parentheses around the symbol for an action mean the action will probably happen
A line of action symbols constitutes an instruction. The order of symbols indicates the order of events. If one symbol is right above another, the actions are simultaneous.

YOU MAY ALWAYS TURN BACK TO THESE EXPLANATIONS IF YOU FORGET THEM.

(Keep reading)
Instructions 1-3 apply WHEN YOUR EYES ARE OPEN.

1. If you see a sight close its eyes, a heavy touch from the machine may be falling toward you. You must instantly jump aside. $S_1A \rightarrow S_7V \rightarrow U \rightarrow (U\theta)$

YOU MUST FOLLOW THIS AND SUCCEEDING INSTRUCTIONS AS LONG AS YOU STAY IN THE EXHIBIT. STAY WITH EACH INSTRUCTION UNTIL YOU HAVE IT THOROUGHLY IN MEMORY; AND CHECK OUT THE SYMBOLIC VERSION SO YOU LEARN TO READ THE SYMBOLS.

2. If a sight in front of you jumps over you, a touch may be about to tackle you. You must instantly jump to one side.

$$u \rightarrow S_{\Delta t} \rightarrow (U \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow U \rightarrow$$

3. If a sight waves its hands in front of your open eyes, a touch may be about to shove from behind. Jump to one side.

$$u \rightarrow S_{\Delta o \rightarrow} \rightarrow U \rightarrow (U \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow U \rightarrow$$

IF THERE ARE ANY SIGNS, TRY STANDING AROUND AND FOLLOWING THESE INSTRUCTIONS FOR A SHORT WHILE.

4. If you close your eyes, you must keep them closed until a touch tackles you, a touch shoves you, or you can't keep your mind on the exhibit (which you should also consider to be an effect of the machine). Then you immediately open your eyes.

$$u \rightarrow S_{\Delta o \rightarrow} \rightarrow U \rightarrow (U \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow (\text{A horizontal line between})$$

$$u \rightarrow \text{instinctive} \rightarrow U \rightarrow \text{action symbols means "or."}$$

$$u \rightarrow \text{With it, instr. can be combined.}$$

THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS TELL YOU WHAT TO DO WHEN YOUR EYES ARE CLOSED. LEARN THEM WELL.

5. If you feel a breath blowing on one of your hands, a touch may be falling on you. You must instantly jump to the side away from the breath.

$$u \rightarrow (V \rightarrow U \rightarrow) \rightarrow U \rightarrow (\text{Turn page and continue})$$

6. If your closed eyes are shadowed, a touch may be about to tackle you. You must instantly jump aside.

$$u \rightarrow S_{\Delta o \rightarrow} \rightarrow U \rightarrow (U \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow U \rightarrow$$

7. If you sense a massive touch going above your head, another touch may be about to shove you from behind. Jump aside.

$$u \rightarrow (V \rightarrow U \rightarrow) \rightarrow U \rightarrow$$

8. If you have any time left over from following other instructions, close your eyes and go around with your hands in front of you, shoving touches whenever you feel them.

$$u \rightarrow U \rightarrow U \rightarrow$$

NOW TRY INSTR. 8. REMEMBERING AND FOLLOWING THE OTHER INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT CLOSED EYES (INSTR. 4-7). WHEN YOU HAVE TO OPEN YOUR EYES AGAIN, AS PER INSTR. 4, CHECK ANYTHING YOU FORGOT; AND THEN GO TO THE SUCCEEDING INSTRUCTIONS. NOW-CLOSE YOUR EYES.

THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY WHEN YOUR EYES ARE OPEN.

9. If you see a sight falling toward or about to step on another sight whose eyes are open, run until you face the sight on the ground and close your eyes. BEFORE YOU FOLLOW THIS INSTRUCTION YOU MUST HAVE MASTERED THE PRECEDING INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT CLOSED EYES.

$$u \rightarrow S_{\Delta o \rightarrow} \rightarrow (V \rightarrow U \rightarrow) \rightarrow U \rightarrow$$

(Keep going)
10. If you see a sight about to tackle another whose eyes are open, run until you face the sight about to be tackled and jump over both sights. If the sight about to be tackled has closed eyes, you must immediately shadow them.

\[ u \land \frac{s_2 \land (s_1 \land s_2)}{s_1 \lor (s_1 \land s_2)} \frac{u \lor s_1}{s_2} \frac{u \lor s_2}{s_1} \]

11. If you see a sight about to push another with open eyes from behind, you must shadow the sight about to be pushed. But if the sight about to be pushed has closed eyes, you must immediately jump over both sights.

\[ u \land \frac{s_1 \land (s_1 \land s_2)}{s_2 \land (s_1 \land s_2)} \frac{u \lor s_1}{s_2} \frac{u \lor s_2}{s_1} \]

You must now put all the instructions into practice until you have learned them thoroughly by doing as they say. In other words, carry out Instr. 8, and the other instructions as they apply.

If you can’t practice the instructions because you still have not seen a sight or felt a touch, skip directly to Page 18.

Learning the instructions in practice should take a good while. When you have mastered them, the first phase is over. Turn to Page 10 and begin the second phase.

You are now in the second phase of transforming yourself with the perception-disassociator. Throughout this phase, you must stoop or crouch somewhat. That is, you must keep yourself below the height of your neck when you stand straight—except when you jump over a sight. The symbol is \( u \frac{3}{4} \). \( u \frac{3}{4} \) means that you crouch and close your eyes. Now crouch.

The numbered instructions for this phase are so similar to those in the preceding phase that they will be given in symbols only. Changes are noted parenthetically. You may turn back if you forget symbols.

1. \( u \frac{3}{4} \land s_1 \lor \frac{u \land s_1}{s_1} \) 2. \( u \frac{3}{4} \land (s_1') \frac{u \land s_1}{s_1} \)

3. \( u \frac{3}{4} \land (c_1) s_1 \) 4. \( u \frac{3}{4} \land \frac{c_1}{c_1'} \frac{u \land c_1}{c_1} \) 5. \( u \frac{3}{4} v c_1 \frac{u \land s_1}{s_1} \)

6. \( u \frac{3}{4} v c_1 \frac{u \land s_1}{s_1} \) 7. \( u \frac{3}{4} v (c_1)' s_1 \frac{u \land s_1}{s_1} \)

The big change comes next.

(Keep going)
Throughout the third phase, you must squat or move on your hands and knees. That is, you must always keep yourself below the height of your waist when you stand straight—unless you are able to jump over a sight from your low position. The symbol is \( u-\frac{3}{4} \). Now get down.

Instr. 1-7 from the last phase apply here without change. They are thus stated in the most abbreviated form.

\[
\begin{align*}
&u \frac{3}{4} \quad (S_3) \quad (S_4) \quad (S_5) \quad (S_6) \quad (S_7) \\
&u \frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \\
&\begin{array}{c}
\frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \\
\frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4}
\end{array}
\end{align*}
\]

The biggest change comes next.

8. If you have any time left over, close your eyes and go around with your hands in front of you. If you encounter touches standing higher than you, tackle them. If you encounter touches as near the ground as you, shove them. You must be sensitive and judge heights with eyes closed.

\[
\begin{align*}
&u \frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \\
&\begin{array}{c}
\frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \\
\frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4}
\end{array}
\end{align*}
\]

10. The previous Instr. 10 applies if \( S_9 \) is near the ground, that is, it applies unless \( S_9 \) is too high for you to jump or shadow it.

\[
\begin{align*}
&u \frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \\
&\begin{array}{c}
\frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4} \\
\frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{3}{4}
\end{array}
\end{align*}
\]

(Keep going)
14. $u \frac{1}{2} \wedge S_2 \wedge (S_3 \wedge S_4) \quad u \leftrightarrow S_5$

The second half of the previous Instr. 11 is dropped.

Except for the instruction to tackle touches, the changes are simply limitations to the instruction feasible for $u \frac{1}{2}$. They should be easy to remember.

You will next go on to Instr. 12, and carry it out along with the other instructions. As soon as you encounter an actual situation where you cannot act because $u \frac{1}{2}$, the third phase will be over. AT THAT POINT YOU MUST TURN TO PAGE 14 AND THE FOURTH PHASE.

If you can't carry out the instructions because all the components have vanished, the third phase is over. Turn to Page 14 and the fourth phase.

12. Adding to Instr. 8, if you have time left over, you may also keep your eyes open and blow on sights. You may also shadow or jump over sights unless they are too high.

\[ u \frac{1}{2} \wedge \quad u \leftrightarrow S \wedge S_5 \quad u \leftrightarrow S_5 \quad u \leftrightarrow [5] \]

---

You are in the fourth phase of perception-dissociation. Throughout this phase, you must crawl on your stomach (keep below knee height). The symbol is $u \frac{1}{2}$. Now get on the floor.

You can no longer be tackled, nor can you jump. Thus, the numbered instructions are greatly limited, and they will be restated fully.

THE FIRST TWO INSTRUCTIONS APPLY WHEN YOUR EYES ARE OPEN.

1. If you see a sight close its eyes, a touch may be falling or stepping on you, and you must immediately scramble aside.

\[ u \frac{1}{2} \wedge \quad u \leftrightarrow S_3 \quad u \leftrightarrow U \]

2. $u \frac{1}{2} \wedge \quad u \leftrightarrow (S_2 \wedge U) \quad u \leftrightarrow U$

THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS TELL YOU WHAT TO DO WHEN YOUR EYES ARE CLOSED.

3. When to reopen your eyes.

\[ u \frac{1}{2} \wedge \quad (S_2 \wedge (S_3 \wedge U)) \quad u \leftrightarrow U \]

4. If your closed eyes are shadowed, a touch may be falling or stepping on you. Scramble aside.

\[ u \frac{1}{2} \wedge \quad S_2 \wedge (S_3 \wedge U) \quad u \leftrightarrow U \]

5. $u \frac{1}{2} \wedge \quad (S_2 \wedge U) \quad u \leftrightarrow U$

6. $u \frac{1}{2} \wedge \quad (S_2 \wedge U) \quad u \leftrightarrow U$

TRY INSTR. 6. REMEMBERING AND FOLLOWING INSTR. 3.5.

WHEN YOU HAVE TO REOPEN YOUR EYES AS PER INSTR. 3, CHECK ON ANYTHING YOU FORGOT. THEN GO TO PAGE 15. NOW CLOSE YOUR EYES.
The rest of the instructions apply when your eyes are open.

7. \[ u \frac{4}{4} \frac{S_2 \land \langle S_1 \mid S_1 \rangle}{\langle S_1, S_1 \rangle} \frac{u \land}{u \lor S_2} \]

If \( S_2 \)'s eyes are closed, you must shadow them unless they are too high.

8. \[ u \frac{4}{4} \langle S_1 \rangle \langle S_1 \rangle \frac{u \land}{u \lor S_2} \]

You blow on \( S_2 \)'s hand unless it is too high.

9. Adding to Instr. 6, if you have time left over from following instructions, you may also shadow or blow on sights if they aren't too high.

\[ u \frac{4}{4} \langle S_1 \rangle \langle S_1 \rangle \frac{u \land}{u \lor S_2} \]

You must now put these nine instructions into practice until you have learned them thoroughly in practice; and even continue after that until you have difficulty keeping your mind on the exhibit.

IF YOU CAN'T PRACTICE THE INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE ALL THE COMPONENTS HAVE VANISHED, SKIP TO PAGE 18.

Otherwise, stay with this phase until you have difficulty keeping your mind on it. Then turn to Page 18 and the final phase of perception-dissociation.

You are now in the final phase of transforming yourself with the perception-dissociator. When you finish transforming yourself, you will have lost track of time, and will have ceased to notice sound. You will be dealing with sights and touches as unrelated phenomena; and you will be responding by reflex action to unconscious signals from "other people."

For this last phase, you will turn to Page 5. You will go through the symbols there in any order you like as if they were one long instruction, carrying out that instruction. You are to "use" each symbol once. There have been enough precedents in the interpretation of the symbols that you should now be able to interpret any combination of them. Continue to follow the previous numbered instructions as they apply, depending on whether you are 1, 3/4, 1/2, or 1/4. (But forget the instructions for time left over; you won't have any extra time.) REMEMBER THE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT WHEN TO REOPEN YOUR EYES IF YOU CLOSE THEM.

When you are through, you will be transformed. NOW TURN TO PAGE 5 AND BEGIN.
If you have found these words and are reading them in desperation because you are completely confused; or because you have lost interest in the exhibit; or because you have finished; then you are transformed.

If you want to use the model to simulate the reversal of your transformation before you leave the exhibit, do the following. Spend 50 seconds erect, with open eyes, walking up to sights and pushing them—assuming that you will find touches where you see sights. Count the seconds “one-thousand-and-one,” “one-thousand-and-two,” etc.

Then you will close your eyes. If you are blown on or pushed before 250 seconds have passed, you will open your eyes and—assuming that you will find a sight where you were touched—you will shadow it. Otherwise you will open your eyes when the 250 seconds have passed. Now close your eyes and do as instructed.

It is now suggested that you leave the exhibit. Go out through the curtain.

Stay in the exhibit and follow every instruction that is relevant, until you become thirsty.

If you begin to encounter components, return to the page you were on before you turned to this one.

If you still don’t encounter components, the model must be broken. Leave the exhibit by the same passage through which you entered.
Suppose you stand in front of a swinging door with a nail sticking out of it pointing at your face; and suppose you are prepared to jump back if the door suddenly opens in your face. You are deliberately taking a risk on the assumption that you can protect yourself. Let us call such a situation a “risk game.” Then a mock risk game is a risk game such that the misfortune which you risk is contrary to the course of nature, a freak misfortune; and thus your preparation to evade it is correspondingly superficial.

If the direction of gravity reverses and you fall on the ceiling, that is a freak misfortune. If you don’t want to risk this misfortune, then you will anchor yourself to the floor in some way. But if you stand free so that you can fall, and yet try to prepare so that if you do fall, you will fall in such a way that you won’t be hurt, then that is a mock risk game. If technicians could actually effect or simulate gravity reversal in the room, then the risk game would be a real one. But I am not concerned with real risk games. I am interested in dealing with gravity reversal in an everyday environment, where everything tells you it can’t possibly happen. Your “preparation” for the fall is thus superficial, because you still have the involuntary conviction that it can’t possibly happen.

Mock risk games constitute a new area of human behavior, because they aren’t something people have done before, you don’t know what they will be like until you try them, and it took a very special effort to devise them. They have a tremendous advantage over other activities of comparable significance, because they can be produced in the privacy of your own room without special equipment. Let us explore this new psychological effect; and let us not ask what use it has until we are more familiar with it.

Instructions for a variety of mock risk games follow. (I have played each game many times in developing it, to ensure that the experience of playing it will be compelling.) For each game, there is a physical action to be performed in a physical setting. Then there is a list of freak misfortunes which you risk by performing the action, and which you must be prepared to evade. The point is not to hallucinate the misfortunes, or even to fear them, but rather to be prepared to evade them. First you work with each misfortune separately. For example, you walk across a room, prepared to react self-protectingly if you are suddenly upside down, resting on the top of...
your head on the floor. In preparing for this risk, you should clear the path of objects that might hurt you if you fell on them; you should wear clothes suitable for falling; and you should try standing on your head, taking your hands off the floor and falling, to get a feeling for how to fall without getting hurt. After you have mastered the preparation for each misfortune separately, you perform the action prepared to evade the first misfortune and the second (but not both at once). You must prepare to determine instantly which of the two misfortunes befalls you, and to react appropriately. After you have mastered pairs of misfortunes, you go on to triples of misfortunes, and so forth.

The principal games are for a large room with no animals or distracting sounds present.

A. Walk across the lighted room from one corner to the diagonally opposite one, breathing normally, with your eyes open.

1. You are suddenly upside down, resting on the top of your head on the floor. You must get down without breaking your neck.

2. Although the floor looks unbroken and solid, beyond a certain point nothing is there. If you step onto that area, you will take a fatal fall. Thus, as you walk, you must not shift your weight to your forward foot until you are sure it will hold. Put the ball of the forward foot down before the heel.

3. Something happens to the cohesive forces in your neck so that if your head tips in any direction, it will come right off your body, killing you immediately. Otherwise everything remains normal. Thus, as you walk, you must “balance” your head on your neck. When you reach the other side of the room, your neck will be restored to normal. (Prepare beforehand by walking with a book balanced on your head.)

4. Invisible conical weights fall around you with their points down, each whistling as it falls. You must evade them by ear in order not to be stabbed. Walk softly and fast.

5. The room is suddenly filled with water. You have to control your lungs and swim to the top. Wear clothes suitable for swimming.

A. Play game A while on a long walk on an uncrowded street. The floor is replaced by the sidewalk. The fifth misfortune becomes for space suddenly to be filled with water to a height of fifteen feet above the street.

B. Lie on your back on a pallet in the dimly lit room, hands at your sides, with a pillow on your face so that it is slightly difficult to breathe, for thirty seconds at a time.

1. The pillow suddenly hardens and becomes hundreds of pounds heavier. It remains suspended on your face for a split second and then “falls,” bears down with full weight. You must jerk your head out from under it in that split second.

2. The pillow adheres to your skin with a force greater than your skin’s cohesion, and begins to rise. You must rise with it in such a way that your skin is not torn.

C. Lie on your back on the pallet in the dimly lit room.

1. Gravity suddenly disappears completely, so that nothing is held down by it; and the ceiling becomes red-hot. You must avoid drifting up against the ceiling.

2. The surface you are lying on becomes a vast lighted open plane. From the distance, giant steel spheres come rolling in your direction. You must evade them.

3. Your body is split in half just above the waist by an indefinitely long, rather high, foot-thick wall. Your legs and lower torso are on one side, and your upper torso, arms, and head are on the other side. Matter normally exchanged between the two halves of your body continues to be exchanged through the wall by telekinesis. It is as if you are a foot longer above the waist. In order to reunite your body, you must first roll over and get up, bent way forward. There are depressions in the wall on the same side as your feet. You have to climb the wall, putting your feet in the depressions and balancing yourself. You will be reunited when you reach the top and your waist passes above the wall.

D. Sit in a plain, small, straight chair, on the edge of the seat, hands hanging at the sides of the seat, feet together in front of the chair, in the lighted room, for about thirty seconds at a time.

1. The chair is suddenly out from under you and sitting on you with its legs straddling your lap and legs. You have to get your weight over your feet so you won’t take a hard fall.

2. The direction of gravity reverses and the chair remains anchored to the floor. You have to grab the seat and hold on in order not to fall on the ceiling.

3. You are suddenly in a contra-terrain, in which the atmosphere is unbreathable and prolonged contact with either the atmosphere or the ground will disintegrate you. The seat and back of the chair become a penetrable hyperspatial sheet between the alien universe and your own. As soon as you feel the alien atmosphere, you must jerk your feet off the ground and deliberately sink or plunge through the seat and back of the chair in the best way that you can. You will end up on the floor under the chair in your universe.

4. You are suddenly in dark empty space in a three-dimensional lattice of gleaming wires. Segments of the lattice alternately burst into flame and cool off. You adhere to the chair as if it were part of you. With your hands holding onto the seat, you can move yourself and the chair forward by
from blundering into a radiation beam, you have to communicate pre-verbally to the other mind by every means from vocal cries to pantomime, and get your body-his-mind out of range of the radiation. When the body is out, you will both be restored to normal. (The first thing to anticipate is the basic shift in viewpoint by which you will be looking at your own body from the other's position. There is no point in tensing your muscles in preparation for the misfortune, because if it occurs, you will be working with a strange set of muscles anyway. The next thing to prepare to do is to spot the radiation beam; and then to yell, gesture, or whatever—anything to get the "other" to avoid the radiation. Note finally that neither player prepares for the possibility that he will be surrounded by radiation. Each player prepares for the same role in an asymmetrical pas de deux.)

Asymmetry: The two of you play a given duo game, but each prepares to evade a different misfortune.

AB. Stay awake with eyes closed for an agreed upon time between one and fifteen minutes. Use a timer with an alarm.

1. Each suddenly has the other's entire present consciousness in addition to his own, from perceptions to memories, ideologies, ambitions, and everything else—threatening both with psychological shock.

The couple must take up positions such that their sensory perceptions are as nearly identical as possible. Beforehand, each must discuss with the other the aspects of the other's attitude to the world which each must fears having imposed on his consciousness. During the game, each must think about these aspects and try to prepare for them.

2. Each suddenly relives the other's most intense past feelings of depression and suicidal impulses. In other words, if five years ago the other attempted suicide because he failed out of college, you suddenly have the consciousness that "you" have just failed out of college, are totally worthless, and should destroy yourself. Presumably the other has since learned to live with his past disasters, but you do not have the defenses he has built up. You are overwhelmed with a despair which the other felt in the past, and which is incongruous with the rest of your consciousness. In summary, both of you risk shock and suicidal impulses. Beforehand, of course, each must tell the other of his worst past suicidal or depressed episode; and discuss anything else that may minimize the risk of shock.

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A. Memo on the Dream Project

Original aim: To recreate the effect of e.g. Pran Nath’s singing–transcendent inner escape–in direct life rather than art. I needed material which could function as an alien civilization (since the source of Pran Nath’s expression is an alien civilization relative to me); yet which was encultured in me and not an affectation or pretense. I decided to use dreams as the material, assuming that my dreams would take me to alien worlds. But mostly they did not. Mostly my dreams consist of long periods of tawdry, familiar life interrupted occasionally by senseless, unmotivated anomalies. In contrast, my original aim required alluring, psychologically gratifying material.

The emphasis shifted to redefining reality so that dreams were on the same level as waking life; so that they were apprehended as what they seem to be: literal reality (and not memory, precognition, or symbolism). The project was still arcane, but in a drastically different way. I was getting into an alternate reality which was extremely bizarre but not psychologically gratifying. It was boringly frightful and sometimes obscene. I became concerned with the analytical study of the natural order of the dream world, a para-scientific investigation. As I grappled with the rational arguments against treating dreams as literal reality, the project became a difficult analytical exercise in the philosophy of science. The original sensuous-esthetic purpose was lost.

Now I would like to return to the original aim, but how to do it? Obtain other people’s dreams–see if they are more suitable? Work only with my rare dreams which do take me to alien worlds? Try to alter the content of my raw dreams? Attempt to affect content of dreams by experiment in which many people sleep in same room and try to communicate in their sleep? The most uncertain approach to a solution: set up a transformation on my banal dreams, so that to the first-order activity of raw dreaming is added a second-order activity. The transformation procedure to somehow combine conscious ideational direction–coding of the banal dreams–with alteration of my experience, my esthesia, my lived experience.

B. Dreams and Reality–An Experimental Essay

Excerpts from my dream diary which are referred to in the essay that follows:

12/11/1973
I notice a state between waking and dreaming: a waking dream. I have been asleep; I wake up; I close my eyes to sleep again. While not yet asleep, I experience isolated objects before me as in a dream, but with no background, only a dark void. In this case, there are two pocket combs, both with teeth broken. In the waking world, I threw away one of my two pocket combs because I broke it; the other comb is still in good condition.

12/30/1973
I am chased by the police for one block west on West Market Street in Greensboro. I reach the intersection with Eugene Street, and in the north direction there is a steep hill rather than the street. The surface of the hill is bare ground and grass. I run up the hill, sensing that if I can get over the hill I will find Friendly Road and the general neighborhood of my mother’s house on the other side. The police start shooting. If I can get a few yards farther on the top of the hill I will be past the line of fire. I take a headlong dive and awaken in the middle of the dive to find myself diving forward on my mattress in the front room of my apartment. The action is carried on continuously through waking up and through the associated change of setting.

1/12/1974
Just before I go to sleep for the night, I am lying in bed drowsy. I think of being, and suddenly am, at the south edge of the Courant Institute plaza, which is several feet above the sidewalk. The edge of the plaza and the drop are all I see. It is night; and there is only a void where the peripheral environment should be. (Comment: It is of great theoretical importance that while most of the internal reality cues were present in this experience, some, like the peripheral environment, were not. In my dream experiences, all reality cues are present.) The drop expands to twenty or thirty feet, and I start to fall off. Fright jolts me completely awake. I have had something like a waking nightmare and have awakened from being awake. I thought of the scene, was suddenly in it (except for peripheral reality cues), lost control and became endangered by it, and then snapped back to my bedroom.

1/1/1974
One or two nights after 1/12/74 I was lying in bed just before going to
sleep. I could see women standing on a sidewalk. The scene was real, but I was not in it; I was a disembodied spectator. Also, the peripheral environment was absent. The reality was between that of a waking visualization and that of the Courant Institute incident of 1/12/74.

Comment: The differences between this experience and a waking visualization are that the latter is less vivid than seeing and is accompanied by waking reality cues such as cues of bodily location.

1/16/1974

1. I am in an apartment vaguely like the first place in which I lived, at 1025 Madison Avenue in Greensboro. I am a spy, I am teen-aged and short; and I am in the apartment with several enemy men, who are middle-aged and adult-sized. My code sheets look like the sheets of Yiddish I have been copying out in waking life. Eventually the men discover me in the front room with the code sheets on a fold-up desk. They chase me out the front door and onto the west side of the lawn, and shoot me with a needle gun. At that moment my consciousness jumps from my body and becomes that of a disembodied spectator watching from an eastward location, as if I were watching a film.

2. I am living in a dormitory in a rural setting with other males. At one point I walking barefoot in woods outside the dormitory, and Supt. Toro tells me I am walking in poison ivy. My feet begin to show the rash, but I recognize that I am in a dream and think that the rash will not carry over to the waking state. I then begin to will away the rash in the dream, and I succeed.

1/20/1974

For some reason the dream associates Simone Forti with flute-like music. It is shortly before midnight. In the dream I believe that Simone lives in a loft on the east side of Wooster Street. The blocks in SOHO are very small. If I walk through the streets and whistle, she will hear me. I start to whistle but can only whistle a single high note. I half awaken but continue whistling, or trying to; the dream action continues into waking. But I cannot change pitch or whistle clearly because my mouth is taped. As I realize this, I awaken fully.

Comments: I tape my mouth at night so I will sleep with my mouth closed. I experimented at trying to whistle with the tape on while fully awake. The breath just hisses against the tape. The pitch of the hises can be varied.

2/1/1974

1. I try to assist a man in counterfeiting ten dollar bills by taking half of a ten, moistening it to half of a one, and then coloring over the one until it looks like the other half of the ten. The method fails because I bring old crumpled tens rather than new tens, and the one dollar bills are new.

Comments: There are no natural anomalies in this dream at all. What is anomalous is that this counterfeiting method seems perfectly sensible, and I only begin to question it when we try to fit the crumpled half-bill to the crisp half-bill. Why am I so foolish in this dream? I retain my identity as Henry Flynt, and yet my outlook, my sense of what is rational, is so different that it is that of a different person. More generally, the person I am in my dreams is much more limited in certain ways that I am in waking life. My waking preoccupations are totally absent from my dreams. Instead there is bland material about my early life which could apply to any child or teen-ager. Thus, I must warn readers who know me only from this diary not to try to make the image of me here fit my waking life.

2/3/1974

3. I have had several dreams that I am taking the last courses of my student career. (In waking life I have completed all course work.) I am usually failing them. Tonight I dream that I have gone all semester without studying (in a course in English?). Now I am in the final exam and sinking. I will have to repeat these courses. Subsequently, I am sitting in a school office (of a professor or psychologist?), giving him a long list of foreign words, a foreign vocabulary?). I mention this episode because I remember that while I retained my nominal identity as Henry Flynt, I had the mind of a different person. I experienced another person's existence instead of mine. Professor Noll also appeared somewhere in this dream; as he has in several school dreams I have had recently.

2/3/1974 (This is the date I recorded, but it seems that it would have to be later.)

I get up in the morning and decide to have a self-indulgent breakfast because of the unpleasantness of working on my income tax the day before. So I put two slices of pizza in the oven, and also eat two bakery sweets, possibly éclairs. Then I think that a Mexican TV dinner would have been better all around, but it is too late; I have to eat what I am already preparing. Subsequently, I go with John Allen to a Shoreham cafeteria at Houston and Mercer Streets. The cafeteria chain is a good one, but this cafeteria is dark and extremely dingy upstairs where the serving line is. John complains that there is no ventilation and that he is suffocating, and he steps out.
Comment: When I awoke, my first thought was that the pizza in the oven would be burning. (I assumed that I had arisen, put the pizza in the oven, and gone back to sleep.) But then I realized that the breakfast was a dream. I got up and prepared the Mexican dinner which I had decided was best in the dream, but I also ate one éclair.

7/8/1974

I am caught out in a theft of money, and I feel that the rest of my life will be ruined. Comments: The quality of the episode depended on my strong belief in the reality of the social future and in my ability to form accurate expectations about it. When I awakened, the whole misadventure vanished.

End of excerpts from my dream diary.

"... it is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views or perceptions... But ... inasmuch as it is the common objective world that renders ... general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist will identify with the world of reality. Henceforth the private views, though just as real, will be treated as its perspectives. ... the common objective world, whether such a thing exists or is a mere convenient fiction, is indispensable to science ... ."


A. We wish to postulate that dreams are exactly what they seem to be while we are dreaming, namely, literal reality. Naively, we want to get closer to literal empiricism than natural science is. But science has worked out a very comfortable world-view on the assumption that both dreams and semi-conscious quasi-dreams are mere subjective phenomena of individual consciousness. If we wish to carry through the postulate that dreams are literal reality, then we will have to adopt a cognitive model quite different from that of natural science. It is of crucial importance that we are not interested in superstition. We do not wish to adopt a cognitive model which would simply be defeated in competition with science. We wish to be at least as rational, as empirical, and as cognitively parsimonious as science is. We want our cognitive model to be compelling, and not to be a playing which is easily taken up and easily discarded.

The question is whether there can be a rational empiricism which differs from science in placing dreamed episodes on the same level as waking episodes, but which stops short of the "nihilistic empiricism" of my philosophical essay entitled "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs." (In effect, the latter essay rejects other minds, causality, persistent objective entities, past time, the possibility of objective categories and significant language, and so forth, ending up with ungraded immediate experience.)

As an example of our problem, the waking scientific outlook assumes that a typewriter continues to exist even when we turn our backs on it (persistence of objective entities). In many of our dreams we make the same sort of assumption. In other words, in some of our dreams the natural order is not noticeably different from that of the waking world; and in many dreams our conscious world-view has much in common with waking common sense or scientific pragmatism. On 2/3/1974 I had a dream in which a typewriter was featured. I certainly assumed that the typewriter continued to exist when my back was turned to it. On 7/8/1974 I dreamed that I was caught out in a theft of money, and I felt my life would be ruined because of it. I certainly assumed the reality of the social future, and my ability to form accurate expectations about it. These examples illustrate that we are not nihilistic empirists in our dreams. The question is whether acceptance of the pragmatic outlook which we have in dreams is consistent with not regarding the dream-world as a subjective phenomenon of individual consciousness. Can we accept dreams as "literal reality": or must we reject the very concept of "reality" on order to defend the placing of the dream world on the same level as the waking world?

In summary, the question is whether we can place dreams on the same level as the waking world while stopping short of nihilistic empirism. A further difficulty in accomplishing this aim is that neurological science might succeed in gaining complete experimental control of dreams. Scientists might become able to produce dreams at will and to monitor them. The whole phenomenon of dreaming would then tend to be totally assimilated to the outlook of scientists. Their decision to treat dreams as subjective phenomena of individual consciousness would be greatly supported by these developments. Would we have to go all the way to nihilistic empiricism in order to have a basis for rejecting the neurologists’ accomplishments?

Still another difficulty is presented for us by semi-conscious quasi-dreams such as the ones described in my diary. Semi-conscious quasi-dreams exhibit some reality cues, but lack other important internal reality cues. Science handles these experiences easily, by dismissing them along with dreams as subjective phenomena of individual consciousness. Suppose we accept that the semi-conscious quasi-dreams are illusory reality. But if they can be illusory reality, how can we exclude the possibility that dreams might be also? If, on the other hand, we accept the quasi-dreams as
literal reality, what about the missing reality cues? Can we justify different treatment for dreams and quasi-dreams by saying that all reality cues have to be present before an experience is accepted as non-illusory? If we propose to do so, the question then becomes whether we should accept the weight which common sense places on reality cues.

Why do we wish to stop short of nihilistic empiricism? Because we do wish to assert that dreams can be remembered, that they can be described in permanent records; that they can be compared and studied rationally. We do what we did to cite the past as evidence; we do want to distinguish between actual dream experience and waking fabrication, knowing what we have dreamed, and we do want to describe what we experience in intersubjective language.

As easy way out which would offend nobody would be to treat dreams as simulations of alternate universes. But this approach is cowardly evasion for several reasons. It excludes the phenomenon of the semi-conscious quasi-dream, which poses the problem of internal reality cues in the sharpest way. Further, we cannot give up the notion that our project is nearer to literal empiricism than natural science is. We cannot accept the notion that we must dismiss some of our experiences as mere illusions, but not all of them. We do not see dreams as simulations of anything. Some of the most interesting observations I have made about connections between adjacent dreamed and waking episodes in my own experience are noticeable only because I take both dreamed and waking experience literally.

Before we continue our attempt to resolve our methodological problem, we will provide more detail on topics which we have mentioned in passing. We begin with the purported empiricism of natural science. The philosopher Hume postulated that experience was the only raw material of reality or cognition. However, he did not content himself with ungraded experience. He insisted on putting over our experiential raw material on an intellectual framework in such a way that experience was used to simulate the inherited conception of reality, a conception which we will call Aristotelian realism. Similarly for the purported empiricism of natural science. In fact, the working scientist learns to think of the framework or model as primary, and of experiences and verification procedures as ancillary to it. The quotation by d'Auro which heads this essay conveys as much.

What we are investigating is whether experiences can be draped on a different intellectual framework in which dreamed and waking life come out as equally real. Some examples of alternate verification conventions follow.

1. Accept intersubjective confirmation of my experience of the dream world which occurs within the dream as confirmation of the reality of the dream world.

2. Accept intersubjective confirmation of the past of the dream world which occurs in the dream itself as confirmation of the reality of the dreamed past.

3. Recognize that there is no infallible way to tell whether other people are lying about their dreamed experience or their waking experience.

4. Develop sophisticated interrogation techniques as a limited test of whether people are telling the truth about their dreams.

5. Accept that a certain category of anomalies occurs in dreams only when several people have reported experiences in that category.

The principal characteristic of the approach which these conventions represent is that each dream is treated as a separate world. There is no attempt to arrive at an account, for a given "objective" time period, which is consistent with more than one dream or with both dreamed and waking periods. Thus, many parallel worlds could be confirmed as real. As our discussion proceeds, we will move far from this approach, probably out of a sense that it is pointless to maintain a strong notion of reality and yet to forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality.

C. Something that I have learned from a study of my dream records is that while dreams are not chaotic, while they can be compared and classified, it is not possible to apply the method of natural science to them in the sense of discerning a consistent, impersonal natural order in the dream world. It is not that the natural order is different in dreams from what it is in the waking world; it is that the dream worlds are incommensurate with the discernment of a natural order in the scientific sense. Here are some specific observations which relate to this whole question.

1. Some dreams are not noticeably anomalous. The laws of science are not violated in them. This observation is important in giving us a normal base for our investigation. Dreams are not all crazy and chaotic.

2. In some dreams, it is impossible to abstract an impersonal natural order from personal experiences and anecdotes. There are no impersonal events. There is no nature whose order can be defined impersonally. The dreams are full of personal magic which cannot be generalized to a characteristic of an impersonal natural order.

3. As a special case of (2), in some dreams, we jump back in time and move discontinuously in time and space. Chronological personal magic.

4. In dreams, the distinction between myself and other people is blurred in many different ways. Also, I sometimes become a disembodied consciousness.

5. As a generalization of (4), sometimes it becomes impossible to distinguish objects from our sensing and perceiving function. The mediating sensory function becomes obtrusively anomalous. Stable object gestalts cannot be
identified.
6. Sometimes we experience the logically impossible in dreams. My father
was both dead and buried, and alive and walking around, in one dream.
7. The possibility of identifying causal relationships is sometimes lacking in
dreams. It is not just that actions have unexpected effects. It is that events
are strung together like beads on a string. There is no sense of willful acting
on the world or manipulation of the world which can be objectified as a
causal relation between impervious events.

Observation (2) above can lead us to an insight about the waking world.
Perhaps science insists on the elimination of personal anecdotes from the
natural order which it recognizes because the scientist wants results which
can be transferred from one life to another and which will give one person
power over another. At any rate, science excludes anecdotal anomalies which
cannot be made somehow into “objective” events. As an example, I may be
walking down the street and suddenly find myself on the other side of the
street with no awareness of any act of crossing the street.

What dreams provide us with is worlds in which anecdotal anomalies
cannot be relegated to limbo as they are in waking science. They are so
prominent in dreams that we can become accustomed to identifying them
there. We may then learn to recognize analogous anomalies in the waking
world, where we had overlooked them before because of our scientific
indoctrination.

Of course, we run the risk that superstitious people will misuse our
theory to justify their folly. But the difference between our theory and
superstition is clear. When the superstitious person says that he
communicates with spirits, he either lies outright; or else he misinterprets his
experiences—embedding them in an extraneous pre-scientific belief system,
or treating them as controversies of scientific propositions. We, on the
other hand, maintain more literally than science does that the only raw
material of cognition is experience. We differ from science in draping
experiences on a different organizational framework. The “reality” we arrive
at is incommensurate with science; it does not falsify any scientific
proposition. As for science and superstition, we headed this essay with the

quotation by d’Abro to emphasize that the scientist himself is superstitious:
he is determined to believe in the common objective world, even though it is
a fiction, because it is necessary to science. The superstitious person wants
you to believe that his communication with spirits is intersubjectively
consequential. Thus our theory, which tends toward the attitude that
nothing is intersubjectively consequential, offers him even less comfort than
science does.

D. We next turn to semi-conscious quasi-dreams. Referring to my
experience on the morning of 1/12/1974, I describe the experience by saying
that I was on the Courant Institute plaza. But I cannot conclude that I was
on the Courant Institute plaza. The reason is that important internal reality
cues are missing in the experience. For one thing, the peripheral environment
is missing; in its place is a void. Referring to my experience on 1/1-1974,
still other cues are missing. I am awake, and the scene is unstable and
momentary. The slightest attention shift will cause the scene to vanish.

When we recognize that we have disallowed falling asleep, awaking, and
anomalous phenomena in dreams as evidence of unreality, a careful analysis
yields only two types of reality cues.
1. Presence of the peripheral environment.
2. “Single consciousness.” This cue is missing when we see a
three-dimensional scene and move about in it, and yet have a background
awareness that we are awake in bed; and lose the scene through a mere shift
of attention. Its absence is even more marked if the scene is a momentary
one between two waking periods.

Let us recall our earlier discussion of the empiricism of science. Science
does not contend itself with ungraded experience. It drape experience on an
intellectual framework in such a way as to simulate Aristotelian realism. It
feeds experience into a maze of verification procedures in order to confirm a
model which is not explicit in ungraded experience. It short, science grades
experience as to its reality on the basis of standards which are
“intellectually” supplied. Internal reality cues are thus characteristics of
experience which are given special weight by the grading procedure. The
immediate problem for us is that ordinary descriptive language implicitly
recognizes these reality cues; one would never say without qualification that
one was on the Courant Institute plaza if the peripheral environment was
missing and if one was also aware of being awake in bed at the time. (In
contrast, it is fair to use ordinary descriptive language with respect to
dreamed episodes when our consciousness is singular, that is, when
everything seems real and unqualified.)

For purposes of further comparison I may mention an experience I
have had on rare occasions while lying on my back in bed fully awake. It is
as if colored spheres whose centers are located a few feet or yards in front of my chest expand until they press against me, one after the other. I use the phrase "as if" because reality cues are missing in this experience, and thus I cannot use the language of stable object gestalts without qualification in describing it. The colors are not vivid as real colors are. They are like visualized colors. The spheres pass through each other, and through me—within only a moderate sensation of pressure. I can turn the experience off by getting out of bed. The point, again, is that it is inherent in ordinary language not to use unqualified object descriptions in these circumstances. Yet the only language I have for such sensory configurations is the language of stable object gestalts—this is particularly obvious in the example of the Courant Institute plaza. (Is "ringing in the ears" in the same class of phenomena?)

An insight that is crucial in elucidating this problem is that when I describe episodes, the descriptions implicitly convey not only sensations but beliefs, as when I speak of a typewriter in a dream on the assumption that it persisted while I was not looking at it. The peculiar quality of a quasi-dream comes about not only because it is an anomaly in my sensations but because it is an anomaly in the scientific-pragmatic cognitive model which underlies ordinary language. If I discard this cognitive model and then report the event, it will not be the same event: the beliefs implicit in ordinary language helped give the event its quality. As a further example, now that I have recognized experiences such as that of 1/12/1974, I am willing to entertain the possibility that they are the basis for claims by superstitious persons to have projected astrally. But to use the phrase "astral projection" is to embed the experiences in a pre-scientific belief system extraneous to the experiences themselves. If we learn to report such experiences by using idioms like "ringing in the ears" and blocking any comparison with notions of objective reality or intersubjective import, we will have flattened out experience and will have moved in the direction of ungraded experience and nihilistic empiricism.

E. We next take up connections between adjacent dreamed and waking periods. As a preliminary, we reject conventional notions that dreams are fabricated from memories of waking reality; or that dreams are precognitions of waking reality; or that dreams are mental phenomena which symbolize waking reality. We reject these notions because they conflict with the placing of the dream world on the same level as the waking world.

Connections between dream and waking periods are important in this study because we may wish to create such connections deliberately, and even to attribute causal significance to them. Initially, we define the concept of dream control: it is to conduct one's waking life so that it is supportive of one's dreamed life in some sense. We also define controlled dreaming: it is to manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep (or during sleep) so as to influence the content of that person's dreams. (An example would be to give somebody a psychoactive sleeping pill.)

A careful analysis of connections between dream and waking periods yields the following classification of such connections.

1. I walk around the kitchen in a dream, then awaken and walk around the kitchen. Voluntary continued action.

2. Given a project with causally separate components, voluntarily assembled, I can carry out the project entirely while awake, entirely in dreams, or partly while awake and partly in dreams.

3. I walk around the kitchen while awake, then sleep. I may then walk around the kitchen in a dream. Also, I draw a glass of water while awake. I may have the glass of water to use in the dream. We could postulate that such connections are not mere coincidences, if they occur. However, we certainly cannot produce such connections at will. We call these connections echoes of waking actions in dreams. Note the case in which I taped my mouth shut before sleeping, and could not whistle in the subsequent dream.

4. We next have connections from dreamed to waking periods which can be postulated to have causal significance. First, misfortune or danger in dreams is regularly followed by immediate awakening. Secondly, I have had experiences in which a headlong dive or an attempt to whistle continued from dream to waking, right through waking up. These experiences are causally continuous actions. However, I cannot bring them about at will.

5. We can manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep (or during sleep) so as to influence the content of that person's dreams. The dream is not an echo of the waking action; the causal relationship is manipulative. Examples are to give someone a psychoactive sleeping drug or to create a special environment for sleep. The case in which I taped my mouth shut before sleeping was a remarkable borderline case between an echo and a manipulation.

In conclusion, dream control is any of the connections described in (1)-(4). Controlled dreaming is (5). We have analyzed these concepts meticulously because we want to exclude all attempts at magic, all superstitious thinking from the project of placing dreamed and waking life on the same level. There must be no rain dancing, no false causality, in this project.

F. Until now, we have analyzed our experience episode by episode. We could make this approach into a principle by assuming that each episode is a separate and complete world, which has its reality confirmed internally. In particular, the notion of objective location in space and time would be maintained if it appeared in a dream and was intersubjectively confirmed in
the dream, but the notion would be purely internal to each episode. The objection to these assumptions, as we mentioned at the end of (8), is that they propose to maintain the notion of objective location, and yet they forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality. If we adopt these assumptions and then compare all the reports of our dreamed and waking periods, we may find that we have experienced different events attributed to the same location—and indeed, that is exactly what we do experience.

One of the main discoveries of this essay has been that dreamed and waking periods are more symmetrical than our scientific-pragmatic indoctrination would have us suppose. The reality of the dream world is intersubjectively confirmed—within the dream. Anecdotal anomalies can be found in waking periods as well as in dreams. Entities which resemble common object gestalts but which lack some of the reality cues of object gestalts can be encountered while we are fully awake. Now we can recognize a further symmetry between dreamed and waking life. A dreamed misfortune is usually "lost" when we awaken, and its disappearance is taken as evidence of the unreality of the dream (the nightmare). But we can also "lose" a waking misfortune by going to sleep and dreaming. Further, just as a waking misfortune can persist from one waking period to another, a dreamed misfortune can persist from one dream to another (recurrent nightmares). Thus, we conclude that in regard to the consistency of episodes with each other, there is no basis for preferring any one episode, dreamed or waking, as the standard by which the reality of other episodes will be judged. Of course, rather than maintaining the reality of each episode as a separate world, we can block all attributions of events to objective locations. This approach would alter the quality of the events and bring us closer to nihilistic empiricism.

A further problem arises if we take the dream reports of other people as reports of reality. Suppose I am awake in my apartment at 3 AM on 2/6/1974, but that someone dreams at that time that I am out of my apartment. Multiple existences which I do not even experience are now being attributed to me. (My own episodes also pose a problem of whether "multiple existences" are being attributed to me, but that problem concerns events I experience myself.) What we should recognize is that the problem of "multiple existences" is not as unique to our investigation as may at first appear. Natural science has an analogous problem in disposing of the notion of other minds. The notion of the existence of many minds, none of which can experience any other, is difficult to assimilate to the cognitive model of science. On the other hand, to deny the existence of any mind, as behaviorists do, is to repudiate the scientist's observations of his own mental life. And if the scientist's observations of his own mental life are repudiated, then there is no good reason not to repudiate the scientist's observations of his bodily sensations and of external phenomena also; that is, to repudiate the very possibility of scientific observation. Further, when behaviorists try to convince people that they have no awareness, whom (or what) are they trying to convince? And what is the behaviorist explanation of the origin of the fiction of consciousness? Who benefits from perpetuating this fiction, and how does he benefit?

We must emphasize that the above critique is not applicable to every philosophical outlook. It applies specifically to science—because the scientist wants to have the benefits of two incompatible conceptual frameworks. Some of the common sense about other minds is necessary in the operational preliminaries to formal science; and the scientist's role as observer is indispensable to formal science. Yet the conceptual framework of science is essentially physicalistic, and can allow only for external objects. What this difficulty reveals is that the cognitive model of science has stabilized and prevailed even though it has blatan discrepancies in its foundations. The foremost discrepancy, of course, is that the scientist is willing to have his enterprise rest on a fiction, that of the common objective world. Thus, the example of science suggests an additional way of dealing with the problems which arise for our theory; we can allow discrepancies to persist unresolved.

There is an interesting observation to be made about one's own dreams in connection with multiple existences. I have found that the person I am in my dreams is significantly different from the waking identity I take for granted, as in my dream of 2/1/1974. As for the problem of other people's dreams, one way of handling them would be simply to reject the existence of other people's dream worlds and of their consciousnesses, and to limit one's consideration to one's own dreams. But perhaps the most productive way to handle the problem would be to construe it as one involving language in the way that the problems concerning quasi-dreams did. Our descriptive language is a language of stable object gestalts, of scientific-pragmatic reality. If we accept reports of other people's dreams in language which blocks any implications concerning objective reality, then our perceptual interpretations will be different and the quality of the events will be fundamentally different. The experience-world will be flatter. But maybe this is a revolutionary advance. Maybe reports of our appearances in other people's dreams, in language which blocks any implications about reality, are what we should strive for. And if we cease to be stable object gestalts for others, maybe our stable object gestalts will not even appear in their dreams.
Note on how to remember dreams

The trick in remembering a dream is to fix in your mind one incident or theme in the dream immediately upon awaking from it. You will then be able to remember the whole dream well enough to write a description of it the next day, and you will probably find that for weeks afterwards you can add to the description and correct it.
16. On Social Recognition

The most important tasks which the individual can undertake arise not from personal considerations but from the general conditions of society. The standards of accomplishment for these tasks are implicit in the tasks, and are objective in the sense that they can be applied without reference to public opinion. For example, given that humans express themselves in statements which are supposedly true or false, there arises a fundamental philosophical “problem of knowledge.” Then, the fact that societies are organized in different ways at different times and places poses fundamental problems of “political” thought and action. Sometimes the most important task posed by the conditions of society is to invent a whole new activity. The origination of experimental science in Europe in the seventeenth century is an example. For lack of a better term, these tasks will be referred to as “fundamental tasks.”

The fact that a fundamental task is posed by the general conditions of society does not mean that public opinion will be aware of the task, or that the ruling class will commission someone to undertake it. It may well be that the first person to perceive the problem is the person who solves it; and public opinion may not catch up with him for decades or centuries.

The person who devotes himself to a fundamental task is, more often than not, persecuted or ignored by society. Society puts up an immense resistance to solutions of fundamental problems, even when, as in the cases of Galois and Mendel, those solutions are politically innocuous. There is no evidence that this state of affairs is limited to some particular organization of society. Further, there are cases in which an objectively valid result is known, and yet apparently society can never adopt the result institutionally. Art is objectively inferior to broad, as I have shown, and yet all indications are that art will always be a major institution. The persecution of individuals who undertake fundamental tasks is an instance of a general human social irrationality which runs throughout history, from human sacrifice in ancient times to present-day war between communist countries. The conclusion is that for an individual to commit himself to a fundamental task tends to preclude social approval for his activities.

Quite apart from the fundamental tasks which are posed by general social conditions, the ruling class needs a continual supply of new talent at
all levels of society. At the lower levels, this supply is assured by the necessity of selling one's labor power in order to eat. At the higher levels of accomplishment, the ruling class assures itself of a continual supply of new talent by offering publicity or fame-social recognition—as a reward for accomplishing the tasks specified by the ruling class. Famous men such as Einstein are held up to children as examples of the proper relationship between the talented individual and society; and an international institution, the Nobel Prize, exists to implement this system of supplying talent. According to the doctrine, the individual has a duty to benefit society, to choose a task posed by the ruling class as his occupation. (His publicly known occupation is supposed to correspond to his real goals.) If he performs successfully, he will receive publicity as an indication that he is indeed benefiting society.

Our analysis of fame is the opposite of that of Ben Vautier. Vautier asserts that the desire for personal publicity is an instinctive drive of human beings, and that the accumulation of publicity is a genuinely selfish act like the accumulation of food. In fact, Vautier goes so far as to make no distinction between what Gypsy Rose Lee and Lenin, for example, did to gain fame; and he assumes that a pacifist, for example, would welcome military honors equally as much as he would a peace award. We assert, on the contrary, that the desire for publicity is not instinctive; it is inculcated in the young so that the ruling class may have a continual supply of new talent to serve its purposes. The desire for publicity, far more than the desire for money, is establishment-serving more than self-serving. (We suggest that the principal reason why Vautier seeks publicity is not instinct, but economics. Vautier has no inherited source of income, and has never been trained for a profession. For him, the alternative to the art/publicity racket would be common labor. If he had the opportunity for a life of leisure, he might feel differently about publicity.)

The issues which are raised here are extremely important for the person who perceives a fundamental task, because his sanity may depend on whether he understands the rationality of his motives for undertaking the task. He will already have been inculcated with the establishment's concepts of service and recognition, concepts which are epitomized in the image of Einstein's career. What we suggest is that it is vital to disabuse oneself of these concepts. To repeat, fundamental tasks are posed by the general conditions of society. Yet the individual who undertakes such a task will probably be persecuted or ignored. Given these circumstances, the doctrine that the individual has a duty to benefit society is a hypocritical fraud, an obscenity. For the individual to commit himself to a fundamental task tends to preclude social recognition for his activities; or, to reverse the remark, social recognition is not a reward to accomplishment of a fundamental task (just as military honors are not a reward to pacifism). Thus, it is not rational for the individual to undertake a fundamental task in order to gain fame.

The motive for undertaking a fundamental task should be genuine selflessness. (We will continue our argument that the striving for fame is not genuinely selfish below.) The individual who perceives a fundamental task should undertake it for his private gratification. The task is of primary importance to society. By accomplishing it, the individual gains the privilege of knowing something which is socially important, but which society cannot deal with honestly. The individual should undertake the task in order to utilize his real abilities, to develop his potentiality for its own sake. The undertaking of a significant task which utilizes one's real abilities is the true source of happiness. To perceive a fundamental task and not to undertake it is to be stunted: one loses one's self-respect and becomes progressively demoralized. (Another rational motive for undertaking a fundamental task is to transform the social environment by methods which do not depend on society's approval or comprehension.)

We do not mean to suggest that the individual who undertakes a fundamental task should conceal his results. Even though such tasks may seem individualistic, they require cooperative, social activity for their accomplishment. A proposed solution to a fundamental problem can hardly develop without being scrutinized from a variety of perspectives. It is essential to have qualified critics, and it is unfortunate that they are so rare. Solutions to fundamental problems are social consumption goods (their consumption is not exclusionary), so that critics or collaborators have as much opportunity to benefit from them as their originators do. As an example, most of my writings are really collaborations with Tony Conrad. I often find that I do not understand my own position until I know how it appears to him. When communication of results is essentially a form of collaboration, it is very different from the attempt to gain publicity or fame.

It is precisely in the context of the generalized social irrationality which runs throughout history that the attempt to gain fame must be seen as foolishly un-selfish. What difference can it possibly make whether the masses venerate one's name a hundred years after one's death? The adulation of the masses after one is dead is of no conceivable value to oneself. It is society which indoctrinates one to worry about one's reputation after one is dead, in order to condition one to serve the interests of the ruling class. Then, what does it mean to the individual who solves a fundamental problem to have his name publicized in the mass media, to be a celebrity among people who cannot possibly understand what he has done? Even more important, we must recognize that publicity carries a definite risk for
the individual committed to a fundamental task. The solution of such a problem must usually be expressed in categories which are incommensurate and incompatible with the categories of thought which are common coin at the time. In order for the solution of a fundamental problem to be exposed in the mass media, it has to be translated into media categories and this usually results in irreparable distortion. In fact, the solution is distorted in precisely such a manner that it begins to serve the interests of the ruling class. One encounters an immense pressure which tends to harness one to goals which have nothing to do with objective value. More precisely, when an individual who has solved a fundamental problem is publicized in the mass media, a process of mutual subversion takes place as between the establishment/media and the individual. In the process, the establishment is likely to come out far ahead.

There are two other reasons why it is actually advantageous to the individual who undertakes a fundamental task to avoid publicity. Since one's activity is likely to be treated as a threat by society, one can minimize the energy required to defend it, and can carry the activity further, if one receives no publicity. Then, there will unavoidably be false starts made in developing the solution to a fundamental problem. If one is not operating in the glare of publicity, it is far easier to abandon these false starts.

It used to be that when I saw publicity being given to an inferior way of doing a thing, and I knew a better way, then I reacted with a sense of duty. I had to appoint myself as a missionary, to enter the public arena and start a campaign to replace the inferior approach with the better approach. But this sense of duty must now be called into question. Is it really in my interest to thrust myself on the media as a missionary? The truth is that in the context of generalized social irrationality, it is un-selfish and self-sacrificing to believe that I must either agree with current fads or else contest them publicly. The genuinely selfish attitude is "that it is sufficient for me to know what the superior approach is. I can ignore the false issues which fill the mass media; I do not have to participate in public opinion at all. The genuinely selfish attitude is that "it does not concern me." Genuine selfishness is living one's life on a level which does not communicate with the level of the mass media and public opinion.

If we recognize that it is irrational to undertake a fundamental task in order to benefit society and gain social approval, then our very choice of fundamental tasks should be affected. The most visible fundamental tasks are those which the establishment is to some extent aware of, and which if accomplished would immediately be rewarded with social approval. (In the natural sciences, there literally may be a race to solve a well-known problem). But if our motives are genuinely self-serving, and have to do with the development of our potentiality for its own sake, then there is no reason to limit ourselves to widely understood problems. We can undertake to discover timeless results—permanent answers to questions which will be important indefinitely—without concerning ourselves with whether society can adopt the results institutionally. We can pose problems of which neither the establishment, the media, nor public opinion are aware. We can undertake tasks which draw on our unique abilities, so that our personal contribution is indispensable.

There is a difficulty which we have postponed mentioning. The individual is always compelled to engage in some socially approved activity in order to obtain the means of subsistence. We cannot assume that the individual will have an inherited source of income. In order to pursue a fundamental task, he will have to pursue a legitimate occupation at the same time. It may be extremely difficult to lead such a double life, because to do so requires precisely the self-assurance that comes from accomplishing the fundamental task. Leading a double life is not a game for the person who is unsure about his real abilities or his vocation. If the individual is capable of leading a double life, our suggestion is to obtain the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle available. Do not hesitate to practice outward conformity in order to exploit the establishment for your own purposes.

There remains the case of the individual who, like Galois, is not prepared to lead a double life. His problem is one of destitution. However, he is different from an ordinary pauper. By assumption, he is more talented than the members of the establishment; he does not belong to the establishment because he is overqualified for it. Given that he is more talented than members of the establishment, and that his survival is threatened, a collateral fundamental task emerges, the task of immediately transmuting his talent into power to handle the establishment on his own terms. To perceive this task is a major result of this essay. The task cannot be defined accurately without a perfect understanding of the difference between fundamental tasks and the serve-society-and-get-famous fraud. We contend that Galois should have regarded the task of immediately transmuting his talent into power over the establishment as an inseparable collateral problem to his mathematical researches. From a common sense point of view, this collateral task will seem utterly impossible. However, we are talking about individuals whose vocation is to do the seemingly impossible. Thus, we conclude by leaving this unsolved fundamental problem for the reader to ponder.
17. Creep

When Helen Lefkowitz said I was "such a creep" at Interlochen in 1966, her remark epitomized the feeling that females have always had about me. My attempts to understand why females rejected me and to decide what to do about it resulted in years of confusion. In 1961-1962, I tried to develop a theory of the creep problem. This theory took involuntary celibacy as the defining characteristic of the creep. Every society has its image of the ideal young adult, even though the symbols of growing up change from generation to generation. The creep is an involuntary celibate because he fails to develop the surface traits of adulthood—poise and sophistication; and because he is shy, unassertive, and lacks self-confidence in the presence of others. The creep is awkward and has an unenjoyable appearance. He seems sexless and childish. He is regarded by the ideal adults with condescending scorn, amusement, or pity.

Because he seems weak and inferior in the company of others, and cannot maintain his self-respect, the creep is pressed into isolation. There, the creep doesn't have the pressure of other people's presence to make him feel inferior, to make him feel that he must be like them in order not to be inferior. The creep can develop the morale required to differ. The creep also tends to expand his fantasy life, so that it takes the place of the interpersonal life from which he has been excluded. The important consequence is that the creep is led to discover a number of positive personality values which cannot be achieved by the mature, married adult.

During the period when I developed the creep theory, I was spending almost all of my time alone in my room, thinking and writing. This fact should make the positive creep values more understandable.

1. Because of his isolation, the creep has a qualitatively higher sense of identity. He has a sense of the boundaries of his personality, and a control of what goes on within those boundaries. In contrast, the mature adult, who spends all his time with his marriage partner or in groups of people, is a mere channel into which thoughts flow from outside; he lives in a state of conformist anonymity.

2. The creep is emotionally autonomous, independent, or self-contained. He develops an elaborate world of feelings which remain within himself, or which are directed toward inanimate objects. The creep may cooperate with other people in work situations, but he does not develop emotional attachments to other people.

3. Although the creep's intellectual abilities develop with education, the creep lives in a sexually neutral world and a child's world throughout his life. He is thus able to play like a child. He retains the child's capacity for make-believe. He retains the child's lyrical creativity in regard to self-originated, self-justifying activities.

4. There is enormous room in the creep's life for the development of every aspect of the inner world or the inner life. The creep can devote himself to thought, fantasy, imagination, imaging, variegated mental states, dreams, internal emotions and feelings towards inanimate objects. The creep develops his inner world on his own power. His inner life originates with himself, and is controlled and intellectually consequential. The creep has no use for mediations whose content is supplied by religious traditions. Nor has he any use for those drug experiences which adolescents undertake to prove how grown-up they are, and whose content is supplied by fashion. The creep's development of his inner life is the summation of all the positive creep values.

After describing these values, the creep theory returned to the problem of the creep's involuntary celibacy. For physical reasons, the creep remains a captive audience for the opposite sex, but his attempts to gain acceptance by the opposite sex always end in failure. On the other hand, the creep may well find the positive creep values so desirable that he will want to intensify them. The solution is for the creep to seek a medical procedure which will sexually neutralize him. He can then attain the full creep values, without the disability of an unresolved physical desire.

Actually, the existence of the positive creep values proves that the creep is an authentic non-human who happens to be trapped in human social biology. The positive creep values imply a specification of a whole non-human social biology which would be appropriate to those values. Finally, the creep theory mentioned that creeps often make good grades in school, and can thus do clerical work or other work useful to humans. This fact would be the basis for human acceptance of the creep.

In the years after I presented the creep theory, a number of inadequacies became apparent in it. The principal one was that I managed to cast off the surface traits of the creep, but that when I did my problem became even more intractable. An entirely different analysis of the problem was required.

My problem actually has to do with the enormous discrepancy between the ways I can relate to males and the ways I can relate to females. The
essence of the problem has to do with the social values of females, which are completely different from my own. The principal occupation of my life has been certain self-originated activities which are embodied in "writings." Now most males have the same social values that I find in all females. But there have always been a few males with exceptional values; and my activities have developed through exchanges of ideas with these males. These exchanges have come about spontaneously and naturally. In contrast, I have never had such an exchange of ideas with females, for the following reasons. Females have nothing to say that applies to my activities. They cannot understand that such activities are possible. Or they are a part of the "masses" who oppose and have tried to discourage my activities.

The great divergence between myself and females comes in the area where each individual is responsible for what he or she is; the area in which one must choose oneself and the principles with which one will be identified. This area is certainly not a matter of intelligence or academic degrees. Further, the fact that society has denied many opportunities to females at one time or another is not involved here. (My occupation has no formal prerequisites, no institutional barriers to entry. One enters it by defining oneself as being in it. Yet no female has chosen to enter it. Or consider such figures as Galileo and Galois. By the standards of their contemporaries, these individuals were engaged in utterly ridiculous, antisocial pursuits. Society does not give anybody the "opportunity" to engage in such pursuits. Society tries to prevent everybody from being a Galileo or Galois. To be a Galileo is really a matter of choosing sides, of choosing to take a certain stand.)

Let me be specific about my own experiences. When I distributed the prospectus for The Journal of Indeterminate Mathematical Investigations to graduate students at the Courant Institute in the fall of 1967, the most negative reactions came from the females. The mere fact that I wanted to invent a mathematics outside of academic mathematics was in and of itself offensive and revolting to them. Since the academic status of these females was considerably higher than my own, the disagreement could only be considered one of values.

The field of art provides an even better example, because there are many females in this field. In the summer of 1969 I attended a meeting of the women's group of the Art Workers Coalition in New York. Many of the women there had seen my Down With Art pamphlet. All the females who have seen this pamphlet have reacted negatively, and it is quite clear what their attitude is. They believe that they are courageously defending modern art against a philistine. They consider me to be a crank who needs a "modern museum art appreciation course." The more they are pressed, the more proudly do they defend "Great Art." Now the objective validity of my opposition to art is absolutely beyond question. To defend modern art is precisely what a hopeless mediocrity would consider courageous. Again, it is clear that the opposition between myself and females is in the area where one must choose one's values.

I have found that what I really have to do to make a favorable impression on females is to conceal or suspend my activities—the most important part of my life; and to adopt a facade of conformity. Thus, I perceive females as persons who cannot function in my occupation. I perceive them as being like an employment agency, like an institution to which you have to present a conformist facade. Females can be counted on to represent the most "social, human" point of view, a point of view which, as I have explained, is distant from my own. (In March 1970, at the Institute for Advanced Study, the mathematician Dennis Johnson said to me that he would murder his own mother, and murder all his friends, if by doing so he could get the aliens to take him to another star and show him a higher civilization. My own position is the same as Johnson's.)

It follows that my perception of sex is totally different from that of others. The depictions of sex in the mass media are completely at variance with my own experience. I object to pornography in particular because it is like deceptive advertising for sex; it creates the impression that the physical aspect of sex can be separated from human personalities and social interaction. Actually, if most people can separate sex from personality, it is because they are so average that their values are the same as everybody else's. In my case, although I am a captive audience for females for physical reasons, the disparity between my values and theirs overrides the physical attraction I feel for them. It is hard enough to present a facade of conformity in order to deal with an employment agency, but the thought of having to maintain such a facade in a more intimate relationship is completely demoralizing.

What conclusions can be drawn by comparing the creep theory with my later experience? First, some individuals who are unquestionably creeps as far as the surface traits are concerned simply may not be led to the deeper values I described. They may not have the talent to get anything positive out of their involuntary situation; or their aspirations may be so conformist that they do not see their involuntary situation as a positive opportunity. Many creeps are female, but all the evidence indicates that they have the same values I have attributed to other females—values which are hard to reconcile with the deeper creep values.

As for the positive creep values, I may have had them even before I began to care about whether females accepted me. For me, these values may have been the cause, not the effect, of surface creepiness. They are closely
related to the values that underlie my activities. It is not necessary to appear strangely dressed, childish, unassertive, awkward, and lacking in confidence in order to achieve the positive creep values. (I probably emphasized surface creep traits during my youth in order to dissociate myself from conformist opinion at a time when I hadn't yet had the chance to make a full substantive critique of it.) Even sex, in and of itself, might not be incompatible with the creep inner life; what makes it incompatible is the female personality and female social values, which in real life cannot be separated from sex and are the predominant aspect of it.

Having cast off the surface traits of the creep, I can now see that whether I make a favorable impression on females really depends on whether I conceal my occupation. Celibacy is an effect of my occupation; it does not have the role of a primary cause that the creep theory attributed to it. However, it does have consequences of its own. In the context of the entire situation I have described, it constitutes an absolute dividing line between myself and humanity. It does seem to be closely related to the deeper creep values, especially the one of living in a child's world.

As for the sexual neutralization advocated in the creep theory, to find a procedure which actually achieves the stated objective without having all sorts of unacceptable side effects would be an enormous undertaking. It is not feasible as a minor operation developed for a single person. Further, as the human species comes to have vast technological capabilities, many special interest groups will want to tinker with human social biology, each in a different way, for political reasons. I am no longer interested in petty tinkering with human biology. As I make it clear in other writings, I am in favor of building entities which are actually superior to humans, and which avoid the whole fabric of human biosocial defects, not just one or two of them.
The Three Levels of Politics

Political activity and its results can occur on three levels. The first level is the personal one. An individual may vote to re-elect a local politician because of patronage he has received, for example. On this level the individual’s motivation is narrow, immediate self-interest. Often the action has a defensive character; the individual is trying to hold on to something he already possesses.

The second level may be called the historical level. It is exemplified by the Civil War in the United States. Certain political movements result in large-scale, irreversible social change. The Civil War set in motion the industrialization of the United States, as well as abolishing slavery. In 1860, slavery was viewed by large numbers of Americans as a legitimate institution. One hundred years later, even American conservatives did not often defend it. To re-establish a plantation economy in the South today would be out of the question. These observations prove that on the second level, society really does change. On this level, political action does make a difference.

However, there is a further aspect to the Civil War which indicates that politics does not make the difference people think it makes. According to the ideology of the abolitionists, the accomplishment of the Civil War would be to raise the slaves to a position of equality with whites. In fact, nothing of the sort happened. The real accomplishment of the Civil War was to transform the United States into an industrial capitalist society (and to abolish an institution which was incompatible with the capitalists’ need for a free labor market). By the time the Northern businessmen brought Reconstruction to an end, it was clear that the position of blacks in American society was where it had always been: at the bottom. The Civil War changed American society, but it did not make the society any more utopian. On the contrary, it brought into prominence still another violent social conflict—the conflict between labor and capital.

The third level of politics has to do with the utopian aspect of modern political ideologies, the aspect which calls not only for society to change, but to change for the better. Typical third-level political goals are the abolition of war, the abolition of the oligarchic structure of society, and the abolition of economic institutions which value human lives in terms of money. In all of human history, society has never changed on this third level.

The successful Communist revolutionists of the twentieth century (in the underdeveloped countries) have repeatedly claimed to have accomplished third-level change in their societies. However, these claims of third-level change have always turned out to be illusions which cover a recapitulation of capitalist development. Communist revolutions are typical examples of real second-level change which is accomplished under the cover of claims of third-level change, claims which are pure and simple frauds.

By introducing the concept of levels of politics, we can resolve the apparent paradox that society certainly changes, but that it really does not change. It is important to understand that empirical evidence on the question of the levels of politics can only be drawn from the past, the present, and the immediate future (five to ten years). Recent technological developments have brought into question the very existence of the human species. In addition, technology is developing much faster than society is. It is meaningless to discuss the issue of second versus third-level social change with reference to the more distant future, because there may not be any human society in the more distant future.

This essay is concerned with the politics of the third level. The first and second levels are certainly real enough, but we are not the least interested in them. As we have just said, we make the restriction that any empirical analysis of the third level must refer to the past, the present, or the immediate future. Our purpose is to present a substitute for the politics of the third level.

There are a number of present-day political tendencies which hold out the promise of third-level social change. These tendencies are all descended from the leftist working-class movements of nineteenth century Europe, most of them by way of the early Soviet regime. The promises of third-level change held out by these tendencies are nothing but cheap illusions. What is more, a careful examination of leftist ideologies in relation to the historical record will show that the promises of third-level change are extremely vague and without substance. Beneath the surface of vague promises, leftist ideologies do not even favor third-level change; they are opposed to it.

One example will serve to demonstrate this contention. In my capacity as a professional economist, I have become familiar with the official economic policies—the doctrines of the professional economists of the various socialist governments and leftist movements throughout the world. It should be mentioned that most of the followers of leftism are not familiar with these technical economic policies; they are aware only of vague, meaningless promises of future bliss coming from leftist political speechmakers. When we turn to technical economic realities, we find that virtually every leftist tendency in the world today accepts economic
principles which in the parlance of the layman are referred to as "capitalism." The most important principle is stated by Ernest Mandel: "the economy continues to be fundamentally a money economy, with the satisfaction of the bulk of people's needs depending on the number of currency tokens a person possesses." When it comes to the realities of technical economics, virtually every leftist in the world accepts this principle. So far as the third level is concerned, there is no such thing as a non-capitalist political tendency, and there is no point in arguing for one. A similar conclusion holds for virtually every aspect of third-level politics. Leftists claim that Communism eliminates the causes of war; while at the same time war breaks out between China and the Soviet Union.

We propose to draw a far-reaching conclusion from these considerations. Returning to the example of first-level politics, it is rational for the patronage-seeker to be in favor of the election of a local politician and against the election of his opponent. This is a matter which is within the scope of human responsibility, and with respect to which individual action can make a difference. But it is not rational to be either for against "capitalism," to be either for or against war. As we have seen, "capitalism" and war are permanent aspects of human society, and no political tendency genuinely opposes them. It is meaningless to treat them as if they were within the scope of human responsibility in the sense that the election of a local politician is. In other words, the third-level aspects of society are not partial, limited aspects which can be eliminated by conscious human action while the bulk of human life is retained. The only way you can meaningfully be against the third-level aspects of human society is by adopting a different attitude to the human species as such.

This attitude is the one you would adopt if you were suddenly thrown into a society of apes—apes which perpetually preyed within their own ecological niche. It is clear that if you proposed to be "against" such a situation, and to do something about it, then politics as it is normally conceived would be out of the question. To anticipate our later discussion, the first thing you must do is to protect yourself against society. The way to do this is to create an invisible enclave for yourself within the Establishment. Having such an enclave certainly does not imply loyalty to the Establishment. On the contrary, there is no reason why you should be loyal to any faction among the apes. You only pretend to be loyal to one faction or another when it is necessary for self-defense. If there is a change of regime in the country where you are living, you either leave or join the winning side. Transfer your invisible enclave to whatever Establishment is available. But all this is an external, defensive tactic which has nothing to do with the primary goals of our strategy.

We will finish our critique of third-level politics, and then continue the description of the substitute which we propose. In addition to making vague promises of third-level change, leftism encourages indignation at social conditions which are beyond anyone's power to affect. Leftism attributes great ethical merit to such indignation and morally condemns anyone who does not share it. But this attitude is totally irrational and dishonest. In philosophy and mathematics, it is possible for a proposition to be valid even though it has no chance of institutional acceptance. But in social, economic, and political matters, attitudes which have policy implications are nonsense unless the policies are actually implemented. Institutional acceptance is the only arena of validation of a social doctrine. It is absurd to attribute ethical merit to a longing for the impossible. Indignation at a social condition which is beyond anyone's power to affect is meaningless. (Indeed, to the extent that such indignation diverts social energy into a dead end, it is "counter-revolutionary.") To be more radical in social matters than society can possibly be is not virtuous; it is idiotic.

Although third-level politics is a fraud, it is the contention of this essay that there exists a rational substitute for it. Once you perceive that you exist in a society of apes who attack their own ecological niche, there are rational goals which you can adopt for your life that correspond to third-level change even though they have nothing to do with leftism. The preliminary step, as we have said, is to create an invisible enclave for yourself within the Establishment. The remainder of the strategy is in two parts which are in fact closely related.

The first part is based on a consideration of the effects which such figures as Galileo, Galois, Abel, Lobachevski, and Mendel have had on society. These men devoted themselves to researches which seemed to be purely abstract, without any relevance to the practical world. Yet, through long, tortuous chains of events, their researches have had disruptive effects on society which go far beyond the effects of most political movements. The reason has to do with the peculiar role which technology has in human society. Society's attitude in relation to technology is like that of a child who cannot refrain from playing with matches. We find that the abstract researches of the men being considered accomplished a dual result. On one hand, they represented inner escape, the achievement of a private utopia now. Of course, the general public will not understand this; only the few who are capable of participating in such activities will appreciate the extent to which they can constitute inner escape. On the other hand, they have had profoundly disruptive effects on society, effects which still have not run their course.

Thus, the first part of our strategy is to follow the example of these
individuals. Of course, we do not stay within the bounds of present-day academic research, any more than Galileo or Mendel did in their time. What we have in mind are activities in the intellectual modality represented by the rest of this book. It should be clear that such activities do represent a private utopia, and are at the same time the seeds of disruptive future technologies which lead directly to the second part of our strategy.

It is important to realize that by speaking of inner escape we do not mean fashionable drug use, or Eastern religions, or occultism. These threadbare superstitions are embraced by the cosmopolitan middle classes—intellectually spineless fools who are always grasping for spiritual comfort. Superstitious fads are escapism in the worst sense, as they only serve to further muddle the heads of the fools who embrace them. In contrast, the inner escape which we propose is original and consequential, leading to an increase in man’s manipulative power over the world. It has nothing to do with irrationality or superstition.

The second part of our strategy is predicated on the following states of affairs. First, it is the human species as such which is the obstacle to third-level political change. Secondly, technology is developing far more rapidly than society is, and no feature of the natural world need any longer be taken for granted. Society cannot help but foster technology in the pursuit of military and economic supremacy, and this includes technology which can contribute to the making of artificial superhuman beings. Every fundamental advance in logic, physics, neurophysiology, and neurocybernetics obviously leads in this direction. Thus, the second part of the strategy is to participate in the making of artificial superhumans, possibly by infiltrating the military-scientific establishment and diverting research in the appropriate direction.

Note: This essay provides a specific, practical strategy for the present environment. It also shows that certain types of opposition to the status quo are meaningless. Subversion Theory, on the other hand, was a general theory which was not limited to any one environment, but also which failed to provide a specific strategy for the present environment.
In the first and second chapters, we developed our intuitions concerning perceptions of the logically impossible in as much detail as we could. We decided, on intuitive grounds, which contradictions were admissible and which were not. As we proceeded, it began to appear that the results suggested by intuition were cases of a few general principles. In this chapter, we will adopt these principles as postulates. The restatement of our theory does not render the preceding chapters unnecessary. Only by beginning with an exhaustive, intuitive discussion of perceptual illusions could we convey the substance underlying the notations which we call admissible contradictions, and motivate the unusual collection of postulates which we will adopt.

All properties will be thought of as "parameters," such as time, location, color, density, acidity, etc. Different parameters will be represented by the letters $x, y, z, \ldots$. Different values of one parameter, say $x$, will be represented by $x_1, x_2, \ldots$. Each parameter has a domain, the set of all values it can assume. An ensemble $(x_0, y_0, z_0, \ldots)$ will stand for the single possible phenomenon which has $x$-value $x_0$, $y$-value $y_0$, etc. Several remarks are in order. My ensembles are a highly refined version of Rudolph Carnap's intensions or intension sets (sets of all possible entities having a given property). The number of parameters, or properties, must be supposed to be indefinitely large. By giving a possible phenomenon fixed values for every parameter, I assure that there will be only one such possible phenomenon. In other words, my intension sets are all singletons. Another point is that if we specify some of the parameters and specify their ranges, we limit the phenomena which can be represented by our "ensembles." If our first parameter is time and its range is $R$, and our second parameter is spatial location and its range is $R^2$, then we are limited to phenomena which are point phenomena in space and time. If we have a parameter for speed of motion, the motion will have to be infinitesimal. We cannot have a parameter for weight at all; we can only have one for density. The physicist encounters similar conceptual problems, and does not find them insurmountable.

Let $(x_1, y, z, \ldots), (x_2, y, z, \ldots)$, etc. stand for possible phenomena
which all differ from each other in respect to parameter $x$ but are identical in respect to every other parameter $y, z, \ldots$. If the ensembles were intension sets, they would be disjoint precisely because $x$ takes a different value in each.) A "simple contradiction family" of ensembles is the family $\{ \{x_1, y, z, \ldots \}, \{x_2, y, z, \ldots \}, \ldots \}$. The family may have any number of ensembles. It actually represents many families, because $y, z, \ldots$ are allowed to vary; but each of these parameters must assume the same value in all ensembles in any one family. $x$, on the other hand, takes different values in each ensemble in any one family, values which may be fixed. A parameter which has the same value throughout any one family will be referred to as a consistency parameter. A parameter which has a different value in each ensemble in a given family will be referred to as a contradiction parameter. "Contradiction" will be shortened to "con." A simple con family is then a family with one con parameter. The consistency parameters may be dropped from the notation, but the reader must remember that they are implicitly present, and must remember how they function.

A con parameter, instead of being fixed in every ensemble, may be restricted to a different subset of its domain in every ensemble. The subsets must be mutually disjoint for the con family to be well-defined. The con family then represents many families in another dimension, because it represents every family which can be formed by choosing a con parameter value from the first subset, one from the second subset, etc.

Con families can be defined which have more than one con parameter, i.e., more than one parameter satisfying all the conditions we put on $x$. Such con families are not "simple." Let the cardinality of a con family be indicated by a number prefixed to "family," and let the number of con parameters be indicated by a number prefixed to "con." Remembering that consistency parameters are understood, a 2-con $=$family would appear as $\{ \{x_1, y_1\}, \{x_2, y_2\}, \ldots \}$. A "contradiction" or "$\varphi$ object" is not explicitly defined, but it is noted by putting "$\varphi" in front of a con family. The characteristics of $\varphi$ objects, or cons, are established by introducing additional postulates in the theory.

In this theory, every con is either "admissible" or "not admissible." "Admissible" will be shortened to "am." The initial am cons of the theory are introduced by postulate. Essentially, what is postulated is that cons with a certain con parameter are am. (The cons directly postulated to be am are on 1-con families.) However, the postulate will specify other requirements for admissibility besides having the given con parameter. The requisite cardinality of the con family will be specified. Also, the subsets will be specified to which the con parameter must be restricted in each ensemble in the con. A con must satisfy all postulated requirements before it is admitted by the postulate.

The task of the theory is to determine whether the admissibility of the cons postulated to be am implies the admissibility of any other cons. The method we have developed for solving such problems will be expressed as a collection of postulates for our theory.

Postulate 1. Given $\varphi(x \in A_1, x \in B_1, \ldots)$ am, where $x \in A_1, x \in B_1, \ldots$ are the restrictions on the con parameter, and given $A_1 \subseteq A_2, B_1 \subseteq B_2, \ldots$, where $A_1, B_1, \ldots \neq \varnothing$, then $\varphi(x \in A_1, x \in B_1, \ldots)$ is am. This postulate is obviously equivalent to the postulate that $\varphi(x \in A^0 \subseteq C_0, x \in B^0 \subseteq C_0, \ldots)$ is am, where $C_0$ is a subset of $x$'s domain and the intersections are non-empty. (Proof: Choose $C = A_1 \cup B_1 \cup \ldots$.)

Postulate 2. If $x$ and $y$ are simple am cons parameters, then a con with con parameters $x$ and $y$ is am if it satisfies the postulated requirements concerning am cons on $x$ and the postulated requirements concerning am cons on $y$.

The effect of all our assumptions up to now is to make parameters totally independent. They do not interact with each other at all.

We will now introduce some specific am cons by postulate. If $s$ is speed, consideration of the waterfall illusion suggests that we postulate $\varphi(x \in S^0 \subseteq O_0, x \in S^0 \subseteq O_1)$ to be am. (But with this postulate, we have come a long way from the literal description of the waterfall illusion.) Note the implicit requirements that the con family must be a 2-family, and that $s$ must be selected from $\{0\}$ in one ensemble and from $\{s, >0\}$ in the other ensemble.

If $t$ is time, $t \in R$, consideration of the phrase "$t$ years ago," which is an am con in the natural language, suggests that we postulate $\varphi(t) : a \in \mathbb{N}, b \in \mathbb{N}, a < b \Rightarrow \varphi(t) \in \{a, b\}$ to be am, where $a$ is a fixed time expressed in years A.D., $b$ is a fixed number of years, and $\varphi$ is a variable--the time of the present instant in years A.D. The implicit requirements are that the con family must have the cardinality of the continuum, and that every value of $t$ from $a \leq b$ to $b \leq a$ must appear in an ensemble, where $a$ is a variable. Ensembles are thus continually added to the con family. Note that there is the non-trivial possibility of using this postulate more than once. We could admit a con for $a = 1963$, $b = \frac{1}{2}$, then admit another for $a = 1963$, $b = 2$, and admit still another for $a = 1963$, $b = 1$, etc.

Let $p$ be spatial location, $p \in R^2$. Let $P_1$ be a non-empty, bounded, connected subset of $R^2$. Restriction subsets will be selected from the $P_1$. Specifically, let $P_1 \cap P_2 = \varnothing$. Consideration of a certain dream illusion suggests that we admit $\varphi(p \in P_1, p \in P_2)$. The implicit requirements are obvious. But in this case, there are more requirements in the postulate of
admissibility. May we apply the postulate twice? May we admit first $\varphi(p \in P_1)$, then $\varphi(p \in P_3)$, where $P_3$ and $P_4$ are arbitrary $P_i$’s different from $P_1$ and $P_2$? The answer is yes. We may admit $\varphi(p \in P_1)$, $\varphi(p \in P_3)$ for arbitrary $P_1$ and $P_3$, $P_1 \cap P_2 = \emptyset$, but having made this “initial choice,” the postulate cannot be reused for arbitrary $P_3$ and $P_4$. A second con $\varphi(p \in P_3)$, $\varphi(p \in P_4)$, $P_3 \cap P_4 = \emptyset$, may be postulated to be am only if $P_1 \cup P_3$, $P_2 \cup P_3$, $P_1 \cup P_4$, and $P_2 \cup P_4$ are not connected. In other words, you may postulate many cons of the form $\varphi(p \in P_1)$, $\varphi(p \in P_3)$ to be am, but your first choice strongly circumscribes your second choice, etc.

We will now consider certain results in the logic of amcons which were established by extensive elucidation of our intuitions. The issue is whether our present axiomization produces the same results. We will express the results in our latest notation as far as possible. Two more definitions are necessary. The parameter $\theta$ is the angle of motion of an infinitesimally moving phenomenon, measured in degrees with respect to some chosen axis. Then, recalling the set $P_1$, choose $P_3$ and $P_4$ so that $P_1 = P_3 \cup P_4$ and $P_3 \cap P_4 = \emptyset$.

The results by which we will judge our axiomization are as follows.

1: $\varphi(S, C_1 \cup C_2)$ can be inferred to be am. Our present notation cannot express this result, because it does not distinguish between different types of uniform motion throughout a finite region, i.e., the types $M$, $C_1$, $C_2$, $D_1$, and $D_2$. Instead, we have infinitesimal motion, which is involved in all the latter types of motion. Questions such as “whether the admissibility of $\varphi(M, S)$ implies the admissibility of $\varphi(C_1, S)$” drop out. The reason for the omission in the present theory is our choice of parameters and domains, which we discussed earlier. Our present version is thus not exhaustive. However, the deficiency is not intrinsic to our method; and it does not represent any outright falsification of our intuitions. Thus, we pass over the deficiency.

2: $\varphi(p \in P_1, s > 0, \theta > 0)$, $\varphi(p \in P_2, s > 0)$, and other such cons can be inferred to be am. With our new, powerful approach, this result is trivial. It is guaranteed by what we said about consistency parameters.

3: There is no way to infer that $\varphi(C_1, C_2)$ is am; and no way to infer that $\psi(45^\circ, s > 0, \theta > 0, s > 0)$ is am.

The first part of the result drops out. The second part is trivial with our new method as long as we do not postulate that cons on $\theta$ are am.

4: $\varphi(p \in P_2)$, $\varphi(p \in P_3)$ can be inferred to be am. Yes, by Postulate 1.

5: $\varphi(s > 0, p \in P_1)$, $\varphi(s > 0, p \in P_2)$, $\varphi(s = 0, p \in P_1)$ can be inferred to be am.

Yes, by Postulate 2. These two amcons are distinct. The question of whether they should be considered equivalent is closely related to the degree to which con parameters are independent of each other.

6: There is no way to infer that $\varphi(p \in P_1, p \in P_2)$ or $\varphi(p \in P_1, p \in P_3)$ is am. Our special requirement in the postulate of admissibility for $\varphi(p \in P_1, p \in P_2)$ guarantees this result.

The reason for desiring this last result requires some discussion. In heuristic terms, we wish to avoid admitting both location in New York in Greensboro and location in Manhattan and Brooklyn. We also wish to avoid admitting location in New York in Greensboro and location in New York in Boston. If we admitted either of these combinations, then the intuitive rationale of the notions would indicate that we had admitted triple location. While we have a dreamed illusion which justifies the concept of double location, we have no intuitive justification whatever for the concept of triple location. It must be clear that admission of either of the combinations mentioned would not imply the admissibility of a con on a 3-family with con parameter $p$ by the postulates of our theory. Our theory is formally safe from this implication. However, the intuitive meaning of either combination would make them proxies for the con on the 3-family.

A closely related consideration is that in the preceding chapter, it appeared that the admissibility of $\varphi(p \in P_1)$, $\varphi(p \in P_2)$, $\varphi(p \in P_1, p \in P_2)$, $\varphi(p \in P_1, p \in P_2)$ (as Type 1 chain). Further, if this implication held, then by the same rationale the admission of $\varphi(p \in P_3)$, $\varphi(p \in P_2)$, $\varphi(s > 0, p \in P_3)$, $\varphi(s = 0, p \in P_2)$, both of which are am, would require the admission of the object $\varphi(p \in P_3, p \in P_2)$, $\varphi(s > 0, p \in P_3)$, $\varphi(s = 0, p = p_0)$. We may now say, however, that the postulates of our theory emphatically do not require us to accept these implications. If there is an intuitively valid notion underlying the chain on $s$ and $p$, it reduces to the amcons introduced in result 5. As for the chain on $p$ alone, we repeat that simultaneous admission of the two cons mentioned would tend to justify some triple location concept. However, we do not have to recognize that concept as being the chain. It seems that our present approach allows us to forget about chains for now.

Our conclusion is that the formal approach of this chapter is in good agreement with our intuitively established results.
Note on the overall significance of the logic of amicons:

When traditional logicians said that something was logically impossible, they meant to imply that it was impossible to imagine or visualize. But this implication was empirically false. The realm of the logically possible is not the entire realm of connotative thought; it is just the realm of normal perceptual routines. When the mind is temporarily freed from normal perceptual routines—especially in perceptual illusions, but also in dreams and even in the use of certain "illogical" natural language phrases—it can imagine and visualize the "logically impossible." Every text on perceptual psychology mentions this fact, but logicians have never noticed its immense significance. The logically impossible is not a blank; it is a whole layer of meaning and concepts which can be superimposed on conventional logic, but not reduced or assimilated to it. The logician of the future may use a drug or some other method to free himself from normal perceptual routines for a sustained period of time, so he can freely think the logically impossible. He will then perform rigorous deductions and computations in the logic of amicons.

20. Subjective Propositional Vibration-work in progress

Up until the present, the scientific study of language has treated language as if it were reducible to the mechanical manipulation of counters on a board. Scientists have avoided recognizing that language has a mental aspect, especially an aspect such as the "understood meaning" of a linguistic expression. This paper, on the other hand, will presents linguistic constructs which inescapably involve a mental aspect that is objectifiable and can be subjected to precise analysis in terms of perceptual psychology. These constructs are not derivable from the models of the existing linguistic sciences. In fact, the existing linguistic sciences overlook the possibility of such constructs.

Consider the ambiguous schema ‘A→B&C’, expressed in words as 'C and B if A'. An example is

Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks. (1)

In order to get sense out of this utterance, the reader has to supply it with a comma. That is, in the jargon of logic, he has to supply it with grouping. Let us make the convention that in order to read the utterance, you must mentally supply grouping to it, or "bracket" it. If you construe the schema as ‘A→(B & C)’, you will be said to bracket the conjunction. If you construe the schema as ‘(A→B) & C’, you will be said to bracket the conditional. There is an immediate syntactical issue. If you are asked to copy (1), do you write "Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks"; or do you write "Jack will soon leave, and Bill will laugh if Don speaks"? Is that the way you are reading (1) at the moment? A distinction has to be made between reading the proposition, which involves bracketing; and viewing the proposition, which involves reacting to the ink-marks solely as a pattern. Thus, any statement about an ambiguous grouping proposition must specify whether the reference is to the proposition as read or as viewed.

Some additional conventions are necessary. With respect to (1), we distinguish two possibilities: you are reading it, or you are not looking at it (or are only viewing it). Thus, a "single reading" of (1) refers to an event which separates two consecutive periods of not looking at (1) (or only viewing it). During a single reading, you may switch between bracketing the conjunction and bracketing the conditional. These switches demarcate a series of "states" of the reading, which alternately correspond to ‘Jack will
soon leave, and Bill will laugh if Don speaks' or 'Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh, if Don speaks'. Note that a state is like a complete proposition. We stipulate that inasmuch as (1) is read at all, it is the present meaning or state that counts—if you are asked what the proposition says, whether it is true, etc.

Another convention is that the logical status of (Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks) if and only if (Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks)
is not that of a normal tautology, even though the biconditional when viewed has the form 'A=A'. The two ambiguous components will not necessarily be bracketed the same way in a state.

We now turn to an example which is more substantial that (1).

Consider
Your mother is a whore and you are now bracketing the conditional in (2) if you are now bracketing the conjunction in (2). (2)

If you read this proposition, then depending on how you bracket it, the reading will either be internally true or else will call your mother a whore. In general, ambiguous grouping propositions are constructs in which the mental aspect plays a fairly explicit role in the language. We have included (2) to show that the contents of these propositions can provide more complications than would be suggested by (1).

There is another way of bringing out the mental aspect of language, however, which is incomparably more powerful than ambiguous grouping. We will turn to this approach immediately, and will devote the rest of the paper to it. The cubical frame is a simple reversible perspective figure which can either be seen oriented upward or oriented downward. Both positions are implicit in the same ink-on-paper image; it is the subjective psychological response of the perceiver which differentiates the positions. The perceiver can deliberately cause the perspective to reverse, or he can allow the perspective to reverse without resisting. The perspective can also reverse against his will. Thus, there are three possibilities: deliberate, indifferent, and involuntary reversal.

Suppose that each of the positions is assigned a different meaning, and the figure is used as a notation. We will adopt the following definitions because they are convenient for our purposes at the moment.

\( \frac{Q}{Q} \) (for '3' if it appears to be oriented upward)
\( \frac{Q}{U} \) (for 'O' (zero) if it appears to be oriented upward)

We may now write

\[ 1 \times \frac{Q}{Q} = 4 \]

We must further agree that (3), or any proposition containing such a notation, is to be read to mean just what it seems to mean at any given instant. If, at the moment you read the proposition, the cube seems to be up, then the proposition means \( 1 \times 3 = 4 \); but if the cube seems to be down, the proposition means \( 1 \times 0 = 4 \). The proposition has an unambiguous meaning for the reader at any given instant, but the meaning may change in the next instant due to a subjective psychological change in the reader. The reader is to accept the proposition for what it is at any instant. The result is subjectively triggered propositional vibration, or SPV for short. The distinction between reading and viewing a proposition, which we already made in the case of ambiguous grouping, is even more important in the case of SPV: Reading now occurs only when perspective is imputed. In reading (3) you don't think about the ink graph any more than you think about the type face.

In a definition such as that of \( \frac{Q}{Q} \), '3' and 'O' will be called the assignments. A single reading is defined as before. During a single reading, (3) will vibrate some number of times. The series of states of the reading, which alternately correspond to \( 1 \times 3 = 4 \) or \( 1 \times 0 = 4 \), are demarcated by these vibrations. The portion of a state which can change when vibration occurs will be called a partial. It is the partials in a reading that correspond directly to the assignments in the definition.

Additional conventions are necessary. Most of the cases we are concerned with can be covered by two extremely important rules. First, the ordinary theory of properties which have to do with the form of expressions as viewed is not applicable when SPV notation is present. Not only is a biconditional not a tautology just because its components are the same when viewed; it cannot be considered an ordinary tautology even if the one component's states have the same truth value, as in the case of \( 1 \times \frac{Q}{Q} = 2 \). Secondly, and even more important, SPV notation has to be present explicitly or it is not present at all. SPV is not the idea of an expression with two meanings, which is commonplace in English; SPV is a double meaning which comes about by a perceptual experience and thus has very special properties. Thus, if a quantifier should be used in a proposition containing SPV notation, the "range" of the "variable" will be that of conventional logic. You cannot write \( \frac{Q}{Q} \) ' for 'x' in the statement matrix 'x = \frac{Q}{Q} '.

We must now elucidate at considerable length the unique properties of SPV. When the reader sees an SPV figure, past perceptual training will cause him to impute one or the other orientation to it. This phenomenon is not a mere convention in the sense in which new terminology is a convention. There are already two clear-cut possibilities. Their reality is entirely mental; the external, ink-on-paper aspect does not change in any manner whatever.
The change that can occur is completely and inherently subjective and mental. By mental effort, the reader can consciously control the orientation. If he does, involuntary vibrations will occur because of neural noise or attention lapses. The reader can also refrain from control and accept whatever appears. In this case, when the figure is used as a notation, vibrations may occur because of a preference for one meaning over the other. Thus, a deliberate vibration, an involuntary vibration, and an indifferent vibration are three distinct possibilities.

What we have done is to give meanings to the two pre-existing perceptual possibilities. In order to read a proposition containing an SPV notation at all, one has to see the ink-on-paper figure, impute perspective to it, and recall the meaning of that perspective; rather than just seeing the figure and recalling its meaning. The imputation of perspective, which will happen anyway because of pre-existing perceptual training, has a function in the language we are developing analogous to the function of a letter of the alphabet in ordinary language. The imputation of perspective is an aspect of the notation, but it is entirely mental. Our language uses not only graphemes, but "psychemes" or "mentemes". One consequence is that the time structure of the vibration series has a distinct character, different in principle from external, mechanical randomization, or even changes which the reader would produce by pressing a button. Another consequence is that ambiguous notation in general is not equivalent to SPV. There can be mental changes of meaning with respect to any ambiguous notation, but in general there is no psyche, no mental change of notation. It is the clear-cut, mental, involuntary change of notation which is the essence of SPV. Without psychemes, there can be no truly involuntary mental changes of meaning.

In order to illustrate the preceding remarks, we will use an SPV notation defined as follows.

- (is an affirmative, read "definitely," if it appears to be oriented)
- (is a negative, read "not," if it appears to be oriented)

The proposition which follows refers to the immediate past, not to all past time; that is, it refers to the preceding vibration.

You have deliberately vibrated (4).

Further, the same can be said for (2). We must compare (5), (2), and (4) in order to establish that (4) represents an order of language entirely different from that represented by (5) and (2). (5) is a grammatical English sentence as it stands, although an abnormal one. The invariable, all-in notation "bat' has an equivocal referential structure: it may have either of two mutually exclusive denotations. In reading, the native speaker of English has to choose one denotation or the other: contexts in which the choice is difficult rarely occur. (2) is not automatically grammatical, because it lacks a comma. We have agreed on a conventional process by which the reader mentally supplies the comma. Thus, the proposition lacks an element and the reader must supply it by a deliberate act of thought. The comma is not, strictly speaking, a notation, because it is entirely voluntary. The reader might as well be supplying a denotation to an equivocal expression: (5) and (2) can be reduced to the same principle. As for (4), it cannot be mistaken for ordinary English. It has an equivocal "proto-notation:" " . You automatically impute perspective to the proto-notation before you react to it as language. Thus, a notation with a mental component comes into being involuntarily. This notation has an unequivocal denotation. However, deliberate, indifferent, and most important of all, involuntary mental changes in notation can occur.

We now suggest that the reader actually read (5), (2), and (4), in that order. We expect that (5) can be read without noticeable effort, and that a fixed result will be arrived at (unless the reader switches in an attempt to find a true state). The reading of (2) involves mentally supplying the comma, which is easy, and comprehending the logical compound which results, which is not as easy. Again, we expect that a fixed result will be arrived at (unless the reader vacillates between the insult and the internally false state). In order to read (4), center your sight on the SPV notation, with your peripheral vision taking in the rest of the sentence. A single reading should last at least half a minute. If the reader will seriously read (4), we expect that he will find the reading to be an experience of a totally different order from the reading of (5) and (2). It is like looking at certain confusing visual patterns, but with an entire dimension added by the incorporation of the pattern into language. The essence of the experience, as we have indicated, is that the original imputation of perspective is involuntary, and that the reader has to contend with involuntary changes in notation for which his own mind is responsible. We are relying on this experience to convince the reader empirically that (4) represents a new order of language to an extent to which (5) and (2) do not.

To make our point even clearer, let us introduce an operation, called "collapsing," which may be applied to propositions containing SPV.
proto-notation. The operation consists in redefining the SPV figure in a given proposition so that its assignments are the states of the original proposition.

Let us collapse (4). We redefine

for “You have deliberately vibrated (4)” if it appears to be oriented like

for “You have not deliberately vibrated (4)” if it appears to be oriented like

(4) now becomes

We emphasize that the reader must actually read (4), for the effect is indescribable. The reader should learn the assignments with flash cards if necessary.

The claim we want to make for (4) is probably that it is the most clear-cut case yet constructed in which thought becomes an object for itself. Just looking at a reversible perspective figure which is not a linguistic utterance—an approach which perceptual psychologists have already tried—does not yield results which are significant with respect to “thought.”

In order to obtain a significant case, the apparent orientation or imputed perspective must be a proposition; it must be true or false. Then, (5) and (2) are not highly significant, because the mental act of supplying the missing element of the proposition is all a matter of your volition; and because the element supplied is essentially an “understood meaning.” We already have an abundance of understood meanings, but scientists have been able to ignore them because they are not “objectifiable.” In short, reversible perspective by itself is not “thought”; equivocation by itself has no mental aspect which is objectifiable. Only in reading (4) do we experience an “objectifiable aspect of thought.” We have invented an instance of thought (as opposed to perception) which can be accommodated in the ontology of the perceptual psychologist.
ERRATA

p. 4 delete 5/15/1962
Adams House

p. 24 delete 5/15/1962
audience,

pp. 26-32 middle of p. 26 to top of p. 32 should come after p. 60

p. 27 line 5 fact it
line 7 of them, which

p. 42 line 4 bodies
"statements", it

p. 53 delete 2/22/1963
February 27, 1963

p. 55 line 7 mind',

p. 72 delete third line from bottom

p. 74 delete 2/22/1963
February 27, 1963

p. 84 delete 2/22/1963
February 27, 1963
(photo

p. 86 line 26 transformation

p. 94 line 2 from bottom is true,

p. 96 lines 12-14 all S to have superscript D

line 13 \( \geq z_j \).

under the figure: given \( z_j < x_{j+1} \)

p. 97 line 14 D-Memory
p. 99 lines 13, 14, 15 right-hand

p. 100 line 3 from bottom 1962

p. 101 line 19 Chicago,"

line 25 sun,"

p. 102 line 4 from bottom assertion."

p. 104 line 9 switch

line 26 \( A_{a_i}' \),

line 28 \( A_{a_i}'' \)

p. 105 between lines 25, 26

Conclusion 3.1. Conscious remembering occurs in some mental state.

p. 106 line 7 \( x_j - x_{j-1} \)

p. 108 line 20 \( x_{j-1} - x_j \)

lines 4, 5 from bottom \( j+1 \)

p. 109 line 2 2.4 \( D \)-Memories
p. 114 line 5 from bottom "A single

p. 120 line 5 2.

p. 125 bottom line table. See Carnap, Meaning and Necessity.

**ERRATA**

p. 129 line 1 --s. 7
line 12 from bottom "totally determinate inpperseq" iff an inpperseq
line 10 from bottom "antecedentially indeterminate inpperseq" iff an inpperseq
line 8 from bottom "halpointally indeterminate inpperseq" iff an inpperseq

pp. 134–151 These pages should have tab pagination identifying them as pp. 1–18 of the "Guidebook." Also, the Guidebook must start on a right-hand page.

p. 139 line 13 a↑b
p. 141 line 15 NOW—CLOSE
p. 145 in Instr. 1–3. (t [△]
line 6 from bottom 9.

p. 147 line 3 u↑
p. 152 delete 2/22/1963
February 27, 1963
(photo
p. 158 line 23 most fears
line 24 imposed
p. 179 bottom line definite
p. 180 line 5 categories,
p. 187 delete 2/22/1963
February 27, 1963
p. 195 line 12 admissible
p. 201 line 19 'A∈(B&C)',
line 20 conditional.
p. 202 line 12 than (1).
p. 204 line 7 from bottom vibration
p. 206 lines 4–7 definitions in braces {}