

MUSEUM OF MODERN ART OXFORD

ART & LANGUAGE

1966-1975

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RETROSPECTIVE EXHIBITIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE
(A Recommendation for Optimistic Amnesia)

MAIN

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Conventionally a retrospective exhibition is taken as an occasion for the artist to present his work to date as a reified, 'logical' whole, and as an opportunity to demonstrate that he has progressed. That one should be offered such an opportunity at all suggests the achievement of a certain currency in art world chit-chat, usually based upon the journalistic acceptance of 'early work' rather than upon the significance of current activities. Consenting artists sit Jack Horner-ish in the corners of society, proudly exhibiting mouldy plums.

It is not customary to take the artist's retrospective as an occasion to challenge his practice in general, e.g., to challenge the artist-teacher's performance as an art teacher. Presumably his students (those of them who are not already thoroughly institutionalized or just irredeemably idle) take such displays as further evidence of the lack of possibility for non-trivial dialogue in their relationship with those who exercise pseudo-beneficent bureaucratic functions over them; that's to say that anyone who can present his own activity as if its production had not entailed transformation of his social/productive function (presumably because it hasn't) can't have much to offer students as a basis for continuing dialectic.

One of the chief problems art students face in the pursuit of some sense of their own (class) identity is their sense of non-identity with (alienation from) the products of those very professions to which they are presumed to be seeking entry. It's surely obvious to most that what their teachers (and their teachers' idols) produce is mostly offensive rubbish, and that most of what they see in art galleries is simply trivial. So what defensible forms of activity are properly theirs? Where do they (or anyone else) look for models/forms of practice which they can internalise without either haplessly reinforcing the hegemony of their hopeless officers or just being beady-eyed.

We can't claim to be able to provide well-formed answers, but we can claim to have had some of the same problems and thus to be able to suggest a precondition for purposeful dialogue.

In the belief that most current forms of practice in art are the ideological parasites of a radical 'form' which embodies an offensive social 'content', we've considered how one might have a practice in art which would function at the centre of a dynamic social existence. This has naturally involved consideration not merely of the possibility of a quite different model of practice in art (a different 'form of art'), but also of the viability of different pictures of social and political reality.

One of the most significant characteristics of the alternative model of practice which we've offered is that it's not to be interpreted simply by reference to a body of objects ('art-works'); i.e., the answer to 'what do you do?' is not 'sculptures/paintings like those over there'; the answer, as we see it, must at some point involve an account of characteristic problems and those activities which are supposed to deal with them. Incidentally, it's our view that there's no practice which can adequately be characterized by reference to a body of objects; i.e., it's not that we're avant-garde, we simply think that most people are willfully inclined to confuse 'labour' with 'products of labour' when talking about art. We're less interested in the proliferation and criticism of art objects as such than we are in the

development and criticism of the theory supporting practice, i. e., a dimension of social practice.

It seems odd (to us not least of all) that we should hold an exhibition of 'old and new work'. The point is, we're aware that there's no closed set to be constructed on the basis of our activities. You can't count the spaces between the works 'exhibited' and come up with a guide to what's been omitted. Also we're not consistent. We don't have any objective way to measure 'progress', and there's no assembly of objects/products which we can review with satisfaction. 'Practice' doesn't stop when you put your paintbrush/pen/spanner down; there's no clocking on and off; practice is a 'dimension of all one's existence' which can be internalized reciprocally; i. e., it's something to be developed and held 'in common'. The different model of practice in art thus entails a different model of social existence. We are opposed to those whose concept of (their own) practice is that it necessarily involves the production of objects characterized by the stamp of (their own) individual authorship, and we would see ourselves as collaborators rather than competitors of those whose concept of practice is that it should entail the possibility of transformation of (social) function; this latter group includes more students than teachers/'artists'.

Look at the kinds of relations that obtain between Heads of Departments/course supervisors and students. Think about the conduct and function of assessments (if you can bear to). Students are managed and exploited by teachers seeking promotion and/or self-gratification. They are also encouraged to compete with each other for success according to criteria which they have not helped to establish. Of course students are often complicit and they exploit each other. Junior-executive postures are as common among students in art schools as among other groups. The moment when students become self-aware - as a 'class' - is the moment when they stop exploiting each other. Once common interests are recognized, the students' situation offers the opportunity for certain model transformations upon 'outside' social existence, and thus for genuinely reciprocal dialogue with those elsewhere who are concerned about the conditions for learning. The conditions for learning in art schools are generally such as to promote the generation of trivialities. We've always seen the need to return to art its ability to express/embody/deal with significant issues, and have recognized that this need will not be satisfied without transformation of the conditions of learning. For the student such transformation can attend only upon reflexive consideration (awareness) of the conditions of (his) social existence.

If we want to be able to talk about 'dynamic social existence' and 'defensible non-parasitic practice', then there will be contradiction at some point unless the dialogue within which such items are discussed is itself an expression of defensible transitional social relationships. Either social practice can be made to express developed class consciousness or self-interest will prevail. Can the sort of social existence which might satisfy our own criteria of defensibility be imagined (as generally accessible) in terms of any of the (putatively) available political instrumentalities? It seems likely that it can't (though see below, about history lessons), and if it can't then the model of social existence which applies to relations between 'those of us who know each other' may be the strongest one we have to offer as confirmation of what we have learned and as a base for learning in the future! 'We' produce ourselves, as a non-finite set.

This leaves us with a familiar problem: we learn under conditions in which contradiction prevails, yet would apply what we learn in search of the conditions for the alleviation of contradiction. We don't know just what learning means, but we do know that at some point it must entail a sense of the need to transform the circumstances in which learning takes

place. If there is a meaning to the concept of 'retrospective exhibition', it is surely to be found at the heart of this paradox. The condition of contradiction under which we all live and of which all are conscious, though to widely varying degrees, constrains what and how we learn. We are all possessed by ideology and we bureaucratize ourselves and each other day in and day out. These are the conditions of our lives. In an extreme view, all teaching is indoctrination and all learning submission. But this is obviously absurd. The point is that we can imagine that it might be different. Though we can't live it, we can imagine a (relatively) 'non-ideological' life. (Of course mere imagining doesn't make it so. Beware the Open University sociologist; he offers you the open prison of his own world view as a means to liberation from the prison of your own; the illusion of self-determination in exchange for the experienced reality of deprivation.)

To survey one's own practice retrospectively is to survey that which one wishes to have transformed and to transform; the conditions which (have) constrain(ed) learning are exposed in the process of criticism of practice. What's involved in surveying 'early work' is not a critique of loyalties; it's more like a procedure for the recognition of ideology and hence for the superceding (unmasking/exorcism) of certain learning conditions.

We can't be independent of our own history, either as members of Art & Language or as white Anglo-Saxon Protestants or whatever; our relationship with our own history is complex - i. e., it's one of the conditions of contradiction in our present existence-- and we have to be able to learn from it somehow. The study of history provides us with concepts and with terminology, though these too will become transformed in use. We might 'emphasize' those terms which carry the markers of transformational possibility and expose to criticism those which suggest ideological entrenchment or 'renewal' of ideology, e. g., we're obviously not liberals and never have been.

It's not hard to find alternative models of social reality to those offered in defence of liberalism. History offers us socialism, and a substantial body of theory. So what would a socialist art be like (in practice) which was not simply a means to illustrate aspects of social history (e. g., not simply a licence to paint apotheoses of International Socialist martyrs in the style of last year's biennale winner)? (And, getting more bourgeois, look at the Gulbenkian Foundation.) We may speculate, but we can't specify, largely because we don't know what socialism will be like for us, here. (It must be obvious that Labour Party socialism isn't what we mean.) We're not inclined to sidle-up to the unions with eager expressions on our faces, and it's no good just hoping that the 'guardians' of political theory will be aware of the (general) historical-cultural indices of the resources of expression available to us - i. e., that they'll be 'sympathetic to the Artist's Problems'. Either you accept some responsibility for the (social) conditions of your own productive existence, or you just give up. In the latter case you join the ranks of those whose fear of being found out is strong enough to ensure continued lip-service to the nostrums of cultural bureaucracy, i. e., you become vocationally depoliticized.

So we work to establish the conditions within which it might be possible to speak of a social or socialist art and mean something non-trivial and defensible. This involves the development of an appropriate (and adequately sophisticated) body of theory; the identification of those with whom we can talk, whose ('class') interests we share; and the integration of the resulting dialogue in a historic practice which is genuinely reciprocal and thus non-parasitic. There's no 'reified achievement' to fall back on. We have to keep working because if we stop it will be as if we had never begun.

WE HAVE SOME NON-UTILITARIAN PROBLEMS (OF NOTATION) IN THE FACE OF others' worrying about the possibility of a utilitarian aspect of the (arty) instrumentalities. Perhaps it's the case that they think the drawings/set-theoretical material could 'carry' their own conditions of learning (and a bound variable of what is learnt). $\exists a$, in-and-for-itself ... re the remarks made about the 'Handbook(s)' and the Parsonian vapours/apologetics about the chaos of a complex normative input to a structural(izable) continuum(?). Of course, the instrumentalities don't work in respect of the utopian dream of a set standing in (completed) relation to a fragment of nature; the point may be that the set is a rigid designator of a particle of nature ... plus going-on to find the next sub-atomic particle ... or, in relation to a discourse-set, going-on to discover the possibilities of expressions in that set!

Will the iterated world/discourse/language, etc. conditions always provide a structural fragment (and generation) if there is a world-set? Yes - that's trivial. But the possibility of transition (which is, as it were, the possibility of Natur) is merely dysfunctional in relation to the 'whole': the unfolded, sub-specie aeternitatis structure. And don't say the iterative modalities need not provide you with a structural going-on. Firstly, the iterative sets/lists (that distinction is not important at the moment) can proliferate, changing into, say, a transformational (i.e., an orthodox) set-theoretical algebra-calculus, i.e., there is a naturally necessary succession of inclusion of sets giving the conditions of rationality. (Art Pr ss et al consider this to be the discovery of the 'order' of the universe.) Secondly, the antecedent set is a function (in some fragmentary way) over the maxima and minima of the set conditions of the world/Natur. In a sense, you never could, or would never need to, start. But that's an aspect we might well keep in mind with respect to the non-transitive (in an intentional way) character of a dialectical continuum. The non-set-theoretical dimensions/uniterated functions (what?!) of Dasein may support the possibility of learning inside or rather along the (many) dialectical continua.

Defensibility and going-on (learning) go up the spout with the 'last moment' of the dialectical string in a similar way to the set-theoretical problem of having and only having a (the) single set - simpleton set - as the set of all sets. Without dwelling on the psycho-epi-generative drama of that sole (soul) set, look at the M polemical instrumentalities of approaching the only set/the final (sic) dialectical moment. (That would be like trying to construct the pathway for expressing the possibility of learning.) With the proliferation of our soul margin(s) we don't abandon the historical materialism and say the sets/margins are multiplied over necessity ... neither are they 'reflections' of reality.

N.B. As a set is not a reflection of reality, it can, nevertheless, occupy a 'real' space in the vector of ideology (intensionality). But the orthographic characteristics of that set cannot be said to co-occur with that real intensity (i.e., BxS and BxS filtration as a function on the set continues the proliferation). That's not correct - if it was the case, filtration would be a mechanistic range of modalities functioning over a string of sets. BxSF is in some way a member of the set for Bx ... rather, position one, two and three. Otherwise it would be a fairly orthodox embedding circumstance. (Ha!)

That's to say, $\left[\begin{matrix} U_1 & U_2 & U_3 \end{matrix} \right]$ etc.; that may be very much like arse-scratching going-on, but the last item of the sets-strings (or the dialectical string - sub-specie aeternitatis tokens), in preserving some aspect of historicity, would look like: $\left[\begin{matrix} U_4 & U_3 & U_2 \dots \end{matrix} \right]$

(This is a garbled problematic, but I'll carry on.) Wait! The MM functions of the first

set are identical to those of the last set. The point is you don't get round that by placing a priori vector limits on the modalities of the first and last sets because we're not dealing with anything like the set interpretation, {U} and going-on '(→)' or '(←)'. It's simply a problem of finding the resources of expression for the possibility of a token of discourse - rather, THE token of DISCOURSE and the para-deontological and teleological functions of that.

However, that aspiration (of utilitarianism, contra-narrative conditions of needs and-rationality) would be in phase with those who stand about waiting to learn - and to learn it! (What we want is a Video Display Unit showing one (non-complex?) set only, and erasing all but a basic minimum of world-discourse conditions? That would just be a stick to beat les philosophes and generative linguists with.) The success of intensional designators is not brought about by the reform of (or dropping completely) the non-maximum conditions of a set/rigid denotation ... nor does the fast-breeding of sets of interpretation-understanding help you to keep up with nature. (Certainly we're not out of step with Marxist-Leninists; i. e., simply insofar as the dialectical nodal points would have to be - even if we took instrumentalism as an out of phase correspondence to nature - transcendental in number.) The permanent revolution cannot be dialectical - neither can the logic of dialectical materialism deal with 'reformism' (as a normative concept?). In a sense the warning that the modal functions 'between' set members are not related in some (limited) way to a semantics turns these modalities into a reference point (standing) for the conditions of that reference!

1) We don't have simpleton-set members. 2) We don't have a MM range of parsing, in the orthographical sense, the (given) text. 3) That's to say (1), 2)), the 'members' are points of reference for the complete iterative M of, and as, the morpheme's vulgar occurrence. A lot of the material on the concept of a non-finite dialogical continuum/integers and intervals/or neighbouring sets missed the point perhaps. There is no vacant space (of M ideology) between members unless you consider reference points to be 'successful' denotations - and drawing heir lines - of the sentoid/morph ... because that's not a unique figure in the function-vector. That index of (or on?) the para-given is a function (and exhaustively so) of those discourse-members.

We could be doing Engel's job of turning the thing-in-itself (of some kind) of discourse into the thing-in-and-for-itself/us ... What's wrong with the gloomy non-finite Dasein aspect as a characterization of the discovery of the ontology of Being as the M of the thing-in-and-for-itself? The contrastive sets cannot put a strain on psychological consistency; yet another utilitarianist contradiction. Only if you had an index of identity criteria attached to the sets could you begin to suggest a learning circumstance as the socio-epistemological drama co-occurrent with a change in the conditions of rationality ... that'd be pretty thorough-going but truisitic.

The index doesn't exist sub-specie aeternitatis - an index doesn't function diachronically over the tokens/set members (sic/sic). (Maybe we should leave indexical expressions well alone, e. g., some think you have to.)

There are some problems remaining. They are not (despite appearances) technical, contra-Jacques Monod ('Chance and Necessity') asking for an epistemological revision in dialectical materialism. How and why is it difficult to pull dialectical materialism out of historical materialism?

A non-structural, complex whole: $\{\{aMM\} \longrightarrow\}$, but that would be structural to the extent that the indexes (= M & M) would be functions of oratio recta 'a'... A 'double aspect' pseudo-structural: $\{\{aMM/MaM/MMa/etc.\}\}$ or just $({}^rA{}^B)$, $({}^rB{}^C)$. That's to say, $BxS_1/S_2 \dots x \longrightarrow {}^r_x \longrightarrow (x)$ and using the conglomerate of indices as the set members and membership conditionality with THE DISCOURSE set $\{\dots\}$. You could do without 'r' and have to do without '{ }', unless you could introduce something fairly unanalysable such as 'real time' ... real? ...

M (a \longrightarrow b); a = any BxS^1 , b = any BxS^2 , ' \longrightarrow ' = what?

THIS CONNECTS WITH THE GIVEN POLITICAL MOMENT, ETC. . .

A kind of entailment theory. . . We are in no position to assign any particular potentiality to any particular social factor since we must, in one way or another, presuppose the dialectical reciprocity of them all. This sort of observation, salvaging though it may be, is no constitutive salvation for our class problem.

The advocacy of gradualism in social change is nothing but a negative form of normativity. There is, as far as we can see, no obviously growing socio-historical challenge via (traditional) reformist socialist forces. In fact, the opposite is the case - and clipboards and telly for the schools/community is symptomatic of things getting worse. The good thing is that the alternative gets clearer . . . but the class dialectic (for us) gets trickier. When commodity production continues as a direct expression of the aims (of individuals) and is supported by expanding individual demand, consumption ideology prevails and is not shed - even when the market contracts. It prevails, reflecting the material framework, insofar as it generates the necessary consensus: the over-easy acceptance of pseudo-alternatives as genuine choices. There are a good number of modalities to ideological change . . . to tot-up; scale assumptions may function over the vectoral space for strategy. It seems obvious now.

Think of solidarity . . . the apparent need for a party . . . the Gramscian organization for change . . . what we don't want is a theory of spontaneity. Our practical restructuring must occur 'within' the comprehensive tasks of transformation in the class struggle. The ideological task comprehends 'educational' and 'aesthetic' ones. We might want to consider discussion of a 'total' ideological/transformatory value of a number of independent points of production. This might be useful for working-out organizational and intellectual tasks of socialization. What we might ask, then, is how an ideological penetration and the strategy of penetration recurs in the problematic of the socialization of practice with respect to a) reflecting reality, and b) socio-historical solidarity vis-à-vis the conditions of socialist transformation. We consider the question how the prospect of penetration (i. e., sorting out our own sectional hegemonialism) is increased by a multiple concurrence of point of production 'facts', each of which is independently insufficient to support a factum probandum vis-à-vis success in the ideological and historical struggle. Oh God . . . 'having an effect' perhaps . . . the point is that when we're saying 'how many?', etc. in this connection, we are not suggesting meaningful quantification, save in the dialectical limit.

Let's suppose that there are social facts - and facts of class-problem penetration, ideological transformation, etc. It might be that there are putatively independent practices which are supposed to demonstrate or to indicate a non-Pyrrhic victory with respect to a substantive ideological problem - and vectored on the consideration of transformatory consciousness conditions (propaganda . . . slogans?). What happens when you consider these as partial iterations - of ideology - collectivized, or socialized?

It may be an unrealistic assumption that, by considering a number of distinct alternative situations (as iterations), it may be possible to affirm that the ensuing 'facts' of practice imply a relevant reflection of reality. Assume that there are a limited number of cases which are of no value in determining the ideological or transformation-conditional circumstances.

There may be no rewarding Marx's old theory of labour as value - contra-Habermas, etc. 'Scientism' in neo-Marxism is naive. Strategic aspects of the instrumentalities of ideoc-


logy must be shared. If, in one dimension of the Kulturwelt, the value of each independent practice is independent of that of any other, that value can't be 'numerical' and simplistically axiological. Sociality value is not a matter of head-counting. Now, here's a funny problem for the Gesamtpersönlichkeit. How do we 'weight' dialogical successes, concurrence in solidarity? And ideological iteration ... is this a case for a transitional practice?

'There is a logic, there is a logic ...' I keep telling myself.

Now, back to points of production. We have to order them in a ragbag of doubt and putative ideas.

Question: where are we, flitting about with a lot of diagrams? This ghost has got to be exploited somehow. Is the 'order' we're considering anything like 'historical order' at all? Given an interpenetration of practice and points of production, we are bound to consider iterations as in some order, independent, perhaps of the 'practical' surface (i.e., as 'x's order', 'x's history', etc.).

Now, for a number of reasons, mostly doubt about the significance of a rigorous linear order with respect to certain results, we're going to have to examine a dialectic of dependence-independence in historical/practical order ... and live with it. A non-linear construction of (you know) the Aufbau is often unfortunate - an unfortunate consequence of the dialectic itself. What do/might indeterministic production structures look like? There is always an historical aspect. We may be considering a fairly simple issue, or set of issues (in contrast to earlier speculations and confusions). There is the suggestion that a point of production must (or might) have alternative possible ... what? Histories, futures ... how is the former different from the latter? This could all be mad ... just end up as the consideration of one crazy Boolean frame after another. Forget it; what we are saying is that there is a certain indeterminacy essential to the complex mediations and transitions we must be engaged in strategically. Now this is not an epistemic indeterminacy (cf. above passim).



It may be appropriate to argue that (the) ordering under consideration may be tree-like. Is this a mystery: $p_1, p_2, p_3 \in P$, for all $p_1, p_2, p_3 \dots$ and where p_2 precedes, or takes precedence over p_1 , and so does p_3 ? What if p_2 takes precedence over p_3 - or vice versa - assuming that p_2 isn't the same as p_3 (how?)? It might be odd to assume that p_1 and p_2 might be the same (compact?), unless they had the same historical uniqueness. A different history would generate different indices ... points of production. An epistemic gap might involve one in an investment in a subjectivity-objectivity gap. It seems that a distribution of function mystification subtends from an epistemic gap in this connection. And there's no point in trying to get support for a pseudo-relativistic historiography. The history would be an obscenity. There might be some way we can come to grips with a dialectically embedded 'transitivity'. It would have to be reversible. It might just be a question of things looking transitive poetically. A full-blooded strict partial ordering would quiet all conflict \rightarrow dialectic in a history of practice 'composed' of relations and processes indexed by points of production. And it can be added that it's harder than we think (thought?) to banish unsightly relativism. It might be appropriate to start looking for a transitivity 'mediated'

(given a contradictory aspect) by apparently overarching strategy. Remember, we're always dealing with self-superseding points of production, ideologemes, etc. How do you evaluate points of production dialectically with respect to particular(ized) historical ends? We'd still find symmetry a hard corollary for transitivity or pseudo-transitivity.

We cannot extend the sociality of any well-wrought activity very readily. No-one is in a position to provide the a priori conditions for the boundaries of paralinguistic contexts (or their microstructural topicalities) which can conform to the conditions of rationality. (Interdisciplinary studies will invariably proliferate distribution of function - be something grosser than it seemed in prospect - something that misses the ideological space.)

Any set-theoretical possibility of ideology is mitigated by an ersatz Kierkegaardian circumstance. (Consider the 'Erkenntnis' treatment of intensity.) Systematic ideality is said to transcend - but is transcended by 'immediacy'. The arithmetical properties of the points of reference of ideology - whatever scale they may have in relation to cultural exegesis - may constitute a continuum or a continuity. They will be, however, a *petitio principii* for the continuum's expressibility when considered methodologically. The categorization of a continuum and its cardinal points of reference are the ideological dynamic.

The intensional quantifiable conditions of a point of reference (and between points of reference) comprise a rational ideological continuum: according to the conditions of rationality, an embedding of points of reference gives you an historical point of view. That's an ever-so-civil view of historicity.

But the condition of a set is the natural necessity of a dialectic situation or circumstance - very much on the surface. That 'necessity' is a non-surface - historically underdetermined point of access! An object, vis-à-vis modalities ascribed to it *de dicto*, is a significant point of reference-as-access in an idealist sense.

The a priori conditions of possible dialectical/dialogical stems can be exhaustively extended - or reduced to an apparent fragment of syntax to be interpreted by (our) accelerative understanding (*sic*). As an historical point of access, it must be closely related to social practice.

Our historical conditions of topicalization may be thought of as dealing with the Kantian aesthetic. It will have structural and non-structural aspects. The Chomsky-Katz-Fodor-plus conditions of rationality tradition won't help us at all with its dichotomization, *viz.* content as a product or function(s) of form. Topicalization/categorization has often been treated as a manifold set of (reflexive) pragmatic parameters. Some people are going to make themselves very busy in reaching overdetermination synchronically ... now ... and now.

Context definition is a linguistic pseudo-ascent from any surface string treated. A sentoid is a non-historical unembedded discrete atomic type that's logically prior to any lexical treatment. That's a fairly orthodox and daft view. It's not a problem of instrumental adequacy, although it escapes the problems of the linguistic situation's approaching existence - as subjectivity. Even pragmatic transivities are treated as collective subjectivities.

Perhaps the ideological Anschauung is formless. We can talk of pragmatical change ... ideological revision as ideology, but the modalities of a parameter are susceptible to the same problems of interpretation as sentoid, despite the fact that a modal value indexed is (à la Gedankenexperiment) naturally necessary ... like conversation. If we had an ideological Gestalt, change would be dialogically tautomeric. Consider 'historical change': waiting inside the algebra is parastructural post festum. The transition in change is a logic

of learning, and learning is not within an architectonic of a pragmatics' (a possible continuum). A continuity might be like a compact yet complex single point of reference - as a function of x's subjectivity (x being someone 'in the culture', etc.) versus a diachronic set of sets of (what?) BEING! Oh God... A diachronic continuum would only work if we had an exhaustive list of the conditions of generativeness. We don't and can't have such an exhaustive set because in listing, etc. those conditions are, or would be, transformed: learning/change would be absurd; teaching anything but the algebra would be redundant because every morph (or what?) would, in a depth structural sense, present us with anaphora. (This is polemical in two ways: you have either an 'experiential' index accelerating towards a single compact rational one (and teleology becomes meaningless), or an empty index while its 'significance' or interpretation accelerates away. Both alternatives are based on (simple) surface assumptions which add up to an indexical cultural point of reference!)

What do we learn with? Morphs, strings, sentoids, sentences, propositions, lexicon, grammar ... ? You don't get a question out of a Gestalt of Lebensphilosophie.

There are identity problems. Perhaps they are not just methodological problems. 'I-Thou' relationships are not the entire problematic of ontology or a complete substitute (no substitute at all) for economic-political theory. Any two points of reference share that difficulty presented by identity, disjunctiveness and contrastiveness. 'I-Thou' as a triviality of learning (?); at least an 'I-Thou'/'I-I'/'I-(...)' circumstance is significant in relation to the considerations of aims and purposes vis-à-vis an alleged interface of nature and culture. Perhaps that could be changed to a possible moral principle ... a consistency that's never satisfied. It's not enough to say that the rules of defensibility are never in phase with the rules of consistent knowing or believing or ought-ing. Oh well ... an ascent to moral determinism ladies. We do go-on: we're not doubters within the limits of an iterative Gedankenexperiment - or outside the limit of iterativeness.

Ideology is contra-logical, i. e., an unquantifiable prestructural function of going-on (and more ...). It's got to be caught - is a circumstance of conflict.

It might be odd not to have an accessible reflexive point of reference for any dialectical circumstance. A non-reflexive indexical continuum is an absolute Transcendental Idealism in which you couldn't do anything. We don't have the same landscape as the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, neither are we practically faced with associated undecidability ... denumerability problems and paradoxes. Just think of a simple type as a privileged point of access. There is a transcendental imagination that offers us a para-paradoxical 'Socratic' principle of 'awareness' which is more than epistemological dredging. It is a mystifying form of ideology which deludes many people into the belief that 'authenticity' must not only be non-social but methodologically anti-social. Related to this is the idea that there are domesticated panaceas for the (e. g.) problem of alienation as it is expressed in class dysfunction.

We haven't got much left at the moment: a deontic (etc.) Drang - rather than a complete internalization of (an) ideology. It doesn't always have to look like that, however. You join the community instead ... but so small and transitional. It only takes a moment to join in understanding, but how can you trace the socio-historical indices of such a practice - if that's what it becomes. What are we left with? The basicness of history as production (and in production) makes socio-opportunism look sillier and sillier.

A POINT OF REFERENCE ... OR WHAT? INDIVIDUATED (DISTRIBUTED) IDEO-PRACTICE is somehow invested in it. But this is not the gross iteration situation. (That's to say, we're not talking about the gross (total) iteration set ... or are we?) It looks as if it would be to fetishize a point of production to make it its own gross iteration set. In a funny way, however, you could say that a point of production (practice ...) is its own postulated first member. And this is true, perhaps, even when it is not the sine qua non of a region of ideo-practice. The issues don't get clearer. It might be argued that points of production are fetishized often, and as a matter of course. People do say 'there it is' - refer to an item as reflexively authoritative reflexively. So where's a contradiction or contrast basic to conflict likely to occur? Are we talking about ('transitional') quasi-fetish → ~fetish (relations of division remain the same), or are we talking about ... fetish → ~fetish (relations ... change), or are we talking about a possible transformation of relations? Note that 'relations ... change' means there has been a shift from asymmetry to (possible) symmetry, irreflexivity to possible reflexivity, etc. The alternatives are closer together than we think.

Start again ... at least we are appraised of the facticity of the situation ... logically. You might ask what a 'shift' would be like in this connection. Nobody has the answer at the moment. Acquiring a sense (realization) of a gross congeries of iterative 'practice' might be a transitional realization - i. e., the realization of a dissolution of any reification (which is made very complex) in favour of a set of relations with a putative initial member. This is highly general - much like "'topic"-as-index' as 'index-as-point-of-production'. And so on, and on and on ... The 'work' as ideo-practice/production (include 'field of enquiry ... universe of discourse' with maximal 'identity'-cum-analytical detail-depth) is capable of division (or, perhaps, pseudo-partition) into contributing members to the communism of dialogue. (But what about identity and other such Leibnizian hang-ups?) Cavils notwithstanding, subdivision as we've so far tried to get may be an interesting redemption in the transitional 'place'. ('Environment' is no good here.) Do we leave it there?

It seems that the possible consequences of the 'later' (i. e., historically more advanced) negation should be examined. This negation is the true shift from asymmetry to symmetry. We can ask what its significance might be in the social(ity) project. Do we remove the hegemony of 'initial member'? Obviously not entirely .. but we don't at the advanced stage regard 'initial members' as a result of fetishizing 'art': it is an iterative possibility of which (or with respect to which) (e. g.) a slogan is an index ... point of production.

We don't seem to be concerned with a comprehensive need for an analysis of points of production ... not obviously.

This is all getting a start. Ultimately, the required diagrams may not be all that hard to draw - giving an acceptable insight into point of production.

Does our dialectic swallowing of point of production get in the way? Oh well, here come the Peter-Osgoods. There will have to be a clearer distribution diagram for any divisional field, and not the picture of an Edsel that I have in mind. It might be good to list the disadvantages of a strict ordering of members: 1) It does posit some initial member in the set - suggesting or signalling privilege. 2) It makes it hard to see how transformation of any kind might be mooted inside the iteration set (as a result of the activity of 'members'); no critical grip is feasible from within. 3) No claim can be more substantial than another in the situation of possible conflict. If you enforce the idea of asymmetry, to put it crudely, some putatively 'authoritative' object (art object) contains X's iteration as a member, and

not vice versa. You have a no-change meaning circumstance. But there's more to it than just no-change ... an individual's activity has got to resonate successfully with a collectivity's. I keep going back to the view that we do need to produce something clever vis-a-vis points of production and how to locate them. Back to possible history and ideological spaces - with not much to go on.

Everyone's an expert on the subdivision thing - joining a group, or something as apparently trivial ... fights for the leadership of. We might hazard that the abandonment of transitivity is an indication of (or an augury of) a conflict; it must provide a diagram of supersession - albeit sketchy and thin.

It still worries me whether or not we have to answer the difficulty of the finitude of the 'division' relation ... but forget prolixity for a moment.

Are we justified in thinking that iterations with different indices are different? The indices might be historical (reflexive-looking) descriptions. We can say that this seems to be so pragmatically ... but trivially so (presumptive 'I-Thou', etc. ... and all the bores of the fair). This might be an old story, approached in a funny way.

Iteration of '...' is a relation to be approached dialectically via diagram(s). Now, asymmetry, irreflexivity, etc. are demonstrably reactionary ways of drawing it (them). Can it not be argued that access to a total possibility of ideological practice is denied by the intimacy of the relation between iteration of '...' and the existence of an initial member?


We may, somehow, have got rid of the problematicness of an ideo-practice totality/point of production relation by forgetting about it. The symmetry of the relation (plus, etc.) as strict dialectical ordering is the sine qua non of the totality - at least when you are considering iteration. Do you have a clear picture yet? I don't, but I do have a decent picture of what irreflexivity, etc. implies - and, perhaps, of what we need when or if we try to abandon it and its relatives. From who's perspective are we considering this issue? Now go back and start again.

Oh, diagrams $A \longrightarrow a^1$
 \downarrow
 a^2

What we may want to say is that a^1 might supersede A in the relation. But, I hear the hills crying, 'That would be to reverse the asymmetry ... the situation you want chucks transitivity out.' The answer is a question I suppose: at some point do you not get rid of (or severely diminish) the analytic meaning of transitivity in a constant shifting - finally getting rid of transitivity itself?

A convention might be that no two (?) iterations at the same level are in an iteration of '...' relation. Alternatively, we might be resolving to say that (post factum) those iterations which are not in an iteration of '...' relation are at the same level (two critics?). This is fairly easy to intuit ... perhaps it should be. Can we suggest a transformation in which the iterations (of ideo-practice) 'at the same level' are dialectically 'reordered' - i.e., shift their relationships with each other? What's important, however, is the relation conceived schematically as one-off for each iterative prospect - and then is itself 'iterated'. One might think that this is a way of coping with the various transformations between direct and indirect discourse (if transformations they be). I'm still stuck with the ins and outs of the synopsis of 'contribution' ... iteration of '...', etc. It must be tree-

with-modifications-(French art?)-like. Consider some earlier speculations, etc. on possible histories ... considered from various (spèciously) single perspectives.



... This looks like a prevailing situation, but there's something wrong with it for sure: there's the sense that $\{A\}$ is a repository of some kind. This is crazy.

A soft suggestion which ultimately borès me to death ... The 'meaning' (sloganoid intensiõn?) of an item is divided into possible functionally related activities - at various levels. This would be a way that 'art' keeps its hegemony or authority. 'You go up to it and sort out your "iterative" claim (if you like ... what it means) as a contribution to the totality.' This suggestion contours a sort of sub-objecthood and it's ontological messing about; it's hegemonial - supporting hierarchies of activity quite arbitrarily. A defence is that that sort of diagram may be necessary in a transitional circumstance that remains contemplation-fixated.

DIALÉCTIC AND UNSIGHTLY DRINKING: ART GALLERIES AS THE PUTATIVE SITES OF NON-TRIVIAL CONFLICT

Transitivity meets irreflexivity ... meets ... what? We're thinking occasionally of 'production' as something like 'subdivision', or perhaps multiple semiotic subdivision. Question: is the field of the relation 'iterator of' finite? (This 'production' could be the slow death of ideology - i.e., it's difficult to refer to the same subset of ideology - hence, production irreflexivity - but only if you have a fairly robust denotational model for subsets. - And the union(s) of sets, and unity (Bell?) as a condition of reflexivity ... as an answer? No.) The important issue is not the reflexion, but the revision of a subset. This is learning - but not in all senses in which this can imply social transformation: not, for example, considering one lump of the mind in relation to another, etc. So there is a 'reference' (see above - designations, etc.) ... and this 'reference' is to the same class. Transitivity takes on an unorthodox look; obviously, because the points of reference aren't simple, they are complex socio-teleological relations. Transitivity is clearly historical (material) change. Then there follows an ... 'and so what?'

The 'dimension' of critical intensionality has to be placed between states of historical change. And the latter has to be sorted out in relation to ideology. (To fail to recognize change as intensional and ideological is to beg for a lot of reactionary solutions to substantial historical problems: a) a non-social determinism - an Aristotelian view of the state's relation to society as natural, or to no account, emerges; b) class strategy would presumably be thought mystical (and the observation is a type of error in itself); c) contradictions in social group interests have to be disjoint from the natural world ... and lots and lots more of objectionable squitter.)

Now, ideology is transition, and it belongs transitionally to some type of transformation. This may be under-obvious to some. Should it be said (more clearly, perhaps) that (say) a demonstration should amount to a particular critical and ordering condition on dialogical-social experience? The way that might make sense is as a private/public interface - as autonomy/non-autonomy. We still haven't answered the question of the finiteness of the field of 'iterators of' insofar as it applies here. Perhaps it would be illicit to answer the question without stating the 'stand' iterators may have as historical 'subjects', in most senses of 'Gesellschaft', to the instrumentally determined Kulturwelt. That's a pretty odd relation, or none at all, save where one is keeping an historical critical grip on production. That does occur: to argue that it is not sufficiently the case is to be blind to the historical-instrumentally determined classes that symmetrically supervene over all other classes - according to various postulated Kritiken Vernunft. (Remember what has been said elsewhere about epistemic utilities.) Supervention may be a clue to a sense of degrees of vulgarity, as it were, as natural and non-natural transformation. How? A social transformation of/from/by, etc. another class (yes, it is transitive) is accidental a fortiori, but, anyway, the transformational issue is unfortunately written in between the Kultur constellations while trying to sort out this Aufbau. We assert that as ideo-practice in the capitalist framework of relations (i.e., here we presume that you can in some way reform/revalue art (ideology) as practice). Something said earlier: the distribution of function occurs in the realm of ideological instrumentality - standing in the relation to 'authentic' art production that a theory-practice of other kinds of discourse stand to (the/all) discourse. There are lots of problems here: 'natural' or complex semantics(?) ... and so on.

Distribution of function in ideo-production: social a priori conditions of membership of practice (permutate any one from ...)...

Reasons for the (sort of) meta-instrumentalistic view of practice, rather than 'production points per se'...

The public/private interface should not suggest a possibility of exclusive occurrence of either 'components' or valuations, etc. - and this goes back to one of our original problems, viz. is the difficulty of sustaining an 'iterator of' to be found in either of the labour demarcated semantical domains of the accidental/vulgar? The latter is powerful (with respect to the possibilities of transformations) and as such may be seen as a function of continued - and revised - class culture. That is a production potential (sans measure functions for a (any) practice) of dialogue. Class consciousness, however, gives you a headache when it's constantly connected with a rather thick nineteenth century idealization of dialectic which comes on as a union of separate and disjoint 'bodies of knowledge'. Hence the clumsy expression 'meta-instrumentalism' - that is, the Kultur grip of the instruments fits with/is from the socially determined base of a priori conditions for a single iteration. That's where the public/private interface lives. The finiteness of field (of interest) for iterators must be, as cultural capital, found in the issue of cultural sets' contradictions - class conflict. The field of iterator-life may be transitionally dependent upon the vulgarisms of identity between classes. There's an irony in that sort of relation 'between'. Sort it out, 'dialectical development' - Marc-Wogau! Certainly, the class partitioning mentioned elsewhere as a Spinozoid function could be dealt with by the vulgar identity relations and the various historical trees, twigs, branches on either side of the identity relation. Could it be, however, always an issue as to type of 'access' to the historicity of the 'other side'? What does that mean? Certainly the tenor of this is getting sociological ... stop it!

The substantive issue at this stage may well be specific activity-class-ideology-transition-production: what might transitional forms be like? Is it the point we only reached marginally in a funny way? Now a point of production as partially iterated (or iterated as a part of production on somebody's (etc.) part) may be the interface - or better, dialectic - of our 'internal' dialectical activity. And overt 'surf' content may be directed to serious slogans (corrected slogans).

The issue of self-understanding with respect to the internalization (iteration(?)) of slogan-'surf' (wasn't that dialogical-dialectical tension?) may be the dynamic - the actual internalization of the corrected slogan. This is odd, but quite possible.

A genealogy of morals? No. The tree-like modalization of vulgar identity for dialectical - or practical - relations is a difficulty because we've written historicity out into a point (!) of production. This is the excuse for the previous remarks about the internalized iterations, practically significant, so far as ideo-instruments of transitional production go. How about 'reiteration' ... on the dialogical right-hand margin?

'Significance' might be historically gauged, in an elliptical way, as the power of an iteration-slogan's transformatory-and-transitive possible futures. Commonality for membership - to the dialectical (Marxian or Aims of Industry) unity - is getting very strange.

The Spinozoid partition might be iterative. And the part it plays in the social pseudo-base for ideo-instruments could be characterized (apropos everything said earlier) as out-of-phase accidentness/surface of cultural 'wholes'. Now, back to the idea of division or subdivision. This also has a connection with a notion like the ideological distribution of func-

tion. Iteration-'sames' - or reiteration - seems to be the mystery/problem and not iteration-'differents'; that's boring childish play. Division or partition has to be raised if only because unitary functions are opaque as much as is unity. A set of out-of-phase iterative functions appears as conditions for ideo-practice ... and that same set may be 'internal' (in some historically/socially filtered way), as the possibility of a single point of production. We've talked of the latter as a relative (at least) of 'point of reference' and we've said a lot about reference-demonstration recently; 'what do you do? - "x"' demythologized.

Distributive functions are historically important for the transformation of the acciditness of surface to a significance in practice. The distribution of function may be a partial solution to reflexivity inasmuch as it forces one to deal with a set of contributing members (cf. subdivision).

We might argue that we don't, at this stage, have to answer questions about the finiteness of the relation's field. The point is that successive iterations have different hosts (and these are agents - or indices/<agents>). The privileged position an iterator has over a field must itself be a contributing member 'towards' (in some way) other neighbouring members in that field. Alright; those other members are iterated by/from the privileged position, or we must be in a position to argue that 'iteration of' is not asymmetric. (To what? To how many? Too much for filtration = \supseteq df. vulgar?) Also it is not non-reflexive. Yes, those production points are reiterated in the field of that privileged iteration; the iteration takes up the whole dialogical space in some way (not that you have a succession of fields/new universes of discourse, because you've got to 'tell me' (obliqua) what the 'iteration of' is). Reflexivity isn't difficult, and it has lost some of its noetic importance(?). A lot of issues come up, however, with this reworked reflexion, i.e., class consciousness becomes an issue of self-understanding in relation to neighbouring contributing members' practice. You refer to 'something' and that's making a deterministic partition. To stop the 'you'll-never-know' jeering, we attempt to weaken asymmetry. We say that a 'subdivision' cannot have that of which it is a 'part' (member) as a subdivision of it. Oh, but it can.

Points of production are pretty odd too. Are we concerned with an analysis of points of production? It's not a matter of considering strict partial ordering of contributing members. 'But you said "abolish asymmetry", or did you mean "abolish" an ordering of any kind?' Is it a dialectical issue in some way? Does the transformational prospect negate strict partial ordering (or practice(s)) vis-à-vis 'given' points of production?

Matricide: remember BxS? It's still quite powerful. An iterated point of production cannot stand in any essential accidental relation to others. It gets itself wrapped up in our telos-drenched holism ... this, apropos vulgarism/dialogical history, as a generalizing expression of that holism. Is it indexical? Surely not in any 'successful' (i.e., semantical reference) sense. The answers - or rather interests - are not in the mechanics of collectivistic teleology as a surrogate for transformations. The postulated production point is invested with telos (of a kind) and occupies the whole space; 'indexicality' is subdivision - an expression of the possible relations of ideological practice. Good night to pragmatic clarification.

1.

A non-instrumentalistic approach to history (change) might be found by inspecting a sort of Lockean (?) information theory; consider semantical 'epistemic utility' in relation to an information measure of what is said of a world/domain - the maximization of theoretical utilities with respect to a non-dynamic world. It's a rather dated approach, but itinerant. (Domain D contains N sets/classes; we've indexed n members of c sets Cw; all n members in D represent w sets.) In information theory, when n grows without limit 'in D' (sic), and w = c, information approaches zero (i.e., information becomes smaller and smaller and the size of the universe increases). Our semantical dirigible implies that, as there is no scalar top limit, then there is no information content to our sets (of discourse) 'c', insofar as c = w and N = n. And D? For some $\exists x S^1$ there will be at least (one) other $\exists x S^1$; N = n, where $N \supseteq D$, $n \supseteq D$ and N is non-finite. The instrumentalism (maximising the possibilities of utilising a set (?)) becomes a telling of parables - cf. Hegel's remarks about the Hebrew language - 'the language (sic) is not impoverished' as a consequence of erotetic Drang. And it does look as though we've got to do dialectic ourselves.

1.1

The pusillanimous pseudo-demarkation lines between 'state descriptions' in the art press are, almost without exception, products of a profound care-lessness. A bourgeois structuralism - or rather, casuistry - is endemic in all overt 'explanations of individual actions'. This is not simply non-historical, or non-transitive. It is the fragmentation aspect of the totality of (inter)actions and their manifold relations - i.e., psycho-social-historical-essentialism. Don't label this Hegelian anthropological pantheism as 'behaviouristic', because that neither reflects the reality of dialogue, not (its) aspirations. The reduction of the vectoral space has very little to do with the absurdity of every element (what?) of praxis operating as both argument-value (bound variable) and function (unbound).

1.1.1

This is a bit arcane. However, what happens when someone says he doesn't understand the conditions/modalities of the set of discoursé (AL)? Presumably he's made a distinction between the achievements of belonging to the set of discourse, and generating new members of the set of discourse (AL) - ideology reified. And that is to suggest that the next element fragment of discourse (AL)/PRAXIS has a supra-dialogical space between it and the last (what = iterated?) fragment. Again, that's saying something rather like: 'I can only have access to a single world of discourse ... although I know there are neighbouring worlds which are, through this non-modal symmetry between members of the universe of discourse, completely opaque to me(!)'. (Reification of ideology as oratio recta existing without the possibility of oratio obliqua ... and the single, non-growing set ... is a corollary of the concept of natural kinds - Absolute Spirit.) The point is that Darwinian descent is not a tag for expressing chain strength between two sets, or members of a set. Certainly, transitivity between members is not \equiv , but a modalized identity function; the non-iterated modalities of Darwinian descent (i.e., the 'supra-dialogical') become the next members ('n') of the universe of discourse. (Hence the grammar of going-on's replacing historical agent.) N.B., Darwinian descent is the product of teleological input of nature ... which doesn't repeat ... doesn't repeat ...

1.1.2

A privileged asymmetrical iteration of pseudo-ideology ... that's not quite correct since

we have our 'icy finality' quote. (There is, for example, the claimed case of 'ideology as that which enables us to make sense of the world' - as a double aspect - as a particularly docile middle class view of expertise (sets of discourse, neighbouring and inaccessible sets of discourse (the pan-techne juggernaut of Modernism)).)

1.1.2.1

N.B., this is not to suggest any solidarity with fabulously authentic 'alienation'-fixated suggestions for alternative 'ways of life'. Our pseudo-instrumentalism might suggest a pre-phenomenological circumstance that doesn't get confused about the distinctions between de facto and de jure obligations... or essence and opportunism.

1.1.3

Returning to Absolute Spirit, am I involved in a petitio by generalizing the conditions of joining a dialogue as 'iterations and the vector area' and by suggesting that there may be a single discourse set (A1, etc.)?

A rubric: 'On why our instrumentalities are not asymptotic ...'

1.2

The refutation of the 'whole' (in a non-spiritual sense) and the demarcation (de facto) of a fragment of that whole is reactionary - inasmuch as the conditions of a fragment must be 'more than' the iterated index (function) thereof. Or, the neighbouring set 'B' is said to be inaccessible - as if there was only the possibility of a relationship of mutual exclusivity between 'a' and 'β'. This does not occur where there is a possibility of learning between two selection restriction-cum-indexing-the-marginal-soul-content events. 'α' and 'β' might conform to the laws of inductive logic. Alternatively, we stay with a notion of a modalized transitivity of 'a₁', 'a₂', etc.

But consider 'filtration-embedding' as a euphemism for a set of modalities which cover more than the orthodox 'utilities' (e.g., Weber show, etc.). A rather gloomy maxim: 'the world (universe of discourse/nature) must grow larger (in aggregate, not complexity) and faster than your information of the world can.' The maxim is simply an expression of caution with respect to our orthodox way of joining a world of discourse - 'strength through intensional isomorphism'. Conditions for the contiguous (non-independent?) goings-on (cf. 'Handbook(s) to Going-On): the supercession of unsatisfactory points of reference. There are no conditions prevailing to suggest a problematic revision/refutation of a chain-like function of going-on (a unilateral whole-cum-Anschauung again). How about that as vulgar substitutivity?

Class conflict is of crucial social and, for us, practical relevance. It amounts to a basic ideologeme. We might ask the question how to cope with the allegation that social-realization-on-class-theoretical-ideological lines shifts its focus to intersector conflict - indicating the technological character of the context. A possible practical consequence of an affirmative answer to the question may be the revaluation/critical analysis of the 'conventions' of class division as an important ideological step in the class struggle, and the transformational possibilities → necessities consequent thereon. The point is that an affirmative answer would emanate from an absurd sociological mystification. At the same time, indices are indices.

It's easy to ask the question, and questions like it, and to comment, but one can enquire as to its legitimacy. It might be that one can more easily ask to what extent do conventional

conflict categories obscure and disarm conflict categories, insofar as reformist practice embed those categories in participatory function distribution. And it might be rejoined that if one thinks that the question thus framed is revoltingly revisionistic, a course of ideological action is necessary. We have been trying to break hegemony at another ideological level with such a course of action projectively in mind.

A suggestion is that a degree of institutionalization occurs in advanced sectors - within organisations, the circumstances of production and consumption, etc. Touraine suggests that the institutional level falls between the level of economic power and the organisation - i. e., the organised enterprise which lies at a level above work behaviour. Now, where this occurs, the institutional practice is (or can be) a 'reification' of conflict. There can be no participatory conflict - on pain of translocating oneself in the organisational net.

Now, there is not only the technological range of choices. There is, or should be, an ideological range thereof. Our 'battle'/conflict involves some ideological a priorities. This makes the ideological issue all the more important. (This is almost a slogan, but in the trade): With art practice dialectically construed as practice/radical theory, in the constituent but self-superseding function of ideology, it has as a project the specific activity of socialization - the theory of socialization as ideology + practice. And, in generalizing, it must widen the scope for ideological transformation/sociality, insofar as there remains the necessity of ideology in the dialogic/dialectical reflection of reality. But this project is a transitional ----->transformational one. Ideology/dialogic reflection (reflexion) may be taken - to a limited extent - in its categorical acceptance. But it does involve the 'expression' of intensionality ... and all the logical close calls adhering thereto.

THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES*
DIRECT SPEECH

Sorting out a significant activity against a pervasive background of romantic and/or liberal individualism looks as if it requires the presence of a tractable notion of critical realism. Realism, not another abstract shibboleth of critics and ideologists, but a striving to take account of the concrete factors which make up the working situation(s). Only by not skating over the factors which shape the possibilities of activity so comprehensively, that rather than appearing as objects of consideration, they tend to dictate what are to be the objects of consideration, can one progress from orthodoxy to significance and activity. What is required is a realistic and critical activity which transcends the immediate institutional context of progressively inverted and abstract specialisms. Such activity would be sketchy and speculative and 'gappy', rather than tight and well-ordered; and be potentially a shared activity of foundational criticism and construction which might involve its members in common ventures.

We need to perform a para-sociology of institutions - to look at the relationship of factors which are important in the constitution of art schools. The art school forms the immediate working environment of teachers and students alike; so it has to be taken into account in trying to deal with constraints on work. It is a fairly standard assertion that structure is a significant determinant on content. The methodology which one employs, and which follows from the structure in which working is embedded, equally determines the nature of what one does.

The question of structure has both an internal and external aspect. The external part is probably the most fundamental, because obviously the form taken by that college course will follow from governmental and bureaucratic demands; but it is the internal sense of structure which is the most immediate conditioning factor on the possibilities which are open for work. It may be the greatest mistake of all to neglect to take account of the role which being in a college has on the resources and opportunities which are available - the influence of being, as regards working conditions, in every respect institutionalised. But this is precisely what often does occur - largely because institutions maintain a broadly passive (sic) role. But simply because art schools do not usually thrust themselves to the front, as institutions, does not mean they are without this effect, or even that authority is unaware of it.

Regarding internal relations, one's primary concern is from the point of view of the kinds of activities which college divisions foster, mediated by the constraints on activity which they entail. Thus the usual factors are the divisions into studio activity, history of art and general studies. But additionally one has to take account of the library, and also the avenue of students' union work. There is another factor which is slightly tangential, but which becomes important for many students, and that is the relation between art school courses and art teaching courses.

Looking first at art history and general studies: it is a truism that there is a disjunction between these aspects of a course and studio work, and it is widely recognised that problems emerge around it. But reactions to the difficulty tend to be on the whole very much

*An extract from 'Art and Education', a report by Paul Wood and David Rushton, 1975.

just that - simple reactions outside the academic tenor in which these studies are normally conducted.

It backs up what has just been said about the influence of structure when we recognise that this academic character is ordained in the official policy which set up general studies departments in the sixties. But there are two other things which must be realised: firstly, that this model of art history and general-studies activity is not the only one - it may in fact be a dramatically erroneous one; and secondly, the justifiable distaste which is felt for the form of these studies must not be understood as justifying a disregard for them in their totality. In fact the flight from general studies and art history, which in a sense only mirrors the peripheral status they are accorded, could be taken as a major cause of the execrable state in which art studies presently find themselves.

Specialism in history becomes a way of not answering broad questions, and a foundation for doubting their legitimacy as questions. All too frequently in the teaching of art history an account of individual movements or genres is approached without sufficient investigation of the broader relations in which artists, etc. were/are socially or intellectually involved, and with no investigation at all of the relations between those relations and our contemporary practical relations. Instead one concentrates on objects, on the items which, as it were, solidify out of that web of activity, in the expectation, one can only assume, that they will be thought interesting in themselves. But we too are enmeshed in history.

For a student, or at least for someone whose work is carried on within an institution, it would surely make sense to embody (in work) a notion of general studies and art history as something not complete in themselves, sustaining only a contingent and external relation to activity, but something internal and necessary to work - to articulate this activity in such a way that it forced a revision of the present moribund alignments, - by taking them seriously, pointing out their restrictive influence, and - in working - trying to approach a synthesis of these considerations in the fabric of one's working conditions; rather than simply registering a superficial dislike of the way things are, and flying away from them in negative fashion.

It is here, in turning towards a conception of an activity which among other things would be sensitive to historical and cultural methodologies, rather than just historical and cultural objects, and which would incorporate a sense of criticism into itself rather than as something external and half-dead, an activity which would attempt to promote a wide-ranging comparative examination of cultural predications, that another aspect of art school structure comes to the fore.

It seems to be a feature of the contemporary ideology as expressed in art education that book-bound information is inferior to immediate sensory information. It is one of the clichés of McLuhanism that the former is inferior to electronically transmitted information. But it would seem to be the case that if such a hierarchical ranking of information channels were dogmatically followed an instance of the kind of narrowness which we are criticising here would, no less debilitatingly, be transferred to their potential resources. With the expansion in the number and kind of potential information inputs one would expect richness to follow from their syncretized utilisation - rather than from an a priori ranking of their efficacy.

THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES* COUNTER COURSE

The Penguin Education book Counter Course contains nothing derived from an experience of the contemporary art institutional situation. Far from this being a vindication of the status quo in art education, it is silent testimony to the level of ideological triviality upon which this domain proceeds. This is the triumph of an ideology - an ideology which has succeeded in removing from the area of practice any space for the generation of structured questioning and dialogue: of critique. This 'trivial' omission mirrors the loss of a sense of critical practice whose continual revision, re-orientation and re-structuring could alone prevent the activity from becoming moribund, and its educational institutions reactionary.

To stay with this book for a moment: it claims in the Preface to be addressed to students who 'find their courses boring, cramped by exams, methodologically unsound, or with a content politically obnoxious in its only possible real world uses'. But this doesn't seem to map easily onto impressions of an art education - far from feeling cramped or restricted the student is more likely to feel that he inhabits an ideological desert, a context whose distinguishing feature is precisely the absence of any constraining criteria, or the obtrusion at any level of a teleology with, even remotely, real world implications.

Noam Chomsky often speaks of the ideological triumph of the American 'mandarin' class as being measured by the fact that even 'dissent' takes place within the confines of the area in which it has set the terms of debate: a triumph which, to remain triumphant, must go essentially undetected. It is some fragment of this self-assuredness which makes reflexivity seem unreal, and which muffles awareness of one's wider issues. This seems to characterise the silence emanating from art schools. There is a level of 'noise', which occasionally grows loud enough to be heard, but, being non-reflexive and in the main a re-phrasing of standard or inherited problems, it is just this sort of dissent-on-a-leash that has exercised many people recently.

There could be another explanation, whose consequences would be graver: that contributors who are capable of articulating criticism of education, historiography and science look on the educational example provided by the art school as some kind of desideratum. This would be grave because it would mean that their 'radicalism' was flawed by the distorted and pervasive liberal inheritance which is constitutive of art education today. This may turn out to be the case; but the present suggestion is restricted to holding that there is a critical hiatus in art and its educational practice, and that the primary problem facing practitioners is the articulation of the structure of that orthodoxy and its critique.

One fairly obvious, but nonetheless substantial point, is worth iterating: whereas it is relatively easy (as far as the teaching of, say, 'education' goes) to pick out the dominant exponent of contemporary belief and to make a substantive and systematic criticism of both the implicit and explicit theses of R. S. Peters - by studying his published work - it is almost definitionally the case that art educators, as often as not themselves painters, are reluctant to commit themselves to substantial articulations of their educational methods and teleology. This is not ascribable to (unfortunate) contingency; it is the function of this

*An extract from 'Art and Education', a report by David Rushton and Paul Wood, 1975.

questionable limitation of practice which is a currently constitutive feature of domainal orthodoxy.

It is possibly for this reason that past attempts at a criticism of orthodoxy have been somewhat narrow in their ostensible target area, this range being determined by the actual student and/or teaching experiences of the authors. At the opposite extreme, and generated out of the same lacuna in the reified and reificatory standard belief expressions, there arises the criticism of orthodoxy couched in terms of a general cultural critique. Just as the particularised depth analysis of some aspect can be seen not to bear on reality because it appears over-rarified, so a cultural critique can miss the mark if, in its generality, it contains no lines of projection for a mapping onto the concrete ramifications of a practice.

But the scarcity of explicit articulations of orthodox ideology itself warrants explanation. It only stands as an interim marker to account for the lack of criticism - namely that the difficulty of the critical task increases proportionately with the difficulty of locating and defining the object(s) of criticism. Analogously, one is permitted to be much less delicate in framing criticisms of Soviet rather than British neo-capitalism. But the less obtrusive nature of the latter should not exempt it from attack. It seems that the objectified specializing of the 'domainal orthodoxy', and the explications of practice underlying it, need sorting out - if the low profile of the critical surface is to be explained as following internally, rather than as a merely regrettable, contingent state of affairs.

PUTATIVE ART PRACTICE IN BRITAIN IS FOCUSED ON THE ART SCHOOLS. MOST 'artists' are art teachers in some capacity. Some people think that this is a good thing as it obviates - or has traditionally obviated - the commonality-eschewing-non-teaching-pro-artist. It obviously isn't a good thing: the apparent socio-historical advantage that careless observers might discern in the quasi-communal eclat of the art school is vitiated in the ideological (etc.) practices that a slightly more careful observer is bound to notice.

Most of the participants (who know one another) in Art & Language have been art school teachers. Some of us have had long careers, others short; most of us have been sacked (or made redundant, offered responsibility for a staple-gun (and only that), given hanging-about pseudo-welfare work, baby-minding chores, etc.). We are, however, often asked to recommend more tractable replacements: our paths are littered with reifications of our utterances by experts in not-being-found-out.

The social, educational and ideological character in the art schools at all levels is lamentable with respect to its own indices. As reinforcers of class hegemony, they are among the most reactionary and backward of educational establishments.

It can't all be put down to the crystallinity of NDD artisanism and its neighbours. The overheard shrieks of those confronted by an inherited academistic bureaucracy (B.A. degrees, etc.) merely add support to the view that art schools are a practical apotheosis of idealist/liberal ideology - plus authenticity. A characteristic authoritarianism is invested in the ordered strictness of relations between (e.g.) art teachers (qua class collaborators) and higher-up bureaucrats. The micro-hegemony is almost invariably successful in stifling - or in failing to consider - the intensional dialectical conditions of substantive criticism. The expense account fantasies of the higher-up bureaucrats (get a list of (e.g.) heads of department-up) are circumscribed as a result of (their) having passed through the hierarchy. Within the specious limits of their provenance, they (and perhaps also head-of-department-(etc.))-impersonators) imagine themselves functioning supra-bureaucratically. The delusion usually follows a conspiracy in mutual self-aggrandisement between several sections of the hierarchy: functional 'staff-student' activity is excised as too problematic and a reification of a bureaucratically accessible aspect of that activity proclaimed a necessity. A less obviously (i.e., transparently) reificatory form proclaims the belated discovery of redundant necessity a revelation. All sections become agents and victims of perpetuated negligence. The enforcement of an arbitrary distribution of functions and facilities by opportunism and bureaucracy is enacted in the generation of arbitrary (repressive) legislation.

Because 'we' are not employed much in the art schools, we don't have to talk to art teachers. At the same time, one is faced with the problem of how to penetrate (and be active in) the class conflict and the problem of a social project's historical (class) embeddedness.

Student struggles are embedded, in important ways, in the class-struggle mesostructure. Microstructurally, they constitute class-struggles in themselves. Art students in particular have been the victims of social dislocation and depoliticization. This is a function of bureaucratic reification which transcends the petty officialdom of the Polytechnics; the dominant ideology saturates on a considerable scale. The well-known bourgeoisification tradition of practising to be an artist/businessman/teacher is entrenched formally and informally.

Margaret Thatcher's imposition of a Polytechnic-like constitutional formula to the putative

institutionalization of the non-Polytechnic art schools, etc. has served, under the guise of reformism (democratization), to strengthen the ideological and economic hand of hegemony. As with the Polytechnics, these allegedly educational institutions are designed (and mostly function) as suitable places of employment of a tractable bourgeois or narco-bourgeois workforce. The Houghton Committee rewarded financially a promotion by the ATTI of class identifications disguised as analogical indices of wage comparison. The ATTI is a pseudo-union (affiliated to the TUC), pseudo-professional association (BMA?): it is caught schizophrenically between the possibility of being identified with the traditional reformist trade unions and the self-image of the professional man. Art school teachers, in seeing themselves as light blue collar businessmen, find that their interests are best served by maintaining an airy aloofness in the face of pervasive contradictions. In many ways, militant indifference is more readily internalized by art students as an image of professionalism than are perhaps more technically explicit images by certain other students.

Sociality and depoliticization in the art schools is clearly a partial reciprocal contrivance of the students themselves. They constitute a lumpen sub-intelligentsia (unattached) in relation to their own alleged spokesmen and, of course, so far as the officers and NCO's of the establishments are concerned: The situation is reciprocal insofar as the mystification of depoliticization (or unpoluticization) has been internalized. The issue as to what sort(s) of partial ordering is really confronted must be regarded as highly complex: whether it be irreflexive, asymmetrical, transitive or not (or what) is a network of functional questions, which can only be sorted out on the basis of a more comprehensive analysis of the logic of the interpenetration of base and ideology, etc., with respect to the (necessity of) class conflict, than exists at the moment. Some sort of dianalysis, however, can proceed on the obvious assumption (observation) that institutions dedicated to the ideological tuning and perpetuation of hegemony must display (internal) relations which reflect the logic and practice (and theory) of class domination. This is also true of the kinds of relation such institutions bear to the communities they scab off.

It is also possible to consider the class situation of art students vis-à-vis their courses, relations with the ideological instruments who push them around (etc.) without having an unequivocal answer to sociological allegations that class conflict has shifted its base to become intersector conflict. However, it must be considered how the class self-activity might (given some activity) be seen as defensible socializing activity. The examination will rest on the question to what extent can art student self-activity be organized so as to be meaningful (and not just elliptical) class activity. The transformational locale would seem, initially, to be consciousness to ideology, bearing in mind that the impasse faced is an impasse in socialization as such.

The trick proposition of the art school teachers is, among other things, that the art students' problems are merely sheltered distributions of, or pseudo-dialectic attenuations of, their own. The trick represents an illicit sociality more than an amusing fake because it is compulsively behaviourist. The conventionalization of the trick is a condition for the overvaluation of entirely idle chit-chat.

A student's (students') substantive problems (in 'the reality he reflects') are generally opaque to his officers and NCO's who, at best, can only mediate via a spurious youthfulness in relation to the halfwits who make head of department, external assessor, etc. Mediation of this kind is rip-off appropriation whose conditions are the relatively simple pragmatics of 'intimate' dialogical - conversational - circumstances. In more complex conditions, a student's capacity to see, find expression and act in an historically (and educa-

tionally) non-vacuous practice is denounced as deviance - or worse - and it is usually excised.

A primary problem for an art student is that of his own socialization in class activity. This will reflect a complex examination of (art) students' situation vis-à-vis the conditions of transformation on a micro-, meso-, macro-scale. In art schools, the reflective instrumentalities are saturated by ideological and historical paradox (e.g., intra-, as well as inter-, space transformations must be considered). The class basis is (perhaps temporarily) secure. These concerns are necessary conditions of radical dysfunction within and (projectively) without the institutions. (Constitutionalist student-politics can only amount to leisure activity for earnest friendship generalizers: it a) is antecedently distributed so as to obviate local conflict; b) is transparent to teachers and their masters; c) reflects participation in a macro-scale situation which is meaningfully only one of conflict.)

The student's class penetration/situatedness is historically advantageous if you compare it with the pitayune problemativeness of the grown-up artist. The question is raised-what sort of dialogue, organization, etc. could enable the grown-up artist to learn something (that is, evaluate his own relations ... practice) in the light of any substantial relationship (interrelationship) with (or in) class dysfunctional activity as socialist student practice. A related question is to what extent can those artists (etc.) who see their situation as problematic do any 'teaching' at all. (Obviously, the dialogical/dialectical situation is relationally more complex than those questions might at first seem to suggest.) The question(s) are readily amplified: to what extent can/must the class character of (art) student practice be regarded as a pointer to the grown-up artist's social sectional problem of penetrating and participating in the transformations of the class-struggle (and in the transformation that is the class-struggle); to what extent do the grown-up artist's struggles and difficulties with respect to class activity and a possible intra-spatial revaluation (i.e., of art practice) present a transformational possibility in the students' context? The questions must disclose a theoretico-practical dialectic Aufbau, not a passive thematic prospect. A feasible response to the questions will have to propose the dialectic (the culturing reciprocity) between artists (who have some-grasp of their socio-historical situation) and art students (who may or may not have such a grasp) outside the bureaucratizing range of the institutions.

We can't just go-on in an excoriatory or diagnostic spirit complaining that students are irredeemably quieted and mystified - victims of the low cunning of the morons who pretend to teach them/organize their educations, etc. And the possibility of teaching must not be tainted with the pretensions of art teachers who, universally, pretend to one another that they are teaching when they are just hanging around and fostering the ideology of hanging around and occasionally doing things for a fundamentally despised or sentimentalized mass ... community arts opportunism.

SELF-SUPERSEDING STRATEGY ... OR THE GIVEN POLITICAL MOMENT

(This is related to our speculations on the conditionality of a class-set-thing-in-and-for-itself. But remember, we're not able to deal in any way with a totality of human life-dimensions ('soul and its forms') - significantly so, contra many reactionary or 'dissident' fools.)


A 'point of reference' is liable to look very deterministic. Because it's a function of 'surf' (co-)determinates or acciditness and not like a mere instrumentality for 'surf', there are a few problems with the various attendant forms of relativism.

One suggestion

An ideological space is occupied wholly by a single point of reference. It therefore cannot be indexical in any normal form - i. e., 'dialectical' history. It is an index-in-itself. But that absolute relativism is absurd. (Yes, but Wittgenstein didn't help much: We can't retire to 'language'.) Perhaps what we should say is that the single point of reference appears to be superseded by a 'new' (the 'next') point of reference only insofar as the social circumstance of iterating the conditions of identity or 'verisimilitude' must militate against that kind of relation. Hence 'Surf-ing' ... get it?

There must be, nevertheless, a non-dialectical order for our succession of reference-points-cum-surface. What must be made clear is that considering points of reference as sets of relations will tend to be mystificatory. But that claim remains fairly opaque at the moment in its 'are you at home?' aspects. The problem is a non-issue (and so are the related socio-structures) with respect to the ideology - 'realization' value of a point of reference. The 'realization' is the wedding together of the surface-iterations and a given ideological value: an assignment of production strategy as a function of a given situation. The so-called 'hidden' teleological aspect of ideology - waiting until the final conditions of change/Volks-unity can reveal themselves - is a mistake. Going back to our 'set of relations', the teleological 'aspect' is iterated ... as ideology; both can be parametric only in relation (sic) to the historicity of iterations.

Ideology is entirely iterative ... in a sense it is extensional. Its 'expansion' is not a product of reflective research. If that was to imply the generation of subsets of points of reference, then we would look for (and discriminate) intensional conditions. The 'index-in-itself' (point of reference) has to be a self-superseding strategy. This is at least an initial attempt to de-mystify the complex relation:



This spurious relation is founded on the possibility of a 'given' but iterative history. So, ideological space might not be wholly extensional - and, by not rising to the surface, some may fail to recognise that the revision from point of reference to point of reference would prevent any 'super-reference' of the intensive aspects of ideology.

The existence of an historical continuum is dependent upon the possibility of ideological production. The indexical (sic) points of production supersessively reflect reality. The production-values (indices) exist within (?) the complex relation we had above - going back to our index-in-itself. But the historical Drang is a priori or a function of reflexion. The relationship one has to the totality of social production is in fact the function of 'Drang' ←

—> reflexion'. Perhaps the ideological dimensions of a production index will be equivalent (in type, scale, life) or interchangeable with those of a production index (practice).

To ask questions about the linearity of the historical structure of the iterations ... production-indices successively embedded in practice ... is to miss the point about an index functioning as an evaluation of practice. Generalizations on superstructural features are index valuations which assign production-indices to practice/strategy.

This may be All Too InHuman/theoretical. How do various valuations act as complex practice? There is a functional relationship between indexical points and production points (i.e., 'surf' iterations). It may be assumed that the 'productive-ordering' of a practical structure (whole) will not be dialectical. The practice-whole is much more peculiar historically than any linear ordering may suggest. Ideology-iteration-production involves strategical and non-strategical transformations of a single point of production. An historical or dialectical materialism confuses and mystifies the possibility of ideological transformations by singling out a point of production as non-strategical so that ideology must remain opaque in its various forms at the point of production (sociology rules).

The telos-strategy of ideology pre-selects or pre-filters points of reference; that is its only recursive function. The problem of how many reference points may be quantified as points of production is raised here. At least recursive filtrations as indexical valuations cannot be limited in their range (or resource) of expression between points of reference: There has to be, however, an assumption that on one level, at least, reference points α and β are intuitive equals. They are the recursive indices of an iteration.

This is still All Too InHuman. Is the difference between the resonances within a region of indices and between index functions (value-postulates) merely one of degree, or taxonomic, or superstructural, or what? Will a production point have different or alternative possible production historicities? We might suggest extensional co-reference between non-identical interpretations (the structure of strategies?). Remember that the activities inherent in the compact ideological whole are the characteristics of the negotiated categories of class struggle. It isn't an 'indeterminism' of historical production-indices that we have to cope with, but our dialogue with determinism: 'Change does not occur inexorably - but transformatory struggle has go to.' A way to deal with this might be to speculate whether there might be a possibility of historical transformations where future, or non-compressent, strategic contingencies do not properly sustain a valuation; a point of production will have no (indexical) valuation - reference.

Some people who talk about transcendental 'conditions' of change fix the latter state in statu quo - contra our Deflected Permanent Cultural Revolution. Is this because 'futures' are ordered in some way, but, as such, they are not moot to the problem as points of production? But we're not saying a given point of production has a unique Ordnungscharakter - is a unique index of a given strategy/practice - are we? We appear to have placed some sort of hierarchical character to 'point of reference —> production —> practice' so that they each pertain to a function/product role, etc. quite systematically and taxonomically (sic) - categorically. There are bound relationships between indices and strategy. If they are in any way transitive they will not only 'sustain themselves', but may be said to provide the conditions of alternative practices (... and strategy?). 'Production' will have a transitive life (say, commonality with - itself) only insofar as its indices are not values for a bet-hedging induction to the next (phantom) point of production and transformation.

A production/iteration does stand in a determined relation to strategy; it's simply a matter of the teleo-theoretical attached to, as well as directed to, practice. With that historically transformatory aspiration (teleological circumstance) there's no alternative for the Gesamtpersönlichkeit but to regard practice as 'collective' points of production: We said before that the modal valuations of 'surf' (i-iteration), as something like the integration of the dialectical spaces between (what? - satisfaction(?)), are really expressions of the 'collectivity' of historical 'iterations'. 'Ideology \rightarrow ' - practice - remains very much on the surface in all its 'super-valuations' and class rationality conditions. With respect to that sense of 'surface' (taking up the whole of the dialogical space available for the interpenetration of ideology), it is, perhaps felicitously, difficult to salvage any rigorous idea of the 'linearity' of the Ordnungscharakter - 'order' related only to the point of production:

'Surface' is not a successful reification of our, or anybody's, work. The work may be an index historically, but it may also have been (or be) an index set functioning over antecedent work. Its value as 'weights' or as Drang is superseded. (The distinction is warningly tenuous, especially in relation to any 'real time' analogues provided for the sake of 'order'.) Otherwise, we would set up conditions for a Kulturformula ... that would probably be an impenetrable 'reality'. Go back to the compactness of the single reference instead. A point of production is peculiar: it has a lot of logical and bloodless characteristics ... just like the items we fear. But what alternative might there be? We do need to have a theoretical grip on the intension superseding conditions of socialization - or politicization. Politicization, as expressed in the compactness of ideology, is not a sort of fine-tuned socialization.

The penetration of class 'dysfunction' (very sic) might amount to the consideration of ideology-production as a product(!). That index has to function somehow as a reference point for teleological Drang; the modalities of this 'point' are not those of the world of modal logic. Consider strategical alternatives of point of production x_i such that $x_{(1)} \wedge x_{(2)} \in x_i$. Socialization may be a Cartesian product of a strategic set.

There may be some odd conditions of change in the transitive $x_{(1)} \rightarrow x_{(2)}$ which will necessarily transform x_i . There are degrees of transformation, however, that may produce B_i . That is to say there is an order (sic) inside a single point of reference, or that a point of production has a 'future' in relation to mesomerism. A production point can be thought of as saturated and as saturating its own order. That order is dialogical and, a-propos 'sui index', a condition of the dialectic.

Assume there is a form of linearity of order ('character') in the 'relation' that one ideoproduction point bears to another (but not 'between') ... not hard, is it? A number of (indexical) points of production α, β, Γ , and sets of transformation-production iterations Θ and $I - \alpha \neq \beta, \Theta \neq I$ - don't seem to work too well together in most 'relational' ways. But there exists a (set of) relation(s) for $\alpha \rightarrow \beta \dots$ as ' $\alpha \hat{g} \beta$ '. There are degrees of teleo-grip (?) such that $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \hat{g} \supseteq \alpha \hat{g} \beta$. All that $\Theta = \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \text{etc.}\}$; α can't be an index of production at a significant level(?). $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ go is a locus classicus of indexical expression. $\alpha \wedge \beta$ is acceptable only in a diachronic way, itself a function of γ . (This is running into a defence of work circa Bxal-Ing.)

There's no-point in talking our way into having an index as peripheral to our ideo-set(s) $\Theta \dots$, (e.g.) the possibility of $[\alpha] < \Theta$ and $[\beta] < \Theta$ when $\Theta = \Theta$ and $\alpha \neq \beta \dots$ the problem of (dialectical) change. The dialectic relation of a point of production (α) with (a) practice is

not a set-theoretical 'Spinozistic' partition ... of what? Some say 'of modal expressions' and provide one-one mapping conditions. We've got to ignore, for a moment anyway, the primitive Heraclitean dialectical fluxus ... rabid relativism. That is to say, α is itself 'saturated' by the practice/activity as a condition of continuity-penetration. This is not an $x \in p$ circumstance, for practice is to be seen as self-activating and that the pseudo-componential points of production don't make up its 'mechanism'. A critical purchase on an activity is partially resolved, like the mind-body problem inherent in the component-linearity-mentality, but the interpenetration of valuation and determining indices in social practice. (Bear in mind here what was said about the 'extensionality' of the intensional ('surf' < ...').)

One's self-inspecting points of production must have an order of a kind (=reference), but only as the residue of the dynamic (going-on) of a strategy. Remember that there will be (and is) a union of strategical subsets, each one of which is ... who knows? ... an infinite of length $A \dots$, where the subset is $\{\alpha\beta/\beta < \bar{A}\}$.

What's wrong with this and any other sort of linearity? Although each subset (mode of production) is a point of reference in terms of its modification by another subset, etc., they are, after all, modes of production. And that's not to say something squashy about 'the production' (cf. Marx) basic to (human) socialization. (N.B. Extensional \leftrightarrow intensional modes.) There is alternatively a scale-limit to a point of production's referential grip if transformation-limit to $\alpha\beta/\beta < A$. Strategy is mappable, otherwise you'd have something nasty like a whole (any set) as a totality of infinitely many parts (expressions), and then some infinities would be greater than other infinities. It would be enough to say that there exist two cardinal (ordinal ?) subsets - $A\beta/\beta \dots \beta\gamma/\gamma \dots$ - so that the 'predictive' aspect of practice is dealt with in the same way, in the union of Kultur-telos sets. This possibility of non-linear (in any type (sic) of expression) 'order' is not an elaborate Markovianism.

Oh no! We're back into semantical issues: the valuation, with respect to complex iterations of (production) ideology, or in relation to considerable 'generalizations'. The deterministic point of production-partition can only live in the universe of hereditarily finite spaces. Somewhere reflexion will be intractable. Or sometime Peter Kropotkin's transcendental dream is (already) true. But remember that the finite spaces are iterations, transparent to iterations' and only iterations' point of production, not to impenetrable-surface-accidents. So, α in any of its spurious forms is not an ϵ -model of any kind.

Iterations are historical ... of a practice ... only(?) in the sense that that practice may belong to a union of sets. The priority or precedence of α to β may be a triviality generated by the history ... i.e., generated by α and β ... i.e., ' α ' and ' β '. Yet we talk about the historicity of an iteration. This should be seen in relation to the problems of a subset of indices turning out to be the same as the 'original' set ... (e.g.) $([\alpha]=[\beta]) \in A$, or simply $(\alpha=\beta, \alpha \in \beta)$. Certainly α as a point of production is indexical in (all) relations to other sets.

History has to be dealt with recursively if iterations are to be at all historical. And that implies or is equivalent to an assertoric continuity: $\alpha \rightarrow \beta \rightarrow$, etc. Cutting out modalities for $\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \alpha \in \beta$ doesn't crop up. 'Remembering'/'forgetting' is a function of β at β 's (social) production point. To preserve the Spinozistic union of possible sets, i.e., to preserve the possibility of 'strategy' and all its related concepts, involves a diminution of indexical relativism.

This is none-too-tidy: if A^a is the circumstance of a Spinozoid product \hat{a} , then its relation to the ideological union can be changed from $a \in A$ to $a = A \dots$ and that can only be expressed 'in' some β . Back to a non-castellated $a\beta / \beta \dots \beta\gamma / \gamma \dots$ 'non-castellated' insofar as we have problems how we can 'practically' place an upper limit on indexical (sic) valuation prospects for a . It would be a strange kind of transformatory historical perspective if 'values' are to be denumerable in the space occupied by 'natural' purpose(s). (That's what is being asked when 'a' is in $a \rightarrow \beta$, etc., and remains (transparently) on the dialectical ledger.) The 'history-perspective' is the possible discursive valuations, or 'life', of a in the 'strategical/teleological' modifications of the 'mode' of a (cf. our earlier remarks on (i, j) = mode and modification).

'Helpful hints' (sic): 'only a' 'single' possible ideological iteration for a given index - point of production - is realizable or actualizable; valuation is possible only insofar as a possible history is provisionally posited; transformatory-transitional activity relative (in some way) to a can only be capable of valuation relative to such a possible history/(ideological) iteration. The first hint doesn't say much - except to point out the danger of classic modernist 'dysfunctionalism-linearity (i.e., ' $a \rightarrow \beta$ ')' insofar as for all modalities of valuation β will 'follow' a . The other hints only leave you with $a \dots \hat{a}$. (Remember we can't use sub- or super-scripts!) What keeps worrying here is that one can (amongst this shambles) engage with the 'ends' of transformatory/transitional practice - a union of natural purposes. The dialogue 'within' that compactness is not at all denumerable. That could be a fairly antique problem; it certainly isn't all based on irony either; one continues to enumerate in some way the Darwinian ancestors of one's discourse. There remains the task of ridding ourselves of bivalence with the prospect of (say) a lack of confidence in our historical supposition:

We're left with some odd problems of-and-for ideology, but they certainly do not constitute a fog. Bivalency is in fact a non-arbitrary 'complexity' for a . Even its expression is seen at the moment by some as a supervaluation of (reference to) a synchronic (failing everything else) dialogical stem. The nagging thought about this is that no disjoint item (mode of production, in fact) in the stem can contribute to its 'parent' point of production's transformation. The possibility of $[a/\beta/\gamma]^a$ is not feasible unless one can countenance a less than full-blooded point of reference. (Surely given that classical problem one doesn't (or refuses to) engage in the teleological end(s) of discourse.) But a valuation space can hardly be arbitrary in any way. Perhaps transformations are possible only with respect to the quantification of the whole discourse space - $\mathcal{H}a^a(a)$. (We too are waiting for the next instalment.) ...

GOOD EVENING ... IT'S MODERN AMUSEMENTS TIME AGAIN

To set up the conditions for demonstrating ideological change, consider a point of production as something that designates rigidly. (We've suffered by the execrable quasi-collectivist notion of 'membership' and sub-membership of classes (of ideology). This is not anti-intentionality, but we know too well the dangers in alleging that 'understanding' rests solely on (subjectively) privileged asymmetrical relations - in reflections of reality profound only via the infinity of truisms (only if you can convince someone that you've got Zeno's stop-watch-for-dialogue with you).)

In relation to the Spinozoid partition of the distributive members of a class, an iterative point of production will be a unique point of reference; but historically an iterated point of reference \neq a unique point of production. Tokens and types again.

Most of this will be elliptical unless we start off with the issue of privileged asymmetry. But this isn't a suggestion for making a generalization on the 'communism' involved in hitting the (moving) dialogical 'target'. Some conversations are anomalies or appear anachronistic. Most of them are anathema. (However, one can get anxious over where to begin. 'Symmetry' has got to be raised up as a function of change ... as a critique of dialectical change. As a function of historical conditions, which are always teleological conditions, the latter's purport is reflexive. Revision-or-reformism issues can be dealt with bearing in mind the non-fetishized character of that reflexivity. Class conflict isn't a job for the social sciences ... etc.)

The birth of phenomenologicalizing social (sic) sciences came about as a profound misunderstanding over the Kantian conception of synthetic a priori, i. e., 'peculiar intuitions' of time and space. Perhaps we would want to argue that most (social/political) sciences are reflexive but not progressively so - apropos the class consciousness as both function and product of ideology-practice. (We shall probably have to return to the great rigid designator.) The reflexivity of discourse is an historically dynamic symmetry. We return to iterated points of reference (a de-notation possibility) because we're not the purveyors of a mystical hermeneutics of that symmetry.

Consider two iterations standing (alone) as the partition of ideology's compactness via the transformation of those iterations. N. B. the oblique point of reference is transformed into a cultural-social position. There is another form (sic) of transformation here - obtaining a social and historical relationship with other reiterated points of reference (cf. permanent cultural change).

Symmetry (of a kind) is the life of ideo-practice transformations. A privileged transformation, in any of its smug and/or epistemological guises, is an idealization of maintaining an outside-inside-the-cultural-domain distinction. It is an idealization simpliciter, approaching a subjectivistic 'authenticity'. An alternative is 'outside' = supervaluation of ideology.

But idealization problems don't simply rest on failure to catch significant points of reference for the 'algebra'-grammar. The point is you don't catch glimpses of the grammar of ideology between supra-social (dialectical?) changes in practice. Nor can the glimpses be supra-social. Anyway the following is pretty well tautomeric ... any observations are reflexive historical iterations - transformational reiterations - and as such are partitions of

the ideological whole. An additional point of production? The scale issue is pretty well otiose, however.

Any 'valuation' dialogue (in an informal sense) will rely on a very strong prejudice vis-à-vis 'the existence of a whole'. To add on (growing) conditions of change (some may say) is to get out of the (over) determination of reflexion ... or approaching a(n over) determinism. Unique sets of points of reference - as points of production - return to deal with the pseudo-division of ideo-practicé (holism).

A funny sort of model ... we want to start with paired iterations, initially, to go-on to (or dismiss) the possibility of macro-points of production ... i.e., a complex, unique set of points of reference. Neither 'it's just an activity' nor 'it's a transformed (dialectically) unique, i.e., non-reflexive, point of production activity' should come up.

The paired iteration production points have two non-idealized relations ... i.e., they're unbound relations 'within' and 'to' the dreaded ideo-whole. They have to be strange and strained relations. Well, most importantly, they are practice (practical) relations that reflect ideological-instrumentalism of (say) 'slogan adaptation' (in spite of there being some funny stuff in that). (Remember the "axiological" iteration' above; it's not an ethics (vis-à-vis a whole).) We may be able to set up a demonstration model (?) of the historical transformations 'within' the pair - but we're not prepared, surely, to set those designators up as an inside-outside underprivileged set of iterations? That would be very reactionary anyway as a 'demonstration'. It is a contributing member ... 'within the pair'.

The point of production designator-practice will look, for the moment(?), something like:

$$\begin{array}{c} it^{\alpha} \dots it^{\beta} \\ \vdots \\ \text{reit} \end{array}$$

Or a permanent change-pair:


$$\begin{array}{c} \alpha t^{\alpha} \\ \vdots \\ it^{\beta} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \beta \\ \alpha \beta \end{array}$$

(You don't know where to start again do you?) Things have to be much more complex than may be suggested here. The dialectical resonances aren't simply between α and β , whoever they may be, or whatever they may be called. Let's not get fixated with the dia-logische- and diachronic - aspects of the possibility of a point(s) of production as two possible equipollent points of reference. We require something much more complex than that. At least the ideo-practice has a different Kultur interface of multiple contributing members of the compact set.

Someone might recommend that we carry on spreading the word about compactness: 'bad faith' simply couldn't cope with that. We might face our own-claims on (to) the socio-dialectical problem. (N.B. this is not an initial expression of a new sociology for the TUC - practice-designators will transform historical needs.)


But hang on: the dubious diachronism might get sorted as an ideological decision via (an) iteration (even in a Fred Engels way) which is a strategical model of 'the next' ideo-whole (Zeno again). What about the neighbouring iterations through practice? Forgetting for a moment the half-worries some may have over $\{it^{\alpha} \rightarrow \text{ideo-whole}^{\beta}, \dots\}$ as sui causa, consider the partition of the 'ideo...practice...' in relation to it^{α} 's-neighbours. They are (only) putative neighbours for (and of) it^{α} . That may be part of the historical reflexivity

and a recognition of it^a 's co-functionality with it^b in relation to ideological practice. (That may be a partial generalization for strident iterations. Class instantiation - 'solidarism' - never should (have) be(en) expressed by '=' between members alone, or '=' as a condition for a high degree of reiteration - a well distributed set of historical functions between members of the set.) One does not want to suggest commitment to a single point of production and then judder on to another single point. it^a is a cultural, etc.; but as we have each fragment of practice having the same logical conditions (sic) as every other fragment, we are dealing simply with matters of 'scale' (someone said). No, not 'gathering' conditions for a Volks-change. If we go back to our assumption about the grosser possibilities of (re) iteration, we're not haying, say, multi-wholes. That'd be a reactionary, asymmetry-grabbing ploy. Not only is there a possibility of an historical or teleo-reflexive nexus - a co-indexicality. But a co-functionality? Anyway, the (theoretically) naive 'world' in ' $it^a < \omega$ ' (sic) would be too full of denotative holes not to allow cross-functionality. No, the latter has to be transitive - enumerative not denumerable. A 'history':




Notwithstanding gilt frames, press on. This has nothing to do with a Logik of ... We should look at the above diagram as a vague historical story ... ' ω^a ' is the phantom of this opera, or it appears as an unnatural break with someone thinking that 'determinism' for $it^{\beta a}$ is attached. Just remember the above; it will have a dia-functional, historical relationship to future $it^{\beta a}$'s. Isn't it ludicrous to start 'here' as it were; there's not an initial expression except ... back to pairs. Let all expressions be $[it^{a\beta}]$. Don't forget this isn't a rigorous holism. Most expressions won't appear as iterations. They will have a very short historical life or natural relationship to another as a partial reiteration, or the para-structural partition of $\langle \omega \rangle$ ideo-practice will be parasitic on it^a . One of the tribulations of demonstrating [class structure \longleftrightarrow class action] is that very problem of partitioning.

A condition of transformation compactness relative (always to it^k) to ... a history:



No, forget that; that was supposed to be about names-sentoids being 'clearly' cross-mentioned in relation to the ideo-worlds of bits of indirect discourse. O.K., they are opaque, but that is based on a distinction we'd not want to make: transparency/'directness' claims are ludicrous. We're trying to deal with ideo-practical satisfaction in the middle of further ideo-worlds and 'historical iterations'. Anyway, the historical iterations don't line up as a manifold in anything like the above ... enter BxS ; $BxS^{it^a} \longleftrightarrow it^a$. That's got to be symmetrical and transitive, with some odd things included. $R it^a \longleftrightarrow BxS^{it^a} \implies it^\beta$ - is something said. It can't just be:



No conditions of conflict are to be found in this dialogical model - it's no demonstration of what takes place when something's being said and in 'saying'.

'Inside-outside' the ideo-practice might be salvaged as class interest vis-à-vis a filtered reiteration. It^R, therefore, ideo-practice (here) a mediatory treatment of the universes of discourse? Recognise it^a's are ideo-practice instrumentalities. They furnish, perhaps, a way of dealing with para-dysfunctional aspects of all ideo-practice, i.e., to some extent a way of dealing with iteration itself. A tactical logic of the varieties of unsatisfiability of it¹ - it² is required.

FOR THE B.B.C.: A VISUAL DESCRIPTION OF ...

Going-on - as 'reality': the dialogic ... goes into 'design'. *Natura facit saltus*. 'Monosémie' is really a bore isn't it? Cf. below. Good poster design won't perfect reality too much. The dialectical form of a dialecteme is the particular space (slot) containing the (a) filler. This involves the presupposition that there is a slot for a 'slogan' (Slog for short). Slog ... or mythos ... 'ideo' ... (what?) is not so different from a 'word' - vis-à-vis culturation. Perhaps Slog - is the smallest unit we can legitimately consider (BxSBy). Slogs are 'unitary' (i.e., they're complex-simplex in a sense). That they may fill ideo-practical space in a quasi-unitary way might be thought to be the 'syntax' to the morphemics of going-on. The filler = the stretch of material that fills the slot, i.e., an allegedly 'given' position (GP). And the filler is composed of not less than (what?) one structural item. You might say that it is or might be 'composed' of a filler-out of conventional syntax.

A complex Slog (?) + GP constitutes a Slog(eme)/dialegame. The form of a (DSlog₁) is the particular given position, as the 'expression' of some functional connection to some other (DSlog_x).

A $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \leftarrow \\ \rightarrow \end{array} \right. B \left. \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ \leftarrow \end{array} \right. C$ There are three positions - from some point of view there must be.

Morphological variations of the fillers are of no concern.

A = *Slog₁ ~ GP₁* - i.e., the postulated given position containing its Slog.

Slog₁ ~ GP₁ = postulated *Slog₁*

C = *Slog₃ ~ GP₃* = postulated *Slog₃*

So, *Slog₁* ← /represent a 'formal' conflict (i.e., an idealized conflict)/ → *Slog₃* where A and C are implied.

An iteration here might be thought to illustrate the issue - time and again index I = some iteration - a mediation perhaps. Slog expresses functional connection ... O.K. ? We talk about 'form' in an oblique way. Form of a 'Slog' is token ← to type, or something very like it. What if A is translated into B? That is to say, from the point of view of Reich des Sollens (RDS), there is no contrast - qua expression of functional connection. In fact, they all have a unique or contrastive property, i.e., a non-Reich des Sollens uniqueness. That may be cultural.

But how about: Slog T¹ / Slog T² / Slog T³? 1 = 2 RDS ... contribution - as functional - connection expression. But they are disjoint - hence non-RDS - life-uniqueness. Now can iteration be coped with analogously (e.g. ≡ RDS)?

So we postulate RDS and congruence rules. Are they cultural? RDS must be 'ideology'? Opacity of conditions perhaps. RDS → 'as - slogans' is the key no doubt ... cf. hanging about with Parsonian pictures and a 'translation' would also be RDS - identical - obviously - given 'ideology'a.

Consider Slog₁ = Slog₂ = Slog₃: identity will always fuck us around, or, with a plea about orthographical sameness, we might replace '=' with '≠' just there. Go-on extending the list: Slog₁ '≠' etc. as translation dependent; '(Slog₁ ≠ Slog₂)', etc. morphologically. So what? But -

RDS says '='
~RDS says '≠'

How would you go about displaying this?

We can say that 'given position' is a signal of functional connection, confronts Slog as a signal of functional connection, without committing anybody to having a French accent. The idea of 'slots' as substitutable versus the idea of Slogs as substitutable could make the dialectic look orthographical. Slogan-ing is not a new notational possibility; Slog-Slog relations would be able to express 'BxS' functions however.

'Strive to unify life and culture' is 'stulc' for short; pretend it's a slogan. stulc → 'stulc' might be construed as social action, not simply a nexus for some sort of practical display of logical construction. Going-on must be:

{ ['stulc']
↓
[stulc] }

What does the gap between look like in the slogan pair?

Slog ... → ← Slog suggests the ambiguity that's focussed in the Drang of iteration.
What about ... Slog ... ?
... Slog ...

A sort of formalism may be inescapable in certain dialectic projects. We are bound, for example, to embed $a \rightarrow b \rightarrow '...'$ in lots of clever-looking Kunst or homely picture-making.

An index of correctness as a correct slogan has a correctness vis-à-vis 'going-on.' When a relation of successive correction exists between 1^1 and 1^2 , we might want to construe it as a filtering relation; I don't exactly know what sort of filtration, however. We don't want a problem of tableau running-up with respect to Slog. Slogs must be incitationally non-vacuous: they are, consequently, never absolutely complete, however compact the determinative ideological space is. Do we say that they are asymptotes of some epistemology? I hope not. Slogs do seem to have a more intricate infrastructure than I seem to suggest; they introduce vividness into ideological pictures.

Problem: find a way of doing without the idea of 'equivalence' when dealing with ideological 'effectiveness' ... at a stroke. There's some way that this would be a suggestion for a non-bourgeois condition of rationality

— Slog }
— stulc }
— Slog }
— stulc }

stulc = ... v ... = ... $1 \neq \dots^2$, or 'life and culture without poets'. How do we deal with someone who says that slogans are very simple items - propositions that are believed-and-you-can-forget-about-the-intricacies-of-what-propositions-are-like? Logic and the lack of it come up, but the attendant epigrammatic conventions must be avoided - i.e., self-activity is not going to emanate from self-conviction à la chit-chat-of-Zarathustra. What might a translated slogan look like? In practice, a form of transformation is unavoidable if you're looking around to see what the others are doing.

Slog ¹	R	Slog ²
Slog ¹	≠	Slog ²
token ¹	≠	token ²
type ¹	=	type ²

next Slog ...

A slogan is some sort of intermediate occurrence - both vulgar and accidental.

A $\overset{\leftarrow}{>} B \overset{\leftarrow}{=} 'B'$ B $\overset{\rightarrow}{>} A \overset{\rightarrow}{=} 'A'$

A B

We ask how this may be completely iterated where we have the self-image of those engaged in dialectic; we must produce a more than diagrammatic phenomenon by one day.

Someone might want slogan-izing to be like crazy syntagmatics. As a basis of slogan projectivity, we might introduce the sloga-morph as pertaining to Slog syntax and considered in the context of syntactics. Sloga-morphics would be the process of transferring morphic material into the full slogan-dialectical context.

Consider FREE DES WARREN:

• Slog(pos(ition)₁) context • \leftarrow same functional property \rightarrow • Slog(pos₂) context •
 and similarly for transcendental idealizations of this, where • Slog • is a common term for the same slogan (filler) and position₁ is substitutable for position₂. a₁ \leftarrow \rightarrow a₂, etc. These are like allo-slogans in free variation. But slogans are not-capable of free variation. Well ... consider a circumstance in which you might consider a set of slogans equivalent.

A* B C
 B* A C

The functional properties of B are not the same as A's in some circumstances; but qua slogan(s) they may be. Accept that they are, and that the acceptance is defensible. What if they are both members of a closed set? Consider further that, although morphologically distinct, these items could be (both) Slog(•••), since they are both substitutable in given position₃, i.e., are correct slogans. But this is only a sort of quasi-syntactic conventionality, isn't it?

A correct slogan will exhibit no 'given position' substitutivity except in a transcendental idealization. That's it ... going-on is better than gathering together a muddy dialectic.

THE REQUIREMENT THAT ONE SHOULD SEE HIS 'WORK' AS 'IN' THE DIALECTIC OF conflict is replete with problems. The requirement is, however, substantial.

Shows of old ... to new work are, at best, congeries of putative high points - non-vivid, i. e., detail-less samples as illustrations (sic) of a 'development' or some similarly art-schoolese myth. Things (as robust as you like) are imported, but being durables, are untransformed. There is, presumably, supposed to be a constant base set of allegations, prehensions, etc. Infernally, transformation is meaningless, i. e., external and unproblematic. Our approach essentially opposes this; at the same time, one still wants a possible point of production to have some sort of practical stability as a 'filled' ideological space ... for a moment ... no more.

It's going to be hard for us to end up with anything that looks like an even surface - but this is not exacerbated by the projective consideration that relations between direct and indirect discourse (ideo-practice, etc.) are going to show and have to be taken into account.

Retrospective art shows are invariably silly and pointless. They represent the non-dialectical pervading hiatus of art production. Artists connive at them so as to build up an earnestly sought and compulsively husbanded 'reputation' ... 'distinction' (art-schoolese again). Dealers like them because, in their expropriation, they can give the illusion of doing what they imagine their job to be.

We are not to be trusted: past and present and ... production is not and has never been a linear formality; we have attempted to exercise an incredulity with respect to past (and etc.) absurdities; we have seen ourselves as distributed functions of socio-historical practice. These points of reference (here, somewhat oversimplified) are commercially inconvenient and ontologically insecure and untidy. To be secure and tidy, you've got to be a liar. Most artists are liars; class liars and historical liars, the fixers of gentlemanly privatism. Old and new work art shows are the paradigmatic display of the privatist modality.

How do we stop ourselves from being Cretans? The answer is an old problem, viz. to sort out the dialectic of where the work is supposed to be able to function - and this - in relation to the complex indices of sociality and ideology. The 'catalogue' may extend the dialectic that the paper on the walls diagrammatizes.

GOOD MORNING ... OLD-FASHIONED AMUSEMENTS

A law of teleological explanation is always 'a \rightarrow ' from 'BxS⁽⁰⁾ \rightarrow ' (somehow) ...

$$BxS^0 \xrightarrow{\beta} BxS^1 \xleftarrow{\alpha} BxS^2$$

A	A'A'	A'A''A'
A	'(A)A'	'(A)'A'A'
A	(A ⁰)A	(A ⁰)'A'A
{A...}	{'A'...} 1	{'A'...} 2
A ⁰ /A ¹	A ¹ /A ⁰	A ² /A ⁰

It's all meaningless, but it gets a tick and a star.

'(?)' BxS⁽⁰⁾ is paired with any selection of A.

$$A... (N) A^0... 'A... (N) 'A^1... \dots A^1... 'A... (N) A^2$$

Darwinian descent or a complete iterative indexed history with no transitivity? What's the point? 'The slate is wiped clean' (dialectically) is an absurdity, BxS¹ \rightarrow BxS² is a triviality. (N. B., — M \rightarrow .)


The fallacy of BxS¹'s independence - and its possible reduction to BxS⁰ might be considered in the light of the above - Darwinian descent vs. aggregations - on the phenomenological pathway.

$$\begin{aligned} (A)S^0 &\leftarrow S^1 \rightarrow S^2 \leftarrow S^3 \rightarrow S^4 \leftarrow \dots \\ (B)S^0 &\leftarrow S^1 \rightarrow // \leftarrow S^2 \rightarrow // \leftarrow S^3 \rightarrow // \leftarrow S^4 \rightarrow // \dots // \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} (A)S^2 &= (S^1 \rightarrow, \leftarrow S^3) \\ (B)S^2 &= (S^1 \rightarrow, \leftarrow S^2 \rightarrow, \leftarrow S^3) \end{aligned}$$

GRAMMAR?

What of the existential-to-phenomenological shift in (BxS¹ \leftarrow BxS²)?
(Token Type): Obviously.



But there's no BxS on its own. It appears reasonable to invoke Earl Haig's axiom (diluted): for some BxS¹, there will be at least one other BxSⁿ (at some time) ... oh well.

Again, it all depends on what BxS is. It's a vector, i.e., "'a" \rightarrow t', and sometimes it 'performs' BxS¹(Bxal). BxS¹ is in fact parasitic upon BxSⁿ (etc.), although, groan, it's not of the same type.

Why don't we ban zero on the ledger? There's no BxS⁰. Is {BxS¹ \leftarrow BxS²} intelligible without any iteration on the Bxal ledger? Forgetting the in-the-limit selection restrictions, isn't BxS¹ \leftarrow BxS² a token and type change - from the experience to the original designer?

Again, what's ' \rightarrow '? Perhaps it's an intensive ideo-something.

When you have success with ' \rightarrow ', ' \rightarrow ' fails.

$A \xrightarrow{\text{token}(0)} A \xrightarrow{\text{token}(1)}$; one problem is how to translate such items into BxS ... without a theory of reference; $BxS^1 \leftarrow BxS^2$ must be relegated to ($\dots \leftarrow BxS^1$) or nothing.

Whither $\{BxS^0 \xleftrightarrow{ } BxS^1 \xleftrightarrow{ } BxS^2\} \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{token} \\ \text{type} \end{array} \right. ?$

We might ask what we're saying ... Possibly that a theory of Darwinian descent-cum-reference may succeed for tokens, but there will be a failure in relation to type ...

\leftarrow type \rightarrow . Is this splitting-up of the vulgar and the accidental o.k.? Tokens are not accidental. $BxS^1 = \text{token}$; $BxS^1 \rightarrow$ (etc.) = token (to token) \in type, or a product of type. Multiply the operations times two: a = 6 (token); a = 6 (type > BxALM ledger limit) ... and expect them at some time(s) to be concurrent...

$A \text{ (token } \Delta \text{ type) (token } \Delta \text{ type)}; A \stackrel{\bar{\bar{}}}{\&} A$
 $\text{(token } \epsilon \text{ type)}; A \stackrel{\bar{\bar{}}}{\&} A$

'CCCP
"CCCP is — " \rightarrow SLOG'
'KCCP (\neq CCCP)
"CCCP is — " \rightarrow '

BxS ... as a leap, or BxS ... as a gradually rising leap?

WE MIGHT WANT TO WALK INTO OVER-COMPLEX ITERATIONS, JUST LIKE A LOT OF madmen cutting something out of B. Venet's mathematical textbooks. It's notions like 'the spread of ideas' that seem dianalytically tantalizing: 'iteration of discourse - transformed' sounds like a start - but there's more to it. Slogans are very quickly transformed into what, to all intents and purposes, is indirect discourse. How are slogans iterated obliquely and dialectically (if slogans per se be iterable)? Hasn't the dialectic got something to do with a direct form of discourse designed to pin down what happens in history? It's an over-simplification to think of lists as just lists, just compiled recursively. It's just a hopeless, behaviourism to consider that ideological production equals indices attached to probabilities.

We want to get species of 'slog ----> ideology' as believable practical 'identities'. There's an idealism in praying and working for non-spurious socio-historical evaluative chatter; we might want to talk about anthropocentric idealism when considering complex practices in terms of possible iterative solids. A solid looking like a $(K \times U \times U)$ Cartesian product, or what? We could continue to exploit BxS/BjS and forget the noetics of overdeterminedness.

More unsightly graphics: $\langle A \rangle, \langle B \rangle, \langle C \rangle, \langle D \rangle, \langle \dots \rangle$. It's a name ... no it's not, it's a description of the form 'the so-and-so'. The conventional ideas of modal logic where they include 'worlds', etc. are mostly irrelevant as they stand ... still clarification compulsive, filling the world with insubstantial examples. Everyone needs encouragement to stick with an inspection of the mesostructure.

a b c d e f
' $1 \times 2 \times 1 \times 2 \times 1 \times 2$ ': what's the proportion of 1's to 2's when faced with the hypothesis $\langle 1, 2 \rangle, \langle 1, 2 \rangle?$ ' is hopeless as a way of tracing a practice on the basis of points of production.

Sloganizing your own work occasionally presents you with linear alternativensess relations = caricatured: 'what you say versus what you think'(?); 'Consciousness' in the context of 'the spread of ideas': a reflexive revolutionary perspective is partially idealist; one reflects reality because he has to because of history, perhaps. Someone might argue that the conditions of iteration are in some ways a mirror of the conditions for freezing history, i. e., the conditions of history's compactness.

Looking at samples: 'Bxal...Bxal...Blank/Blank, Blank...' explicit Bj's-(somewhere); what's a graphisme for going-on-formally like? Bx/Bj sampling is far too facile, but it looks like a good way to set up an apparat for slogans to look dynamic.

'One picture is worth a thousand words or half a "Life of Trotsky"' is all very well, but a picture of what, where?

There are further complexities in the compactness issue; it's a fair question whether they reflect concatenation ----> iteration, or are reflected in it.

HISTORICALLY PROPER NAMES

What's the maximum logical propriety for dealing with your own history? It might be argued that a sort of reflexive (or reflective?) iteration of diagrams gets over, or shows a way of getting over, our problem of definiteness: 'slogans given the virtual impossibility of language'. Oh, such a terrible beauty. Here's your chance to instantiate 'the necessity of slogans in modern art'. At the same time, surface is still surface - at least noetically.

Our concatenation dialectic might purport to cope with something as homely as 'the spread of ideas'; whatever they may be. We might ask at what point we can forget the question whether or not it's a piece of reality (and defend the amnesia). Suddenly we're going to be using 'iteration' in a funny way that reflects our 'concatenation'. It's funny how nature afflicts us with a non-indexical perspective. Dopplegangerishness is a feature of iteration.

1	2	3	4	5	6
slog a					
1	2	3	4	5	6

Slogs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
 and (slog) slog a n
 || †
 (slog) slog a 1

This congruence looks resonant.

Discovering and marking ambiguities is sometimes an historical activity. Historically, however, ambiguities are often alleged to be epistemic gaps in the interpretation of authorities. Fanatical mono-denotationalism is no achievement at all. Our history occurs for us vulgarly or opaquely or ungrade (obliquely). Now, consider occurrences that one might consider historically opaque: one might, at some point, say that they are eccentrically historical ... historically eccentric. Those that aren't opaque we may want to call historically-conventional - or standardly historical. ('...historical' and 'historically...' - do they connect, and how?) Both types are historical in some way, and both of them are ideological in some way also. No very special theory is required except insofar as disambiguation is feasible. Mono-historicism - as a fanaticism - is crazy historical positivism. And as a corollary of this, there can be no mono-denotationalism for historical production of iteration. Obliquity (mediatedness) indicates, to some extent, an ambiguity in history and in discourse ... but how?

'Oh, it's all quotation marks - so that historio-ideological complexes and occurrences of retrospection are all self-denoting' is far too schematic, but it's diagrammatic of a region of the area of concern. One thing to avoid is a fixation with orthographic accidents as a logical or technological saturation of one's history. It's also silly to think that you can seal-off history as ideological '... and then...' - ideological Humeanism(?). Perhaps our philosophical vulgarism is more direct than we thought.

We can be fixated by chatter about works, 'occurrences', histories and genres of (these and other) objects, and thereby get ontologically superannuated and endowed. That's to say, we can regard ideo-iterative indices (perhaps, 'scenarios') as occurrences of production technology (?) and stay secure, or we can think of (and treat) and mark as best we can some ideo-iterative scenarios as meanings and learn how to go-on despite the insecurity.

$SLOG^P \longrightarrow SLOG^P \longrightarrow$; this is peculiar, even if you hadn't noticed.

How can you import subjective ambiguity into slogans and keep them slogans? Opacity is entertained, but its demonstration may depend on our/your sophistication vis-à-vis description. Less peculiar (i. e., less an issue that's overwrought with taking thought) is the surface-surface dialectical-technical problem of just going-on. Ex-ing (cf., etc.) is, in this connection, a sort of overdetermined dialectic.

Is iteration (insofar as we discuss it in a peculiar way) a phenomenon that admits of natural-observation treatment? At no point do we want to slide into academic-type discussions of 'internality' and 'externality'.

$Slog^1 = Slog^2$, but (x's iteration) $Slog^1 \neq Slog^2$; $Slog^1(\text{ia}) = Slog^2(\text{ib}) \dots$ and all the rest. And it's not all flogging orthography to death.

This all might be a display of intension difficulty. Alright, we know that - but wherewith slogans? How does one avoid the apparent necessity of a reduction to extensionality? A demonstration, to some extent, presupposes a reflexive description: 'work'. Straight (i. e., linear) iteration will always look like Begriff-Kunst cowardice - or cleverness - or no problem at all. And for that matter, so will linear transformation - most of the time:



' will leave us obtuse.

The problem is to try to avoid unsightly semiology with its embarrassing bulges and unnecessary bending. Consider, e. g., a 'soft' translation of certain possible functions: a) 'Somebody attends an exhibition; he thinks we think ...; p... is in our history (e. g., connected as y in Bxal-Byal), with a slog on a greater scale (socially); but it's not complete. And it's abstract from the point of view of considering its historical 'target', indexed by us, potentially to them (and not us(?)).' b) 'The participant(s) or respondents that there can be additional material-information of the subject ... and so-on.'

ALPHABET OF LENIN - INTERMEDIATE PARA-STRUCTURES

We have gone on about surface versus depth in relation to the conditions of an entelechy and not too obvious rules of congruence ... and that does bear on the issue of iteration and reiteration in (say) 1Bxals¹, 2Bxals¹, etc. Something else that is none too clear is the historical function of (semantical(?), ideological) width, neighbourhoodness for an iteration. The problems here might have accrued from a substitution fixation - or fixedness - as a mediation for what occurs naturally. BxS¹ is under-rehearsed and, as dialogical individuation, is underdetermining ... perhaps.

It might be argued that 'blurring' is not intermediate except in a Schillerian (interiorized (sic)) manner. But that is the problem of an aesthetic education ... the postulated alternative to capitalist rationality. BxS and its fellows are practical solutions in relation to a dialectical unity. The historical descent of BxS → is the condition(ality) of that dialectical unity. To avoid the idealizations of interiorized alternatives to gross Kultur mechanics/legislation 'unity' must be approached via a class and the 'contradictions' (whatever they may be) of that class as intensionality/endziel: a practical circumstance. (Something about 'gradualism'/'partialism' versus 'holism' might be culled from the following. And view the 'outcome' bearing in mind the assumption that BxS will be a partial expression of class-understanding and not an intensional or an extensional mystification of classes, sets, existenz, etc.)

We want to point out the important ambiguity of (for the moment) orthographic surface entities as demonstrators/descriptions (points of reference?). That is, designation is not as simple as the naturalness (of the occurrences) of dialogue would at first appear to allow. The 'morphological' issue may not be that clear, but we certainly don't want it to devolve into linguistics. The point about that is that we're not too concerned with 'reference problems' per se. A point of reference is a vulgar occurrence 'a', and that vulgarism is a peculiar generalization ... or there's no reference at all. The semantical way of 'call the ... 1' is a pseudo-intermediate ploy of the partialist's ideological practice ... take no notice of it. That is, the practice (and (all) dialogue) cannot generalize from moment/item to moment/item or from a set to sets. (Set of sets and self-reference, although supposed conditions of class-understanding, are not achieved in any obvious non-problematic way.)

The vulgar(ism) may be all we can have for type. The orthographical surface (accidental) is the filler for 'call the ... 1' and is resonant - with respect to what? Does that problem screw-up the distinctions required for mediatoriness? Yes. The accidental occurrences may have vulgarisms 'attached' (I hear you say). But both accidents and the vulgar will have neighbouring frames (something shall be said about that) which will not necessarily contain the 'next' (for that frame) iteration or the same interpretation. The point is the frames' relations (?) of sameness/difference will be determined, for token-token/type-token, etc., only by a postulated resonance.

Successive slogans are either non-contrastive with respect to their vulgarity and contrastive with respect to (a generalized) accidentality, or, etc. Non-contrastiveness would suggest an 'extensional' situation ... at the point of culture production where descriptions are made. To suggest Boolean frames for iterated states of non-contrastiveness for the resonances of reference (ideo-practice) is not what we want ... transitive mediations for (ad hoc partial) strategy. There is the problem of the ideo-practical telos¹, etc., as the resonance-Drang between contiguous points of production. 'Practicality' should be closely

attached to the neighbourhood vulgarisms (demonstrations/designations) as the product or residue of ideological asymptotes. Reference, etc., is practical and a non-idealization only through the growing historical set of 'interpretations' - hence, asymptoticness - which may have little to do with its incompleteness apropos extensionality. Neither the question of great vulgarity nor accidentalness is being considered here as a party and class issue (cf. 'generalizations' above). None of this is a clarification of the superstructural, nor is it a contribution (sine qua non) to the dialectical materialists' view of teleology.

Sort out functions from indices ... how? We won't succeed if what occurs in a fairly natural way is index self-reference (consider the NaturKultur). While we might suggest a sort of 'more or less' range for vulgar functions and accidental indices, and vice versa, that would not be, of itself, an ideological insight ... more a micro-sociology of knowledge relative to the (...) of degrees of ideological change. Again this is not 'superstructural' (cf. 'Self-Superseding Strategy ...' and 'Good Evening ...'). The vulgar may be considered the vanguard of the accidental - as 'radical change' - but it would be pretty daft ... except as going-on.

Idealistically, and that includes the unpleasant and unworkable Word and Object, the vulgar and the accidental are demonstration and reference respectively. But if there's no binding between these two aspects, how can we deal with bound pairs of either aspect? 'Quotation' and its inductive(ness) filtration: the quotation is bound in context (yawn) as ideological insight - a demonstration of future historical frames. Oh, that's resonant designation, is it? We certainly can't bother with Quantifying In, or quantifying in, these days (cf. inside-outside distinctions made elsewhere). 'In' would be rather like Joseph Schumpeter's political analysis: they only think social relations are like that but they know they aren't. (Yes, as absurd and trivial as that, and as awful as 'serving the community'.)

The accidental blurt has (or is) an illicit opacity, or a mystery. It is illicit, insofar as the vulgar (reference-demonstration-power-classes) of the natural base of dialectic is ignored. (We mean 'humanly natural'.) Basil Bernstein is a parasite on most Death-to-Ideology-partial-utilitarian strategists, and not the last to go up against the wall.

A legitimate claim for the occurrence of direct discourse, or of quantification 'in', might be based on the fact (or allegation) that there is a peculiar sort of frame, the boundaries of which are ideo-practically conflict-torn (= df. vulgar). But, even if it were substantiated, accidental(ist) mappings may be said to be functions themselves of ideological (frame) insight. All we wanted to say is that there is a natural form (forms) of designation, and that an intermediate between accidental and vulgar (not a mediation) would support a non-essentialist approach to cultural forms. Any other approach would face some problems of redemption - inclusion in drawn up deontic frames, or some mystification therein. 'Intermediate' occurrences are resonant in respect of vulgarity and accidentalness. And a non-intermediate 'x' is the continuity of ideological instrumentalism. And this, purely in relation to ideo-growth-practice ... of some sort of designation. An 'x' - a priori - as a function of ideo-practice 'within' some funny frames/classes = df. solidarism ... approaching slogans. Designation is congruent with something: obviously the functions of a class. Any sort of algebra of sets of functions gets lost in the ideo-practice production of reference (= designation); N. B., the indexical self-reference of those designations does not rely on a contradictory unity in some basic ('stem') paradoxes. There are many ways in which an index-designation may be determined by polar classes. But, anyway, in our heavily metaphorized circumstance, you wouldn't know any of them. Class-insight (or production) can't be seen as determined by its polarity to other classes in the compact space of ideology.

There isn't really a logic of compactness that we experience as natural designation. 'That's the logic of ... dialectics' faces the same issues of inside-outside, 'voluntarism' (in the Mannheimian social sciences). The phrase signals an obfuscatory half-view, and no matter how leftish-faith half-views are, they remain, a fortiori, conditions for bourgeois normativity. Gramsci was right once or twice.

DEAR STEFAN ...

(In 'Art-Language', Vol. 3, No. 2 a review was published of Marx and Engels on Literature and Art, edited by Stefan Morawski and Lee Baxandall. Stefan Morawski sent the reviewer a few pages of 'items for the conversation' by way of response. The following is a picture of an extension to this conversation. We would like to apologise to Professor Morawski for taking his name in vain, but he has focussed in an informal way some recurring concerns which may usefully be aired here.)

It may sometimes be that ignorance is a function of prevailing conditions of learning rather than a consequence of idleness. I was complaining then and am complaining now about the conditions I am expected to do my learning under. What your book offered was a kind of framework for guessing what kind of theory of art Marx and Engels might have constructed; however, an index-card mentality vis-à-vis the relationship between topic and subject just leaves everyone high and dry in the face of its Edwardian technology.

Having refused to put my mind on what I had identified as a single-line track to nowhere, I not surprisingly found myself out of phase with both the implicit and the explicit conclusions of your introduction. In connection with these conclusions, and in regard to what I feel is a fairly consistent theme, to whom is it important that Marx and Engels should have had 'good taste' in art and literature, or have been 'artistically cultured persons'? Presumably to the artistically cultured; isn't it possible that the 'remaking of Marx' mentioned in your letter has been done in your own image - a re-making of Marx in an un-Marxian spirit? 'How one does one's singling out determines what he singles out.' It might be of use to speculate on what the criteria were for the singling out in this case. If one or several categories of excerpts (from Marx's letters, manuscripts, etc.) were included then there must have been one or several categories of excerpts excluded. So ... what concerns should be ignored when we talk or learn about art? Does a consideration of what we exclude in our definition of art serve also to define what we mean by art?

One thing we've perhaps overlooked in this exchange is the class-connotation in Western use of the words 'artistically cultured': it just means posh and no artist worth knowing is. Have we a mistranslation? What are the dynamics of 'culture' in Poland? In the sixties we heard a lot about 'communism with a human face'. Firstly, this phrase embodies an insulting *petitio principii*; its widespread use in the West provides pathetic justification for the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. Secondly, this human face was the face of 'culture' in various forms. It is not unusual in the West to find art cited in mitigation of past and present regimes - a compensation for the unkindness of capitalist society. Artistic freedom becomes an index of freedom in general. 'France will never be a dictatorship because the President of the Republic loves literature', according to Eugene Ionesco.

If artists in Soviet Eastern Europe are discouraged from withdrawing into the kind of separated existence they lead in the West, then this seems from our standpoint a redeeming feature. It might mean also that 'dissidents' confront society, or the state, in a direct way unknown to us in the West. If the above remarks seem to demonstrate heartlessness and insensitivity towards your problems, consider how absurd it must seem to us to be warned gravely by such as you against the 'massive propaganda inculcation of the population through the arts' in a situation where the fact that most of us are denied even the opportunity to teach is not the work of a heavy-handed secret police (who might give us the opportunity for similarly heavy-handed response), but of the licit freemasonry of bureaucrats/heads of

departments who openly evince fear and mistrust of the effects of so much as an inculcation of scepticism among their students. We have in effect to speak so often to the empty air that remarks about the importance of art's separate existence seem like mocking echoes in a dark cave (Plato's perhaps?).

The idea of approaching, attempting to learn from Marx as an 'artist', still more as an 'artistically cultured person' seems absurd. On the other hand it seems to me inevitable and essential that we should approach the practice of art as a socialist art, notwithstanding the fact that certain explicitly Marxian theories have been internalised in such a way as to make them an implicit rather than an explicit part of the dialogic process - as in some Art & Language work in the past. In any attempt to confront theories of art with Marx's theories we have to take into account the fact that Marx's is essentially a theory of relationships between people. Thus one effect of considering art within a progressive framework would be that one is presented with the tasks of transition from art object towards (social) practice. The application of Marx's theory within the confines of art can certainly serve to show that the more absurd claims made for art merely sustain a 'thin domain of dreams'. The fact that exposure to other (non-Marxian) areas of theory tends to have the same effect testifies to the 'closed world' character which the practice of 'modern art' has evolved.

It seems to me that one of the most important differences between our respective approaches is demonstrated by the emphasis placed in your introduction on art as a fetish with a 'life' of its own, in fact a kind of 'sacred life' akin to 'human nature', which we interfere with at our peril. In contradistinction to this Hegelianising view, I'd say that art involved fundamental reference to people and that it sustains the insecurity attendant thereon. The idea of the separate life of art seems often to be held almost as an item of faith, as if the right to hold it were a kind of 'human right' to be fought for in the language of 1923 - as if it were the 'social content' and not the 'political form'. No doubt some people think that the tango is the latest thing - but to fight for the right to tango, thinking it's the latest thing?

Speaking of 'human rights', why do you assume that we know about the circumstances of artists in Eastern Europe? And what am I to make of your assumptions about the effect of this supposed knowledge on our attitudes to art and to Marx in the West? When your paragon (sic) Solzhenitsyn hangs about like Jeremiah at the gates of Nineveh, I think to myself, 'What a way to earn a living'. He can scarcely claim artistic immunity, or even semi-autonomy, for Gulag Archipelago, can he? Surely it must be clear that in fact he's not so much a prophet as a political scarecrow, and that he has both been duped by and been the dupe of both sides. To put it another way, how do you cope with the idea of Gulag as 'Book of the Month Club Choice', the blue-rinse topic of the week across America? Would you say that this tells you nothing about Solzhenitsyn or his work? (Some may want to go forward, others may actually wish to go back, but both will be called 'dissidents', and both are of equal use to the propaganda machine.)

For our part, how do we cope with the Chinese exhorting us to heed the words of Margaret Thatcher and ward off the Russian bear by closing our capitalist ranks in the EEC (Peking Review, June 1975)? Something reeks of opportunism on an epic scale. (A note on communications: there is a prevalent idea that world problems are sort of embarrassing misunderstandings, and that we Freischwebende Intelligenz are above all that. What bullshit.)

Nurses in England used to keep their charges in order with the warning 'Boney'll get you', long after the Napoleonic wars were over. Old ladies used to encourage frugal habits right

into the 1950s with the words, 'There's a war on, you know'. Their charges may come to see Boney and the nurse as two of a kind and may then happily disregard both.

Another thing I object to is having to do my learning confined within artificially constructed categories. Aesthetics is an artificially constructed category, but it has gained a spurious historical legitimacy. 'Marxian aesthetics' is as artificially constructed a category as 'Martian aesthetics' would be. If we insist on trying to construct an 'aesthetic approach' which would be in line with Marx's theories we have to start from the admission that this is 'modelling', as you put it. The construction of models is an activity which faces rigorous adequacy criteria. It is not an ad hoc and compulsive attempt to inflate the importance of a postulated Ptolemaic fit - which in any case is bound to be adventitious. What you've done is concoct a series of hopeful images out of your own art-loving snobbery. You may be inviting us to overlook the snobbery, but 'modelling' (even as a metaphor) is not cobbling-up a defence for saying what you like.

Cinderella's tasks and treadmills for young minds use up time that might be better spent in other ways. You say it is essential that we consider something which you identify as an ambiguity in Marx's approach to art: 'On the one side ... the Kunstlerische productive Gesellschaft, on the other towards preserving art as a semi-separate activity'. An historically schematic reification of a confusion in nineteenth-century Marx is not in itself the demonstration of a substantive ambiguity; while the difficulty is important, its meaningfulness and its amenability to action is vitiated by anachronistic and crystalline approaches to the dialectic. The postulated ambiguity is by no means located in one well-formed category; the distribution of function and the 'world' of imagination interpenetrate, but complexly...

Your wanderings through time are indeed like Solzhenitsyn's. (He uses the Russian storyteller's present tense. 'I am standing on the corner in 1925. Now I am standing on the corner in 1975.') At one time your book is an element-collecting historical work; in the next breath we must remake Marx, model, make crucial choices... Yes, we must, but not in the name of irrefutable scholarship. Have I got to believe you because you are a Professor? The question of what constitutes authority seems important here. The trouble with liberals is that they always identify themselves as underdogs, even when they are fairly obviously overdogs. In view of your avowed anti-totalitarian attitudes, your assertion of the doctrinal 'authenticity' of your interpretation seems strange. It reminds one of the compulsion felt by Stalinist intellectuals and scientists to demonstrate the conformity of data to (Marxist) theory. Here, where possibly we could have been at one, on the subject of the effect of 'authority' on human speculation, we are most apart.

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