HERBERT MARCUSE (1898–1979) is an internationally renowned philosopher, social activist and theorist, and member of the Frankfurt School. He has been remembered as one of the most influential social critical theorists inspiring the radical political movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Author of numerous books including One-Dimensional Man, Eros and Civilization and Reason and Revolution, Marcuse taught at Columbia, Harvard, Brandeis University and the University of California before his death in 1979.

DOUGLAS KELLNER is George F. Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education at UCLA. He is author of many books on social theory, politics, history and culture, including Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, Media Culture and Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity. His Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, co-edited with Stephen Eric Bronner, and book Media Spectacle is also published by Routledge.

CLAYTON PIERCE is an assistant professor in the department of Education, Culture, and Society at the University of Utah. His books include On Marcuse: Critique, Liberation, and Reschooling in the Radical Pedagogy of Herbert Marcuse (with Douglas Kellner and Tyson Lewis) and Marcuse’s Challenge to Education (with Douglas Kellner, Tyson Lewis and Daniel Cho). His latest book Education in the Age of Biocapitalism was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2013.
CONTENTS

Introduction
Marcuse's Adventures in Marxism
DOUGLAS KELLNER AND CLAYTON PIERCE 1

I Studies in Marxism
Review of Karl Vorländer’s Karl Marx: Sein Leben und Sein Werk 69
Value and Exchange Value 72
Recent Literature on Communism 74
Dialectic and Logic Since the War 82
Supplementary Epilogue Written in 1954 to Reason and Revolution 94
Preface to Raya Dunayevskaya’s Marxism And Freedom (1958) 98
Review of George Lichtheim’s Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study 104
Humanism and Humanity 106
Epilogue to Marx’s 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon 117
Afterword to Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence 123
The Concept of Negation in the Dialectic 128
The History of Dialectics 132

II Marxian Interventions
Marcuse on Cuba 153
The Emancipation of Women in a Repressive Society:
A Conversation with Herbert Marcuse and Peter Furth 161
Socialism in the Developed Countries 169
Socialist Humanism? 180
The Obsolescence of Marxism
Revolutionary Subject and Self-Government
Re-examination of the Concept of Revolution
Rat Marcuse
Letter from Inge Marcuse to Chancellor William J. McGill with Comments by Harbert Marcuse
FBI Report on An Essay on Liberation
Angela Davis and Herbert Marcuse
Conclusions on Science and Society
The True Nature of Tolerance

III Lectures and Interviews on Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment
Marxism Confronts Advanced Industrial Society
Obsolescence of Socialism
The End of Utopia
Discussion Between Herbert Marcuse and Peter Merseburger
Herbert Marcuse: Philosopher of the New Left
Varieties of Humanism: Herbert Marcuse talks with Harvey Wheeler
Revolution 1969: Discussion with Henrich von Nussbaum
ACLU Conference: May 21 1969
Interview with Pierre Viansson-Ponte

IV Letters, Testimonies, and Responses to Critics
Letter to Max Horkheimer
Correspondence with Raya Dunayevskaya, 1957
Correspondence with Raya Dunayevskaya, 1961
Preface to Franz Neumann, The Democratic and Authoritarian State
Soviet Theory and Practice
Letter to Karel Kosik
A Tribute to Paul Baran
On Changing the World: A Reply to Karl Miller
The Guardian, Reply to Critics
The Dialectics of Liberation and Radical Activism
Commentary on Henry Kissinger
Correspondence with Rudi Dutschke,
Jürgen Habermas, Letter to Herbert Marcuse

V Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution
Marxism and the New Humanity: An Unfinished Revolution
Interview with Street Journal & San Diego Free Press
Marx and Para-Marx on Capitalist Contradictions
Le Monde Diplomatique
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Interview with Herbert Marcuse by Gianguido Piani</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Marcuse in 1978: An Interview by Myriam Miedzian Malinovich</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Reification of the Proletariat</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protosocialism and Late Capitalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis Based on Bahro's Analysis</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Conversation with Herbert Marcuse: On Pluralism, Future, and Philosophy</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Marcuse Lead by Bill Ritter</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afterword</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Marcuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Throughout his life, Herbert Marcuse synthesized Hegelian, Marxian, and other currents of modern philosophy and modern philosophy in an attempt to reconstruct the Marxian theory in accordance with changes in the trajectory of modern culture, politics, and society. Marcuse maintained a critical and non-dogmatic approach to Marxism, seeing Marxian theories of history and society as indispensable tools for developing a critical theory of the contemporary moment. Interpreting Marxian categories as social and historical, he saw the Marxian theory as in need of constant revision and updating in the light of new historical and theoretical developments—just as Marcuse himself constantly updated and developed his own work in reference to existing social conditions, political struggles, and historical possibilities for a freer, happier, and more egalitarian society that could offer alternatives to the various systems of domination he mapped throughout his career.

As argued in previous volumes, Marcuse's theory and politics were marked by idiosyncratic and novel syntheses of philosophy, psychoanalysis, aesthetics, and critical social theory. The combination of these traditions directed Marcuse in his work toward human emancipation and social transformation that was constantly situated within a Marxian theory of
domination and emancipation in the present age. In this Introduction, we argue that Marcuse’s yearning for a utopian and emancipated society was an ever-present theme in his work and, as such, provides us today with an enduring legacy from which to draw upon to better understand evolved systems of domination and social struggles which in the twenty-first century have helped construct our current historical situation.

However, as is often wrongly assumed, Marcuse’s critical theory of society was not an overly negative or pessimistic one. For Marcuse, the concept of utopia presented normative visions of a good life and a good society and hopes for a better world. Marcuse and his generation were influenced by the utopian philosophy of Ernst Bloch, who in his three-volume work, *The Principle of Hope*, articulated systematic philosophical and political perspectives on utopia from daydreaming and fairy tales to alternative political organization such as Plato’s *Republic* or Sir Thomas More’s *Utopia*. In the contemporary historical situation, marked by social upheaval and insurrection brought on by the neoliberal restructuring of the global economic and political order, Marcuse’s concept of revolution as a totality of upheaval is decidedly relevant for critically interpreting the insurrections of 2011 from the Arab Uprisings through the Occupy movements and other struggles against global capitalism and state repression of the contemporary moment. It could be further argued that Marcuse offers an early theorization of what Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have called “multitudinal” resistance, or of John Holloway’s “crack capitalism” theses that have been developed in part by interpreting and learning autonomous forms of refusal to capitalism from emerging episodes of social rebellion.

---


From his ebullient 1969 *An Essay on Liberation* until his death in 1979, Marcuse was clearly engaged in conceptualizing autonomous yet interconnected social movements against capital, racism, sexism, and ever expanding forms of U.S. imperialism. Marcuse’s critical theory of society, we contend, is therefore best understood within Marxian theories of revolution and subjectivity that were constantly being informed and developed by Marcuse from the variety of insurrectionary movements that sprang out of the 1960s and 1970s, making his thought especially relevant to its era and ours.

Texts selected for this volume will show that revolution for Marcuse is conceptualized as a rupture with and overthrow of the existing social order through the development of economic, political, cultural and social relations that can create the conditions for a decisive break with the current neoliberal regimes of domination and social control. Hence, we want to ask in this volume what it means to read and think about Marcuse’s work in the neoliberal moment of capitalist development. As Marcuse’s critical theory was highly adept at identifying and analyzing the ways capitalist societies stabilized internal contradictions through new systems of domination and control, we argue that how Marcuse envisioned revolutionary social change in counterrevolutionary contexts is highly relevant in the neoliberal stage of capitalist development that now confronts the challenge of creating alternatives to capitalist and imperialist societies. For example, Marcuse’s critique and theorization of the Welfare/Warfare state helps underscore some of the signature characteristics of neoliberalism that multiple theorists have outlined, as well as differences between the advanced industrial system theorized by Marcuse and twenty-first century global neoliberal capital.

Yet the historic redistribution of wealth from the working and middle classes to an elite corporate oligarchy through the ongoing dismantling of Keynesian social policies from the 1980s into the present, the expansion of privatization, and profiting from ecological and social disasters—i.e. continued deregulation of the financial industry after the 2008 banking crash or the rebuilding of New Orleans for corporate gain—reveal a more predatory form of capitalism that was evident in the advanced industrial system theorized by Marcuse. Further, institutions and policies enacting neoliberal governing rationalities have also given birth to new types of technologies of control that have allowed

---


for the regulation of subjectivities within the population in new and powerful ways, especially in areas of health and education, that Marcuse's analyses of domination and control in capitalist and totalitarian communist and socialist states help elucidate. Arguably, one of the most damaging features of neoliberal rationality has occurred in the subjective dimension whereby a qualitative understanding of human beings as investment machines responsible for their own wellbeing based on their ability to make sound market decisions has emerged. Indeed, as Ulrich Bröckling has noted in his research on subjectivity formation in neoliberal societies "the individuals' approach to their own health as the consequence of decision regarding investment and disinvestment" leads to social and political environments built on an ethical imperative where "blaming the victim here rules: whoever is sick has not adequately looked after his health; whoever falls victim to an accident or crime ought to have better seen to his own security." 6

Thus one of the biggest challenges that has evolved in the move from an advanced industrial to a neoliberal society is a deepening of what Marcuse called forms of repressive desublimation—with the individuals' whole being integrated within the instrumental rationality of capitalist systems of domination and control, in which pleasures become intensified into forms of domination, such as addictive consumer sprees or obsession with media, sports, or other leisure activities. In short, shaping a subject's identity has become one of the most important targets of neoliberal governing strategies because human life itself has become a site of investment/disinvestment for corporations, governments, and institutions interested in extracting the most possible value from populations and the natural world. For example, current neoliberal educational reform policies frame students and populations as sites of potential human capital value (or as reserves of surplus labor power) to be used in a "race to the top" of a global economic competition. 7 Or, perhaps in a more direct sense, molecular and cellular material, as Donna Haraway and others have pointed out, have become the material base of exchange as the expansion of capitalist production desperately seeks new areas for market growth. 8 In this sense, both the school and the genetic

---


7 On the biopolitical dimension of the current neoliberal educational restructuring project in the U.S., see Clayton Pierce's Education in the Age of Biocapitalism: Optimizing Educational Life for a Flat World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

8 See Donna Haraway, Modest Mouse@Second Millennium.Female©.Meets_OncoMouse™ (New York: Routledge, 1997); When Species Meet (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press); and Sarah Franklin and Margaret Lock,
Introduction

start-up lab share in the neoliberal era what Marcuse understood to be the further integration of the human and natural worlds into the exchange and production systems of capital.

Constructing an emancipated society (and thus his theory of revolution) for Marcuse demands that not only the capitalist mode of production be rejected and all of its attendant institutional and cultural products of domination overthrown, but also that a “new human being” be produced that refuses at the biological level the “sick society” of late capitalism. In this sense, Marcuse’s understanding of revolution under intensifying forms of social and political control points to the creation of a societal condition outside the capitalist mode of production where an alternative ontology of human life can emerge. It seems to us that in a time when cellular materials of animals and humans have been turned into commodity exchange values, Marcuse’s call for “a new human being” based on alternative values to the ones constituting a “biocapitalist” society, where new technologies of control over life (both human and nonhuman) are rapidly expanding, is as important as ever. In other words, the biotechnological and bioscientific industries in general have fundamentally transformed what it is to be human (or an animal for that matter), and thus what can be bought, sold, and exchanged within the circuits of capital. Indeed, some of the most powerful economic sectors of the twenty-first century have been remaking the biological foundations of life through new forms of control and discipline that include the regulation of life at the genetic level. We thus argue that Marcuse’s project to reject the further integration of the biology of the human and natural world should be rethought in a “postgenomic” age whereby the “great refusal” now must include a critique of “biocapital,” or the advance of the capitalist mode of production into the molecular and genetic dimensions of life.

Against existing systems of domination and control, Marcuse envisages the formation of a new revolutionary subjectivity which instinctually refuses the values of the sick society that late capitalism produces. We shall therefore propose that Marcuse’s concept of revolution continues to be useful for conceptualizing the insurrections of the contemporary era precisely because it provides a normative vision of total social transformation based on the development of “new human beings” within increasingly technologically sophisticated counter-revolutionary regimes of systematic control, of which it provides a radical critique. Hence, we argue that there is an important biopolitical dimension to Marcuse’s work which, alongside Foucault’s later articulation and other critical theories, can be articulated to develop theories of domination and emancipation in the contemporary moment. For Marcuse, the concept of revolution entails both theorizing and practicing

Remaking Life and Death: Toward an Anthropology of the Life Sciences (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2003).
entirely new ways of life and he focused his work on radical critiques of the existing social systems of both advanced capitalism and the now-defunct Stalinist communism, seeking alternatives to the contemporary systems of oppression and domination. This aspect of Marcuse's retooling of Marxist theory and practice, a focus on how ultimately “life itself” is at stake in the brutally administered society, is particularly important in a time when the capitalist mode of production (buoyed by the promise of bioscientific industries such as genetic engineering and pharmaceuticals for example) is capturing more and more forms of life and turning them into commodified types of “biocapital” at an alarming rate.9

One of our central claims therefore is that Marcuse's advancing of a Marxist theory of revolution that considers how nonhuman and human life continues to be enclosed and folded into the circulation and exchange processes of capital is utterly timely. His dialectic of revolution in advanced industrial society has always been finely attuned to the ways in which science and technology in late capitalist society further pushes the domination of nature beyond previous limits—extending the market into more and more domains of life. As we are daily confronted by things like Monsanto’s “terminator seed” or the first genetically engineered animal made for human consumption, the AquAdvantage Salmon, Marcuse rightly stressed that revolutionary change must begin by rejecting the expanded instrumental reach of the “capitalist delirium” that aims to reconstruct life itself for market purposes.10 Indeed, currently the gene, molecules, animal material, and human life are subject to a kind of technological reconstitution of a higher order. Not only are the sexual drives of humans being reordered under new forms of technological control and consumption in late capitalist society, but the very biological basis of life is being reconstructed for market life.

Yet Marcuse's dialectical theory of revolution also illuminates how human social life gets further subsumed into the valorization process of capital through new advancements in technological control. In the sphere of education, for example, the dominant paradigm of human capital accumulation has almost

10  Cooper, Life as Surplus, op cit.
been completely normalized as the default goal of the U.S.A.’s educational system. In President Obama’s call to fix the U.S. system of education in order to “out-compete” the rest of the “flat world” in a “race to the top,” an evolved type of counter-revolutionary education has emerged under the various neoliberal restructuring projects currently taking place in the U.S. and other sectors of neoliberal capitalist growth. With education reform being pushed by the Obama administration to promote higher production of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) skills in the nation’s schools, what we are now seeing is a model of educational subjectivity that looks like what Adam Smith and John Stuart Mills called *Homo economicus*: the self-interested, entrepreneurial individual.

Education, fit within the dominant human capital framework, is one of the most important sites from which *Homo economicus* can make crucial investments to accumulate the most human capital (such as education in high-tech areas of labor) possible in order to be a competitive actor on a highly competitive global stage. It is clear that Marcuse saw such a future for institutions such as the university and school. In fact, in his review of Rudolf Bahro’s concept of protosocialism included in this volume, Marcuse essentially enumerates what has recently been called the hegemonic productive form of labor in late capitalist society “immaterial labor.”

Pointing to Bahro’s notion of “surplus consciousness,” Marcuse argues that:

in the highly developed capitalist countries liberation has become contingent on the spread of a form of consciousness that is rooted in yet at the same time transcends the process of material production. Bahro calls this “surplus consciousness” [Überschussiges Bewusstsein]. It is “that free human [psychische] capacity which is no longer absorbed by the struggle for existence” which is to be translated into practice. The industrial, technological-scientific mode of production, in which intellectual labor becomes an essential factor, engenders in the producers (the “collective worker”) qualities, skills, forms of imagination, and capacities for activity and enjoyment that are stifled or perverted in capitalist and repressive noncapitalist societies. These press beyond their inhuman realization towards a truly human one.

---

11 Thomas Friedman argues that contemporary neoliberal capitalism provides a “flat world” whereby everyone can compete equally in the global economy, an obviously ideological construct in a world dominated by powerful multinational corporations, nation states, and global capitalist institutions; see Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat. A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).

Marcuse then goes on to point out that:

in the subjectivity of surplus consciousness, compensatory and emancipatory interests are forced together into a unity. Compensatory interests concern mainly the sphere of material goods: bigger and better consumption, careers, competition, profit, "status symbols," etc. They can (at least for the time being!) be satisfied within the framework of the existing system: they compensate for dehumanization.13

In Marcuse's analysis of Bahro's intriguing concept of "surplus consciousness" two important points surface that show how Marcuse was thinking about revolutionary subjectivity (and its realistic possibility) at the end of his life when new forms of labor were compelling individuals to consume more education and training—in short, human capital investments.14 On Marcuse's account, intellectual forms of labor (immaterial labor) simultaneously produce a deeper level of repressive desublimation in individuals, but also "transcend" the process of material production. That is to say, intellectual labor is not chained to the factory, but takes place in new sites of production like the laboratory or, in our day, "flexible" work on computers. Here it seems that Marcuse may be suggesting that the revolutionary subject (who now contains a type of surplus consciousness) will need to figure out a way to transform the "qualities, skills, forms of imagination, and capacities for activity and enjoyment" that have been perverted in capitalist society and utilize them in a new expression of refusal that can produce new types of human and social life.

Bahro/Marcuse's critique of the manner by which individuals pursue "compensatory interests" as a way of superficially satisfying their new technologically constituted needs and satisfactions is also highly relevant for understanding how human subjectivity is regulated and constructed in late capitalist society. Specifically, Marcuse argues that as the dominant mode of labor in late capitalist society continues to shift toward an intellectual or immaterial basis, so too will new forms of repressive desublimation and resistance emerge. Currently, Marcuse's analysis of Bahro's notion of "surplus consciousness" can therefore be read as highly accurate when contextualized upon the terrain of a human capital based society where everyone is concerned with making the most rational, responsible, and highest rate of return investments for their socio-economic life. Thus Marcuse clearly

recognized how something like an emerging surplus consciousness within an intellectual-labor-rich society brings with it new forms of control and subjective imprisonment, as well as new potentialities for improvement and enrichment of human life.

Thus, Marcuse captures how new forms of biotechnology and information technology contain potentialities for human domination and social control and resistance and a utopian reconstruction of human life. This analysis takes place within a constant transformation and development of advanced capitalist society that is always generating new forms of social control, profitability, and potential for new forms of human life and society.

In this volume, we shall collect key texts that show how Marcuse’s appropriation of Marxism were of crucial importance to Marcuse’s work and continue to be relevant to contemporary critical social theory and radical politics. Part I covering “Studies in Marxism” collects reviews, articles, encyclopedia entries, and lectures, many unpublished, that document Marcuse’s commitments and understanding of key aspects of the Marxian theory and his own commitments to Marxism. Part II on “Marxian Interventions” collects transcripts of talks, interviews, and other texts recording lectures Marcuse gave, many previously unpublished, on occasions ranging from a Cuba protest meeting in 1962 to international conferences on Marxism and socialism in the 1960s to reflections on the emancipation of women in a repressive society and transcripts of Marcuse speaking in defense of his student Angela Davis when she was under attack by the state for her radical politics.

Marcuse, it must not be forgotten, was a political activist and radical as well as a scholar and writer. Thus Part III showcases this aspect of Marcuse’s life by collecting “Lectures and Interviews on Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment” which include radio talks, lectures, and public debates on Marxism and revolution during the 1960s and early 1970s when these controversies take center stage of political concerns and struggles during a tumultuous period of history. Part IV presents “Letters, Testimonies, and Responses to Critics” which demonstrate how centrally Marcuse’s own positions and politics were at the center of crucial issues and debates going on over the problems and future of contemporary capitalist and communist societies. Part V on “Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution” contains texts which acknowledge that the revolutionary aspirations and movements of the 1960s had given way to an era of counterrevolution in the 1970s, in which Marcuse saw institutions, practices, and discourses of repression and domination, that he had critiqued for decades, return. From this perspective, Marcuse anticipated the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, and other counterrevolutionary forces of the 1980s to which his own work provided instruments of critique and protest.

During the past several decades after Marcuse’s death in 1979, his work continues to be relevant in an era of globalization, developments of new
syntheses of capitalism and technology, new social movements and forms of protest and struggle, and new crises ranging from ecological disaster, democracy, and the global high-tech capitalist system itself. Critique and crisis were key categories of Marcuse’s work that developed theoretical analysis and criticism of forms of domination and oppression in contemporary societies, and which sought possibilities for political change and transformation in contemporary radical social movements. Here Marcuse’s thought often had a utopian dimension as when in *Eros and Civilization* he anticipated the counterculture and movements of the 1960s in a vision of liberation, emancipated sexuality, and joyful play written during the bleak Cold War period of McCarthyism in the conformist 1950s.

Marcuse also believed that Marxism itself had utopian perspectives on the future. For Marcuse, socialism represented another way of life, producing new emancipated and developed human beings who would deploy science, technology, culture, art, and other forms of production to enhance the human senses, the body and social relations, and life itself in a new society marked by cooperation, reconciliation with nature, peace, and a respect for all forms of life from animals and the wonders of nature to human beings. Marcuse also opposed the bureaucratic forms of communism produced by Stalinist social systems which he saw as oppressive as capitalism. As with Lukács, Korsch, Gramsci, and his colleagues at the Frankfurt School, Marcuse opposed a “scientific” and dogmatic form of Marxism for more critical, Hegelian and dialectical, and emancipatory forms of Marxism which attacked all forms of domination and militated for liberation. Marcuse also championed an activist form of Marxism in which theory was oriented toward practice and itself developed as new historical forms of practice and social life emerged.

We argue that Marcuse’s work, as exemplified in his major publications and the six volumes of the *Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*, of which this is the last volume, is highly relevant to the problems, crises, and struggles of the contemporary era. As in previous volumes, we are collecting texts of Herbert Marcuse that we think are important to understanding the full import and significance of his work and that are particularly relevant to contemporary political and theoretical issues. As in previous volumes, our focus is on unpublished and in many cases unknown material found in the Herbert Marcuse archive in Frankfurt, Germany, and in Douglas Kellner’s personal archive, that contains Marcuse’s own collection of manuscripts, lectures, letters, and research material. Similar to other volumes in *Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse* series, we have drawn on this material and classic and more recent Marcuse research to help develop a context for understanding Herbert Marcuse’s life and work, and in this Introduction will sketch out dimensions of Marcuse’s adventures with Marxism and utopia.

Since the beginning of the publication of the six-volume *Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse* in 1998, there has continued to be increasing global interest in Marcuse’s work, testified in part by the development of an International Herbert Marcuse Society with biennial global conferences
Introduction

and with the Fifth Biennial Conference taking place at the University of Kentucky on November 7-9, 2013. The previous conference “Critical Refusals” was held in 2011 at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, which featured Angela Davis as keynote speaker, and a collective march of the participants at the end of the conference to meet with the Occupy Philadelphia movement, who then had an encampment at Dilworth Plaza adjacent to Philadelphia’s City Hall. Previous conferences included events in 2009 on “Marcuse and the Frankfurt School for a New Generation,” held in Toronto; “Critique and Liberation in the Work of Herbert Marcuse,” gathered in 2007 at Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia; and the first International Herbert Marcuse Society conference took place in 2005 on “Reading Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization After 50 Years,” also at Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia. Indeed, many of the conferences mentioned were organized by younger scholars like Andrew Lamas and Arnold Farr who have been enthusiastic participants in keeping Marcuse’s work alive and relevant to challenges of the twenty-first century.

In addition to these events, many other conferences and events have taken place throughout the world on Marcuse’s work that continues to resonate with the younger generation, as well as scholars who came of age in the 1960s when Marcuse was one of the most influential radical scholars and Marxian theorists in the world. We might also note Harold Marcuse’s website that

15 See the website http://www.marcusesociety.org/ (accessed on February 20, 2013) for information on the International Herbert Marcuse Society conferences.

16 Reiland Rabaka, for example, has theorized the connections and divergences between the Frankfurt School (and in particular Marcuse) and what he has called “Africana Critical Theory” (W.E.B. Du Bois and the Problems of the Twenty-first Century: An Essay on Africana Critical Theory, Lexington Books, 2007; Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing The Black Radical Tradition, From W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral, Lexington Books, 2010). More specifically, Rabaka’s work simultaneously critiques the insular and Eurocentric epistemic origins of critical theory while also affirming how Marcuse’s critical theory of society emphasizes the “primary task of wrestling with the most pressing issues of their epoch, as opposed to pointing to or point out the future ‘forces of transformation’” (Rabaka, 2010, p. 362). In this sense, Marcuse’s critical theory that heavily relied on European philosophical and political traditions (especially early in his career) was the only original member of the Frankfurt School to challenge his own critical theory of society with social movements that militated against entrenched forms of racism and patriarchy in the U.S.A. for example. Not losing sight of Marcuse’s own theoretical blind spots, Rabaka sees Marcuse as part of broader, more diverse intellectual tradition(s) that “create thought and practices that not only confront and contradict the established imperial order, but also bring into being the ‘new humanity’ and ‘new society’ that Du Bois, Fanon, Che Guevara, and Herbert Marcuse, among others, wrote and spoke so passionately about” (Rabaka, 2007, p. 88).
Introduction

contains the “Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) Official Homepage” (http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/index.html; accessed on February 20, 2013), which collects references to Marcuse and his work all around the world and various Marcusiana, and his Marcuse family homepage which collects information about the Marcuse family tree and relevant publications.\(^\text{17}\)

In the following sections we introduce the collection of writings, lectures, correspondences, and speeches by situating them in the broad arc of Marcuse’s work by pointing to specific features of his critical theory of society that we argue are particularly relevant to our neoliberal moment. First, we offer a history and analysis of Marcuse’s encounter with Marxist thought and politics, as well as the ways he developed and advanced many of its central themes and concepts such as alienation, accumulation, and revolution and counterrevolution in his writings and political interventions. In the next section we focus on ways Marcuse’s development of Marxism not only anticipated contemporary neoliberalism as an emerging phase of capitalism, but also provides a neglected diagnosis of (i) the ways human subjectivity are integrated more smoothly into forms of social control and (ii) how a “revolutionary subjectivity” connected to what he called an emergence of “new human beings” might develop out of these conditions. We argue that in the neoliberal moment one of the key areas that should be theorized is how human subjectivity can be decoupled from the needs and values of capitalist societies desperately searching for new sites of production and exchange in order to prolong the processes of capitalist accumulation and growth. As institutions such as colleges and universities, healthcare corporations, the pharmaceutical industry, and the genetic food industry, for example, continue to promote a kind of public pedagogy of dependence and investment into these areas of capitalist growth, it is now more important than ever to identify and practice an alternative way of being human than what is artificially constructed in these institutional and corporate spaces. One of the aims of this Introduction therefore is to point to such areas in Marcuse’s work that could potentially articulate a “great refusal” or acts of refusal to neoliberal assaults on subjectivity and, in fact, to “life itself” on this planet. In retrospect, Marcuse made many contributions to updating and developing Marxian critical social theory and theories of liberation and social transformation, and his life and work was inextricably connected with the fate of Marxian theory in the twentieth century. Yet, as our introduction and the pieces contained within this volume show, Marcuse provides a Marxian and revolutionary framework for the twenty-first century as well.

Marcuse claims that he first became actively interested in politics, revolutionary socialism, and Marxism during a period when he was stationed in Berlin during the First World War when a Worker Councils movement broke out in 1918 following the Russian Revolution in which he participated. At this time Marcuse began to study Marx seriously. While Marcuse had read socialist pamphlets during the war, the intense political activity had made comprehensive study of Marxism impossible. He stressed that his experiences of the war and the German revolution led him to a thorough study of Marxism in the 1920s in order to grasp more clearly the dynamics of capitalism and imperialism, as well as the failure of the German revolution. He was also determined to understand his inability to identify with the major left parties, the Social Democrats and the Communists. Marcuse began reading Marx and other socialist classics to learn the Marxian theory of revolution and concept of socialism.

Marcuse and others of his generation who would become radical intellectuals during the Weimar period that culminated in the rise of German fascism were especially influenced by Georg Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* and Karl Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy*. Both presented critical and philosophical versions of Marxism quite different from the more economic and political reductive and dogmatic versions of Marxism promoted by Social Democratic and Communist parties. Both Lukács and Korsch had more active and creative views of the human subject and consciousness than more determinist versions of Marxism and both stressed the importance of philosophy and critique for a radical program of social transformation.

Although, like most radicals of his generation, Marcuse was excited by the Russian Revolution, he did not join the Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) though he often voted Communist as a "protest." It was no doubt difficult for a young man of Marcuse’s class

18 On Marcuse’s involvement in the German Worker’s Council movement, see Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*. There is still no definitive biography of Marcuse’s life and work. The account of Marcuse’s participation in the German revolution of 1918 and his political ideas at the time are based on interviews with Marcuse by Douglas Kellner in La Jolla, California, December 1978.

19 Interview with Herbert Marcuse, December 1978.


21 Although some commentators have claimed that Marcuse was a member of the Spartacus group, he explicitly denies it in a conversation with Douglas Kellner (December 28, 1978), affirming that he had indeed joined the Social
Introduction and background to identify himself with the working-class politics of the KPD. Although Lukács and Korsch joined the Communist Party, they were older than Marcuse, and based their decision on political experiences and knowledge of party politics unavailable to the young Marcuse. It seems that after the turmoil of the war and the German revolution, Marcuse was unable to make any clear political commitments. He did, however, already perceive himself on the Left politically and would remain there the rest of his life. When asked why he failed to join any communist organization at the time, he responded in a 1972 interview:

I didn’t join any, and if you ask me why I must confess to my shame that I can give you no answer. I simply don’t know. By 1919, when I went from Berlin to Freiburg, life in Freiburg was completely unpolitical. Then when I came back to Berlin the communist party was already split. I detected foreign influence—Russian influence—which I didn’t consider exactly beneficial, and that may be one of the reasons why I didn’t join. Nevertheless I became more and more politicized during this period. It was evident that fascism was coming, and that led me to an intensive study of Marx and Hegel. Freud came somewhat later. All this I did with the aim of understanding just why, at a time when the conditions for an authentic revolution were present, the revolution had collapsed or been defeated, the old forces had come back to power, and the whole business was beginning all over again in degenerate form.22

Marcuse was too young and inexperienced to pursue the career of a professional revolutionary, and gravitated naturally towards his previous interest in studying philosophy. Marcuse’s first published essay, “Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism,” proposes a synthesis between Marxism and Heidegger’s phenomenological existentialism. His goal is to produce a “concrete philosophy” capable of dealing with the central problems of the day.23 This remarkable philosophical debut anticipates later

---


attempts to create a "phenomenological" or "existential" Marxism, and historically situates Marcuse within a current of "critical Marxism" that sought to reconstruct Marxism in order to provide an alternative to the "revisionism" of the dominant trends of the Second International and the dogmatism of Soviet Marxism. The essay articulates an activist, practice oriented interpretation of Marxism that has continued to shape Marcuse's later writings, and contains one of the first and best interpretations and critiques of Heidegger's influential *Being and Time*.

Marcuse's first published essay indicates that he saw Marxism at the time primarily as a theory of revolutionary practice. Marxism, he writes:

> is not a scientific theory, a system of truth whose significance lies alone in its correctness as "knowledge," but is a theory of social activity and historical action. Marxism is the theory of proletarian revolution and the revolutionary critique of bourgeois society.\(^2\)

Together with Lukács and Korsch, Marcuse is resisting the tendency of leading Marxists of the Second International and Soviet Marxists to interpret Marxism as a theory of "scientific socialism," which is to be judged according to criteria of "scientific rigor."\(^2\) Marcuse does not, however,
advocate a strictly voluntaristic concept of radical action, arguing instead that “Marxism is science in so far as the revolutionary action that it wants to liberate and establish requires insight into its historical necessity and truth.”

But he stresses above all “the inseparable unity of theory and praxis, science and action, which every Marxian investigation must preserve as the highest guide.” We see here that Marcuse has not yet begun the critique of science that will be one of the distinctive features of his version of critical Marxism; at this point he conceives of science and theory as integral components of social practice.

The question of revolutionary practice is decisively raised, Marcuse suggests, only when “activity is posited as the crucial realization of the human essence and, at the same time, when this realization appears precisely as a factual impossibility i.e. in a revolutionary situation.” If an examination of the concrete historical situation shows that free development of human powers and potentialities is not possible in a society in which “personal powers are transformed into objective forces,” then “one’s own activity becomes an alien power that stands over against one.” Dominated by alien forces, the individual is “robbed of the real content of life” (i.e. freedom, individuality, pleasure, etc.) and is reduced to the form of an “abstract individual.” This picture portrays the “existence of capitalist society that reveals the ‘reality of an inhuman existence’ (The Holy Family) behind its economic and ideological forms.” Marcuse argues that capitalist society obstructs and suppresses free human activity and calls for “radical action” as a “countermovement” against the forms of alienated existence. In his theory of radical action, Marcuse grounds his early perspectives on revolution in a contradiction between the human need for free, self-realizing activity and an inhuman capitalist society which dominates and alienates the human individual—a position that would often return in his later writings.

Marcuse is building here on Lukács’s theory of reification, which describes how capitalist society objectifies and alienates individuals. In a

famous analysis in *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács describes how commodity fetishism, the capitalist labor system, the market, bureaucracy and mass media as well as science and technology tend to promote conformist modes of thought and behavior which eradicate individuality and freedom. “Reification” in Lukács’ theory also appears as the “phenomenal form of bourgeois society” and as a corresponding “reified” consciousness that perceives a specific socio-historical form of existence as “natural” and “eternal,” and consequently “resistant to change.”\textsuperscript{33} Reification thus describes the peculiar form of objectivity in capitalist society and is related to what the Frankfurt School would later criticize as technological rationality, one-dimensional thought, and instrumental reason.\textsuperscript{34} But at this point in Marcuse’s development, “reification” in his usage refers more to a process of dehumanization and alienation produced by the material conditions of capitalist society than to the form of bourgeois society and objectivity.\textsuperscript{35}

Lukács’ analysis of reification set the program and framework for Marcuse’s critique of capitalist and later socialist societies throughout his work. Marcuse recalled that he read *History and Class Consciousness* when it was first published and found it superior to the dominant varieties of orthodox Marxism.\textsuperscript{36} He admired its revival of the neglected aspects of Marxism, such as the Hegelian dialectic, the emphasis on consciousness and the subjective factors of revolution, and its attempt to develop a Marxian philosophy. Although he never shared Lukács’ celebration of the Communist Party and enthusiastic embrace of Leninism, Marcuse continued to believe that the Korsch–Lukács interpretations of Hegelian Marxism represented the most advanced and revolutionary current of Marxism which most strongly influenced his own appropriation of Marx.\textsuperscript{37}

---

\textsuperscript{33} Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, especially the chapter “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat.”


\textsuperscript{35} Marcuse, “Contributions,” pp. 47ff; S1, pp. 350ff.

\textsuperscript{36} Marcuse, conversation with Douglas Kellner in La Jolla, 28 December 1978.

\textsuperscript{37} Marcuse criticizes Lukács’ theory of class-consciousness as the weak point in his analysis, within the context of a defense of the importance of Lukács’ work,
The thrust of Marcuse's early essays is towards a radical activism that runs counter to the trend towards resignation and "inwardness" (Innerlichkeit) that was prevalent in sectors of German society in the 1920s. In an audacious interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time, Marcuse attempted to reconstruct Heidegger's concepts of "resoluteness" and "authenticity" and to merge them with Marxian concepts of revolutionary practice in his concept of radical action. This initial attempt to merge Marxism and phenomenological existentialism—a project later undertaken by a variety of European and American intellectuals—is fraught with difficulties and raises questions concerning whether such a synthesis between, in many ways, incompatible philosophical doctrines is useful. We do not however, believe that Marcuse's early essays should be dismissed as merely an early, and unsuccessful, attempt to synthesize Marxism and phenomenological existentialism, which other thinkers would later take up in different historical situations. For we believe that his early essays contain a critique of Heidegger, phenomenology and existentialism that is still cogent and compelling, as well as appropriation of themes of phenomenology and existentialism into his own increasingly Marxian philosophical perspectives. In the following sections we shall accordingly trace Marcuse's development of his Marxian philosophical perspectives in a critical engagement with classical Marxism.

TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCTION OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

After the deaths of Marx and Engels, the dominant currents of the official Marxian movement were hostile to philosophy and conceived of Marxism as a theory of scientific socialism, or an instrument of political practice. The result was that the Marxian theory was ossifying into a rigid orthodoxy which was serving as a legitimating ideology for the political practice of Marxian parties or governments. As a response to this theoretically sterile Marxism, Lukács and Korsch attempted to provide a philosophical dimension to Marxism by emphasizing and articulating its Hegelian-dialectical roots. At the same time, Max Adler and other Austro-Marxists were trying to establish a Kantian foundation for Marxism, while others discerned a kinship between Marxism and positivism. In this situation Marcuse thought that phenomenological existentialism would provide a philosophical dimension needed to revitalize


Some of Max Adler's texts have been translated in Austro-Marxism, ed. and trans. Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode (New York: Oxford, 1978). Many members of the Vienna Circle considered themselves both socialists and positivists, and discerned a compatibility with Marxism. For a later attempt to
the Marxian theory and to enable it to expand its problematic to encompass concrete problems of human existence, subjectivity, and culture, closed off to more traditional versions of Marxism.

Marcuse maintained that the basic presuppositions of Marxism should be articulated, developed and defended in order to provide a “foundation” for Marxism. This very issue shows how Marxism in the 1920s was not only the ideology of left-wing political movements, but also became an affair for intellectuals, who wanted to defend it against other theories and to participate in the Marxian enterprise. They saw that “orthodox” Marxism either relied on unexamined or questionable premises and frequently sought supplementary support for the Marxian theory in other philosophers such as Hegel, Kant, and, in Marcuse’s case, Heidegger and phenomenology. Marcuse’s position in the attempts of radical intellectuals to expand and strengthen the Marxian theory is interesting. On the one hand, he was one of the first to call attention to the writings of the early Marx as a source of the basic presuppositions of Marxism, but he seemed to think, on the other hand, that it needed a phenomenological-existential foundation which he believed Heidegger could provide.  

Marcuse asserted that there is a normative dimension to the Marxian claims that under capitalism people are alienated, exploited and dehumanized, and that the goal of revolutionary practice is to overcome all forms of alienation to achieve “a life worthy of a human being.” This critique presupposes that certain institutions and forms of practice are alienating and dehumanizing, that overcoming alienation is necessary for human liberation and well-being, and that the goal of the process of transformation is a state of being more fully human. Now Marcuse seemed to think that it is important to have a normative concept of non-alienated human being, and that phenomenology could describe and secure its essential structures—from which standpoint one could criticize certain forms of alienated practice and alienated social structures that repress or mutilate human beings. In another essay, Marcuse writes:

In that unique transcendence of historical processes, contexts become visible which render problematic the taking of the historical stages as the final givenness. Neither the current historical situation as facticity, nor the continuous

---

40 For discussion of Marcuse’s study with Heidegger and appropriation of phenomenology and existentialism into his own philosophical perspectives, see the Introduction by Douglas Kellner, Tyson Lewis, and Clayton Pierce to Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation, Volume 5 of the Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, edited by Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).
historical development as a causal connection without gaps constitutes the full reality of historical processes; rather, these factual states of affairs constitute themselves in a reality whose fundamental structures lie at the foundation of all factual realizations in history. All historical situations are as factual realizations only historical transformations of such basic structures that will be realized in every order of life in various ways. The way of the realization of human living with one another in capitalist society, for example, is a realization of the basic structures of human being with one another in general not in some formal abstract sense, but as highly concrete basic structures. Truth and falsity would then lie in the relation of factual realization of such basic structures: an order of life would be true when it fulfilled, false when it concealed or repressed them.41

This passage was written in the context of a critique of Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*, which suggests that Marcuse believed a phenomenological Marxism could overcome the dilemma of historical relativism.42 Mannheim had argued that Marxism is an ideology which merely reflects the historical situation of a given class and thus has but a relative historical validity. Marcuse wished to defend the validity claims (Geltungsanspruch) of Marxism against its sociological devaluation, and to establish that there were criteria of validity which surpassed the realm of historical change. This point of view is consistent with the Hegelian Marxian distinction between appearance and essence, and the claim that it is the task of theory to describe the essential structures and processes that underlie the less essential, derivative and changing appearances. Marcuse seemed to believe that phenomenology could ground and explicate these fundamental structures, which then would provide criteria that could determine the historical validity of Marxism or a given form of historical practice; i.e., that a given form of practice could be justified as a striving to overcome alienated forms of practice and to aim at the realization of essential aspects of human being that the theory had validated. Marcuse was, in fact, to adopt a similar approach using the Hegelian and Marxian philosophies in his work with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research on the critical theory of society. However, in his post-1934 work with the Institute for Social Research,

concepts of human needs and potentialities and historical tendencies would replace the early attempt to grasp ontological structures of human and social life. The crucial development in his thought is his appropriation of the Marxian anthropology and the concept of labor and its alienation under capitalism found in Marx’s early writings, as we shall discuss in the next section.

In retrospect, perhaps Marcuse’s most compelling reason for developing a phenomenology of historical materialism lies in his lifelong aversion to crude materialism and economic reductionism. In a discussion of Marxist materialism, Marcuse argues that the claim that all human products, institutions, ideas, etc. are rooted in relations and forces of production is not a “value priority.” Rather:

With this claim no optic temporal priority is meant, such that first pure production and reproduction existed and then “cultural” and “spiritual” object regions and ways of behaving came. Rather one must hold fast to this often overlooked basic proposition—existence as a being in the world is always at the same time already “material” and “spiritual,” “economic” and “ideological” (these terms serve only to indicate traditionally differentiated regions). Thus, in the historical movement of the particular human existence the ideological region is already co-reproduced [mitproduziert].

In this passage Marcuse attempts to avoid a crude, mechanistic materialism which holds that spiritual or intellectual products are but epiphenomena of the material base, mere reflections of economic phenomena or relations, contingent superstructures that have no autonomy or causal efficacy of their own. This form of reductionistic materialism was widespread in his day and Marcuse clearly opposed it. In the passage cited, Marcuse puts into question the validity of the traditional opposites of “material” and “spiritual,” “economic” and “ideological” to indicate that these notions are unclear and are in need of further clarification. He then argues that what are traditionally separated into two different realms of being are actually reproduced together in the same historical process and are thus “equiprimordial” (to use Heidegger’s term). The point at issue here comes out in another passage which seems to put into question what was then taken as the “fundamental thesis” of “dialectical materialism” (Diamat):

44 That Marx did not advocate this crude materialism, which Marcuse saw as characterizing both the Marxist-Leninist and Social Democratic version of Marxism at the time, is clear from an examination of Marx’s early writings, which will be discussed in the next section. See also Alfred Schmidt, Marx’s Concept of Nature (London: New Left Books, 1976).
The old question of which has objective priority, which "was there first," Spirit or Matter, Consciousness or Being, is not to be decided by the dialectical phenomenology and is already in its formulation meaningless. What is always given is only human being as historical being in the world, that is both spirit and matter, consciousness and being; thus only on the basis of this evident givenness can one make statements about the founding relationship that dominates the phenomena. Every deflection from this givenness to an absolutizing of one of its parts is dogmatism and a procedure that flouts all dialectics, for it begins its dialectical investigation with a rigid abstraction, a primum absolutum. 45

On the basis of the passages just quoted, we suggest that aversion to crude "dialectical materialism" provided another strong motive for Marcuse to develop a dialectical phenomenology. This aim was shared by Lukács and Korsch, and later by Sartre. 46 These thinkers all accepted the Marxist critique of capitalism and bourgeois society, the theory of revolution, and much of the theory of history, but opposed the then current dogma of dialectical materialism because it lent itself to crude mechanistic reductionistic interpretations, and produced inadequate concepts of human nature, society, culture and history. Marcuse seemed to believe that a dialectical phenomenology could bracket the question of the priority of matter and thus avoid a materialist metaphysical dogmatism. The question of the priority of matter over spirit, or being over consciousness, is dismissed as a pseudo-problem by a phenomenology that focuses solely on describing the givens of experience without raising metaphysical dilemmas. Apparently, Marcuse thought that he could use a basic phenomenological procedure of bracketing certain metaphysical questions and undercutting dualisms to avoid committing himself on what Marxists were claiming as the "fundamental question of philosophy." 47 This phenomenological way of avoiding commitment to a mechanistic materialism of the sort that dominated Second and Third International Marxism was a compelling motive for Marcuse's attempt to mediate between Marxism and

46 See the repudiation of a reductionistic materialism in Lukács' History and Class Consciousness, and Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy; Sartre's critique of philosophical materialism is The Critique of Dialectical Reason (London: Verso, revised edition 2004).
47 Engels maintained in his "Ludwig Feuerbach" essay, quoted by Marcuse in "Contributions," that the "basic question of all philosophy" concerned the relation between thought and being—hence the choice between idealism and materialism—claiming that Marxism resolutely opted for philosophical materialism, and holding that being and nature were primary and that spirit and thought were secondary and derivative; thus consciousness, on this analysis, is a "product, function and derivation of matter." Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin, Kautsky and other prominent Marxists followed this line, which became a pillar of orthodox Marxism. See the critique by Karl Korsch in Marxism and Philosophy.
phenomenology. There is no question that many orthodox Marxists, both then and now, adhere unambiguously to the priority of being over consciousness, of matter over idea, and thus maintain a “dialectical materialism” as the foundation of their world-view which Marcuse could not accept.48

A final possible motivation for Marcuse’s turn to phenomenological existentialism as a mode of new philosophical sustenance for Marxism is his commitment to a concern with the concrete problems of human existence and with the situation of the existing individual (an enduring legacy in Marcuse’s writings from his early interest in phenomenological existentialism). Orthodox Marxism, at the time of Marcuse’s early writings (and even today in some of the more sterile regions of Marxist theory and practice) neglected the problems of the existing individual and often saw individuals as functions of a class or group with no special interest or importance as individuals. Marcuse maintained, against this trend, a strong belief in the importance of the human individual, its needs, consciousness, and potentialities and continued to make the emancipation and development of the individual human being a key component of his thought.

**MARX’S ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844**

Marcuse’s review article on Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* is one of the most important of his early essays.49 His interpretation begins a tendency to reinterpret Marx in the light of his early writings and continues efforts to develop the philosophical foundations of Marxism. Marcuse’s study, which remains one of the best interpretations of the early Marx,

---


49 Marcuse, “Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus,” *Die Gesellschaft*, IX, 8 (1932) pp. 136-74; trans. Joris de Bres in *Studies in Critical Philosophy* (Boston MA: Beacon Press, 1973, pp. 3-48 (hereafter SCP); page references will be to the English publication, but the translations will often be ours. We note that Marcuse’s review of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* brought his name to the attention of a broader public, especially on the Left, than he had earlier enjoyed. Henry Pachter told Douglas Kellner of the admiration that he and others in Korsch’s circle had for Marcuse’s review when it was first published and that this was the first time they had taken notice of Marcuse (conversation with Pachter, 11 July 1978, New York).
portrays the synthesis of philosophy, political economy and revolutionary social theory as the distinguishing feature of Marxism. It contains a provocative discussion of the young Marx, whose early writings would have a powerful impact on contemporary thought and would decisively shape Marcuse’s own theoretical enterprise.

The publication of Marx’s *Manuscripts*, written in Paris in 1844 and first published in 1932, has been called one of the great philosophical events of the century. Marcuse was evidently sensitive to important new theoretical works, for just as he had written one of the first interpretations of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, he also published one of the first comprehensive interpretations of Marx’s *Manuscripts*. Marcuse later tells how the *Manuscripts* “liberated” him from Heidegger and turned him closer to Marx:

During this entire period, I had already read Marx and continued to study Marx; then arrived the publication of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. That was probably the turning point. Here was, in a certain sense, a new Marx, who was truly concrete and at the same time went beyond the rigid practical and theoretical Marxism of the parties. And from then on the problem of Heidegger versus Marx was no longer really a problem for me.  

Marcuse must have felt an affinity for the doctrine in Marx’s *Manuscripts*, as the theory of alienation, the humanism which undercut both philosophical idealism and materialism, and the broad philosophical perspectives found there corresponded with his own emerging theory. Marx’s early writings provided powerful support for Marcuse’s own enterprise, which could inspire him to develop the full philosophical-revolutionary import of Marxism which he thought was being distorted and covered over by the leading Marx interpreters and tendencies of the day. His enthusiasm and belief in the importance of Marx’s *Manuscripts* for a correct interpretation of the Marxian project is disclosed in the opening paragraph of his essay:

The publication of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* from the year 1844 is a decisive event in the history of Marx research. These *Manuscripts* put the discussion of the origins and original meaning of historical materialism, indeed the whole theory of “scientific socialism,” on a new basis; they also make possible a more fruitful and productive posing of the question of the actual connection between Marx and Hegel.

---


52 *SCP*, p. 3.
Marcuse's argument is that the 1844 Manuscripts disclose the "original meaning of Marx's fundamental categories; thus it could become necessary to revise the current interpretation of the later working out of the critique through reference to its origin." Marcuse announces the important project of revising the interpretation of Marxism on the basis of the writings of the early Marx. These "revisionist" projects represent attempts to develop an interpretation of Marxism critical of the various Marxist orthodoxies.

The "Marxist-Leninist" establishment long remained quiet on the issue of the relation of the 1844 Manuscripts to Marx's later writings, assigning them a minimal importance in the Marxian corpus; eventually, however, they were forced to engage in heated polemics against those who would found their Marxism on the early Marx. The standard "orthodox" argument is that the early "philosophical-humanist" Marx was an opening stage which Marx completely abandoned in his later critique of political economy. The early

---

53 Ibid.
54 Marcuse's essay was both an anticipation of, and direct influence on, this trend to assign a fundamental importance to the writings of the early Marx in interpreting the Marxist corpus as a whole. The Marxist-Leninist Robert Steigerwald claims that Marcuse's article is "actually the mine of almost all attempts up until now to revise Marxism on the basis of the early Marx," and "contains all the stereotypes of bourgeois and revisionist Marx—critiques that start with the early Marx, and which are today still influential," Herbert Marcuses dritter Weg, p. 87. Irian Fetscher gives Korsch, Lukács and Marcuse credit for inaugurating "the current interpretation (dominant in the West) from the early writings of Marx," in Marx and Marxism (New York: Seabury, 1971) p. 46. The project of revising the accepted picture of Marxism on the basis of the new material found in the early writings of Marx was also formulated, but differently, by two Social Democrats, Landshut and Mayer, who edited and wrote an introduction to the first German edition of the Manuscripts, Die Frühschriften (Leipzig: 1932). They argued that Marxism was "fundamentally an ethical doctrine," and developed an interpretation that influenced later ethico-humanist trends of Marx interpretation that emphasized the philosophical character of Marxism, playing down the importance of its critique of political economy and revolutionary social theory. See, for example, Karl Lowith, from Hegel to Nietzsche (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967); Jean-Yves Calvez, La Pensée de Karl Marx (Paris: Seuil, 1956); and Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Grove Press, 1963). The Manuscripts also had a strong influence in France and helped produce a succession of syntheses of Marx, Hegel and existentialism in the works of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Kojève, Hippolyte and to some extent Lefebvre and Garaudy. On the impact of the early Marx on the French scene, see Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

55 Steigerwald summarizes this Marxist-Leninist devaluation of Marx's Manuscripts in Herbert Marcuses dritter Weg, pp. 86-91, and on p. 116 lists several "Marxist" commentaries which "correct" "bourgeois" Marx interpretations. See also Louis Althusser, For Marx (New York: Vintage, 1968) who claims that there is an "epistemological break" between the philosophical
Marx, however, has also been used as a weapon to criticize bureaucratic communism and to affirm a more emancipatory notion of Marxism and socialism than was found in most "actually existing socialist" societies.\(^6\) Hence, the 1844 *Manuscripts* have had a wide and varied impact and have been the subject of much intense polemic.\(^7\)

Marcuse characterizes Marx's *Manuscripts* as "a philosophical critique and foundation for political economy in the sense of a theory of revolution."\(^5\) Marx's critique of political economy is philosophical in that its fundamental categories "develop out of a critical confrontation with the categories of Hegelian philosophy (i.e. labour, objectification, alienation, sublation, property)."\(^5\) Moreover, Marx's dialectical method was developed by thinking through problems at the root of Hegel's philosophy and was not, Marcuse suggests, merely an abstraction of dialectics from Hegel's philosophy. Most important, the Marxian theory of alienation and its revolutionary abolition rests on a philosophical conception of human nature that is the basis of an argument that human beings are alienated in capitalist society, which must be radically transformed to liberate the individual. Thus, "the revolutionary critique of political economy itself has a philosophical foundation, just as, conversely, the philosophy underlying it already contains revolutionary praxis."\(^6\) Marcuse claims that the Hegelian dialectical categories and method, as well as the theory of alienation and its overcoming, remain operative throughout the succeeding stages of Marx's thought, even in the later, more specifically economic, writings.

Marcuse therefore rejects the interpretation which claims that the early works of Marxism are "philosophical" in opposition to the later "scientific" works, and stresses instead the continuity of Marxism via the interconnection of philosophy, political economy and revolutionary practice throughout

\(^{56}\) Marx's early writings were deployed by Eastern European Marxists in the interests of developing a "humanistic" version of Marxism used to criticize the orthodox "Stalinist" versions. See the articles in *Socialist Humanism*, ed. Erich Fromm (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) and the works of Kosik, Schaff, Kolakowski, Markovic, Petrovic, Stojanovic and others.


\(^{58}\) SCP, p.3.

\(^{59}\) SCP, p.4.

\(^{60}\) SCP, pp. 4–5.
Marx's writings. Marcuse argues that Marx's critique of political economy is at once a demonstration of the deficiencies of the early theories of capitalism in classical political economy (for example, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say, etc.) and a critique of capitalist society and what it does to human beings. In opposition to these theories, Marx lays the foundation for a "new science" that becomes a "science of the necessary conditions of the communist revolution." This revolution is not only an economic transformation, but is also a "revolution of the whole history of the human species and the determination of its essential being." The critique of political economy is therefore not merely one science that stands beside others, but is "the scientific expression for a problematic that involves the human being in its entirety." In Marcuse's reading, Marx rejects the academic division of the sciences into separate disciplines and endeavors to found a "new human science" that serves as a superordinate, unifying discipline which aims at human liberation and the creation of a new social order.

The target of the critique of political economy is the "total 'alienation' and 'devaluation' of human reality as it is found in capitalist society." It is exactly this phenomenon that is covered over by bourgeois political economy. The basis of human alienation in capitalist society is the alienation of labor, which is the fundamental concept of the new science that Marx develops. While bourgeois social sciences neglect alienated labor, for Marx the alienation of labor is the fundamental fact of capitalist society from which such other categories of political economy as production, exploitation, profits and wages can be interpreted and criticized.

Marx's achievement was to take the philosophical concept of alienation developed by Hegel and others and give it a concrete material foundation by analyzing alienation in contemporary capitalist society. For Marx, the alienation of labor is not only the cornerstone of political economy, but contains a fundamental anthropological dimension, for it designates "not only an economic fact, but an alienation of human being, a degeneration of life, a devaluation and loss of human reality." This phenomenon of alienation is an historical event, indeed "a decisive event in human history," the abolition of which will "revolutionize the whole history of the human species." Bourgeois
political economy is criticized by Marx because it lacks this anthropological-historical and critical dimension: "Because bourgeois political economy does not have human beings and their history in its conceptual scheme, it is in the deepest sense not a 'human science,' but is a non-human science of an inhuman world of things and commodities." In this view, bourgeois political economy fails to grasp its essential object, the human being who is the subject of labor and foundation of economic activity. Marx, however, provides both a historical theory of human nature and its development as well as an analysis of what capitalism does to human beings. Marcuse points out that consideration of the importance of Marx's philosophical anthropology refutes attempts to interpret or impugn Marxism as a reductionistic economism that sees the human being solely as an economic animal.

For Marx, alienated labor is an historical phenomenon produced by concrete socio-economic conditions. "Alienation" does not refer to a timeless metaphysical condition, nor does Marx identify alienation with "objectification" or "externalization," as do some Hegelians and existentialists. For Marx, objectification refers to an essential aspect of labor (making objective human powers, making objects), whereas alienation is a form of objectification that takes place under certain socio-economic conditions that are to be abolished in order to produce non-alienated

68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 The relationship between the concepts of objectification (Vergegenständlichung), externalization (Entauserung) and alienation (Entfremdung) in Hegel and Marx has been a central issue of debate since the publication of Marx's Manuscripts. Marx ends his Manuscripts with a discussion of Hegel, where he objects to a "double error" (pp. 331ff): (1) Hegel's idealism reduces concrete history to a thought process and illicitly tries to grasp history through "abstract philosophical thinking" (p. 331); and (2) Hegel presents alienation as the externalization and objectification of spirit, and thus fails to grasp the historically specific material conditions of alienation which revolutionary practice is to eliminate (pp. 332ff). Both Marx and Marcuse claim that Hegel collapses objectification, externalization and alienation into one ontological process which fails to distinguish between the necessary features of externalization and objectification in all human activity and the contingent features of alienation, removal of which is a major aspect of human liberation. This point is highlighted in a study by George Lukács, The Young Hegel (London: Merlin, 1975). Lukács compares Hegel's theory of "externalization" (Entauserung) with Marx's theory of alienation, providing a detailed historical and conceptual analysis of these terms (pp. 537-49); he then contrasts Hegel and Marx on the concept of "objectification" (pp. 549ff). See also the commentary and critique by Jean Hippolite, "Alienation and Objectification: Commentary on G. Lukács' The Young Hegel," in Studies on Marx and Hegel (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). Hippolite in turn defends Hegel by re-ontologizing both alienation and objectification and criticizing Marx's "optimistic" view that alienation could be overcome (pp. 87ff).
labor. Consequently, for both Marx and Marcuse, although the activity of objectification is a ground for the possibility of alienation, “alienation” itself is historically constituted by the capitalist mode of production and can only be overcome when capitalism is abolished.

**MARCUSE ON MARX’S ANTHROPOLOGY, THEORY OF ALIENATION AND CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM**

Marcuse argues that the whole Marxian critique of political economy and theory of revolution is founded on a certain conception of human nature and its essential powers. The intention of the critique is to show that basic human needs and powers are being repressed and distorted in capitalist society; consequently, the theory of alienation provides a justification of revolutionary social transformation on the grounds of capitalism’s oppressive and destructive effects on human life. The analysis aims at not merely another philosophical theory of human nature, but at characterizing the contemporary human situation, which is evaluated in the light of its failure to satisfy fundamental human needs and to develop human potentialities.

Marcuse shows how Marx’s theory of human nature and alienation developed in a critical dialogue with Hegel, Feuerbach, and the “young Hegelians.” As a correction against interpretations that exaggerate the Feuerbachian roots of Marx’s early anthropology, Marcuse argues that Marx derives key aspects of his theory from Hegel’s analysis of labor, objectification and alienation and that therefore “Marx’s theory has its roots in the center of Hegel’s philosophical problematic.” Specifically, Marcuse believes that Marx begins with a materialist reconstruction of Hegel’s concepts of labor.

---

71 SCP, pp. 8ff.
72 Ibid. Many critics claim that Marx’s anthropology in the *Manuscripts* is primarily Feuerbachian and is utilized as a polemical model against Hegel’s idealist anthropology. See Lloyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967); Schlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Writings of Karl Marx* (New York: Cambridge, 1968); and Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 45ff. The interpretation of the early Marx as a Feuerbachian critic of Hegel is problematic in that Marx is neither a Hegelian nor a Feuerbachian in his early writings, but is instead creating his own synthesis of Hegel, Feuerbach and other young Hegelians, British political economy, and French revolutionary thought. Although Marx frequently champions Feuerbach’s naturalism against Hegelian Idealism, he counteracts the passive aspects of Feuerbach’s theory of human nature with emphasis on the active, creative aspects of the human being and concepts of labor and *Geist* of Hegel. On the heterogeneous origins of Marx’s theory of labor, see the article by R. N. Berki, “On the Nature and Origins of Marx’s Concept of Labor,” *Political Theory*, vol. 7, no. 1 (February 1979) pp. 35-56.
Introduction

and spirit (Geist), which are concretized in terms of Feuerbach's "naturalism." However, Marx then proceeds to interpret human sensuousness and needs stressed by Feuerbach in terms of practical social activity which develops human nature and constitutes the human-social world (i.e. praxis).

The concept of labor is central to Marx's anthropology because it develops essential human potentialities and fulfills basic needs. Marx stresses the primacy of human agency, the creative ability to produce objects and to recognize one's self and one's humanity objectified in the human-social world. Labor is thus an activity in which basic human powers are manifest: it develops one's faculties of reason and intelligence, it exercises bodily capabilities, it is social and communal activity, and it exemplifies human creativity and freedom. Human needs and potentialities are a product, in Marx's view, of the entirety of previous history, and consequently Marx argues that human nature is essentially historical. Against tendencies to interpret human nature as universal and unchanging, Marx stresses the constitutive power of historically specific modes of production. The human world, in this view, is a historical world; to cite Marx, "History is the true natural history of the human being, its act of origin, the creation of the human being through human labor."

In this regard, it is important to point out that although Marcuse uses the language of ontology and "essence," he rejects concepts of a fixed, universal and ahistorical concept of the human essence. He argues that

To play off essence (the determinants of "the" human being) and facticity (the given concrete historical situation) against each other is to miss completely the new standpoint that Marx had already assumed at the outset of his investigations. For Marx, essence and facticity, the situation of essential history and the situation of factual history, are no longer separate regions or levels independent of each other: the historical experience of the human being is taken up into the definition of the human essence. We're no longer dealing with an abstract human essence, which remains equally valid at every stage of concrete history, but with an essence that can be defined in history and only in history.

Consequently, although there are ontological-essentialist tendencies in Marcuse's work, they are always interpreted in a theoretical framework that attempts to undercut previous dichotomies between essentialism and

73 Marcuse is one of the first to stress explicitly that Marx's anthropology conceives of human beings in terms of needs and powers. On this theme, see Bertell Ollman, Alienation (New York: Cambridge, 1971) and Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx (London: Allison & Busby, 1976).
74 SCP, pp. 24ff.
75 SCP, p. 24.
76 SCP, p. 28.
Introduction

31

Admittedly, Marcuse does not adequately clarify this project and sometimes uses the language of traditional ontology. Although he often engages in ontological generalization, he then calls for situating his ontological categories in a concrete historical situation. For example, after generalizing Hegel's master-slave categories into a universal framework to discuss the dynamics of domination, he states: "After the possibility of alienated labor has been shown to have its roots in the essence of the human being, the limits of philosophical description have been reached and the discovery of the real origin of alienation becomes a matter for historical analysis." Thus, it is a mistake to claim that Marcuse's, or Marx's, anthropology is "reductionist" and falls prey to a "metaphysics of labor" which reduces essential human activity to labor and greatly exaggerates its constitutive role in human life. In fact, Marx and Marcuse refer to human beings not as productive, laboring beings in any narrow or solely economic sense, but as many-sided beings with a wealth of needs and powers that are at once individual, social and historical. The Marxian concept of the production and reproduction of everyday life includes sex, communication, symbolic interaction and exchange, and many other human activities. Far from being reductionist, the anthropology of the early Marx provides a concept of a many-sided human being, from which standpoint the one-sidedness and restrictions of capitalist society can be criticized. Hence the Marxian concept of human being and its alienation is not measuring and condemning capitalism from the standpoint of a fixed, ahistorical and identical human essence which is then shown to be in contradiction with activity in capitalist society. Rather, Marx argues, and Marcuse assents, that human life under capitalism is fatally deprived of free, creative activity and thus suppresses fundamental human potentialities and distorts fundamental human needs. Crucially, the Marxian theory of labor and its alienation leads to, and provides the justification for, a theory of socialism and revolution.

In Marcuse's interpretation of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, the central fact that grounds and justifies revolution is the

---

77 See SCP, pp. 35-9.
78 SCP, pp. 37ff.
80 The term the "metaphysics of labor" was introduced by Adorno as a critique of an alleged reduction of essential human nature to labor by Marx. See T. W. Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971) p. 270. Habermas and his colleagues criticized the reductionistic anthropology of labor in Marx, which failed to conceptualize adequately symbolic interaction and pointed to a "secret positivism" in Marx. See Jürgen Habermas, *Human Knowledge and Interests* and Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York: Seabury, 1974).
81 SCP, pp. 26ff.
contradiction between one’s essential human needs and powers and the historical conditions of capitalist society. As noted this contradiction involves the opposition between free, many-sided, creative activity and alienated labor. Marcuse concludes that:

If essence and existence stand opposed to each other, and if their union as their actual realization is the authentic free task of human praxis, then where the factual conditions have progressed to the complete perversion of the human essence, the radical abolition of this factual condition is the definitive task. It is precisely the unceasing focus on the human essence that becomes the inexorable impulse for the founding of the radical revolution. For the actual situation of capitalism is characterized not only by an economic or political crisis, but by a catastrophe of the human essence — this insight condemns to failure from the outset mere economic or political reform and unconditionally demands the catastrophic abolition of the actual conditions through total revolution.82

It is here that Marcuse most dramatically departs from the traditional Marxian concept of revolution. Indeed, in many of his works, Marcuse will move away from analysis of the contradictions in the political-economic system and class struggles to focus on repression of individuals, which generates refusal and revolt. Marcuse posits dormant, emancipatory powers in human nature striving for realization and expression as the foundation of revolt and struggle, and he finds a Marxian basis for such a position in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts — while later he will seek a similar matrix of revolutionary potentiality in human nature through Freud’s instinct theory and “authentic art.”

Marcuse continues to argue—as expressed in the above passage—that the capitalist system of alienation, exploitation and oppression is literally “catastrophic” for human beings and that only total revolution could overcome the contradiction between human beings and capitalist society. Total revolution is required, Marcuse believes, both because alienated labor affects the totality of life and because the entire system of labor and leisure under capitalism is alienating and oppressive. Economic and political reform alone will not eliminate the evils of capitalism, thus total revolution is necessary. Following Rosa Luxemburg’s concept of revolution, Marcuse still envisages revolution as a “catastrophic upheaval” that will overthrow and transform the existing society in its entirety.83 Marcuse’s later work will

82 SCP, p. 29.
83 Marcuse told Douglas Kellner that Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of revolution and the events of the Russian and German revolutions decisively influenced his early concept of revolution, which he perceived as a “catastrophic upheaval” and total restructuring of social life (conversation, December 28, 1978).
attempt to justify this position and will later make his ultra-radical ideas the center of heated controversy.

In his essay on Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts*, Marcuse analyses the role of alienated labor, private property, money, commodities, class domination and reification in capitalist society—ideas that would crucially influence his own theory of advanced capitalism. He was also impressed by the vision of human emancipation in Marx’s *Manuscripts*, one of the sources of Marcuse’s later theory of liberation, which envisages the image of an emancipated human being in a non-repressive society—a vision of liberation that would be shared by many in the New Left and countercultures of the 1960s. Developing Marx’s reflections on communism and humanism in his early works, Marcuse stresses the gratification of needs, the cultivation of the senses, the aesthetic-erotic components in a non-repressive civilization, and a new sensibility and consciousness as necessary components of a liberated society. Marcuse is thus one of the few Marxists to take seriously Marx’s early vision of an emancipated sensibility and the total revolution that would involve developing new human needs and powers, a new sensibility, new human relationships, new institutions, and a new labor system—in short, a totally new society—all dedicated to the fulfillment and realization of many-sided human beings. In this way Marcuse appropriates and develops the revolutionary-socialist content in the much discussed Marxian humanism.

Marcuse also takes seriously Marx’s vision that all antagonisms, conflicts and contradictions found in capitalist societies would be overcome in an emancipated socialist society. The Marcusian themes of reconciliation and harmony thus have their origins (or at least Marxian roots) in Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts*. Marx believed that with the socialist revolution the antagonisms between human potentialities and actual existence would be abolished through the abolition of alienated labor, private property and class domination. Socialism would make possible labor as a “universal and free appropriation” of the world that would make possible a “many-sided, development and expression” of human nature.

Marcuse’s stress on “total revolution” and a radical restructuring of society as a whole shows that those Marxist-Leninist critics are wrong who complain that Marcuse is merely advocating an “anthropological revolution,” for we have seen that revolution for Marcuse requires both a change of human activity and consciousness, combined with the transformation of socio-economic conditions and institutions. Marcuse’s

---

86 Stefan Breuer, *Die Krise der Revolutionstheorie* (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1977) p. 111. Breuer’s critique of Marcuse’s alleged hypostatizing conditions of labor...
reading of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, however, provides a philosophical reading of Marx clearly at odds with the dominant tendencies of “scientific Marxism.” He continues the attempt, begun by Lukács and Korsch, to develop a version of “critical Marxism” that emphasizes subjectivity, needs, emancipation, and Hegelian dialectics as providing the method and categories of social transformation. Since Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts* were first published in 1932, he felt that they confirmed the interpretation of Marxism developed by Lukács and Korsch (who had not seen Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts*) and thus provided textual support in Marx for a version of critical Marxism.

Although Marcuse’s interpretation of Marx’s *Manuscripts* is excellent, his own understanding of capitalism, revolution and socialism is too dependent on Marx’s early writings, and he has not yet appropriated adequately Marx’s later studies of capitalism and politics. The early Marcuse is thus too caught up in the philosophical problematic of the early Marx and German Idealism and has not yet achieved a solid enough grasp of the Marxian theories of society and history. His theory of revolution is too focused on human nature and its alienation and not enough on the socio-economic causes of alienation, or the contradictions of capitalism and class struggle which generate revolutionary struggle and consciousness. After 1933, in his work with the Institute for Social Research, he would study the later Marx and would correctly argue in *Reason and Revolution*: “Under all aspects, however, Marx’s early writings are mere preliminary stages to his mature theory, stages that should not be overemphasized.”\(^87\) And in his work following the Second World War, Marcuse would develop his own controversial critiques of Marxism and his own theory of capitalist society, socialism and political change.\(^88\)

---

Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* is one of the first and best attempts by a "critical Marxist" to present a comprehensive and balanced evaluation of Soviet society and ideology.\(^{89}\) The very title *Soviet Marxism* suggests that the version of Marxism developed in the USSR was a highly specific interpretation of Marxism. Most of the Marxian critiques of the Soviet Union had been written by Trotskyists, Social Democrats, or ex-Marxists, who turned with a fury against the Soviet Union for betraying Marxism (or their own expectations). Marcuse's study, however, begins an attempt by "Western Marxists" to overcome sectarian discourse about the Soviet Union with critical and analytical discussion. Many previous representatives of Western Marxism tended to defend uncritically the Soviet Union, or to attack it harshly—or, as with Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to swing sharply from one attitude to another.\(^{90}\) Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht, Ernst Bloch and others, whatever their private doubts, refused to criticize the Soviet Union openly. Even Karl Korsch, who had developed one of the first independent Marxist critiques of the Soviet Union in the 1920, reluctantly concluded in the post-war period that it was reactionary to attack the Soviet Union since the only significant political choice, he believed, was between US capitalism and Soviet communism.\(^{91}\)

Marcuse's colleagues in the Institute for Social Research generally maintained a discrete silence on the issue in the 1930s and 1940s, although some of its members, like Karl Wittfogel and Max Horkheimer, eventually became bitter anti-communists.\(^{92}\) Marcuse was the first member of the

---

89 On the differences between "critical" and "scientific" Marxism, see Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms* (New York: Seabury, 1982). Marcuse is a paradigm of a "critical Marxist" who uses the Marxian theory as an instrument of critique, and systematically applied Marxist theory to critique Soviet Marxism.


92 On the position of members of the Institute for Social Research toward the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s, see Helmut Dubiel,
Introduction

Institute for Social Research group to attempt a thoroughgoing analysis of the relationship between classical Marxism and Soviet Marxism, and between Soviet ideology and reality. Thus his book *Soviet Marxism* is important for its contributions to developing a critical Marxian discourse on the Soviet Union that avoids the sectarian polemics of communist apologists, anti-communist ideologues, or Marxian sects.

Marcuse had become a specialist in communism and the Soviet Union during the Second World War in his work with the OSS (Office of Strategic services), the World War II predecessor of the CIA, and then the State Department. After the Second World War he became the chief political analyst for the Central European section of the State Department and helped prepare a lengthy classified intelligence report on "The Potentials of World Communism." After his Institute colleagues who had also worked for the U.S. Government—Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, and Leo Lowenthal—left government service for academic posts, Marcuse was forced to stay in Washington because of his wife Sophie's illness. Marcuse thus witnessed the beginnings of the Cold War and the repression of radicals and liberals in government service during the McCarthy era, although he maintained that he was not directly subject to a witch-hunt himself. Rather, he was tired of being a government bureaucrat and was eager to return to writing and teaching. Consequently, at the time of his wife's death in 1951, he left his State Department job and sought an academic position.

Marcuse's first U.S. academic appointments were with the Russian Institute at Columbia University and the Russian Research Center at Harvard. In the Acknowledgements in *Soviet Marxism*, Marcuse notes that his work on the political tenets of Soviet Marxism, which forms the first half of the book, was carried out in 1952–3 at Columbia, while the second half of the book on the ethical tenets of Soviet Marxism was prepared at Harvard in 1954–5. Although both the Columbia and Harvard research institutes were centers of Cold War anti-communism, Marcuse openly taught Marxism at Columbia and was known as "Marxist-in-residence" at Harvard. His study *Soviet Marxism* reveals that Marcuse was neither an orthodox communist nor a Cold Warrior. Instead Marcuse presents a rather ambivalent reading of both regressive and progressive elements of the Soviet Union which he

---


believes reflects the ambivalence of Soviet Marxism as both a realization and distortion of Marxism.

Marcuse assumes throughout his life that the original Marxian theory is an "emancipatory" and "progressive" articulation of humanity's aspirations for freedom, happiness, and a better world. He argues that the "fundamental ambivalence" in the attempts to realize Marxism in the Soviet Union consists in the fact that "the means for liberation and humanization operate for preserving domination and submission, and the theory that destroyed all ideology is used for the establishment of a new ideology."94 Marcuse's writing strategy in Soviet Marxism is to confront Soviet "ideology" with "reality" so as to provide an "immanent critique" of both Soviet ideology and society by exposing its distortions of Marxism and its failure to realize Marxian socialist ideals in practice. Marcuse claims that his "immanent critique"

starts from the theoretical premises of Soviet Marxism, develops their ideological and sociological consequences, and re-examines the premises in the light of these consequences. The critique thus employs the conceptual instruments of its object, namely Marxism, in order to clarify the actual function of Marxism in Soviet society and its historical direction.95

In the Introduction to Soviet Marxism, Marcuse explicitly sets forth a Marxian method of historical analysis which relates Soviet ideology to its social reality. He identifies "objective trends" and "tendencies" within Soviet society and conceptualizes Soviet development "in terms of the interaction between Soviet and Western society." Throughout the book, he shows how trends of international geopolitics and the capitalist world market influenced Soviet development. Marcuse's study combines Marxian ideology critique of Soviet Marxism with political analysis of the Soviet Union, using as sources documents, speeches and party pronouncements as well as the classical texts of Marxism-Leninism. The interconnection of philosophical and political factors makes Soviet Marxism a complicated and often difficult presentation of a complex and controversial phenomenon. The book has been widely misunderstood and many interpreters, or critics, have failed either to discern its dialectical analysis of both liberating and oppressive features, or the complexity of Marcuse's interpretation of possible liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union in conjunction with continued repression. Consequently, New Left critics, who assume a predominantly critical posture toward the Soviet Union, praise Soviet Marxism as a critique of Stalinism, the Soviet

bureaucracy, and the Soviet state, although some miss Marcuse’s important analysis of liberalizing trends in Soviet society. Anti-Soviet liberals and conservatives who have discussed the book often claim that Marcuse provides apologetics for the Soviet Union and overlook his frequently sharp critiques. And communist reviewers who attack Soviet Marxism claim that Marcuse’s interpretation is wholly negative and argue that he takes the position of a Cold War, anti-Soviet propagandist.

In fact, however, Marcuse’s interpretation is not a clear-cut “for” or “against” the Soviet Union but is instead a portrayal of contradictory tendencies within a complex and difficult to interpret society. Marcuse breaks with the Cold War anti-communist discourse that demonizes the Soviet Union yet provides sharp criticism of its departures from what he sees as the emancipatory features of Marxism. The book thus begins a trend within the Left to develop reasoned critiques of the Soviet Union without sectarian rhetoric that both criticizes repressive features of bureaucratic communism while appreciating potentials for social progress within the Soviet system.

Marcuse’s analysis of “liberalizing trends” and “progressive” elements within Soviet society led liberal and left critics to claim that Marcuse was not critical enough of the Soviet Union. This raises the question of the extent to which Marcuse’s analysis of the liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union may have been influenced by the “thaw” produced by Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin produced after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956. Communists and others were animated by the hope that Khrushchev’s speech would mark the end of Stalinism and create a new type of communism. Marcuse told Douglas Kellner, however, that he had no “illusions” about Khrushchev and his only references to him in the text of Soviet Marxism analyze those features in Khrushchev’s Twentieth Congress

96 For example, Johann Arnason titles his chapter on Soviet Marxism “Marcuses Kritik des Stalinismus” in Marcuse zu Marx (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1971), and Jean-Michel Palmier in his Sur Marcuse (Paris: 10/18, 1968) describes it as a “passionate polemic against the Stalinist bureaucracy ... an analysis without doubt pessimistic of Soviet Marxism and its cruel contradictions,” pp. 24, 34.

97 Soviet Marxism was generally surpassed by One-Dimensional Man and Marcuse’s popular writings of the 1960s and has largely been neglected in Marcuse scholarship. For an exception, see Muller, Krieger und Gelehrte, who puts Marcuse’s research into Soviet Marxism in the context of his work with U.S. government service and academic work. Muller has many scholarly contributions in his book, although it is questionable whether Soviet Marxism is “one of Marcuse’s most important books” (p. 485; our translation).

speech which denote continuity with the objectives of the Stalinist regime, followed by citation of Khrushchev’s proclamation that “the continued strengthening of the state and of the party agencies remain on the agenda.” Thus, in 1958, Marcuse did not seem to believe that the change in political leadership was a decisive force of de-Stalinization.

Rather, Marcuse derived his analysis of the existence of liberalizing tendencies from study of the socio-economic situation and other trends in the Soviet Union. He argues that the “industrial base” had been created to produce a higher form of communism and that there were structural imperatives in the bureaucracy, ideology, technology and world political constellation that may drive these tendencies to a higher stage of civilization. Hence, Marcuse reveals himself here to be committed to the Marxian method of social analysis, focusing on the base of Soviet society to discern its essential features, rather than being guided in his analysis by the superstructure of the new Soviet leaders.

In the 1961 preface to the Vintage edition of Soviet Marxism, Marcuse claims that the “trend towards reform and liberalization within the Soviet Union has continued.” He also seems clearly sympathetic toward Khrushchev here, accepting Isaac Deutscher’s analysis of the modifications of Soviet policy, internal and external, in the Khrushchev regime. Furthermore, Marcuse seems to accept Khrushchev’s doctrine of “peaceful co-existence” and call for disarmament at face value, as well as Khrushchev’s claim that the Soviet Union is moving toward the “second phase” of communism. These remarks suggest that Marcuse continued to believe in liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and that the Khrushchev administration was a vehicle of liberalization.

In the 1963 Preface to the French edition of Soviet Marxism, however, Marcuse notes that focus on the issue of whether fundamental changes are taking place in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev deflects attention from the question of whether fundamental changes are taking place in U.S. politics, “in particular since the arrival to power of the Kennedy administration.” In Marcuse’s view, it seemed that U.S. politics was becoming more aggressive and interventionist in the Third World and was forcing the Soviet Union to focus more on competition with the West and the arms race, thus suspending

---


100 Marcuse, Preface, Soviet Marxism, p. vi.

Introduction

possibilities of liberalization in an intensified Cold War atmosphere. He highlights here his thesis that Soviet communist parties are more and more the "historical inheritors of the pre-war Social Democratic parties," but indicates that they now face another communist movement on their Left, namely the Chinese communists who "reclaim the heritage of Marxism-Leninism." Consequently, in the early 1960s, Marcuse perceived a shifting, fluid political situation that made it increasingly difficult to perceive liberalizing tendencies in the Soviet communist countries.

In historical retrospect, it can be argued that the ousting of Khrushchev in 1964 and the subsequent course of Soviet communism put a brake on the liberalizing tendencies which Marcuse had discerned in the 1950s. This suggests that Marcuse may have exaggerated the liberalizing trends and underestimated the continuity with the Stalinist period. Later Marcuse became more critical of the post-Khrushchev regime, especially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus his views on the Soviet Union were responses to a changing and fluid historical situation and he modified his analyses and appraisals in response to changing historical circumstances.

Yet Marcuse does offer provocative critical perspectives on both the Soviet political system and its ideology. Since the 1930s, critique of ideology has been Marcuse's forte. In Soviet Marxism, he turns the Marxian critique of ideology against Soviet Marxism itself in the last several chapters of Part 1 and throughout Part II on "The Ethical Tenets of Soviet Marxism." For Marcuse, the most striking and paradoxical feature of Soviet Marxism is that a blatant revisionism masquerades as a relentless orthodoxy in which the function of the dialectic "has undergone a significant change." Marcuse argues that whereas the Marxian dialectic is a tool of critical and revolutionary thought that analyses the contradictions and antagonisms of a social order, Soviet Marxism surrenders the critical dialectic and uses it to justify the existing regime, by codifying it into a philosophical system which contains categories, laws and principles that are used to legitimize the rationality of the established Soviet society. Marcuse shows in a penetrating discussion how various texts of Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are used to produce a version of Marxism at odds in significant ways with Marx's own historical materialism.

Soviet Marxism is of interest for Marcuse's own thought because it reveals parallels between his theories and critiques of the Soviet Union and advanced capitalist societies. Although Marcuse claimed in a 1961 Preface to the Vintage edition that he rejected theories of the "convergence" of capitalist and communist societies and that he choose to stress their differences, he also analyzes similar features of social control and domination operative in both societies.\(^{102}\) With regard, however, to Marcuse's tendency in One-Dimensional Man and other writings to equate different, historically specific trends and

---

institutions under one generic concept of “advanced industrial society,” the more historically specific analyses of Soviet Marxism serve as an antidote to some of the more generalizing tendencies in some of his other works. Thus Soviet Marxism is important within Marcuse’s corpus as a critique of Soviet communism that parallels his critique of advanced capitalism and which calls attention to both similarities and differences within these social systems.

In the 1961 Preface of the Vintage Edition, Marcuse claims that the contradictory reception of the book suggested “that I have achieved a modicum of success in freeing myself from Cold War propaganda and in presenting a relatively objective analysis based on a reasoned interpretation of historical developments.” Readers sympathetic to the Soviet Union may find Marcuse’s presentation too critical, while others will perhaps find it not critical enough. Others may differ with both his presentation of “fundamental trends” and his interpretations of Soviet politics and ideology. Yet Marcuse’s attempt to escape from ideological discourses on Soviet Marxism and to present a balanced interpretation arguably provide a model that more biased ideological interpretations should consider.

This approach took on added relevance during an era when the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, stigmatized the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” and when rampant anti-communism threatened to intensify hostilities between the two superpowers and to lead the world to the brink of nuclear war. In this context, Marcuse’s attempt to provide a reasoned and balanced assessment of the Soviet political system and ideology provided a welcome relief from the anti-Soviet diatribes which pervaded discourses about the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.

Interestingly, Marcuse’s last published article “Prorosocialism and Late Capitalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis Based on Bahro’s Analysis,” contained in this volume (p. 396), engages the critique of “actually existing communism” of East German dissident Rudolf Bahro who anticipated democratizing tendencies in the Soviet communist-inspired societies on the grounds that these societies were producing a “surplus consciousness” that could not be satisfied in the existing bureaucratic and repressive system. Further, Bahro believed, like Marcuse, that there were liberalizing features in the Marxian theory which could drive democratic transformation. Neither Bahro nor Marcuse anticipated the collapse of “actually existing communism” at the end of the 1980s, although their analyses could explain why large numbers of individuals in the Soviet societies were alienated from the Stalinist system and desired democratization.

Marcuse’s notion of socialism was significantly different from Soviet communism’s bureaucratic system, and was connected to his concept of utopia and utopian possibilities for emancipation, as we’ll see in the next section.

---

UTOPIA, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIALISM

In this section, we first suggest that Marcuse advocated a form of utopian socialism influenced by Ernst Bloch, and will then engage Marcuse's own conception. In his three-volume work, *The Principle of Hope*, Bloch developed a method of cultural criticism which searches for utopian moments in art, philosophy, religion, culture, and everyday life that can be used to develop the vision and practice to create an alternative society. Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* traced utopian moments in culture, philosophy, and everyday life which Marcuse believed exhibited a yearning for a better world and sketched out visions of a non-repressive society with a new reality principle, and has pursued the theme of utopian and emancipation throughout his later work.

By the 1970s, Marcuse aggressively defended his utopian-socialist perspectives and argued that socialism should be conceived as "a qualitatively different society, in which the relations of human beings to each other, as well as between humans and nature, are fundamentally revolutionized." For Marcuse, "the alternative is socialism. But socialism neither of the Stalinist brand nor of the post-Stalinist brand, but that libertarian socialism which has always been the integral concept of socialism, but only too easily repressed and suppressed." Such a concept of socialism, in contrast to existing socialism, radically differs so that it is necessary to break the Marxian taboo on utopian speculation in order to project its emancipatory features. In "Liberation from the Affluent Society," Marcuse states:

> we have been too ashamed, understandably ashamed, to insist on the integral, radical features of a socialist society, its qualitative difference from all the established societies: the qualitative difference by virtue of which socialism is indeed the negation of the established systems, no matter how productive, no matter how powerful they are or they may appear."  

The utopian impulse is a deep one in Marcuse, and has been a constituent element in his appropriation of Marxism from the beginning. In a 1930s article "Philosophy and Critical Theory," Marcuse writes that critical theory:

---

104 On Bloch's *The Principle of Hope*, see the references in Note 1.
105 On Marcuse's synthesis of Marx, Freud, modernist aesthetics and critical theories in *Eros and Civilization*, see the Introduction by "Douglas Kellner, Clayton Pierce, and Tyson Lewis in Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation.
always derives its goals only from present tendencies of the social process. Therefore it has no fear of the utopia that the new order is denounced as being. When truth cannot be realized within the established social order, it always appears to the latter as utopia. This transcendence speaks not against, but for, its truth. The utopian element was long the only progressive element in philosophy, as in the constructions of the best states and the highest pleasure, of perfect happiness and perpetual peace.  

Marcuse's move to a militantly utopian position is cryptically indicated in the title of his 1967 Berlin lecture, "The End of Utopia" (published in Five Lectures). This phrase could be interpreted in two ways, and in fact these two different interpretations illuminate different phases of Marcuse's post-1950s work. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse's analysis signified the end of utopia in Mannheim's sense: the stabilization of advanced industrial society invalidated utopian thinking, ending its relevance for social theory and political practice. However, in the 1960s Marcuse spoke for the end of the taboo against utopian thinking precisely on the grounds that utopian ideas are so relevant and viable that they cannot be dismissed as "merely utopian" in the pejorative, etymological sense of "utopia" as "nowhere." In An Essay on Liberation (hereafter EL), Marcuse argued that the very forces of production are "utopian," for the technical-material capabilities present at hand make possible the creation of a society without poverty, repression and exploitation. Marcuse often expounded on this theme in the 1970s, writing:

The word "utopian" should not be used by socialists anymore, because what is said to be utopian, really is not anymore. An example: the elimination of poverty, of suffering. Today the social wealth is so great that a rational organization of productive forces actually directed toward the interests of everyone would make possible the overcoming of poverty in the world in a few years. Further, shortening of working time is according to Marx the precondition of a socialist society. No one denies—not even the bourgeois economists—that the socially necessary labor time could be decisively reduced in the developed industrial land without diminishing the cultural and material level of life. These examples provide indexes which show that the propagandistic caricature of socialism as utopian is really nothing else but its defamation.


For these reasons, Marcuse proposes lifting the Marxian taboo against utopian thinking, for such a revision is suggested, and even necessitated, by the actual evolution of contemporary societies. The dynamic of their productivity deprives “utopia” of its traditional unreal content: what is denounced as “utopian” is no longer that which has “no place” and cannot have any place in the historical universe, but rather that which is blocked from coming about by the power of the established societies.\(^\text{112}\)

Marcuse counters a frequent criticism that Marxism is a hopelessly “utopian” conception which realistic people should not accept. He states that:

I will not be deterred by one of the most vicious ideologies of today, namely, the ideology which derogates, denounces and ridicules the most decisive concepts and images of a free society as merely “utopian” and “only” speculative. It may well be that precisely in those aspects of socialism which are today ridiculed as utopian, lies the decisive difference, the contrast between an authentic socialist society and the established societies, even the most advanced industrial societies.\(^\text{113}\)

These reflections led Marcuse to utilize more aggressively the term “concrete utopia” to describe the alternative society envisaged.\(^\text{114}\) He insists that democratic and emancipatory socialism is indeed a possibility today. The problem is that although “the material and intellectual forces for the transformation are technically at hand,” “their rational application is prevented by the existing organization of the forces of production.”\(^\text{115}\) This signifies that utopian transformation is possible, but it can only take place as a radical break with the present society.\(^\text{116}\) Marxist socialism, Marcuse suggests, should not, on the one hand, be dismissed as “utopian” because there is no revolutionary class, because its demands for the abolition of poverty, misery and alienated labor in the creation of a free society are eminently rational and represent the real need for and goal of liberation. On the other hand, Marcuse suggests, Marxism is not utopian enough, for the technical-material possibilities at hand make possible even more radical and emancipatory social transformation than Marx envisaged.

\(^{112}\) *El.,* pp. 3–4.


\(^{114}\) Marcuse uses Ernst Bloch’s term “concrete utopia” in “Theory and Praxis” in *ZeitMessungen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975) p. 27, and his article on Bahro which we include in this volume, pp. 396ff.

\(^{115}\) *El.,* p. 64.

\(^{116}\) *SL,* p. 62.
In describing the most advanced and emancipatory possibilities of a new society, Marcuse now rejects the previous ontological dualism in his thought between the realms of necessity and freedom, and work and play. He formulates his critique of these dichotomies as a critique of the Marxian concept which conceives of the realm of freedom only beyond the realm of necessity, which remains a realm of alienated labor, as if one could be free only in a realm beyond labor. Whereas in earlier work, Marcuse seemed to maintain this distinction, thinking that liberation could only take place beyond labor, and receiving criticism for this position, he now writes:

I believe that one of the new possibilities, which gives an indication of the qualitative difference between the free and unfree society, is that of letting the realm of freedom appear within the realm of necessity—in labor and not only beyond labor.\textsuperscript{117}

This is a change of the utmost importance in Marcuse's theory, for he now posits the possibility of non-alienated labor which can be genuinely self-fulfilling, and thus reduces the sharp division in his theory between labor and play, as well as overcoming the excessively negative concept of labor as inevitable necessity, unfreedom.

Marcuse struggled with the concept of the relation between the realms of freedom and necessity in the Marxian project in a series of essays which provide a transition between his earlier position that freedom cannot enter the realm of necessary labor and his later notion that radical transformation of the labor process and technical apparatus could make possible free activity in the realm of labor. In the 1964 foreword to \textit{Negations}, Marcuse cites the famous passage in Marx's \textit{Grundrisse} on automation, which stresses the liberating possibilities in automation through (1) reducing socially necessary labor time; (2) giving humans control over their entire labor apparatus; thus (3) making possible a thoroughgoing reorganization of the labor process and the construction of a labor apparatus that will make possible non-alienated labor.\textsuperscript{118} Marcuse now argues that automation makes possible experimentation with the labor apparatus as a whole and creative restructuring of the labor process which could increase the realm of freedom while minimizing alienated labor. In Marcuse's view:

In totalitarian technological society, freedom remains thinkable only as autonomy over the entirety of the apparatus. This includes the freedom to reduce it or to reconstruct it in its entirety with regard to the pacification of the struggle for existence and to the rediscovery of quiet and of happiness.

\textsuperscript{117} SL, p. 63.
The abolition of material poverty is a possibility within the status quo; peace, joy, and the abolition of labor are not. And yet only in and through them can the established order be overcome. Totalitarian society brings the realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity under its administration and fashions it after its own image. In complete contradiction to this future, autonomy over the technological apparatus is freedom in the realm of necessity. This means, however, that freedom is only possible as the realization of what today is called utopia.\(^{19}\)

Marcuse is no naive technocrat or futurist who thinks that increased automation and technological progress will automatically increase human freedom. He argues that the development of technology also increases the possibility of servitude and domination, in which individuals could become cogs in the social-technical machine, servants of the apparatus. For Marcuse the danger exists that freedom and individuality will diminish in both the realms of labor and leisure. In 1966 he wrote:

> it seems to me that contemporary industrial society has all but closed this realm of freedom, and closed not only by virtue of its ingress into all spheres of the individual existence (thus preconditioning the free time), but also by virtue of technical progress and mass democracy. What is left to individual creativity outside the technical work process is in the way of hobbies, do-it-yourself stuff, games. There is, of course, the authentic creative expression in art, literature, music, philosophy, science—but it is hardly imaginable that this authentic creativity will, even in the best of all societies, become a general capability. The rest is sport, fun, fad.\(^ {120}\)

For Marcuse automation and technological progress might lead to increased liberation and free time, or to increased slavery, in which the features of creativity and individuality will diminish in both the work world and leisure world.\(^ {121}\) Human liberation thus requires:

> collective control over the entire apparatus of labor and socialization of the means of production in a “free association” of workers and citizens; reconstruction of the labor apparatus to produce objects of consumption necessary to fulfill human needs that would simultaneously allow development of human potentialities within the labor process; reduction of socially necessary

\(^{19}\) Marcuse, “Foreword,” *Negations*, p. xx.
\(^{121}\) Later, Marcuse’s friend Andre Gorz was to pursue a “politics of time,” arguing that new technologies made possible the reduction of alienated industrial labor and the production of a new economy and society of freedom; see the new edition of Andre Gorz, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Ecology* (London and New York: Verso, 2013).
labor time and expansion of free time; and the education of individuals to obtain the capacity for creativity, autonomy and individuality in both labor and free time.\textsuperscript{122}

In this Marcuscan vision, the “realm of freedom” may perhaps appear in the work process itself, in the performance of socially necessary labor. The technical apparatus could then serve to create a new social and natural environment: human beings could then have their own cities, their own houses, their own spaces of tranquility and joy; they could become free and learn how to live in freedom with others. Only with the creation of such an entirely different environment (which is well within the capabilities of technology and well beyond the capabilities of the vested interests which control technology) would the words “beauty,” “creativity,” “community,” and so on designate meaningful goals; the creation of such an environment would indeed be non-alienated labor.\textsuperscript{123}

By the late 1960s these reflections led Marcuse to criticize the concept in Marx’s \textit{Capital III} which maintains that “Human freedom in a true sense is possible only beyond the realm of necessity.”\textsuperscript{124} Marcuse now argues that Marx’s distinction between the realm of freedom and necessity epitomizes the division of the human existence into labor time and free time, the division between reason, rationality on the one hand, and pleasure, joy, fulfillment on the other hand, the division between alienated and non-alienated labor. According to this classical Marxian concept, the realm of necessity would remain a realm of alienation, no matter how much the working day is reduced. Moreover this conception seems to imply that free human activity is essentially different, and must remain essentially different from socially necessary work.\textsuperscript{125}

Marcuse then argues that there is another Marxian conception in the \textit{Grundrisse} which posits the possibility of freedom and creative activity within the realm of necessary labor, thus overcoming the dichotomy between free creative activity and socially necessary labor in \textit{Capital III}: “This concept,” Marcuse writes,

\begin{quote}
envisages conditions of full automation, where the immediate producer is indeed “dissociated” from the material process of production and becomes a free “subject” in the sense that he can play with, experiment with the technical material, with the possibilities of the machine and of the things produced and transformed by the machines. But as far as I know this most advanced vision of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{122} Marcuse, “The individual in the great society,” p. 74.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
a free society was apparently dropped by Marx himself and no longer appears in Capital and in the later writings.\textsuperscript{126}

Thinking through the consequences of this notion of non-alienated labor led Marcuse to rethink also the concepts of socialism and to sharpen his criticism of existing socialist societies. Throughout his writings, Marcuse polemicized against the tendency in socialist theory and practice to fetishize the unfettered development of the forces of production at the expense of developing new relations of production and human potentialities. He argues both for a new technology and against the development of current technology without a radical reconstruction of the labor process and technical apparatus.\textsuperscript{127} Here Marcuse corrects tendencies in existing socialism to take over both capitalist technologies (assembly line and Fordism, nuclear energy and weapons, etc.) and capitalist relations of production (Taylorism, labor stratification and hierarchy, wage differentials, etc.). Emancipatory socialism, by contrast, requires completely new institutions, relations of production, technologies and labor apparatuses. Such radical transformation would make possible the sort of non-alienated labor, erotic relations and harmonious community envisaged by Fourier.\textsuperscript{128} In this conception, socialism is “first of all, a new form of human existence” in which “self-determination” and freedom would at last be a real possibility for the majority of the population: “What is at stake is the idea of a new theory of human existence, not only as theory but also as a way of existence: the genesis and development of a vital need for freedom and of the vital needs of freedom.”\textsuperscript{129} Human beings in this society would have “a different sensitivity as well as consciousness: men and women who would speak a different language, have different gestures, follow different impulses; men and women who have developed an instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality, ugliness.”\textsuperscript{130} Consequently, in order to produce this type of socialism, there must be “the emergence and education of a new type of human being free from the aggressive and repressive needs and aspirations and attitudes of class society, human beings created, in solidarity and on their own initiative, their own environment, their own \textit{Lebenswelt}, their own “property.”\textsuperscript{131} Such a revolution in needs and values would help overcome a central dilemma in Marcuse’s theory—sharply formulated in One-Dimensional Man—that continued to haunt him: “how can the administered individuals—who have made their mutilation into their own liberties and satisfactions ... liberate

\textsuperscript{126} Marcuse, “The Individual in the Great Society,” op. cit.
\textsuperscript{127} On Marcuse’s concept of new technologies, see one-dimensional man and the discussion in Kellner, \textit{Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism}, pp. 330ff.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{EL}, pp. 21–2.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{EL}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{EL}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{131} Marcuse, “The Realm of Freedom,” op. cit.
themselves from themselves as well as from their masters? How is it even thinkable that the vicious circle be broken?"\(^{132}\)

In order to break through this vicious circle, individuals must transform their present needs and consciousness and develop new needs and consciousness so as to create the necessary conditions for social transformation.\(^{133}\) In the 1970s Marcuse argued that emancipatory needs were developing within contemporary society. Those who fault Marcuse for an allegedly extreme utopianism—which totally rejects this world for dreams of another world—fail to note that in his 1970s writings Marcuse does not push such a radical rupture between the present historical situation and need-structure and his proposed new human being and liberated society. Throughout the 1970s, Marcuse specifies social conditions which may begin to produce radical social transformation and valorizes struggles which may lead to radical structural transformation. Moreover, he continued to speculate on the new forms and organization of labor, new technologies, new institutions, new culture, new values and new types of human beings necessary to produce a society that would reduce the repugnant features of the existing society that have been the target of Marcuse's critical project. Although Marcuse never systematically developed these ideas, there are many indications scattered throughout his later writings as to what kind of individual and social transformation could generate new needs and liberate individuals from what Marcuse calls "repressive" or "false needs" and produce a qualitatively different type of society and way of life. In addition, Marcuse continued to analyze new forms of domination and power, and in the next section we shall discuss how Marcuse's ideas help illuminate forms of the construction of subjectivities and social control in contemporary neoliberal societies.

**MARCUSE AND NEOLIBERAL SUBJECTIFICATION**

In the later phase of Marcuse's writings and activism (1969–1979), one of the most consistent themes in his work was theorizing a material base from which a new culture and new biological foundation of human beings could emerge from within advanced capitalist society. During this period, Marcuse continually pointed to the revolutionary potential of non-integrated, marginalized sites of struggle that had materialized within a variety of groups fighting capitalist and imperial systems of domination and control. For Marcuse, the possibility for cultivating new human beings with alternative values to capitalist society needed to begin outside of the integrated working class (at least in the U.S.A. where he viewed unions and the large consumer

\(^{132}\) ODM, pp. 250–1.

\(^{133}\) El., p. 67.
population as mostly working within the ethos and ideology of capitalism). Thus radical student groups, the liberation movements of African American, Chicano/a, American Indian and other marginalized racial and gender groups in the U.S.A., and “third world” anticolonial movements, represented what he viewed as having the most potential for producing revolutionary forms of subjectivity and embodying a life of activism and the “great refusal.” Liberation movements linked to these groups suggested the beginnings of alternative forms of social life for Marcuse because their various practices of resistance and movement building was actively challenging and rejecting the values that undergirded advanced capitalist society as opposed to making deals with capital to improve the lives of some while continuing the exploitation of others. As Marcuse began to diagnose novel forms of control and domination that were beginning to become apparent in the early stages of neoliberalism in the U.S.A. throughout the 1970s, he warned that “against the specter of a fascism American-style, the Left is waging an uphill fight: divided in itself, without effective organization.” Yet Marcuse also maintained during this time that political opposition to a rising model of global fascism still retained revolutionary potential. For Marcuse, “its main weapon is still political education—countereducation—in theory and practice: the slow painful process of making people aware of the fact that the repressions required for maintaining the established society are no longer necessary, that they can be abolished without being replaced by another system of domination.”

Marcuse’s call for a type of countereducation to counteract “fascism American-style” is particularly important considering the degree to which repression and exploitation has exponentially increased in our fully mature neoliberal moment. In other words, in a society and culture that has advanced technological domination through new biotechnological practices that are able to more deeply intervene into the life processes of humans and nature, the development of countereducational strategies that can reject the mutilation and capitalization of life at the subjective level (the biological or instinctual as Marcuse calls it) is perhaps now more important than ever.

For example, consider how biotechnological and biomedical advancements have created more complex and sophisticated methods of control over the life functions of humans and nature since Marcuse’s death in 1979. Indeed, as we argued in the introduction for Volume 5, Marcuse’s critical theory of technology and science in capitalist society pointed to the ways in which new technologies carried with them a conservative pedagogical quality. That is, technologies in the workplace, in the living room, or images on the screen taught people ways to repress and sublimate their desires which, in turn, increased alienation through deeper investments in the relative affluence of

134 Article sent to Pierre Domercq May 18, 1976 which was published in _Le Monde Diplomatique_, and which we publish later (pp. 358ff).
advanced capitalist society and its ability to "deliver the goods." In short, one of the most insidious ways advanced capitalist society manages crises of production and consumption, and what Marcuse argued throughout most of his work from One-Dimensional Man forward, is through the cultivation of internalized forms of control that are largely taught through capitalist technologies geared toward dominating and optimizing life for a one-dimensional or, now perhaps more appropriately, a "flat world" (Friedman 2005). Subjects in the context of a neoliberal "flat world" are thus compelled within a radically marketized society to adjust their cognitive abilities (with drugs such as Ritalin and Adderall) so as to attain optimal performance in schools and workplaces, invade women’s bodies to assess the genetic health of fetuses or even to choose a preferred sex, boost one’s libido through the artificial regulation of sexual desires and performance, and even participate in the creation and consumption of new commodity life forms (genetically engineered animals and plants). Marcuse’s call to uneducate ourselves from the needs created in what now can be called a “biocapitalist” age could not be more relevant especially when one considers the depth of control new technologies have attained over bodies, entire populations, and increasingly the entire biosphere.

How new technologies and science create the material conditions for greater biological control over humans and nonhumans in capitalist society was indeed a major concern in Marcuse’s work. In one of his most important works written during the gestation period of U.S. neoliberal reform, Counterrevolution and Revolt, Marcuse makes this point with stunning accuracy:

In the established society, nature itself, ever more effectively controlled, has in turn become another dimension for the control of man: the extended arm of society and its power. Commercialization of nature, polluted nature, militarized nature cut down the life environment of man, not only in an ecological but also in a very existential sense. It blocks the erotic cathexis (and transformation) of his environment: it deprives man from finding himself in nature, beyond and this side of alienation; it also prevents him from recognizing nature as a subject in its own right—a subject with which to live in a common human universe.135

Here it is clear that Marcuse interpreted human and natural domination in advanced capitalist society as inextricably linked; in nature’s domination through science and technology humans learn that dominating their internal psychological (and now genetic) dimension in order to make themselves more efficient producers and consumers in a competitive market society is a natural and in fact desirable performance principle to follow.

135 Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) p. 60.
In fact, perhaps more than any theorist of the twentieth century, Marcuse's focus on how the productive capacities of human beings (as well as the expansion of biological control over nature) were increasingly targeted in capitalist systems of domination points to what current neoliberal theorists have called neoliberal subjectification: the onset of an "ethic of self-care" that guides individual decision making by taking its cues from the rationalities and practices produced by institutions and corporate actors focused on expanding market logics into the molecular domain of life. In our view, from the late 1960s forward one of the most prominent areas of Marcuse's research looked at the question of how social life was being reconstituted in line with an increasingly aggressive market society that demanded people think of themselves as highly competitive and entrepreneurial individuals. In the contemporary moment, this involves analyzing how new biotechnologies and biomedical treatments produce subjectified individuals as optimizable biological organisms within a consumer capitalist culture.

Hence, technological rationality, a concept Marcuse analyzed throughout much of his work, in the beginning stages of contemporary neoliberal society has been advancing to a point where human subjectivity itself was increasingly being administered not just at an ideological level but also a biological one. As a way to underscore this aspect of Marcuse's research that focused on subjectification within capitalist systems of control, we focus in this section on two related themes: technologies of subjective integration and the possibility of reconstructing social life along qualitatively different terms. In the final decade of Marcuse's research on advanced industrial society, one of the enduring questions he investigated tried to identify tendencies in capitalist society where "a qualitatively different human existence, of a life no longer spent in earning a living, the reduction of alienated labor to a minimum, and consequently, the emergence of a new sensibility, a new morality, the rediscovery of the body and of nature as life enhancing and life protecting powers" could emerge. For the late Marcuse, the intensification brought on by new forms of technological control over the body and mind redrew the lines of resistance—in particular the need to articulate spaces and practices that could liberate subjectivity from its increased administration and control.

---


Marcuse began regularly introducing his theoretical and practical call for the creation of a “new man or humanity” at the Dialectics of Liberation conference in 1967, and in 1969 in his Essay on Liberation. Building on his analyses developed in Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man where he examined the novel ways advanced capitalist society was integrating the psychological and political dimensions of individuals into capitalist social relations and values, Marcuse started focusing on the ontological question of how freedom and happiness could be reconstructed outside the value framework of capitalist society and become a new biological foundation of the subject. For us, Marcuse’s identification of the problem of subjectification in advanced capitalist society (and especially in this early stage of neoliberalism) is one that reflects one of the most constant qualities of his critical theory of society: the application of Marxism to the contemporary moment as a way to better address the particular historical advances of capitalist systems of control and domination. Of course, such a line of analysis does not set Marcuse against Marx (at least the thinker himself); rather it advances Marx’s own identification of the importance of subjectivity as it relates to the mode and means of production of capitalism throughout its evolutionary arc.

Here we are suggesting that Marcuse’s turn to how the subject is produced in advanced capitalist society, and what liberatory potential exist within the current model of capitalist production, picks up on Marx’s own investigations into the dialectical relation between subject formation within sites of capitalist production and the types of discipline needed to ensure the optimization and maximization of surplus value from the workers’ bodies. For instance, in Marx’s famous chapter in Capital Volume 1 on “Machinery and Large-Scale Industry,” Marx is not solely concerned with the effect of technology on the rate and mass of surplus value, though this is a main focus of the chapter. In addition to theorizing the ways technological advancement within the capitalist mode of production intensified alienated labor and thus stunted the creative, educative, and imaginative powers of workers during the periods of handicrafts, modern manufacture, and large-scale industry, Marx also clearly delineated a pedagogical or educational dimension that was beginning to develop between the human/machine relation that had reached its apex in the factory. In one of the most striking passages of this chapter, Marx points to the ways education for technical competency in the factory became a way to control and shape the “disposable working population held in reserve, in misery, for the changing requirements of capitalist exploitation.”

That is, Marx argues that the bourgeoisie, working hand-in-glove with the state (in this case through the Factory Act laws), eventually required a particular type of subjectivity from the overall mass of the working populations in Europe.

For Marx, capitalist factory owners and investors, as well as members of the British parliament, learned throughout the evolutionary process of capitalist development that directly intervening into the subject formation of the working population led to greater degrees of extractable surplus value. In this sense, capitalist technology and science had to expand its reach beyond the factory walls in order to increase the accumulation process (and its ultimate goal of maximizing surplus value from human labor power). One way that Marx identified how the bourgeoisie regulated the bodies and minds of working-class populations to the rhythm and movements of factory technologies was through the vocational and educational curricula of schools (as well as in the factories themselves). Noting the bourgeoisie's need to produce higher value subjectivities (value-added beings in contemporary economic terms) through factory technology, Marx writes:

"though the Factory Act, that first and meager concession wrung from capital, is limited to combining elementary education with work in the factory, there can be no doubt that, with the inevitable conquest of political power by the working class, technological education, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the schools of the workers."  

From Marx's point of view, subjectification in vocational and public schools that focused on strengthening limbs, increasing endurance, and generally preparing bodies to push human labor power to its maximum limit, grew out of the capitalist class's blind drive to increase its primary source of value: human labor power.

For Marx, which is particularly evident in Chapter 15 of Capital Volume 1, the historical development and advancement of the capitalist mode of production dialectically included the requirement to produce optimizable subjectivities to the needs of capitalist growth. Massive factory machines of the industrial age, as Marx shows in his historical analysis of the different technological periods, not only divided labor along gender and age lines, it also mutilated the productive and creative powers of human beings through standardizing and centralizing habits of labor and their disciplinary mechanisms within sites of capitalist production. In other words, subjectivity in the factories that Marx analyzed in the industrial age of capital had to be disciplined and taught to subjects (workers) in order to be responsive to the needs of machines, to give over their life forces to the productive powers of capital and not to their own autonomous development as multidimensional beings. Yet in his masterwork and in other writings, Marx only just began to touch upon the long-term physiological and psychological affects on the subjectivity of the individual worker and the larger population in general.

139 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 619.
Marcuse's turn to the subjective dimension in the latter phase of his work, we suggest, picks up and extends this legacy of Marx in some very important and relevant ways for our contemporary moment. It also demonstrates that Marcuse was neither a dogmatic Marxist nor was he a theorist who rejected Marx's analyses as irrelevant to the problems of the late capitalist period. Rather Marcuse consistently adhered to Marx's own methodological and philosophical approach of historical materialism. This meant for Marcuse understanding and critiquing the evolutionary adaptations the capitalist mode of production develops in pressing beyond its limits while also identifying sites of revolutionary potential in society.

One of the clearest examples of Marcuse's application of historical materialism in the late capitalist period was in his analysis of the revolutionary subject position. As Marx's own study of capital had shown, the expansion and growth of the capitalist mode of production also created its own negating forces through its greatest internal contradiction: the proletariat. For Marcuse, different from Western Marxists such as Lukács and many of his contemporaries who dogmatically gave primacy to the proletariat class and communist parties as the only revolutionary group in capitalist society, the role of historical materialism, and thus Marxism, was to chart and identify the contours of the internal laws of capital within historically and culturally specific settings. In this sense, Marcuse can be seen as not imputing the revolutionary results (the proletariat) of Marx's dialectical analysis of industrial capitalism, but rather generating a historically specific theory of the revolutionary subject position in the late capitalist period and specifically in its early transitional phase into the neoliberal form of capitalism.

For Marcuse, this meant, in large part, understanding how capitalism itself is a historic and dynamic process that constantly shifts in response to its internal limits and barriers (such as working-day laws in the industrial period). In the 1970s, Marcuse saw capitalism shifting to respond to some of the gains made by unions, civil rights movements, and government entitlement programs, as well as legislation protecting the environment (the creation of the EPA for example). In an unpublished talk in 1975 Marcuse offered a striking analysis of the growing proto-neoliberal movement in the U.S.A. The manuscript from the Frankfurt, Germany, Herbert Marcuse archive titled "Why Talk on Socialism?" powerfully shows Marcuse outlining what has today become integral features to the various neoliberal restructuring projects underway in the U.S.A. and across the globe.140 Pointing to the policies of Gerald Ford's administration after Nixon's impeachment, Marcuse accurately forecasts economic and social policy that has become completely normalized in the current historical moment:

140 Charles Reitz provides an excellent contextualization of this piece which we include in this volume; see his note that accompanies the text on p. 111.
Ford’s program: the logical answer of neo-capitalism: help the rich, compel the poor to work harder. For example, Treasure Secretary Simon regarding the tax reduction “money must not be channeled to families earning more than $20,000 a year because they are the biggest buyers” (Los Angeles Times, January 23 [1975]). And the time honored remedy: end the proliferation of such non-profitable services as “food stamps, social security, and federal retirement benefits” and cut down on education (no tax rebates). Why? In order to reverse the “downward slide of corporate profits.” For “the Administration fears drift to socialism” (Budget Director of Los Angeles, Ash (Los Angeles Times, January 26 [1975]). “Downward slide” of which corporations? The same papers report record profits of Exxon, Standard, Indiana and California, Texaco, Mobil, and even the steel industry, banking industry, etc. Others will continue to depend on the huge government subsidies (Lockheed, PanAm, etc.)—which is of course not socialism! The program wouldn’t help because the collapse of prosperity is rooted in the capitalist mode of production itself—its inevitable outcome—is socialism inevitable?

The picture Marcuse paints in 1975 of the social and economic policies aimed at reconsolidating wealth in the hands of an elite corporate class and increased disciplining of the poor and communities of color to “work harder” is indicative of the intensifying “repression and control of the population” generated from the internal contradictions of capitalism. Yet Marcuse also viewed the burgeoning neoliberal stage of capitalism as producing even more powerful conditions of social control and discipline in his rethinking of Marx’s revolutionary subject under “the concentrated power of corporate capitalism.” In a short commentary Marcuse wrote titled “The Reification of the Proletariat,” he gives perhaps his clearest model of how and where revolutionary subjectivity could be produced within a social and political environment created through corporate monopoly capitalism (see p. 392, this volume).

On the one hand, as we discuss in more detail in the next section, Marcuse viewed the proletariat not as a static, universal place holder for revolutionary subjectivity. Instead he argued for a historical materialist concept that did not reject the fact that “the working class [is] still the ‘ontological’ antagonist of capital, and potentially revolutionary subject,” but understood it as “a vastly expanded working class, which no longer corresponds directly to the Marxian proletariat.” Marcuse thus theorized the “working class” as a multifaceted category shaped by the perpetual advancement of the capitalist mode of production, especially in its shift into a highly technological and knowledge-based system. In Marcuse’s understanding of an “expanded

142 Marcuse, “Reification of the Proletariat,” see p. 392.
143 Marcuse, “Reification of the Proletariat,” see p. 392.
working" class, he was including along with traditional forms of working-class labor engineers, technocrats, scientists, professionals, and white-collar employees as the more privileged group, but nonetheless still performing alienated forms of work as they also lacked control of the means of production. Drawing on Rudolf Bahro's work on surplus consciousness, Marcuse argued that the gap between the top tier of the expanded working class and bottom was closing due to the generalization of knowledge and education that the advanced capitalist mode of production required in new industries such as computer processing, medicine, food production, military technology, and so on.

Capitalist society in the early growth period of neoliberalism was speeding up the "mechanization and intellectualization" of labor and, as a result, Marcuse argued "an increasing quantity of general ability, skills, knowledge" was accumulating in a way that could create the basis for revolutionary change. Again, Marcuse's resituating of revolutionary subjectivity within a new phase of capitalist growth is strikingly similar to contemporary theorists such as Maurizio Lazzarato, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt who have offered insightful analyses on the importance of immaterial labor (labor based on the exchange of knowledge and symbols and affective behavior) in the global neoliberal context. Not unlike these theorists' call to rethink revolution and resistance within global networks of capitalist power in a "multitudinal" fashion, Marcuse was already theorizing a model of revolutionary subjectivity as a multifaceted concept during this period of the 1970s. Similar to Hardt and Negri's suggestion that immaterial forms of labor form the basis to the formation of subjectivities under neoliberal technologies of control, Marcuse argues that:

surplus consciousness tends to become a material force, not primarily as class consciousness, but rather as the consciousness of an opposition which expresses itself in new (or recaptured) modes of action, initiated not by any specific class, but by a precarious and temporary "alliance" of groups among the dependent population. Such actions include the "citizen initiatives" (e.g., the organized protest against nuclear energy installations, against capitalist urban renewal), the fight against racism and sexism, the students' protest, etc. At the same time, workers' initiatives transcend the merely economic class struggle in the demands for the self-organization (autogestion) of work.


145 Marcuse, "Reification of the Proletariat," see p. 392.
Here it is clear that for Marcuse the question of how revolutionary subjectivity can be produced in a highly controlled and repressed capitalist society rests on (1) the expansion of the category of the proletariat and labor; and (2) the creation of diverse collective sites of struggle against new formations of oppression and technologies of control. Marcuse, just as Marx had done in his initial theorization of the creation of the industrial working class in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, recognized that the technological dynamism driving capitalist development involved not only the constantly transforming mode of production driven by the search for new ways to increase surplus value, but also transforming the subjectivity of workers and, in particular, producing new forms of knowledge and technology that could be repurposed for revolutionary instead of repressive needs. The noose of centralization and technological progress that the capitalist unwittingly provided for Marx's proletariat in the industrial era, in other words, needed to be reconstructed in a more permeable and less fixed manner according to Marcuse's application of historical materialism in early neoliberal society to conceptualize both new forms of social control and resistance.

In Marcuse's historical materialist rethinking of the subject position for revolutionary life in early neoliberal society, we can see that technologies of subjective integration have a distinct dialectical quality. Today, mass media, information technologies, and genetic food industries, in their ability to control the "dependent population" at a deeper level (genetic), also represent what Marcuse earlier saw as more dispersed and varied forms of revolutionary forces and sites of negation. Hence, the revolutionary subject is not necessarily tied exclusively to the factory in the neoliberal phase of capitalism. In fact, in the expansion of technological domination over the life of the worker and nature the neoliberal phase of capitalism creates its own, potentially autonomous, sites of resistance where revolutionary subjectivity is being produced. For example, the food sovereignty movement in India and Latin America has constituted itself as a resistive response to neoliberal policies forcing the acceptance of industrial agriculture policies and practices and allowing acts of "biopiracy" that transfer biological material and place-based indigenous knowledge into circuits of capitalist exchange. Further, a variety of anti-austerity movements in Turkey, Greece, Spain, the U.S.A. (the Occupy Movement), Mexico, Italy, and many Latin-American countries have revolted against the increased disciplining measures taken against the developing world and the developed world against an expanded working class (immigrants, educational workers, farmers, refugee populations, sex workers, youth, and so on) by an increasingly smaller oligarchy of corporate and military elite which has generated massive yet diverse forms of revolutionary resistance and thus spaces of subject formation. In a remarkable letter written to the radical German student leader Rudi Dutschke (included in this volume), Marcuse articulates an example of how revolutionary subjectivity could be produced in a contemporary counter-cultural space: the commune. Speaking on the challenges of political organization against
capital and other forms of oppression such as racism, sexism, and imperial warfare in southeast Asia, Marcuse points to the commune as a potential site of revolutionary subjectivity production that is worth quoting at length. Despite their limitations, Marcuse writes:

Still the communes have a powerful potential, but this can only come to fruition if they maintain their connection to the “outside” political movement. Politicization, in this sense, does not mean that Marx and Mao are to be continuously studied in the communes, but rather that these communes actually, though temporarily, become units of production that reconstruct not only personal affairs but also the common work. Learning how to farm, even small-scale industrial labor, how to operate computers and become familiar with technology—not to attain a romantic regime of guilds and craftsmanship—but in order to be able to enter into society’s fabrication processes at a later date and to be able to work in the right manner in the transition to socialist production. In these ways the communes could impart a practical socialism and give it a trial run. In this manner you can connect personal life (and individual relationship) to the life of the particular community and to the world “outside.” A commune must organize itself with a view to its future Aufhebung [transformation into a higher form]. Personal liberation, instead of being bogged down in self-indulgence, can direct itself toward the common good through autonomy and discipline. And to do all of this in the complete awareness that one’s efforts are only of a preparatory sort and the societal processes are of detestably long duration.146

In Marcuse’s description of the revolutionary potential of autonomous sites of subjectification such as the commune, we can see how a countereducation might materialize in neoliberal contexts. A few important features of countereducation Marcuse identifies can be extrapolated from this passage. First, the commune as a site of subjectification cannot exist as a venue for escapism, a political project that ignores the “outside world” and the ongoing assault on life. Second, from an ontological and labor perspective, human productivity should not be regulated by dogmatic principles, but rather a common and experimental model of living together collectively in a way that doesn’t reproduce individualistic nor cultist notions of a group. Such an experimental and open modality of labor for Marcuse importantly stresses “common work” based on recommoning practices with the land, technology, and habit formation outside the performance principle of capitalist society. Finally, spaces of autonomous subjectification such as the commune represented for Marcuse sites of generative change, human communities that could model and demonstrate alternative and diverse examples of life outside (but also inside) of capitalist systems of domination and control. In

the above example of a site that retains revolutionary subjectivity potential for Marcuse, we can also see how a countereducation to capitalist society involves combining the destruction of capitalist technologies of integration with alternative spaces of subjectivity production to create a new, albeit temporary dialectical unity. The challenge now and for the future is to identify spaces such as the one Marcuse describes here that can accomplish such a practice of countereducation for the subject in neoliberal society. As technologies of subjective (and nonhuman) integration are now working at the genetic level, reconstructive sites of collective life that can reject and produce an alternative to neoliberal society have new challenges indeed, Marcuse's theorization of proto-neoliberal subjectification however provides a powerful and practical guide as do current anti-capital, anti-racist, gender equality, and ecological movements that have formed into highly unique and diverse sites of countereducational practice.

**MARCUSE, MARXISM, AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY**

Although Marcuse was attacked by orthodox Marxists for his "revisionism," he never abandoned the Hegelian Marxian search for a "revolutionary subject." Far from surrendering the Marxian revolutionary problematic, in retrospect some of the problems with Marcuse's account in the late 1960s derive from a failure to question more fundamentally Marxian concepts of the proletariat as the privileged agent of revolution, the concept of a "revolutionary subject," and the Marxian concept of revolution as a radical upheaval and overthrow of the existing society leading to the seizure of state power and the establishment of a revolutionary government.

The problem is that the Marxian model simply did not fit the process of social change taking place in the 1960s in the U.S.A. and other advanced capitalist countries. Although Marcuse is to be lauded for expanding Marxian discourse, opening up its categories to new historical content, and championing progressive social forces, ultimately his view of social transformation was deeply immersed in the Marxian theory of revolution, forcing him in the 1970s to revise more radically his views on social change, the working class and the transition to socialism.147

Marcuse's critique of the orthodox Marxian theory of revolution is evident in a conversation with Hans Magnus Enzensberger, published in

---

147 See Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, who argues that Marcuse's life-work responded to different crises for the Marxian theory when historical and political conditions revealed its limitations. When Marcuse observed new forces of revolution and new social movements emerging in the 1960s and 1970s, he accordingly revised his theory of social change.
Enzensberger continually confronts Marcuse with orthodox Marxist-Leninist positions on capitalism and revolution, while Marcuse radicalizes his critique of orthodox Marxism and moves towards new revolutionary perspectives. Marcuse continually affirmed that the industrial working class today is no longer equivalent to Marx's proletariat, which is a historically specific concept derived from an earlier stage of capitalist development, and argued that the category of immizeration is no longer the crucial criterion delineating the revolutionary subject. Rather, the mark of potentially revolutionary forces is oppression; those people who are not totally integrated into the system, who do not identify with the system, may develop needs or consciousness that might provide the subjective conditions for radical social change. These needs are not necessarily born out of poverty, Marcuse stresses. They might grow out of oppression at work, gender, sexual, or racial oppression, or simply the experience of living in an oppressive society whose way of life is no longer tolerable. Such potentially radical forces of opposition are not solely—or even primarily—to be found in the industrial working class, but may cut across classes and be found in groups of intellectuals, students, the unemployed, racial minorities, and so on.

Marcuse stresses that the concept of the "proletariat" for Marx is both a socio-economic category and a political one. As a sociological concept, the proletariat describes the industrial working class engaged in manual labor, which is defined by wage labor sold to capital that is both "alienated" from the products of labor and the control of labor activity and is exploited through its production of surplus value and consequent appropriation by the capitalist class. As the most alienated and exploited class, the proletariat is for Marx, politically, a "revolutionary class" whose life activity represents

148 In a 1957 preface to Raya Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 Until Today* (New York: Humanities Press, 2000), Marcuse writes: "Marx's concept of the proletariat as 'revolutionary class in itself [an sich] did not designate a merely occupational group—i.e. the wage earners engaged in the material production—as a truly dialectical concept, it was at one and the same time an economic, political and philosophical category. As such it comprised three main elements: (1) the specific societal mode of production characteristic of 'free' capitalism, (2) the existential and political conditions brought about by this mode of production, (3) the political consciousness developed in this situation. Any historical change in even one of these elements (and such a change has certainly occurred) would require a thorough theoretical modification. Without such modification, the Marxian notion of the working class seems to be applicable neither to the majority of the laboring classes in the West nor to that in the communist orbit" (p. 12). Precisely this issue preoccupied Marcuse throughout the last decades.
the absolute negation of capitalist society, and whose intolerable working and living conditions create needs to overthrow the existing society and to create a new one. Thus, for Marx, the proletariat is an explosive political force, and Marx believed that its position in the process of production and organization in the factory, in trade unions and in political parties made it the central revolutionary force. Moreover, Marx believed that it was a universal class that represented the general need to replace capitalism with more humane forms of production and life.

Marcuse emphasizes again and again that the proletariat is the potentially revolutionary subject for Marx because it does not share the needs of the bourgeois class and because its needs demand the overthrow of capitalism. If the working class is free of capitalist consciousness, values and needs, then it is capable of producing a new society since it is free from the needs and values of the old one. If, however, industrial workers are not free from capitalist needs and values, and if they share needs and values with the rest of the “underlying population,” then such workers are not a “revolutionary subject” in Marx’s sense.

Therefore the “proletariat” for Marx is not simply identical with “wage labor” or the “working class” per se, but is pre-eminently a political concept denoting the subject of revolution. In a letter to Lassalle which Marcuse liked to quote, Marx claimed that the “proletariat is revolutionary or it is nothing at all.”149 Marcuse insists that today the industrial working class is no longer the radical negation of capitalist society and is therefore no longer the revolutionary class. It has no monopoly today, he claims, on oppression and immiseration, and is in fact better organized, better paid and better off than many members of racial minorities, women, and service, clerical and agricultural workers, as well as the unemployed and unemployable. In this case, the industrial working class no longer possesses “radical needs” to overthrow the system and is thus not a revolutionary proletariat in Marx’s sense. Thus Marcuse rejects theories which make the industrial working class the privileged agent of revolution and which operate with a fetishized concept of class. In a conversation with Habermas, Marcuse states:

To say that the proletariat is integrated no longer does justice to the existing state of affairs. Instead, one must go further in one’s formulations. In present day late capitalism, the Marxist proletariat, in so far as it still exists at all, only represents a minority within the working class. The working class, in terms of its consciousness and praxis, has been embourgeoisified to a great extent. Therefore, we cannot apply reified, fixed Marxist concepts directly and rigidly to the present situation. The expanded working class, which today makes up 90 per cent of the population and which includes the great majority

149 Karl Marx, letter to Lassalle, cited in a lecture by Marcuse at Columbia University, 11 October 1972.
of white collar workers, service workers—in short, everything Marx ever designated under the term productive worker—this working class remains a potential agent or subject of revolution; but the revolution itself will be an entirely different project than it was for Marx. One will have to contend with groups which were of no significance whatsoever to original Marxist theory; for example, the renowned marginal groups organized by students, oppressed racial and national minorities, women (who comprise no minority but rather the majority), citizens’ initiatives, etc. These are not substitute groups who are to become the new revolutionary subjects. They are, as I call them, anticipatory groups that may function as catalysts, and no more than that.\textsuperscript{150}

This situation invalidates previous theories of revolution which posited a radical, violent upheaval led by proletarian insurrections, aiming at the conquest of state power and the establishment of a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Answering Enzensberger, who was defending the orthodox Marxian scenario, Marcuse argued that the very concept of a “dictatorship of the proletariat” is no longer an appropriate political concept:

When proletariat signifies “factory worker,” as it did for Marx, then this formulation is completely inadequate. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” was for Marx, and people forget this too easily, the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority of the people over a minority. Is the “proletariat” in this sense still an overwhelming majority in the advanced industrial lands? Does it have today a monopoly on being exploited?\textsuperscript{151}

Marcuse was probably the most tenacious and unyielding critic of the Marxian concept of the “proletariat” as the privileged revolutionary subject. Historical scholarship of the epoch was questioning the cogency of Marx’s own concept of the proletariat, which conflates features of the British, French and German working classes into a quasi-Hegelian revolutionary subject. For instance, Timothy McCarthy claimed that the early Marx’s concept of “revolutionary proletariat” was put in question by the revolutions of 1848, by the historical situation in Europe in the 1850s and 1860s, the Paris Commune and the later developments of the labor movement.\textsuperscript{152} The failure of the proletariat to carry out its revolutionary mission and the changed class composition of the working class in the twentieth century has led Andre Gorz to write a polemic, \textit{Adieux au Proletariat}, which calls—in the spirit of Marcuse—for new perceptions of the working class(es) and new

\textsuperscript{150} Marcuse and Habermas, “Theory and Politics,” p. 150.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

perspectives on social transformation. While incurring the wrath of many orthodox Marxists, Marcuse's critique of traditional Marxism thus forced those interested in radical social change to rethink the dynamics of class composition and social change in advanced capitalism through his constant interrogation of the Marxian theory.

Although Marcuse does not disavow confrontation politics, or even violence in some situations, on the whole in his last years he advocated more gradualist, democratic coalition politics that would create the preconditions for socialism. Marcuse also continued to assert his utopian socialist position which argued that a vision of emancipation and a better life was necessary to motivate and guide progressive social transformation in the contemporary era. Yet, in general, during the 1970s, Marcuse tended to sublimate his "revolutionary romanticism" into theories of a liberated society and humanity, rather than into visions of a revolutionary upheaval of the sorts that he and others envisaged in the 1960s.

For Marcuse, several decades of severe disillusionment after the defeat of the German revolution, the Spanish communes, the triumph of fascism, the strengthening of monopoly capitalism after the Second World War, and the failures of the New Left, produced a "revolutionary realism" that led Marcuse to formulate new perspectives on revolution and to criticize both Marxist-Leninist theories and his own former views. Marcuse's openness to new perspectives and ideas and his readiness to revise his theory in the light of novel experiences demonstrate a remarkable flexibility and openness in his thinking which has been grossly underestimated due to many critics' perception of him as a victim of "one-dimensional pessimism." On the contrary, Marcuse was remarkably flexible and was until his death always open to new ideas and perspectives. Therefore we believe that Marcuse would be highly sympathetic to the Arab Uprisings of 2011 and explosion of global Occupy movements from Tahrir Square to Occupy Wall Street and multiple sites throughout the world.

In 2011, a year with a similar insurrectionary aura as 1968, a year in which Marcuse's ideas and influence were evident, saw insurrections in north African Arab uprisings, leading to the overthrow of dictators, first in Tunisia and Egypt, and then in Libya after an intense civil war. Impressively, the people of Egypt and Tunisia had both overthrown corrupt dictators and in non-violent demonstrations had expressed their will for change and yearnings for democracy, freedom, social justice and dignity. As Slavoj Žižek maintained, the Egyptian (and arguably Tunisian) revolutions had been

---

secular, with demonstrators combing calls for democracy and freedom with demands for social justice.\textsuperscript{155}

The uprisings exemplified the "people power" movements of the 1960s, as well as the model of the "multitude" seizing power developed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. As Hardt and Negri argued in a widely-circulated article on the Arab uprisings:

One challenge facing observers of the uprisings spreading across North Africa and the Middle East is to read them as not so many repetitions of the past but as original experiments that open new political possibilities, relevant well beyond the region, for freedom and democracy. Indeed, our hope is that through this cycle of struggles the Arab world becomes for the next decade what Latin America was for the last—that is, a laboratory of political experimentation between powerful social movements and progressive governments from Argentina to Venezuela, and from Brazil to Bolivia.\textsuperscript{156}

Hardt and Negri do not mention here the role of charismatic Latin-American leaders with political parties who galvanized social movements to win state power in democratic elections. In his documentary \textit{South of the Border} (2010), Oliver Stone focuses on several presidents in Latin America who have led movements to produce left and center-left regimes. While Stone arguably exaggerates the role of the charismatic Latin-American leaders that he interviews in his film, and downplays the role of social movements, it is likely that the Latin-American left had evolved a progressive agenda with a combination of charismatic leaders and progressive political parties aligned with social movements.

The insurrections have been described by Hardt and Negri and their followers in terms of revolutionary desires articulated in non-hierarchical rhizomatic networks without central authority or leadership. Žižek (2011), by contrast, calls for strong political movements with a specific program and goals claiming that the self-organization of the protest movements "is clearly not enough to impose a reorganization of social life. To do that, one needs a strong body able to reach quick decisions and to implement them with all


necessary harshness." The question thus emerges from the Egyptian and Tunisian insurrections whether movements and masses without charismatic leaders and progressive parties can construct a genuinely democratic society, without producing oppressive institutions and violence. Their challenge is also to generate political leaders and groups who nurture democratic institutions and social relations without developing oppressive modes of power and reverting to the old mode of authoritarian government and repression.

In mediating between Hardt and Negri, who describe the political insurrections of 2011 in terms of networks of revolutionary desire and political experiment, and Žižek who calls for strong political organization and revolutionary political strategy, we might reflect on the use of Herbert Marcuse’s concept of revolutionary subjectivity and concept of revolution in the contemporary moment. Like Deleuze and Guattari, and Hardt and Negri, Marcuse points to the role of revolutionary desire and the body in motivating political insurrection, but equally insists on the cultivation of critical subjectivity and critical theory to intelligently merge theory with practice. In addition, Marcuse theorizes the destructive instincts, described in Freud’s concept of thanatos, which threaten that an unleashed subjectivity engaged in passionate political insurrection can generate violence and destruction, a danger which a critical political subjectivity needs to be constantly vigilant toward and to channel destructive instincts into liberating actions and goals. Indeed, as we write in 2013, continued violence in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya after their insurrections and ongoing violence in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and other countries point to the depth-dimension of instinctual aggression that has been produced by centuries of capitalist and imperialist violence, providing obstacles to liberation that Marcuse was concerned to theorize and to develop new subjectivities that would seek a life free of violence, exploitation, and war.

As global movements against the enclosure of more forms of life grow, such as food security and re-commoning of land and autonomous food production movements, Marcuse’s demand for a countereducation that rejects the further commodification and control of life and replaces it with a “new human being” and non-oppressive relation to nature may be emerging as we write. One important lesson we can take away from the writings in this final volume of the collected papers of Herbert Marcuse, therefore, is that Marxism, revolution, and utopia in the thought and work of Marcuse are concepts and practices that identify historically grounded forms of domination and oppression while simultaneously articulating

---

forms of resistance appropriate to new types of control. Perhaps learning to be different human beings who embody alternative values from the ones produced and disciplined in advanced neoliberal capitalist societies requires a kind of double abolition. The first act of abolition would need to take place at the insti?ctual, unconscious (and conscious) level of the subject who has internalized the oppressive and life-destroying power relations (racism, patriarchy, class, and domination of the natural world) of an even more brutally efficient society. Here, in other words, subjects would need to abolish the various pedagogies powerful new industries such as the biopharmaceutical and bio-genetic food sciences employ to train individuals to think of health and bodily optimization in their terms.

The second level of abolition needed to begin the countereducation Marcuse suggests in our neoliberal moment would be through a reconstruction and re-imagina?on of where education and learning in general can take place. As Marcuse and later Douglas Kellner have demonstrated in his body of work, cultural apparatuses such as the media and advertising industries in general have created a kind of permanent education in society where individuals take their cues from the most powerful corporations of the capitalist era. Pharmaceutical industries, for example, spend equal or more on “public education campaigns” (advertising and marketing) than they do on actual research and development of new drugs. Higher educational institutions similarly market themselves as sites of human capital investment for individuals looking to re-train and prepare themselves for the competitive neoliberal economy of the twenty-first century. Yet education sold and consumed as an exchange-value commodity also relies on and teaches educational consumers that it is their responsibility to adequately prepare themselves for the knowledge-based workforce—including the cost that itself is another site of capital accumulation in the student loan industry.

To conclude: Herbert Marcuse experienced many of the major historical events of the twentieth century including the German and Russian revolutions of the First World War; the rise of fascism and the Second World War; the stabilization of capitalism and development of a consumer society in the 1950s; the political and cultural upheavals of the 1970s; and their decline and the rise of what would be seen as Reaganism, soon after Marcuse’s death in 1979. We believe that Marcuse’s categories can provide a model for analysis of conservative counterrevolutions, as well as the rise of neoliberalism and globalization and a triumphant capitalism in the 1990s. While many forecast the death of Marxism after the collapse of the Soviet Union and actually existing communism in 1989, we would argue that the rise of neoliberalism and globalization, manifold capitalist and ecological crises,

and global opposition to them in an ever-expanding array of oppositional movements, suggests that Marxian/Marcusian categories continue to be salient to analyzing and contesting forms of domination and theorizing forces of resistance and liberation in the contemporary moment. As we suggested in this Introduction, Herbert Marcuse's activist version of critical Marxism continues to be relevant in the era of continuous global financial crisis from 2007–2008 to the present, and of global uprisings from the Arab uprisings to the Occupy movements of 2011 which have placed insurrection and social upheaval back on the historical agenda. History never repeats itself and we need constantly to develop and refine our theories and practices, but we can learn from and use the best theories of the past, and the life and work of Herbert Marcuse continues to be relevant to those interested in radical critique of existing society and developing emancipatory alternatives and a better way of life.
I

STUDIES IN MARXISM

REVIEW OF KARL VORLÄNDER’S KARL MARX: SEIN LEBEN UND SEIN WERK

Vorländer wants to “give[n] a frank description based on facts, a description which honors the great man but nonetheless knows itself to be free from any one-sided prejudice.” “Sine ira et studio,” he wants to project a vivid image of Marx’s “course through life of his personality and his world-view” and also “of his scientific and political main achievement in its essential traits.” The intention of the author thus is directed toward an “objective biography,” i.e., the description of the life of an historical personality, of the range and effect of that personality, without any presuppositions, if possible.

From the beginning, such a formulation of the task raises the question as to how far such an intention can at all gain a proper perspective on its object, i.e., whether an objective biography can at all grasp Karl Marx as an historical figure. Biography contains the life which it describes as an image of the hero who collects from his surrounding world the forces and powers which nourish him until his personality is fully formed and he grasps his time and forms it. Thus the unique personality becomes the final unit of meaning in which historical forces and powers merely mirror themselves.

*Editors' note:*
The review of Karl Vorländer: Karl Marx: Sein Leben und Sein Werk was published in the official journal of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Die Gesellschaft, 6 (part 2), 8 (Berlin: 1929) p. 1869. The text shows Marcuse attempting to define what a Marxist biography of Marx would look like and how Vorländer falls short. In particular, Marcuse claims that Vorländer’s attempt to provide an “objective biography” reduces Karl Marx to the biographical facts of his personal life and downplays his intellectual and political significance. The detailed critique of Vorländer’s distortions of Marx’s ideas show Marcuse to be a Marx scholar of the first rank, an achievement confirmed by the collection of articles in this volume.
Studies in Marxism

In its fullness, this personality thus is already history itself and becomes historically determining.

It is certainly possible to describe Karl Marx's life and work in this manner. But then it will become obvious that this life and this work are pushed away and are laid aside in a curious fashion. The greatest vividness of description does not preclude such a result. First of all, a certain distancing and isolation are produced which make harmless and irrelevant both life and work. The second factor is that that historical necessity which is indicated for us by Karl Marx becomes perforated and undermined. This biography brings about a weakening of historical materialism and a weakening of the theory of revolutionary practice. Thus it proves in these central points that it has not found an approach appropriate for its object.

Historical materialism never denied the historical force of personality. But it has given to personality a completely new meaning in contrast to bourgeois hero-worship, by placing personality under two decisive powers. These are time and necessity. Both these concepts, if they are not to remain a trivial phrase, have to be divested of the meaning inherited from idealistic critical philosophy, in order to be taken in their complete originality. *Time* here means the concrete "inner and outer" situation of societal human *Dasein* out of which this *Dasein* exists and becomes "history." *Necessity* is understood as the "fateful" being and practice which is posited with this situation and demanded by it.

Seen from this perspective, a biography of Karl Marx has to be written from within that European, and in particular German, situation which roughly can be delineated by the revolutionary stages of 1830, 1848, and 1871. This biography has to gain its meaning out of the change-over of two historical epochs which is indicated by the beginning of the proletarian class struggle against bourgeois capitalist society. Only then the areas of philosophy, journalism, and national economy cease to be merely some areas of activity which have been grasped and executed more or less decisively by some personality. Only then can one see these areas as the necessary *accoucheurs* of the revolution which were demanded by the historical situation of that time, namely as the breakthrough of radical theory into revolutionary practice. Then the *Communist Manifesto*, *Historical Materialism*, *Capital*, and the foundation and collapse of the First International are no longer biographical stages of a unique historical person but become typical fighting positions of a historical-societal movement in which we still find ourselves today, and which dominate us even today in extreme actuality.

Such a "Marxist" biography is not given by Vorländer nor does he intend to produce it. He simply narrates Marx's development from his birth to his death. He considers his family, his schooling, profession, friendships, and enemies, successes and defeats. He gives a brief analysis of Marx's writing, sketches his influence and importance for the present, in short he considers the surrounding world merely as the horizon of a person and not as a concrete historical force. He narrates all of this honestly and
with great warmth, and with a conscientious examination of the material, although much unpublished material could still have been brought into play. He shows a courageous and clear attitude of mind which undisguisedly worships Marx the man and admires him. In his attitude, Voränderl comes closer to the fighting spirit of Marx than Otto Rühle's misinterpretations, which did not out grow the baby shoes of psychoanalysis. Thus Vorlander succeeds excellently in bringing to life Marx the character, in eliminating old falsification and illuminating old obscurities.

But already in this, Vorlander's description endows this life with a certain petit bourgeois note on several occasions. This is the first sign of a wrong perspective. Let us merely cite two passages. The lengthy presentation of the family struggles in the Marx household culminates in the sentence: "As a conclusion, we enjoy immediately the peaceful drama of a harmonious ending before a deeper conflict might come about between father and son, after the older and the younger generation on the Jewish question," he says. "We feel that Marx lacked a certain native permanence, a smell of earth, so to speak, which Engels did possess, although in his manner of thinking, Engels was as international as Marx" (87). Although these are mere slip-ups, they are typical derailings, and they lead us back to the essential deficiency of the book. A biography which sets out in this fashion is bound to come to decisive perversions, for its methodology resides finally only in a specific attitude which is no longer appropriate to its object.

In the section of the book "Marx's Importance for the Present" there is a chapter entitled "What Do We Retain of Historical Materialism?" Here, the above-mentioned curious distancing and isolation of Marx's work becomes most obvious. It is accepted and criticized as a mere "historical" achievement. Here, we can find all the familiar attempts at bending Historical Materialism into a sociology which is founded on Kantian philosophy. No matter how well such an effort can be theoretically justified, it nonetheless disfigures entirely the concrete historical meaning of Marx's work. In this connection, Vorlander even feels the need for placing the word "materialistic" in quotation marks almost continually. We shall soon discuss such attempts in a fundamental manner in this journal, so that for the moment we have to be content with pointing out some particularly noticeable misinterpretations in Vorlander's book.

First of all, there is the linking of the materialistic understanding of history with the dispute of "casuality or teleology" in science. This linking misunderstands completely the meaning of Marxist methodology, for it overlooks the fact that dialectical method cancels out both of these concepts within itself and eliminates the object of their opposition. Then we find the "hierarchy of the purposes" and the positing of purposes which are "communal and accepted by all" (294). These are clear indicators for the tendency of drawing away Marxist theory from concrete practice, for which alone such communal purposes have a meaning in connection with the given historical societal ideology. Instead, he would like to fit Marxist
theory into certain purely philosophical problem positions and solutions. Similarly, Vorländer misunderstands and misinterprets almost continually any "philosophical theories" which occur in Karl Marx's work and fails to see their necessary connection with revolutionary practice. The statement which says that the societal being of men determines their consciousness "is supposed to be understood" according to Vorländer "more in a historical philosophical sense, or if one prefers [sic!] in a psychological rather than an epistemological sense" (302). The great dispute with German Ideology, Vorländer sees as a historical "detour in Hegel" which "nowadays is no longer necessary" (303). Vorländer does not see the central position of the German Ideology in the development of scientific socialism and calls this work an improvisation together with The Holy Family (104).

There is no need to increase the number of these examples on this occasion. These may be sufficient because all of them lead back to a fundamental tendency, the latter is seen in a necessary loosening and banding of Marxism by means of a fundamental attitude which has its foundation in Kantian philosophy. The proof of the correctness of this thesis we will attempt to deliver at a later time in this journal.

* * *

VALUE AND EXCHANGE VALUE

(1) Value and exchange value are not identical; rather, they overlap. What is the meaning of their difference?

(2) The differentiation between value and exchange value in itself contains a critical element. This is because in bourgeois society, value and exchange value are regarded as completely identical insofar as human beings and goods are defined in terms of the exchange values they happen to possess. Within (philosophical and religious) ideologies, value usually is treated with greater dignity and is seen as seemingly detached from the prices that express exchange value; however the...

"Editors' note:
Translator Charles Reitz writes: "The following typed two-page German-language manuscript, 'Wert und Tauschwert fallen nicht zusammen,' is filed as HMA 0109.01 (Herbert Marcuse Archive, Stadt- und Universitäts-Bibliothek Frankfurt). It contains a handwritten notation at the top, '15. IV. 36,' which could indicate the date of the typescript following the German convention of noting first the day, then the month, and then year: 15. April 1936. Marcuse's use of the German-language and the economic content would testify also to this as its time frame. It would place Marcuse in New York City at the time when he and his Frankfurt School colleague, Max Horkheimer, were developing their now classic 1937 formulations of critical
Marxist concept of value clarifies that this apparent detachment is illusory. This is because his concept of value—developed out of the economics in which bourgeois society values everything in terms of exchange value—shows itself to be a value conception from which several other insights can be derived and explained which permit criticism of the conventional ideology. Although the concept of value is introduced from the perspective of economics, it overlaps with other insights that go beyond the sphere of economics.

3) The value of a good can never be understood isolated within a particular subdivision of the production or circulation process, whether this would be by deriving it from the market alone or from the production process alone. In the assessment of value and exchange value the temporal sequence must be left out altogether; when assessing the value of a good, it is meaningless to inquire at what point before it reached the market its value was determined or whether it attained its value just as it was offered on the market or just at the time it was in fact sold. Whenever one wants to understand the value aspect of any particular exchange event, one must comprehend the totality of production and circulation relationships within the society.

4) The method of Marxism has logical presuppositions that correspond to the historical presuppositions of an object. Simple commodity production is not only a conceptual oversimplification, but also an historical epiphenomenon [Vorstufe]. Marx wanted above all else, given his completion of the analysis of the economic system, to furnish simultaneously an adequate analysis of the historical epoch. This interpenetration of the logical and the historical categories is an important characteristic of the dialectical method.

5) Marx understands value on the basis of abstract labor time. The category of abstract labor time is not immediately intelligible. Is it an axiom? If it is, then only in this sense: his explication of the total system allows its axiomatic character to be superseded [aufgehoben]; it is shown to be the decisive historical relationship.

* * *

theory in the German language for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. The original German versions of Max Horkheimer's 'Traditional and Critical Theory' and Herbert Marcuse's 'Philosophy and Critical Theory' were both published in the same Zeitschrift issue that year. In the remarks that follow, Marcuse treats the central philosophical notions undergirding the Marxist critique of the commodification of labor and economic life. The text suggests that Marcuse was much closer to classical Marxism at the time than his colleagues Horkheimer and Adorno. We would add that the text shows Marcuse grounded in a classical Marxian position on capitalism and economics that also demonstrates his lifelong engagement with Marx's thought within the contemporary moment.
RECENT LITERATURE ON COMMUNISM


For the policy-maker as well as the layman there is a great and natural curiosity about the future of a world society which includes both the Soviet Union and the United States. How, for example, are the Western and Soviet systems likely to develop, and what effects will they have on each other? More specifically, what trends in their development are currently discernible, and what role is Marxian theory playing in the process? The volumes under

*Editors' note:

"Recent Literature on Communism" was published in *World Politics*, Vol. 6, Nr. 4 (New York: July 1954), pp. 515-25. The opening pages of the review powerfully articulate Marcuse's Marxist perspectives on historical development since the time of Marx to the present, and the current division of the world into opposing capitalist and communist societies. Marcuse sees Marx as "a genuine child of the liberalist period," which he means as a theorist of the stage of market capitalism that marked his era. Marcuse describes how Marx believed that inherent contradictions of the capitalist system would lead to its collapse and analyzed how developments within the capitalist system led to its stabilization, including the integration of the proletariat as an "aristocracy of labor within the Western developed capitalist societies."

Within the context of Russian society, Marcuse explains how Lenin's break with classical Marxism, which makes the party rather than the working class the dominant force of revolution, led to the anomaly, for Marxian theory, of socialism developing outside of the most advanced Western societies. The rest of the review engages recent books on Soviet development and history, and reveals Marcuse as a master of the literature on Soviet Marxism, as well as Marxist theory.

Marcuse first engages British historian E. H. Carr's *History of Soviet Russia* which he takes as a masterful expression of how Russia under Stalin progressively developed its system of communism outside of and against Western developments, while reproducing the base of industrial society. Marcuse next takes on his friend Barrington Moore's book *Terror and Progress—USSR*, which analyzes Soviet power in industry, agriculture, science and art, with focus on the apparatus of terror that developed in the Stalinist system to ensure party dictatorship. In *Soviet Marxism* (1958), Marcuse himself would follow Moore's attempt to theorize and critique the system of Soviet communism. Marcuse, by contrast, is more critical of British historian Hugh Seton-Watson's *From Lenin to Malenkov*, which he sees as abstracted from the turbulent history described by Carr and falling into abstractions and "vague generalities or well-known facts."
Studies in Marxism

review, in varying ways and from differing vantage points, are all concerned with these questions, and it is of some interest to consider the character and substance of the answers that they provide.

Viewed from the present stage of historical development, the original form of Marxian theory appears as a genuine child of the liberalist period. Marx's dialectic was that of free capitalist competition, through which the basic economic processes would freely develop their inherent contradictions. The very rationality of the system would, according to Marx, lead to its destruction by the proletarian revolution. But then the liberalist period gave way to that of "organized capitalism." Growing productivity, a rising standard of living, and the concentration of economic and political power worked together to reconcile a large part of the laboring classes to the established society. When Lenin, in his struggle against "economism" and the "spontaneity theory," broke with the "classical" Marxian conception and organized the Party rather than the class as the active revolutionary force, he reoriented Marxian theory to the new reality of capitalism. However, in spite of this strategic reorientation, Lenin continued to envisage the revolutionary dialectic as the dialectic of the capitalist system itself. He thought that only a small part of the working class—namely, the "labor aristocracy"—had been "corrupted," while the vast majority of the proletariat was still maturing for the revolution. Viewed within the Marxian philosophy of history, the fact that the socialist revolution had triumphed only in backward Russia appeared as a historical "accident," bound to set in motion the forces which would correct this accident—that is to say, release the revolution in the advanced industrial countries, especially in Germany.

In the first three volumes of his History of Soviet Russia, E. H. Carr has demonstrated, with a wealth of material, how Bolshevik policy, domestic as well as foreign, was in this sense tentative and improvised—designed to expedite the "rescue" of socialism from outside Russia, from the West. It was the final defeat of the German revolution which caused the fundamental reorientation of Bolshevik policy—this time not only a strategic reorientation on the same theoretical base, but the creation of a new base. The Stalinist rather than the Leninist revolution constitutes the historical turning point: the rise of a new civilization outside and alongside the capitalist world. What Marx had seen as the internal development of capitalist society that would explode this society from within now emerged as an external power that, repelled by capitalist society, would compete with it from the outside. On the foundation of a nationalized and centralized economy, a social system was constructed which adapted and mobilized the technical and scientific rationality of industrial civilization. The latter was thus split into two and faced the future in a hostile and competing civilization. Confronted with this challenge, Western society has responded with the economic, technical, and political mobilization of its own resources—a process which now threatens to engulf the liberalistic and libertarian forces that have been the great advocates of progress. Certain basic trends seem to be dangerously common
to both competing systems: the triumph of technological rationality, of large industry over the individual; universal coordination; the spread of administration into all spheres of life; and the assimilation of private into public existence.

The new historical constellation undermines the ground for that theoretical neutrality which has been allowed to the social sciences during the last two centuries or so. In order to maintain its traditional objectivity, social theory would now have to operate in a universe of discourse comprising the Soviet order as well as its counterpart, and would have to subject both to the same critical standards, seeing both in the one world-historical continuum in which they developed. Clearly, the construction of such a universe of discourse today would be a very speculative and highly unrewarding enterprise. In the life and death struggle between two civilizations, to transcend the struggle is a precarious and dangerous matter. Objectivity is on safer ground when it abstracts from the world-historical continuum, from long-range trends and implications, and discards, for the time being, all theorizing. Thus, the social scientist can preserve objectivity while at the same time taking side with and for his civilization. He can point to the terror in the Soviet world, in contrast to the liberties in the Western world; to the low living standard there, compared with the high living standard here; to expansion there, as against containment here. He can show how Soviet society has made the individual into a complete instrument of labor, into a receptacle of decrees, into a means for other ends. To place these facts within the historical perspective and dialectic would require a super-Hegelian hybris—the usurpation of the power of the Weltgeist. It is neither of scientific nor of moral comfort to recall that terror has been the godfather of progress in the building of any civilization. No philosophy can justify the sufferings of the millions who are again being sacrificed, here and there, on the slaughter bench of World History. Still, Communism is more than and different from what Stalinism has made of it—more and different not only in theory, but in actuality. The tension between the real potentialities of Communism and its present implementation determines to a great extent the contemporary history of Communism in and outside the Soviet world. Under these circumstances, there is no justification for abstracting from the social content of Communism, for ignoring the long-range historical dynamic generated by this content, or for belittling its influence on the transformation of the Western world.

Yet such abstraction is all too prevalent in the contemporary analysis of Communism. It often leads to a distortion of facts by omission—a distortion which is the more irresponsible as it minimizes the prospects which Western civilization is facing. The abstract character of this type of analysis is frequently hidden by a misplaced concreteness: the material is purified from the historical context and, in this insulated form, is subjected to the most up-to-date methods of sociological and psychological exactness. From such material, for example, an imaginary "operational code of the Politburo" can
be constructed with considerable resemblance to a reality from which all substance has been removed. The conceptual framework of such analyses, if it exists at all, is usually limited to variations on the theme of “Power” (with a capital P). From Lenin to Malenkov, the development of Communism is seen as the diabolic scheme of a ruthless conspiratorial group which became the more evil the more it became totalitarian. The basic objective of the Bolsheviks has been to obtain, secure, and extend power by all available means, and Marxian theory has helped them to organize a “socialist” dictatorship as the most effective means of attaining this objective.

All this may be perfectly true, but it leads barely to the point where analysis should commence. The Bolshevik regime sustains and is sustained by the dynamic of a highly industrialized society in which all groups and functions are rigidly coordinated with the nationalized productive apparatus. This system operates side by side with the far more advanced industrial civilization of the West, and its structure, its goals, and the means to achieve them are to a great extent determined by this competitive coexistence. No matter how absolute the leaders’ power is, no matter what their personal or group interests are, this situation objectively defines their power as well as their aims. Moreover, Communism is also a social factor in the Western world which cannot be evaluated simply or even primarily in terms of the strategy and composition of the Soviet-controlled Communist parties; a good case could be made for arguing that, as a social factor, Western Communism was stronger before it came under Soviet-Russian control and is stronger where it is still largely outside Soviet-Russian control. The question as to where the Soviet Union is going and what the prospects of Communism are can be approached only through an analysis of Soviet and Western society, of the trends inherent in their economic and political structure, and of their interrelation.

In his book Terror and Progress—USSR, Barrington Moore, Jr., tries to answer this question by interpreting the Soviet-Russian system of power in terms of the social structure which it has created. The larger part of his book is devoted to the actual functioning of the controls in the various branches of Soviet society. Industry, agriculture, science and art, and the terror-apparatus itself are taken up, and in each of these areas the operation of the controls, the position of the controllers, and the response of the controlled are shown. The very detailed description draws upon a large contemporary material, including the interviews with refugees from the Soviet orbit conducted by the staff of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. Utilized with great care and in the proper context, they not only provide new information but also serve as a check for conclusions derived from less direct sources. Throughout the book, emphasis is placed on the identification of weak spots: conflicting interests and policies, unmastered forces in the material and intellectual culture, flaws in the system which may constitute nuclei for centrifugal trends. Moore finds quite a few. But in the total picture they appear as the cracks and waste of a going system rather than as explosive
elements. However, the system itself is not regarded as static, or the direction of its movement as fixed.

The most important insights of Moore's analysis are in the last chapter, "Images of the Future." Here, he tries to infer from his findings the dynamic of the system, and, in doing so, he progresses into the dimension where the real prospects of Soviet society become visible. In the preceding chapters, the dictatorship itself was not subjected to the same qualitative analysis which was applied to the subjects and to the stuff of the dictatorship: the dictator or dictators remained above the clouds, on an inaccessible Olympus of their own. But in the last chapter the dictatorship itself is seen as part of the whole which it dominates. As such, it is an institution which is afflicted by the vicissitudes of the institutions within and without its dominion. Moore discerns the fundamental trends which operate as "sources of change" in the institutions of Soviet society. Three are distinguished: (1) "a continuation and possibly even some intensification of the dynamic, totalitarian, and expansionist characteristics of the Stalinist system" (p. 223); (2) the ascendancy of the "technical-rational and formal legal features that exist in the Soviet system ... over the totalitarian ones" (ibid.); and (3) a reactivation of the "traditionalist elements" which would tend to revert Soviet society to some sort of semi-feudal "Oriental despotism" (p. 225). Without excluding the possibility that the first or third trend may gain momentum, under certain conditions, Moore considers a technocratic development most likely. It would involve a "rationalization" of the dictatorship; the growth of technical-bureaucratic administration over political terror; collegiate rather than personal rule; and a "larger flow of goods and services" to the mass of the population (p. 189). Moore's sober and conscientious attitude avoids the overstatements which could provide the grand historical perspective for his findings. This reviewer, who has more faith in speculation, believes that, given "normal" conditions of national and international stabilization, Soviet society might tend toward a totalitarian welfare state. As to the prospects of international stabilization, he agrees with Moore's pessimistic view: "The essence of the matter lies in the fact that the mere existence of a powerful industrial state dominating much of the Eurasian continent would be a potential threat to other nations, and primarily to the United States, no matter how peaceful its behavior and apparent intentions" (p. 229).

It is significant that Moore's analysis, which probes into the structure of Soviet society in its national rather than international aspects, culminates in a statement defining the position of the Western world. In spite of the doctrine and practice of "socialism in one country," the interconnection between the two systems has remained a substantive one throughout. An analysis of Communist trends which does not focus on this interconnection would be inadequate in its essentials. And for the period from 1917 through 1923, E. H. Carr's History of Soviet Russia has set standards which can hardly be equaled. To this reviewer, Carr's work is a rare example of great contemporary historiography: it combines mastery of the factual material
with that knowledge and understanding of theory which enables him to see the course of the Bolshevik revolution in the context of the political and economic transformation of contemporary civilization. Thus from his account it becomes clear to what extent the fate of Communism from Marx to Lenin reflects a historical process whose direction is by no means irreversible. Neither Stalinism nor Fascism have eradicated the roots of a different kind of Communism in industrial society. So long as these roots exist, the history of world Communism will be the social history of Communism and capitalism in their interdependence.

Hugh Seton-Watson’s *From Lenin to Malenkov*, on the other hand, is far from presenting this history. His book is characteristic of the oversimplifications and abstractions which relate most of what happened to the evil power-drive of the Bolsheviks and their misguided followers. In the introduction, the author states: “If I can make any claim to an original approach to the subject, it is in my emphasis on the relationship of communist movements to social classes...” However, this intention has not materialized. Social classes and their relation to the Communist movement are discussed at various places, but such discussion does not go beyond vague generalities or well-known facts, and, what is more important, it does not guide the analysis and presentation of the material. The book gives an account of the development of Communism from the beginnings of Leninism to the present, in all the major areas of the world, including the colonial regions, and all this in 356 pages. Summing up, Seton-Watson declares that the “social causes of communism are frustration of the intelligentsia and poverty of the masses” (p. 352). He immediately qualifies the second factor by pointing out, correctly, that the populations living in the most abject misery are usually not the most revolutionary ones: “revolutionary agitators” must be at hand to “exploit poverty for their ends.” Thus it all comes back to the intelligentsia: “The frustration of the intelligentsia is a more immediate cause of communist and other anti-western revolutionary movements than is the poverty of the masses” (pp. 353f.). He asks: “Can anything be done to remedy this scourge of the twentieth century?” Yes, improvements in the educational system, especially, for Asian, African, and Latin-American intellectuals, that will enable them to serve their peoples’ welfare and at the same time “remove the frustration that devours them” (p. 354). Seton-Watson is more specific in defining what should be the objective of Western policy: the “aim must be to liberate the peoples oppressed by totalitarian Stalinist imperialism.” However, the “means by which Stalinism can be forced back, and the oppressed peoples, including the Russian people itself—the greatest martyr of the last thirty years—can be liberated, are not clear today. This does not mean that they will not become clear, or that they do not exist” (pp. 348f.).

One has only to compare Seton-Watson’s chapters on the Central European revolutions and on the Comintern policy with E. H. Carr’s treatment of the same subjects in the magnificent third volume of his History
Studies in Marxism

of Soviet Russia in order to see how abbreviations and simplifications change the picture of a revolutionary period in world history. Carr's volume is entitled Soviet Russia and the World; it deals with Bolshevik foreign policy until shortly before Lenin's death, but, in doing so, it covers the history of postwar Europe and Asia during this period. Carr shows how the "dual policy" of Soviet national interest and international revolutionary objectives originated and developed in the constant interplay between Marxian theory and practice, between East and West, between metropolitan and colonial movements. He demonstrates how each major turn in this policy, and the rapid subordination of the international to the national aspects, was determined by a new constellation of forces inside and outside the Soviet camp, and how Soviet policy tried to cope with this constellation in terms of the inherited principles of Marxist theory and strategy. The role of Marxian theory in Soviet policy is certainly most controversial, but the fact remains that the Leninist party was a Marxist party, that the Bolshevik organization of Soviet society followed in the beginning the basic, Marxian concepts, and that Marxism has been canonized as the official Soviet ideology. Once this ideology has thus been incorporated into the society, it operates as a real factor apart from the personal sincerity and intentions of the policy-makers. The dual policy depends, for the attainment of its ultimate objective, on the materialization of the Marxian prediction: the establishment of socialism in the mature capitalist world, and primarily in Germany. Carr's analysis shows to what extent "socialism in one country" was decided before Stalin—but in Germany rather than in Russia; and his chapters on the German revolution and its influence on Comintern policy contain in a footnote more material and more insight than whole monographs on the subject.

With the Weimar Republic began that social and political reorganization of the Western world which enabled it as a whole to withstand the Central European revolutions of the left and the Fascist counterrevolution, and to survive the Second World War. On the European side, German Social Democracy played a decisive role in this process. Before the First World War, the German and Austrian Social Democratic organizations were ostensibly the strongest Marxist forces and the undisputed interpreters of Marxist theory and strategy. When Lenin challenged this monopoly, he and his followers remained a small minority. And Social Democracy, without losing the support of the majority of the laboring classes, became the savior of the very system against which it was organized. Clearly, this accomplishment cannot be understood in terms of personalities and party structure: the policy of democratic cooperation was not simply imposed upon a radical rank and file by the bureaucratic party leadership. Nor would it be sufficient to explain the course of Social Democracy as the mere reflection of capitalism's growing capacity to grant the workers a higher standard of living. In the fateful period at the end of the First World War, this was hardly the case in Central Europe.

In his book Central European Democracy and Its Background, Rudolf Schlesinger tries to provide an explanation by writing the history of the
representative economic and political organizations of the German and Austrian working classes from 1862 to the triumph of National Socialism. The political parties, trade unions, consumers’ cooperatives, etc., are treated as “sectional organizations” typical of a mature industrial society. On this basis, Schlesinger follows the development of the conflict between economic and political interests which determined to a high degree the fate of Central European democracy. He rejects Lenin’s theory of the “labor aristocracy” as inadequate to explain the collaborationist policy of Social Democracy, arguing that if “labor aristocracy” is

thought of as the group of those who are capable of gaining material improvements in consequence of their employers’ prosperity, it is clear that an increase in the sum of profits distributable will tend to turn that group from a mere minority aristocracy into a majority of the whole working class. Supposing that it embraced the whole of the working class, there is no reason why in the labour movement, and also in the body politic, of such an imperialist State democracy in the full sense of any formal definition could not flourish. It would be destroyed only by the revolt of the underdog nations—and by the Imperialist States’ own preparations to meet this threat. (p. 83)

Schlesinger traces the revisionist and collaborationist policies of Social Democracy back to the very beginnings of the party and shows the strength of the Lassallean rather than Marxian tradition in its development. A well-documented historical survey, his book points up the predominance of national and nationalistic attitudes which found amazingly outspoken expression at the party and trade union congresses during the first decade of the twentieth century. The uniformity of these attitudes is somewhat overplayed, and the opposition to them treated too summarily. But the Social Democratic policy of 1914 and 1918 clearly appears as the culmination of a long process in which the working-class institutions and organizations were effectively integrated into the growing structure of “organized capitalism.” No wonder then that Social Democracy sided with the established order and against the Marxian revolution as early as November 1918, when the famous alliance with the army was concluded. Thus, what happened in the period of the Weimar Republic was, according to Schlesinger, hardly more than “a moderate shift in the distribution of social power within the Junker-bourgeois coalition which controlled Germany” (p. 152).

From this point on, Schlesinger’s book becomes a critical history of the decline and downfall of the German and Austrian democracies—critical from a left-socialist point of view. His partisanship neither violates nor contradicts the facts. He rejects the short cut which puts all the responsibility for the failure of the social revolution in these countries on the Social Democrats; and he is not satisfied with the explanation that the German workers just were not “revolutionary.” German Communism is subjected to an equally critical analysis. In his view, the class orientation of the German workers
became fluid as the Empire collapsed, and a less hesitant strategy on the part of the Communists-Spartacists during the first months of the revolution would have swung the German workers to the left.

Schlesinger’s study elucidates the extent to which the fate of Communism during the formative period was determined by factors outside Russia and outside Bolshevism. From Marx to Stalin, the ideology and reality of Communism were shaped by the ideology and reality of industrial civilization. There is no evidence that this essential link has been loosened. The prospects of Communism must still be evaluated in terms of the prospects of present-day industrial civilization.

**DIALECTIC AND LOGIC SINCE THE WAR**

Nothing is perhaps more revealing for the basic trends of Soviet Marxism than its treatment of dialectic. The dialectical logic is the cornerstone of Marxian theory: it guides the analysis of the prerevolutionary as well as of the revolutionary development, and this analysis in turn is supposed to guide the strategy in both periods. Any fundamental “revision” of the dialectical logic that goes beyond the Marxist application of dialectic to a new historical situation would indicate not only a “deviation” from Marxist theory (which is only of dogmatic interest), but also a theoretical justification for a new strategy. Interpreters of Stalinism have therefore correctly drawn attention to events in this sphere. They have concluded that Soviet Marxism has toned down and arrested the dialectic in the interest of the ideological...

*Editors’ note:
“Dialectic and Logic since the War” was published in *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, ed. Ernest J. Simmons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955) pp. 347-58. A published note on the article indicated that “This paper is part of a larger study of Soviet Marxism, written under a grant by the Russian Institute, Columbia University,” and indeed previews his book *Soviet Marxism* which appeared in 1958. The article reveals Marcuse to be extremely adept at both Marxian and Soviet dialectical theory, focusing on the shift in the concept of dialectics from Hegel and classical Marxism in Soviet Marxism, which Marcuse describes as a development that uses Marxian dialectic as a legitimating ideology for the Soviet system under Stalin and his followers. In particular, Marcuse sees the Soviet Marxist distinction between “internal” and “external” contradictions, and the claim that Soviet communism has “solved” the explosive contradictions which in classical Marxism were supposed to lead to revolution, as legitimating ideologies which Soviet Marxism uses to keep the critical aspects of the Marxian theory from application and critique to Soviet society itself.

1 This paper is part of a larger study on Soviet Marxism, written under a grant by the Russian Institute, Columbia University.
Studies in Marxism

justification and protection of a regime which must appear as regressive and to be surpassed by the dialectical development. Chief support for this conclusion is seen in the Soviet Marxist reformulation of the concept of dialectical contradictions (following the disappearance from the dialectical vocabulary of the “negation of the negation”) and of the relation between base and superstructure, and in the reintroduction of formal logic.

The first and most fundamental of these apparent revisions predates the Second World War. Antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions are already distinguished in the representative articles of the Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Great Soviet Encyclopedia) on Historical Materialism and on the Law of the Unity and Conflict of Contradictions. The distinction becomes central in Zhdanov’s ideological offensive in the Aleksandrov controversy (June 1947) and has since remained a decisive feature of Soviet Marxist dialectic. In Stalin’s last article, the doctrine of nonantagonistic contradictions is made the theoretical foundation of the “transition to Communism.” The two other events in the development of Soviet Marxist dialectics belong altogether to the postwar period and are closely connected in substance. The official statement of the relation between base and superstructure is given in the context of Stalin’s “Marksizm i voprosy iazykoznaniia” (Marxism and Linguistic Problems), 1950; the reintroduction of formal logic in the schools was decreed in 1944, but the broad discussion begins only in 1948 and culminates in 1950–51.

The attempt to evaluate the significance of these developments requires brief consideration of the function of dialectic within the system of Soviet Marxism as a whole. By themselves, they reveal neither their philosophical nor their political implications—they do not even appear as “revisions;” we shall see that each of the three reformulations could pass as a perfectly legitimate and “orthodox” inference from the Hegelian as well as Marxian dialectic. But while not a single one of the basic dialectical concepts has been revised or rejected in Soviet Marxism, the function of dialectic itself has been significantly changed: it has been transformed from a mode of critical thought designed to guide Marxist practice into a fixed universal system no longer inherently connected with the actual practice. This transformation itself is part of the reorientation of Marxism in terms of the development of capitalist society since about the turn of the century. Presently we shall try to indicate some of the factors which altered the relation between Marxism and the reality which Marxism was designed to change.

---

3 Vol. XLVII (1940).
4 Bol’shevik, no. 16 (1947); Voprosy filosofii, no. 1 (1947).
6 Summary of the discussion in Voprosy filosofii, no. 6 (1951).
The historical ground for the transformation of Marxism was provided by the transition from the free capitalism of the nineteenth century (the liberalistic period) to the "organized capitalism" of the twentieth century. The tremendous growth in productivity led to a considerable rise in the standard of living in the advanced industrial countries—a rise in which organized labor participated. Consequently, the class position of the Marxian proletariat changed: a large part of the laboring classes acquired a vested interest in the society whose "absolute negation" they were supposed to represent. To the Marxist theoreticians, the trend toward class cooperation, the growth of trade-unionism and social democracy appeared not only as a false strategy but as a threat to the basic Marxian conception of socialist theory and practice. In his struggle against revisionism and economism, Lenin answered this threat with a decisive reorientation. His theory of Bolshevism amounted to acknowledging that the revolutionary forces had to be re-created and organized outside and even against the "immediate interest" of the proletariat whose class consciousness had been arrested by the system in which they functioned. The Bolshevik doctrine of the predominant role of the Party leadership as the revolutionary vanguard grew out of the new conditions of Western society (the conditions of "imperialism" and "monopoly capitalism") rather than out of the personality or psychology of the Russian Marxists. The increasing power of advanced capitalism, the coordination of Western social democracy with this society, Leninism, and the idea of "breaking the capitalist chain at its weakest link" are parts and stages of one and the same historical trend. But although the Leninist reorientation foreshadows the development of "socialism in one country," that is to say, outside the centers of advanced industrial civilization, and thus implies a basic modification of Marxism, Lenin did not follow up his strategic reorientation. He remained "orthodox." In line with Marxist orthodoxy, he first regarded the Bolshevik Revolution as preliminary to the revolution in one of the advanced capitalist countries, namely, Germany. The Leninist policy during the first years of the Bolshevik dictatorship was tentative in the sense that it relied to a great extent on the working of the revolutionary dialectic within the capitalist world. "Socialism in one country" became definitive only after the failure of the Central European revolutions had become definitive, that is to say, after 1921. The building of socialism on a backward and (for a long time to come) isolated base found no theoretical guidance in Marxian theory. Lenin, and also Stalin, never abandoned the notion that "socialism in one country" could be ultimately victorious only through the triumph of socialism in the advanced industrial society of the West. In this respect, Stalinism remained as orthodox as Leninism.

Then, however, the growth of the Soviet state into a strong national and international power led to a unification and integration of the Western world which made the expectation of an indigenous collapse of capitalism appear more unrealistic than ever before. This "uneven development toward socialism" inside and outside the Soviet Union generated the rift between theory and practice which is characteristic of Soviet Marxism. The goal
remained the same, but the ways and means for attaining it had become very different. As a result of the historical changes in the international arena, the historical carrier of the revolutionary dialectic was no longer the industrial proletariat in the advanced industrial countries but the Soviet state. Its development was to be interpreted in terms of a socialist rather than capitalist dialectic, of nonantagonistic rather than antagonistic contradictions. And outside the Soviet orbit, there was still the dialectic of capitalism. During the Stalinist period, the interrelation between the two remained almost taboo. Only recently, there are indications that, in line with a general reorientation of Soviet policy, the problem of dialectic is redefined. In order to understand the implications of this development, a restatement of the original function of the Marxian dialectic will be necessary.

Marx elaborated his dialectic as a conceptual tool for comprehending an inherently antagonistic society. The dissolution of the fixed and stable notions of philosophy, political economy, and sociology into their contradictory components was to “reflect” the actual structure and movement of this society; the dialectic was to reproduce in theory what happened in the reality. To reproduce it adequately, in order to provide the true theory of this society, the traditional categories had to be redefined since they concealed rather than revealed what happened. The theory of society had to be elaborated in its own terms. But the dialectical relation between the structure of thought and that of reality is not merely that of reflection and correspondence. If Hegel consistently transgresses the clearly established distinction between thought and its object, if he talks of “contradictions” (a “logical” term) in the reality, of the “movement” of concepts, of quantity “turning” into quality, he indeed stipulates a specific identity between thought and its object—he assimilates one with the other. But it may be assumed that the wisdom of his critics, who note that Hegel confuses two essentially different realms, was not beyond the reach of his intelligence and awareness. According to Hegel, the traditional distinction between notion and reality is “abstract” and falsifies and prejudices the real relation. Thought and its object have a common denominator, which, itself “real,” constitutes the substance of thought as well as its object. This common denominator, this structure common to thought and object is the structure of Being as a process comprising Man and Nature, Idea and Reality. The process of Thought, if true, that is to say, if it “comprehends” the reality, if it is the Notion (Begriff) of its object, is the process in which the object constitutes itself, becomes what it is, develops itself. As such this process appears in three different realms of Being: in Nature, in History proper, and in “pure” Thought (Logic). They are essentially different stages of “realization,” essentially different realities. Hegel’s Logic, far from obliterating these differences, is their very elaboration. But their common structure and common Telos (Reason—the realization of the free Subject) establishes for Hegel the supremacy of the Notion, the reality of the Logos. The (true) thought process is in a strict sense an “objective” process. Thus, when Hegel speaks of one notion turning into another he says that the notion, thought through, reveals
Studies in Marxism

contents which at first seem alien and even opposed to this notion; thinking only reproduces the movement of the objective reality of which the notion is an essential part. What happens in the thought process is not that one notion is replaced by another one more adequate to the reality, but that the same notion unfolds its original content—a dynamic which is that of the reality comprehended in the notion. The reality has (or rather is) its own Logos and thus its own Logic. This is not just a manner of speech. Since the Greeks first defined the essence of Being as Logos, the idea of the logical essence of reality (and of the reality of logic) has dominated Western thought; the Hegelian dialectic is only its last great development.

The Marxian "subversion" of Hegel's dialectic remains committed to this idea. The driving forces behind the social process are, not certain conflicts and antagonisms, but contradictions because they constitute the very Logos of the social system from which they arise and which they define. According to Marx, (the Logos of) capitalist society speaks against itself: its economy functions normally only through periodic crises; growing productivity of labor sustains scarcity and toil, increasing wealth perpetuates poverty; progress is dehumanization. Specifically, as Marx claims to show in Capital, it is the free wage contract and the just exchange of equivalents which generate exploitation and inequality; it is the realization of freedom, equality, and justice which turns them into their opposite. 7

The rationality of the system is self-contradictory: the very laws which govern the system lead to its destruction. These laws originate in the basic societal relations which men enter in reproducing their life: with this materialistic foundation, the Logos is conceived as a concrete historical structure, and the logical dynamic as a concrete historical dynamic.

This brief restatement of some of the basic concepts of dialectic may serve to illustrate the hypostatization it underwent in Soviet Marxism. Here, dialectic is identified with the method and "theory of knowledge" of Marxism, and the latter with the only true scientific "world outlook" of the Communist Party. 8 Marxian theory may perhaps be called a "world outlook," but as such it claims to validate the abstract-philosophical generalities by their concrete historical content. To be sure, dialectical materialism can be presented as a series of general assumptions, categories, and conclusions—but the general scheme immediately cancels itself, for its categories come to life only in their dialectical use. Consequently, in trying to present dialectic "as such," Soviet Marxists can do nothing but abstract from the concrete dialectical analysis of the "classics" certain principles, to illustrate them, and to confront them with "undialectical" thought. The principles are those enumerated in Stalin's

---

8 See the report on the results of the discussion of the problem of logic in Voprosy filosofii, no. 6 (1951).
"Dialectical and Historical Materialism" which, in turn, are only a paraphrase of Engels' propositions in his *Dialectics of Nature*. In terms of Hegel's and Marx's dialectic, they are neither true nor false—they are empty shells. Hegel could develop the principles of dialectic in the medium of universality, as a Science of Logic, because to him the structure and movement of Being was that of Thought and attained its Truth in the Absolute Idea; Marxian theory, however, which rejects Hegel's interpretation of Being in terms of the Idea, can no longer unfold the dialectic as logic: its medium is now the historical reality, and its universality is that of history.

The problem whether or not the Marxian dialectic is applicable to Nature must here at least be mentioned because the emphasis on the dialectic of Nature is a distinguishing feature of Soviet Marxism—in contrast to Marx and even to Lenin. If the Marxian dialectic is in its conceptual structure a dialectic of the historical reality, then it includes Nature insofar as the latter is itself part of the historical reality (in the *Stoffwechsel* between man and Nature, the domination and exploitation of Nature, Nature as ideology, etc.). But precisely insofar as Nature is investigated in abstraction from these historical relations, in the natural sciences, by that very token it seems to lie outside the realm of dialectic. It is no accident that in Engels' *Dialectics of Nature* the dialectical concepts appear as mere analogies, figurative and superimposed upon the content—strikingly empty or commonplace compared with the exact concreteness of the dialectical concepts in the economic and socio-historical writings. And it is the *Dialectics of Nature* which has become the incessantly quoted authentic source for dialectic in Soviet Marxism. Inevitably so, for if "dialectic reigns everywhere," if dialectical materialism is a "scientific world outlook," then the dialectical concepts must first and foremost be validated in the most scientific of all sciences—that of Nature. The consequence is a dehistorization of history.

The Soviet Marxist hypostatization of dialectic into a universal scientific world outlook entails the division of Marxian theory into dialectical and historical materialism, the latter being the "extension" and "application" of the former to the "study of society and its history." The division would be meaningless to Marx, for whom dialectical materialism was throughout historical materialism. In Soviet Marxism, historical materialism becomes one particular branch of the general scientific and philosophical system of Marxism which—codified into an ideology and interpreted by the officials of the Party—justifies policy and practice.

---

9 For the "omission" of the "negation of the negation," see p. 355.
The significance of this transformation for the Soviet state is so obvious that some important implications are generally overlooked. The dimension of History which, in Marxian theory, is the determining and validating dimension of dialectic, is, in Soviet Marxism, a special field in which supra-historical laws assert themselves. The latter, arranged into a universal system of propositions, become the ultimately determining forces in History as well as Nature. The dialectical process thus interpreted is no longer in a strict sense a historical process—rather is History reified into a second Nature. Soviet developments thereby obtain the dignity of the objective natural laws by which they are allegedly governed and which, if correctly understood and taken into consciousness, will eventually right all wrongs and lead to final victory over the opposing forces. If there is anything which strikingly distinguishes Soviet Marxism from previous Marxian theory, it is—apart from the codification of Marxian theory into an ideology—the interpretation of socio-historical processes in terms of objective determinism. For example, in Rozental’s Marksistskii dialekticheskii metod (Marxist Dialectical Method), the capitalistic development, the transition to socialism, and the subsequent development of Soviet society through its various phases are presented as the unfolding of a system of objective forces that could not have unfolded otherwise. Stalin’s emphasis on the superstructure as a “powerful active force” which helps the base to assume its adequate form does not contradict this trend. Not only is the activity of the superstructure itself derived from the base, but two years later Stalin insists that the “laws of political economy under socialism are objective laws ... which proceed irrespective of our will,” and that the state can “rely” on them and utilize them consciously and according to plan, but not abolish or even change them. To be sure, strong and constant emphasis is placed on the guiding role of the state and of the Communist Party and its leadership, which holds the monopoly of interpreting and formulating the dialectical laws, and on the patriotic heroism of the Soviet people, but their action and success are made possible only by their understanding of and obedience to the laws of dialectic. At a first glance, this seems to be “orthodox Marx.” Marx and Engels maintained throughout that the historical process is governed by objective laws, operating with the inexorable force of the laws of nature. However, as objective laws, they remain historical laws, laws of history; they express the dialectical relation between man and nature, freedom and necessity. The objectivity of these laws preserves the “subjective factor”: they contain the Subject as conscious agent—not merely as the obedient servant and executor of the laws, but as the medium through whose actions and thoughts alone the historical laws become laws. Marx’s statement that “man himself is the basis of his material

12 “Marksizm i voprosy iazykoznaniiia.”
13 “Economic Problems ... ;” ref. 5, p. 2.
as well as of any other production” is more than an incidental remark; it proclaims indeed the first principle of the materialistic interpretation of history, which begins to take shape in formulations like these:

Man has only to learn to know himself, to measure all existential conditions against himself, to judge them according to his own essence, to organize his world in a truly humane manner, in conformity with the demands of his nature—and he will have solved the riddle of our time ... We see in history, not the revelation of God, but of man, and of man only ...

Nor are these formulations characteristic only for the early period in the development of Marx and Engels. If, after 1848, and especially in Capital, the subjective factor seems to be completely absorbed by the determining objective factors, this shift in emphasis and weight is caused by the concentration of Marxian theory on the “critique of the political economy” of capitalism. It is one of the main propositions of this critique that the economic laws of capitalism assert themselves “behind the back” of the individuals. The blind supremacy of the objective factors, the victimization of the Subject appears to Marx as the result of “man’s enslavement under the means of his labor.” But the reestablishment of the Subject remains the aim.

In contrast, Soviet Marxism subjugates the subjective to the objective factors in a manner which transforms the dialectical into a mechanistic process. Characteristic is the interpretation of the relation between necessity and freedom: it is the key problem in the Hegelian as well as Marxian dialectic, and we have seen that it is also a key problem in the idea of socialism itself. Soviet Marxism defines freedom as “recognized necessity.” The formula follows Engels’ restatement of Hegel’s definition according to which freedom is “insight into necessity.” But for Hegel, freedom is not merely “insight” into necessity, but comprehended (begriiffene) necessity. As such, necessity is realized and cancelled (aufgehoben) in freedom. Mere “insight” can never change necessity into freedom; Hegel’s “comprehended” necessity is “not merely the freedom of abstract negation, but rather concrete and positive freedom”—only thus is it the “truth” of necessity. The transition from necessity to freedom is that into a fundamentally different dimension of Being, and Hegel calls it the “hardest” of all dialectical transitions.

16 For a discussion of this problem, see Leonard Krieger, “Marx and Engels as Historians,” Journal of History of Ideas, XIV, no. 3 (June 1953), pp. 396ff.
17 For example, M. D. Kammeri, in Voprosy filosofii, no. 6 (1952).
18 Anti-Düühring, Part I, ch. xi.
Soviet Marxism minimizes this transition and assimilates freedom to necessity—in ideology as well as in reality. This assimilation is expressed in the Soviet Marxist interpretation of dialectical change, that is, of the socio-historical development from one stage to another. The interpretation itself adheres to the inherited theoretical conception. The Marxian dialectic stipulates that the contradictions which determine the structure and course of a social system change with a change of the system. Soviet Marxism correlates “antagonistic contradictions” (“conflicts”) to class societies, and “nonantagonistic contradictions” to classless and socialist societies. The former are irreconcilable and can be “resolved” only through explosion; the latter are susceptible to gradual solution through “scientific” social and political control.20 But in both cases the contradictions tend toward a qualitative change of the social system—only on the basis of a classless society is the turn from quantity to quality “nonexplosive.”

The elimination of “explosions” from the dialectical development is inherent in the Marxian conception itself. According to Marx, the “catastrophic” character of the transition from quantity to quality belongs to the realm of blindly operating, uncontrolled socio-economic forces; with the establishment of socialism, these forces come under the rational control of society as a whole, which self-consciously regulates its struggle with nature and with its own contradictions. Moreover, the change in the mode of transition from one stage to another is already stipulated in Hegel’s system: once the level of free and self-conscious rationality has been reached (“Being-in-and-for-itself”), such rationality also governs the further transitions at this level. Similarly, Marx applied the notion of the “negation of the negation” specifically to the capitalist development. It is the “capitalist production” which, with the necessity of a “law of nature,” engenders its own negation: socialism is this “negation of the negation.”21 Soviet Marxism claims that the Bolshevik Revolution has created a qualitatively new base—the base for socialism. Consequently, Stalin drops the “law of the negation of the negation” from his table of dialectical laws. Moreover, according to Soviet Marxism, the socialist base renders possible, within the framework of the central plan, a constant and conscious adjustment of production relations to the growth of the productive forces. Even the basic contradiction becomes amenable to control. The treatment of the dialectic merely reflects these fundamental propositions. The Soviet Marxist “revision” is “orthodox.” Since Soviet Marxists maintain that Soviet society is a socialist society, they

20 See in addition to the references above, M. M. Rosenthal, Marksistskii dialekticheskii metod (Moscow, 1951), pp. 283ff.; S. P. Dudel, “K voprosu o edinstve i bor’be protivopolozhnosti kak vnitrennem soderzhanii protsessa razvitiia,” Voprosy dialekticheskogo materializma (Moscow, 1951), pp. 73ff.

Studies in Marxism

consistent with the corresponding dialectical characteristics. What is involved is not a revision of dialectic, but the claim of socialism for a nonsocialist society. Dialectic itself, in the transmitted orthodox form, is used to substantiate this claim.

All this seems to confirm that the Soviet Marxist treatment of dialectic just serves to protect and justify the established regime by eliminating or minimizing all those elements of the Marxian dialectic which would indicate a continuation of the socio-historical development beyond this regime—toward a qualitatively different future. In other words, Soviet Marxism would represent the "arresting" of dialectic in the interest of the prevailing state of affairs—the ideology would follow the arresting of socialism in reality. However, the situation is more complicated. Neither the Soviet ideology nor its application are immune to the objective historical dynamic which the regime claims as its supreme law and basis. Even the most centralized and totalitarian plan remains subject to this dynamic, which, to a great extent, operates outside the reaches of the planning powers. It appears that the international development after the Second World War, especially the internal stability and the intercontinental integration of the Western world, drives the Soviet Union toward a general reorientation which calls for intensified efforts to solve the "internal contradictions" in order to break the stalemate in the field of the "external contradictions." In Soviet Marxist language, the internal contradictions derive from the still persisting lag of the production relations behind the productive forces, and the gradual correction of this lag is to be undertaken by measures for preparing the "transition to Communism." This trend would also lead to changes in the "superstructure." In line with the assimilation of the ideology to the reality, the trend would not only be noticeable but perhaps even anticipated in the ideology. Recent developments in the Soviet Marxist treatment of dialectic seem to corroborate this assumption. It appears that ideological preparations are being made for increasing the flexibility of the regime—ideological preparations which would parallel a new adjustment of production relations and consumption standards to the growing productive capacity, and a corresponding adjustment of international strategy.

This trend seems to be reflected precisely in that Soviet Marxist position which appears as a defense against the application of dialectical logic to the present state of affairs—namely, the reinstatement of Formal Logic. The recent discussion of the relation between Formal and Dialectical Logic was

22 I have tried to develop this thesis in my study on Soviet Marxism. For the distinction between internal and external contradictions, see Stalin's Kitogam rabot XIV konferentsii RKP(b). Doklad aktivu moskovskoi organizatsii RKP(b), 9 maja 1925 g. (Moscow, 1933).

linked throughout with Stalin's "Marxism and Linguistic Problems." There Stalin had pointed out that it is "un-Marxist" and incorrect to talk of the "class conditioning" of language and to envisage a specifically "socialist language." He had maintained that language "differs in principle" from a "superstructure" in that it does not change with the basis but outlives this or that basis: it is created by and "serves," not certain classes, but society as a whole over the course of centuries. By the same token, Soviet Marxism now holds it is incorrect to treat Formal Logic as "class conditioned" and to envisage a specific "Soviet Logic" corresponding to the new basis of Soviet society. The report on the results of the discussion on Logic sums up: "the logical forms and laws of thought are no superstructure over and above the basis ..." "Formal Logic is the science of the elementary laws and form of correct thinking." "There are no two Formal Logics: an old, metaphysical, and a new, dialectical Logic ... There is only one Formal Logic, which is universally valid ..." Dialectical Logic does not deny, cancel, or contradict the validity of Formal Logic; the former belongs to a different dimension of knowledge and is related to the latter like higher to elementary mathematics.

We are not concerned here with the course and conclusions of the discussion. Significantly, the changing trend announces itself in a return to Marxian orthodoxy after the Leftist "Marxist deviations." In terms of Marxian theory, neither language nor logic as such belong to the superstructure: they rather belong to the preconditions of the basic societal relationships themselves: as instruments of communication and knowledge, they are indispensable for establishing and sustaining these relationships. Only certain manifestations of language and thought are superstructure, for example, in art, philosophy, religion. Following the Marxian conception, the Soviet discussion distinguished between Logic itself and the sciences of Logic: as a specific interpretation of Logic, some of the latter must be classified as ideological. But neither the Hegelian nor the Marxian dialectic denied the validity of Formal Logic: they rather preserved and validated its truth by unfolding its content in the dialectical conception which reveals the necessary abstractness of "common" as well as "scientific" sense.

Compared with this tradition of dialectic, "Marxist" linguistics and logic must indeed appear as a gross "Leftist deviation," as an "infantile disease" of Communism in its age of immaturity. It seems to be an ideological by-product of the first phase of the Stalinist construction of socialism in one...

25 Voprosy filosofii, no. 6 (1951).
26 They are summarized in Voprosy filosofii, ibid., and in Gustav Wetter, Der Dialektische Materialismus (Vienna, 1952), pp. 544ff.
28 We are here concerned only with the Stalinist evaluation of Marr's doctrine—not with this doctrine itself.
country. The violent struggle to overcome the technological and industrial backwardness of the country, imposed by terror upon a largely passive and even hostile population, found its ideological compensation in the various doctrines of the uniqueness and superiority of Soviet man, deriving from his “possession” of Marxism as the only true and progressive “world outlook.” But Marxian theory is in its very substance international: within its framework, nationalism is progressive only as a stage in the historical process—a stage which, according to Marx and Engels, had already been surpassed by the advanced Western World; Soviet Marxism never succeeded in reconciling the contradiction between its own nationalism and Marxian internationalism either in its strategy or in its ideology, as is demonstrated by the painful distinctions between “bourgeois cosmopolitanism” and genuine internationalism, between chauvinism and “Soviet patriotism.” Moreover, the emphasis on a special Soviet mentality, logic, linguistics, etc. was bound to impair the appeal to the international solidarity in the ultimate revolutionary objective which neither the doctrine of socialism hor of Communism in one country could altogether discard. The “Marxist” theories may have fulfilled a useful function in the “magical” utilization of Marxian theory, but with the technological and industrial progress of Soviet society, with the growing political and strategic power of the Soviet state, they came into conflict with the more fundamental objectives. As Soviet policy began to be oriented to the transition to Communism, the Marxist doctrines had to give way to more “communist,” more universal and internationalist conceptions. Far from signifying the “arrest” of dialectic in the interest of the stabilization of the attained level of development, the recent reiteration of the common human function and content of language and logic seems to be designed to bring the ideology in line with the drive toward the “next higher stage” of the development, that is (in Soviet terms), the second phase of socialism, or (in more realistic terms) the intensified effort to improve living conditions in the Soviet Union and to stabilize the international situation.

* * *

Studies in Marxism
SUPPLEMENTARY EPILOGUE WRITTEN IN 1954 TO REASON AND REVOLUTION*

The defeat of Fascism and National Socialism has not arrested the trend toward totalitarianism. Freedom is on the retreat—in the realm of thought as well as in that of society. Neither the Hegelian nor the Marxian idea of Reason have come closer to realization; neither the development of the Spirit nor that of the Revolution took the form envisaged by dialectical theory. Still, the deviations were inherent in the very structure which this theory had discovered—they did not occur from outside; they were not unexpected.

From the beginning, the idea and the reality of Reason in the modern period contained the elements which endangered its promise of a free and fulfilled existence: the enslavement of man by his own productivity; the glorification of delayed satisfaction; the repressive mastery of nature in man and outside; the development of human potentialities within the framework of domination. In Hegel's philosophy, the triumph of the Spirit leaves the State behind in the reality—unconquered by the Spirit and oppressive in spite of its commitment to Right and Freedom. Hegel accepted Civil Society and its State as the adequate historical realization of Reason—which meant that they were not the ultimate realization of Reason. The latter was relegated to metaphysics: Hegel concluded the encyclopedic presentation of his system with Aristotle's description of the Nous as Theos. At the beginning and at the end, Western philosophy's answer to the quest for Reason and Freedom is the same. The deification of the Spirit implies acknowledgment of its defeat in the reality. Hegel's philosophy was the last which could dare to comprehend reality as manifestation of the Spirit. The subsequent history made such an attempt impossible.

Hegel saw in the power of negativity the life element of the Spirit and thereby of Reason. This power of Negativity was in the last analysis the power to comprehend and alter the given facts in accordance with the

* Editors' note:
The "Supplementary Epilogue Written in 1954" was published as an addition to the second edition of Reason and Revolution, Marcuse's magisterial study of "Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory" (to cite its subtitle), published in 1954 by Columbia University Press (pp. 433–9). While a Beacon Press paperback edition of Reason and Revolution appeared in 1960 with a new Preface, it did not include the Epilogue in the 1954 version, which we are publishing here. The text contains a succinct overview of Marcuse's version of "advanced industrial society," encompassing communist and capitalist worlds, as systematically absorbing "the spirit of negativity" that was a key feature of critical/revolutionary consciousness for Hegel and Marx into an organized and conformist system of industrial and technological production, including the integration of the working class which in Marx's theory was to be the instrument of revolution. Marcuse would continue to develop this vision in following books, reaching classical formulation in One-Dimensional Man (1964) which is previewed in this succinct 1954 text.
Developing potentialities by rejecting the “positive” once it had become a barrier to progress in freedom. Reason is in its very essence contradiction, opposition, negation as long as freedom is not yet real. If the contradictory, oppositional, negative power of Reason is broken, reality moves under its own positive law and, unhampered by the Spirit, unfolds its repressive force. Such decline in the power of Negativity has indeed accompanied the progress of late industrial civilization. With the increasing concentration and effectiveness of economic, political, and cultural controls, the opposition in all these fields has been pacified, co-ordinated, or liquidated. The contradiction has been absorbed by the affirmation of the positive. In 1816, when the wars of national liberation had ended, Hegel exhorted his students against the “business of politics” and the State which had “swallowed up all other interests into its own,” to uphold the “courage of truth,” of thought, the power of the Spirit as the highest value. Today, the Spirit seems to have a different function: it helps to organize, administer, and anticipate the powers that be, and to liquidate the “power of Negativity.” Reason has identified itself with the reality: what is actual is reasonable although what is reasonable has not yet become actuality.

Has the other, the Marxian attempt to redefine Reason suffered a similar fate? Marx believed that industrial society had created the preconditions for the realization of Reason and Freedom while only its capitalist organization prevented this realization. Full maturity of the productive forces, mastery over nature, and a material wealth great enough to fulfill at least the basic needs of all members of society at the attained cultural level were the prerequisites for socialism, and these prerequisites had been created. However, in spite of this substantive link between capitalist productivity and socialist freedom, Marx thought that only a revolution and a revolutionary social class could accomplish the transition. For in this transition, far more was involved than the liberation and rational utilization of the productive forces, namely, the liberation of man himself: abolition of his enslavement to the instruments of his labor, and thereby the complete transvaluation of all prevailing values. Only this “more” would turn quantity into quality and establish a different, non-repressive society—the determinate negation of capitalism. These new principles and values could only be realized by a class which was free from the old and repressive principles and values, whose existence embodied the very negation of the capitalist system and therefore the historical possibility of opposing and overcoming this system. Marx’ idea of the proletariat as the absolute negation of capitalist society telescopes in one notion the historical relation between the preconditions and the realization of freedom. In a strict sense, liberation presupposes freedom: the former can be accomplished only if undertaken and sustained by free individuals—free from the needs and interests of domination and repression. Unless the revolution itself progresses through freedom, the need for domination and repression would be carried over into the new society, and the fateful separation between the “immediate” and the “true” interest of the individuals would be almost
inevitable; the individuals would become the objects of their own liberation, and freedom would be a matter of administration and decree. Progress would be progressive repression, and the "delay" in freedom would threaten to become self-propelling and self-perpetuating.

The decisive importance of the relation between the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary proletariat has been demonstrated only after the death of Marx, in the transformation of free into organized capitalism. It was this development which transformed Marxism into Leninism and determined the fate of Soviet Society—its progress under a new system of repressive productivity. Marx' conception of the "free" proletariat as the absolute negation of the established social order belonged to the model of "free" capitalism: a society in which the free operation of the basic economic laws and relations would increase the internal contradictions and make the industrial proletariat their principal victim as well as the self-conscious agent of their revolutionary solution. When Marx envisaged the transition to socialism from the advanced industrial countries, he did so because not only the maturity of the productive forces, but also the irrationality of their use, the maturity of the internal contradictions of capitalism and of the will to their abolition were essential to his idea of socialism. But precisely in the advanced industrial countries, since about the turn of the century, the internal contradictions became subject to increasingly efficient organization, and the negative force of the proletariat was increasingly whittled down. Not only a small "labor aristocracy" but the larger part of the laboring classes were made into a positive part of the established society. It was not simply the overflow of productivity into a rising standard of living which caused this transformation. When Engels died in 1895, the living and working conditions of the laboring classes in the advanced capitalist countries had shown a long range tendential improvement far above the level described and anticipated in Marx' Capital. Still, Engels saw no reason for a fundamental revision of the Marxian prediction. Engels' emphasis on the growing legal-parliamentary power of organized labor seems to indicate that he counted on a further improvement in the condition of labor, as the direct result of growing working class power within the functioning capitalist system. Nor did the trend seem to refute the Marxian conception. The "supra-profits" of the monopolistic period could serve as an explanation for the rise in real wages—at the expense of "supra-exploited" groups and regions, and at the cost of recurrent war-preparation and wars. Not just impoverishment, but impoverishment in the face of growing social productivity was supposed to make the proletariat a revolutionary force. Marx' notion of impoverishment implies consciousness of the arrested potentialities of man and of the possibility of their realization—consciousness of alienation and de-humanization. But then the development of capitalist productivity stopped the development of revolutionary consciousness. Technological progress multiplied the needs and satisfactions, while its utilization made the needs as well as their satisfactions repressive: they themselves sustain submission and domination. Progress in administration reduces the dimension in which individuals can still be "with
themselves" and "for themselves" and transforms them into total objects of their society. The development of consciousness becomes the dangerous prerogative of outsiders. The sphere in which individual and group transcendence was possible is thus being eliminated—and with it the life element of opposition. Here we can indicate only a few of the principal factors which enabled late industrial civilization to absorb its negativity.

The increase in the apparatus of production and distribution outgrew individual and group control and generated a hierarchy of public and private bureaucracies, with a high degree of neutralization of responsibility. Even at the top of the hierarchy, where responsibility is identifiable and final, the specific individual and group interest can assert itself only within the overriding interest of the preservation and expansion of the apparatus as a whole. The latter is indeed the incarnation of the general will, the collective need. Since it keeps, at least in the advanced industrial countries, society going under improving conditions and with better satisfaction of needs, the rationality of opposition appears even more spurious, if not senseless. Considering the given facts and tendencies, there is no reason to assume that further progress demands the destruction of its present basis. This reconciliation of the opposition was operative long before the first World War revealed the extent to which the "objectively" revolutionary classes had been integrated into the national interest.

The tremendous rise in the productivity of labor within the framework of the prevailing social institutions made mass production inevitable—but also mass manipulation. The result was that the standard of living rose with the concentration of economic power to monopolistic proportions. Concurrently, technological progress fundamentally changed the balance of social power. The scope and effectiveness of the instruments of destruction controlled by the government made the classical forms of the social struggle old-fashioned and romantic. The barricade lost its revolutionary value just as the strike lost its revolutionary content. The economic and cultural coordination of the laboring classes was accompanied and supplemented by the obsolescence of their traditional weapons.

The consolidation of the capitalist system was greatly enhanced by the development of Soviet society. This development influenced the situation of the Western world in two ways: (1) The failure of the Central European revolutions after the first World War isolated the Bolshevik Revolution from its anticipated economic and political base in the advanced capitalist countries and led it on the road of terroristic industrialization by virtue of its own resources. What Marx had branded as the repressive and exploitative features of capitalist industrialization was thus reproduced, on a new basis, in Soviet society in order to obtain as rapidly as possible the achievements of Western industrialization. Compared with the Marxian idea of socialism, Stalinist society was not less repressive than capitalist society—but much poorer. The image of freedom which Marxism had upheld against the prevailing unfreedom seemed to have lost its realistic content. In the Western
world, Communism came to be identified, not with a higher but with a lower stage of the historical development, and with a hostile foreign power. As against this power, the national cause also appeared as the cause of freedom. (2) Then the Soviet state grew into a highly rationalized and industrialized society, outside the capitalist world and powerful enough to compete with the latter on its own terms, challenging its monopoly in progress and its claim to shape the future of civilization. The Western world answered with total mobilization, and it was this mobilization which completed national and international control over the danger zones of society. The Western world was unified to an extent unknown in its long history. The common interest, which had already successfully organized the internal contradictions, now proceeded to organize the external ones. The international co-ordination in turn helped to intensify the national co-ordination. Conformity becomes a question of life and death—not only for individuals but also for nations.

The tendencies which were here just enumerated have been often and amply described in terms of “mass democracy,” “popular culture,” etc. Such terminology leads itself easily to a wrong focus: as if these tendencies were due to the rise of “masses,” or to the decline of certain cultural values and institutions. They rather seem to grow out of the historical structure of late industrial society once this society had succeeded in controlling its own dialectic on the ground of its own productivity. Nor are these tendencies confined to any specific cultural or political area. The pre-conditioning of the individuals, their shaping into objects of administration, seem to be universal phenomena. The idea of a different form of Reason and Freedom, envisioned by dialectical idealism as well as materialism, appears again as Utopia. But the triumph of regressive and retarding forces does not vitiate the truth of this Utopia. The total mobilization of society against the ultimate liberation of the individual, which constitutes the historical content of the present period, indicates how real is the possibility of this liberation.

* * *

**PREFACE TO RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA'S**

**MARXISM AND FREEDOM (1958)**

The reexamination of Marxian theory is one of the most urgent tasks for comprehending the contemporary situation. Perhaps no other theory has so accurately anticipated the basic tendencies of late industrial society—and
apparently drawn such incorrect conclusions from its analysis. While the
economic and political development of twentieth-century capitalism shows
many of the features which Marx derived from the inherent contradictions
of the system, these contradictions did not explode in the final crisis; the
"era of imperialism" has seen an intercontinental re-grouping but also an
intercontinental stabilization of the Western world—in spite of or because
of a "permanent war economy." And while the socialist revolution was
prepared and began under the guidance of rigidly Marxist conceptions, the
subsequent construction of socialism in the communist orbit exhibits hardly
any of the substance of the Marxian idea. However, for the reexamination of
Marxian theory, nothing is accomplished by merely pointing up the contrast
between reality and the Marxian "predictions." Inasmuch as Marx's and
Engels's notion of the development of mature capitalism and of the transition
to socialism was elaborated prior to the stage at which its "verification"
was envisaged, Marxian theory may be said to imply predictions. But the
essential character of this theory denies such designation. Marxian theory is
an interpretation of history and defines, on the basis of this interpretation,
the political action which, using the given historical possibilities, can establish
a society without exploitation, misery, and injustice. Thus, in its conceptual
structure as well as in its political practice, Marxian theory must "respond"
to the historical reality in process: modification of the theoretical concepts
and of the political practice to be guided by them is part of the theory itself.
However, if such modifications were merely added to the original
conception in order to correct it under the impact of new, unexpected facts,

began corresponding with Marcuse. Dunayevskaya initiated writing to Marcuse to
respond favorably to his book *Reason and Revolution* and to articulate their shared
interests in Hegel and Marxism, a correspondence that continued for decades; see
*The Marcuse-Dunayevskaya-Fromm Correspondence, 1954–1978. Dialogues on
Hegel, Marx, and Critical Theory*, edited by Kevin B. Anderson and Russell Rockwell
(Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2012); the text contains an excellent contextualizing
introduction, and full extant correspondence between Dunayevskaya and Marcuse, as
well as between Dunayevskaya and his erstwhile colleague and sometimes adversary
Erich Fromm.

Marcuse's Preface opens with a call for the re-examination and updating of the
Marxian theory, which he claims "accurately anticipated the basic tendencies of late
industrial society," but also apparently drew "such incorrect conclusions from its
analysis." Ironically, Marcuse would become famous for questioning the Marxian
theory that the proletariat was still a revolutionary subject, while Dunayevskaya
held a relatively orthodox view that saw the working class as the lever to socialist
revolution. Yet both Marcuse and Dunayevskaya pursued critical and dialectical
versions of Marxism and criticized dominant Marxist orthodoxies, as well as the
hegemonic bourgeois ideology. Marcuse makes clear in the Preface his view that
classical Marxism contains a synthesis of philosophy, political economy, and politics,
and, along with Dunayevskaya, argues for the continued importance of philosophy for
the Marxian project. Marcuse argues as well that humanism is at the core of Marxian
theory, and reads Marxism as a theory of human liberation and development, as well
as critique of capitalism and theory of revolution.
the theoretical structure itself would be destroyed. The latter is retained only if the modifications themselves are derived from the original conception, as the historical alternatives inherent in it. The modifications must be demonstrably related to the theoretical basis, that is, to the dialectical-materialistic concept of industrial society. This concept unifies the various layers of Marxian theory, the most general philosophical as well as the most specific economic categories, the doctrine as well as the political action of Marxism must be validated by it.

Failure to elucidate the function and the full content of dialectical materialism has marred much of the Marxist and non-Marxist discussion of Marxian theory. With some notable exceptions (such as Georg Lukács's Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and the more recent French reexaminations of Marxism), dialectical materialism was minimized as a disturbing "metaphysical rest" in Marxian theory, or formalized into a technical method, or schematized into a Weltanschauung. Raya Dunayevskaya's book discards these and similar distortions and tries to recapture the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy.

It has often been emphasized that Marx's philosophical writings which preceded the Critique of Political Economy prepared the ground for Marxian economics and politics. After a long period of oblivion or neglect, these philosophical writings became the focus of attention in the twenties, especially after the first publication of the full text of the German Ideology and of the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. However, the inner identity of the philosophical with the economic and political "stage" of Marxian theory was not elucidated (and perhaps could not be adequately elucidated because a most decisive link was still missing, namely, the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie of 1857-1858, first published in 1939 and 1941). Dunayevskaya's book goes beyond the previous interpretations. It shows not only that Marxian economics and politics are throughout philosophy, but that the latter is from the beginning economics and politics. Marxian theory emerges and develops under the impact of the historical dialectic which it expounds. The starting point is the comprehended situation of capitalist society. Its "notion" derives from the philosophical insight into the capitalist economy: this society creates the preconditions for a free and rational human existence while precluding the realization of freedom and reason. In other words (since the prevalent abuse of the word "freedom" all but prohibits the use of the term), Marx holds that capitalist society creates the preconditions for an existence without toil, poverty, injustice, and anxiety while perpetuating toil, poverty, injustice, and anxiety.

The "value" of such a goal is not questioned by Marx. He accepts "humanism" not as a philosophy among others but as a historical fact or rather historical possibility; the societal conditions for the realization of the "all-round individual" can be established by changing the established societal conditions which prevent this realization. He accepts the "value" of a humane society (socialism) as standard for thought and action as one accepts the value of health as standard for the diagnosis and treatment of a disease. Marxian
theory does not describe and analyze the capitalist economy "in itself and for itself" but describes and analyzes it in terms of another than itself—in terms of the historical possibilities which have become realistic goals for action. As critical theory, Marxism is two-dimensional throughout: measuring the prevailing society against its own, objective-historical potentialities and capabilities. This two-dimensional character manifests itself in the union of philosophy and political economy: Marxian philosophy is critique of political economy, and every one of the economic categories is a philosophical category. This union is well brought out in Dunayevskaya's discussion of Capital, which shows that the most technical economic analyses of the process of production and circulation are just as firmly committed to the humanistic philosophy as are the critique of Hegel and the theses on Feuerbach.

Once the humanistic idea is seen not merely as origin and end but as the very substance of Marxian theory, the deep-rooted anarchistic and libertarian elements of Marxian theory come to light. Socialism fulfills itself not in the emancipation and organization of labor, but in its "abolition." As long as man's struggle with nature requires human toil for procuring the necessities of life, all that can be attained in this sphere is a truly rational societal organization of labor. Its establishment at the stage of advanced industrialism is "only" a political problem. For Marx, it is to be solved by a revolution which brings the productive process under the collective control of the "immediate producers." But this is not freedom. Freedom is living without toil, without anxiety: the play of human faculties. The realization of freedom is a problem of time: reduction of the working day to the minimum which turns quantity into quality. A socialist society is a society in which free time, not labor time is the social measure of wealth and the dimension of the individual existence:

The true economy—saving—consists in the saving of labor time ...; but this saving is identical with the development of productivity. Therefore certainly not renunciation of enjoyment, but development of power, of the faculties of production and thus of the faculties as well as the means of enjoyment. The faculty of enjoyment is the condition for enjoyment, consequently the primary means for enjoyment. And this faculty is development of individual ability, productivity. Saving of labor time is increase of free time, i.e., time for the full development of the individual. This is the greatest productive force, which in turn reacts upon the productivity of labor ... . It is evident that labor time cannot remain in abstract opposition to free time—as it appears from the point of view of bourgeois economics. Labor cannot become play ... . Free time—which is leisure time as well as time for higher activity—transforms its possessor into a different subject.29

29 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie (Berlin: Dietz, 1953) p. 599.
This is the image of a society in which the individual's "occupation" is the shaping of his free time as his own time, while the process of material production, organized and controlled by free individuals, creates the conditions and means for the exercise of their freedom for "enjoyment."

If socialism is conditional upon a reduction of "merely necessary" labor to such an extent as to reverse the relationship between labor time and free time, between earning a living and living—in other words, if free time is to be the content of the individual existence, then socialism is conditional upon advanced industrial production with the highest possible degree of mechanization. Therefore the Marxian concept of the socialist revolution as the final event of mature capitalism. But the relation between socialism and advanced industrialism is not merely a technical-economic one. It involves the development of those human faculties which make for the free (in Marx's words—the "all-round") individual, especially the development of "consciousness." In Marxian theory, the term has a specific connotation, namely, awareness of the given potentialities of society and of their distortion and suppression, or, awareness of the difference between the immediate and the real interest. Consciousness is thus revolutionary consciousness, expressing the "determinate negation" of the established society, and as such proletarian consciousness. The development of consciousness in this sense requires institutionalized civil and political rights—freedom of speech, assembly, organization, freedom of the press, etc., to the extent to which the mature capitalist society can afford them. The Marxian insistence on democracy as the preparatory stage of socialism, far from being a cloak of "Aesopian language," pertains to the basic conception and is not minimized by the equally strong insistence on the difference between "bourgeois" and socialist democracy.

The historical dialectic which joins theory and practice, philosophy and political economy, also joins capitalism and socialism. The unifying force is, as Dunayevskaya reiterates, not that of a dogmatic system but that of the comprehended historical dynamic. But then, the development of Marxism itself, in theory and in practice, is subject to this dynamic. Social Democracy on the one side, Leninism and Stalinism on the other, must then be discussed in terms of the historical interplay between theory and reality. The last parts of Dunayevskaya's analysis are devoted to this discussion.

The key for the understanding of the development of Marxism since about the turn of the century is the transformation of "free" into organized capitalism on an international scale, its economic and political stabilization, and the ensuing increase in the standard of living. This transformation affected the laboring classes of the advanced industrial countries in a decisive way. Under the leadership of their successful bureaucracy, the situation of a major part of these classes changed from one of "absolute negation" to one of affirmation of the established system. With the reduction of the revolutionary potential in the West, socialism was losing its classical historical agent and area and was subsequently constructed in the backward.
areas of the East in a way essentially alien to the Marxian conception. The growth of the communist orbit in turn welded the capitalist countries closer together and created a firmer basis for stabilization and internal unification. Neither wars nor depressions nor inflations nor deflations have arrested this trend. It presents the greatest challenge to Marxist theory and to the Marxist evaluation of contemporary communism.

To meet the challenge, Dunayevskaya uses the full arsenal of the concepts which she had assembled in her interpretation of Marxian theory in the first parts of her book. While the author of this Preface agrees in all essentials with the theoretical interpretation of the Marxian oeuvre in these first parts, he disagrees with some decisive parts of the analysis of post-Marxian developments, especially with that of the relationship between Leninism and Stalinism, of the recent upheavals in Eastern Europe, and, perhaps most important, with the analysis of the contemporary position, structure and consciousness of the laboring classes. Marx’s concept of the proletariat as “revolutionary class in-itself (an sich)” did not designate a merely occupational group, i.e., the wage earners engaged in the material production—as a truly dialectical concept, it was at one and the same time an economic, political, and philosophical category. As such it comprised three main elements—(1) the specific societal mode of production characteristic of “free” capitalism, (2) the existential and political conditions brought about by this mode of production, (3) the political consciousness developed in this situation. Any historical change in even one of these elements (and such a change has certainly occurred) would require a thorough theoretical modification. Without such modification, the Marxian notion of the working class seems to be applicable neither to the majority of the laboring classes in the West nor to that in the communist orbit.

July 1957

* * *
This is to my knowledge the most adequate and most lucid presentation of the development of Marxian theory and the Marxian movements from 1848 to the time of the first World War. Concentrating on German and Austrian history, the book succeeds in tracing and analyzing within the framework of a changing society the various Marxist schools—revisionist, centrist, etc.—the issues which divided them, and the gradual transformation of the original theory in this process. The chapter on Engels, which shows the beginnings of the codification of critical theory into a universal "system," is the high point of this analysis. The following critical remarks do not minimize the achievement. They refer mainly to the last part of the book, entitled "The Dissolution of the Marxian System," which deals (in fifty pages) with the development from 1918 to 1948, and which does not sustain the level of the preceding discussion.

In the preface to his book, the author states that his study "represents no commitment to anything save the critical method inherent in the exercise of rational thinking" (p. 7). In the Introduction he says that:

"to take a historical view of his [Marx's] work ... presupposes advantage point made available by developments beyond the stage reflected in the Marxian system—in other words, it assumes that the Marxian categories are no longer quite applicable to current history. (p. 15)"

But "the historical view" does not imply any such assumption—and the phrase "in other words" seems to cover up a non sequitur. It may well be that the Marxian categories are no longer applicable. This is a perfectly legitimate thesis—but it has to be demonstrated. Lichtheim has not done so, and he could not do so because such a demonstration requires an analysis of advanced industrial society and of the structural changes which the development of this society in coexistence with the communist societies has brought about—an analysis which is outside the scope of his book. Its last part is no substitute for it. Here, Lichtheim gives hardly more than a repetition of familiar clichés and accusations; the presentation of Marx's theory of the state is very inadequate.

* Editors' note:
Marcuse's review of George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* was published in *Political Science Quarterly*, 77, 1 (New York: 1962) pp. 117-19. The very positive short review sees Lichtheim's text as "the most adequate and most lucid presentation of the development of Marxian theory and the Marxian movements from 1848 to the time of the first World War." Marcuse sees Lichtheim's study as clearly outlining the parameters of the major tendencies of Marxian thought and politics within their historical context although faults Lichtheim for not adequately engaging whether classical Marxian still applies to contemporary conditions, an issue that would challenge Marcuse for the rest of his life.
in itself contradictory, and the transfiguration of Karl Marx into some
end of John Stuart Mill is almost complete.

The last chapter bears the title “Beyond Marxism,” but I could not
discover even the outline of such a Beyond, except the statement that the
Marxian system has been dissolved, because it has not become reality, and is
entirely perverted in Soviet society as well as in the other communist states.

I have no quarrel with the statement of fact that present-day communism
is not the realization, and is perhaps even the perversion, of the Marxian
conception, but I do not see any justification for the “because” which makes
the statement of fact into a verification of the thesis. It is worthwhile quoting
the last sentences of this chapter:

Marx’s critical theory stands and falls with the claim that human action
can bring about the end of ‘pre-history.’ Unless this claim is made good, the
socialist revolution cannot be regarded as a radical break with the past. To the
pragmatic outlook of the modern labor movement this conclusion may come
as no great surprise, but it spells the dissolution of the Marxian system and the
end of the eschatological hopes embodied in it. (p. 400)

Accepting the premise that the socialist revolutions which have occurred
do not constitute a “radical break with the past” (there might be questions on
that at least in the case of China and Cuba), the only conclusion at which a
“historical view” could arrive is the all too obvious one that pre-history has not
yet come to an end. Why this conclusion spells the dissolution of the Marxian
system is not clear—mainly because (as Lichtheim himself has convincingly
down) Marxian thought is not a “system” but a critical theory, and because
his theory is not an “eschatological” speculation. Lichtheim here abandons the
“historical view” to which he has committed himself. It would have required
repeating the Marxian categories as what they are: historical categories which
try to define tendencies and counter-tendencies within an antagonistic society.

There is another thesis in Lichtheim’s book, one that is well argued and
demonstrated, with a wealth of material. It stresses, once again, the contrast
between the young and the mature Marx; the latter has shelved the radical
revolutionary politics of his earlier writings (until about 1850) and adopted
the long view,” accepting the growth of democratic institutions and the
rising legitimate power of organized labor as the framework of his analysis.
According to Lichtheim, this trend culminates in the Inaugural Address of
1864 and finds its codification in Engels’ writings. There is no need here to
reopen the familiar controversy between Lenin and Trotsky on the one hand,
and Bernstein, Kautsky, et al., on the other. Lichtheim’s discussion is by far
the most thorough and even the most convincing effort along this line. I only
wish to raise the question whether Lichtheim, in arguing his thesis, does not
underrate the revolutionary content of the economic analysis in Capital, of
the Critique of the Gotha Program and of the Civil War in France.

* * *
HUMANISM AND HUMANITY

Ladies and Gentlemen, please allow me to begin with an apology that really is not one. I am afraid that I will be speaking rather negatively — but I believe that seeing the negative and addressing it is a fundamental presupposition for anything positive. Today the words "humanity" and "humanism" cause us some perplexity. Clearly something about them has not worked. It seems as though these ideas, these concepts, are of only antiquarian value, that humanism and humanity belong only to history. But what does that mean that they belong only to history? If something happened just thirty years ago, that is history, and yet it conditions the present and will also affect our future. What we have learned during these thirty years that we had not earlier known, is this: what human beings can be made to do. They can be made into inhuman beings. In addition they can be made, in a pleasant enough way, so pliable and adaptable, that they can no longer defend themselves, so they are no longer capable of distinguishing truth from lies, education from propaganda. Before we can understand what is happening and what we can do about it, we must relearn how to see, we must relearn how to think. What human beings can be made to do is one of the lessons that too many have forgotten, though the power elite has not forgotten it. We are all inclined to forget that which is false, to forgive that which is false, instead of forgetting what is right, instead of forgiving what is right. In history nothing repeats itself in the same way. If something repeats itself, it does so in a different form, and so both humanism and humanity have a new form and a new content. If I may, I would like to briefly bring to mind what humanism and humanity have meant historically. Humanism was the intellectual movement.

*Editors’ note:
“Humanism and Humanity” was originally presented as an address to the 1962 Berlin congress of B’nai B’rith, as translator Charles Reitz notes below. While Marcuse’s 1958 Preface to Dunayevskaya’s Marxism and Freedom allies himself with Marxist humanism, in this text Marcuse critically interrogates the tradition of humanism, and provides his own materialist ideal of a fully human being. Following Marx, Marcuse stresses that a person can only be fully human if their basic human needs are met, and they are capable of "independent thought and independent action.” In the latter part of the address, Marcuse raises the question of whether individuals today are capable of independent thought and action and whether societies today allow for the development of fully human beings. The text was written during the period that One-Dimensional Man (1964) was gestating and anticipates some of its key ideas.

studies in Marxism

that, since the close of the middle ages, saw to it that the study of classical antiquity would serve as one of the fundamental pre-conditions for the free development of the human personality and human individuality. The idea of education, the idea of culture, stood against everything barbaric, everything inhuman, unfree. Humanity - that was the idea of the human species - the unity and the equality of all persons - standing above all conflicts among races, nations, and cultures. This was the idea of humanity, not as an abstract concept, but as a challenging task yet to be accomplished.

And now let’s ask: if this all is so, what does humanism have to do with humanity? Through an education to the classics and culture of the ancient world, the Renaissance and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw an education of humanity against its intellectual and political repression by medieval scholasticism and secular despotisms which required further human subjugation, unfreedom, wretchedness. We will hold in abeyance here the question of whether or not the idea of classical culture here was in fact an accurate one, and whether or not classical culture really opposed repression and unfreedom in this sense. But it is certain that this great humanism had a pagan and a libertarian undertone which we clearly see in “the Renaissance man,” in Rabelais, in Spinoza, in Goethe, and (here I want to name someone who is usually not mentioned as a humanist, but who in my estimation is one of the last great humanists) Sigmund Freud, of whom I shall soon speak in this address. Each of these great humanists formulated an idea of humanity that was suited to its time. What does it mean to say an idea is suited to its time? Am I saying that the idea of humanity and the actualization of humanity are so time-dependent that the concepts may become obsolete? Not! But to clarify this, I would like to provide a brief indication of what humanity authentically means. Humanity - people. But people not as a biological species or genus, people not as a total natural organism, rather people as a critical intellectual unit, as an historical totality. Those qualities which in practice define people as people, as distinguished from animals and non-persons, constitute a human being in this sense. Primarily this means intelligence, but not intelligence as an abstract faculty, but intelligence as the capacity to understand the human condition and hence transform it such that crudeness, helplessness, hunger, and ignorance can be overcome. Understanding intelligence in this manner presupposes an independence of mind. This is the ability of the individual to think autonomously, rather than to simply comply with habits of thought worked out first by others. In other words, intelligence in connection with humanity and humanism is, as such, first and foremost freedom and has freedom as its precondition. Now of course this knowledge and this intelligence, which can contribute to the actualization of human potential, are never merely individual matters. The individual, as an isolated person, is unable to meet the challenge. This is an historical and social responsibility which civilization can, or at least should, carry out against raw nature and against all repressive social and intellectual forces.
To the degree that society becomes humane, it makes the equality of all people (as expressed in humanism) into a reality. This means equality of every human face and person, not just among those of a particular nation, race, or tribe, but above and beyond, and in opposition to, the division of humanity into different nations, races, or tribes. Equality, because every human being has all the qualities and capacities that define humans as human. And it is only this equality of all human beings that makes freedom possible. Because there is almost an obligation today to misinterpret it, I feel compelled to explain what this equality, the equality which stands in the center of humanism, actually means. Equality in its humanist sense, as it was understood before Christianity in the ancient Greek world, naturally did not involve people being all the same, but rather the direct opposite. Equality in its humanist sense created the fundamental condition on the basis of which all persons were able to fulfill their own needs and utilize their own talents, becoming truly free individuals who could be different and where differences were not suppressed. For this reason humanism must be grounded in this idea of equality; if this precondition does not exist, human beings can only be free at the expense of others. And then one is not really free. Because one who is free only at the expense of others is dependent on those who are not free. What are the fundamental conditions that must be in place in order for humanity to be a reality and not a mere idea? They can be pulled together in a single proposition: that the vital needs of all human beings are met. Met in a very emphatic sense. Met such that people's lives are no longer spent in a brutal struggle for existence; such that work is no longer a mere means to life, but instead an expression of the free development of one's own personality. Yet if this and only this counts as humanity, if this and only this counts as human existence, then right up to today no authentic humanity has ever existed. So for quite a while now, our civilization has not made our humanity a reality; hence we should not speak so easily about progress, nor look down so quickly on classical antiquity because it maintained that slavery was natural. What did Aristotle mean by this assertion, which like so many of his propositions is misunderstood?

He meant that people exist who are incapable of independent thought and independent action, and who cannot decide things for themselves, because they must spend their lives in producing the necessities of life and therefore cannot live life as an end in itself. This is because they are human instruments: they are unfree. As you can see, Aristotle took freedom very seriously. It was his view that no person was free just because work was over for the day, or because it was a holiday, and therefore he did not attribute humanity to the slave. We know today that there is nothing natural about slavery. We know that it is possible for all people to have human(e) qualities (Menschlichkeit). But have we thereby overcome slavery? Or has it been internalized, made more general, more democratic, more pleasant, more unproblematic. The struggle for existence does go on. It is every bit as brutal as it ever was, not only for individuals, but also for nations
around the world. This struggle is not getting easier; it is getting more
global, more destructive, more inhuman. So, are the apologists of violence
right when they say concepts like humanism and humanity are abstract
concepts, concepts of a bourgeois culture which have become obsolete?
No, humanism is more than that kind of concept; but we must admit that
humanism as an historical movement has collapsed. But let us also admit
something more difficult: that our contemporary epoch is more inhuman
than the past. This is because the degree of inhumanity can be assessed
in only one way: in comparison with the given possibilities of furnishing
each human(e) existence to everyone. And the given possibilities, technical
possibilities, economic possibilities, are greater now than they have been in
any historical period. With the growth of these possibilities has come the
growth of destructiveness. Civilization continues and strides forth under
the ongoing threat of atomic warfare, total annihilation. Humanism is not
at fault for this. The fault lies with a civilization to which humanism both
complied and of which it simultaneously complained. I’d like to remind you
in a few words of the diagnosis of this guilt made by Freud. He predicted this
catastrophe. It was his belief that cultural progress requires the repression
of drives and impulses, a repression of that which he had called the pleasure
principle. This refers to the core drives of an organism to satisfy its needs
and desires. Culture is built upon an organism’s repression of this pleasure
principle, its becoming an instrument of commodified, wage – CR] labor.
And against this repression, the individual reacts instinctively with a
rebellion against the father and against all social elements that represent
the father and which impose instinctual repression through the society’s
morality. This imposition is further repressed, and the feeling of guilt, guilt
on account of the rebellion against the father, are anchored within the
individual and become stronger. The result according to Freud: a continual
diminution of the vital drives and erotic pleasures, and the growth of
drives toward aggression, destruction, and death. Also according to Freud:
as cultures progress, this fatal dynamic intensifies. It intensifies because
the more technical progress makes possible the satisfaction of life’s needs
with less and less labor, the necessity to reproduce instinctual repression
becomes that more urgent. A civilization built upon the necessity of work
would collapse without this existential struggle. But a progressing culture
can maintain these pressures only by providing also an escape valve for
the instincts (one that functions better and better), and this escape valve
is the release of the destructive drives. These interconnections were a
necessity, according to Freud. Cultural progress hinges upon advancements
in the destruction of material and intellectual resources, and it is precisely
this sort of destruction that work, wealth, the conquest of nature, science
and technology, make happen. Yet in the end the individual pays. Living
standards rise with increased preparations for war; the population grows
simultaneously with genocide; space flight and national aggressiveness go
hand in hand. This is Freud.
Is there anyone who does not believe in the inevitability of such developments? Let us not underestimate the extent of the changes that have to be made in order to avoid catastrophe. Humanism, in its traditional form, has been shipwrecked. I have said that this is not the fault of humanism, but humanism is in part responsible, as I would briefly like to make clear to you. The ways and means by which humanity may be actualized as humanity changes over time. Today the concept of humanism is not adequate to this task. The main weakness of traditional humanism was its insistence on the education of humanity to a sense of human inwardness and to a certain style of life that was in reality only accessible to an elite.

The well-rounded personality, the ideal of humanism, the intellectual education and physical training, presupposed a degree of material and mental independence that only the fewest people had. Consequently, humanism fled the miserable conditions through an escape into the private sphere of a personal humanism separated from the public sphere, the social sphere. One could be humane at home or on Sundays, but during the week one participated in the humiliation of humanity. Just one example of this: the great humanist Goethe, a minister of the court in Weimar, signed-off on a death sentence of a woman found guilty of murdering her child — a tragedy — which Goethe thereafter described with such empathy in Faust that the inhumanity of the death sentence was movingly expressed. But the miserable realities of social existence were not altered through these higher values. Indeed, the higher values cold easily be transformed into the packaging of an inhuman society. One could be so proud of one's Goethe and one's Beethoven and at the same time construct concentration camps. In spite of this, humanism did of course contribute to the humanization of culture. Civilization did become more humane. The rule of law became standardized, more predictable. Society became more democratic, poverty was slowly pushed back, the social order made more reasonable and more secure. In all of this I have spoken of the past. We must admit that the present is less humanistic, less liberal, more violent and more destructive than those days. Humanism's powerlessness has increased, and its weakness has negative implications. It does not look reality in the eye; it has not adequately pushed back the intellectual, spiritual, and theoretical limits. It has had no effect upon politics, which is still bound together with the fate of humanity. Today humanism must become political. As a plank of some political platform, as a slogan of a united front organization? Certainly not: Humanism is not compatible today with any of the contemporary political organizations. Humanists are not welcome today in any of the contemporary political organizations. It can all too easily happen that these organizations fight for just those things the humanists are fighting against. Today the task of the humanist is first and foremost to discern and to communicate just what is going on. A recognition and denunciation of the bad is today more than ever the precondition for overcoming the bad. Recognizing the bad is hard enough, denouncing it is unpleasant and dangerous. Why is this? It is so
difficult because humanism today demands a critique of the contemporary world situation without compromise.

It is more and more difficult to recognize the powers opposed to gratification since they are more and more hidden behind the advancing technologies of control over human beings and nature. How can anyone criticize a society that is improving and elevating the standard of living, and making life easier. Critique is not easy: genuinely humanistic criticism addresses the most sacred goals of the nation and its strategy. Thus, the humanist in the East today easily appears as a capitalist; in the West as a communist. More specifically and concretely: just what are the issues today that humanistic criticism needs to address? How contemporary civilization threatens to botch its historic chance to economic, social, and political fulfillment. How the total readiness for the total annihilation of the enemy is at the same time a total readiness for one’s own annihilation. How the risks of peace are still better and less likely than the risks of atomic war or the risks of diminishing the intellectual and physical prowess of the current and future generations. How the military and economic preparations for the eventuality of war produces exactly those forces, once again, that have engineered the destruction of humanity already once in our lifetimes. As you see, humanism is a painful challenge. Culture, education, compassion are no longer sufficient: today in these areas everyone can be a humanist. But they have never in this manner alone been able to stop the butchery. Humanism is becoming a more and more serious matter, the more the eventuality of human annihilation becomes, the more civilization has all the technical and scientific means at its disposal to make humanity real.

In conclusion, let me remind you of something great and emblematic of the twentieth century: Schöenberg’s “Moses and Aron,” which many of you saw in a splendid performance yesterday. This is a relevant and rich work of art because it appears that the struggle between Moses and Aron, as depicted in this piece, has not ended; indeed it might just be beginning. The struggle between Moses and Aron: false images, images of a false freedom, a false humanity; against the idea, against the concept [of human liberation – ed] that demands realization. False deeds against knowledge, against the principles that demand realization. A civilization that is capable of conquering outer space should also be able to fashion upon Earth a place where everyone enjoys human dignity and worth. Yet we must not underestimate the immensity of the negatives that lie before this undertaking. We may even have to go, as in the story of Moses and Aron, once again into the desert before this task can be accomplished.

I apologize once again here at the end as I did at the beginning for being so negative, but I believe negativity is a precondition of improvement.

* * *

This unfinished typescript, “Why Talk on Socialism,” (HMA 0500.01) has a handwritten note (perhaps by an archivist or earlier researcher) above its title:
“HM UCSD Feb. 24, 1975.” This seems a legitimate reference to the time of its composition at the University of California, San Diego, the institution Herbert Marcuse was affiliated with during the most tumultuous period in his intellectual and political career. The Vietnam War was finally ending with the defeat of Saigon in April 1975 (the US had somewhat earlier withdrawn its troops), Nixon had just resigned the US presidency in the aftermath of Watergate, facing almost certain impeachment and removal from office, Gerald Ford became the unelected US president; and reactionary California governor Ronald Reagan’s second term had just ended during which he sought and obtained the forced retirement of Marcuse from his teaching position. In February 1975 Marcuse was in a post-retirement phase, yet he did continue to lecture at UCSD occasionally. This was a period of ongoing political ferment, including much contentious rivalry among campus radicals and socialist organizations. The manuscript contains a forceful restatement of the logic and necessity of socialism in the US today, but it ends abruptly with a note of caution against sectarian squabbling. The nineteen-page text is clearly the draft of an important and radical address set down in outline form, triple-spaced for the most part, with revisions/additions in Marcuse’s identifiable hand and some few marginalia in the hand of an unknown amanuensis. The transcription below follows the typescript word for word, preserving incomplete sentences, sentence fragments, and original emphases, while consolidating clearly grouped statements into paragraph form – Charles Reitz, translator.

\[\text{Why Talk on Socialism?}\]

Because an alternative to the established social system seems more and more on the agenda—an alternative possible to realize in this country—Marxian theory considers socialism as the only historical successor of capitalism which could bring forth human progress after the elimination of the destructiveness of capitalism. To get an objective picture (as far as possible) suspend all judgment as to whether the existing socialist-capitalist countries can be called so in a Marxian sense; disregard the innumerable different interpretations among the innumerable Marxist groups (Old and New Left)—they have enough in common.

“Alternative” = which replaces the established system as a whole which means: not only other and better (more equitable) functioning institutions (economic and political), but also a “new quality of life” a mode of existence = non-alienated relationships…. (I’ll come back to this).

But why a total alternative, why not reforms, modifications within capitalism? Because—and here we encounter a basic Marxian conception—the prevailing crisis is rooted in the very structure of capitalism, and is bound to become aggravated as capitalism continues to grow: capitalism destroys itself as it progresses! Therefore no reforms make sense. The notion that the society, as a whole is sick, destructive, is hopelessly outdated, had found
The Marxian notion contains three hypotheses which have to be demonstrated: 1) that capitalism, in its advance, develops aggravating conflicts (contradictions) which it cannot resolve, but also that capitalism itself is based on a contradiction; 2) that, at the same time, social forces merge within the system which indicate the coming transition to socialism as a historic possibility: a) objective—transformation of the free enterprise economy into monopoly and state capitalism; joint stock companies—first socialization of ownership; b) subjective—a politically conscious working class, forming the human base of the revolution; 3) that socialism is the only historical alternative for a better society (= non-utopian, "scientific," definite negation").

Today, To discuss in terms of the contemporary American scene: the "energy crisis," the corruption of democracy, unemployment, inflation—structural crisis of capitalism.

Marx's model: capitalism functioning under its own, optimal conditions. Capitalism = production for private profit under competitive conditions—in function only if growing, enlarged accumulation, investments, commodity sales—therefore it necessitates: constant raising of the productivity of labor through technical progress, mechanization, rationalization, speed-up systems. But C = (c+v)! Consequence: concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands, monopolistic resulting from free competition (dialectic)—saturation of the domestic market: therefore imperialist expansion abroad, colonialism, arms race, self-propelling production of waste, planned obsolescence, gadgets, luxuries for the privileged metropolitan population, under intensified exploitation of labor in the metropolis and in the Third World. Result: constant overproduction.

But: the inner limits of growth: declining rate of profit for all but the few oligopolistic giants; working class resistance to pressure on wages (here, too, limits of tolerance!); inter-capitalist competition, narrowing the world market; independence movements in Third World.

Race against these limits: creation of a capitalist world market, ruled by the common international interests of capital—the multinational corporations, their power, transcending all national borders and ideological differences (business with USSR and China); but also—a new conflict between the multinationals on the one hand, and the national interest on the other: 1) Exxon subsidiary in the Philippines 1973 refuses to sell oil to US navy; 2) ITT makes foreign policy, undermines US foreign policy; 3) Exports of production and technology abroad damages the US economy—unemployment, negative balance of payment, building up of competitors; 4) obsolescence of the sovereign national state and its ideology—another example how capitalism in its progress undermines its own foundations—a)

Economically: disappearance of free competition and free enterprise; b) politically: weakening of national sovereignty.
At home in the US the race against the inner limits of capitalism necessitates the production of ever more "superfluous" goods and services and necessitates creation of the need to buy these goods and services. Growing social wealth at the price of an ever more wasteful exploitation of energy (natural and human!) and of perpetuating full-time alienated work and alienated relationships between human beings. At the same time: present crisis—increased mechanization creates technological unemployment, and business shrinks because of higher prices, the saturation of the market and decline of real wages. Capital counteracts this shrinking by the monopolistic imposition of high prices: inflation, the cure? (see Gundar Frank).

[Former US President Gerald] Ford's program: the logical answer of neo-capitalism: help the rich, compel the poor to work harder. For example: Treasury Secretary Simon regarding the tax reduction "money must be channeled to families earning more than $20,000 a year because they are the biggest buyers" (Los Angeles Times, January 22 [1975]); or Ford: it would be a mistake to penalize "middle income Americans" (Los Angeles Times, January 23 [1975]). And the time honored remedy: end the proliferation of such non-profitable services as "food stamps, social security, and federal retirement benefits" (ibid.) and cut down on education (no tax rebates) Why? In order to reverse the "downward side of corporate profits." For "the Administration fears drift to socialism" (Budget Director of Los Angeles, Ash (Los Angeles Times, January 26 [1975]). "Downward slide" of which corporations? The same papers report record profits of Exxon, Standard Indiana and California, Texaco, Mobil, and even the steel industry, banking, etc. Others will continue to depend on the huge government subsidies (Lockheed, PanAm, etc.)—which is of course not socialism! The program wouldn't help because the collapse of prosperity is rooted in the capitalist mode of production itself—its inevitable outcome—is socialism inevitable?

Capitalism, which once attained the most rapid and sweeping development of productive forces, now reproduces itself through their evermore destructive and wasteful development: global sale of arms, "unproductive white collar work, intensified repression and control of the population. The internationalization of capital would not solve anything: tied to the need for the maximization of profit it reproduces the conflict between rich and poor capital and labor, on an international scale. The gap between rich and poor, the advanced and the backward countries, becomes larger. At the same time there emerges a competitive capitalism in the Third World: the power of the countries possessing vital material resources. Implied in this development is the danger of new wars, communist countermoves, and perpetual, vast "defense" budgets at the expense of welfare and real needs.

In Marxian terms the conflict between the vast social wealth in resources, goods, knowledge, and its destructive, unequal, wasteful utilization—all a part of the basic contradiction between modern socialized production and individual accumulation, a consequence of production for private profit. The general form of the internal contradictions of capitalism has never been
more blatant, more cruel, more costly of human lives and happiness. And—
this is the significance of the Sixties—this blatant irrationality has not only
penetrated the consciousness of a large part of the population, it has also
caused, mainly among the young people, a radical transformation of needs
and values which may prove to be incompatible with the capitalist system,
hierarchy, priorities, morality, symbols (the counter-culture, ecology
movement - CR]... . The very achievements of capitalism have brought
about its obsolescence and the possibility of the alternative!

The main prerequisites are these, already given: global planning of
resources, production, allocation of labor; end of private enterprise,
operation of [private -CR] ownership from control, automation, qualitative
reduction of working time; possible conquest of scarcity, mastery over nature.

They all point to the emergence of modes of social and personal existence
freed from the prevailing repression, and the possibility of correspondingly
new institutions. But, in the established society bound to the requirements of
profits, they are restrained, blocked, turn into their opposite: they increase
the enslavement of men and women by the means and modes of their labor.
(How long can this go on—the big question.)

These are the prerequisites for the transition to socialism = the objective
conditions. But: what about the men and women supposed to fight for it,
who are the subjects of the socialist revolution? Evidently, in socialism, is to
be essentially different from capitalism in all aspects of life, then it can be
sought for only by human beings who have emancipated themselves from
the aggressive and repressive goals and values of capitalism, emancipated
from the alienating effects of private property, who have no vested interest
in the acquisitive society. No problem for Marx = the proletariat free from
all these interests, and therefore free for socialism: impoverishment, material
privation, misery—motive for revolution. (Later changed to "relative
impoverishment"—the poorest strata of the working class were not the
most militant ones! Other motives for revolution??) Moreover, when Marx
wrote, the proletariat constituted the majority of the population, therefore:
democratic transition, "democratic dictatorship!"

Today, in most advanced capitalist countries, this is no longer the case.
The working class is not identical with "the proletariat" = its changed
composition. For Marx: "proletariat" = blue collar, in the material
production. And yet: no radical change without the class which is capable of
changing the mode of production which reproduces the established system!

At the same time, when these changes in capitalism occurred, the Marxian
notion of socialism was revised: socialism was identified with replacing
the capitalist mode of production by abolition of private ownership and
control, [with] economic planning in order to construct socialism, and by
the historical fact that the socialist revolution was successful in some of the
most backward countries instead of in the most advanced ones.

The idea of socialism as the "leap into freedom" as qualitative change,
the negation of capitalism, was defamed as "utopian" ... . Marxist parties
and groups are still clinging to notions and goals and strategies developed in the nineteenth century—neglecting to take into account the changes in the structure of capitalism and their impact on class struggle, and equally neglecting the new possibilities and qualities of building socialism at the highest stage of technology and productivity. That is why they are losing relation to reality, why so much of what they say sounds like sectarian jargon, why they are fighting each other rather than the common enemy.

[Translator’s note: At this point the thematic flow of the typescript breaks off. It is followed by a two-page attachment (clearly composed on a different typewriter) elucidating in some detail the related sub-topics of energy crisis and food crisis, which will be passed over here without comment. Instead, I draw your attention, as I did above, to Marcuse’s final publication before his death. His final thoughts reinforce the labor humanist and commonwealth foundations of the critical philosophy that he shares with Marx: “The working class still is the ‘ontological’ antagonist of capital…” (Marcuse 1979, 20). Employing Rudolph Bahro’s theory of “surplus consciousness” (Bahro 1977a, 376ff; 1977b) Marcuse argues against his previous emphasis in One-Dimensional Man on the systemic integration of the consciousness of the workforce. In his estimation under the changed socio-economic conditions of 1977–78, a “counter-consciousness” (1979, 21) was already emerging that made it possible for the consciousness “of the underlying population [to be] penetrated by the inherent contradictions of capitalism” (1979, 21). Where Marcuse (1969a, 7–8) earlier wrote of the “kept intellectuals” whose consciousness was quite fully assimilated/integrated within the single-dimensional system ideology of advanced capitalism, and where Antonio Gramsci wrote of “hegemonic intellectuals,” Bahro held that even state functionaries in the USSR or Eastern Bloc (not to mention sectarian members and leaders of US socialist parties) often did not fully identify with their political group’s political line. There, system-thinking was easily undermined when social contradictions became politically heightened, and a surplus consciousness (überschüssiges Bewusstsein, literally “overflow” of consciousness) widely emerged (Bahro 1977a, 381). During the final stages of his own intellectual development, Marcuse believed Bahro’s insight was immensely significant. Douglas Kellner concludes: “In effect, Bahro and Marcuse are arguing that critical consciousness and emancipatory needs are being developed by the contradictions in the social conditions of advanced industrial society—capitalist and state socialist” (Kellner 1984, 308–9). As we have also seen, Marcuse advocated a united front political strategy, reiterated here in terms of his call for a common ground platform: and which we have endeavored to develop in Charter 2000, http://progressiveplatform2000.org/Charter 2000-Platform.htm Let me end with a reprise of Marcuse’s vivid conclusion from the above: “And—this is the significance of the Sixties—this blatan irrationality has not only penetrated the consciousness of a large part of the population, it has also caused, mainly among the young people, a radic
transformation of needs and values which may prove to be incompatible with the capitalist system, its hierarchy, priorities, morality, symbols (the counter-culture, ecology [movement—CR]... . The very achievements of capitalism have brought about its obsolescence and the possibility of the alternative")

* * *

EPILOGUE TO MARX'S 18TH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON

Marx's analysis of how the revolution of 1848 developed into the authoritarian rule of Louis Bonaparte, anticipates the dynamic of late bourgeois society: the liquidation of this society's liberal phase on the basis of its own structure. The parliamentary republic metamorphoses into a political-military apparatus, at whose head a 'charismatic' leader of the bourgeoisie takes over the decisions which this class can no longer make and execute through its own power. The

*Editors' note:
The Epilogue to Karl Marx, Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte (Frankfurt: Insel, 1965) pp. 143-50, was published in an English translation by Arthur Mitzman as "Epilogue to the New German Edition of Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon," Radical America, 3, 4 (Cambridge: July/August 1969) pp. 559. The text shows once again Marcuse's acuity as a Marx scholar who engages in a close reading of classic text by Karl Marx whose 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon analyzed the transition to an authoritarian state populism in France which ended the hopes for democratic transformation of France after the 1848 uprisings. Marcuse, however, is mainly interested in the relevance of Marx's analysis for interpreting contemporary history in which, like Marx in this day, sees rightwing forces winning power through democratic elections, with Hitler, Mussolini, and other fascist leaders in the twentieth century, using elections to seize and consolidate power. While Marx saw Louis Napoleon as a largely comic figure, Marcuse sees his twentieth-century successors as part of a trend toward social domination, whereby the masses choose and identify with authoritarian leaders, a tendency that continues to the present. Although the concluding pages of the article focus on how today the masses and forces of reason are becoming absorbed in a technological apparatus of domination, the analysis worked out systematically by Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man, the text ends on a hope, evoking young protestors who are rebelling against the system from outside and for whom the revolutionary classics of the past are not, Marcuse suggests, obsolete.

Socialist movement also succumbs in this period: the proletariat departs (for how long?) from the stage. All this is the stuff of the twentieth century—but the twentieth from the perspective of the nineteenth, in which the horror of the fascist and postfascist periods is still unknown. This horror requires a correction of the introductory sentences of the 'Eighteenth Brumaire': the ‘world-historical facts and persons’ which occur ‘as it were twice’, no longer occur the second time as ‘farce’. Or rather, the farce is more fearful than the tragedy it follows.

The parliamentary republic decays in a situation in which the bourgeoisie retains only the choice: ‘despotism or anarchy. Naturally it voted for despotism. Marx reports the anecdote from the Council of Constance, according to which Cardinal Pierre d’Ailly called out to the advocates of moral reform, ‘Only the devil himself can still save the Catholic Church, and you demand angels?’ Today, the demand for angels is no longer the order of the day. But how does the situation arise in which only authoritarian rule, the army, the sellout and betrayal of liberal promises and institutions can any longer save bourgeois society? Let us attempt briefly to summarize the general theme which Marx makes visible everywhere through the particular historical events.32

The bourgeoisie had a true insight into the fact that all the weapons which it had forged against feudalism turned their points against itself, that all the means of education which it had produced rebelled against its own civilization, that all the gods which it had created had fallen away from it. It understood that all the so-called bourgeois liberties and organs of progress attacked and menaced its class rule at its social foundation and its political summit simultaneously, and had therefore become ‘socialistic.’

This inversion is a manifestation of the conflict between the political form and the social content of the rule of the bourgeoisie. The political form of rule is the parliamentary republic, but in countries ‘with a developed class structure’ and modern conditions of production, the parliamentary republic is ‘only the political form of revolution of bourgeois society and not its conservative form of life’.33 The rights of liberty and equality which have been won against Feudalism and which have been defined and instituted in parliamentary debates, compromises and decisions, can no longer be contained within the framework of parliament and the limits imposed by it they become generalized through extra-parliamentary class struggles and class conflicts. Parliamentary discussion itself, in its rational-liberal form (which has long become past history in the twentieth century) transformed every interest, every social institution ‘into the general idea’: the particular interest

of the bourgeoisie came to power as the general interest of society. But once it has become official, the ideology presses toward its own realization. The debates in the parliament continue in the press, in the bars and ‘salons’, in public opinion’. The ‘parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision of the majorities: how shall the great majorities outside parliament not want to decide? When you play the fiddle at the top of the state, what else is to be expected but that those down below dance?’ And ‘those down below’, they are the class enemy, or they are the non-privileged of the bourgeois class. Liberty and equality here mean something very different—something which threatens constituted authority. The generalizing, the realization of liberty—that is no longer the interest of the bourgeoisie, it is ‘Socialism’. Where is the origin of this fateful dynamic, where can it be pinned down? The threatening ghost of the enemy appears to be everywhere, in one’s own camp. The ruling class mobilizes, not only for the liquidation of the socialist movement but also of its own institutions, which have fallen into contradiction with the interest of property and of business: civil rights, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly and universal suffrage are sacrifices to this interest, so that the bourgeoisie ‘might then be able to pursue its private affairs with full confidence in the protection of a strong and unrestricted government. It declared unequivocally that it longed to get rid of its own political rule in order to get rid of the troubles and dangers of ruling.’ The Executive becomes an independent power.

But as such a power, it needs legitimacy. With its secularization of liberty and equality, bourgeois democracy endangers the abstract, transcendent ‘inner’ character of ideology and thereby, the consolation in the essential difference between ideology and reality—inner freedom and equality strives toward externalization. In its rise the bourgeoisie mobilized the masses; since then it has repeatedly betrayed and suppressed them. The evolving capitalist society must increasingly reckon with the masses, fit them into some condition of economic and political normalcy, teach them how to calculate and even (to a limited degree) how to rule. The authoritarian state requires the democratic mass base; the leader must be elected—by the People, and he is elected. Universal suffrage, which is negated de facto and then de jure by the bourgeoisie, becomes the weapon of the authoritarian executive against the recalcitrant groups of the bourgeoisie. In the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx gives the model analysis of the plebiscitary dictatorship. At that time it was the masses of small peasants who helped Louis Napoleon to power. Their historical role in the present is projected in Marx’s analysis. The Bonapartistic dictatorship cannot abolish the misery of the peasantry; the latter finds its natural ally and leader in the urban proletariat, whose task is the overthrow

of the bourgeois order." And vice versa: in the despairing peasants, 'the proletarian revolution will obtain that chorus without which its solo song becomes a swan song in all peasant countries.'

The obligation of the Marxian dialectic to the comprehended reality forbids dogmatic obligation: perhaps nowhere is the contrast of Marxian theory with contemporary Marxian ideology greater than in the perception of the 'abdication' of the proletariat in one of the 'most splendid industrial and commercial prosperity'. The abolition of universal suffrage excluded the worker 'from all participation in political power'. To the extent they were

letting themselves be led by the democrats in the face of such an event and forgetting the revolutionary interests of their class for momentary ease and comfort, they renounced the honour of being a conquering power, surrendered to their fate, proved that the defeat of June 1848 had put them out of the fight for years and that the historical process would for the present again have to go on over their heads.

As early as 1850 Marx had turned against the minority of the London Central Committee who put a dogmatic interpretation in 'the place of a critical view', and an idealistic one in place of a materialistic: 'While we say to the workers, you have 15, 20, 50 years of civil war and national struggles to go through, not only in order to alter relations but in order to change yourselves and make yourselves capable of political rule, you say the contrary: We must immediately come to power ...'

The consciousness of defeat, even of despair, belongs to the truth of the theory and of its hope. This fracturing of thought – in the face of a fractured reality, a sign of its authenticity – determines the style of the 'Eighteenth Brumaire': against the will of he who wrote it, it has become a great work of literature. Language grasps reality in such a way that the horror of the event is staved off by irony. Before it no phrases, no clichés can stand—not even those of socialism. To the extent that men sell and betray the idea of humanity, smash down or jail those who fight for it, the idea as such can no longer be expressed; scorn and satire is the real appearance of its reality. Its form appears both in the 'socialist synagogue', which the regime constructs in the Luxemburg Palace, and in the slaughter of the June days. Before the mixture of stupidity, greed, baseness and brutality of which politics is

37 Ibid, p. 308.
38 Ibid, p. 308.
composed, language forbids seriousness. What happens is comical: every party is supported on the shoulders of the next, until this one lets them fall and supports itself in turn on the next. So it goes from Left to Right, from the proletarian party to the party of order.

The party of Order hunches its shoulders, lets the bourgeois-republicans tumble and throws itself on the shoulders of armed force. It fancies it is still sitting on its shoulders when, one fine morning, it perceives that the shoulders have transformed themselves into bayonets. Each party strikes from behind at that pressing further and leans from in front on that pressing back. No wonder that in this ridiculous posture it loses its balance and, having made the inevitable grimaces, collapses with curious capers.48

That is comical, but the comedy itself is already the tragedy, in which everything is gambled away and sacrificed.

The totality is still nineteenth century: the liberal and pre-liberal past. The figure of the third Napoleon, still laughable for Marx, has long since given way to other, more horrible politicians: the class struggles have metamorphosed, and the ruling class has learned how to rule. The democratic system of parties has either been abolished or reduced to the unity which is necessary if the established institutions of society are not to be endangered. And the proletariat has decayed into the generality of the working masses of the great industrial nations, who bear and preserve the apparatus of production and domination. This apparatus forces the society together into an administered totality which mobilizes men and countries, in all their dimensions, against the enemy. Only under total administration, which can at any time transform the power of technology into that of the military, the highest productivity into final destruction, can this society reproduce itself on an expanded scale. For its enemy is not only without, it is also within, as its own potentiality: the satisfaction of the struggle for existence, the abolition of alienated labor. Marx did not foresee how quickly and how closely capitalism would approach this potentiality, and how the forces which were supposed to explode it would become instruments of its rule.

At this stage, the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production has become so broad and so obvious, that it can no longer be rationally mastered or stamped out. No technological, no ideological veil can any longer conceal it. It can only appear now as naked contradiction, as reason turned into unreason. Only a false consciousness, one which has become indifferent to the distinction between true and false, can any longer endure it. It finds its authentic expression in Orwellian language (which Orwell projected too optimistically into 1984). Slavery is spoken of as

40 Marx-Engels, op. cit., p. 244.
freedom, armed intervention as self-determination, torture and firebombs as 'conventional techniques', object as subject. In this language are fused politics and publicity, business and love for mankind, information and propaganda, good and bad, morality and its elimination. In what counter-tongue can Reason be articulated? What is played is no longer satire, and irony, via the severity of horror, becomes cynicism. The Eighteenth Brumaire begins with the recollection of Hegel: Marx's analysis was still indebted to 'Reason in History'. From the latter and from its existential manifestations, criticism drew its power.

But the Reason to which Marx was indebted was also, in its day, not 'there': it appeared only in its negativity and in the struggles of those who revolted against the existent, who protested and who were beaten. With them, Marx's thought has kept faith—in the face of defeat and against the dominating Reason. And in the same way Marx preserved hope for the hopeless in the defeat of the Paris Commune of 1871. If today unreason has itself become Reason, it is so only as the Reason of domination. Thus it remains the Reason of exploitation and repression—even when the ruled cooperate with it. And everywhere there are still those who protest, who rebel, who fight. Even in the society of abundance they are there: the young—those who have not yet forgotten how to see and hear and think, who have not yet abdicated; and those who are still being sacrificed to abundance and who are painfully learning how to see, hear and think. For them is the Eighteenth Brumaire written, for them it is not obsolete.

* * *
The writings of Walter Benjamin collected here originated during the historical epoch that began with the outbreak and demise of the German revolution (both dates nearly coincide) and that ended with the Second World War. They belong to a particular “portrait of the past, which is likely to fade from view with each and every discrete now that does not recognize itself as implicated within it.” Words appear here, perhaps for the last time, that can no longer be expressed with conviction without sounding off-key: words like “culture of the heart,” “peace-loving,” “redemption,” “happiness,” spiritual things,” “revolutionary.” Their internal interconnectedness and the contours of their continuing truth comprise the substance of Benjamin’s work. T. W. Adorno has made comprehensive comments in his introduction

Editors’ note:
Afterword to Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence” provides an English translation by Charles Reitz of Marcuse’s Afterword to a collection of writings by Walter Benjamin, Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze: Mit einem Nachwort von Herbert Marcuse (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, [1965] 1999) pp. 99–106. The end of the German text notes that it was written in Newton, MA., October 1964, at the time Marcuse was publishing One-Dimensional Man. Marcuse notes that some of the language found in Benjamin has different historical resonances than the discourse today, but contains powerful moments of revolutionary theory. Marcuse writes here his most sustained reflections on Walter Benjamin, who worked on the margins of Frankfurt School circles, committed suicide in the mountains of Spain in 1940 to avoid being captured by the Nazis from whom he was trying to escape. As Marcuse notes, T.W. Adorno wrote the Introduction to the German collection of Benjamin’s writings, and Marcuse adopts the same oracular style used in Adorno’s reflections of the era in his own coming to terms with Walter Benjamin. The focus of the reflections are Benjamin’s uncompromising position on revolution, during a dark historical period when the forces of fascism were on the ascendancy. Interpreting Benjamin’s philosophy of history, Marcuse notes that ruptures and breaks in history are prime characteristics of Benjamin’s vision which posits a revolutionary philosophy of history, at odds with Western liberalism and the German Social Democratic notion of time, which posited a linear progressive view of history rooted in Enlightenment optimism. Benjamin and Marcuse emphasize, by contrast, historical breaks and regression in history, leading Benjamin to assert that revolutionary advances are often nurtured as much by reflections on an oppressive past as by hopes for a different future, providing an original philosophy of history that obviously intrigued and influenced Marcuse.
to Benjamin’s *Collected Works*—my purpose here is to elucidate only the essays in this volume.

The violence that is dealt with in Benjamin’s analysis is not that which is criticized everywhere else; especially not when it is the violence employed (or attempted) by those below against those above. It is exactly this sort of violence that Benjamin, in some of the most sublime passages in his writing, considers to be a “pure” violence, that violence which might furnish “mythical” remonstrance to the violence that has dominated history up to this point. The violence criticized by Benjamin is that of the Establishment [*Gewalt* with connotations of domination—*tr.*], that which preserves its monopoly on legality, truth, and justice. Here the violence-laden character of the law is invisible, though it becomes ferociously evident during so-called “exceptional circumstances” (which are *de facto* nothing of the sort). These exceptional circumstances are simply the usual for the oppressed. The challenge here however, according to his “Principles of the Philosophy of History,” is to “bring about the *genuinely* exceptional circumstances” which ruptures the historical continuum of violence [as domination—*tr.*]. Benjamin took the meaning of the word “peace” too seriously to be a pacifist: he had seen that that which we call peace is inseparable from war, and how this peace is an “inevitable sanction of each and every victory” perpetuating the violence of war. In complete opposition and contradiction to this type of peace is the peace (understood in Kant’s sense of “perpetual peace”) that concludes the prehistory of a humanity that was its past. Genuine peace is the real, material “redemption,” it is non-violence [*Gewaltlosigkeit* non-domination—*tr.*], the advent of the “just person.” But the perpetuation of violence amidst justice and injustice makes [Kant’s—*tr.*] non-violence messianic, nothing less. In Benjamin’s critique of violence, it becomes clear that messianism is a trope that expresses the historical truth: liberated humanity is only conceivable now as the radical (and not merely the determinate) negation of the given circumstance. Given the power of the established facts, even Goodness has become complicit and powerless. Benjamin’s messianism has nothing to do with customary religiosity: guilt and restitution are for him *sociological categories*. Society defines destiny and is itself derelict: within it a person must become guilty. “Destiny discloses itself in the understanding of a life as one condemned, a life, at bottom has been condemned and then becomes guilty.” Just like violence.


43 Tr. note: This volume brings together five texts: an early study, “The Political Agenda of the Coming Philosophy,” “A Critique of Violence,” “Character and Destiny,” “Principles of a Philosophy of History,” and “A Political-theological Fragment.”
destiny is a form of the established legal system: "a scale upon which only unhappiness and guilt register, innocence and blessedness being bound too light float away." Innocence never makes an appearance within destiny; happiness only occurs where "adhesion to its own web within the concatenation of fates is dissolved." Happiness is redemption from destiny, and when this destiny is a society that is historically established, i.e. a form of oppression legally established, then redemption is a materialist and political concept: the concept of revolution.

Benjamin was unable to compromise on the concept of revolution – even at a time when compromises might have advanced its concerns. His critique of social democracy is not primarily a criticism of that party which had become a prop of the status quo; it is rather a recollection of the truth and actuality (not as yet questioned) of the revolution as a historical necessity. There are lofty places where Benjamin attacks components of the "progressiveness" of the continually expanding industrial society: productivity, legality, social advance, traditionally tabooed from criticism. He reminds us that real progress hinges not on the amelioration of the labor process [i.e. wage-labor process – tr.], but on its supercession; not on the exploitation of nature, but its emancipation; not on the person as such, but the "just person." These are the revolutionary challenges that require a "tiger’s leap," a rupture with the continuum, not just eliminating its corruption. Benjamin’s analysis extended even further: it penetrates into the heart of that gradualism which is a legacy of social democracy, into that strategy and politics which, in the name of a better future prolongs the atrocious past through exploitative productivity. Revolution, according to his “Principles of the Philosophy of History,” is a tiger’s leap – not into the future, but into the past – a tiger’s leap driven by hate and self-sacrifice beneath the open skies of history.” This hate and self-sacrifice “are more in touch with the images of subaltern ancestors than with the ideal of a liberated grandchild.” It is a matter of the past and not the future. This is a thesis that is difficult for others to accept, which disavows as inhuman any assurances that see freedom in the progress of the established order and which permit the exploitation of the present generation for the ostensibly free grandchild to come. To permit this may well follow from the laws of history up to this point, but the laws of history constitute a logic to be lifted to a higher level by dialectical thought; the tiger must leap right out of this logic. Benjamin’s thesis of a revolution ignited by the past rejects the construction of a new society through the instrumentalities of unfreedom. So too it rejects the rationalizations of the liberal mind-set to the effect that the sacred quality of life (which has never been respected by the established order) argues against the violence of revolution. It almost appears as if (at least in "A Critique of Violence") that an appeal to the future would profoundly undercut his praise for the violence of the revolution. Benjamin discusses the thesis that finds abhorrent “the revolutionary execution of the oppressor” by assessing its correlate “We confirm that life, in and of itself, is of higher value than
happiness and justice in life,” therefore a “universe of justice” may not be achieved through killing. For Benjamin this position is “false and base ... being is reduced to mere living, and this is the sense in the above mentioned statement.” Here Benjamin has proposed formulations that we find difficult to accept any longer: “As sacred as human persons are ... their situation their corporeal vulnerability is not.” Perhaps these are understandable in terms of his hope that “here and there the power of myth has entered into the present situation,” such that “words against justice will self-destruct” and the New no longer lies “in some unimaginably distant place.” His late essay, “Principles of a Philosophy of History,” is also buoyed by this hope. It insists upon historical materialism, which sees in historical realities “the sign of a messianic immobilization of the historical process, in other words a revolutionary possibility in the struggle for the repressed past.” Only rarely is the truth of critical theory expressed in such an evocative manner; the revolutionary struggle aims at immobilizing that which is happening and has happened – prior to any other positive goals, this negation is the first positive. What humanity had done to humanity and to nature must be stopped, radically stopped – because then and only then can freedom and justice start. Instead of the atrocious concept of advancing productivity, in which nature is simply there, “gratis,” to be exploited, Benjamin commits himself to Fourier’s idea of the sociality of work which is “far removed from the exploitation of nature and the greedy harvest of the fruits which slumber as possibilities in its lap.” To a liberated people, redeemed from oppressive violence, there belongs an emancipated and redeemed nature. In “Character and Destiny” Benjamin had already indicated the falsity of a separation of subject from object, the inner from the outer: this separation had revealed itself as the rationale for exploitation. As a result, the “immobilization of the historical process” refers not only to objective “aspects of guilt” but subjective as well: “thinking requires not only a movement of ideas, but also that they stop.” Even they are permeated with injustice and wrong. What the historical materialist “appreciates in the artifacts of high culture is something totally different from their provenance which he cannot view without a shudder.” His own thoughts have this provenance also. They come to a stop at that point in time when he becomes conscious of their provenance, and then his consciousness changes. Thinking “is stunned” in a manner that makes it unable to continue in the customary ways; negation becomes a constructive principle. One of its results is the impossibility of being stunned now by the knowledge that the things we experienced during and after fascism “are ‘still’ possible in the twentieth century.” These are the realities of the twentieth century which remains imprisoned in its provenance and permeated by it.

The “shock” of immobilization also applies to the question of what to be done with regard to organizing activities and organizational matters. Within the totality of the established facts these activities, when not actually detrimental, are at best impotent. Their impotence is premature non
violence. If the revolution is to be messianic, it cannot remain oriented within the continuum. Which does not mean that one must wait for a Messiah. Benjamin the Messiah would be exclusively constituted by the will and conduct of those who are suffering under the established order, the oppressed: in class struggle. If this is not acute, then the image of the possible freedom is only visible in a completely different sphere: in “redemption in music or in truth” and not in the sphere of the expanded forces of production, not in the sphere of some “technological Eros.” Nor is freedom found in free time, where one may compose or philosophize, but in immobilization instead, as this occurs in the greatest music and literature. It is easy to misinterpret Benjamin’s words in the sense of a frayed humanism that pits “higher values” against materialism. Benjamin warns: “class struggle is a battle for crude material things without which nothing fine or spiritual may be accomplished.” These latter are implicit in the material struggle this is genuinely a struggle that ruptures the continuum “through care, courage, humor, deception, resoluteness” which will even call into question every new victory of the rulers.

There is a massive distance separating such language from the present. It was written at the outbreak of the Second World War and during the triumph of fascism. The present does not belong any longer to that historical period: the time has been obliterated when it seemed possible to oppose fascism effectively through open and/or covert means – to burst the continuum of history. This opening has closed once more. And so the actual course of history stands as bloody testimony to the truth of Benjamin: the battle for liberation draws its power not from its view of the future but from its view of the past. The “Angelus Novus” of history “has looked into the face of the past,” but a “storm is blowing in from Paradise” and “propels him inevitably into the future, while piles of ruins rise up to the heavens.” This inevitability is the hope that supports all those who despite their weaknesses continue to fight the fight against the continuum of what is: as broken ones they break with the latticework of guilt erected by the law-making and law-enforcing order.

Newton, Mass., October 1964

* * *

Translator’s note: The “Angelus Novus” is a watercolor by Paul Klee made in Weimar in 1920 which was purchased by Walter Benjamin.
I believe we all agree that, in terms of the original or even the expanded concepts of Marxian theory, determining the content of the present historical period and particularly the developments of late capitalism presents certain difficulties. Rather, we can do so, but only at the risk of generating additional difficulties. If the same theory can equally well deal with the development of A as well as non-A, prosperity as well as crisis, revolution as well as the absence of revolution, or the radicalization of the working-class as well as its integration into the existing system, then although this may indicate the validity of the theory, it also indicates its indifference. Given this state of affairs, Marxian theory has been reproached for precluding every possible refutation. These difficulties involve the origin of the Marxian dialectic from the Hegelian — a relation I will discuss briefly in the context indicated.

The present period seems to be characterized by a stalemate of the dialectic of negativity. We face new forms of late capitalism and thus the task of developing revised dialectical concepts adequate to these forms. The main problem seems to lie with the dialectical concept according to which negative forces develop within the ruling antagonistic system. Today, this development of negativity within the antagonistic whole is barely demonstrable. Thus, I would like to begin with a discussion of the negative and specifically with the controversy in France concerning Althusser's efforts to redefine the connections between the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic. The positive and conformist character of the Hegelian dialectic has often been

*Editors' note:
“The Concept of Negation in the Dialectic” was first published in English in Telos, 6 (St. Louis: Summer, 1971) pp. 130–2. The text reproduces an address Marcuse presented at the Prague Hegel Conference in 1966, and was first published as “Zum Begriff der Negation in der Dialektik,” Filosoficky casopis, 15, 3 (Prague, 1967) pp. 37–55 although the English translation in Telos by Karl Boger cites publication in Marcuse Ideen zu einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970). Written for Hegel-Marx scholars, but aiming at stressing the importance of the concept of negation for contemporary critical theory, Marcuse distinguishes between a conformist reading of Hegel that downplays the concept of negation, and a concept of the dialectic that seeks negating forces in history and the negative role of critical reason as forces of emancipation and transformation. The short address posits the contemporary world-historical totality as a “world system of coexistence of capitalism and socialism.” Marcuse claims that oppositional forces outside of the existing system could serve as forces of negation and upheaval by virtue of their needs that transcend the system and that require another way of life for their satisfaction, a position Marcuse will continue to take. These forces are not, Marcuse insists, concentrated in one class but are constituted as unorganized and diffuse radical oppositions characterized by “refusal to join and play a part,” marked by “the disgust at all prosperity, the compulsion to protest.” Marcuse would continue to search for such unconventional forces of negation who could constitute new forms of opposition and new social movements into the 1970s, providing forces of negation that Marcuse would continue to champion and theorize their revolutionary potential up to the end of his life.
emphasized. I venture to say that in the Hegelian dialectic, negation takes on a false character: notwithstanding all the negation and destruction, it is always going on in itself which ultimately develops and rises to a higher historical level of negation. Thus, it appears that in all the explosive, radical revolutionary tensions and destruction of Hegelian philosophy, it is always only one force which develops: namely, the one whose repressed possibilities are exhausted by negation. This conformist character is not Hegel's capitulation to circumstantial determination; on the contrary, it is located in his very conception of the dialectic in which the positivity of reason and progress eventually prevails.

Althusser maintains that had Marx just set the Hegelian dialectic on its feet, it would only have substituted another system of reason for the Hegelian one even though he would have transformed its basis. That is, he would have maintained within philosophy instead of transcending it. According to Althusser, Marx actually broke with the Hegelian dialectic, since he developed it in terms of "real development"—one of Engels' expressions—a new dialectic in its own right.

I would submit an alternative to Althusser's thesis: even the materialist dialectic remains under the influence of the positivity of idealistic reason so long as it does not destroy the concept of progress whereby the future is always deeply rooted in the present; so long as the Marxian dialectic does not radicalize the concept of transition to a new historical level, i.e., the reversal of the break with the past and the present, the qualitative difference built into the theory's tendency for progress. This is no abstract claim. On the contrary, this is a very concrete problem in view of the question of whether and to what extent advanced industrial societies in the West can at least serve as models for constructing a new society based on technological development of the productive forces.

I would like to clarify two central dialectical concepts: the negation of the negation as the internal development of an antagonistic social whole, and the concept of the whole whereby each individual position finds its value and worth. As to the concept of negation as overcoming (Aufhebung), for both Marx and Hegel it is essential that the negating forces driving a system's self-resolving contradictions to a new stage develop within that very system. The development of the bourgeoisie within feudal society and of the proletariat as revolutionary force within capitalism are examples of determinate negation against the whole and yet within it. Moreover, by means of this negation which develops within a system, the movement towards a new stage becomes the higher stage as it unleashes the fettered productive forces in the established system. But in any revolutionary transformation of the existing whole, the development of an essence already existing in itself cannot be realized within the existing order. Thus, the material foundation for the development of socialist productivity already exists in the highly developed technological basis of capitalist production. But isn't that another form of the progress of objective reason and a new form of the self-reproducing superiority of past labor—labor objectified in the technological apparatus—over living labor?
Against this concept of dialectics, I ask whether the negating forces within an antagonistic system develop with historical necessity in this progressive liberating manner. Must classes and class struggles be placed within this positive dynamic? This problem involves historical materialism as a whole in its relation to the idealist dialectics. Doesn't dialectical materialism reduce its own material basis by not dealing profoundly enough with the effects of social institutions on man's being and consciousness by belittling the role of brute power as well as the power of facts (i.e., the mounting productivity of labor and the rising standard of living), and by undervaluing the role of science and technology in the formation and determination of needs and satisfaction? That is, does not Marxian materialism undervalue the forces of integration and cohesion in late capitalism?

While there may be no intellectual or ideological forces strong enough at least there are social forces strong and material enough to neutralize the contradictions for a whole period and to suspend negative forces or even transform them into positive ones which reproduce the existing order instead of destroying it. This hypothesis casts doubt on the concept of self-developing negation as liberation within an existing whole. Thus, it also casts doubt on the materialist concept of reason in history. Consequently, it is necessary to separate the concept of praxis from its coupling in this schema and rejoin the inside and the outside upon which the schema has been historically dependent.

With this intentionally undialectical formulation of the contradiction of inside and outside, I now come to the concept of the whole. The questions raised here concern the real possibility that in the historical dynamic an existing antagonistic whole is negated and superseded externally and that this is how the next historical stage is reached. I believe that the concept of outside which I still want to examine briefly also has a place in the Hegelian philosophy, especially in its legal philosophy. I am thinking of the relation of bourgeois society to the state. Despite all the very skillfully worked out dialectical transitions which bind the state within bourgeois society, it is nevertheless decisive that Hegel brings the state from outside bourgeois society and does so with good reason, because only a power outside the whole interest system, the bourgeois "system of needs," can advocate the universal in this hopelessly antagonistic society. In this sense, the universal remains outside the system of bourgeois society. If there is an historical place for such an outside, then every determinate social whole must itself be part of a greater totality within which it can be effected by the outside. This greater totality itself must again be a concrete historical totality. For Marx, national capitalism is such a partial whole of global capitalism. But here also, there is the difference between inside and outside, particularly in the concept of imperialism: interimperialistic conflicts appear as an external destructive power opposed to the inner revolutionary action of the proletariat, which is the decisive force.

What, then, is the relation of this partial whole to the totality? Today, the global system of capitalism that was the totality for Marx, is a partial whole in the world system of coexistence of capitalism and socialism. Within this
In Marxism, we witness the absorption of the revolutionary potentiality of late capitalism itself. As a consequence of this absorption, negation and negativity confront each other as geographically and socially separate, independent wholes. The inner contradiction develops and transforms itself in this global antithesis. Today, the dialectic faces the task of theoretically working out this essentially new situation without simply cramming it into worn-out concepts. Here are some suggestions: the outside of which I have spoken is not to be understood mechanistically in the spatial sense but, on the contrary, as the qualitative difference which overcomes the existing antitheses inside the antagonistic partial whole (e.g., the antithesis of capital and labor), and which is not reducible to these antitheses. That is, these social forces are outside the whole: their needs and aims represent what is suppressed and cannot develop in the existing antagonistic whole. The qualitative difference of the new stage of the new society would then be not only the satisfaction of vital and intellectual needs (which, to be sure, remain the basis of all development). Much more, it would be the formation and fulfillment of new needs stifled in the antagonistic society. These new needs would find their expression in radically altered human relations and in a radically different social and natural environment: solidarity instead of the struggle of competition; sensuality instead of repression; the disappearance of brutality, vulgarity, and its language; and peace as a lasting state.

I speak here not of values and aims but of needs. As long as these aims and values do not become real needs, the qualitative difference between the old and new society will not be able to develop. This humanism can become a concrete social force only when it is supported by the already existing new social and political powers which have stood up and will stand up against the old repressive whole.

To the degree to which the antagonistic society unites itself in an immensely repressive totality, the social position of negation shifts. The power of the negative arises outside this repressive totality from forces and movements still not grasped by the aggressive, repressive productivity of the so-called "society of abundance," from forces and movements which have already freed themselves from this development and thus have the historical opportunity to actually industrialize and modernize humanely. The force of negation which rebels against this system as a whole from within the "society of abundance" corresponds to that opportunity. Today, the force of negation is concentrated in no one class. Politically and morally, rationally and instinctively, it is a chaotic, anarchistic opposition: the refusal to join and play a part, the disgust at all prosperity, the compulsion to protest. It is a feeble, unorganized opposition which nonetheless rests on motives and purposes which stand in irreconcilable contradiction to the existing whole.

* * *

---

*Studie in Marxism*
THE HISTORY OF DIALECTICS

I. The Significance of Dialectics in Ancient Philosophy

1. Origins: Zeno, Sophists, Socrates.—Aristotle attributes the earliest employment of dialectics to Zeno of Elea, and indeed Zeno’s paradoxes manifest a genuinely dialectical character, that of upheaval, the denial, on the basis of conceptual thinking, of what is assumed to be true in immediate experience. By pointing up the contradictions involved in the assumption of the plurality and movement of beings, Zeno seeks to lead thinking to the improbable (paradoxical) truth of his master Parmenides, according to which being is one and without motion. Thus from its historical inception dialectics involves negation in the form of a break with the immediacy of experience: the negating character of thinking as the way to truth, the concept as the form of the real, the conceptual (intelligible) world as the only true world.

The paradoxical character of dialectics is soon divorced from its relation to the nature of truth and regarded solely as a technique of rhetoric. It is put to work in the service of a type of argument intended to promote a particular cause, whatever that cause might be, whether in the market-place before the court of justice, in the assembly or in debate. Contradictions in experience—especially the contradiction between the idea (justice, law, morality) and its realization—are regarded indiscriminately as an index of the relativity of truth as it appears in its most extreme form in the sophist doctrine of the right of the stronger, the cunning and the clever. Yet even here dialectics retains its critical force in the destruction of “ideology” as a

* Editors’ note:

“The History of Dialectics” was published as an encyclopedia entry from an Entry on “Dialectics” in Marxism, Communism, and Western Societies: A Comparative Encyclopaedia, edited by C.D. Kernig, Vol. 2 (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 408-18. The “Dialectics” entry is divided into two parts: “A. The Dialectical Method” and “B. The History of Dialectics.” On p. 420 following a bibliography compiled by Walter Kern, authorship is revealed as “Claus D. Kernig (A)” and “Herbert Marcuse (B),” so we conclude that Marcuse was the author of the entry on “The History of Dialectics,” which we are publishing here. The text provides an extremely detailed scholarly examination of “The Significance of Dialectics in Ancient Philosophy,” followed by a section on “The Significance of Dialectics in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel,” and concluding with a section on “The Meaning and Significance of Dialectics in Marx.” The text reveals Marcuse to be a first-rate philosophical scholar of the concept and history of dialectics, who privileges Marx with his own section. We found a folder in Marcuse’s private collection that contained the texts from the Encyclopaedia which also has a German version of the “Dialectics” entry, but there was no bibliographic reference to the German publication in his archive. The project reveals that Marcuse was an internationally renowned expert in dialectics and Marxism, with serious scholarly credentials as well as having strong political and intellectual influence on the New Left.
bulwark of the status quo: thinking is trained to mistrust all positive rights and to reject any claim which they might make upon it. From here it is just a step from the dialectics of the sophists which Plato condemns to the Socratic dialogue.

This dialogue typically concludes on a negative note: what you take to be brave is not bravery; what you take to be pious is not piety; what you take to be just is not justice. And yet the survival of society and the state depends upon such knowledge. Men live in ignorance, in untruth—and they do not know it. They must learn to think, and thinking begins with insight into the untruth of everything which is immediately taken to be true. Thinking arises out of the immediacy of experience and cannot get beyond it unless it is set in motion by the philosopher, who already knows that men live in untruth. This intervention does not go beyond experience; it only shakes experience, setting it in motion in order that it reveals its own contradiction. And the man who learns from the intervention of the philosopher comes to recognize this contradiction, not as a reflection of his own deficiency or an error of his particular consciousness but as something universal and objective which belongs to the validity and effectiveness of the status quo. The question is what is meant by “brave”, “pious”, “just”; analysis reveals that what is meant by such terms does not, in fact, find expression in man’s daily discourse and activity, so that such discourse and activity cannot properly be regarded as true. Truth must somehow lie in that which is common to all the various modes of being more or less brave, more or less pious, more or less just, as the brave, the pious, the just, the “one” which converts the “many” into incomplete, imperfect appearances of bravery, piety and justice. As in the Eleatics, the primary concern of thinking is directed towards the relation between the one and the many, the universal and the particular: the meaning of terms can only be found in this polarity, which appears in the form of irreconcilable contradiction. It can be brought to light only by “talking over” (διαλέγομαι) what is taken to be self-evident in everyday discourse: things which have been prematurely identified must be distinguished; things which have been prematurely separated must once again be drawn together. Thinking becomes a dialogue in which positions are pitted against one another so that each receives the recognition and rejection which is its due.

The point is often made that the Socratic dialogue only has the appearance of genuine discourse, a fact which becomes especially apparent in Plato’s later dialogues: Socrates’ interlocutors play a very subordinate role, often limited to brief expressions of agreement or denial. The fact is, however, that dialectical thinking is really incompatible with two genuinely equal positions: it must break through the immediacy in which the speakers are imprisoned at the outset of the dialogue, and this is the decisive contribution of the man who has already broken through such immediacy, the philosopher. His questions are posed in such a way that they do not allow free scope for any answer whatever; they impose a very specific demand, the negation of immediacy. If the interlocutor is prepared to elaborate his thinking in reply
to such a demand, he is free to decide for himself whether to go along with the argument or to shut himself off from it. The Socratic dialogue keeps the dialectical tension between thinking and Being, method and reality. Thinking that is unable to transcend the immediate is the reflection of a poor practice, and the upheaval of this thinking threatens the practice to which it pertains. The trial of Socrates shows the subversive character of the dialectic, which is still visible in the central books of Plato's *Republic* but which disappears with the incorporation of the dialectic to logic.

2. Plato and Aristotle.—In Books VI and VII of the *Republic* Plato introduces dialectics as the power of linking capable of comprehending the highest level of the intelligible world (the world of Ideas and of the Idea of the good). As such a power, dialectical thinking is reason (αρετή), which grasps true, essential reality without the help of the senses (511b, 532a). Dialectical reason (like all thinking) begins with premises (hypotheses), but in contrast to mathematical science, it employs such premises not as “causal origins” or first principles (άρχαί) but as mere hypotheses concerning what (really) is, as “things ‘laid down’ like a flight of steps up which it may mount all the way to something which is not hypothetical, the first principle of all and having grasped this, may turn back and, holding on to the consequences which depend upon it, descend at last to a conclusion, never making use of any sensible object, but only of Forms, moving through Forms from one to another and ending with Forms” (511b, Cornford trans.).

This first “systematic” portrayal of dialectics reveals, as yet undifferentiated form, the essential characteristics which are subsequently attributed to it: (a) the antagonistic relation of logos and sense; (b) the treatment of the premises of thinking as mere hypotheses, from which the ascent can be made to the “first principles” which sustain them; (c) the “descent” from the first principles (which properly become principles of understanding once thinking attains insight into them) back to the hypotheses, now firmly grounded, the mediation of the immediate.

Clearly dialectics has here become a method of the search for truth (q.v.) but truth lies in the reality of the Ideas, and the dialectical mediations of thinking constitute the real structure of being, through which the sensible world “participates” in the Ideas, the many in the one, the particular in the universal. All genuine communication, all discourse which can be true or false, conceives the particular as universal (which alone renders it intelligible and communicable), and thus regards everything perceived by the senses in the light of that which is non-sensible, accessible only to reason—it discloses the one which makes the many what it is. For Plato this function of true communication is not simply the concern of a formal logic (q.v.) divorced from the particular factual content of reality; the logos of thinking is that of reality; as method dialectics has an essentially “realist” character. This is especially clear in the *Sophist*, where the dialectical analysis of the “hypotheses” makes it necessary to give up the static unity and particularity of the Ideas in favour of their “mixture” and interrelation. The method of
analysis combines separation and composition, composing and separating
what is composed or separated in the real being itself (253b–d). The Ideas
here γένη (families, genera) of being, a characterization which seems to
stand them as dynamic, efficacious unities, and accordingly dialectics is the
ence of the separability and combinability of the genera of beings, its goal
know which are compatible, which incompatible, and what degree of
versality attaches to each, i.e. the unifying effect which each exercises in
the plurality of (particular) beings. The opposition of the one and the many,
the universal and the particular, proves to be the mirror-image of truth, as
the playful character of the dialectical manipulation of contradictions is the
mirror-image of its true seriousness. Thus we may take it as a mark of dialectics
that in the dialogue named after the sophist whose definition it seeks, it is the
opposite which finally emerges, that of the philosopher (253c). The dialogue
which takes its name from the sophist lays the ontological foundation of
dialectics, and it is the proper conception of dialectics which differentiates
the philosopher from the sophist. Its essence is the mediation of opposites,
the possibility of which has now been accounted for. The Philebus (16c)
raises dialectics as a gift of the gods: “Through Prometheus or someone of
its stature it came to mankind”. Every being is both one and many, limited
and unlimited, but the multiplicity of any being cannot be understood in its
limited character so long as the number of mediations between (μετατέθη)
the one and the unlimited has not been recognized and determined (16d–e).
This overcoming of opposites distinguishes the philosophical logos from its
sophistical counterpart, which in its ἀντιλέγει never gets beyond the mere
discovery of opposites.

In the transition from Plato to Aristotle dialectics suffers devaluation,
coming once again into the proximity of sophistry, from which Plato had
distinguished it so sharply. It is significant that Aristotle (Metaphysics 987b
29ff.) explains Plato’s introduction of the Ideas through his preoccupation
with dialectics, i.e. his ontology through his “method”. For Aristotle dialectics
is essentially a technique of persuasion which, in contrast to the apodeictic
scientific character of philosophy, is grounded in “probable premises only”
(ibid. 995b 20ff.).

Dialectics receives its proper definition in the Aristotelian Organon,
where formal logic emerges out of the dialectical logic of Plato. The Topics,
which determines the “place” of dialectical inference, makes the extremely
enlightening observation (155b 8ff.) that any dialectical “arrangement or
phrasing of questions” is of interest only to the partner in conversation, “while
the philosopher, who searches only for himself alone, is not concerned that
the premises of the argument are true and known, since the respondent does
not himself posit them ...”. Should we see in this contrast the methodological
rejection of dialogue and a withdrawal of philosophy into its own self-
sufficient certainty? In any event, although Aristotle recognizes in dialectics
a higher value than sophistry, it appears in his treatment predominantly as
a technique of argumentation: the dialectician is “one who knows how to
Studies in Marxism

claim and contest. To assert is to make one of many ... and to contest is to make many of one" (ibid. 164b 3f.).

The objective significance of "the one and the many" beyond its application in argument is here concealed. This is also apparent in the formal, quantitatively way in which the relation of the dialectic to the universal is conceived. On Sophistical Refutations (170a 34ff.) dialectics is concerned with the refutations which are common to all τεχνη and δόγματα, "refutations which depend on points of view shared by all the arts (τεχνη) and proper to none."

The Metaphysics (1061b 8ff.) identifies dialectics and sophistics in so far as dialectics, while concerned with the attributes common to all beings, does not comprehend them as belonging to being as such. And in the opening passage of the Rhetoric (1354a 1) rhetoric is characterized as the counterpart (αντίπαρος) of dialectics, since both are concerned with any and every subject in the same non-conceptual way. Thus dialectics fails to play the rôle which Plato ascribes to it: to relate the plurality of beings to the concept of the universal, to grasp the universal in the particular. It can do no more than point up contradiction (q.v.): it is not knowledge (q.v.) in the strict sense. For this reason it is essentially different from philosophy (q.v.) dialectics is content to doubt and question, where philosophy knows and recognizes (Metaphysics 1004b 24ff.). The unscientific character of dialectics is also responsible for the fact that the dialectical treatment of opposites remains inadequate (ibid. 1076b 25ff.).

3. The Stoics and Plotinus.—In the Stoic Schools (from the 3rd century B.C.) dialectics becomes a specialized discipline within a disciplinary conception of philosophy. Surviving texts are not sufficient to provide us with an adequate picture of Stoic dialectics, so that we must be content with occasional references, which moreover fail to convey any idea of the differences between the various schools.

Dialectics is a part of logic. It is to be distinguished from the other part rhetoric, by the fact that it reaches proper discourse (ὁρθὸς διάλεγοσθα) in the form of question and answer, while rhetoric treats of uninterrupted monologue. So dialectics is the knowledge of what is true and false and what is neither (Diogenes Laertius, VII, 42). Dialectics itself is divided into two parts, one of which deals with referential sounds (phonetics), the other with that which the sounds refer to or mean (τὰ ονομαστα). Objects of meanings are things themselves (τὰ πρᾶγματα). Since things are outside language, however, dialectics is concerned with meanings only in so far as they are expressed in language το λεγέν (Sextus Empiricus in von Arnim Stoicorum veterum fragmenta Lpz., 1903, Vol. 11, no. 166). The Stoics treat the greater part of traditional logic within the theory of meaning: genera, the proposition, judgment and inference in their various valid and invalid forms. The unfolding of the subject-matter through claim and counter claim, question and answer, appears to be given up in favour of systematic
The dialectical reality of opposites and the negative becomes merely a concern of formal logic.

This development is decisive for the history of dialectics. The concept of logos is hypostatized, made into a thing, and this leads to a hypostatization of the dialectical movement. This tendency is not reversed until the advent of German idealism (q.v.), and then only partially.

For the Stoics logos becomes the creative, life-giving principle of world-substance which permeates all matter—it becomes God. The problem of the unity of opposites, of the one and the many, of experience (immediacy) and reality becomes a problem of cosmology and theology. Accordingly, to understand this problem is now the task of logic and epistemology: the relation of subject to object (see SUBJECT, OBJECT) is no longer understood dialectically. Dialectics thus loses its proper motif, the ground of its necessity as laid down by Plato. At the same time it loses the rationale of negation and its resolution.

When Plotinus once again conceives of dialectics as a real process, as movement, and determines the hierarchy of levels in this process as it ascends to the one and descends to the many, the impression is given that dialectics is something of a mystical conception, a suspicion which attached to it for centuries. Even as a method of knowledge, dialectics comes to be regarded as mysticism. Plotinus derogates conceptual, discursive thinking in favour of a kind of immediate intuition or vision which embraces beings themselves (Enneads 1, 3, 5). Plotinus' concept of dialectics is therefore worthy of closer consideration, not only because of the powerful (though indirect) influence which it exercises on the Middle Ages, but because of the unity which it effects between dialectics as a method of knowledge and as a real process.

Part III of the First Ennead treats of dialectics as the science of the highest truth and the highest good. Plotinus begins by simply recapitulating the results of Plato's discussion of dialectics in the Republic, the Phaedrus and the Sophist, without, however, revealing the inner logic which led Plato to these results. By his very nature the philosopher is in a position to free himself from dependence on the corporeal world; mathematics then strengthens him in his confidence in an intelligible world so that dialectics can eventually lead him to a knowledge of the first principle and true being (ibid. 1, 3, 3). Dialectics is the science which is capable of comprehending true nature and the true relations of all things, of distinguishing and arranging species and genera, of grasping being and non-being, the good and the not-good, the eternal and the non-eternal. Why negation and opposition is necessary to the constitution truth is not explained, since the doctrine only appears in the context of Plotinus' cosmology: the reason lies, ultimately, in the primary and the one—which can only be expressed in the negation of all predicates, although it is the ground of the possibility of all predicates. After dialectics has clarified the order and essential distinctions of beings and grasped the structure of the intelligible world and the relations of the primary genera (τέλος), the analysis returns to the First Principle (ibid. 1, 3, 4). There it finds
rest in a vision of the one no longer dissipating itself amidst the multiplicity of things. Once it is thus in firm possession of truth, dialectics is no longer dependent on the theory of propositions and syllogisms; it may employ them occasionally as instruments, but will leave the preoccupation with such logic to the lesser sciences (*ibid.*, 1, 3, 4 & 5). After this cavalier rejection of logic, Plotinus poses the crucial question: what principles can guarantee the absolute claim of dialectics? He answers: reason is the source of principles which are evident in themselves to the soul capable of grasping them: ἐνα μὲν διδασκόν τας ἀρχάς, εἰ τις λαβεῖν δύναται γενή (ibid. 1, 3, 5). By virtue of this immediate evidence of its ultimate principles (see PRINCIPLE), which is proper to θεωρία (theory) and us to intellectual intuition, dialectics relates to beings themselves and to the one which lies beyond all beings. Thus it is not simply an instrument of philosophy but works on things themselves and has being as it were, for its matter: περὶ πράγματα ἐστὶν όλον ἐκ τῶν ἐξελθείν (ibid.); by intuiting, it also has a hold on the things themselves: ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρήματος πράγματα ἐγκατά (ibid.). Intellectual intuition provides the ground for the unity of dialectical knowledge and dialectics as a real process. The rigidified logic of the Stoics is pushed aside and dialectics becomes, in a literal sense, the process of the cosmos.

We must be careful not to exaggerate the mystical character of Plotinian philosophy. Compared with the theological dialectics of the Middle Ages, Plotinus' nation of objective mediation in being and the spheres of Being and of the overcoming of negation possesses a conceptual precision which is much closer to Platonic thought than to Christian mysticism. His philosophy is rather related to the Hegelian, so that Hegel himself emphasizes Plotinus' "intellectualism" and warns against the mistake of seeing in Plotinus nothing but simple "ecstasy".

In the Middle Ages it is chiefly the idea of negation as a positive power of knowing that receives further development. It is thus dealt with for the most part in mysticism and negative theology. Its conceptual form can be traced to the writings of Nicholas of Cusa. Mathematics is employed as a hermeneutic device. But all this has no significant influence on the rise of Hegelian dialectics.

II. The Significance of Dialectics in Kant, Fichte and Hegel

1. Kant.—According to Hegel, the decisive transformation of the concept of dialectics in the modern era is due to Kant. Kant divests dialectics of the "appearance of being arbitrary", with which it had been commonly associated, by portraying it as "a necessary procedure of reason" (Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ..., I, 1, p. 38).

It is indeed arbitrary, Hegel argues, to treat dialectics simply as a method (of argumentation or cognition) without grounding its truth in the movement of being itself (in objectivity). On the other hand it is equally arbitrary
conceive objective dialectics as a cosmological or ontological process completely divorced from or only extrinsically related to subjectivity. No concern with the unity of opposites or negation or the totality of things deserves the title of “true dialectics” unless it comprehends the necessity of determinations and can exhibit the concept as the movement of the thing referred to in it. In a single stroke Hegel thus discredits all pre-Kantian dialectics with the exception of its pre-Socratic origins and the Platonic, to which he accords some degree of recognition. Kant himself has not succeeded in surmounting the subjectivity of dialectics, since he confines it solely to “determinations of thinking” in their illusory application to things-in-themselves, but he provides “impetus towards the restoration of logic and dialectics” (ibid., T1 2, p. 493) by recognizing the necessity of illusion and hence the objectivity of contradiction.

In regarding Kant as responsible for the restoration of dialectics, Hegel, referring to Kant’s critical philosophy, the transcendental dialectic of the antinomies of pure reason. Yet we can find the same tendency even in Kant’s pre-critical writings (cf. Debortin, Studien zur Geschichte der Dialektik,...), especially in the treatise of 1763 entitled “An Essay to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy”. The treatise begins with a fundamental distinction between formal-logical opposition as expressed in and excluded by the principle of non-contradiction and “real opposition”, “in which two predicates of a thing are opposed, but not by the principle of non-contradiction” (Werke, ed. by E. Cassirer, Bd 2, p. 209). In real opposition, as in the formal-logical, “one [predicate] denies what the other affirms”, but in contrast to purely logical contradiction, the result is not nothing but “something”. Such opposition, in which negation itself is something positive, reigns in reality—indeed it is the law of reality, as Newtonian physics had shown in the law of the composition and resolution of forces and as it finds expression in the mathematical concept of negative magnitudes. “For negative magnitudes are not negations of magnitudes ... but something truly positive in themselves, only opposed to the other” (ibid., p. 207). Kant not only establishes the unity of opposites as the structure of reality and its dynamic principle, he not only grasps the positive as determined by negation: going beyond tradition, he even recognizes negation as the fundamental determination of everything positive. “Determinations which conflict with one another ... must be encountered in one and the same subject” (ibid., p. 214). Here Kant approaches the concept of mediation, through which substance can be proved to be subject. But in so far as the whole approach in this pre-critical treatise is determined by the model of mathematics and Newtonian physics, dialectics remains the dialectics of nature, without any essential reference to subjectivity.

Even in his pre-critical writings Kant recognizes the questionable character of the formal-logical principle of non-contradiction, but without yet conceiving the idea of a dialectical logic. This only occurs in the Critique of Pure Reason, where, after the Analytic, Kant evolves the Transcendental Dialectic
as the second part of Transcendental Logic. The Transcendental Analytic, which expounds the elements of all pure knowledge of understanding, constitutes the "logic of truth." By contrast the Transcendental Dialectic is a critique of dialectical illusion, which necessarily arises when the concepts and principles of pure understanding are applied beyond the limits of possible experience, i.e., when, instead of being understood as a canon for the proper use of understanding, logic is misused as an organon of knowledge (B 8687). When this occurs reason inevitably becomes entangled in contradictions which manifest themselves in a series of dialectical inferences (e.g., from the conditioned to the unconditioned, from parts to the whole), in which each thesis has a specific anti-thesis, each affirmation a specific negation and both can be proved in a logically consistent way. So Kant portrays the antinomies of pure reason in the antinomies of finitude and infinity, divisibility and indivisibility, causality according to laws of nature and causality through freedom (see Causality), the existence and non-existence of an absolutely necessary being. The Transcendental Dialectic can uncover the reason for these antinomies and expose the illusory character of inferences which are valid from a purely logical point of view, but it can never bring about the disappearance of illusion or make it cease to be illusion (B 354). For the dialectics of human reason is "natural and inescapable".

Not only does illusion belong to truth, reason to understanding; illusion is the manifestation of truth, the consummation of understanding. We must go beyond experience and the knowledge of understanding and endure illusion. The truth which manifests itself in transcendental illusion is that of the ideas, concepts of reason possessing only normative significance. Ideas represent the "maximum" towards which all theory and practice must strive, even though they can never attain it (see Theory and Practice). The truth of the ideas is the theoretical and practical power of human freedom, the power to transcend all given limits. "For what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have come to a stand, and how great a gulf may still have to be left between the idea and its realization, are questions which no one can, or ought to, answer. For the issue depends on freedom: and it is the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit" (B 374). It is only in the sphere of human action that ideas can become "effective causes" as in a "constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others" (B 373). Here too Kant speaks of "the vulgar appeal to so-called adverse experience, which would never have existed at all if, at the proper time, institutions had existed in accordance with ideas ..." Here, if anywhere, we find the inner connection between reason, freedom (q.v.) and dialectics.

Although Hegel regards the Kantian antinomies as a "chief transition to modern philosophy" (Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ..., Tl 1, p. 183), it is not the conception of dialectics which they contain that binds Hegel most deeply to Kant. What he continually calls "the great and immortal
"contribution" of Kantian philosophy is not the Dialectic but the Analytic. It is thus the Analytic which provides the source of Hegelian dialectics in German idealism. "One of the deepest and most valid insights in the Critique of Pure Reason is its recognition of the unity which constitutes the essence of the concept as the original, synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of the think... or self-consciousness" (ibid., Tl 2, p. 221). It is the concept of distinct entities, which are at the same time inseparably conjoined, or of an identity which is in itself an inseparable difference (ibid., Tl 1, p. 104). Here we recognize two of the most important elements of Hegelian dialectics, the idea of "substance as subject" and that of mediation. But between Kant's unity of apperception and Hegel's concept of subjectivity as "substance" here lies Fichte's development of the transcendental dialectic, which must first be taken into account.

2. Fichte.—Fichte also takes as his starting-point Kant's concept of transcendental apperception. For him too this is the original concept of dialectics, in that the dialectical progress of thinking, the positing of opposites and their resolution, is demanded by the original "fact" of the transcendental subject. In this origin dialectics is essentially idealistic.

The transcendental ego—or "I-ness"—is the original and ultimate unity of opposites: "The crucial claim of the philosopher... is this: just as the ego is solely for itself so, at the same time, there necessarily arises a being outside it: the ground of the latter lies in the former..." (Werke, ed. by F. Medicus, Bd 3, p. 41). The ego (by which Fichte also refers to a transcendental, universal consciousness, never to the individual) is at once subject and object: "The search for a bond between subject and object must remain eternally fruitless if the two are not conceived in their unity from the outset" (ibid., p. 112). What is implied in Kantian apperception as the "synthesis" of opposites (where all unity reflects the unification of subject and object through the subject) now becomes explicit in Fichte. The subject exists only in so far as he acts (ibid., p. 41), and Being exists only as positing and opposition: "All reality is, therefore, active; and everything active is reality" (ibid., Bd 1, p. 329). But this does not mean that Kant's epistemological subject has become the subject of action. Fichte calls upon the reader to "think the concept of activity here in a completely pure way" and to "abstract completely" from all temporal conditions and all objects of activity. Fichte's opposition of ego and non-ego, of reality and negation and the synthesis of the opposites in the concept of the limit, his whole conception of dialectics as it is worked out in 1794 in the First Part of The Foundation of the Lore of Science as a Whole, thus remains transcendental and theoretical. The dimension of human activity lies, in the strict sense, outside and beyond theory, but in its immanent evolution theory reaches the point at which it demands action as the sole possible solution to the problem which it itself poses (see Theory and Practice). The problem is to find some "X" which can mediate the opposition between the ego and the non-ego without forfeiting the identity of consciousness (ibid., p. 302). Such
mediation is theoretically impossible: this is the Gordian knot which can never be resolved but can at least be broken by "reason's claim to absolute power" (ibid., p. 339). Theory understands the indissoluble unity of the ego and the non-ego as the unity of activity and passivity, but the ground of this unity of opposites remains unintelligible to it: it lies "beyond the limits of the theoretical part of the science of knowledge" (ibid., p. 372).

"Reason's claim to absolute power" affirms: "There ought to be no non-ego, since there is no way in which the non-ego can be reconciled with the ego" (ibid., p. 339). But the non-ego exists, and the ego can exist only with and through it. Original subjectivity is a way of being determined which is, at the same time, a way of determining; what determines this way of determining "remains wholly insoluble in theory"—so that theory is driven beyond itself "into the practical part of the doctrine of science" (ibid., p. 373). The practical part of science conceives the "ought" as the law of the ego: the Being of the ego is a striving which is itself limits only in order to surmount them. Objectivity is thus conceived as resistance, and it is only by surmounting such resistance that the ego can become free subject. With the disappearance of all resistance, the ego would also disappear, so that its striving can only be an eternal "approximation".

In Fichte's doctrine of science, dialectics is once again conceived for the first time since Plato, as a demand to understand immediacy by determining it as mediation. Being as being posited: philosophy becomes the task of surmounting the given by conceptual means, recognizing and resolving the negation which it entails. The relation of dialectics and freedom is even clearer here than in Kant. Dialectics appears in the first instance as freedom of thinking: the philosopher "is able to abstract, i.e. he can separate by the freedom of thought that which is united in experience" (ibid., Bd 3, p. 9). What is given in (immediate) experience is a union of opposites, the evolution of which constitutes (the movement of) reality. The understanding of this process as a necessary one, grounded in the very nature of things, is the theoretical foundation of free activity. It demands the separation of what is united in (traditional) logic. The principles of logic cannot be taken as immediately given; they themselves must be deduced, mediated. This occurs when they are grasped as the structure of subjectivity; there can be no more ultimate explanation than this. Thus Fichte shows that the principle of identity (A = A) presupposes and expresses the original, synthetic unity of consciousness, a unity which (as consciousness of something) entails its own proper opposition and at the same time gives rise to the principle of non-contradiction, which it surmounts (see also Identity; Contradiction). This points the way to dialectical logic as the "overcoming" of traditional logic.

3. Hegel.—Hegelian dialectics cannot properly be portrayed as a continuation or further development of the Kantian and Fichtean. It is true that Hegel sees it as his task to complete the work, begun by Kant and carried on by Fichte, of justifying logic itself and of grounding the categories. With
this the limits of traditional logic have already been surpassed. But despite this continuity in the history of ideas there appears in the Hegelian dialectic a qualitatively new element, which might be characterized provisionally as the "power of the negative". It is true that Fichte, in the concept and function of the non-ego, finds in negation the impetus to dialectical process, but Hegel recognizes for the first time its reality beyond the transcendental idealistic sphere. With this the "unity of opposites" as the "original, synthetic unity of apperception" (Kant) is also removed from the realm of transcendental constitution. The concept of constitutive subjectivity now experiences a decisive transformation: subjectivity becomes real substance. Dialectical logic becomes ontology. This means that Hegelian dialectics cannot be isolated from the system; its structure is the structure of the system as a whole. Hegel himself insists on this in the last chapter of the Science of Logic: his method is "only the movement of the concept itself", "the peculiar method of each individual fact" (Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ..., Tl 2, p. 486).

Since it is impossible, in such a short space, to present an adequate idea of Hegel's system as a whole, we shall concentrate on aspects of the Hegelian dialectic which are of decisive significance for Marx, following, for the most part, Hegel's own formulations.

The driving force of dialectics is the necessity that thoughts become "fluid"—only in this way can they become "concepts" capable of comprehending reality (Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ..., Bd 2, p. 35). That thoughts thus become fluid and are raised to the level of the concept, of scientific knowledge, is demanded by the very nature of things, i.e. by the content to be comprehended, reality. For the substance of things is "movement", and as such cannot be grasped by the traditional categories of understanding, for categories fix what is truly flowing and separate what is truly united. This "purification" and stabilization of thinking and its contents, the principle of all the axioms of formal logic, but especially of the principle of non-contradiction, is the beginning of all knowledge—but no more. It is the work of understanding, which posits the univocal distinctions and determinations which first make possible the comprehension of reality in thought. Thus understanding is itself "negative", since it negates the immediacy of sense experience and puts in its place, as its truth, a conceptual order of the object. But this first contradiction, this first break with immediate experience with which all thinking and knowledge begin, produces an abstract order in which understanding, however much it may extend and deepen it, always remains imprisoned. Thinking itself, if it is not bound from the outset to established norms (for which there is no real justification), goes beyond the categories of understanding: negation of the first negation. This is the work of reason, and its truth. Reason "is negative and dialectical because it dissolves the determinations of understanding into nothing" (Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik..., Tl 1, p. 6). In this dissolution, however, the concepts of understanding do not disappear; they are transformed into other concepts—which are only other concepts of themselves—and these alone are
capable of grasping reality concretely. It is of the greatest importance, in an abstract portrayal of dialectics to understand what is meant by the concrete which appears at the third stage of the process. The dialectical negation of the abstract has nothing in common with the demand for existential concreteness and non-conceptual immediacy. Reason is "equally positive and has thus produced what is primary and simple, but as something universal which is concrete in itself" and comprehends and determines the particular (ibid.). The concrete which emerges as the result of the dialectical negation of the immediate, as determined by understanding, is the universal, and indeed the universal of the "primary and simple". This means that the result is the concept of the object, or the conceptual object, for the way in which it has now come to be determined is the object in its reality and truth. There are not two dialectics, one of thinking and one of reality: the two are united from the very outset of the Hegelian dialectic. The real (conceptual) objects are "universal" in so far as its identity and objectivity consist in the unity of all individual determinations (which, taken individually, are mutually exclusive). The object is what it is only as the unity of such diverse determinations; its identity is nothing but the process of this unification, in which every "being other" (for every individual determinate character involves "being other" and hence negation) mediated with Being (Sein). With this, however, the object becomes the subject of its own proper Being. The modes of being of the subject differ in the different regions of Being; the process of the unification of opposites, the mediation of otherness, is a passive occurrence in matter, a gradual ascent to consciousness in organic nature, the reflective mastery of existence and understanding in human history. In history the subject is not only the substance of reality in itself but for itself as well, and thereby spirit. The movement of reality is the conceptual transformation of the given, which is recognized to be negation and negativity. Only through this knowledge and the activity in which it is realized does man (who is here the object) become the free subject of his existence, but this subject is very definitely a "universal": the subjectivity which realizes itself through the totality of mediations occurring in theory and activity and constituting a historical whole. And this historical subject then draws nature into the circle of its mediations; thus understood and transformed, nature becomes a manifestation of spirit, becomes itself historical.

Hegelian dialectics cannot be understood simply as a development from Kant to Hegel, a development in which objectivity is constituted first by Kant's knowing subject, then by Fichte's transcendentally positing subject, and finally by Hegel's historical subject. What is qualitatively new in the Hegelian dialectic is the function of the negative. Even in classical antiquity, the concept of the negative (as non-being, μὴ ὁμοί) played a central role in dialectics, and it retained this central position in the negative theology and cosmology of the Middle Ages. Fichte draws the concept into the notion of constitutive subjectivity. In Hegel it becomes a determination of subjectivity and thereby a determination of substance itself. "Living substance" is "as
object, pure, simple negativity and thereby the division of the simple ...” Hegel, *Phénoménologie des Geistes*, ..., p. 23). The “ego” and the “power of the negative” are two aspects of the same thing *(ibid., p. 35)*; as such they are also the ground of freedom, and not only of transcendental freedom, in this connection, which is developed in *The Phenomenology of Mind* and *Science of Logic*, is condensed to the decisive issue in the preface to *The Phenomenology of Mind*:

But that an accident as such, separated from its context, that what which is united with others and real only in conjunction with them, that this should win its own proper being and isolated freedom is the tremendous power of the negative, it is the energy of thinking, of pure ego. Death ... is the most terrible thing, and to keep and hold fast what is dead demands the greatest force of all. Beauty, powerless and helpless, hates understanding because the latter exacts from what it cannot perform. But the life of the mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, not by being the positive which turns away from the negative ... on the contrary, mind is this power only by looking the negative in the face and dwelling with it. This dwelling is the magic power that converts the negative into being. It is the same thing which above was called subject. *(ibid., p. 34)*

If one could speak of “basic evidence” in the Hegelian dialectic—which is impossible in the strict sense, since the Hegelian dialectic admits no absolute starting-point—it would be the experience of the negativity of beings, which becomes positive in surmounting and being surmounted. Every being *(das Seiende)* is the negation of what it (in truth) is and can be, and in this way it is something other than itself, otherness. Thus Being itself becomes contradiction. Existence is not only something determined by another which stands opposed to it; what a thing is not is not something extrinsic to it but the thing itself; it is in contradiction. Its existence consists in “enduring” the contradiction; its existence is a (unifying) unity, the mediation of otherness with itself—while it itself is nothing but this mediation—the surmounting opposites. And because these are, in strict sense, “inner” opposites, constituting the structure of the real being, they cannot be surmounted by the determinate being to which they belong but must represent “transition” from one determinate being to another, and thus its real negation. This refigures the movement of dialectics towards totality.

This is consequent upon the object of thinking which, a contradiction in itself, surmounts itself and ceases into another. It can only be determined concretely if it is seen in the context, of the whole within which it exists, or rather unfolds and surpasses itself. Any fixed and isolated definition is complete and hence untrue, since it isolates the object from the proper possibilities through which it realizes itself and thus brings the movement which is the law of its being to standstill. There is no aspect, no condition, no movement of the object or stage of such movement which is
by the whole within which its inner contradictions unfold, shattering each successive form its identity. Its catastrophic dynamism radically distinguishes dialectics from all holism or Gestalt philosophy; it reflects the unconscious destructiveness of nature, the conscious destructiveness of history, which by destroying, manifests itself as reason. What exists destroys itself in the process of its evolution, passing over into a new form in which the “limits” or negativity of the old are transcended: what is new is thus the liberation of the old, a process of self-liberation. As liberation, freedom (q.v.) is essentially negation; as a process of liberation (subjectivity), the movement of objectivity constitutes “progress”. This it is in the degree to which the process becomes conscious and self-conscious: the comprehending of reality and its necessity. In this comprehension the universal is realized: the process of history draws all the diverse regions being into itself, making nature itself the material of its freedom, a manifestation of spirit.

By hypostatizing the universal as a rational and self-contained totality, however, an idealistic dialectic deprives itself of its own proper impulse and this is the cornerstone of the idealistic interpretation of dialectical movement as a whole. From the very beginning, following Kant, dialectics is the movement of subjectivity as the constitution of objectivity, the origin of synthetic unity of opposites. Once it breaks out of a purely transcendent context this dynamism is recognized as the process of reality itself in all its regions. “Substance” becomes its own subject; its concrete Dasein (being there) is the unification and overcoming of opposites, its identity the transition to its other. In this unification of the many—representing its determinations and conditions as they are given at any moment—its real identity emerges as the universal which sustains itself through all negation. But this universal is conceived from the beginning as that of the concept, or rather of the process of conceiving, for only in the concept is the “many represented by opposed determinations unified and this unity given a secure foundation. What the “thing itself” truly is, it is in its concept, while the concept is the universal, or “the determinate character which includes itself, as a unity, all the various determinations of a thing” (Werke, hrsg von H. Glockner, Bd 3, p. 145). But if the concept is the “recognized essence” of the thing itself, it cannot be extrinsic to the thing, a product of “mere thinking”. Rather the thing itself must strive towards its concept, it must itself be a process of “comprehending”. Matter is an obstacle to the attainment of this goal, and in its domain the unification of opposites remains blind, passive and incomplete. Even in history, despite all progress in freedom, matter remains (in nature and society) the barrier which is never fully surmounted. It appears in its full negativity even at the most rational stage of history in the contradictions of bourgeois society (Foundation of Philosophy of Right, §243ff.), which are insoluble at this level and can only be brought under control by the coercive power of the state. The state (q.v.) is the universal which cannot be realized at the level of bourgeois society, the free subject—but in this form it is not yet the true universal, nor does
represent true freedom, for it still contains the conflicts of bourgeois society and is itself one particular state among many. In relations between states here rules "a maelstrom of external contingency and the inner particularity of passions, private interests and selfish ends, abilities and virtues, vices, force and wrong" (ibid., § 340)—a play of forces which exposes "the ethical whole itself", the state, to chance and caprice. The state itself is only a particular in the universal of world history, in the course of which all particular totalities (the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman and the Germanic realms) are surpassed in a "rational" process of evolution. But what is the free subject of world history, which unites its opposites in universal reason and makes of the historical sequence of negations a pattern of progress (p. w.) in the realization of freedom? In history itself we find nothing which might qualify; here too reason is blind, and the universal does not exist in the free actions of individuals and peoples. Thus world history is itself only a "manifestation" of a higher universal, the true totality. It is only in such totality that matter, as object, something "thrown against" a subject, can itself be subject, so that it can be and remain itself through all otherness and all negation. And this free unity of subject and object (see SUBJECT, OBJECT) is (pure) thinking, which contains its object within itself as an object grasped and understood, the object in its reality and truth. Such thinking cannot belong to any particular subject: it is the world as comprehended and as concept, but also as conceiving, activity, movement. In this sense it is the absolute, the Godhead. As absolute knowing it is the "idea" which externalizes" itself freely in nature and history and, in and through this negative movement, remains itself and returns to itself.

True reality is seen as absolute idea, as the movement of absolute knowing, and so, in the final analysis. Hegelian dialectics eventually proves to be precisely what, at the outset, it did not seem to be, a method. The absolute idea "proves to lie in the fact that determinateness does not consist in the shape of a given content but is form pure and simple ... the absolutely universal idea. What we have therefore to consider is not any given content as such but the universal of its form, i.e. the method" (Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik..., I 2, p. 485).

III. The Meaning and Significance of Dialectics in Marx

We should not regard Hegel's making Thinking absolute—the absolute as method—as the starting-point or basis of his dialectics. It is rather a result, the fulfilment of the demand of the free subject, the unity of the universal and the particular which remains unfulfilled in the material world and even within the realm of objective spirit (society and the state). In so far as every being and every stage in the unfolding and overcoming of opposites finds its place and function in the Hegelian dialectic only within the ultimate context of a closed totality, dialectics can in fact be regarded as the complete
transfiguration of the status quo, the way Marx characterizes it in the epilogue to the second edition of Capital. And in so far as it organizes surpassing negations in a coherent order of progress, in which synthesis always represents the "higher level", it reveals the optimistic dimension which is the final blessing of all negativity. The uncritical, abstract moment of Hegelian dialectics is not to be found in its triadic form—thesis, antithesis, synthesis: Hegel himself characterizes triplicity as "the quite superficial external side of the mode of knowing" (ibid., p. 498)—but in the order of contradictions as the necessary harmony of the whole. At each individual stage of the process, however, negativity and radical critique reign. This is the way in which Marx understands Hegelian dialectics:

In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it include in its ... affirmative recognition of the existing state of things ... the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up ... because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary. (Marx, Capital Vol. 1 M, 1961, p. 20)

This is to say that its critical and revolutionary character is not simply one property of dialectics among many but belongs to its idealistic core. Once the concept is understood as "the Nature or Essence" of things (Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik..., I 1, p. 14) the immediacy of anything, its given form as it happens to be at the moment, is negated, and this negation is not fiat of metaphysics, it occurs in the concept of the thing itself, in understood reality. "Thinking robs the positive of its power" (Hegel, Werke, hrsg. von H. Glockner. Bd 8, p. 71). Even dialectical thinking remains thinking, and yet it has a revolutionary function: in its very abstractness, through which it comprehends and thereby transcends the power of the positive, it wins its way to a new concept of the concrete.

In the best-known passage in which Marx comments on his relation to Hegelian dialectics he emphasizes its difference from, rather than its essential similarity to his own view:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurges of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’. With me on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into form of thought. (Capital Vol. 1, M, 1961, p. 19)

Marx continually stresses Hegel's inverted conception of the relation between appearance and reality, between ideal and material mediation (e.g., in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State". In Marx's Writing of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, Garden City, N.Y. 1967, p. 154f. & 159f.). This concerns the contrast between historical materialism...
149

and absolute idealism, but it does not alter the fact that Marx derives all
that is essential to his view of dialectics from Hegel. Marx himself sees the
essence of dialectics in "negativity as the moving and generating principle"
the basis of his materialistic presupposition, he conceives such negativity
as the externalization and objectification of man and as the overcoming of
his condition, i.e. as the process of labour (q.v.). The "positive aspect" of
Hegelian dialectic is the "insight concerning the appropriation of the
subjective essence through the annulment of its estrangement ..." (ibid.,
p. 164).

[Hegel thus conceives] man’s self-estrangement, the alienation of man’s
essence, man’s loss of objectivity and his loss of realness as finding of self,
change of his nature, his objectification and realisation. In short, within the
(ibid., p. 164f.).

Once Feuerbach—"the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to
the Hegelian dialectic" (ibid., p. 145, cf. Marx, Engels, The Holy Family
1956, p. 125)—had put real man in place of the self-moving concept
the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life
(see BEING AND CONSCIOUSNESS) again became "painfully" obvious (The Holy
Family, p. 73). Negativity as the moving principle, the unfolding of opposites
and their resolution in the realm of the finite, were now no longer, in their
truth, movements of thinking, of consciousness, but of real human history
(see ALIENATION). In its fundamental structure Marxian materialism is at
once historical and dialectical, as Marxian dialectics is at once materialistic
and historical. The whole which is dialectical in itself now becomes society
(q.v.), i.e. the particular society which is given at any moment in its historical
evolution. Thus Marx analyses capitalism (q.v.) as the system issuing from
feudalism (q.v.) in which the opposition between the productive forces and
the relations of production inhibiting their full employment permeates the
social whole in all its spheres and ultimately brings about its negation, a
negation which liberates the forces which were stifled under the old system
and realizes new forms of social order in the division of labour and property,
already prefigured in the old system, thus presenting a "determinate
negation" and the overcoming of the status quo on the basis of its own inner
dynamism.

The supporting and driving force of capitalism, its law of growth,
becomes the law of its regression and downfall. The realization of capitalism
is the negation; its freedom is suppression. Thus in the just work-contract
the completed exchange of equivalent goods is already exploitation (q.v.);
fierce competition is the road to monopolistic concentration; the rise of
productivity necessarily leads to the destruction and waste of the productive
forces. In this dynamism there arise new arms of social organization of the
productive forces which can no longer be held within the structure of private property and private control.

The genesis of new forms of social being in the resolution of opposition poses a crucial problem for a materialistic dialectic: does the dialectical process itself represent "progress", i.e. are its new historical forms necessarily "higher" in the sense of a more rational organization of productive forces and of allowing greater human freedom? Does the Marxian dialectic implicitly or explicitly adopt the Hegelian pattern—only putting it on a materialistic foundation—according to which the series of historical "realms", in the necessary sequence, represents progress (q.v.) in self-consciousness and in the realization of freedom? Does materialistic dialectics also recognize reason in history? There is no simple answer to such questions. It is clear that historical development appears in Marx's works as a development of productive forces and an advance in freedom which overcomes previous periods of regression. It is also true that this view overshadows conflicting references to the real possibility of decay and annihilation. But on the other hand Marx protests against any attempt to turn his "historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe" into a "historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself, in order that it may ultimately arrive at the form of economy which ensures, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of social labour, the most complete development of man" (Letter to the editorial board of Otechestvennye zapiski, Nov. 1877. Marx, Engels, Selected Correspondence. M. [1955], p. 379).

A similar ambiguity surrounds the concept of dialectical necessity. Marx clearly ascribes the character of necessity to the "action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production": "capitalistic production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation" (Capital, vol. 1, p. 763). The concept of immanent dialectics does in fact imply a necessary unfolding and overcoming of opposites—otherwise it would not be a dialectical concept. And yet this necessity can come about only through social activity in which the consciousness of each man who acts (or is acted upon) itself constitutes a necessary element of the final resolution. But consciousness, reflection, and the will to negation rooted in reflection, are all a matter of freedom. In the Marxian dialectic, thinking and subjectivity remain decisive factor of the dialectical process: the function of class-consciousness (see CLASS, CLASS STRUGGLE) testifies to this. It is true that this subjectivity is no longer that of the absolute idea, of pure thinking, but rather one of social classes; this only makes the role of consciousness in the process of history all the more decisive. To the same extent to which this process is "open" i.e. cannot be captured in a philosophical system, it is also determined by the development of consciousness of the possibility of freedom (liberation or slavery. Freedom and necessity appear here in unresolved tension. The unity of subject and object is never finally realized: the confrontation with nature (and with alienated society in its likeness to nature) remain
realm of necessity, of objectivity, which cannot be resolved or redeemed subjectivity. The Marxian conception does not allow for a dialectic of nature, in which matter would realize itself as subject (see DIALICTICAL MATERIALISM).

Marxian dialectics involves an unresolved tension between freedom and necessity, subject and object, which deprive it of the ultimate reconciliation and justification characteristic of the Hegelian dialectic. It lacks the affirmative character which we find in the Hegelian dialectic as a whole. In this sense Marxian dialectics is essentially revolutionary. It understands the coercive power which men have exercised throughout history on one another and nature; it does not justify this, nor does it even provide consolation in the form of a non-violent abolition of violence. The inner contradictions of a given social order unfold under the dominion of established power; the productive forces—material and intellectual—which are caught up in these contradictions are freed to provide transition to a "higher" historical form of social being in a conscious conflict with the existing powers and the interests and institutions determined by them. The outcome depends upon the conditions of the possibility of the conflict and of the consciousness which emerges in it. To this end it is necessary that those in possession of such consciousness recognize their servitude and its causes, that they will their own liberation and understand how it can be brought about. Marx includes the development of a revolutionary class-consciousness and the conflict of the proletariat in the dialectic of capitalism: capitalism necessarily produces and reproduces the working class as proletariat (q.v.). Its existence is the real contradiction in the reality of such a society, which proclaims private property and the freedom of the individual as its law. The proletariat does not fall under this law, or rather for the working class the law of capitalism is a law of poverty and the impossibility of genuinely human existence. Thus the proletariat in a capitalistic society is its absolute negation: its existential interest is incompatible with the status quo and can only be fulfilled in its dissolution. But only as the negation of the existing order is the proletariat the historical agent of liberation: should its existence no longer pose a real contradiction. It becomes another force contributing to the established order and its interest lies in preserving that order. The necessity of socialism itself depends upon the social condition of the proletariat and its development of class-consciousness. Thus the Marxian conception includes the possibility of its own negation, the possibility of the suppression of class-consciousness and the defeat of revolutionary activity.

In the letter of November 1877 quoted above, Marx reminds us of the similarity between the processes which, both in ancient Rome and with the rise of capitalism, separated the free peasants from their means of production and led to the formation of great estates and concentrations of capital. But this analogous development had very different consequences in the two cases: in Rome the plebeians were reduced not to the status of wage-earners but to a "mob of do-nothings"; and instead of a capitalistic
form of production there arose one which was based on slavery. Until man has mastered history, society itself is only an expression of nature, which determines the possibilities of its development. There is no rational pattern to be found here. The materialistic dialectic sees itself against the open horizon of history, which it understands. With this it pays tribute to human freedom, which is its greatest concern.

* * *
MARCUS ON CUBA

Prof. Herbert Marcuse speaking at Cuba protest meeting, Brandeis University, 3 May 1961

I'm sorry, I have organized notes. I consider it necessary in the prevailing situation to stick closely to my notes for further reference.

I do not question the right of the United States to fight communism in the Western hemisphere—although I may question the definition of the Western hemisphere, which now includes Laos in Southeast Asia, and other items. This is a matter of definition, as is—and here I'm again being serious—the meaning of the phrase "we are fighting Communism." What are we fighting? If we for a moment succeed in breaking through the gunfire of propaganda and indoctrination, we are fighting the effort on the part of backward countries and areas to establish a form of society fundamentally different from our own. This form of society includes such sweeping measures as agrarian reform, nationalization of at least basic industries and credit, and a complete redistribution of property and of power, in order to achieve the development of so-called underdeveloped countries, which consider the form

Editors' note:

We are publishing here two texts by Marcuse on Cuba produced during the highpoint of Cuban-American-Russian tensions after the ill-fated and CIA-assisted Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17, 1961, analyzed in many books, including Jim Rasenberger, The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs (New York: Scribner, 2011); see also Peter Kornbluh, editor, Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (National Security Archive Documents) (New York: New Press, 1998).

Marcuse was teaching at Brandeis at the time, and a demonstration was called to protest U.S. policy against the Cuban revolution, led by Fidel Castro, and in particular to protest the U.S. blockade against Cuba. In Marcuse's personal collection, there was
of our society as inapplicable to those countries. All this takes place in an acute struggle against vested interests which oppose these reforms; that is to say, it takes place under repression of civil rights and liberties, it takes place in the form of a dictatorship. This is the very nature of a revolution. If you fight in an acute and open civil war—and not only civil war, a civil war which is very closely connected with a foreign war [and] vested interests which stand against your efforts to establish a new form of society—you cannot afford to the civil rights and liberties which may and indeed have, as history shows in abundance, served the vested interests to stage a quick comeback. I know of no other revolution, the American included, which did not begin and continue for a long while with the repression of civil rights and liberties. I'm no American historian [but] I do not believe there were civil rights and liberties for the British loyalists during the American revolution.

Nobody and certainly I don't like the repression of civil rights and liberties but I hate and despise the hypocrisy which is involved in making Castro's repression of civil rights and liberties one of the main reasons for our fight against the Cuban revolution. The despicable hypocrisy when at the same time, as far as I know, none of these people who advocate and organize the intervention in Cuba because, at least as one of the main reasons, Castro represses civil rights and liberties, would advocate and organize military or other intervention against Chiang Kai-shek's Formosa, against Franco's Spain, against Salazar's Portugal, against the Dominican Republic, against Haiti, against Guatemala, against a whole series of other Latin America states in which the repression of civil rights and liberties is infinitely more ruthless and brutal than it is in Castro's Cuba. It seems, in other words, that we are only against repression of civil rights and liberties if it comes from the left, but certainly not if it comes from the right.

A six-page typed transcript of a talk titled "Prof. Herbert Marcuse speaking at Cuban protest meeting, Brandeis University, May 3, 1961: NOT FOR PUBLICATION," followed by two pages of handwritten text situating the protest in the context of "totalitarian terror" and the suppression of dissent in the Cold War.

Marcuse's presentation highlights his activism and his impassioned defense of the rights of minorities to dissent against their government's policies. Faculty members criticized the student radicals, and in particular the young woman who chaired the heated discussion, in articles prepared for the Brandeis campus newspaper. Marcuse then responded in a highly polemical text "The Funeral of Democracy," The Justice, May 9, 1961, pp. 4, 6. Marcuse's intervention in the campus newspaper defends the students against the criticism by faculty members, published in the same issue presenting Marcuse as an aggressive polemicist willing to take on rightwing faculty members. Tensions between the U.S. and Cuba escalated after this event, leading to the Cuban missile crisis from October 24–28, 1962 in which the U.S. and Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war; see Anthony Page's 1974 TV movie The Missiles of October, Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), and Michael Dobb, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Vintage Reprint edition, 2009).
Now the same constellation which forces, in an acute civil war, the Castro regime to repress civil rights and liberties—the same constellation leads to an affiliation with foreign powers and foreign influences which leaves no choice. It has come about that practically the world over, the vested interests that are pitted against the movements to establish a new form of society are allied with the United States, whereas the others which do support this movement are allied with the Soviet Union. In the first place, the vested interests with the West; in the second, the revolutionary interests with the USSR. This makes it very easy to identify the world over indigenous social revolutionary movements with movements dependent on, instigated and organized by a foreign power; in other words, to use the term “communism” not only as a slogan covering all these movements of radical social change, but also using it as denouncing all these movements as agents of Soviet or Chinese communism.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Castro regime is allied and perhaps even dependent on the Soviet bloc. We have done everything in our power to force them to do this as soon as possible. What do you expect a country fighting for its survival to do in the face of an economic blockade which may well have succeeded in starving out a large part of the population? If Castro today relies on Soviet help, technically and perhaps even militarily, it is our own fault.

But all this is beside the point. What I’m equally much concerned with are the consequences which this policy—which I reiterate is not only the Cuban policy; it is already propaganda to isolate the Cuban policy from the policy in Laos, from the policy in Formosa, and in other areas of the globe—the consequences of this policy for our own country. What we see is a rapid transformation of our own society into an unfree society which already shows the tendencies which we so valiantly deplore in other countries. The reduction of democratic institutions; the restriction of the freedom of the press, which does not become any better if it is a self-imposed censorship—on the contrary, that is even more contemptible; the united front of the two parties, which has already been mentioned here; the moratorium on criticism, the most undemocratic of all anti-democratic institutions; a misinformation of the public, of which the very excellent memorandum which Norbert Mintz has drawn up, dealing exclusively with the information the New York Times has given the American public between (I think) the 9th and 23rd of April—I strongly recommend that you get a copy of this memorandum and read it, in order to realize how difficult it is even to get the most primitive truths in the press and from the press; and lastly of all, we see in this country what in other countries has been called “the cult of the personality.” Instead of elaborating, I would like to read a letter from a former Brandeis student, now a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley, that came in today.

"There was a large rally to protest American intervention in Cuba, followed by a march to the Federal Building. Lenny and I were among those who were monitoring the picket line when a well-organized group of
right-wing university students from San Francisco colleges abandoned their jeering, tearing up signs and throwing chicken feed, and let loose a barrage of eggs. Our people were wonderfully self-disciplined so no clash of violence resulted, but no thanks were due to the police, who stood by with smiles and watched hecklers throw things, cut the wires to the loudspeaker system, and so on. They were led on by a very small, effeminate young man, with huge glasses and a bad complexion"—I'm quoting—"who kept shouting in a high squeaky voice that what this country needs is more use of force, force, force. We arrived back in Berkeley to find that the President of the University of California—that great liberal Clark Kerr—had told the press that our rallies in San Francisco, as well as our meetings on campus, were obviously not spontaneous. They were obviously not the work of students, and there was some outside mechanism in operation."

I want to add that at the same time this student writes that she is horrified about the rapid spread of not-so-latent anti-Semitism among university students. Those of you who know even a little about recent history may realize that this syndrome of anti-Semitism and the other activities described in this letter is not accidental.

Now is there any alternative? If these are the consequences of our fight against communism, something is basically wrong with it. And not only that I haven't even mentioned the most terrible of the consequences, namely, the ever clear and present danger of a nuclear war. It is still necessary to mention it, because the number of those who prefer to die or who prefer to live on vegetables with a considerable amount of radioactivity in their bones seem to be much larger than the number of those who still want to live, and who still want to live as relatively sane and healthy human beings; in spite of my age, I very definitely belong to the latter group.

Now in concluding, is there any alternative? You are always asking for a cause; that is one of the few cases where you do have a cause. I do not overestimate what can be done, but I think we have the duty to make use of the democratic means and instruments still available to us and to let the President know—not the CIA: American policy is made by the President and we should not make the CIA a scapegoat—let the President know how you feel about it. The alternative was already outlined by Stuart Hughes: negotiations with Cuba, breaking of our unholy alliance with the most ruthless dictatorships the world over, and full support of those social movements which have the aim of improving living conditions in the countries which are not as over privileged as we are, even if these efforts choose to select social institutions and relations of which we do not approve in our own country. Thank you.

Editor's Note: Handwritten notes follow Marcuse's Cuba talk.

The totalitarian terror cancels the distinction between subject and object, man and thing, between the universal and the particular. The totalitarian
error removes the foundations on which the basic categories of Western civilization have been developed and implemented. The point is, not that these categories are being negated and destroyed from outside or by some isolated and catastrophic forces, but in the process of Western security itself, and by its own economic and political mechanisms.

With this destruction, the "universe of discourse" in which the entire logic and language of Western civilization has moved loses its validity. Its categories and laws of thought are no longer applicable: they no longer correspond to the reality nor can they denote the reality. The anti-rational structure of the totalitarian language expresses the same fact. However, the breakdown of the traditional universe of discourse was not arrested by the liquidation of the totalitarian states but continued to prevail after the liberation. Albert Camus speaks of the "vast conspiracy of silence" that has spread all about us," and he states that "mankind's long dialogue has just come to an end" (Politik, no. 4, 1947, p. 191).

In Germany, the young students declare that it is Scheu vor dem Wort which prevents them from making the word the expression of their connections and ideas (Tägliche Rundschau, August 20, 1947): "Are not many of the concepts which one uses to communicate one's conviction invalidated? Are they not corrupted and hinterhalten? Soiled and deprived of their content by those who abused them for many years?" David Rousset describes the reality of the concentration camps in the form of a novel, "par méfiance des mots."

"The Funeral of Democracy"

Editor's Note: Dr. Marcuse is a Professor of Politics and Philosophy at Brandeis University. His article is in reply to the articles by Irl Solomon and Kenneth Slapin on this page. [From the Brandeis student newspaper]

Usually I do not reply to pieces of writing which substitute distortions for facts, invectives for arguments, resentment for sense. In the case of Mr. Solomon, I must make an exception because I wish to defend a student against irresponsible insults. I am not replying to the vulgar ignorance of the letter-writer—I address myself to the Brandeis students, whom I have learned to know and to like.

According to Mr. Solomon, last week's Cuba Protest meeting was (1) a "circus," (2) a "variety show," (3) an "abortion." Miss Geltman, who chaired this abortion (the style betrays the perpetrator of the style) wielded the whip, railroaded the meeting, "attempted to manipulate all present" by "antidemocratic machinations." No wonder, Mr. Solomon says, because Miss Geltman is anyway "forced to operate" "under an ideological strait-jacket" which "precludes any wide appeal to the student body" (!). Thus she engaged (together with the faculty panel) in the "grossest kind of political excesses," by virtue of which "masses of students" were to be
"brainwashed into signing an ambiguous, nonsensical petition." Thus for Mr. Solomon and his vocabulary. Now Miss Geltman is one of the quietest, shyest, most restrained girls I ever met; she could hardly make her voice heard at the meeting; she acted in perfect accordance with parliamentary procedures; she kept calm in the face of the noisiest interruption. To accuse her of gross political excesses would be funny were it not too indicative of the state of mind of her accuser. And I plead guilty to have lent myself to the purposes of the chairman," that is to say, I lent myself to protecting her against rude disruption; I lent myself to helping her make possible an orderly discussion.

Procedural Facts

What are the facts? The meeting had been called and announced as a Cuba Protest Meeting, not as a debate on the Cuba Issue. It had to be limited in time because of the Memorial Meeting on the Warsaw Ghetto which was to start at 8 p.m. the same evening. When it became apparent that a large number of students wished to continue the discussion, it was decided to extend the meeting indefinitely (I stated that I was willing to stay as long as there were any questions and comments; my colleagues likewise stayed). It had been announced at the outset that the question period would be opened after the panel had made their statements and after the chairman had read the brief resolution to be submitted to the meeting. A faculty member in the audience interrupted the chairman before the reading of the resolution and demanded to speak. I drew his attention to the fact that, in accordance with the unprotested ruling, he would be free to speak in two minutes. Then he did speak, and he spoke as long as any member of the panel had spoken, and he spoke without being interrupted a single time. My colleagues on the panel made short replies (I did not reply at all because I had nothing to say), and then the discussion began—I repeat: prolonged without time limit in accordance with the wishes of the audience. Those students who were neither "brainwashed nor intimidated" signed the petition. Mr. Solomon's diagnosis of their action as "unpremeditated idiocy" I leave to the expert who made it. But I cannot do so without admiring the remarkable feat that this expert, whose style and vocabulary are this side of all propriety, accuses Professor Stein of "utter lack of propriety."

Defamed Minority

It is only now that I come to the issue, to the serious issue. The Cuba Protest Meeting was an attempt to give some voice to a small minority which is fighting to make itself heard against the overpowering tyranny of public opinion—a public opinion which is sufficiently indoctrinated to disregard
Marxian Interventions

unpleasant facts and to support a disastrous policy. Today, this minority is defamed, intimidated, denounced. The expert’s “unpremeditated” piece of writing contributes to this defamation. He has the good luck that his opinions are in line with those of most of the newspapers, other media of mass communication, the Committee on Un-American Activities, the FBI. He and his like do not care for such a “circus” and “variety show” as a Cuba Protest Meeting—they attend to the preparation of more serious matters: their own funeral, and the funeral of democracy. Is it still necessary to say that, in an established society, democracy is not the howling with the wolves, not the unpremeditated gulping down of official policy, not the defamation and denunciation of the minority but the protection and exertion of the right to protest against a policy which may well betray the substance of democracy while professing its slogans. A long time ago, it was said that in this country, it may happen that the destruction of democracy takes place in the name of democracy. The letter to which I referred is a particle of the force which may make this prophecy come true.

The Weapon of Slander

Mr. Slapin, while competing with Mr. Solomon in vulgarity and distortion of fact, outbids him by the use of slander as a weapon of political defamation. It is on this ground that his piece requires an answer. (1) He says: I “went so far as to insinuate, in the worst of taste, that the fight against Castro is led on by effeminate, badly-complexioned anti-Semites.” The word “insinuate” is well chosen, because I did not say anything of that sort. I quoted from a letter referring to a student demonstration on the West Coast, in which a man, described (in the letter) as effeminate and of bad complexion, incited the hecklers. Anti-Semitism was not mentioned at all in this context but was quoted (as I explicitly stated) from a later paragraph of the same letter which spoke of increasing anti-Semitism within the university. I read from the letter in order to illustrate some of the tendencies in this country which accompanied the new policy. (2) I did not talk of the “historical necessity of suppressing civil liberties in underdeveloped areas.” This is utter nonsense. I spoke of the suppression of civil liberties in a revolutionary situation, especially in underdeveloped areas and in open civil war, linked to foreign war. (3) The writer exclaims: “Let him (that means me) have explained (sic) again that the Hungarian Revolution was fundamentally neo-Fascist.” I cannot oblige because I cannot repeat something I never said. I did say that the Hungarian Revolution started as a spontaneous and genuine workers’ revolution against an oppressive regime, but that it was then distorted by reactionary groups, which I named: among them supporters of the former Fascist regime of Admiral Horthy. Was the student who signed the article present at the meeting in 1956 when I talked about the Hungarian Revolution? If not, should he not have quoted his source of information
and inspiration? (4) The writer calls the faculty panel "rabid radicals." This is (a) untrue, and (b) a denunciation. However, I do not consider it a slander because I (and here I speak only for myself) am proud of being called a "rabid radical" in the climate of denunciation and McCarthyism which spreads (or is being spread) over the universities.

Revival of McCarthyism

And this, again, brings me to the real issue. We have reached the point where dissent from the essentials of the established policy—dissent in the essentials, not dissent from mere "blunders," incorrect evaluation, CIA etc.—is labeled undemocratic, antideocratic, un-American, communistic. This revival of McCarthyism did not require corroboration on the part of Messrs Solomon and Slapin. What is noteworthy is that those who called the meeting, the dissenters, are being intimidated and denounced, that it was their meeting which was interrupted, that they are the victims of defamation.

In a truly democratic and rational form (both belong [...] differences can be debated without personal jealousy, animosity, and resentment. Instead, one person has been made the target of a campaign of personal defamation. Its source is familiar. I don't mind being the target, but I do mind the connection of political issues with personal invective. It poisons the atmosphere.

I am willing at any time to discuss the issues involved and the specific questions raised by Mr. Slapin with anyone, person or group that is still capable of rational discussion.

* * *
THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN IN A REPRESSIVE SOCIETY: A CONVERSATION WITH HERBERT MARCUSE AND PETER FURTH

Eros and Civilization by the American philosopher Herbert Marcuse influences the conception of this issue of Das Argument as few publications have otherwise ever done. In addition, we count ourselves fortunate that Marcuse visited West Berlin recently for three days and unhesitatingly granted an interview to Das Argument regarding “women’s issues.” A dialogue developed within this interview between Herbert Marcuse and Peter Furth that we relate to our readership below following a few introductory remarks.

In Marcuse’s technical language repression is one expression that stands out. This has a key function that we will therefore seek to clarify here. An explication of this concept may also serve as a brief orientation to Marcuse’s general line of reasoning. In Eros and Civilization (EC) Marcuse uses the terms repression and repressive “to designate both conscious and unconscious, external and internal processes of restraint, constraint, and suppression” (EC, 8). Given the exigencies of food scarcity in the broadest sense, such restraints are inevitable. “Objectively, the need for instinctual inhibition and restraint depends on the need for toil and delayed satisfaction” (EC, 88). The necessity of repression is reduced to the same extent as the productive capacity of the society and the prospect...

Editors’ note:


2. Translator’s note: Das Argument, a critical Marxist journal of philosophy and social science, was founded in 1959 and in 2009 celebrated its 50th year of continuous publication. It has been regarded as a successor publication to the Frankfurt School’s Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung [although it has a more Marxist orientation (DK)].
for gratification increases. "Scope and intensity of instinctual repression obtain their full significance only in relation to the historically possible extent of freedom" (EC, 88). Now in the modern late capitalist society, the economically conditioned extent of possible freedom and the extent of real instinctual repression stand in a clear conflict. This conflict is explained by the irrational system of domination "... the gradual conquest of scarcity was inextricably bound up with and shaped by the interest of domination. Domination differs from rational exercise of authority. The latter ... is confined to the administration of functions and arrangements necessary for the advancement of the whole. In contrast, domination is exercised by a particular group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself in a privileged position" (EC, 36). The system of domination is characterized by its priorities of production and in the principle that undergirds the distribution of products. "The prevalent scarcity has throughout civilization, ... been organized in such a way that it has not been distributed collectively in accordance with individual needs, nor has the procurement of goods for the satisfaction of needs been organized with the objective of best satisfying the developing needs of individuals. Instead, the distribution of scarcity as well as the effort of overcoming it, the mode of work, have been imposed on individuals ..." (EC, 36). Further: "The ideology of today lies in that production and consumption reproduce and justify domination" (EC, 100). Nevertheless the advantages are real and Marcuse is far from complaining about the wealth of consumer goods or about the modern methods of production. With the perfection of the division of labor and automation, and thus the perfection of the alienation of labor, he sees a chance of overcoming the social alienation of humanity: "The elimination of human potentialities from the world of (alienated) labor creates the preconditions for the elimination of labor from the world of human potentialities" (EC, 105). "Totalitarianism spreads over late industrial civilization wherever the interests of domination prevail upon productivity, arresting and diverting its potentialities" (EC, 93).

Where social repression becomes thematic in the following, therefore, this means an oppression and manipulation that go far beyond that which is objectively necessary, and which tend toward a totalitarian domination in which the discrepancy between the possible emancipation and factual disempowerment and stupefaction of the individual has reached a degree hitherto unattained in history. To the extent that society remains repressive, the emancipation of women cannot in itself bring about the desired liberation as Marcuse often emphasizes in this conversation. When institutionalized within the general system of domination, the outcomes of this partial emancipation are considered still to be repressive. For this reason Marcuse decisively rejects the organization of a one-sided "women's movement." Repression impacts both genders, and women alone cannot overcome it. Marcuse explicitly supports all attempts (especially those of women themselves!) to expand an awareness of the conditions women face. Still
Marcuse believes that the oppression of women, like that of blacks and Jews, may only be dismantled when social repression is dismantled as a whole.

W. F. H.,

**Furth:** There is today a social demand for, as it’s put, equal rights for women, and that this should be the way the emancipation of women is to be achieved; that in this manner old demands and wishes of this society would be satisfied in law and in fact; that legal and economic equality may thus be attained and old privileges suspended. Still the question is this: can we say that the emancipation of women, as this has been put forward by the women’s movement, is being realized in this society; is there a surplus remaining which is not overcome?

Marcuse: That depends upon what one understands by emancipation. If we understand by emancipation that women have received employment rights and occupational freedoms that they had been denied earlier, then we can speak of emancipation. I only know the situation in the United States, and cannot comment on the situation in Germany. What I say therefore applies only to the U.S. There is absolutely no doubt that the number of employed women has risen astronomically (whose housekeeping occurs in addition). If this is what emancipation is, then in this sense society has accomplished much, though women are still excluded from many occupations (yet this must not be exaggerated).

But I would understand more under emancipation. Negatively, if emancipation means only that women have greater access to the established system of jobs, greater participation in the established social division of labor, this means that now women face the same repression that has historically confronted males in these occupations. In this sense, in a repressive society one cannot speak of a genuine emancipation of women, because emancipation here never transcends the repression of the social order.

Furth: Certainly the hopes of the women’s movement, as a declared participant in the general liberation movement, were more transcendent. They were not just playing catch-up, seeking parity with men, success in the bourgeois social order as it stood.

Marcuse: But rather to go beyond all this in numerous ways.

Furth: Can’t we look at this as having two aspects, or aren’t there two factors involved here which this hopefulness must address? First of course, to a large extent women see themselves as being the end-recipients of all the
hardship that the society causes. Further, [they believe – *tr.*] that men have been manipulated and oppressed in the production process, that these men hope that the end-recipients might be placed under still more hardship, so they can validate themselves as oppressors vis-à-vis the oppressed, and if this latter factor were eliminated, the entire social order would be transformed.

*Marcuse:* Still there is something clearly mistaken about this. This is because the emancipation of women with regard to employment does not emancipate them as women, but rather this transforms women into instruments of labor. This is an emancipation in terms of the existing social order, yet no emancipation beyond that.

*Furth:* But can’t we also say that not even the bourgeois society can meet these demands, and there are sound reasons why it cannot.

*Marcuse:* Why can’t it meet them? Not in all occupations. Some jobs are eliminated because the work is too heavy for women. It is right that they don’t figure in. Other professions for which women would certainly be suited are closed to them for other reasons. But within this framework, in my estimation, the society can meet the challenge.

*Furth:* Do you believe that bourgeois society can fully emancipate women?

*Marcuse:* With regard to the position of women in the labor process, women participate as the males participate. They are emancipated as labor power, as female labor power, but not as women. The qualities of a woman that are not germane to this labor power are not liberated in occupational emancipation. Whether they are liberated elsewhere – this is an entirely separate question that I would also like to raise, namely that of the liberalization of morality and the liberalization of taboos that always occurs from within a modern industrial society due to social foundations. Certainly taboos that were strongly enforced during the Victorian period exist no longer today; in any case they exist only as something to be broken through. There are regions within developed industrial societies in which young women, for example, who have not had sexual relations before marriage lose prestige. This is practically the reverse of the taboo; I don’t need to tell you about all the other areas in which the earlier taboos against infidelity, etc., have been substantially weakened. Here an entirely different problem arises. Whether this, let us call it desublimation, is liberation; this is again another important question.

*Furth:* Here you are probably again speaking with regard to U.S. experience – with us on these matters we have seen on the contrary that people generally want to go back to the taboos of the 19th Century. Women’s journals are constantly entering into the discussion: women should or should not have sexual experience before marriage? Overall we can say that the taboos are considered as thoroughly broken. But it must be noted that, if indeed these taboos are not really taken very seriously anymore, the freedom that has been gained in leaving them behind, is utilized in a type of competition that the nature of the economic order...
prescribes. Thus sexual generosity and liberty acquire an economic quality and are utilized in a competition to enhance status.

Marcuse: Like every type of emancipation, this emancipation also is part of the entire social process. Still it is something other than the emancipation in the sphere of employment. The question that I have tried to discuss in my new book, for example, is whether this loosening of sexual taboos is interwoven with an intensification of repression. This is because a desublimation within a repressive society is itself repressive, and perhaps even a more repressive means than the taboos, since desublimation can reconcile people with the established social order.

Furth: This would mean that emancipation consists of a leveling of gender disparities, be they in economics, law, or even morality, and also a leveling on a person to person basis. Emancipation here means that women are leveled into abstract economic persons, legal persons, persons governed by taboos (though not so very strongly that anyone identifies themselves as for or against them any longer). Given the manner in which taboos have meaning any longer, they do not compel anyone to identify themselves as consciously opposed to the society or as integrated into it, to become a person, instead everything slides to and fro and one can wriggle this way or that, still this means one wriggles oneself right into this society.

Marcuse: Advanced industrial society as a whole is mobilized for the purpose of obstructing the emergence of a negating consciousness, and the ostensible or actual loosening of taboos is a means toward this goal.

Furth: Now there is still another aspect to this. Earlier I stated that there were perhaps two hopes animating the women's movement from the start. Once the end-recipients are liberated from the hardships that are passed on to them, society would be transformed, although it cannot be said just how the social order would change. A second powerful influence that has perhaps allowed women to invest much hopefulness in emancipation is that a woman experiences her condition as a natural being through a powerful taboo, a natural being of the sort, different from the male, bound periodically to nature, which again and again comes forth in her in a periodic cycle, also through procreation and its

In response to our follow-up questions about the substance of this book, Marcuse wrote: "I do not yet have a final title for my new book. It is a study of ideology in advanced industrial society, insofar as this represents an essentially new system of domination. The book will contain a critical analysis of social transformations (especially with regard to the working class: the absorption of the opposition, politically as well as culturally; absorption of language and concepts. Also a critique of positivistic philosophy). Main problem: the status of dialectical philosophy vis-à-vis these new circumstances." Translator's note: this became One-Dimensional Man (1964).
consequence, the bearing of children and being bound to them. Both of these are very ambivalent in terms of social worth.

Marcuse: Yet neither of these is a fundamental obstacle to emancipation in terms of employment, certainly not given the development of modern technology and the development of modern hygiene...

Furth: Yes, and thus we see on every third page of advertising in news journals and pictorial magazines: use XY-Tampons, and this no longer has any embarrassment attached, no one pays it any mind. And this means certainly that a demand or interest is present here which is responding to a hope that this natural connection can be eliminated and this gender difference dissolved.

Marcuse: Why would one want to dissolve it? It is good certainly –

Furth: Well yes, but it certainly demands much. Precisely the playing up of the hygiene angle shows clearly that the natural background or natural foundation of this difference is supposed to disappear just like magic, I might put it that way. People do not want to have it.

Marcuse: Don’t take that too seriously. This publicity about women’s sanitary needs, etc., is simply advertising. I would not see a social problem in this as such. Certainly this society does not intend to give up the difference between men and women. Don’t forget that in a bourgeois society the particularly feminine qualities continue on as bourgeois qualities. A natural being, and this is certainly an abstract concept, women do not transcend this social order. Nature in this sense has of course been transformed into social nature.

Furth: And yet again I want to say that emancipation here shades into a mere leveling, just making up a deficit: to become as the males already are and what they represent in this society, to have worth as men have worth. Leveling in the direction of a person who is an abstraction, because one does not want to see the person as a male, unless it’s an abstraction with a male appendage.

Marcuse: Well as I have said, I don’t consider that as one of the essential problems, and we won’t go too far into the details of hygiene. I would rather mention to you briefly something I consider extremely important in connection with a remark – yet more than a remark – by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness. He says there that a woman’s ability to be happy does not stem from her role as an instrument of labor, but from her capacity to bestow joy, and that this is independent of her direct role in the production process. He develops this with great detail. The parts of the body that have the least to do with work, are ones that most bestow joy, and the closer women get, organically and psychologically to the production process, the more restricted is their own enjoyment. If we follow him further, this would mean that the emancipation of women with regard to employment in the established society – and I stress in the established society – has negative repercussions for the capacity for joy. Now this is an extremely divisive and problematic circumstance.
because it naturally must not appear as if one is against the emancipation of women in terms of employment, and one must not formulate as if one were. Here the problem is, once again, that which we run up against everywhere: in a repressive society even that which is good is bad. You cannot condemn the good because of this however.

Furth: There might still be the hope that the attainment of legal equality and parity would really be a progressive tendency if this were recognized and rewarded in the economic system. If women were able to move up to the level of men in the economic process.

Marcuse: That is the direction in which things are moving.

Furth: That is definitely the case. Of course in the U.S. much more than in Germany. But again this is done very ingeniously, as we see more and more, namely while trying to restrict women to certain occupations. Not just that they are kept from heavy labor; women themselves avoid this, at least in our society. Other occupations however, which could be open to all, are not open to all. For example, we see more and more employers expand job opportunity (which really is quite an abstract phrase) by opening quite specific jobs: teaching, care-giving, etc., those that have an obviously close connection to traditionally female roles in the family...

Marcuse: ...but also to be sure in industry to a very large extent. Given the mechanization of labor, the role of women in industry gets greater and greater through technology.

Furth: Yes, but also in a fashion that reproduces traditional female subordination. Male workers escape from the assembly lines by becoming pre-assemblers, set-up men, mechanics, foremen, supervisors, etc., while the women are channeled into the purely perfunctory processes. Women are recruited only to the lowest level jobs.

Marcuse: That is perfectly right. This is connected to the fact that both the general and occupational training of women in science and technology is very limited.

Furth: And, is this only happenstance? Is it only an historical phase in the process of transformation?

Marcuse: I believe it’s an historical phase. I cannot see why it should be a permanent barrier. But this is essentially dependent upon the supply of labor, the amount of labor the society is able to employ, unemployment, etc. And other factors also figure in.

Furth: As long as full employment is secured, we can imagine that this process will proceed. Naturally we need to remain aware that in a crisis the first to be let go ....

Marcuse: Primarily males will be employed, since someone in the end must do the housework. This is not completely irrational. Households have not yet become so thoroughly mechanized that no one needs to keep house.

Furth: Yes, if this process is really to be something progressive, we would have to think that the social order needs to furnish more and more help
to the household, especially assistance and facilities to ease what is most important: child-rearing.

Marcuse: Whether it's progress or not, the question of child-rearing is another thing. The mechanization easing household chores is making rapid strides. Women are burdened with gadgets and all the most modish fads, not to mention free time (which certainly is not free). Even here we have the penetration of the social system of production into the private sphere, once again as a means of social subordination and repression.

Furth: The next question is very delicate and difficult to formulate, have already touched upon this, though I articulated it poorly, that emancipation as we have observed it, consists of a leveling, an attempt to cover over the objective differences in gender roles as these are institutionalized —

Marcuse: Why should the society be interested in covering over these differences? Society is always interested in enhancing the birth rate, therefore certainly not interested in a diminution of these differences.

Furth: Because repression, then, may occur indirectly, as we discussed above, and not through taboos any longer, if and when the differences are diminished and new roles can be developed. Taboos evoke conflict. If the conflict doesn't have to become conscious; it could occur up from subconsciously, as a gate-keeper that is not confronted directly. In this manner repression is much more clandestine and more effective.

For this reason it appears to me that while society has contradictions as its foundation, it is certainly interested in having these contradictions seem to be without conflict ...

Marcuse: In the world of employment. Because an increase there of the which you call conflict, would simply constrain the efficiency of the labor in the production process.

Furth: Also in the manner which could validate the hopefulness that once constituted emancipation as a possibility above and beyond established institutions: spontaneity in the relationships between the sexes, freedom of choice, liberation of love from the aspect of domination...

Marcuse: With regard to freedom of choice in this area, this has become nearly complete in the established society. Women no longer marry, I may be permitted this generalization, those whom their parents have chosen.

Furth: ...but isn't it still evident that the hopefulness which once was attached to freedom of choice is something from which we have been disabused.

Marcuse: Certainly, since "freedom of choice" as such — there can be no free choice in a repressive society — only means a choice from among those things which have been directly or indirectly pre-selected. Exactly like elections in politics.

Furth: And there is another aspect to this. Hopefulness about something rather like promiscuity that was also present in the emancipation movement were also not realized. When people engage in it as they now
can — and not only among the uppermost circle of the bourgeoisie as in my view they did during the 19th century — everyone imitating what they read in Proust — what happens is ...

Proust: I don’t know, is there really such a terrible amount of promiscuity in Proust?

With: Yes, that’s correct; but let’s drop it. ...What happens is that people then just get bored. Then people think: why? What was it that we actually desired?

Proust: Exactly. Promiscuity, if Freud is right about it, does not necessarily enhance enjoyment. Freud was of the opinion that there was a tendency within the pleasure urge to construct obstacles in order to enhance pleasure, not to repress it, but to increase it. Promiscuity needs to be viewed in this light. Promiscuity as managed, as directly or indirectly regulated like an escape valve in the liberation of desire, is once again repressive.

* * *

SOCIALISM IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

First of all, I should like to make some preliminary remarks, which will themselves lead forward to the main points of my argument.

To be quite honest, the brief discussion which I have listened to so far has seemed to me rather abstract. In particular, there has been no really clear presentation of the concrete context which shapes and determines the problems of socialism today: the co-existence of communism and capitalism. In my opinion, it is this co-existence which explains both the metamorphosis of capitalism and the disfigurement which the original idea of socialism has undergone in practice. And today it determines the historic possibility of socialism. I cannot think of any single problem, concerning either ideology or the material base, which is not vitally affected and perhaps even defined...

Editors’ note:

“Socialism in the Developed Countries” was first published as “Perspektiven des Sozialismus in der entwickelten Industriegesellschaft,” Praxis, 1, 23 (Zagreb: 1965) pp. 260–70. The text presents an address given at Korcula, Yugoslavia, Summer 1964, and its English translation appeared in International Socialist Journal, 2, 8 (Rome: April 1965) pp. 139–51. Marcuse was associated in the 1960s with the Praxis group that held a summer conference at the resort town of Korcula, and that published an internationally resonant journal Praxis which pursued a “Western Marxist” line independent and critical of Soviet Marxism, a position congenial to Marcuse. In the article, Marcuse sees co-existence between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the Cold War as promoting totalitarianism through what he calls here “advanced capitalism.” The talk and later publication previewed Marcuse’s analysis of the integration of the working class within capitalist societies.
by the co-existence of these two systems. This is a real determining factor, not only a feature of foreign policy; indeed, co-existence is a factor which determines the social structure of capitalism itself.

For instance, the fact of co-existence is the driving power behind growth in productivity, it impels capitalism to stabilize itself and hence it brings social integration within capitalist society; there is a suspension of antitheses and contradictions within the society. Although I use the word "suspension," I could speak equally well of a "pernicious unity of antitheses" which is to be found in advanced capitalist society. I trust, that I will be able to demonstrate this to your satisfaction.

In my opinion, advanced capitalist society suppresses the need for a qualitative change in the system as it exists and repulses its absolute negation. This is its very basis, and on this basis it succeeds in absorbing all revolutionary potential. Of course, the contradictions of capitalism are not transcended; they persist in their classic form; indeed, perhaps they have never been stronger. Certainly, there has never been such an acute contradiction between the social wealth of the capitalist countries and the use to which that wealth is put. Every available force is mustered to disguise such an antithesis.

To my mind, the capitalist system has succeeded remarkably in this, at least in the most advanced centres of industrial society. Thanks to its technical innovations and extraordinary productivity, it has succeeded in channeling antagonisms in such a way that it can manipulate them. On this basis, material as well as ideological, the very classes which were once the absolute negation of the capitalist system are now more and more integrated into it. Technical progress, technology itself, have become a new system of exploitation and domination—new in the sense that it has changed class relations in a crucial way. In the advanced industrial countries there is a class society; all the fine talk about a levelling out of the classes or a property-owning democracy is no more than pure ideology. But it is a class society in which the working class no longer represents the absolute negation of the existing order. Quite shortly, I shall try to show how this vital development has crucially changed such Marxist concepts as the transcendence of alienation and the liberation of the individual personality.

I am referring only to the most advanced centres of industrial society and to trends which have by no means fully emerged. Even in the United States they are little more than tendencies, but I am convinced that they are, as it were, infectious and will quite swiftly spread through the capitalist atmosphere to less advanced countries. Indeed, they will become the models on which more backward countries will base their future industrialization. It would be as well, at this point, to define what I mean by an advanced industrial society.

By this I mean a society in which the mechanization large-scale industry has already embarked on the stage of automation, a technically advanced society in which, for the working class as well as others, the standard of
Interventions

171

...can continually be improved. The former free market economy is transformed into a regulated profit economy, controlled by the state and large monopolies, into the system of "organized capitalism". In this kind of society, the cultural, political and economic power is concentrated to an unprecedented degree. To a large extent, economics are determined by politics and the economy can only function because of the direct or indirect intervention of the State in vital sectors.

This kind of society, hardly more than incipient even in the most advanced countries, is a "totalitarian" society, but in a quite novel way. It is totalitarian in that it homogenizes public and private life, social and individual needs. The essential difference between public and private life is abolished. Wherever he turns, the individual is the victim of rules and regulations, propaganda and manufactured public opinion.

There is another trend towards totalitarianism: all effective internal opposition gradually dies down. Of course, there is a sort of opposition, a sort of discussion—even a free discussion—but it is always immanent within the system. There is no genuine, effective opposition to the system as a whole. Every kind of radical or vanguard movement, political or cultural, is easily absorbed and brought back within the fold. These re-absorbed movements are even made use of to embellish the system, to make it appear attractive.

The society this produces is a static society, despite all its dynamism. Its non-stop expansion, its soaring productivity, its incessant growth produce nothing but more and more of the same, without any qualitative change or any hope of qualitative change.

I must stress that in this society, which has such an unprecedented concentration of cultural, military and political power and so much great wealth, the negation has itself become an affirmative and the need for the negation seems eliminated. And, in advanced industrial society, all this has been accomplished without recourse to terror, in a democratic framework, under the banner of democratic pluralism. The general heading under which I would describe this society is that it is a society on a permanent war footing, all its cultural, technical, economic and political forces in a state of mobilization. It is mobilized firstly against the external enemy, communism, and secondly against the internal enemy, its own creative possibilities. There is an enemy outside and an enemy inside—and the enemy inside is nothing else but the system's own potentialities, which the system itself suppresses.

Automation provides the most striking example of this antithesis between actuality and potentiality. The application of automation means, in effect, that there could be an almost total abolition of socially imposed work, that is to say, of alienated work. The system contains in itself a very real trend—not utopian in the slightest—towards a society in which work time would become fringe time and free time full-time. In this society, abolition of alienated labour would be quite normal and increasingly common. And yet these possibilities cannot be realized within the present system; they would spell doom to the cultural, political and economic institutions on which
the system depends; they would mean, plainly, the final catastrophe of the capitalist system. It is for this reason that full-scale mobilization is needed, not only against the external enemy, but also against these potentialities.

Furthermore, I am convinced that another important trend in society, often hailed enthusiastically as egalitarian, is in fact an assimilation of the social classes where consumption is concerned.

It is true to say that in contemporary America white- and blue-collar workers can spend their holidays in the same places as their bosses, they can dress as well and can afford gadgets and luxury goods which used to be within the reach of the ruling class alone. It is also true that, as consumption is concerned, there has been a definite homogenization of white- and blue-collar workers; class contradictions, though not transcended, have thus been masked. The differences between master and servant, employer and employed, those on top and those underneath, are as great as they ever were, perhaps even greater. Life and death decisions, both for the individual and for the whole nation, descend from on high and are protected against any opposition. Society is utterly dependent on an apparatus of production and distribution which, at an ever-expanding pace, creates the needs which it must satisfy, intensifying the struggle for life when its possible abolition is already in sight. It is vital to realize that this apparatus creates and determines every kind of need, even instinctual needs and individual aspirations; suppresses the distinction between free time and work time and fashions men, from such an early age and so thoroughly and totally that concepts such as reification and alienation become suspect.

Does it make sense to go on speaking of alienation and reification when people really feel and find themselves in this society—in their motor-cars, in their TV sets, their gadgets, their newspapers, their politicians and so on and so forth? This is a world of identification: the objects which are around no longer seem alien and dead. Certainly, work in the service industries, offices and in half-automated factories is still alienated, more inhuman than ever in the past, but resistance is being remorselessly stifled by the omnipresent power of established society, by the ever-increasing tide of goods and the ever-rising standard of living, which seem ever more desirable.

The masses have every reason to integrate themselves into such a society by doing so, they put an end to the exercise of terror. Their connivance and collaboration seem quite reasonable and they even further their own subordination. Once their needs and aspirations have been adjusted to fit with the requirements of the system, once they have been pre-formed, they can make political decisions from time to time in their capacity as electors. Every two or four years, they are able to make a democratic choice and select from a slate of candidates, the one who, in their view, will best represent their interests—interests which never vary from public opinion, manufactured opinion. They have the same freedom of democratic choice within their purchasing power, to acquire consumer goods or cultural benefits. In other words, the masses are integrated and marshalled within the framework of
democratic pluralism. Outside, or rather beneath, this democracy, there are whole sectors who are not integrated into it, who perhaps never will be: racial and national minorities, the permanently unemployed, the poor. They are the living negation of the system. But neither their organization nor their consciousness are sufficiently developed for them to be the subjects of the transition to socialism.

Before I try to explain the stabilization and integration which have taken place, I would like to recapitulate the principal features of organized capitalism.

In this society, an ever-increasing quantity of goods and services is produced and consumed; physical work is easier and life more comfortable for a wider range of people; manifold organizations, opinions and deviations are permitted and practiced; there is an—often over-estimated—assimilation of the social classes, as far as consumption is concerned. But it pays for its achievements at a high price: an enormous waste of productive energies, planned obsolescence, the destruction of necessities of life alongside the misery and poverty which exist outside realm of integration and even within the affluent society itself. This society intensifies the struggle for existence, when it could finally assuage it; it conserves alienated labour, when it is not necessary; it mobilizes men and productive forces, totally and permanently, on the supposition that it may have to wage a war of total destruction. Although this mobilization seems quite rational in the present international situation, nevertheless it is simultaneously re-creating for itself its own enemy, its own threat and its own mobilization. The enemy is woven into politics and economics, where it functions as a powerful incentive to social integration, technical advance and growth of productivity. Society is totally mobilized every sector of society and every field of human activity is involved. Intellectual and material culture, public and private life, mind and soul, thought and language—all these are adjusted to fit in with the needs of the apparatus and then, as needs of the apparatus, are transformed into individuals’ own wants, aspirations, patterns of behaviour and forms of expression. Antitheses, contradictions, negations are thus absorbed, either suppressed or changed into affirmations and, in this way, a pernicious unification and neutralization of antitheses is carried out in every realm of social life: intellectual culture, social morality, the whole complex of working life.¹

I do not deny that there are conflicts within existing society and I know that these are much more acute in France than in the United States. Certainly, there are conflicts between the private and state sectors; these are nothing new in the history of capitalism. But I do not think that this is one of the explosive conflicts which could lead to the destruction of capitalism.

As I suggested earlier, the central antithesis within capitalism today is closely connected with the trend towards automation. On the one hand, the
I can only discuss here, very briefly, one aspect of this pernicious unification of antitheses: the process of integration in the realm of work. I have chosen to say something about this particular topic because it contains a problem of crucial importance to us all. Does the trend towards integration reveal a structural change in capitalism itself or are lesser modifications taking place within the familiar structure of the system, which is going on along the same lines?

I would like to put forward the following hypothesis: the trends towards integration and stabilization, which we have observed, originate from the foundations of the system. In other words, they are not marginal or purely ideological phenomena.

When we consider, however cursorily, the way in which Marxist theory has dealt with these vital changes, we are bound to admit straight away that the traditional explanations are no longer satisfactory in view of what is happening today in advanced capitalist society. For instance, the theory of the labour aristocracy, as formulated by Lenin, can no longer cope with a situation in which it is not just a small fragment of the working class which has been integrated but, as in the United States today, its vast majority. This is no longer a matter of differences between the big fish, the union bureaucracy, and the rank and file, though these differences are still there in much the same form; today, changes in the system of work and rising standards of living have transformed the majority of the organized working class into a labour aristocracy, whereas in Lenin's day this was still no more than a small minority.

I can give you an up-to-the-minute example: sociologists today (by which I mean bourgeois sociologists, not Marxist) speak of a new kind of working class solidarity—solidarity between organized workers who have a job and a measure of security, as opposed to those who have no job and no chance of getting one in the foreseeable future either. There has been a split within the working class itself, turning nearly all the organized working class into a system is pulling towards full automation; on the other hand, the system cannot accept full automation, because that would mean the breakdown of its existing institutions. This is the principal contradiction; it signals the possibility of a revolution in capitalism. The revolution cannot be scheduled for today or tomorrow; it is a long process, which very much depends on future developments in the co-existence between capitalism and socialism. For example, it depends on whether communism or socialism will permit capitalism to hold automation back, to restrain it behind barriers so that it does not burst the system apart. Or whether the economic and cultural development of the communist countries will go ahead so fast that it will force capitalism to implement automation more extensively and swiftly in order to go on competing for world leadership.

(This note and those following are excerpts from Professor Marcus's remarks during discussion—Ed.).
labour aristocracy. And within the working class new differentiations are appearing. According to recent statistics, unemployment is continually falling among college graduates, whereas it is rising among those who have had a higher education. Thus it seems that the theory of the labour aristocracy, if it is to remain at all useful, must be re-formulated to deal with advanced capitalism.

The Marxist theory of monopoly capitalism, or state monopoly capitalism, is much closer to the real situation. It is more comprehensive than the theory of the labour aristocracy since it takes account of the fact that organized monopoly competition makes it possible to extract exceptional profits and plus value, so that large-scale industry, monopolistically organized, can afford to pay higher real wages—not only for a short while, but over a long period. But this theory of monopoly capitalism has almost always been linked with the theory of classical imperialism, according to which the monopolies, despite their international inter-dependence, will sooner or later start fighting among themselves; recurrent quarrels and, in the end, wars between the imperialist powers will destroy the prosperity which has been built up.

Against this theory, I would like to suggest that the classic form of imperialism no longer exists. Obviously, imperialism still does. Its most vigorous new form seems to be neo-colonialism, through which the imperialist powers once more divide up the world, but without military conflict. Of course, there are still numerous contradictions among the imperialist powers (it is not worth going into them in detail because they are so familiar) but these contradictions no longer seem likely to lead, in the foreseeable future, to the outbreak of war. This is one of the points at which the situation of co-existence has had a crucial bearing on the stabilization of capitalism. It could even be said, without undue cynicism—and in a sense which is still not yet completely decided—that communism has become the doctor by the sickbed of capitalism. If it were not for communism, it would be impossible to explain the political and economic unification of the capitalist world—a unification which, so to speak, embodies the old Marxist spectre of the universal cartel. Moreover, this integration of the capitalist world is not merely a surface phenomenon, but has an astonishingly solid economic base.

The falling away of the revolutionary potential in the capitalist world has had obvious results. In the United States, really radical opposition is limited to a few small, ineffective groups. The large trade unions have followed the policy of co-operation; even Marxist sociologists speak of "collision between" capital and labour. The Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions has published some very interesting material on this subject. In a study of the automobile industry, the trade unions were discovered to be unable to separate their own interests from those of the firm. For instance, it is quite normal for a unified trade union-management delegation to go to Washington in order to bring joint pressure to bear to block the shut-down of an obsolete armaments factory or to get a new one built. This kind of lobbying is not at all rare.
I would like to stress that there is a trade union opposition, notwithstanding but it is weak and the great majority of those who have any sway follow the kind of policy I have outlined above. To show just how serious the situation has become, it is worth noting that the East Coast longshoremen have recently refused to load wheat cargoes destined for Cuba, which the State Department had authorized.

I would like now to try to explain very briefly how the stabilization of antitheses, the integration I have spoken of, has an effect on production itself. If we are to say that these things are something more than superficial modifications, that they are witness to genuine structural changes, then we must find their influence and their foundations in the realm of production. Where work is concerned, integration takes place through a gradual transition from physical to technical and psychophysical skills. This shift from physical to psychological strain is centered round the speed-up system; it is probably even more inhuman than the heavy physical labour which used to be the rule. But, as automation develops and spreads, these remnants of the previous system can be got rid of and, at any rate, the most inhumane aspects of mechanized work can be abolished. However, the repressive system of semi-automated work cuts off individual workers or work-teams from their fellows. Even among the mass of workers in a single factory, we can identify a growing isolation, which accompanies growing mechanization. This isolation encourages political apathy and integration into the system. It should be added that these developments often go hand in hand with growing solidarity within the individual unit of each work-team.

These changes in the form of work, which are associated with the development of automation, make the worker more passive than before, re-active rather than active. In my opinion, this is a crucial factor in development which seems to have outmoded the whole concept of the means of production, as Marx defined it. In semi-automated industry—and still more so in fully automated industry—the machine is no longer a means of production in the old sense; it is no longer a means of production in the hands of the worker or the group of workers. On the contrary, the machine has become an element in the whole system of organization which determines the workers' behaviour, not even just in the factory, but outside it, in every realm or activity. The fact that the energy expended is psycho-technical rather than physical means that work in material production becomes much the same as white-collar work, in an advertising agency, a bank or an office. The worker loses his professional independence and his own special position; he is brought to heel and subordinated to the apparatus, together with the other classes which serve it, and he thus takes part in the system of ubiquitous repression and administration, both as object and as subject. The homogenization of white- and blue-collar workers is quite clearly shown in statistics: in the United States today, there are, for the first time, less workers involved directly in production than in non-production jobs. Moreover, this is a lasting trend. As a result, the workers become politically apathetic and...
Trade unions are weakened. Although there are various exceptions, on the whole the white-collar workers are reluctant to organize.

Within this machine-determined apparatus (in which the machines are no longer the mere means of production but integral factors of the system) the worker lives in a universe which seems to run on its own accord, mechanical, always on schedule, drawing him in to its own rhythm. The machines and the behaviour the machines ordain literally make the worker move, make him join in at their rhythm—not only at work, but even in the street, on holiday, in free time. In other words, this new rhythm, ordained by mechanized and automated work, mobilizes the worker’s mind and soul. Sociologists who have done research into automated factories mention a feeling of instinctive satisfaction—to be in the swing of things. The worker is swung along by the form and rhythm of his work; the satisfaction this gives him can be highly productive. I should emphasize again that these are not universal phenomena, but only trends; nonetheless, I believe that, as automation develops and spreads, these trends are bound to become not weaker, but stronger.

I have not lingered over these trends, because Serge Mallet undoubtedly knows much more about them than I and will discuss them in greater detail. The evidence shows that the integration of all opposition and the absorption of the revolutionary potential are not surface phenomena but have a material foundation in the form of production itself and in changes in the mode of production.

I shall not say much at this point about the spread of these trends to the capitalist countries of Europe; I shall only suggest one or two hypotheses. In my opinion, there is a definite tendency for political opposition—working class opposition—to grow weaker in less advanced industrial countries, as well as in the United States. Compared with previous periods, the policy of the strongest communist parties, in Italy and France, is moving towards that of Social Democracy. It seems that these communist parties, in the changed conditions of capitalism, see themselves in the historical position of Social Democracy. With one crucial difference: apparently there is no real power to their left. In the countries concerned, the reduced effectiveness of the strike as a political weapon runs parallel with growing apathy within the working class movement.

I do not hold that technology is the major factor responsible for the situation. In my opinion Technik is a system of domination; in other words, technology and technical advances are organized in such a way that the existing system in the highly industrialized capitalist countries is very largely held together by them. I would be the last person to claim that technology could not have some other organizational basis; indeed, I think it is one of the principal lessons of socialism that it can. Socialism does not just take over capitalist technology; it creates its own, with its own distinctive content.
In conclusion, I would like to ask an awkward question: are the trends which I have outlined visible under socialism as well as organized capitalism? If it is true that these trends are produced by technical changes in the form of production, then we must certainly take note of the fact that capitalist technology (which is nothing but the capitalist branch of techniques) has been incorporated into socialism. If, as a result of incorporating this technical branch, other undesirable things have also been incorporated, then we are faced with a crucial problem. In particular, we must wonder about the possible assimilation of the two systems. Very many of the ideas to be found in Marx—and in Marxists, we should admit this openly—refer to a historically superceded stage of productivity. Marx did not foresee technologically advanced society. He did not foresee all the things which capitalism could accomplish, including conditions of co-existence and on an advanced technological base, simply exploiting its technical breakthroughs. The Marxist concept of the relation between liberty and necessity must also be called into question. You are all familiar with the Marxian idea that, even under socialism, the realm of work remains the realm of necessity, whereas the realm of liberty can only develop above and beyond the realm of necessity. In my opinion, we must question the continuing validity of this concept as far as advanced industrial society is concerned. There is a further question which arises out of the same considerations, perhaps the gravest question of all: every one of us is attached to the ideas of the free development of personality, the plenitude of the individual, the transcendence of alienation, and so on; today we must ask ourselves: what does it all mean? What does it mean when, in a technological society, work time—socially necessary time—is reduced to a minimum and free time practically becomes full-time? How do we set about things? We will not get very far without well-worn notions of "creative work" and "creative development". What does it all mean? Does it mean that we are all to go out hunting and fishing, writing poetry, painting pictures and so on and so forth? I know that it is easy to laugh at what I am saying; I am deliberately being provocative because I feel very strongly that this is one of the most important questions for Marxism and socialism, and not only for Marxism and socialism. We must get down to brass tacks, not go on talking airily about the flowering of the individual and disalienated creative work; what does it all mean? Because the end of necessary work is in sight; it is not a utopia: it is a real possibility.

Finally, there is a second question I want to ask, perhaps even graver still. What has happened to the subject of the revolution? If what I have said holds good, if there is a definite trend towards the integration of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries, can we still go on affirming that the working class is the sole historic subject of the revolution? I would like to recall an idea of Marx, rather neglected by humanist re-interpretations of Marx’s thought. According to Marx, the working class only becomes the historic subject of the revolution because it represents the absolute negation of the existing order. If it is no longer this, then it is no longer qualitatively
different from any other class and hence no longer capable of creating a qualitatively different society. Moreover, if there is a growing measure of utilization, then the very need for a qualitative change is also bound to appear. We ought to ask ourselves whether we should so readily jettison re-interpret the Marxist concept of pauperization. I know that Marx, like Marx and like the whole later Marxist tradition, insisted that pauperization could not be seen as the necessary pre-condition for a revolutionary development and that the most advanced and best-off sectors of the working class could certainly become subjects of the revolution. But today we should examine this view. In other words, we must ask whether it is possible to receive of revolution when there is no vital need for it. Because the vital need for a revolution is something quite different from a vital need for better living conditions, a better income, more liberty and so on, which can be satisfied within the existing order. Why should the overthrow of the existing order be a vital necessity for people who own, or can hope to own, good clothes, a well-stocked larder, a TV set, a car, a house and so on, all within the existing order?

I do not have to apologize here for having put forward a deeply pessimistic analysis. In the situation we are in today, there is one commandment which

In my opinion, almost the entire population of the advanced industrial countries has become an object, in the philosophical sense, and, as such, it might perhaps become the subject of the revolution. This would be a total revolution, not just the work of a single class but of the whole of the oppressed and manipulated society, except, of course, for a small and diminishing ruling stratum. But we must not use concepts of this kind ideologically. I know that exploitation is not abolished because the workers are better off, but I would not go so far as to say that it makes no difference whether the workers own a TV set, a car, a house, etc., or not.

Such an extreme statement would mean not just the end of the dialectic, but the end of materialism as well. If I go up to an American trade unionist and say: “You are cruelly exploited, just as you always used to be. You may be able to afford a car and a house and a holiday in Europe and so on, but that does nothing to change the basic facts of the private appropriation and distribution of surplus value”, perhaps he would show some interest, but it would not have any effect. At best, he would ask: “Fine, but am I going to smash up the system which gives me my car and my home, on account of this concept of exploitation?” Faced with this, we must avoid letting our Marxist concepts rigidify into an ideology: we must match them with reality. I do not want to say: “There is nothing to be done”. Unfortunately, the question of What is to be done? is beyond the scope of an address. There are groups with whom Marxists can and must work. They are not only, and not even primarily, in the working class. In America, for instance, there are groups which could be called humanist. In other words, there are intellectuals who are not content just to sit behind a desk, but are even now risking their lives in the Deep South, fighting for bourgeois rights, the elementary civil rights of the negro. The role of the intellectuals should certainly not be underrated. The
nobody who takes socialism really seriously can possibly break: a Marx shall not be duped by any kind of mystification or illusion. This would not be the first time in history that the real historic subject of the revolution could not be identified. There have been times in the past when the historic subject was latent. This does not invalidate Marxism. The concepts which Marx originated should not be rejected but developed; their further development is already contained in the basic theses. This is why we can and must permit pessimism, in its proper place. Only on such grounds can we produce an analysis free from mystification, which will not transform Marxism from a critical theory into an ideology.

* * *

SOCIALIST HUMANISM?

Herbert Marcuse has achieved a considerable reputation for his works *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, *Soviet Marxism*, and *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Since 1954, he has taught at Brandeis University, with interruptions as Directeur d'études of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris. Born in Berlin in 1898, he studied at the University of Berlin and received a PhD from the University of Freiburg. After teaching a year in Geneva, he was from 1934 to 1940 at the Institute of Social Research, Columbia University. He spent nearly ten years with the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, Washington, after which he returned to Columbia as a research fellow in the Russian Institute; he has also been at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University.

* Editors' note:

“Socialist Humanism?” was published in a book with a similar title *Socialist Humanism*, ed. Erich Fromm (New York: Doubleday, 1965) pp. 107–17. Marcuse's question mark in the title raises questions concerning whether “socialist humanism” is a vital and progressive force in the contemporary era. Throughout the article, Marcuse argues that without translating the humanist values into reality, humanism remains an ideology, whether in capitalist or communist societies. Marcuse insists that in the face of contemporary denial and repression of humanity, loyalty to the idea of socialism excludes the fostering of illusions and requires protection and development of the consciousness of genuine human freedom and justice worthy of a human being.

same kind of combative humanism can be found in other strata as well. It is not just theory to work with these groups, strengthening and developing their consciousness; it is praxis as well. We all know the really revolutionary role which students are playing in countries like Vietnam, South Korea and so on; it would be quite wrong to neglect the role of intellectuals as casually as Marxism used to do.
Almost twenty years ago, Merleau-Ponty raised the issue of socialist humanism with uncompromising clarity. Is the humanistic, nonterroristic construction of socialist society in the given historical period a real possibility? He rejected the alternative of humanism and terror: there is no choice between violence and nonviolence, but only between two modes of violence—capitalist and socialist.

En U.S.S.R., la violence et la ruse sont officielles, l'humanité est dans la vie quotidienne. Dans les démocraties, au contraire, les principes sont humains, la ruse et la violence se trouvent dans la pratique. A partir de là, la propagande a beau jeu. 3

(In the U.S.S.R., violence and deception are official, and humanity is in daily life. In the democracies, on the other hand, the principles are humane, but deception and violence are found in practice. Beyond that, propaganda has a field day.)

The two social systems are locked in a global struggle in which the denunciation of socialist violence is found to strengthen the realm of capitalist exploitation. But socialist violence has the chance of breaking the infernal circle of terror and counterterror as long as it is carried by the supranational solidarity of the only class which, "selon la logique interne de sa condition," is capable of translating humanism from ideology into reality. Merleau-Ponty knew that precisely this condition no longer prevailed, and that the proletariat had ceased to be "the term of reference" in communist thought and policy, but he refused to engage in an ideological rescue of humanism and to reject the actual development in the name of humanistic "values":

Opposer ici au marxisme une "morale d'abord," c'est l'ignorer dans ce qu'il dit de plus vrai et qui a fait sa fortune dans le monde, c'est continuer la mystification, c'est passer à côté du problème. 10

(To oppose to Marxism the principle "morality first" is to ignore that which is most true in the former and which has made its fortune in the world, is to perpetuate mystification, to bypass the problem.)

The solution:

Parler pour l'humanisme sans être pour le "socialisme humaniste" à la manière anglo-saxonne, "comprendre" les communistes sans être communiste, c'est apparentemment se placer bien haut et en tout cas au-dessus de la mêlée. En réalité c'est simplement refuser de s'engager dans la confusion et hors de la

Ibid., p. xf.
vérité. Est-ce notre faute si l'humanisme occidental est faussé parce qu'il est aussi une machine de guerre? Et si l'entreprise marxiste n'a pu survivre qu'en changeant de caractère?

(To speak of humanism without being for "humanistic socialism," in the Anglo-Saxon manner, and to "understand" the communists without being communist, is apparently to place oneself high above, or in any case above, the conflict. In reality, it means refusing to become entangled in confusion and falsehood. Is it our fault if Western humanism is rendered false because it is also an apparatus of war? And if the Marxist enterprise has only been able to survive by changing its character?)

The human reality is an "open" system: no theory, whether Marxist or other, can impose the solution. The contingency of history, which today denies humanism, may also one day deny the denial. Meanwhile there are the enslaved human beings who must accomplish their own liberation, to develop their conscience and consciousness, to make them aware of what is going on, to prepare the precarious ground for the future alternatives. This is our task: "our" not only as Marxists but as intellectuals, and means all those who are still free and able to think by themselves and against indoctrination, communist as well as anticommunist.

Today, after the destalinization and under conditions of liberation and decentralization in the communist world, the "solution" is no more visible than it was at the end of the war. The Soviet Union does not seem to become more "humanistic" by making arrangements with the West, nor the West by accepting these arrangements. But the postwar development of the capitalist and communist societies in coexistence suggests that the prospects of socialist humanism should be re-examined with a view to the technical capability and productivity of these societies. This paper offers only a few remarks on the problems.

In the Marxian conception socialism is humanism in as much as it organizes the social division of labor, the "realm of necessity" so as to enable men to satisfy their social and individual needs without exploitation and with a minimum of toil and sacrifice. Social production, controlled by the "immediate producers," would be deliberately directed toward this goal. With this rational organization of the realm of necessity, man would be free to develop himself as an "all-round individual" beyond the realm of necessity, which would remain a world of want, of labor. But the qualitatively new organization of the realm of necessity, upon which the emergence of truly human relationships depends in turn depends on the existence of a class for which the revolution of human relationships is a vital need. Socialism is humanism in the extent to which this need and goal pre-exist, i.e., socialism as humanism has its historical a priori within capitalist society. Those who constitute the human base of this society

11 Ibid., p. 203.
have no share in its exploitative interests and satisfactions; their vital needs transcend the inhuman existence of the whole toward the universal human needs which are still to be fulfilled. Because their very existence is the denial of freedom and humanity, they are free for their own liberation and for that of humanity. In this dialectic, the humanist content of socialism emerges, not as need not as moral goal and justification but as economic and political practice—as part of the basis itself of the material culture.

This much for the Marxian conception. Its historical denominator is obvious. Socialism is "objectively" humanism by virtue of its specific place in the development of industrial society, defined by the existence, interest, and action of the class-conscious proletariat in its supranational solidarity. This historical constellation has been "surpassed" by the actual development of the advanced industrial societies. To the degree to which their inherent contradictions have unfolded themselves, to the same degree have their rising productivity and power succeeded in suppressing the need for resolving the contradictions. As technical progress provides the instrumentalities for a rational organization of necessity far beyond anything Marx ever envisaged (the "abolition of labor" does not seem to be the problem of the future, but rather how to avoid the abolition of labor), these instruments are used for perpetuating and even intensifying the struggle for existence, for total mobilization rather than for rationalization. The increasing threat of leisure time is utilized by management to defend the status quo of repression. Technological rationality is geared to the requirements of the Cold War, which is waged not only (perhaps not even primarily) against the external enemy, but also against the enemy within the established societies—against a qualitatively new mode of existence which would free man from enslavement by the apparatus which he has built.

In terms of the established industrial societies, nothing is more sensible than the fear of that stage where technical progress would turn into human progress: self-determination of life in developing those needs and faculties which may attenuate the struggle for existence—human beings as ends in themselves. This fear is not only that of technological unemployment, but so that of boredom, of a void which has to be filled and which cannot be filled except by bigger and better management from above and outside. Not only the political but also (and primarily) the technical apparatus and production itself have become systems of domination into which the laboring classes are incorporated and incorporate themselves. The inner logic of their "condition," according to which they were the historical agents of socialist humanism, is no longer their own. The objective identity of socialism and humanism is dissolved. It was never an immediate identity: it was real to the extent to which the objective condition was seized and transcended in the consciousness of the historical subjects and in their action. This mediation is suppressed by the overwhelming power of technical progress welded into an instrument of totalitarian domination, operating not only through the paralyzing concentration of economic and military power, but also through the rising standard of living under the imposed conditions of living. As long
as the established direction of technical progress prevails (and in the era of coexistence it is bound to prevail), change in the ownership and control of the means of production would be quantitative rather than qualitative change. The requisite for the liberation of the humanistic content of socialism would be a fundamental change in the direction of technical progress, a total reconstruction of the technical apparatus. This is the historical idea of humanism today.

Other ideas of humanism belong to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they retain an image of man which has been surpassed by the development of society. This classical image still guides Marx's early writings; it finds expression in the notion of the all-round individual, the "personality" which fulfills itself in a realm of freedom. But this notion pertains to a stage where the intellectual culture was still divorced from the material culture, not yet incorporated in mass production and consumption, where the mind and the soul were not yet taken over by scientific management, where time and space were not occupied, in their entirety, by organized business and organized relaxation—where there could still be a realm of freedom not correlated with necessity. Even so, it is difficult to envisage what Marx's all-round individual would or would not do—simply in terms of occupation or nonoccupation. There is an unfortunate kernel of truth in the malicious denunciation of the vision of free individuals who spend their day in alternating between fishing, hunting, and being creative. If this vision were to become reality tomorrow (and it could far more easily become reality than when Marx wrote!), it would be the very denial of freedom and of humanity. Why?

To be sure, Marx revised his early notions of human freedom by refraining from such positive visions and by examining the conditions of liberation rather than of liberty attained. However, the developed Marxian theory retains an idea of man which now appears as too optimistic and idealistic. Marx underrated the extent of the conquest of nature and of man, of the technological management of freedom and self-realization. He did not foresee the great achievement of technological society: the assimilation of freedom and necessity, of satisfaction and repression, of the aspirations of politics, business, and the individual. In view of these achievements, socialist humanism can no longer be defined in terms of the individual, the all-round personality, and self-determination. If these ideas are supposed to be more than the privilege of a few, if they claim universal validity, they seem dangerously void of meaning and substance. Their realization would call for conditions in which man would fulfill himself in his daily work, in which socially necessary labor would be "attractive labor," a possibility which Marx emphatically denied: "labor cannot become play, as Fourier wants." 12 Short of it, these ideas of humanism have the repressive connotation of pretechnological "high-

12 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Dietz, 1953) p. 599.
Interventions

... which leaves the lower culture on which it is built unaffected. Marx recognized the ideological character of this humanism when he translated the metaphysical terms of the early writings into those of political economy. The chance of humanism arises with the abolition of the exchange economy and its institutions; with the rational, socialist organization of labor; then, man may become free to build his own life and to be human with the others. Even then, the true realm of freedom, the “menschliche Kraftentwicklung” which can end in itself, begins only beyond this realm of necessity. But the socialist organization of labor has created free time, and “the free time which is leisure as well as time for higher activity has naturally [sic!] transformed man into a different subject (in ein anderes Subjekt verwandelt) and as this different subject, man also enters into the process of immediate production.”

Today, advanced industrial society is creating free time, but the possessor of this free time is not a “different subject”; in the capitalist and communist systems, the subject of free time is subordinated to the same norms and powers that rule the realm of necessity. The mature Marxian conception, too, appears idealistic and optimistic.

With the passing of the objective conditions for the identity of socialism and humanism, socialism cannot be made humanistic by committing socialist policy to the traditional humanistic values. In the situation of coexistence (which must be the framework for any nonideological analysis), such humanization is bound to be ideological and self-defeating. Here, a distinction must be made between capitalist and socialist humanism. In the capitalist world, the fight for the rights of man, for freedom of speech and assembly, for equality before the law, which marked the beginning of the liberal era, is again a desperate concern at its end, when it becomes evident to what extent these liberties have remained restricted and denied. And this fight is hampered to the degree to which it respects, in its own action and suffering, the liberal values and the legality which the adversary meets with unpunished violence.

In the communist world, the assertion of individual fights and liberties and of the initiative of the laboring classes would promote (and should promote) radical dissent and opposition to the economic and political repression on which the established regime depends, and which it considers as prerequisite for defense and growth in competitive coexistence. According to this logic, effective dissent and opposition within the communist societies would alter the precarious international balance in favor of capitalism—which would not necessarily brighten the prospects of socialist humanism. For the laboring classes are no longer those to whom the revolution once appealed, and their initiative is not likely to revive international socialist solidarity.

These are the given historical conditions which a discussion of the failures and chances of socialist humanism must face if it does not want to deal with...
mere ideologies. Advanced industrial society can take care of human values while continuing to pursue its inhuman goals: it promotes culture and personalities together with toil, injustice, nuclear armament, indoctrination, self-propelling productivity. The intensity with which powers that be mobilize the underlying population against their liberation goes hand in hand with the growing capabilities of society to accomplish liberation. In as much as these capabilities are utilized (or suppressed) in the interest of domination, of the defense of the status quo, they remain technical capabilities, barred from their humanistic realization. As technical capabilities they define the prospects of socialist humanism. Severance of the fatal link between technical progress and progress in domination and exploitation is a precondition. Humanism must remain ideology as long as society depends on continued poverty, arrested automation, mass media, prevented control, and on the creation and re-creation of masses, of noise and pollution, of planned obsolescence and waste, and of mental and physical rearman. These conditions and institutions are the social controls which sustain and extend the prevailing state of affairs. Consequently, their abrogation on behalf of humanism would be revolutionary subversion, and this subversion would also subvert the very needs and necessities of human existence. What appeared in the pretotalitarian era, as the precondition of freedom may well turn out to be its substance, its historical content. For the substance of freedom as well as humanism must be defined in terms of the human beings in their society and in terms of their capabilities. Advanced industrial society is a society in which the technical apparatus of production and distribution has become totalitarian political apparatus, co-ordinating and managing all dimensions of life, free time as well as working time, negative as well as positive thinking, victims, beneficiaries, and heirs of such a society, the realm of freedom, lost its classical content, its qualitative difference from the realm of necessity, is the work world, the technical world which they must first make their own. The realm of necessity must become the realm of their freedom. The technical apparatus of production, distribution, and consumption must be reconstructed. Technological rationality must be redirected to make the work world a place for human beings who one day may perhaps be willing to live in peace and away with the masters who guide them to desist from this effort. This means not “humanization” of labor but its mechanization and planned production for the emergence of new needs—those of pacification of the struggle for existence. Some aspects of the new technology can be delineated: the complete rebuilding of cities and towns, the reconstruction of the countryside after the ravages of repressive industrialization, the institution of truly public services, the care of the sick and the aged.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\) For an elaboration of these propositions, see my One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), esp. Chs. 9 and 10.
The failure of humanism seems to be due to overdevelopment rather than
narrowness; once the productive apparatus, under repressive direction, has
shifted into an apparatus of ubiquitous controls, democratic or authoritarian,
the chances of a humanistic reconstruction are very poor. This situation
demonstrates the historical truth of the Marxian conception. The humanistic
character of socialism is objectively grounded neither in the socialization of the
means of production nor in their control by the “immediate producers”—
though these are necessary prerequisites—but rather in the existence, prior
and prior, of social classes whose life is the very negation of humanity,
and whose consciousness and practice are determined by the need to abrogate
this condition. The totalitarian-technological stage has not altered this truth:
no matter how “technical” the basis of socialism has become, no matter how
moral it is a matter of the redirection and even reversal of technical progress and
sociological rationality—these are political tasks, involving radical changes
in the society as a whole. Technical progress occurs as political progress in
domination; thus it is progress in the suppression of the alternatives. The fact
that in the most advanced areas of industrial civilization, this suppression
is no longer terrorist but democratic, introjected, productive, and even
sanitary does not change this condition. If suppression is compatible with
individual autonomy and operates through individual autonomy, then
the Nomos (norm) which the individual gives himself is that of servitude.
This Nomos, which is the law of our time, outlaws the pacification of the
single for existence, national and international, among societies and among
individuals. Competition must go on—for profit and power, for work and
living, for the bigger and better deterrent, and it increases the productivity of the
whole, which in turn perpetuates this sort of competition and promises the
transformation of its victims into its beneficiaries, who will then do their best
to make their contribution. And to the degree to which the other societies are
folded into the same circle, the qualitative difference between socialism and
capitalism is being obliterated by the sweep of a productivity which improves
the standard of living through improved exploitation.

Socialist theory has no right to denounce, in the name of other historical
possibilities, growing social productivity which allows a better life for
more sections of the population. But the question here is not that of future
possibilities; it is the present reality which is at stake. In this reality, the denial
of humanity spreads through all achievements: it is the daily preparedness
for annihilation, in the equipment for a subterranean existence, in the ever
more ingenious planning of waste, in the inescapable inanities of the Media, in
the abolition of privacy, and—perhaps the most effective denial of all—in the
helpless awareness of all this, in public acknowledgment and criticism, which
are impotent and contribute to the power of the whole, if they are not crushed
and silenced by force. Thus the need for liberation exists: it exists as universal
need far beyond that of one particular class—but it exists only “in itself,”
not for the individuals in need. Socialism appears again as an abstract idea;
loyalty to its idea excludes the fostering of illusions. Its new abstractness does
not signify falsification. The proletariat which was to validate the equation of socialism and humanism pertained to a past stage in the development of industrial society. Socialist theory, no matter how true, can neither prescribe nor predict the future agents of a historical transformation which is more than ever before the specter that haunts the established societies. But socialist theory can show that this specter is the image of a vital need; it can develop and protect the consciousness of this need and thus lay the groundwork for the dissolution of the false unity in defense of the status quo.

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF MARXISM

I feel that I have to begin by objecting to the title given to my paper. A most important thing was omitted—the question mark. For me, this question mark is the most condensed symbol of the dialectic in Marxian theory, specifically it is symbolic of the fact that it is obsolete precisely to the degree to which this obsolescence validates the basic concepts of the theory in somewhat plainer English: the factors which have led to the passing and obsolescence of some decisive concepts of Marx are anticipated in Marxian theory itself as alternatives and tendencies of the capitalist system. Therefore a re-examination and even reformulation of Marxian theory cannot simply mean adjusting this theory to new facts but must proceed as an internal development and critique of Marxian concepts. In my presentation I do not make the distinction that some of my colleagues make between Marx and Engels themselves and later Marxian theory. Rather I consider for example Rosa Luxemburg's, Hilferding's and Lenin's theory of imperialism as genuine developments of the original Marxian theory. A third and last caveat: since was introduced as a philosopher I should like to apologize for taking up very concrete and immediate political problems and conditions.

*Editors' note:
"The Obsolescence of Marxism" was published in Marx and the Western World, ed. Nikolaus Lobkowicz (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) pp. 17-40. The text is based on a lecture presented at International Symposium on Marxism at the University of Notre Dame in April 1966. Marcuse opens by objecting to the omission of the question mark in the title and argues that the obsolescence of some Marxian ideas, such as communism as a form of liberation and higher stage of human society, validates the truth of basic propositions of the Marxian theory, which asserts that all theories are historical and should be dialectically developed in accordance with historical changes. In fact, the article aggressively argues for the relevance of the Marxian analysis of the capitalist system and critique of capitalism, although it argues that passages in Marx's Grundrisse on automation raise questions whether it is necessary in an advanced industrial society to move through class struggle to the advance toward socialism and whether the working class is the key factor in the transition. Again, Marcuse's defense of some classical tenets of Marxism are evident in the article, as are his provocations to orthodoxy.
The title of my paper is not supposed to suggest that Marx's analysis of the capitalist system is outdated; on the contrary I think that the most fundamental notions of this analysis have been validated, and they can be summarized in the following propositions.

In capitalism the social relationships among men are governed by the exchange value rather than use value of the goods and services they produce, that is to say their position is governed by their marketability. In this exchange society, the satisfaction of human needs occurs only as a by-product of profitable production.

In the progress of capitalism, a twofold contradiction develops: between a) the growing productivity of labor and the ever growing social wealth on the one side, and their repressive and destructive use on the other; and b) between the social character of the means of production (no longer individual but collective instruments of labor) and their private ownership and control.

Capitalism can solve this contradiction only temporarily through increasing waste, luxury and destruction of productive forces. The competitive drive for armament production profit leads to a vast concentration of economic power, aggressive expansion abroad, conflicts with other imperialist powers and finally to a recurrent cycle of war and depression.

This cycle can be broken only if the laboring classes, who bear the brunt of exploitation, seize the productive apparatus and bring it under the collective control of the producers themselves.

I submit that all these propositions with the exception of the last one seem to be corroborated by the factual development. The last proposition refers to the advanced industrial countries where the transition to socialism was to take place, and precisely in these countries, the laboring classes are in no sense a revolutionary potential. This falsification of one of the basic Marxian concepts calls for an analysis of the international situation in which advanced industrial societies develop.

The Marxian concept of the transition from capitalism to socialism can be meaningfully discussed only within the international, global framework in which the system of advanced capitalism actually operates. Within this framework, the following conditions can be ascertained. The continually rising standard of living in the developed industrial countries is due not only to "surface" phenomena but to the overflowing productivity of labor and to the new means of profitable waste open to the advanced industrial system.

Another factor which promotes the unification and integration of the society is a highly effective scientific management of needs, demand and satisfaction. This scientific management, which operates most forcefully in the publicity and entertainment industry, has long since ceased to be merely a part of the superstructure; it has become part of the basic productive process
and of the necessary costs of production. Vast quantities of goods would not be purchased were it not for the systematic, scientific management of need and scientific stimulation of demand.

These factors have made possible the continued growth of capitalism and the vital need for revolution no longer prevails among those classes such as the “immediate producers” would be capable of stopping the capital production. Marx’s conception of revolution was based on the existence of a class which is not only impoverished and dehumanized but which is also free from any vested interest in the capitalistic system and therefore represents a new historical force with qualitatively different needs and aspirations. In Hegelian terminology, this class is the “definite negation” of the capitalist system and the established needs and satisfaction. The emergence of such an internal negative force whose existence and action would demonstrate the historical necessity of the transition from capitalism to socialism is blocked in advanced industrial countries—not by violent suppression or by terroristic modes of government but by a rather comfortable and scientific coordination and administration. The internal historical link between capitalism and socialism thus seems to be severe not only ideologically but also practically as a result of changes in the very basis of the system.

I would like to mention briefly two attempts to save this endangered Marxian conception of the transition to socialism. There is first the theory of the labor aristocracy, which maintains that the integration of labor into the capitalist system actually affects only some privileged groups of workers, those in the trade union bureaucracy and those who control the party machines whereas the rank and file are not subject to this integration. I consider this theory outdated; the integration is by no means confined to the small minority of a labor bureaucracy but extends to the rank and file. The underprivileged groups that bear the brunt of exploitation remain outside organized labor. Secondly, there is the theory of the “temporary stabilization” of capitalism and of “relative impoverishment.” In regard to the notion of a temporary stabilization, one can only remark that, as far as is known, everything in history is temporary; moreover from a semantic point of view the concept does not make much sense—for how long is “temporary”? “Relative impoverishment” is a meaningful concept both logically and sociologically but is insignificant in the context of the revolutionary preconditions for the transition to socialism. If one can still speak of impoverishment when the laborer has not only one automobile but two automobiles, not only one television set but three television sets, this may still be impoverishment, but I do not think anybody can maintain that this kind of impoverishment activates the vital need for radical thought and action.

Has Marxian theory been invalidated by this breakdown of the classical conception of the transition from capitalism to socialism? In answering this question I shall begin by referring to a passage in the Grundrisse der Kritik
As large scale industry advances, the creation of real wealth depends less on the labor time and the quantity of labor expended than on the power of the instruments set in motion during the labor time. These instruments, and their powerful effectiveness, are in no proportion to the immediate labor time which the production requires; rather their effectiveness depends on the attained level of science and technological progress or the application of science to production. ... Human labor then no longer appears as enclosed in the process of production; rather man relates himself to this process merely as supervisor and regulator. He stands outside of the process of production instead of being its principal agent. ... In this transformation the great pillar of production and wealth is no longer the immediate labor performed by man himself, nor his labor time, but the appropriation of his own universal productivity (creative power), that is, knowledge and his mastery of nature through his social existence, in one world: the development of the social (all-round) individual.

The theft of another man's labor time on which the social wealth still rests today then appears as a miserable basis compared with the new basis which large scale industry itself has created. As soon as human labor, in its immediate form, has ceased to be the great source of wealth, labor time will cease, and must of necessity cease, to be the measure of wealth; and exchange value must of necessity cease to be the measure of use value. The surplus labor of the mass [of the population] has then ceased to be the condition for the development of social wealth, and the leisure of the few has ceased to be the condition for the development of the universal intellectual faculties of men. The mode of production which rests on exchange value then collapses.\(^\text{15}\)

Nothing is said here about class struggle or impoverishment; the analysis of the collapse of capitalism is focused entirely on the internal "technical" dynamic of the system, in a word, on the basic tendency of advanced capitalism toward automation. In the images and notions of this passage (man no longer enclosed in the process of production, standing outside, relating himself to the process of production), Man has expressed his most progressive and most radical vision of socialism.

What are the implications of this passage? The technical development of the productive forces within the capitalist system attains a level at which the use of physical human labor as instrument of production becomes all but unnecessary. However techniques by themselves accomplish nothing; the

---

Marxian intervention

transformation of the capitalist into the socialist operators of production would still require a revolution. But the level of capitalist development the eve of the revolution would be such that it would call for a different reality of socialism. In other words, it appears that Marx’s own idea of socialism was not radical enough and not utopian enough. He under the level which the productivity of labor under the capitalist system could attain and the possibilities suggested by the attainment of this level. The technical achievements of capitalism would make possible a social development which would surpass the Marxian distinction between social necessary labor and creative work, between alienated labor and nonalienated work, between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. In Marx’s time, this vision was indeed premature and unrealistic, and therefore basic concept for the transition to socialism remained that of development and rationalization of productive forces; their liberation from repressive and destructive controls was to be the first task of socialism. In spite of all qualitative differences this concept of a “development of productive forces” establishes a technological continuity between capitalism and socialism. By virtue of this continuity, the transition from capitalism to socialism would at first be a quantitative change, greater productivity. Then the passage from quantity to quality, the determinate negation, was to be the redirecting of the productive apparatus toward the all-round development and satisfaction of human needs and faculties.

It seems to me that this conception corresponds to a stage in the development of the productive forces that is already being surpassed by the advanced industrial societies. In these societies what is gradually reducible is: a) physical labor power as producing commodities; b) machines as instruments of individual or group labor; c) scarcity due to a low degree of productivity and to the drive for maximization of profit; and d) the need to abolishing exploitation of organized labor.

These are the possibilities of the advanced industrial society and especially of the “affluent society” (I shall use the term in an ironical sense). The affluent society indicates the passing of the stage of the development of the productive forces that Marx considered as the inner limit of capitalism. It has surpassed these conditions in spite of the poverty prevailing in this society. For the Marxian concept implies the identity of the impoverished classes with the basic immediate producers, that is, with industrial labor. Such is hardly the case in the affluent society, for this society has surpassed the conditions of classical capitalism in spite of the destructive and wasteful use of the productive forces which, according to Marx, was one of the unmanageable contradictions leading to the final crisis of capitalism. Moreover, the affluent society seems to have mastered this contradiction because the destructive and wasteful use of the productive forces proves to be profitable and promotes prosperity. Has the affluent society indeed succeeded in the containment of radical social change? Or, has it succeeded in containing the revolutionary potential?
This question calls for a re-examination of the transition theory in view of the prevailing historical factors. I would like to offer some suggestions for a re-evaluation by distinguishing between the advanced industrial countries, the less advanced industrial countries and the backward countries by indicating very briefly the situation in these three categories with respect to the socialist potential. To phrase it differently: can we today, in these three types of societies the forces (political, economic and cultural) which, in terms of the Marxian conception, may be explosive by operating in the direction envisaged by Marxian theory?

I should like to start with the relation between the less advanced and the advanced industrial countries. The question here is: can we say that the advanced society, that is, contemporary American society, will provide the model for the development in the still more backward capitalist societies such as France and Italy and even Germany? Those arguing against this assumption usually emphasize the existence of a still powerful political movement in France and Italy and its new strategy, “autogestion,” that combines Marxist and traditional syndicalist elements. This movement aims at gaining, within the capitalist system, extended influence and power for labor in the management of the key industrial and other establishments and is supposed to lead to gradual control by the workers themselves.

In my view this new strategy can be effective only after the revolution, not before it. Prior to the revolution, and carried out within the framework of a still healthy capitalist system, this strategy would in all likelihood promote the creation of vested interests on the part of labor in the capitalist system itself. The argument for the assumption that the American society will provide the model for the more backward capitalist societies finds support in the Marxian notion that the most advanced and most productive modes of labor will sooner or later have a “model effect” on less advanced countries.

Let me now comment, equally briefly, on the situation in the backward countries. I think that in the militant underdeveloped countries today at least one series of objective prerequisites for socialism prevails.

(1) The majority of the “immediate producers” live in conditions of misery and intolerable exploitation, and the abolition of these conditions would involve the abolition of the established social system.

(2) The small ruling classes are evidently incapable of developing under their own direction the productive forces; indigenous exploitation is thus protected and perpetuated by foreign powers, and the social revolution would coincide with national liberation.

(3) An advanced militant leadership is active in the work of organizing the underlying population and developing its consciousness. To be sure, the ruled classes are not an industrial but an agrarian proletariat; however as such they are the “immediate producers” who, by virtue of their function in the productive process, constitute the social basis of the established
system, and it is on these grounds that, according to Marxian theory, the proletariat becomes the historical agent of revolution.

Moreover in these countries there is the possibility of skipping the stage of repressive capitalist industrialization, an industrialization that has led to an increasingly more powerful domination of the productive and distributive apparatus over the underlying population. Instead the backward countries may have the chance for a technological development which keeps the industrial apparatus in line with the vital needs and freely develops the faculties of human beings. However this historical chance of skipping preceding stages of repressive development seems to be overshadowed by the fact that these countries depend, for the capital requirements of primary accumulation, on the advanced industrial societies and their imperial interests.

Thirdly, and lastly, there is the situation in the affluent society itself: I repeat that in my view the affluent society corroborates rather than refutes the internal contradictions which Marx attributed to capitalist development. It is true that these contradictions (which I have outlined in the beginning) are suspended and “managed,” but they are not solved by the welfare or welfare state. For this state is faced with the increasing difficulty of absorbing the rising economic surplus, which is itself a result of the rising productivity of labor. Temporarily this difficulty is overcome by the intensified productivity of labor, by the reproduction of a huge military establishment, by planned obsolescence and by scientific stimulation of needs and of demand. But these integrating and cohesive tendencies are counteracted by the progress of automation which tends toward technological unemployment, a trend which can be arrested only by producing more and more unnecessary goods and parasitarian services.

Within the system of repressive affluence, a conspicuous radicalization of the youth and of the intelligentsia takes place. This is far more than a mere ideological phenomenon; it is a movement which, in spite of all its limitations, tends toward a fundamental transvaluation of values. It is a part of the human or social forces which, on a global scale, resist the oppressive power of the affluent society.

I submit, in concluding, a summary identification of these forces within the international and global framework. For only within this framework can we discuss the question, whether the advanced capitalist system is facing a “final crisis” as Marxian theory maintains. What happens in Asia or Africa is not external to the system but has become an integral part of the system itself. Taking this into consideration, one may sketch the following syndrome of a revolutionary potential: first, the national liberation movements in the backward countries; secondly, the “new strategy” labor movement in Europe; thirdly, the underprivileged strata of the population in the affluent society itself; and fourthly, the oppositional intelligentsia. To these four categories may be added one which I shall not discuss here, namely, the
established Communist societies as powers which may sooner or later clash with the capitalist societies. Are these established Communist societies active opponents, are they neutral observers or are they physicians at the bed of capitalism (that is to say does the very existence of Communism stimulate the growth and cohesion of capitalism)?

Among the four tendencies which I have called the syndrome of a revolutionary potential, the major catalyst seems to be the first: the national liberation movements. In fighting against the wars of liberation, the affluent society fights for its future, for its potential of raw materials, cheap labor and investment. To be sure, the classical concept of imperialism is outdated; there are certainly no basic United States economic interests that would explain the war in Viet Nam. However Viet Nam has to be seen in the global context: a triumph of the national liberation movement there may well be a signal for the activation of such movements in other areas of the world—areas far closer to home where basic economic interests are indeed involved. Compared with this threat, the radicalization of the intelligentsia, especially among the youth, seems to be a very minor event. However I suggest a broader aspect. The historical dialectic here affects dialectical materialism itself. To the degree to which critical consciousness has been absorbed and coordinated by the affluent society, the liberation of consciousness from the manipulation and indoctrinations imposed upon it by capitalism becomes a primary task and prerequisite. The development not of class consciousness but of consciousness as such, freed from the distortions imposed upon it, appears to be the basic prerequisite for radical change. And as repression is flattened out and extended to the entire underlying population, the intellectual task, the task of education and discussion, the task of tearing, not only the technological veil but also the other veils behind which domination and repression operate,—all these "ideological" factors become very material factors of radical transformation.

* * *
REVOLUTIONARY SUBJECT AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

I would like to offer some tentative answers to two questions raised with reference to my paper which I did not have time to answer.

I would like to point out that these questions were raised by students and I would be very happy if students would speak in the discussion. In the United States (and that is one of the advantages there), after such a lecture, the students talk, and not my colleagues. I love my colleagues very much, but I would also very much like to hear what the students have to say, and what the students have to ask.

The first question referred to the “revolutionary subject.” How can we today, when the situation is obviously different from the time when Marx and Engels wrote, how can we today identify the revolutionary subject?

I would like to offer a very tentative definition of revolutionary subject, saying: It is that class or group which, by virtue of its function and position in society, is in vital need and is capable of risking what they have and what they can get within the established system in order to replace this system—a radical change which would indeed involve destruction, abolition of the existing system. I repeat, such a class or group must have the vital need for revolution, and it must be capable of at least initiating, if not carrying through such a revolution.

If we use this notion of the revolutionary subject, we will have to say that revolution without the industrial working class is still unimaginable; I cannot think of any technically advanced country where a revolution could be carried through without the industrial working classes. On the other hand, precisely in the most advanced countries of the capitalist world, the majority of the working classes do not have the vital need for revolution; they are not willing and, quite understandably, so they are not willing to risk what they have for an entirely different social system.

Can we reconcile these two obviously conflicting realities? We have here one of the cases where apparently highly abstract and philosophical concepts of dialectical logic manifest their very concrete content. The

*Editors' note:“Revolutionary Subject and Self-Government” was published in Praxis, 5, 12 (Zagreb: 1969) pp. 32-67, and was a response to issues raised in discussion of an address “The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration,” presented at the 1968 Korcula Summer School on Marx and Revolution, Yugoslavia, June 1968; both were published in Praxis, 5, 12 (Zagreb: 1969) pp. 20-5. Here again Marcuse argues for a redefinition of the classic Marxian category of revolutionary subjectivity (the proletariat) in advanced industrialized society by suggesting that the working class in the U.S., has been largely integrated into the value system of capitalism. “Self-government” for Marcuse in this sense focuses on the development of new forms of human autonomy outside the advanced industrial societies where self-governments largely an ethic of self shaped by market society and its consumerist and militaristic needs.
Marxian tradition distinguishes between the revolutionary subject *an sich*, by itself, or in itself, and the revolutionary subject *für sich*, for itself. If we apply this distinction to the situation of the working classes in the advanced industrial countries, we can say that the working classes in these countries are *an sich* the revolutionary subject as long as they are the only class which constitutes the human base of the process of material production, and the only class which, by virtue of its function in the productive process, is capable of arresting this process, and of redirecting it.

I said that the working classes in the advanced industrial countries are *an sich*, by themselves, still the revolutionary subject *as long as* they retain the central and basic position in the process of production. I introduced this time factor ("as long as") in view of the decisive transformations of capitalism at this stage of development: the decline of blue collar in proportion to white collar workers. As an increasing number of unqualified or less qualified workers cease to be necessary elements in the productive process, the more production tends towards automation, and the weaker the role of the old industrial working classes in this process. But we are still even in the United States far from the point where this tendency would change the basic situation.

But while the industrial working classes are *an sich* still the revolutionary subject, they are not revolutionary subject *für sich*: they do not have the political and class consciousness which remains a decisive force in the revolutionary process. And they do not have this political and class consciousness because they are to a large extent integrated into the capitalist system, integrated not only by virtue of the dynamism of the working process itself, but also because they share, to a great extent, the needs and goals of the capitalist system.

I think it would be inexcusable for anyone who still takes Marxian theory not as a dogma but as a critical theory to overlook and minimize the fact that today, to a large extent the working classes in the advanced industrial countries are not only a class in the capitalist system, but also of the capitalist system. They repress or they are forced to repress their own situation, their own real needs, their own real interests; and, in this sense, they think and feel and act in terms of the system of domination and repression.

Now what are the possibilities of accentuating the objective, revolutionary potential of the industrial working classes? A revolutionary working class could counteract this integration; a revolutionary party could develop the consciousness, the awareness of the fact that the working classes in the advanced capitalist countries, in spite of their standard of living, indeed live under intolerable conditions. This discussion during this Conference has emphasized several times that there are intolerable conditions other than those of impoverishment, misery, *Verelendung*.

The so-called affluent society, the so-called society of consumption is intolerable in its aggressiveness, in its waste, in its brutality, in its hypocrisy. It is intolerable in the way in which it perpetuates obsolete forms of the
struggle for existence, in the way in which it perpetuates obsolete forms of the struggle for existence, in the way in which it perpetuates poverty and exploitation, inhuman working conditions of all kinds of speed and oppressive supervision, in the face of the possibilities of authentic automation. It is intolerable in the way in which it extends the commodity form of things and men to the entire society in all its dimensions.

These intolerable conditions exist, but they have not yet generated political consciousness and the vital need for radical change. A revolutionary party which would have the function of developing this political consciousness and political praxis does not exist. On the contrary, the major communist parties have amply demonstrated their conservative (Social-Democratic) tendencies.

Under these circumstances, the task of developing radical political consciousness and practice falls upon non-integrated groups, groups whose consciousness and needs are not yet integrated into the system of domination and who, by virtue of this fact, are capable and willing to develop a radical consciousness. They are aware of the vital need for change, not only in the institutions, not only in the production relations, but also in the revolutionary subject itself as a type of man, in his values, and aspirations.

I believe that the student intelligentsia today is such a group, not by itself a revolutionary force, but as I said before, a détonateur, a catalyst, a minority. And it is no larger a "freischwebende Intelligenz" or some other marginal group in the bourgeois world.

This student intelligentsia is potentially a revolutionary group because from this group, capitalism will recruit its future cadres in the productive process, its technicians, scientists, engineers, mathematicians, even sociologists and psychologists, and perhaps even philosophers! This group will thus assume an increasingly basic function in the productive process itself.

I would like to refer to the paper that was submitted to this conference by Ernst Fischer, and which unfortunately could not be delivered. In this paper, Ernst Fischer points out that, in the revolt of the student intelligentsia, one of the greatest productive forces, and one of the most tabooed and repressed social forces is in open rebellion against the society: the instinctual, I would even say the biological and physiological revulsion against the conditions and values of the capitalist system.

Now the question of autogestion. The example at the end of my presentation already indicated where my criticism would start. I believe that self-government is a stage, is a step in the very revolutionary process only if and when the new form of control is exercised by men and women who are willing and capable of re-directing the capitalist process of production towards an essentially different way of life.

It was said here before that self-government is a way of life. I agreed and asked what kind of way of life? The way of life in which people no longer satisfy the repressive, aggressive needs and aspirations of class society, and in which they no longer produce the same stuff for the same goals. In other
Interventions

Words, self-government in the enterprises, in the factories, in the shops, can become a liberating mode of control only if a liberating change in the controlling group themselves has occurred. Otherwise the change would not break the continuum of commodity form and commodity production to another level of administration and of relationships.

In one word, self-government, to be more than a mere change in the form of administration, must develop within a political working class which has already overcome the fetters of class society. We cannot hope for the miracle that such a change would come in the process of self-government after its establishment. Once the process of self-government has started without a change in the subjective conditions, we may get the same only bigger and better. That may be already great progress, one should not minimize it, but it is certainly not the beginning of a socialist society as a qualitatively different form of life.

**RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION**

The concept of revolution in Marxian theory telescopes an entire historical period: the final stage of capitalism; the transitional period of proletarian dictatorship; and the initial stage of socialism. It is in a strict sense a historical concept, projecting actual tendencies in the society; and it is a dialectical concept, projecting the counter-tendencies within the respective historical period, in as much as they are inherent in this period. These tendencies and counter-tendencies are manifestations of which Marxian theory and practice themselves are essential elements. Marxian theory itself is a power in the historical struggle, and to the degree to which its concepts, 'translated' into practice, become forces of resistance, change and reconstruction, they are subject to the vicissitudes of the struggle, which they reflect and comprehend, but do not dominate. 'Re-examination' is therefore an element of the concept of revolution, part of its internal development.

**Editors' note:**

'Re-examination of the Concept of Revolution' was published in *New Left Review*, 56 (London: July-August 1969) pp. 27-34. The article provides a systematic analysis of the Marxian theory of revolution in the light of the integration of the proletarian and advanced industrial societies. The article appears to have been written before the revolutionary explosions of 1968 and is one of the last moments of revolutionary pessimism found in Marcuse's work, a mood that would shift to revolutionary optimism in *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969) and other post-1968 writings.
This paper can raise only some of the problems involved in such an examination. I shall start with a brief recapitulation of the Marxian concept of the revolution:

1. a socialist revolution, overthrowing the capitalist system, introducing collective ownership of the means of production and control by the ‘immediate producers’;
2. initiated in the advanced industrial societies (because of the magnitude of the internal contradictions at this stage of capitalism, and because the possible realization of the socialist principle ‘to each according to needs’); the shortening of the first phase is essential, otherwise repression would be perpetuated;
3. to occur in an economic crisis, which weakens the established state apparatus;
4. to be carried out by large-scale (organized) mass action of the working class, leading to the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitory stage.

The concept contains the following democratic presuppositions:

a. the revolution is a majority affair; and
b. democracy offers the most favourable conditions for organization and education to class consciousness.

This presupposition underlines the importance of the ‘subjective factors’ awareness of the facts of exploitation, and of the ways to undo their experience of intolerable conditions and of the vital need for change are preconditions of the revolution.

But the Marxian concept of revolution also implies continuity in change, development of the productive forces contained by capitalism, taking over of the technology and of the technical apparatus by the new producers.

What is at stake in the re-examination is not only the identification and enumeration of those presuppositions invalidated by the actual development, but also the concept of the revolution as a whole, because all its elements are interrelated. This involves a re-examination of the Marxian concept of the structural relation between capitalism and socialism under the following aspects:

1. the problem of ‘transition’: socialism in coexistence with, or as successor (heir) to capitalism;
2. the ‘redefinition’ of socialism, in accordance with the new historical stage of the global development: namely, what is the qualitative difference of socialism as definite negation of capitalism?

---

16 The paper was written before the May-June 1968 events in France. Marcus has added only a few lines to indicate their historical significance.
The scope of this re-examination is defined by Marxian theory itself, i.e., by the inherent necessity to unfold the dialectical intent of its concepts in the analysis of the social reality. To the degree to which corporate capitalism is different from the previous stages of capitalism, which guided the Marxian concept, and to the degree to which the development of capitalism has reflected that of socialism, and vice versa, the concept of revolution will be a ‘new’ concept.

But, inasmuch as the stage reached by capitalism and socialism is the result of the economic and political forces which determined the preceding stages, the new concept will be the internal development of the old one.

The following sections merely propose some guidelines for the elaboration of the new concept.

**Global context**

Perhaps the most general aspect of the re-examination is the change in the theoretical framework, reflecting the change in, and the extension of the social basis for the potential revolution, or for the possible containment and defeat of the revolution.

This theoretical framework—and that of the subversive activity—has become a global one: no concept, no action, no strategy which does not have to be projected and evaluated, as element and chance and choice in the international constellation. Just as Vietnam is an integral part of the system of corporate capitalism, so are the national liberation movements an integral part of the potential socialist revolution. And the liberation movements in the Third World depend, for their subversive power, on the internal weakening of the capitalist metropoles.

It may be objected that Marxian theory has always been ‘international’, also on the organizational level. True, but this ‘internationalism’ was orientated on the industrial working classes as a counterforce within industrial capitalism; today, they are not a subversive force. Marxian theory paid attention to the peoples in the colonial and backward areas, but they appeared mainly as adjunct, ally, ‘réservoir’ (Lenin’s term) for the primary historical agent of revolution. The Third World obtained full theoretical and strategic recognition only in the wake of the Second World War, but then the pendulum swung to the other extreme. Today there is a strong tendency to regard the national liberation movements as the principal, if not as the sole revolutionary force, or a (seemingly opposite) tendency to impose upon these movements the theoretical and organizational pattern elaborated for and applied to the strategy in metropolitan areas (i.e., city-based leadership; centralized party control; alliances with groups of the national bourgeois; coalitions).

In reality, the global situation militates against a mechanistic division into the Third World and the others. Rather we are confronted with a **tripartite**
division of historical forces which cut across the division into the First, Second, and Third World. The contest between capitalism and socialism divides the Third World too and, as a new historical force, there appears what may be called (and what is thus called by the New Left) an alternative to the capitalist as well as to the established socialist societies, namely, the struggle for a different way of socialist construction, a construction 'from below', but from a 'new below' not integrated into the value system of the old societies—a socialism of co-operation and solidarity, where men and women determine collectively their needs and goals, their priorities, and the method and pace of 'modernization'.

Opposition in the Metropoles

And this potential alternative (the chance of avoiding the indefinitely extended 'first phase', the chance of breaking the continuum of repression and domination) has sparked and intensified the radical opposition in the advanced industrial countries (East and West), and especially in the centre of the capitalist empire. This opposition may well be the catalyst of change. The Marxian concept is geared to the development in the advanced capitalist countries, and, in spite of the apparent evidence to the contrary, the fate of the revolution (as global revolution) may well be decided in the metropoles. Only if the strongest link in the chain becomes the weakest link can the liberation movements gain the momentum of a global revolutionary force.

The character of the opposition in the centre of corporate capitalism is concentrated in the two opposite poles of the society: in the ghetto population (itself not homogeneous), and in the middle-class intelligentsia, especially among the students.

Common to these different and even conflicting groups is the total character of the refusal and rebellion:

(1) insistence on a break with the continuity of domination and exploitation—no matter in what name; insistence not only on new institutions, but on self-determination;
(2) distrust of all ideologies, including socialism made into an ideology;
(3) rejection of the pseudo-democratic process sustaining the dominion of corporate capitalism.

This 'unorthodox' character of the opposition is itself expressive of the structure of corporate capitalism (the 'integration' of the majority of the underlying population). Neither of the two oppositional groups constitutes the 'human basis' of the social process of production—for Marx a decisive condition for the historical agent of the revolution.

They do not make up the majority of the population.
They are faced with hostility (and resentment) among organized labour, still the human basis of capitalist production and the source of surplus value, and therefore still the potential agent of a possible revolution) and they are not effectively organized, neither on the national nor on the international level.

**Working Class and Revolution**

By itself, this opposition cannot be regarded as agent of radical change; it can become such an agent only if it is sustained by a working class which is no longer the prisoner of its own integration and of a bureaucratic trade-union and party apparatus supporting this integration. If this alliance between the new opposition and the working classes does not materialize, the latter may well become, in part at least, the mass basis of a neo-fascist regime.

Conclusion: the Marxian concept of a revolution carried by the majority of the exploited masses, culminating in the ‘seizure of power’ and in the setting up of a proletarian dictatorship which initiates socialization, is overtaken by the historical development: it pertains to a stage of capitalist productivity and organization which has been overtaken; it does not project the higher stage of capitalist productivity, including the productivity of destruction, and the terrifying concentration of the instruments of annihilation and of indoctrination in the hands of the powers that be.

However, this ‘invalidation’ of the Marxian concept is an authentic and accurate *Aufhebung*; the truth of the concept is preserved and reaffirmed on the level actually attained by the historical development. The revolutionary proletariat becomes an agent of change where it still is the human basis of the social process of production, namely, in the predominantly agrarian areas of the Third World, where it provides the popular support for the national liberation fronts.

And these areas, and these forces are not external to the capitalist system. They are an essential part of its global space of exploitation, they are areas and forces which this system cannot allow to go and shift into that other orbit (of socialism or communism), because it can survive only if its expansion is not blocked by any superior power. The National Liberation movements are expressive of the *internal contradictions* of the global capitalist system.

But precisely because of this relation between the revolutions abroad and the metropoles, the fateful link persists between the prospects of the Liberation movements and the prospects of radical change in the metropoles. The ‘negating’ forces abroad must be ‘synchronized’ with those at home, and this synchronization can never be the result of organization alone, it must have its *objective basis* in the economic and political process of corporate capitalism. The objective factors announce themselves in the strains and stresses of the corporate economy:
(1) the necessity of competition, and the threat of progressive automation with the ensuing unemployment, demand ever enlarged absorption of labour by non-productive, parasitaria jobs and services;

(2) the cost of neo-colonial wars, or controls over corrupt dictatorship increase more and more;

(3) as a result of the increasing reduction of human labour power in the process of production, the margin of profit declines;

(4) society requires the creation of needs the satisfaction of which tend to conflict with the morale and discipline necessary for work under capitalism; the realm of necessity is invaded by the non-necessary, gadget and luxury devices exist side by side with continuing poverty and misery; ‘luxuries’ become necessities in the competitive struggle for existence.

If these tendencies continue to operate, the ever more blatant contradiction between the vast social wealth and its wasteful and destructive use, between the potential of freedom and the actuality of repression, between the possible abolition of alienated labour and the capitalist need to sustain it, may well lead to a gradual dysfunction of the society, a decline of the morale which normally assures the day-to-day performance and the compliance with the required pattern of behaviour, at work and at leisure. This may awaken the consciousness of the use of technical progress as instrument of domination.

The events of May and June in France have shown to what extent the tensions in the established society can loosen the grip of capitalist and trade union integration, and promote the alliance between working class groups and the militant intelligentsia.

The concept of revolution must take into account this eventuality of the diffuse, apparently ‘spontaneous’, disintegration of the system, the general loosening of its cohesion—an expression of the objective obsolescence of alienated labour, of the pressure for the liberation of man from his function as agent (and servant) of the process of production; the revolution may be seen as a crisis of the system in ‘affluence’ and superfluity.

The Agents of Change

In such a crisis, the historical agents of change would emerge—and they would not be identical with any of the traditional classes. But the ‘qualification’ of these agents can be gauged if we recall the perhaps most decisive element in the Marxian concept, namely, that the historical subject of revolution must be the ‘definite negation’ also in the sense that this subject is a social class free from, that is, not contaminated by the exploitative needs and interests of man under capitalism, that it is the subject of essentially different, ‘humanistic’ needs and values.

This is the notion of the rupture with the continuum of domination, the qualitative difference of socialism as a new form and way of life, not only
rational development of the productive forces, but also the redirection of progress toward the ending of the competitive struggle for existence, not only abolition of poverty and toil, but also reconstruction of the social and natural environment as a peaceful, beautiful universe: total transvaluation of values, transformation of needs and goals. This implies still another change in the concept of revolution, a break with the continuity of the technical apparatus of productivity which, for Marx, would extend (freed from capitalist abuse) to the socialist society. Such ‘technological’ continuity would constitute a fatal link between capitalism and socialism, because this technical apparatus has, in its very structure and scope, become an apparatus of control and domination. Cutting this link would mean, not to regress in the technical progress, but to reconstruct the technical apparatus in accordance with the needs of free men, guided by their own consciousness and sensibility, by their autonomy. This autonomy would call for a decentralized apparatus of rational control on a reduced basis—reduced because no longer inflated by the requirements of exploitation, aggressive expansion, and competition, held together by solidarity in co-operation.

Now is this apparently ‘utopian’ notion applicable to existing social and political forces, which could thus be regarded as agents of qualitative change? The Marxian concept of revolution is neither a utopian nor a romantic concept, it insists on the real basis of power, on the objective and subjective factors which can alone elevate the idea of qualitative change above the level of wishful thinking, and this basis is still in the advanced industrial countries.

In the capitalist countries, the force of the alternative appears today only in the ‘marginal’ groups mentioned above: the opposition among the intelligentsia, especially the students, and among the politically articulate and active groups among the working classes.

Both reject not only the system as a whole and any transformation of the system ‘within the existing structures’; they also profess their adherence to a new and qualitatively different system of values and aspirations.

The weakness of these groups is expressive of the new historical constellation which defines the concept of the revolution:

1) against the majority of the integrated population, including that of the ‘immediate producers’;
2) against a well-functioning, prosperous society, which is neither in a revolutionary nor a pre-revolutionary situation.

In accord with this situation, the role of this opposition is a strictly preparatory one: their task is radical enlightenment, in theory and by practice, and the development of cadres and nuclei for the struggle against the global structure of capitalism.

For it is precisely in its global structure where the internal contradictions assert themselves: in the sustained resistance against neo-colonial domination; the emergence of new powerful efforts to construct a qualitatively different
society in Cuba, in China's cultural revolution; and, last but not least, in the more or less 'peaceful' coexistence with the Soviet Union. Here too, the dynamic of two antagonistic tendencies:

(1) the common interest of the 'have-nations' in the face of international upheavals in the precarious balance of power;
(2) the conflicting interests of different social systems, both securing and defending their respective political and strategic orbits.

Conclusion

The Marxian concept of revolution must comprehend the changes in the scope and social structure of advanced capitalism, and the new forms of the contradictions characteristic of the latest stage of capitalism in its global framework. The modifications of the Marxian concept then appear, not as extraneous additions or adjustments, but rather as the elaboration of Marxian theory itself.

One aspect, however, seems to be incompatible with this interpretation. There is in Marx a strain that may be called a rationalistic, even positivist prejudice, namely, his belief in the inexorable necessity of the transition to a 'higher stage of human development', and in the final success of this transition. Although Marx was much aware of the possibility of failure, defeat, or betrayal, the alternative 'socialism or barbarism' was not an integral part of his concept of revolution. It must become such a part: the subordination of man to the instruments of his labour, to the total overwhelming apparatus of production and destruction, has reached the point of an all but uncontrollable power: objectified, *verdinglicht* behind the technological veil, and behind the mobilized national interest, this power seems to be self-propelling, and to carry the indoctrinated and indoctrinating people along. It may strike the fatal blow before the counter-forces are strong enough to prevent it: an explosion of the internal contradiction which would make a re-examination of the concept of revolution a merely abstract and speculative undertaking. The awareness of this possibility should strengthen and solidify the opposition in all its manifestations; it is the only hope.

* * *
RAT MARCUSE

Editors’ note:
="Rat Marcuse’ provides an example of the hate mail Marcuse regularly received, rotest to the crude, ignorant, and anti-semitic tenor of his rightwing enemies. We reproduce the letter with its original handwriting to demonstrate the crudeness and violence of the attack on Marcuse, and other figures of the New Left mentioned in the letter. Another letter from the period apparently written on October 4, 1970 opened: “You lousy Kike, this is the only country where you could find refuge and you are trying to destroy it from within.” Revealing the anti-semitic and fascist nature of some of Marcuse’s rightwing enemies, the letter continued: “Hitler was right—it’s too bad he didn’t get you as a tidy morsel for his ovens. You lousy Christ Killer.” Yet late letters such as this one do not only represent a fringe or lunatic element of the extreme right in the U.S.; rather, we suggest, such texts should be read within the larger context of counterrevolution in the U.S. during this period that is connected to an ongoing culture of violence and bodily threat to anyone or group that represents threat to the ruling elite or dominant conservative ideology.
LETTER FROM INGE MARCUSE TO  
CHANCELLOR WILLIAM J. MCGILL WITH  
COMMENTS BY HERBERT MARCUSE  

Inge S. Marcuse  
8834 Cliffridge Avenue  
La Jolla, California 92038  

September 24, 1968  

Chancellor William J. McGill  
University of California San Diego  
La Jolla, California 92038  

Dear Chancellor McGill,  

I am appealing to you for help in the following matters.  

In order to safeguard our privacy, enable my husband to work in peace and quiet, and protect as best one can his physical safety, we have been trying to reduce publicity concerning my husband to a minimum. During the vacation, this was relatively easy, since all enquiries were directly addressed to him, and therefore I could myself handle the relations with the media. I became quite an expert in saying no in various polite and not so polite ways.  

Now that he is back at the University, the situation is different, since enquiries are generally addressed to the Public Relations Office and their viewpoint varies considerably from mine. They believe in exposing to explain my husband’s point of view. We do not. If people want to know what he has to say, they have to read his books. Moreover, the activities of the media take up time that should be devoted to students and his own work. 

*Editors’ note:  
“A letter from Inge Marcuse to Chancellor William J. McGill with comments by Herbert Marcuse” was dated September 24, 1968, and reveals the desires of the Marcuse family to protect their privacy, during an era in which threats to Marcuse’s life were common, as the previous entry “Rat Marcuse” demonstrates. During 1968, threats escalated as California Governor Ronald Reagan and a well-organized rightwing launched attacks on Marcuse and called for his resignation from the University of California at San Diego. This campaign and resultant media frenzy generated frequent hate mail sent to Marcuse, threats on the telephone, and other hostile actions against Marcuse that led his wife Inge to seek protection from the attacks on Marcuse by writing University of California-San Diego Chancellor William J. McGill. The campaign against Marcuse was supported by some in the conservative media in the area as well as the John Birch society and other rightwing organizations that demanded Marcuse be fired. Marcuse’s students organized to protect his home and accompanied him on trips to the University and for public events.
Should it be possible, therefore, to instruct the PR office, which I understand is directly under your authority, not to give out information about my husband but instead to direct reporters and representatives of the media to address themselves in writing directly to my husband? In this way, we can ourselves handle such enquiries as we see fit.

There is one other problem I should like to mention to you in this connection. I was told by Mrs. Heise(?) some time ago that the PR office had a file on my husband that was made available to reporters. I should be grateful if this practice was not continued. Of course, you may very well wish in specific cases to make this file available to certain persons, but I would appreciate it if it was not done without your explicit authorization.

Respectfully yours,

Inge S. Marcuse

* * *

Herbert Marcuse

September 24, 1968

Chancellor William J. McGill
University of California San Diego
La Jolla, California 92038

Dear Chancellor McGill,

My wife has asked me to transmit the enclosed to you. I understand her concern for my safety and our privacy and should be grateful if you would respond favorably to her request.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Marcuse

* * *
BOOK REVIEW
"AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION"
BY HERBERT MARCUSE
INTERNAL SECURITY - NEW LEFT MATTER

This memorandum presents a review of captioned book, which is being retained in the Communist Infiltrated and New Left Groups Unit, Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division.

SYNOPSIS: Marcuse, a processor in the Philosophy Department of the University of California at San Diego, has been described as the philosopher of the New Left. Captioned book reiterates Marcuse’s oft repeated advocacy of the need for a revolution in the United States. Recognizing that the workers in America have done so well under the free enterprise system that they want no part of any Marxian revolution, Marcuse turns to the native minorities, “mainly among the young, middle-class intellectual and the ghetto population,” to carry the revolution, guided, of course, by the intellectuals. The goal of Marcuse’s revolution is the creation of a “society in which the abolition of poverty and [work] terminates in a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm and the beautiful become forms of existence.” He advocates eliminating poverty and work but offers no formula for achieving this goal except to say this will involve the elimination of private property and the institution of economic central planning. He states that a precondition of his revolution is the unraveling of the moral fiber and undermining faith in accepted values. [Marcuse] is a powerful force in the New Left movement today. It is [doubtful] that the majority of the young radicals really understand his philosophy, but so long as he advocates over[throw] of the present system by, in their terminology, simply “doing their thing,” they remain oblivious to the fact that he is using them as tools in an attempt to gain an intellectual dictatorship. The FBI is not mentioned in the book.

* Editors’ note:
An FBI Report dated September 11, 1969 shows that not only were the FBI monitoring Marcuse, but were even reviewing his books. A Memorandum contained a “BOOK REVIEW” of Marcuse’s An Essay on Liberation under the rubric “INTERNAL SECURITY - New Left Matter.” Marcuse’s FBI file contained hundreds of pages encompassing reports on his travels, newspaper clippings on his talks and writings, interviews with neighbors and colleagues, and other texts, producing a large dossier of texts culled from a Freedom of Information request from the FBI. On Marcuse and the FBI, see Stephen Gennero and Douglas Kellner, “Under Surveillance: Herbert Marcuse and the FBI,” Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Volume 26, edited by Harry F. Dahms, (Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2009) pp. 283-314.
 acción: None. For information.

Memorandum for Mr. W. C. Sullivan

BOOK REVIEW

"AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION"

BY HERBERT MARCUSE

I 00-445771

DETAILS:

The Author

Herbert Marcuse (pronounced Markoose) has been described as the foremost literary symbol and philosopher of the New Left, as well as the idol of the student rebels." He was born in 1898 in Berlin, Germany, immigrated to this country in 1934, and was naturalized in 1943. He was in the State Department from 1945 to 1950. Subsequently, he was affiliated with Harvard and Columbia Universities, and served as professor of Politics and Philosophy at [Brandeis] University, from 1954 to 1965. He is presently professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of California at San Diego. Marcuse has been influenced by the writing of philosopher George [Hegel], psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, and by Karl Marx. He admits he is Marxist but feels Marxism must be updated.

FBI not Mentioned

There are no references to the FBI in caption book.

Book Review

Captioned book, dedicated by Marcuse to "young militants," was published in 1969 and reiterates Marcuse's oft repeated advocacy of the need for a revolution in the United States.

Marcuse expresses a hatred of all liberal democracies and their economic systems based on free enterprise, which, despite their success in improving the standard of living of the [masses], have made one of Marcuse's heroes, Karl Marx, appear ridiculous. Marx predicted that the capitalist system would produce increasing misery for the workers and that this would eventually cause [it to] collapse. Marcuse finds himself in the position of being forced to reject Marx's cherished working class as the [subject] of revolutionary change because he recognizes that the workers have done so well under the free enterprise system [that] they [want no] part of any Marxian revolution. He says this would be [against...].

* * *

The text breaks off here and the rest of the FBI Report is not found in Marcuse's personal archive.
ANGELA DAVIS AND HERBERT MARCUSE

KPIX NEWSCLIPS 1969–1972

Angela Davis/Herbert Marcuse – 10/24/69
(speech at Sproul Plaza, UC Berkeley)
00:04:12:15 – start
(v.o. reporter) No PIX:
Miss Davis’ comments were much the same as those she made yesterday at Mills College, where she spoke about academic freedom and racism.
(MS Davis at microphone):
We have to talk about a complete and total change in the structures of society because that’s the only way for the concept like academic freedom going to remain relevant. We have to go to the streets.
(v.o. reporter): No PIX
The crowd was enormous, one of the largest gatherings at UC Berkeley this year. The speaker – New Left philosopher, Herbert Marcuse and his student, avowed Communist, Angela Davis. UC Regents fired Miss Davis from her job as assistant professor of philosophy at UCLA after she admitted to being a communist. A Superior Court Judge later restored her to her job. Yesterday, Angela Davis thanked the Regents for providing her with an audience of millions instead of the sixty students she would’ve taught. Judging from the thousands that gathered here today, there was much validity to that charge. Professor Marcuse, who spoke of his pride in Angela Davis, was one to be seen by the students.

* Editors’ note:
Our dossier on Angela Davis and Herbert Marcuse, collected from folders in a file in Marcuse’s private archive, contains:
1) A KPIX Newsclips transcription of Angela Davis/Herbert Marcuse at Sproul Plaza, Berkeley, October 24, 1969, and Governor Ronald Reagan attacking the student radicals. This text was found in Marcuse’s private archive under the rubric “KPIX NEWSCLIPS 1969–1972.” KPIX was the local affiliate broadcasting station of the Columbia Broadcasting Network (CBS) in San Francisco. It covered student radicalism, the Black Panthers, Angela Davis, and Herbert Marcuse as the Newsclips transcript published below reveal. The clips show Marcuse as a staunch militant and Ronald Reagan as a staunch reactionary. Indeed, after firing Davis from a teaching position at UCLA, Reagan declared in a memorandum he released on June 19, 1970: “Angela Davis, Professor of Philosophy, will no longer be a part of the UCLA staff. As the head of the Board of Regents, I, not the board, will not tolerate any Communist activities at any state institution. Communists are an endangerment to this wonderful system of government that we all share and be proud of.”
2) A text labeled “Herbert Marcuse, NBC, January 31, 1971,” contains a 4-page typewritten page with corrections. It is not clear where Marcuse presented these comments, but it appears to be one of the talks Marcuse gave at the time in the “Free Angela” campaign after Davis was imprisoned for allegedly providing the guns that were used in the attempt to free political prisoner George Jackson, one of the Soledad Brothers. For details on the case see Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 1994) and Eric Mann’s Comrade George: An Investigation into the Life, Political Thought, and Assassination of George Jackson (New York: Harper...
The Berkeley campus has perhaps the most unique tradition of political activism in the university. It has continually assumed the political responsibility of responding to acts of repression, and have been capable of involving the Americas of the students on this campus, and demonstrative political actions. If only for this reason, I feel very proud to be able to speak to you today.

The fight is just beginning to start. The fight against all those who want, who want to make your university a training school for the perpetuation of a society, the security of which and the prosperity of which is based on the oppression and the enslavement of other peoples within the national frontiers and without. The fight against these powers must go on because ...

00:08:26:00 – end

* * *

In his remarks, Marcuse provides a personal testimony for Davis, highlighting her serious study of the history of philosophy and acclaiming her as “the best or one of the very best students I had in more than 30 years of teaching in this country.” Marcuse also included on a personal note, indicating that “Angela is one of the most non-violent persons I have ever met.” A three-page typewritten text was found in Marcuse’s personal collection labeled Frankfurt, June 4, 1972.” The speech was made just after Davis’s acquittal on June 4, 1972, and situates Davis’s political activities around prisons within the struggles for black liberation in the United States and for global liberation in anti-imperialist movements throughout the world. Marcuse uses the occasion to criticize monopoly capitalism and imperialism, pointing to the continuation of his global interventions for revolutionary socialism into the 1970s. The story of Angela Davis’s hiring and firing from UCLA in the 1960s, her involvement in the prison activist movement, and accusations that she was involved in a conspiracy to liberate prisoners from Soledad is told in Bettina Aptheker, The Morning Breaks: The Trial of Angela Davis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) and the film by Shola Lynch Free Angela and All Political Prisoners (2013).
I shall not talk about the indictment of Angela Davis and her precarious chances to get a fair trial – I shall rather talk about a human being I have known for more than 6 years, and what happened to this human being in our society.

She was my student in philosophy and political theory. In lectures and seminars, we discussed the great texts which have shaped the history of Western civilization: from the Greek philosophers to Hegel and Nietzsche, from the political theorists of ancient Greece to Marx. I have said (and I repeat it because it is a fact and because it may help to explain her development in life) that she has been the best or one of the very best students I had in more than 30 years of teaching in this country.

An extraordinary student not only because of her intelligence and eagerness to learn, to know, but also because she had that sensitivity, that human warmth without which all learning and all knowledge remain “abstract”, merely “professional”, and eventually irrelevant.

Angela learned what the great philosophers were constantly talking about: human freedom, the dignity of man, equality, justice – and how human relationships and human society ought to be based on these ideas. She grasped what every good student will grasp very soon: that these great ideas are nothing unless they are more than mere “ideas”, mere “values” to be professed in the classroom, in the churches, by the politicians; that they are false and irrelevant unless they are being translated into reality – for all human beings.

And Angela had a good look at the world in which she was brought up and which was all around her: the fate of the black people to whom she belonged, the oppression, injustice, misery against which men had fought and protested for many centuries, and which were still there – in fact getting worse while this society now has all the resources necessary to abolish poverty, injustice, and misery the world over.

And this very society is repressing ever more systematically the militant protest against its abominations, in Indochina, in its prisons and mental institutions – the protest against the waste and destruction which are the dark ground beneath the high standard of living. The black and brown leaders are prosecuted; the campuses are stifled; the Berrigans are in jail; Angela is in jail.

This society produces to destroy – the air and the sea and the soil, and some of the best people this very country has produced. These horrible facts are the dark ground on which the social wealth is created, the standard of living attained, the comforts and amenities of life bought and sold.

I feel that no sophisticated explanation is needed to understand how Angela became a black militant, a revolutionary.

Precisely because she was a true “intellectual”, precisely because she was a true philosophy student—and because she was a human being, she took seriously what she read in the works.
Angela was an excellent teacher—even her critics admitted that she did not use the classroom for propaganda and indoctrination. She did not have to!

Presenting the facts, analysing the prevailing conditions was enough. She refused to treat the liberating ideas of Western civilization as mere textbook material, as stuff for examinations and degrees—for her, they were alive and had to become reality—here and now, not in some far away days, not eternal promises and expectations.

So, she could not confine herself to the classroom, to the relatively safe domain and isolation of the campus: she took the truth (her truth, our truth) outside; she protested, she demonstrated, she organized, and she did not conceal her political affiliation. And she was fired from her job—on political grounds.

I want to conclude with a still more personal remark. Angela is one of the most non-violent persons I have ever met (I think one has only to look into her face in order to see this!). Violence was all around her (it is engrained in this society); her life was threatened, the life of her black brothers and sisters was threatened. And yet, I cannot imagine that she conspired or participated in violence. And I would have to have very strong evidence in order to believe it.

* * *

Charles Reitz translator: Marcuse item about Angela Davis, Frankfurt, June 1972

Angela is fighting primarily for the liberation of her own people—but she knows that this struggle has a subsequent goal that is at the same time quite immediate, namely American capitalism. "Immediate" because there is nothing abstract about it anymore. That's where the ghettos, courts, prisons and police are; so too their daily victims. That's where the supermarkets are also, and the production of an insane superabundance of gadgets, commodities designed to become obsolete year by year and purchased anew—an entire wealth-industry in the middle of ... filth, pollution, suffering, and crime.

It is the insane wealth of this society, its criminal utilization, and the conspicuousness of this insanity that makes the oppression so unbearable now, and it widens broader protest against the system. But it also frustrates this. Because the protests collide with the omnipresent power of the system and its prosperity, that the majority of the organized workforce has been integrated into.

The radical opposition is very much limited to minority groups. The liberation struggle of the blacks, as one of the minority groups, understands itself as being in the same anti-capitalist front with the student movement, the younger workers, the women ... But this common need to fight back has not created unity in action, and there is no comprehensive organization that can guarantee even a minimally unified strategy.
Angela has always emphasized during her defense that she is a *communist*. What this means in this regard is this: understand that the liberation struggle of blacks is a part of, or aspect of, the general struggle for liberation from capitalism. And this general struggle (of course with minority impacts) has an extremely concrete and horrifying target: the war against the Vietnamese people. The complete terrorism of late monopoly capitalism is concentrated against them.

The *extreme* form this takes in Indochina is the extreme manifestation of its “normal” form at the imperial center. War crimes which occur everyday in Vietnam promote an everyday criminality at home (and they are also nourished by it). Brutality there, officially sanctioned as an imperative of national honor, engenders brutality here. The pollution of the air, water, and earth here at home in the *motherland* is just a faint reverberation of the total systematic destruction in Vietnam.

It’s not enough anymore to kill the still living human beings (men, women, and children); the nourishing foundation for *future* generations of forests, animals, harvests must be destroyed. The honor (and security) of the nation will not permit an “ally” (that it has invented and militarized) to be left in the lurch.

And still one knows that this will not get anywhere. Maybe atomic weapons will yet be needed. *Nonetheless* the invaders will not succeed....

But why all this? This is not the place to discuss questions of imperialist or neo-imperialist politics. Just some general comments:

- American monopoly capitalism cannot afford to see its rule in strategic areas (Cuba) challenged. Rebellious liberation forces must be terrorized suppressed.
- The war against the Vietnamese people is a preventative war against *every* liberation struggle: in Asia, in Africa, and especially in Latin America. *And at home* ...

The revolution that will not let itself be co-opted, where freedom is *authentic*, is the revolution that must be hindered around the globe. And at home as well, in the metropol itself. Because resistance is mounting too. But it is growing more slowly than the repression.

The fight against the last and most powerful phase of capitalist domination is still without effective organization, nationally and internationally.

For too long the impact of the opposition has been weakened by idiotic acts of terror and by the endless controversies among small groups for whom an ostensible “orthodoxy” is more important than building up anti-capitalist strength.

- Most important is the creation of a *united front* of *leftists*, old and new above all particular organizations (or, better yet, suffused through all of the specific organizations) creating much broader bases for defense.
The counterrevolution must be stopped. If it’s not, the alternative will be fascism.

It is not we here, here in the U.S.A. who stand in the forefront of the fight—it is rather the people of Vietnam.

Let us work for their liberation!

* * *

CONCLUSIONS ON SCIENCE AND SOCIETY*

Whenever I talk with scientists about the function of science in this society, I am told that science is neutral [and] that the scientist is the servant of this society that it can be used and is being used and is being used for the progress of human life and for its destruction.

Let us accept the definition of the position of the scientist in the world today, and let us discuss what kind of servant the scientist is and what importance science has. Could this society exist as it is or could it not without the scientist? In a recent talk at Cal Western, Bronowski pointed out in very picturesque ways that everything we do and even talking to you in this hall and with a microphone and electric lamps would be impossible without science and scientific achievements to date. If we look at the honors heaped on scientists and prices paid for their work, it should be clear to everyone, that if the scientist is a servant, he probably is the most important servant of the society. There would be no engineering without science. How as to the other question is science neutral? If this is true, then it should be clear that what science produces and what is out of its hands, that is, has been publicized and used is so neutral that anyone can use it for good or evil, i.e. is in the nature of a robot, i.e. is an extremely dangerous instrument. The question then arises who is the master that science serves and what is the

* Editors’ note:

“Conclusions on Science and Society” contains concluding pages of a lecture at Scripps Oceanography Institute lecture in 1969. Marcuse was invited to give a lecture at Scripps on April 7, 1969 in a letter sent on March 12, 1969. A text found in his personal papers reveals four pages of handwritten notes on oceanography, science, and the responsibility of scientists followed by a three-page typed set of notes that we are publishing here. This speech given to an audience of faculty and students at Scripps shows Marcuse actively engaging scientists to consider their work within the context of capitalism, and the importance of their intellectual labor to its continuing development. Pushing the theme of the responsibility of the scientist, toward the end of the speech Marcuse implores the scientists to think of their endeavors not as a handmaiden to capital, but rather part of a reimagining of how science can be part of a process of liberating humans and nature from the destructive needs of an ever expanding capitalist production system.
nature of science: Can all science become a dangerous instrument? A death giving not a life giving instrument?

In each nation, the scientist will say that his nation is the best master and science is safest at home. If the American scientist approves of what his country does, then he is right in doing what he does and thinking science instead of thinking politics. If he does not, then he, more than anyone, must think and act politics and counteract his country's destructive policies. If you say that all science is an equally dangerous instrument, that different equations end up by becoming missiles, you are producing a death giving robot. If you think that distinctions are possible, that there is a difference between funneling information to any part of the defense establishment and funneling it to the national heart foundation, that your way is clear. It is you who must make this decision. You are the producers. It's up to you, but the one thing you cannot do is say: we are just scientists, we have nothing to do with politics. Today, in this world in the twentieth century whether you in China or in Russia or in Cuba, you are the servants of the masters with whom the masters could not be masters.

THE TRUE NATURE OF TOLERANCE

Topical Comment: Marcuse Replies

On April 5, The Times published in this space an article by Dr. William S. Banowsky, chancellor of the new campus of Pepperdine College at Malibu. The article was occasioned by the objections raised by Dr. Herbert Marcuse, the Marxist philosopher, to the appearance on the UC San Diego campus of anti-Communist speaker Dr. Fred Schwarz. In the interests of fairness The Times asked Dr. Marcuse to reply to the Banowsky article.

* Editors' note:*

"The True Nature of Tolerance" was published in the Los Angeles Times, April 12, 1970, pp. 7-8, and was found in Marcuse's personal archive. This little-known letter to the LA Times was found in a large dossier in Marcuse's private collection with letters and newspaper articles on a dispute with Dr. William S. Banowsky, the chancellor of the new campus of Pepperdine College at Malibu. A letter sent to Marcuse by Banowsky on April 4, 1970 enclosed an article titled "An Unwitting Score for Tolerance" attacking Marcuse's protest against Dr. Fred Schwarz's of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade's appearance at the University of California at San Diego. Banowsky's critique of Marcuse and his defense of the liberal concept of tolerance was published by the Los Angeles Times on April 5, 1970 and a week later the Times published Marcuse's answer under the title "The True Nature of Tolerance," which we publish here. Marcuse makes it clear that he was not criticizing Schwarz's right to speak on the campus, but rather was questioning his qualifications to lecture in a course on contemporary conservatism.
“The Limits of Freedom”

Furthermore, nowhere have I argued for intolerance of all views opposed to mine, nowhere have I said or implied that I am in possession of the “absolute truth.” I have suggested withdrawal of tolerance from demonstrably aggressive and destructive movements on the Right; I have also argued for intolerance of propaganda against an extension of “public services, social security, medical care, etc.” I do indeed believe that the richest country in the world should not tolerate pressure, on the part of vested interests, against better care for the poor, the sick, and the old.

I continue to insist (and, I believe, in line with the great liberal tradition of the West) that freedom of speech has its objective limits, and that it should no longer be extended to the advocacy of enslavement, genocide, and racism in the guise of patriotic necessities.

Strange as it may seem, I also believe in the need for tolerance. Proceeding from the same assumptions, Banowsky and I arrive at opposite conclusions. “Tolerance is an end in itself. The elimination of violence, and the reduction of suppression to the extent required for protecting man and animals from cruelty and aggression are preconditions for the creation of a humane society.” These sentences introduce the discussion in my essay on “Repressive Tolerance”: I did not write them in order to subsequently take them back.

The sentence immediately following expresses the decisive difference between Banowsky and me: “Such a society does not yet exist; progress
toward it is perhaps more than before arrested by violence and suppression on a global scale."

I agree with Banowsky that "in an open exchange of opinion, truth will eventually triumph," and that "the right to think and ask questions ... more than a courtesy to be discontinued." My entire life as a teacher has been devoted to assuring this right. My point is precisely that the "open exchange of opinion" does not prevail in this society, and that the people's "right to think and ask questions" has become ineffective.

The liberal tradition has been betrayed—not by me, not by some conspiracy, but by the power of the one-dimensional society and those who control it, and under whose control the media, and the general pressure for conformity, have all but monopolized the formation of public opinion. The "open exchange of opinion" in which truth "will eventually triumph" would require that the opposition not only against certain policies within this society, but also against the society itself, would have equal access to the media, would have equal opportunity to develop its own media, etc.

This opportunity is from the beginning denied in fact: the Left does not have at its disposal the vast funds, facilities, and "connections" needed in order to compete freely. A similar situation exists in the educational establishment. The notion that the colleges and universities are dominated by the Left and that "the other side" is not adequately heard is vicious propaganda: the contrary is true.

Conservatism is dominant, and my younger colleagues who have not the privilege of tenure could tell of their difficulties once they have been politically active in the wrong way. It is the Establishment which practices intolerance and enforces conformity on a global scale, and which systematically creates and perpetuates its own majority, thereby destroying the very basis of liberalism. The "tyranny of the majority"—it was after all a great liberal who coined this phrase. And once this tyranny is firmly established, the free exchange of ideas, and the right, nay the possibility, to think independently is rigidly curtailed—also for the majority!

I have never denied (which would be plain silly) the right of the Establishment to do so. It feels itself threatened in its very existence, and it fights back with all available means. Violence has become engrafted in its structure, in the daily household of its citizens. This is the historical condition in which we live. I fight against it with my own means: as a scholar, philosopher, educator—and as a Marxist.

I deny the claim that this society is free and I question the truthfulness of its defenders who present the existing conditions as those of a free exchange of ideas. Just as the "free marketplace" in the economy has long since been subjected to effective monopolistic regimentation, so has the marketplace of ideas. Its restoration, or rather realization, still has to be accomplished. The right, of all, to think freely and critically still has to be fought for.
The Route Is Undecided

There is wide disagreement on the ways to attain this goal. I have never claimed a monopoly on the truth, nor have I ever claimed the “right to dictate whom others may hear.” Like all my books, my essay on “Repressive Tolerance” was meant for discussion. I have been fully aware of the danger involved in my position; I believe that it is infinitely smaller than the danger we risk if we continue to tolerate the forces which drag this country ever deeper into war, waste and violence.

No intellectual dictator, no possessor of absolute truth is required to identify these forces: they identify themselves by their words and actions, and they are easily recognizable by anyone who can reflect on what he sees and hears and reads.

Let me sum up. I want to work for the creation of conditions where tolerance can become real and applicable to all, where it can be what it was supposed to be, namely, a weapon in the fight for humanity. Humanity is not identical only with the population within the territorial limits of the United States. I believe it is ludicrous to boast of freedom and tolerance at home while turning whole areas of the world over to fascist and military dictatorships, while burning, bombing and poisoning whole countries, while blocking the free exchange of ideas within a closed universe of Orwellian language.

I accuse the intolerance of the Establishment, its tolerance of the inhumanity of man against man.
III

LECTURES AND INTERVIEWS ON MARXISM, REVOLUTION AND THE CONTEMPORARY MOMENT

MARXISM CONFRONTS ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
FEBRUARY 22, 1964

ORGANIZATION:
I. Confrontation of Marxian theory with the facts of advanced industrial society (USA!)
II. Extent to which the facts refute the theory: areas of corroboration and of contradiction
III. The Marxist explanation of the areas of contradiction
IV. Evaluation of this explanation
V. Conclusion: is the theory refuted?

Discussion confined to the most advanced areas and tendencies, justified because

Marx established an internal link between the highest stage of capitalism and the transition to socialism; maturity of productive forces and explosion of contradictions;

* Editors' note:
"Marxism Confronts Advanced Industrial Society" contains handwritten notes for a lecture, dated February 22, 1964, which purports to present a "Confrontation of Marxian theory with the facts of advanced industrial society (USA!)," with the exclamation point indicating that the focus would be on the United States. Following five pages of lecture notes centering on the United States are a handwritten set of notes titled "IV. Confrontation with Soviet Society" and "Cont. for William and Mary" on the top of the page, presumably signaling that part of the lecture was delivered at William and Mary College in Virginia, although there are no
the tendencies prevalent in the most advanced areas (technical, scientific, cultural) spread and serve as models of industrialization in backward areas.

1. CONFRONTATION With Capitalism:
   mere enumeration of familiar conditions:

1. Impoverishment – improvement in standard of living
2. Sharpening of class conflicts – increasing class collaboration
3. Revolutionary consciousness – conformist consciousness
4. International proletarian solidarity – nationalism
5. Stagnation and crisis – stabilization and growth of capitalism
6. Imperialist conflicts – supranational alliances and markets (the spectre of the Generalkartell!)
7. Bipolarization of society, reduction of the middle classes – growth of the “new middle classes”
8. finally, and most important:
   co-existence – succession
   successful revolution in backward countries!
   (Omitted: tendential decline in the rate of profit??)
   industrial reserve army?
   Marx anticipates monopolistic extra profits at the expense of smaller enterprises
   Employment growing in non-production branches (“service industries”)

Formidable bill of indictment
- drawn up already around 1900, as the ground of Social Democracy
- The critique, based on these new conditions, strikes at the very roots of Marxian theory:
  - the stabilization, if a structural transformation of capitalism, is not a surface phenomenon!

supporting documents to confirm this. After three pages of handwritten notes on Soviet society, there is a page summarizing statistics from contemporary sources in the 1960s on Soviet society that Marcuse presumably drew upon in lectures on the topic. There follows a page of notes titled “Can Soviet society attain the Welfare State?” followed by five pages of lecture notes under the rubric “V. Is Marxian theory refuted” without a question mark. A two-page handwritten “Conclusion” provides some further notes without a real conclusion. Finally, a two-page typed manuscript titled “Socialist Man” is appended to these lecture notes. The texts show Marcuse preparing thoughts on Marxism and both industrial capitalist and socialist societies at the time he was finishing One-Dimensional Man, and present a rare set of public reflections on Soviet society, some years after the publication of Soviet Marxism.
But now, as against these contradictions,

II. THE AREAS OF CORROBORATION
(1) Concentration and centralization of capital
(2) Constant excess capacity and destructive or restrictive use of productivity
(3) Growing need for regimenting production and distribution: monopolistic and state control
(4) Reduction of free enterprise, free competition, free market
(5) Corollary: weakening of civil and political liberties; rise of militarism and nationalism...
(6) Intensified penetration of economic and political influence spheres abroad: "neo-colonialism"
(7) Conflicts within the unified capitalist orbit: common market; defense policy!

However, Marx's anticipation seems falsified:

none of these centrifugal tendencies (manifestation of the inherent contradictions), nor their ensemble has strengthened the revolutionary potential in advanced capitalism:

"minimum program" and democratic strategy of even the most powerful communist parties and unions (France; Italy!)

Most serious, in Marxist terms:

- the narrowing of the world market by the growth of the communist orbit and the independence of the colonies has promoted the reorganization of capitalism!
- Communism as the physician at the sickbed of capitalism!
- Capitalist unity resolves capitalist contradictions!

III. THE MARXIST ANSWER
Two stages and two levels:
(1) the official Soviet doctrine
(2) the "non-orthodox" Marxist interpretation

re (1) Soviet Marxism
In essence a restatement and up-dating of Lenin's Imperialism: "temporary stabilization", on the basis of
- monopoly-state-capitalist organization
- surplus profits
- "bribing" of labor aristocracy
- war economy.
- The improvements resulting from this reorganization are
  - confined to a small minority of laboring classes
  - wiped out periodically by wars and depressions
  - offset by intensified exploitation of labor
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

- in the metropolitan countries (scientific management)
- in the underdeveloped countries.

Subsequently (Stalin)

- the decline of the revolutionary potential in capitalism explained as
  "transformation of the class struggle into the international struggle between have- and have-not nations"
- But: the "proletariat" of the have-nations belonging to the other camp!
- Moreover, the Soviet doctrine retains the notions of
  - the final crisis of capitalism and the historical superiority of socialism;

But:

- the reality of capitalist stabilization is recognized
  in the theory – and policy – of peaceful coexistence:
  - Triumph of socialism through greater productivity and rationality.

Inadequacy of this answer:
- the “conformist” part of labor more than a small aristocracy
- introduction of “external factors” (the non-capitalist orbit)
- what is “temporary”?
- what is “final”??

re (2) Neo-Marxism

Recognition of structural changes in the capitalist economy and in the laboring classes:
- growing productivity of labor, and cheapening of constant capital
  counteract the tendential decline in the rate of profit, permit a sustained high level of living;

But:

- at the price of sustained and planned production of waste
- indoctrination, manipulation of needs
- constant danger of nuclear annihilation
- total and permanent mobilization.

Nevertheless,

- even these “counter-tendencies” do not resolve the inherent contradictions:
- contraction of the private sector in favor of the monopolistic and semi-public sector; and, generally:
- contradiction between growing productivity and regimentation of needs, between progress and distinction of resources social health and toil perpetuated
- Not: relative impoverishment!
Example: AUTOMATION:
- would tend to the point where the reduction of labor time would amount to a **reversal of the traditional distribution between free time and labor time**
- this **incompatible** with the requirements of capital accumulation: adequate rate of profit and surplus value
  - Thus: **resistance against automation** as against mass unemployment
- arrest of progress and productivity!
  - But against this arrest: threat of **full automation** in the societies where the laws of capitalist development do not prevail
- **weakening of capitalism** in the global competition.

**Marx in 1857**: full-scale mechanization would mean the end of capitalism because: reduction in socially necessary labor time means
- reduction in exchange value of commodities
- reduction in "unpaid" working time, and thus
- reduction in the rate of profit
  - **unless** counteracted by total administration: of prices of enterprise of investment, etc.

Such total administration **might be beneficial** and progressive if it leads to a genuine **WELFARE STATE**.

Too facile critique:
- the loss of economic, and even "cultural" liberties might not be too heavy a price where they have been concomitant with insecurity, fear, poverty, toil
- the reduction of these liberties may well be a precondition for genuine freedom "beyond the realm of necessity".

But:
- in the capitalist (as well as in the communist) societies, such Welfare State would **presuppose a revolution**:
  - **political** in the communist orbit
  - political and economic in the Western world
  - centralized planning
  - centralized government.

Against this threat:
- **alternative** of the WARFARE STATE:
  - rather than the catastrophe of free time, the total transvaluation of values:
    - direction and absorption of productivity by the defense sector
    - permanent mobilization of the population in the perpetuation of the status quo:
material and mental repression of the alternatives –
- perfectly rational in the situation of coexistence!

If this interpretation is correct, even the “affluent society” would corroborate one fundamental thesis of Marx:
- that capitalism incapable of maintaining itself without waste, destruction, constant threat of war on an enlarged” scale.

IV. Confrontation with Soviet Society
Soviet society not yet socialist in Marxian sense
- no Marxian theory of socialism
- only Marxian theory of the preconditions of socialism

But
theory of transition and stages of socialist contamination:
the Two Phases:
qualitative change with the revolution
quantitative change from Socialism to Communism
first phase:
scarcity, repression: justice = injustice
equality = inequality

wage differences...

Presupposes: socialism as heir of capitalism,
not: coexistence = hostile coexistence: arms race

-The Soviet actuality:
- totalitarian state
- dictatorships over the proletariat
- work discipline
- authoritarian management
- incentive system

\{ capitalist features!

Result:
“Socialist” society appears – not as the opposite, not as liberation from, but as extension, streamlining, rationalization of an unfree society.

Is this actual development still explainable, justifiable in terms of the necessary two phases?

(1) justified is: the material and technical basis must first be created, for this; the continuation of toil and repression;
also:
the mentality, consciousness, value-system corresponding to the new society must be developed, in the struggle against survival of “slave-mentality” or “bourgeois” mentality

(2) But:
the end must determine the means:
can there be a dictatorship of liberation?
can men be "forced to be free"?

Historically, the answer seems ambiguous:
- increase in democratization took place not only through popular revolutions, violent civil wars,
- but also through periods of totalitarian terror!
  (examples: Athenian democracy
  English civil wars
  Robespierre)

The historical argument for "educational dictatorship":
- impact of anti-libertarian forces and interests on the people
- immaturity and weakness
- how can slaves by themselves grasp the means for their liberation

The historical result of the experiments in dictatorship is equally ambiguous:
- how the Terror accelerated or slowed down democratization?
- was the Terror historically necessary?

The "logical" against the historical argument:
- how can liberty be administrated and imposed?
- does not the educational dictatorship perpetuate the very mentality which it wants to abolish:
  - dependence on the power of others
  - passivity
  - heteronomy: reliance on government, the state ...

The paradoxical conclusion:
men must not be free prior to their liberation!

The problem aggravated by technological society, where all means of communication and information are centralized and standardized,
- where the individual becomes the all but helpless recipient of the mass media
- subordinated to an omnipresent and omnipotent apparatus of production, distribution, politics!
  - which at the same time increase his standard of living,
  - and promises to continue doing this in spite of waste, destruction, threat of war.

from national product doubled 1952–1962; annual rate of growth somewhat under 7%
Consumption per capita increased by 50–60% 1952–1962; 4–5% a year.
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

Gregory Grossman in Problems of Communism, March–April 1963

Steel production current: 85–90 mill. tons
Goal: 10% above USA within 20 years
US: capacity: 140 mill. tons as annually; actual, current 60% of capacity

New York Times 8/16/10

Can Soviet Society attain the Welfare State?
Growth in productivity and consumption under totalitarianism in the USSR: quote figures!
Completion of the material and technical base: the Soviet timetable (Program of 1961)
1961–1970: creating this base, will surpass the USA in production per head of population
1971–1980: basis completed, approaching the stage where the social product distributed according to needs; one form of ownership: public
Subsequently: completion of the construction of communist society: “withering away” of the State.

But does even the achievement of this goal establish the free society?
Are not the individual needs themselves determined from above, indoctrinated – unfree needs?
The growing Welfare State, with its overwhelming productivity and comforts, reduces the basic need for freedom absorbs all opposition.
Final question:
is such a Welfare State imaginable under the conditions of hostile coexistence?

V. IS MARXIAN THEORY REFUTED

When is a social theory “refuted”, falsified”?
Facts that do not correspond to the theory do not per se constitute refutation:
- otherwise the success of a theory translated into action would prove its historical truth (Fascism!).
Facts do refute a theory
- if not explicable in its own terms,
  - in internal contradiction.

Marx claims to have demonstrated
- structure and “mechanism” of capitalism which, in its progress, will meet its internal limit,
  - to be surmounted (“temporarily”) only through
    - destruction and waste of all resources
regimentation of human needs and faculties
recurrent crises and conflicts: barbarism.

A strong case could be made for the resemblance of this anticipation with reality,
But: the case does not rest here!

The decisive test
is in the existence of the Proletariat as historical agent:
- a class living in the absolute need for changing intolerable conditions
- a class "conscious", and capable of changing society (= the majority of the population).

In the advanced industrial countries, this class disappears.
Thereby:
- internal, historical link between the old and the new society
- between theory and practice
- between abstract and concrete
severed!

Twofold "dependence" of socialism on capitalism:
(1) capitalism creates the material base for socialism
(2) capitalism creates its own gravediggers, "negation" within!
(re 1) capitalism builds the technical base and the productive capacity which make socialism possible.

THEN, "only" a transfer of economic and political control is necessary; otherwise, there is continuity in the technical base, and in the human agents!

Marx' concept of the neutrality of technics:
- the machine, correctly handled, operates equally well for the capitalist corporation and for the socialist state;
- it is the different usage (aim) of the machine process that makes for the different social system.

Thus, development in quantity (technical progress), turned into quality by the new social class: the Proletariat.
However,
- "neutrality" of technics may be true for the individual machine, but not for the technical apparatus as a whole, which has become
  - apparatus of production, integration, domination.

Technical rationality has become political rationality and vice versa:
political leaders appear as administrators of the nation, as the capitalists as administrators of the plant.

They all execute the rational verdicts of the productive apparatus, serve its requirements and needs.

Technological society seems a new form of society:

- the overwhelming power, efficiency, productivity of the apparatus absorbs, integrates, reduces effective opposition.
- the higher standard of living which it produces in the most advanced areas for their privileged population paralyzes protest and rebellion;
- and the new military equipment, and the enemy without do the rest.

The formerly hostile, opposed classes (the “negation”) turn into collaborating classes, with a vested interest in the established system (“affirmation”)

This trend only in the most advanced areas – but precisely in these areas, Marx saw the emergence of the “negation”.

Just as organized capitalism, on the basis of growing productivity, a regimented economy, a supra-continental market, and mobilization against the common enemy, “suspends” the classical internal contradictions (containment of depressions; planned obsolescence and waste as “remedy” against excess capacity ... ) – so it suspends, on the same basis, the internal opposition:

- it transforms the human agents, who, for Marx, were to be the potential carriers of social change, into agents of cohesion and stabilization!

VI. CONCLUSION

While the theoretical analysis seems to stand up before reality, the realization of the theory seems blocked, denied:

- the link between theory and practice, so essential to Marx, seems broken: Marxian theory has no mass basis today.

(Question is not, whether labor “accepts” Marx, thinks in his terms ..., but whether their objective situation, their needs and interest identify them as “revolutionary”;
- whether they are the living alienation from themselves and from their society.

Notion of alienation still valid?

Without mass basis in advanced industrial society, the theory has become abstract.

“Abstract” is not necessarily “false”!

No theory of social change can create the basis for its realization:

- it can only define and project the possibilities of its validation, as the real, historical possibilities of the given society.
There are historical situations in which real possibilities appear as abstract possibilities:
- when the prevailing consciousness, modes of thought are arrested in their free development
- arrested by the overwhelming power of the established state of affairs.

In such a situation, the distance, dissociation of theory and practice does not invalidate the theory:
- in historical terms, the theory may be ahead of reality; the latter below the level of history.

Marx has described such a situation as that of Germany at the time of the French Revolution:
- the attained level of history, the historical possibilities Reason and Freedom were expressed, in ideological form, by the philosophy of the time (German Idealism)
- in the reality, they were repressed: the prospects of society were obscured in and by society.

Thus, the critical theory of society, of social change
- becomes the "heir" and "translator" of philosophy,
  - which, in the dialectical logic, had provided the conceptual weapons for the critical analysis of society
  - the power of negative thinking.

In this respect, Marxian theory today is much more abstract:
- the ideology of advanced industrial society is not so negative, and it does not strive to transcend its society.

Today, Reason does not operate as the "power of the negative", but rather as the power of positive thinking.
Before this power, Marxian theory stands condemned.

Conclusion
Marxism theory still provides the most adequate analyses of capitalism, its tendencies, its contradictions.

The obvious differences in the development
- a new form of the same internal conflicts:
  - high standard of living → at the price of waste, government control defense economy
  - "equalization of classes" → does not reduce the gap between the top and the underlying population, in the rulers and the ruled.

However, the actual development has overcome the social forces which were to resolve the contradictions, and
- to build more human society.
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

Whether these forces emerge "outside"? (backward areas?)
In any case the established societies are likely to continue for a long time — unless nuclear catastrophe
— a corroboration which not even the most incorrigible Marxist would welcome!

This real possibility the greatest indictment!

Conclusion

Is Marxism refuted?
History is not at an end; only qualified answer possible!

As to the West:
— capitalism must demonstrate its capability to continue its growth
  without war
  without a permanent war economy
  without planned obsolescence and waste side by side with poverty
  and toil within its own orbit.
  without further reduction of civil right and liberties.

As to Communism:
  reduction of totalitarian controls toward democracy?
  rising standard of living
  structural tendency toward peace.

But

What is socialism?
— a society in which men determine their own life, on the basis of satisfied vital needs
— without misery, injustice; without enslavement by the instruments of their labor
— freely developing the human faculties for a pacified world.

In technological investigation
— what is left for individual self-determination in full time?
  the "cultural", creative activities?
  hobbies?

Perhaps freedom to be radically redefined:
— in the reconstruction of the technical apparatus toward new needs and satisfactions
— in the rebuilding of the work world:
  abolition of massive togetherness
  reduction of repressive affluence which perpetuates, and intensifies the struggle for existence
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

in short:

- pacification!
- The role of science!

"Socialist Man"

to speak about something that does not exist. Perhaps there are men fighting for creating the conditions for socialist man:
- especially there where the fight invokes the new values
  - against exploitation in any form,
  - against aggression and domination, for peace
- which has become the most powerful socialist goal to the degree to which capitalism, the stability and growth of the system seem incompatible with conditions of peace!

And yet: necessary to speak,
because the image of socialist man and the only historical alternative to present-day man:
- derived from analysis of available resources and capabilities,
- from their possible realization, and
- from the experience of the need for it.

But we have to separate, in Marxian theory,
- the essential features of this image, from
- its outdated qualifications and limitations.

The essential: "determinate negation" of capitalist man, exploiter and exploited.
- "determinate negation": the opposite of this man as the expression of his own potential;
  - an objective social tendency, dynamic link between the present and the future stage of development: next and higher
    - if attained by conscious political practice.
- "capitalist man": whose whole life is determined by his performance and position in the exchange economy,
  - i.e. by his subordination to an apparatus over which he has no control and which imposes upon him its requirements.

Characteristics of capitalist man:
- as object of an increasingly parasitician and oppressive apparatus, he displays aggressiveness in business and fun,
  - competitive (status) satisfaction,
  - immediate "socialization" of his mental structure ...
- resulting in the all-round distortion of the all-round personality: freedom as the freedom to submit and compete,
  - choice of rulers and masters, socially controlled release of repressed instinctual needs ...
This brief enumeration may make it clear that the familiar Marxian formulation of the contrast between capitalist and socialist man no longer applies:
- from each according to his ability,
- to each according to his performance
and then: to his needs.

No longer applies because
- the very needs of the individual, his very unconscious, his instincts have been taken in hand by advanced capitalism and shaped in accordance with their profitable satisfaction.

This repressive achievement is not undone
- by a change in the basic institutions (nationalization), nor
- by a change in the control of these institutions,

unless these changes are "accompanied" by the emergence of new, qualitative different needs.

* * *

**OBSOLESCENCE OF SOCIALISM**

Marcuse - Brandeis farewell lecture 27 April 1965

What the title does not mean:
- that Marx's analysis of capitalism was wrong. Here the main theses:

(1) the social relationships among individuals are governed by the exchange value (not use value!) of the commodities and services they produce:

by their marketability;

*Editors' note:
"Obsolescence of Socialism" constitutes Marcuse's "Brandeis Farewell Lecture" which he delivered in 1965 after conflicts with the administration and his offer of a teaching position at the University of California at San Diego. Here Marcuse gives one of his best treatments of Marxist social theory just after the publication of his celebrated book One-Dimensional Man. The talk, which frames socialism as an open question, is one of Marcuse's clearest accounts of what a transition from advanced industrial society to a socialist one would entail and, perhaps more importantly, provides a sharp analytic bridge from Marx's own thoughts on socialism from the industrial period of capital to the more developed phase of advanced capitalism of the post-WWII conjuncture. As Marcuse states in the first line of this lecture, "what the title does not mean: that Marx's analysis of capitalism was wrong." Contrary to orthodox Marxism during the time of this lecture, Marcuse continuously used Marx as a point of departure for developing a more accurate account of the ways capitalism has adapted to avoid crises, maximize surplus value from human labor power, and integrate potentially revolutionary segments of the population.
(2) in this exchange society, the satisfaction of human needs occurs only as a by-product of profitable commodity production;

(3) in the progress of capitalism, the twofold contradiction unfolds
   - between the growing productivity of labor (social wealth) and its destructive and repressive use,
   - between the social character of the means of production (no longer individual but collective instruments), and their private ownership and control;

(4) capitalism can "solve" this contradiction only temporarily through increasing waste (armament!) and aggressive expansion (imperialism),
   - leading to a recurrent cycle of war and depression,
   - wiping out the benefits of the intervening periods of prosperity;

(5) until the laboring classes, who bear the brunt of exploitation, seize the productive apparatus and bring it under the collective control of the society as a whole.

I submit that all these propositions have been validated
   - with the exception of (5)?
   - transformation of the class struggle into the global struggle between "have" and "have-not" nations:
     - the latter make possible the continued extraction of surplus value in the defense economy.
     (The fight is against the poorest people in the world!)

But then: what is obsolete in Marxian socialism?

The obvious contradictions between reality and Marxian anticipation:
   - no impoverishment of the laboring classes,
   - no sharpening of class consciousness and class struggle,
   - no bipolarization of society (decline of the middle classes),
   - no inevitable all-out conflicts among the capitalist powers.

A quick look at some Marxist attempts to save the Marxian concepts by redefinition:
   - impoverishment taken to mean primarily, human, cultural impoverishment: abandons the materialistic foundation ...
     - impoverishment as "relative": same; you don’t make a revolution because you have only one automobile, etc.
   - class consciousness only "temporarily" repressed by the priority of the "immediate interests": weakness of the distinction between immediate and real interest: it presupposes the maturity of class consciousness.
   - decline of the middle classes veiled by their numerical growth in reality: they have been losing their economic independence. Generally correct, but: economic importance of the non-productive "service industries", etc.
   - imperialism still the driving global force of capitalism (neo-colonialism!)
conflicts aggravated by the "narrowing of the world market", but at the same time restrained by the growth of communism.

Here the decisive point:

- necessary to evaluate Marxian theory entirely within the global framework;
- communism as the physician at the sickbed of capitalism!
- as promoter of Hilferding's Generalcartell! and more recently: tripartite global division: capitalism (private), technological communism (state capitalism??), and "primary" communism (in the backward countries).

But now I want it discuss only the — in my view — central point:
The assumed transition from highly developed capitalism and precisely here: the social classes which were supposed to make this transition are no longer interested in it — became they have a vested interest in the very society they are supposed to abolish.

But this truism

- misses the decisive point:
  - not so much the impoverishment as the vital need for revolution made the laboring classes the historical agent,
  i.e. a social class with qualitatively different interests and aspiration, — with a different mentality,
  and which,
  because of their qualitative differences, would be capable of building a qualitatively different society
  i.e.,
  new forms of human existence — non-alienation.

Now, the emergence of such a new class within the old society is prevented — by the overflowing productivity of the affluent society, and its ability to create and satisfy needs which in turn reproduce and strengthen the same society:

Instead of the class struggle between essentially different, and irreconcilable interests:

- competition of essentially the same interests!

And another development he did not foresee:

- the declining share of (physical) human labor power in the material process of production (its decline in favor of non-production workers),
- and: the gradual replacement of physical labor power (measurable, quantifiable by abstract labor time) by mental energy.

The proletariat was to serve as the historical agent of revolution on two levels (or by virtue of two interrelated) qualities and functions:
(1) the class for which revolution was a vital need, a question of existence.
(2) the class which provided the human basis of capitalism: the basis for the reproduction of this society, and
   - which therefore had the actual power to stop social reproduction!

On both accounts, the theory of revolution seems to collapse.

Attempts to save it (mainly with respect to (1)):
- the idea of "temporary" stabilization and integration; insufficient because:
  - the tendential changes in late capitalism affect the very basis of the system (the production relations themselves)
  - overflowing productivity; change in the character of socially necessary labor; automation (not merely a technical factor!)
- how long is "temporary"?!
- the concept of "labor aristocracy": inadequate in view of the integration of the rank and file.
- reformulation of the Marxian conception in terms of the international situation:
  - class struggle between the have- and have-not peoples.

This translation deserves special consideration.

The international translation is justified on three grounds:
(1) advanced industrial society is a global society in spite of (or because of?)
the division of the world into capitalist and communist countries:
  - dependence of capitalist stability on the fight against communism;
  - dependence of the backward countries on aid from the advanced industrial countries for primary accumulation.
In this sense, there is no "outside" the capitalist system:
  - the external forces are part of the forces of the interior.
(2) The underlying population in the backward countries lives indeed in the vital need of radical social change:
  - it is the "absolute negation" of the blessings of the affluent society.
(3) As pre-industrial, rural population, these peoples constitute the human basis of the material reproduction of the established society.

On these grounds, the translation is justified,

But:

how, and to what degree, does the development in the backward countries (the national liberation movements) determine the development in the advanced countries?

Problems to be discussed:
- all odds on the side of the advanced countries;
- junction between national liberation movements and opposition movements in the advanced countries (theory and practice!);
historical advantage of the late-comer? skipping of the stage of repressive affluence; qualitatively different mode of industrialization?
(these later!)

Neo-imperialism
- war against the wars of liberation whether communist or not
Affluent society without “defense industry”

However, there is another vision of the transition to socialism in Marx:

“As large-scale industry advances, the creation of real wealth depends increasingly less on the labor time and the quantity of labor expended in the productive process than on the power of the instruments set in motion during the labor time. These instruments, and their growing effectiveness are in no proportion to the actual labor time which the production requires; their effectiveness rather depends on the attained level of science and technical progress... Human labor then is no longer enclosed in the process of production – man rather relates himself to the process of production merely as supervisor and regulator. He stands outside this process instead of being its principal agent. In this transformation, the basis of production and wealth is no longer the actual (physical) labor performed by man himself, nor his labor time, but his own creative power, that is, his knowledge and mastery of nature through his social existence – in one word, the development of the social (all-round) individual. The theft of another man’s labor time, on which the social wealth still rests today, then becomes a miserable basis compared with the new basis which large-scale industry itself has created. As soon as human labor, in its physical form, has ceased to be the great source of wealth, labor time will cease, and must of necessity cease, to be the measure of wealth, and exchange value must of necessity cease to be the measure of use value. The surplus labor of the mass of the population has then ceased to be the condition for the development of social wealth, and the leisure of the few has ceased to be the condition for the development of the intellectual faculties of man. The (capitalist) mode of production, which rests on exchange value, thus collapses...”

Man becomes free from the necessities of spending himself in material production,
- free to control, even to “play” with it according to his own human faculties...

Not a word about class struggle! not a word about impoverishment!
But: Marx himself has repressed this vision,
- which now appears as his most realistic, his most amazing insight!
Implications of this passage:
- the technical development of the productive forces can, within the capitalist system,
attain a level at which the use of physical human labor power as instrument of production becomes unnecessary.

The transformation of the capitalist into a socialist apparatus of production then would still require a revolution.

But: the level of development on the eve of the revolution would be such that it would call for a different idea of socialism:

In other words, it appears that Marx’ own idea of socialism was not radical enough, not utopian enough.

The technical level at the last stage of capitalism would make possible a socialist development which surpasses the distinction between

- socially necessary labor and creative work,
- alienated and non-alienated work,
- the realm of necessity and that of freedom

When Marx wrote, this vision was indeed premature, unrealistic.

“Development of the productive forces” was still the primary necessity in the transition to socialism:

- their liberation from capitalist restrictions was to be the first task of socialism.

But the concept implies more:

- namely, a “technical” continuity between capitalism and socialism.

As such, the transition means first quantitative change: greater productivity.

The turn from quantity to quality, the determinate negation

- was to be the revolution by which the exploited producers would take over the productive apparatus
- and direct it toward the all-round development of human needs and faculties.

Now this conception corresponds to a stage in the development of the productive forces which is surpassed precisely in the advanced industrial countries, from which the transition to socialism was to take place:

- what is gradually being eliminated is:
  - physical human labor power as producing commodities,
  - machines as mere instruments of human labor,
  - scarcity due to a low degree of productivity, maximization of profit, difficulty in extracting surplus value,
  - the need (as vital need) for abolishing exploitation.

The affluent society has surpassed these conditions

- in spite of prevailing poverty

(for the Marxian conception implies identity of the impoverished classes and the “immediate producers”: industrial labor;
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

241

...and in spite of the destructive and wasteful use of the productive forces (for such use is profitable and promoting prosperity).

Moreover,

scientific and technical progress have succeeded in shaping — and satisfying — the needs of the exploited population:

the needs which tie them to the system, and reproduce the system in their own mental structure.

Result:

*containment of qualitative social change.*

This situation calls for a reexamination of

- the transition theory
- the idea of socialism itself.

THE TRANSITION THEORY

Distinguish:

1. advanced industrial countries
2. less advanced industrial countries
3. backward countries: independent pre-industrial,
   - neo-colonial satellites.

The relation (1) to (2):

Whether (1) will provide developmental *model* for (2)?

Argument *against*:

existence of powerful oppositional labor movement in France and Italy,

- with a new strategy:
  
  "autogestion".

Argument *for*:

this strategy effective only after revolution; otherwise:

likely to be absorbed by the system,

re (3): *backward countries*

Here, the classical preconditions for socialism prevail,

- not nullified by the fact that the potentially revolutionary forces are the *agrarian* proletariat!

Most important:

- possibility of skipping the stage of repressive capitalist industrialization,
  
  - with the dominance of the apparatus over the producers;
- instead:

  technological development "à la mesure de l'homme".
But:

this historical advantage of the latecomer overshadowed by the danger of becoming dependent on the advanced industrial societies for primary accumulation.

re (3):
the affluent society testifies to its internal contradictions:
– they are “suspended”, neutralized, but not solved by the Welfare-Warfare State.

The contradictions show forth in the increasing difficulty to absorb the rising economic surplus
– the system tries to overcome this difficulty through
  – intensified productivity of labor,
  – enlarged reproduction of the military establishment,
  – planned obsolescence,
  – psychological exploitation superimposed on (and covering up) economic exploitation:
    – systematic stimulation of demand,
    – “synthetic” creation of needs.

BUT:
these outlets are counteracted by the inner dynamic of the system itself:
for example:
– progress of automation towards unemployment,
– lower cost of armament,
– radicalization of the youth and intelligentsia (transvaluation of values).

However, the contradiction does not explode “by itself”:
– left alone, the conflicting tendencies may lead to fascism rather than socialism.

The traditional class struggle is outdated
– by the economic integration of labor,
  – the declining share of labor in material production,
  – the modern technological weapons in the hands of the ruling classes; “revolution” outdated.

But: the internal contradictions unfold on a global scale: the disrupting tendencies have to be evaluated in the international context.
What are the new social forces which may activate the socialist potential?
Here is the syndrome of the socialist potential:
(1) the national liberation movements in the backward countries,
(2) the “new strategy” labor movement in Europe,
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

(3) the underprivileged strata in the affluent society,
(4) the oppositional intelligentsia.

To be added: the established communist societies, as the external counter-force?

(1) may well be the major catalyst in the development,
   - as internal catalyst in the global capitalist system:
     - in fighting against the wars of liberation, the system fights for its indispensable hinterland,
       for neo-colonial surplus-profits,
       for its living space of economic expansion.

The triumph of the independence movement in one area would mean the signal for revolt in areas closer to home, the global mobilization of the exploited colored races.

But the connection between this most immediate catalyst and the three others is practically non-existent;

no such catalyst in advanced countries But:
The transition hardly imaginable without activation of disintegrating forces in the advanced industrial societies,

- This highly speculative event possible if and when progress of the independent movements generates the economic crisis which may end the affluent society.

As long as the repressive and profitable stability of the affluent society prevails,

the radicalization of the intelligentsia – the only precarious link between the present and the future!

The development of consciousness as factor of social change:

- Dialectic of Historical Materialism:
  - as "class consciousness" becomes absorbed and coordinated by the affluent society,
  - the liberation of consciousness, and of the manipulated unconscious becomes a primary task and prerequisite,
  - and: as repression is flattened out and extended to the entire underlying population,
    - consciousness "in general" and in all dimensions of existence must be liberated,
    - the hold of the affluent society over the mental structure of man must be broken
  
the emergence of new needs and faculties,

an intellectual and instinctual rebellion is a precondition for change:

- a necessary but not sufficient condition.
THE IDEA OF SOCIALISM
This leads to the last topic: the image of socialism, and of socialist man. Socialism, as historical heir of the affluent society, and as its determinate negation and qualitative difference, must appear as reversal of the direction of progress, reversal of the development of productive forces!

In what sense “reversal”?
(1) The conquest of poverty and toil on a global scale would require:
- elimination of destructive goods and services,
- elimination of parasitardrian jobs and occupations,
- elimination of competitive (status) consumption which intensifies the struggle for existence.

This means: reduction of the established productive and distributive apparatus of affluence,
- reduction of the standard of living,
- not toward a new socialist puritanism and purgatory, but toward the removal of all the instrumentalities, gadgets, activities and passivities
- which have made the organism (body and mind) into an agency of repressive labor and repressive fun.

(2) In this sense, socialist evolution means:
- negatively: systematic use of the technical apparatus for destroying the destructive environment of affluent capitalism, i.e.:
  - commercialized nature,
  - mass media and mass togetherness,
  - business and status in privacy...

in other words:
- counteracting the attractive aggressiveness of politics, profits, and fun.

- positively: creation of an “erotic” environment as medium for the protection and strengthening of the Life Instincts:
  - restoration of nature as dimension of tranquility and withdrawal;
  - restoration of privacy;
  - restoration of free time which is not leisure time nor recreation;

  - in one word:
    PEACE.

Reduction of the birth rate.
(3) Such reversal of the development of the productive forces based on the achievements of advanced capitalism, would negate and surpass the Marxian concept of the relation between the realm of necessity, and the realm of freedom,
- “alienation” and the “all round individual”.

“Non-alienated labor”, creative work on a social scale is a pre-industrial, pre-technological concept:
Marx was aware of it: he reserved the all-round personality to a realm of freedom beyond that of socially necessary labor, because: in industrial society, all socially necessary labor, as mechanized labor, is alienated. Now: this realm of freedom is closed, occupied by the ingression of mass society into nature, into inner and outer space. Because of this ingression,

- the "realm of freedom beyond..." has become one of administered fun or released repression:
- the administered individuals carry their aggressive needs and activities into the realm of freedom!

At the level of advanced capitalism,

- the abolition of alienation cannot be envisaged as qualitative change in the mode of labor, as emergence of new modes of "creative" social labor
- this is a romantic, regressive idea!
The work process will be increasingly mechanized, automatized, technological, i.e. eliminate autonomy, spontaneity, individuality. The qualitative difference will rather show forth in man's separation from the process of socially necessary labor.
- and precisely this separation will give him the freedom to redirect the process of production.

There will still be mechanized mass production, but:

- the goods and services produced would be very different:
  - housing, the means of transportation, equipment, etc. would be produced in technological production,
  - but the products would serve the pacification and protection from the struggle for existence rather than perpetuation on a larger scale.

And on the basis of utmost mechanization and utmost technological rationality, a new personal artisanship, a new playful experimentation with technical possibilities may arise.

In other words:

- the realm of necessity, of the production of necessary goods and services, would be the realm of freedom to the degree to which these goods and services would be such as to foster and satisfy genuinely humane, non-aggressive needs and faculties,
- and to the degree to which they could be produced without toil.

Material production itself would be freed from toil, and tend toward playful experimentation:
Man, as producer, would come to "stand outside the process of production...".

(4) However, such radical transformation of the process of production, which involves a new technology, of art, presupposes the emergence of radically different needs, of a different instinctual structure:

- a complete transvaluation of values,
- the negation of the prevailing morality of aggression and repression.

The objective ground for such a change is being prepared through the technical and economic changes in the advanced industrial society:

- increasing parasitarians character of much of the socially necessary labor (the "service industries"),
- decreasing social need for full time labor,
- growing pressure for producing goods of beautification and pleasure.

Miserable, distorted, and arrested as these tendencies are within the capitalist framework, in conjunction with the basic antagonistic tendencies, they may become explosive...

they may undermine capitalist work morale and "innerworldly asceticism", plus: organized relaxation and togetherness.

But what are the subjective possibilities for the emergence of new liberating needs,

- for the changes in the mental structure which would make it meaningful to speak of "SOCIALIST MAN"?

The transvaluation can be formulated in Freudian terms as

- decrease of aggressiveness, of destructive energy
- strengthening of erotic energy.

And here, in the fight against these tendencies and possibilities, the affluent society displays its greatest power as anti-socialist force, (1) by the desublimation of aggressiveness in all area of the social reality, (2) while releasing aggressiveness in forms which lead to repetition and escalation.

aggressiveness extends from the mental hospitals, the highways, police stations to the training camps of the special forces, to Viet Nam, to the strategic conquest of outer space.

And aggressiveness permeates
- the language of the politicians and newspapers,
- the images of the mass media,
- the profitable commercial violation of nature,
- the productive process itself: in planned obsolescence, safety last, etc.,
- the growing militarization of society,

and is mobilized, sanctioned, and financed by the U.S. Congress:

*quote* Senator Russell.

re (2):

Aggressive energy is released as "technological aggression"
which inhibits instinctual satisfaction, thereby fosters repetition and
escalation,

and

does away with guilt, guilt feeling, and individual responsibility,
thus removing the instinctual barriers against the wanton, and methodical
destruction of life.

This social - and rational - mobilization of aggressiveness counteracts the
potential liberation of the Life Instincts,

- and a society dominated by the Life Instincts,

"socialist man" appears as the determinate negation of the adjusted
citizen of the affluent society.

**THE NEW NEEDS**

His needs and values would show forth in

- an instinctual revulsion against aggression and destruction (not: pacifism:
aggression against the aggressor!), an existential neurosis, allergy against
the functioning of the organism as instrument of alienated labor and
repressive administration,

- the need for privacy, quiet, being left alone with...,

- the need for an autonomous intelligence, required for finding one's own
needs, and for creating a humane environment.

With these features, "socialist man" is the counter-image of the current image:

- a sort of negative super-man:
  a man who wants peace (not: "peace of mind", but peace to determine
and live his own life),

  - who does not need constant "challenges" to strive for a better life,
  - who hates heroism and sacrifices which serve the interest of
domination,

  - who dares to be a coward, afraid where he ought to be.

Evidently,

this image is frightfully unreal, utopian.

- fitting not even for the "second phase";
But:
The achievements of the affluent society have put on the agenda
the need to emphasize the transcendent, utopian elements in the
idea of socialism,
by virtue of which socialism would indeed be the qualitative
difference, qualitative change:
- historical change in the very nature of man.

To return to today's reality:
The juncture between theory and practice,
between the intelligentsia and the "masses"
cannot be organized and calculated.
With all its technical rationality and planning,
- this society is irrational,
- dominated by blind, unmastered forces,
  by its unfolding contradictions and conflicts.

You are one of these antagonistic forces:
- your protest is more and other than that of a "lost generation"
- it tends toward a total, radical protest:
  - moral and political, in one,
  - instinctual and intellectual.

This means that you seem to become dangerous, and
not only "disturbing"!

So
continue to do what you are doing - no matter in what field -
- as long as you don't forget the essential, namely,
  that you want more than some improvements, more even than
  institutional changes:
  - that you want a different life, way of life.

And
in insisting on this goal, you are not expressing the need of a small
minority, of "intellectuals":
- you are expressing consciously the repressed need of the whole
  the rebellion of Life against Destruction,
  of Eros against Thanatos.

* * *
Today any form of the concrete world, of human life, any transformation of the technical and natural environment is a possibility, and the locus of this possibility is historical. Today we have the capacity to turn the world into hell, and we are well on the way to doing so. We also have the capacity to turn it into the opposite of hell. This would mean the end of utopia, that is, the refutation of those ideas and theories that use the concept of utopia to denounce certain socio-historical possibilities. It can also be understood as the “end of history” in the very precise sense that the new possibilities for a human society and its environment can no longer be thought of as continuations of the old, nor even as existing in the same historical continuum with them. Rather, they presuppose a break with the historical continuum; they presuppose the qualitative difference between a free society and societies that are still unfree, which, according to Marx, makes all previous history only the prehistory of mankind.

But I believe that even Marx was still too tied to the notion of a continuum of progress, that even his idea of socialism may not yet represent, or no longer represent, the determinate negation of capitalism it was supposed to. That is, today the notion of the end of utopia implies the necessity of at least discussing a new definition of socialism. The discussion would be based on the question whether decisive elements of the Marxian concept of socialism do not belong to a now obsolete stage in the development of the forces of production. This obsolescence is expressed most clearly, in my opinion, in the distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity according to which the realm of freedom can be conceived of and can exist only beyond the realm of necessity. This division implies that the realm of necessity remains so in the sense of a realm of alienated labor, which means, as Marx says, that the only thing that can happen within it is for labor to be organized as rationally as possible and reduced as much as possible. But it remains labor in and of the realm of necessity and thereby unfree. I believe that one of the new possibilities, which gives an indication of the qualitative

*Editors' note:
In July 1967, Marcuse delivered a lecture at the Free University of West Berlin on "The End of Utopia," followed by questions and answers with the students. The text was published in Der Ende der Utopie (Berlin: Verlage Peter von Maikowski, 1967) and was translated by Jeremy Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber and published in Five Lectures (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970) pp. 62–82. Marcuse was emerging as a major spokesman for the New Left and student movement in the 1960s, and reviews of the lecture in the German press referred to "Marx, Mao and Marcuse" as major Marxist theorists of the time who were enthraling Western youth in revolt. The lecture and discussion with the students shows Marcuse supporting student activism and the movements of the 1960s and reveals his strong utopian position of envisaging a new society with new values, modes of living and thought as the goal of the student rebellions of the period.
difference between the free and the unfree society, is that of letting the realm of freedom appear within the realm of necessity— in labor and not only beyond labor. To put this speculative idea in a provocative form, I would say that we must face the possibility that the path to socialism may proceed from science to utopia and not from utopia to science.

Utopia is a historical concept. It refers to projects for social change that are considered impossible. Impossible for what reasons? In the usual discussion of utopia the impossibility of realizing the project of a new society exists when the subjective and objective factors of a given social situation stand in the way of the transformation — the so-called immaturity of the social situation. Communist projects during the French Revolution and, perhaps, socialism in the most highly developed capitalist countries are both examples of a real or alleged absence of the subjective and objective factors that seem to make realization impossible.

The project of a social transformation, however, can also be considered unfeasible because it contradicts certain scientifically established laws, biological laws, physical laws; for example, such projects as the age-old idea of eternal youth or the idea of a return to an alleged golden age: believe that we can now speak of utopia only in this latter sense, namely when a project for social change contradicts real laws of nature. Only such a project is utopian in the strict sense, that is, beyond history — but even this "ahistoricity" has a historical limit.

The other group of projects, where the impossibility is due to the absence of subjective and objective factors, can at best be designated only as " provisionally " unfeasible. Karl Mannheim's criteria for the unfeasibility of such projects, for instance, are inadequate for the very simple reason, to begin with, that unfeasibility shows itself only after the fact. And it is not surprising that a project for social transformation is designated unfeasible because it has shown itself unrealized in history. Secondly, however, the criterion of unfeasibility in this sense is inadequate because it may very well be the case that the realization of a revolutionary project is hindered by counterforces and countertendencies that can be and are overcome precisely in the process of revolution. For this reason it is questionable to set up the absence of specific subjective and objective factors as an objection to the feasibility of radical transformation. Especially— and this is the question with which we are concerned here— the fact that no revolutionary class can be defined in the capitalist countries that are technically most highly developed does not mean that Marxism is utopian. The social agents of revolution — and this is orthodox Marx— are formed only in the process of the transformation itself, and one cannot count on a situation in which the revolutionary forces are there ready-made, so to speak, when the revolutionary movement begins. But in my opinion there is one valid criterion for possible realization, namely, when the material and intellectual forces for the transformation are technically at hand although their rational application is prevented by the existing organization of the
forces of production. And in this sense, I believe, we can today actually speak of an end of utopia.

All the material and intellectual forces which could be put to work for the realization of a free society are at hand. That they are not used for that purpose is to be attributed to the total mobilization of existing society against its own potential for liberation. But this situation in no way makes the idea of radical transformation itself a utopia.

The abolition of poverty and misery is possible in the sense I have described, as are the abolition of alienation and the abolition of what I have called "surplus repression." Even in bourgeois economics there is scarcely a serious scientist or investigator who would deny that the abolition of hunger and of misery is possible with the productive forces that already exist technically and that what is happening today must be attributed to the global politics of a repressive society. But although we are in agreement on this we are still not sufficiently clear about the implication of this technical possibility for the abolition of poverty, of misery, and of labor. The implication is that these historical possibilities must be conceived in forms that signify a break rather than a continuity with previous history, its negation rather than its positive continuation, difference rather than progress. They signify the liberation of a dimension of human existence this side of the material basis, the transformation of needs.

What is at stake is the idea of a new theory of man, not only as theory but also as a way of existence: the genesis and development of a vital need for freedom and of the vital needs of freedom—of a freedom no longer based on and limited by scarcity and the necessity of alienated labor. The development of qualitatively new human needs appears as a biological necessity; they are needs in a very biological sense. For among a great part of the manipulated population in the developed capitalist countries the need for freedom does not or no longer exists as a vital, necessary need. Along with these vital needs the new theory of man also implies the genesis of a new morality as the heir and the negation of the Judeo-Christian morality which up to now has characterized the history of Western civilization. It is precisely the continuity of the needs developed and satisfied in a repressive society that reproduces this repressive society over and over again within the individuals themselves. Individuals reproduce repressive society in their needs, which persist even through revolution, and it is precisely this continuity which up to now has stood in the way of the leap from quantity into the quality of a free society. This idea implies that human needs have a historical character. All human needs, including sexuality, lie beyond the animal world. They are historically determined and historically mutable. And the break with the continuity of those needs that already carry repression within them, the leap into qualitative difference, is not a mere invention but inheres in the development of the productive forces themselves. That development has reached a level where it actually demands new vital needs in order to do justice to its own potentialities.
What are the tendencies of the productive forces that make this leap from quantity into quality possible? Above all, the technification of domination undermines the foundation of domination. The progressive reduction of physical labor power in the production process (the process of material production) and its replacement to an increasing degree by mental labor concentrate socially necessary labor in the class of technicians, scientists, engineers, etc. This suggests possible liberation from alienated labor. It is of course a question only of tendencies, but of tendencies that are grounded in the development and the continuing existence of capitalist society. If capitalism does not succeed in exploiting these new possibilities of the productive forces and their organization, the productivity of labor will fall beneath the level required by the rate of profit. And if capitalism heeds this requirement and continues automation regardless, it will come up against its own inner limit: the sources of surplus value for the maintenance of exchange society will dwindle away.

In the Grundrisse, Marx showed that complete automation of socially necessary labor is incompatible with the preservation of capitalism. Automation is only a catchword for this tendency, through which necessary physical labor, alienated labor, is withdrawn to an ever greater extent from the material process of production. This tendency, if freed from the fetters of capitalist production, would lead to a creative experimentation with the productive forces. With the abolition of poverty this tendency would mean that play with the potentialities of human and nonhuman nature would become the content of social labor. The productive imagination would become the concretely structured productive force that freely sketches out the possibilities for a free human existence on the basis of the corresponding development of material productive forces. In order for these technical possibilities not to become possibilities for repression, however, in order for them to be able to fulfill their liberating function, they must be sustained and directed by liberating and gratifying needs.

When no vital need to abolish (alienated) labor exists, when on the contrary there exists a need to continue and extend labor, even when it is no longer socially necessary; when the vital need for joy, for happiness with a good conscience, does not exist, but rather the need to have to earn everything in a life that is as miserable as can be; when these vital needs do not exist or are suffocated by repressive ones, it is only to be expected that new technical possibilities actually become new possibilities for repression by domination.

We already know what cybernetics and computers can contribute to the total control of human existence. The new needs, which are really the determinate negation of existing needs, first make their appearance as the negation of the needs that sustain the present system of domination and the negation of the values on which they are based: for example, the negation of the need for the struggle for existence (the latter is supposedly necessary and all the ideas or fantasies that speak of the possible abolition of the struggle
for existence thereby contradict the supposedly natural and social conditions of human existence; the negation of the need to earn one's living; the negation of the performance principle, of competition; the negation of the need for wasteful, ruinous productivity, which is inseparably bound up with destruction; and the negation of the vital need for deceitful repression of the instincts. These needs would be negated in the vital biological need for peace, which today is not a vital need of the majority, the need for calm, the need to be alone, with oneself or with others whom one has chosen oneself, the need for the beautiful, the need for "undeserved" happiness - all this not simply in the form of individual needs but as a social productive force, as social needs that can be activated through the direction and disposition of productive forces.

In the form of a social productive force, these new vital needs would make possible a total technical reorganization of the concrete world of human life, and I believe that new human relations, new relations between men, would be possible only in such a reorganized world. When I say technical reorganization I again speak with reference to the capitalist countries that are most highly developed, where such a restructuring would mean the abolition of the terrors of capitalist industrialization and commercialization, the total reconstruction of the cities and the restoration of nature after the horrors of capitalist industrialization have been done away with. I hope that when I speak of doing away with the horrors of capitalist industrialization it is clear I am not advocating a romantic regression behind technology. On the contrary, I believe that the potential liberating blessings of technology and industrialization will not even begin to be real and visible until capitalist industrialization and capitalist technology have been done away with.

The qualities of freedom that I have mentioned here are qualities which until now have not received adequate attention in recent thinking about socialism. Even on the left the notion of socialism has been taken too much within the framework of the development of productive forces, of increasing the productivity of labor, something which was not only justified but necessary at the level of productivity at which the idea of scientific socialism was developed but which today is at least subject to discussion. Today we must try to discuss and define - without any inhibitions, even when it may seem ridiculous - the qualitative difference between socialist society as a free society and the existing society. And it is precisely here that, if we are looking for a concept that can perhaps indicate the qualitative difference in socialist society, the aesthetic-erotic dimension comes to mind almost spontaneously, at least to me. Here the notion "aesthetic" is taken in its original sense, namely as the form of sensitivity of the senses and as the form of the concrete world of human life. Taken in this way, the notion projects the convergence of technology and art and the convergence of work and play. It is no accident that the work of Fourier is becoming topical again among the avant-garde left-wing intelligentsia. As Marx and Engels themselves acknowledged, Fourier was the only one to have made clear this
qualitative difference between free and unfree society. And he did not shrink back in fear, as Marx still did, from speaking of a possible society in which work becomes play, a society in which even socially necessary labor can be organized in harmony with the liberated, genuine needs of men.

Let me make one further observation in conclusion. I have already indicated that if critical theory, which remains indebted to Marx, does not wish to stop at merely improving the existing state of affairs, it must accommodate within itself the extreme possibilities for freedom that have been only crudely indicated here, the scandal of the qualitative difference. Marxism must risk defining freedom in such a way that people become conscious of and recognize it as something that is nowhere already in existence. And precisely because the so-called utopian possibilities are not at all utopian but rather the determinate socio-historical negation of what exists, a very real and very pragmatic opposition is required of us if we are to make ourselves and others conscious of these possibilities and the forces that hinder and deny them. An opposition is required that is free of all illusion but also of all defeatism, for through its mere existence defeatism betrays the possibility of freedom to the status quo.

Question. To what extent do you see in the English pop movement a positive point of departure for an aesthetic-erotic way of life?

Marcuse. As you may know, of the many things I am reproached with, there are two that are particularly remarkable. I have supposedly asserted that today the movement of student opposition in itself can make the revolution. Second, I am supposed to have asserted that what we in America call hippies and you call Gammler, beatniks, are the new revolutionary class. Far be it from me to assert such a thing. What I was trying to show was that in fact today there are tendencies in society - anarchically unorganized, spontaneous tendencies - that herald a total break with the dominant needs of repressive society. The groups you have mentioned are characteristic of a state of disintegration within the system, which as a mere phenomenon has no revolutionary force whatsoever but which perhaps at some time will be able to play its role in connection with other, much stronger objective forces.

Q. You have said that technically the material and intellectual forces for revolutionary transformation exist already. In your lecture, however, you seem to be speaking of forces for “utopia,” not for the transformation itself, and this question you have not really answered.

M. To answer this question, of course, a second lecture would be necessary. A few remarks: If I have put so much emphasis on the notion of needs and of qualitative difference, that has a lot to do with the problem of transformation. One of the chief factors that has prevented this transformation, though objectively it has been on the agenda for years, is the absence or the repression of the need for transformation, which has to be present as the qualitatively differentiating factor among the
social groups that are to make the transformation. If Marx saw in the proletariat the revolutionary class, he did so also, and maybe even primarily, because the proletariat was free from the repressive needs of capitalist society, because the new needs for freedom could develop in the proletariat and were not suffocated by the old, dominant ones. Today in large parts of the most highly developed capitalist countries that is no longer the case. The working class no longer represents the negation of existing needs. That is one of the most serious facts with which we have to deal. As far as the forces of transformation themselves are concerned, I grant you without further discussion that today nobody is in a position to give a prescription for them in the sense of being able to point and say, “Here you have your revolutionary forces, this is their strength, this and this must be done.”

The only thing I can do is point out what forces potentially make for a radical transformation of the system. Today the classical contradictions within capitalism are stronger than they have ever been before. Especially the general contradiction between the unprecedented development of the productive forces and social wealth on the one hand and of the destructive and repressive application of these forces of production on the other is infinitely more acute today than it has ever been. Second, in a global framework, capitalism today is confronted by anticapitalist forces that already stand in open battle with capitalism at different places in the world. Third, there are also negative forces within advanced capitalism itself, in the United States and also in Europe—and here I do not hesitate to name again the opposition of the intellectuals, especially students.

Today this still seems remarkable to us, but one needs only a little historical knowledge to know that it is certainly not the first time in history that a radical historical transformation has begun with students. That is the case not only here in Europe but also in other parts of the world. The role of students today as the intelligentsia out of which, as you know, the executives and leaders even of existing society are recruited, is historically more important than it perhaps was in the past. In addition there is the moral-sexual rebellion, which turns against the dominant morality and must be taken seriously as a disintegrative factor, as can be seen from the reaction to it, especially in the United States. Finally, probably, here in Europe we should add those parts of the working class that have not yet fallen prey to the process of integration. Those are the tendential forces of transformation, and to evaluate their chances, their strength, and so forth in detail would naturally be the subject of a separate and longer discussion.

Q. My question is directed toward the role of the new anthropology for which you have called, and of those biological needs that are qualitatively new in the framework of a need structure that you have interpreted as historically variable. How does this differ from the theory of revolutionary socialism? Marx in his late writings was of the opinion
that the realm of freedom could be erected only on the basis of the realm of necessity, but that probably means that a free human society could be set up only within and not in abstraction from the framework of natural history, not beyond the realm of necessity. In your call for new biological needs, such as a new vital need for freedom, for happiness that is not repressively mediated, are you implying a qualitative transformation of the physiological structure of man that is derived from his natural history? Do you believe that that is a qualitative possibility today?

**M.** If you mean that with a change in the natural history of mankind the needs which I have designated as new would be able to emerge, I would say yes. Human nature—and for all his insistence on the realm of necessity Marx knew—this human nature is a historically determined nature and develops in history. Of course the natural history of man will continue. The relation of man to nature has already changed completely, and the realm of necessity will become a different realm when alienated labor can be done away with by means of perfected technology and a large part of socially necessary labor becomes a technological experiment. Then the realm of necessity will in fact be changed and we will perhaps be able to regard the qualities of free human existence, which Marx and Engels still had to assign to the realm beyond labor, as developing within the realm of labor itself.

**Q.** If the vital need for freedom and happiness is to be set up as a biological need, how is it to materialize?

**M.** By “materially convertible” you mean: How does it go into effect in social production and finally even in the physiological structure itself? It operates through the construction of a pacified environment. I tried to indicate this in speaking of eliminating the terror of capitalist industrialization. What I mean is an environment that provides room for these new needs precisely through its new, pacified character, that is, that can enable them to be materially, even physiologically converted through a continuous change in human nature, namely through the reduction of characteristics that today manifest themselves in a horrible way: brutality, cruelty, false heroism, false virility, competition at any price. These are physiological phenomena as well.

**Q.** Is there a connection between the rehabilitation of certain anarchistic strategies and the enormity of extra-economic violence which today has become an immediate economic power through internalization, by which I mean that the agents of manipulation know how to internalize bureaucratic and governmental mechanisms of domination?

**M.** But that’s not internalization of violence. If anything has become clear in capitalism it is that purely external violence, good old-fashioned violence, is stronger than it has ever been. I don’t see any internalization at all there. We should not overlook the fact that manipulatory tendencies are not violence. No one compels me to sit in front of my television set for hours, no one forces me to read the idiotic newspapers.
Q. But there I should like to disagree, because internalization means precisely that an illusory liberality is possible—just as the internalization of economic power in classical capitalism meant that the political and moral structure could be liberalized.

M. For me that's simply stretching the concept too far. Violence remains violence, and a system that itself provides the illusory freedom of such things as television sets that I can in fact turn off whenever I want to—which is no illusion—this is not the dimension of violence. If you say that, then you are blurring one of the decisive factors of present society, namely the distinction between terror and totalitarian democracy, which works not with terror but rather with internalization, with mechanisms of coordination: that is not violence. Violence is when someone beats someone else's head in with a club, or threatens to. It is not violence when I am presented with television programs that show the existing state of things transfigured in some way or other.

Q. Is there a connection between the program for a new historically and biologically different structure of needs and a rehabilitation in strategy of those groups that Marx and Engels, with a touch of petit-bourgeois morality, denounced as déclassé?

M. We shall have to distinguish among these déclassé groups. As far as I can see, today neither the lumpenproletariat nor the petit bourgeois have become at all a more radical force than they were before. Here again the role of the intelligentsia is very different.

Q. But don't you think that precisely students are such a déclassé group?

M. No.

Q. Under the conditions of maturity of the productive forces, is it still possible or valid to speak of "necessity," of necessary, objective laws or even tendencies of social development? Must not the role of subjectivity be completely restructured and reevaluated as a new factor in the present period, which is perhaps what legitimizes the reemergence of anarchism?

M. I consider the reevaluation and determination of the subjective factor to be one of the most decisive necessities of the present situation. The more we emphasize that the material, technical, and scientific productive forces for a free society are in existence, the more we are charged with liberating the consciousness of these realizable possibilities. For the indoctrination of consciousness against these possibilities is the characteristic situation and the subjective factor in existing society. I consider the development of consciousness, work on the development of consciousness, if you like, this idealistic deviation, to be in fact one of the chief tasks of materialism today, of revolutionary materialism. And if I give such emphasis to needs and wants, it is meant in the sense of what you call the subjective factor.

One of the tasks is to lay bare and liberate the type of man who wants revolution, who must have revolution because otherwise he will fall
apart. That is the subjective factor, which today is more than a subjective factor. On the other hand, naturally, the objective factor—and this is the one place where I should like to make a correction—is organization. What I have called the total mobilization of the established society against its own potentialities is today as strong and as effective as ever. On the one hand we find the absolute necessity of first liberating consciousness. On the other we see ourselves confronted by a concentration of power against which even the freest consciousness appears ridiculous and impotent. The struggle on two fronts is more acute today than it ever was. On the one hand the liberation of consciousness is necessary, on the other it is necessary to feel out every possibility of a crack in the enormously concentrated power structure of existing society. In the United States, for example, it has been possible to have relatively free consciousness because it simply has no effect.

Q. The new needs, which you spoke of as motive forces for social transformation—to what extent will they be a privilege of the metropoles? To what extent do they presuppose societies that are technically and economically very highly developed? Do you also envisage these needs in the revolution of the poor countries, for example the Chinese or the Cuban Revolution?

M. I see the trend toward these new needs at both poles of existing society, namely in the highly developed sector and in the parts of the third world engaged in liberation struggles. And in fact we see repeated here a phenomenon that is quite clearly expressed in Marxian theory, namely that those who are “free” of the dubious blessings of the capitalist system are those who develop the needs that can bring about a free society. For example, the Vietnamese struggling for liberation do not have to have the need for peace grafted onto them, they have it. They also have need of the defense of life against aggression. These are needs that at this level, at this antipode of established society, are really natural needs in the strictest sense; they are spontaneous. At the opposite pole, in highly developed society, are those groups, minority groups, who can afford to give birth to the new needs or who, even if they can’t afford it, simply have them because otherwise they would suffocate physiologically. Here I come back to the beatnik and hippie movement. What we have here is quite an interesting phenomenon, namely the simple refusal to take part in the blessings of the “affluent society.” That is in itself one of the qualitative changes of need. The need for better television sets, better automobiles, or comfort of any sort has been cast off. What we see is rather the negation of this need. “We don’t want to have anything to do with all this crap.” There is thus potential at both poles.

Q. If the objective basis for a qualitatively different society is present will place so much emphasis on an absolute break between the present and future? Must not the transition be mediated, and does not the idea of an absolute break contradict concrete attempts to bridge the gap?
What I would say in my defense is this: I believe that I have not advocated a break. It is rather that when I look at the situation I can conceive of our definition of a free society only as the determinate negation of the existing one. But one cannot then take the determinate negation to be something that ultimately is nothing more than old wine in new bottles. That is why I have emphasized the break, quite in the sense of classical Marxism. I don't see any inconsistency here. The question implied in yours, namely, how does the break occur and how do the new needs for liberation emerge after it, is precisely what I should have liked to discuss with you. You can of course say, and I say it to myself often enough, if this is all true, how can we imagine these new concepts even arising here and now in living human beings if the entire society is against such an emergence of new needs. This is the question with which we have to deal. At the same time it amounts to the question of whether the emergence of these new needs can be conceived at all as a radical development out of existing ones, or whether instead, in order to set free these needs, a dictatorship appears necessary, which in any case would be very different from the Marxian dictatorship of the proletariat: namely a dictatorship, a counteradministration, that eliminates the horrors spread by the established administration. This is one of the things that most disquiets me and that we should seriously discuss.

Putting aside the choice of dropping out of the system through underground subcultures, how is it possible to engage in heretical activities within the system, for example heretical medicine that does not merely cure people to restore their labor power but makes them conscious of how their labor makes them sick and how they could participate in qualitatively different work?

On the problem as to whether and how the elements you have called heretical can be developed within the established system, I would say the following: In established societies there are still gaps and interstices in which heretical methods can be practiced without meaningless sacrifice, and still help the cause. This is possible. Freud recognized the problem very clearly when he said that psychoanalysis really ought to make all patients revolutionaries. But unfortunately that doesn't work, for one has to practice within the framework of the status quo. Psychoanalysis has to deal with just this contradiction and abstract from extra-medical possibilities. There are still today psychoanalysts who at least remain as faithful as possible to the radical elements of psychoanalysis. And in jurisprudence, for example, there are also quite a few lawyers who work in a heretical way, that is, against the Establishment and for the protection of those accused whom it has cast out, without thereby making their own practice impossible.

The interstices within the established society are still open, and one of the most important tasks is to make use of them to the full.
Q. Is there not a conflict between the sort of needs that arise among the Vietcong and the sort that you have called sensitivity, are they not perhaps incompatible, and does one not perhaps have to choose between them?

M. The first tendencies pointing to a new image of man lie in solidarity with the struggle of the third world. What emerges in the advanced industrial countries as new needs is in the third world not at all a new need but a spontaneous reaction against what is happening.

Q. It seems to me that the needs determining social revolutionary movements are quite old ones. Industrialization requires discipline. Isn’t it a luxury to lump this together with aesthetic Eros?

M. But the need for freedom is not a luxury which only the metropoles can afford. The need for freedom, which spontaneously appears in social revolution as an old need, is stifled in the capitalist world. In a society such as ours, in which pacification has been achieved up to a certain point, it appears crazy at first to want revolution. For we have whatever we want. But the aim here is to transform the will itself so that people no longer want what they now want. Thus the task in the metropoles differs from the task in Vietnam — but the two can be connected.

Q. Does the thesis that the technification of domination undermines domination mean that the bureaucracy or the apparatus provides itself with its own provocation or that it must be permanently provoked as a learning process that makes comprehensible the contradictions and senselessness of this bureaucracy? Or does it mean that we should provoke it because of the menace of fascist terror that would cut off any possibility of change?

M. It surely does not mean the latter, for the status quo itself must be endangered. One cannot turn the argument that radical action will menace the status quo against the necessity of doing so. Technification of domination means that if we rationally think through technological processes to their end, we find that they are incompatible with existing capitalist institutions. In other words, domination that is based on the necessity of exploitation and alienated labor is potentially losing its base. If the exploitation of physical labor power in the process of production is no longer necessary, then this condition of domination is undermined.

Q. Are you saying that labor should be completely abolished, or that labor should be made free of misery?

M. I have wavered in terminology between the abolition of labor and the abolition of alienated labor because in usage labor and alienated labor have become identical. That is the justification for this ambiguity. I believe that labor as such cannot be abolished. To affirm the contrary would be in fact to repudiate what Marx called the metabolic exchange between man and nature. Some control, mastery, and transformation of nature, some modification of existence through labor is inevitable, but
in this utopian hypothesis labor would be so different from labor as we
know it or normally conceive of it that the idea of the convergence of
labor and play does not diverge too far from the possibilities.

Q. Does not revolution become reified when the oppressed hate the
oppressor to the point where the humanistic element gets lost? Is this
reification one that can be undone during, or only after the revolution?

M. A really frightening question. On the one hand, I believe that one must
say that the hatred of exploitation and oppression is itself a humane
and humanistic element. On the other hand there is no doubt that in
the course of revolutionary movements hatred emerges, without which
revolution is just impossible, without which no liberation is possible.
Nothing is more terrible than the sermon, “Do not hate thy opponent,”
in a world in which hate is thoroughly institutionalized. Naturally in the
course of the revolutionary movement itself this hatred can turn into
cruelty, brutality, and terror. The boundary between the two is horribly
and extraordinarily in flux. The only thing that I can at least say about
this is that a part of our work consists in preventing this development as
much as possible, that is to show that brutality and cruelty also belong
necessarily to the system of repression and that a liberation struggle
simply does not need this transmogrification of hatred into brutality
and cruelty. One can hit an opponent, one can vanquish an opponent,
without cutting off his ears, without severing his limbs, without torturing
him.

Q. It seems that you have an ideal of a harmonious society without tolerance
or pluralism. Who will determine the common good in such a society?
Are there to be no antagonisms? This ideal is unrealistic and, if there is
to be no tolerance in resolving antagonisms, it will be undemocratic and
require dictatorship.

M. Either a free society without tolerance is unthinkable, or a free society
does not need tolerance because it is free anyway, so that tolerance does
not have to be preached and institutionalized. A society without conflicts
would be a utopian idea, but the idea of a society in which conflicts
evidently exist but can be resolved without oppression and cruelty is in
my opinion not a utopian idea. With regard to the concept of democracy:
that is of course a very serious matter. If I am to say in one sentence
what I can offer as a momentary answer, it is only that at the moment
no one could be more for a democracy than I am. My objection is only
that in no existing society, and surely not in those which call themselves
democratic, does democracy exist. What exists is a kind of very limited,
illusory form of democracy that is beset with inequalities, while the true
conditions of democracy have still to be created. On the problem of
dictatorship: What I suggested was a question, namely, I cannot imagine
how the state of almost total indoctrination and coordination can turn
into its opposite in an evolutionary way. It seems to me inevitable that
some intervention must occur in some way and that the oppressors must
be suppressed in some way, since they unfortunately will not suppress themselves.

Q. It seemed to me that the center of your paper today was the thesis that transformation of society must be preceded by a transformation of needs. For me this implies that changed needs can only arise if we first abolish the mechanisms that have let the needs come into being as they are. It seems to me that you have shifted the accent toward enlightenment away from revolution.

M. You have defined what is unfortunately the greatest difficulty in the matter. Your objection is that, for new, revolutionary needs to develop, the mechanisms that reproduce the old needs must be abolished. In order for the mechanisms to be abolished, there must first be a need to abolish them. That is the circle in which we are placed, and I do not know how to get out of it.

Q. How is it possible to distinguish false from genuine utopias? For example, has the elimination of domination not occurred owing to social immaturity, or because its elimination is, so to speak, biologically impossible? If someone believes the latter, how can you prove to him that he is mistaken?

M. If it were demonstrable that the abolition of domination is biologically impossible, then I would say, the idea of abolishing domination is utopia. I do not believe that anyone has yet demonstrated this. What is probably biologically impossible is to get away without any repression whatsoever. It may be self-imposed, it may be imposed by others. But that is not identical with domination. In Marxian theory and long before it a distinction was made between rational authority and domination. The authority of an airplane pilot, for example, is rational authority. It is impossible to imagine a condition in which the passengers would tell the pilot what to do. The traffic policeman is another typical example of rational authority. These things are probably biological necessities, but political domination, domination based on exploitation, oppression, is not.

Q. In the advanced sectors of today’s industry and bureaucracy there already, among scientists, technicians, and so on, an alienated form of the integration of work and play – think of planning and strategy games, game theory, and the use of scientific phantasy. How do you estimate the possibility of this activity turning into refusal within the power structure as suggested for example by Serge Mallet?

M. My objection to Mallet’s evaluation of technicians is that precisely this group is today among the highest paid and rewarded beneficiaries of the system. For what you have said to be possible would require a total change not only of consciousness but of the whole situation. My second objection is that as long as this group is considered in isolation as the potentially revolutionary force one arrives only at a technocratic revolution, that is a transformation of advanced capitalism into
technocratic state capitalism, but certainly not at what we mean when we speak of a free society.

Q. With regard to a new theory of man: How do the needs of peace, freedom, and happiness concretely become translated into biological, bodily needs?

M. I would say that the need for peace as a vital need in the biological sense does not need to be materially translated because in this sense it is already a material need. The need for peace, for example, would be expressed in the impossibility of mobilizing people for military service. That would not be a material translation of the need for peace but a material need itself. The same applies to the other needs I mentioned.

Q. Back to the problem of the qualitative break. The latter seems to presuppose a crisis, and indeed there is one. But how can we tell when the crisis has progressed to the point of a break? Or does the crisis just turn into a break? How can the minority that has consciousness of what is possible intervene in society to prevent utopia from being blocked off?

M. I would see an expansion of the crisis in certain symbolic facts and events, events that somehow represent a turning point in the development of the system. Thus, for example, a forced ending of the war in Vietnam would represent a considerable expansion of the crisis of existing society.

Q. In connection with the problems of a new theory of man: this new theory has already found its advocates in the third world, namely Fanon, who says, “The goal is to establish the total man on earth,” and Guevara, who says, “We are building the man of the twenty-first century.” I should like to ask you how your ideas of a new theory of man are connected with these two declarations?

M. I had not ventured to say so, but after you yourself have said it, and you seem to know something about it, I can now say that I believe in fact, although I have not mentioned it here, that at least in some of the liberation struggles in the third world and even in some of the methods of development of the third world this new theory of man is putting itself in evidence. I would not have mentioned Fanon and Guevara as much as a small item that I read in a report about North Vietnam and that had a tremendous effect on me, since I am an absolutely incurable and sentimental romantic. It was a very detailed report, which showed, among other things, that in the parks in Hanoi the benches are made only big enough for two and only two people to sit on, so that another person would not even have the technical possibility of disturbing.

* * *
Merseburger: Sadly ladies and gentlemen, the war in Vietnam does not only drive rabble-rousers and rioters out into the streets, as was proclaimed by a member of parliament last weekend in Bad Dürkheim. For in the condemnation of this war, men of the most differing political persuasions join together. There are avowed Democrats, conservative Gaullists, pacifists, and communists all in the same camp. In America and also in German universities, however, the opposition to the war in Vietnam becomes the crystallization of a movement which calls itself the “New Left.” And one of the prophets of these young radicals, one of the theoreticians of this “New Left” is Herbert Marcuse.

In Kapital, Karl Marx decisively describes the character of the prophets. The prophet dreams up a new and free society which is not based on coercion and violence. The way to this society is still barred by the antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Marcuse agrees also that this antagonism determines unfreedom, in which he says we all live. Only, today it is, and I quote a “comfortable, frictionless, and reasonable democratic unfreedom.”

Now what does that mean? I shall attempt to sketch this for you briefly before the beginning of our discussion with Marcuse.

It means that the mechanisms of highly industrialized society—Marcuse simply calls them the system—have become so flexible that the old class opposition can no longer become the vehicle of a necessary historical transformation. For the capitalistic system nowadays is in a position to produce so much that nearly all needs can be satisfied. This in turn leads to the fact that the oppositional forces which originally desired a change in principle, no longer question the system, in principle. Opposition thus shrinks to a discussion of alternative political practices or, as Marcuse says, to alternative political practices within the status quo. In the jargon of the Marcuse...
adepts, this means that opposition operates in terms of stabilizing the system.

At the same time, and this is very important, this whole system which produces so rationally, according to Marcuse, is so irrational, so unreasonable within itself, by means of the fact that it produces superfluous needs just to keep the production apparatus going. Considered globally, there is unheard of misery side by side with unheard of wealth and waste. There are unheard of possibilities of productivity side by side with, until now, unheard of possibilities of destruction.

Summed up in terms of its key phrases, one could formulate Marcuse's program roughly thus: instead of economic freedom he calls for freedom for the economy or, more concretely, freedom from the control by economic forces, freedom from an economic system which, as he thinks, obeys nowadays its own laws and not the laws of reasonable human beings. In order to attain this freedom, Marcuse thinks there is a need of, above all, spiritual freedom, and this freedom he understands in the following manner. It is necessary, so he says, that individual thinking become possible again, for it is largely prevented today by the means of mass communication and mass education. In an exaggerated manner, he once formulated this demand as the doing away with public opinion, together with its producers. It is from here, ladies and gentlemen, that the radical students gather their ideological wherewithal for their campaigns which are not only directed against a powerful German publisher. Who, now, is this man? What strategy does he recommend to the New Left, and where is the difference between this new left and the old extreme left?

Herbert Marcuse, who is now sixty-nine comes from bourgeois parents in Berlin. The war turned him into a revolutionary. In 1918 he is a member of the soldiers' council in Berlin-Reinickendorf. During the Weimar Republic his sympathies first extend toward Rosa Luxemburg, and later to anyone who in his opinion represents the case of the revolution honestly and without compromise. Already in December of 1932, he considers the Weimar Democracy a lost cause and goes to New York in 1934. In 1941 he advises the American government in psychological warfare. Today he teaches philosophy at the state university of California at San Diego.

Like Marx, Marcuse dreams the dream of a new world without classes, without violence. Marcuse is a utopian.

Our first question: which is the most important condition for his beautiful new world?

Marcuse: What would be necessary for that would be indeed the rising of a new type of human being with a new scale of values, with a new valuation, and with new goals. Thus it does not suffice to continue the developing of the presently existing technological and other

Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment 265
productive forces along the same lines. What would be necessary is indeed a break and a transvaluation of values.

PM: The totalitarian system of the communist type, does that have better starting chances for the race into this beautiful new world?

HM: At the moment it does not look like that. But I have to maintain the simple fact that there is planning and that a changing of the resisting forces fundamentally does not occur. This opens the possibility for the socialist countries and those which today call themselves socialist to go in different directions. A political revolution, however, would be still necessary.

PM: In Berlin you said that this totalitarian system of communist coinage would have to be attacked from the left. What does that mean?

HM: That means that the fundamental presuppositions of a socialist society must not be given up in any way, namely planning and the nationalization of the means of production. However, it is necessary to strive for a radicalization of the control of these productive forces and for a democratic participation—democratic, however, only after what I have called a new type of man, new goals and values have already become effective.

PM: But doesn't the new left have actually better chances in the Western system, which, as bad as it may be, nonetheless allows for a formal opposition and for a press which can print everything for attacking the system from the left, which one is not allowed to print in the East.

HM: That is a bit too optimistic in regard to the press. God knows, one cannot say that, for example, the American press prints everything which is essential to the opposition.

PM: But your books are printed.

HM: My books are printed ...

PM: You can speak freely.

HM: ... I can speak freely. Because of my age and because of my education I have a privileged position. All of this is allowed me because it is relatively harmless or altogether harmless. But one must not underestimate the fact that those who are in a less fortunate position have for example extraordinary difficulties in finding a job.

PM: In the totalitarian communist system, you would not, however, be able to do any of this. How do you then conceive of a revolution from the left?

HM: In the West?

PM: In the East.

HM: That I can imagine only, if I can imagine it at all, if persons and groups come into power which can pursue a politics of pacification and of what I called a new positing of values in contrast to present politics. After all, we have seen enough changes of government in Russia. Why should one not be able to conceive of a change government in this direction?
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

PM: You once said that for the old Marxists, for the veteran Marxists, the new left is a nightmare. Yet, if I hear you right, there is no great difference in the positing of goals between the old and the new left.

HM: Well the great difference lies in the fact that the new left no longer considers the industrial workers, the proletariat as Marx called them, to be the revolutionary societal class. There is also another very decisive difference, and that is the fact that the new left expects more and different things from socialism than what can be found in the traditional definitions.

PM: What is it that it expects more?

HM: A qualitative difference in human relations, if I may say so, and a qualitative difference in the institutions. That means that socialism does not consist in working more productively, i.e., more rationally, than in capitalist societies. Instead it means that there come about truly human relations of a new quality, namely, free human relations. It means that the struggle for existence, the competitive struggle on a national and international scale is no longer necessary. It means that what Marx once called the abolishing of labor, i.e., the abolishing of no longer necessary labor, of alienated labor, is, in fact, gradually placed on the agenda.

PM: What is it that the new left can use for a support if there are no revolutionary classes any longer?

HM: The new left nowadays can actually only rely upon the fact that in developed industrial society there are all the intellectual and material resources which make possible such a qualitatively new society. That is a historical fact. It is merely necessary—and the 'merely' is naturally in quotation marks—to execute this decisive change.

PM: But in America today, according to your theory, there are, apart from the student opposition, actually only the non-privileged, such as the radical blacks or the intellectuals, on which the left could rely. But that is not enough to make a revolution?

HM: Certainly that is not enough. I have been misunderstood and accused of seeing the new and great revolutionary force in the intellectuals of today. That is of course nonsense. The intellectuals today articulate, and give voice to what is objectively there in the historical situation—as I have just tried to indicate. The black movements and those of the other non-privileged groups contribute directly or indirectly toward revealing the breaks and mistakes in the system. They weaken the system, but whether they are themselves a revolutionary force is a question which cannot yet be answered today at all.

PM: At least according to the theoretical approaches of the new left, there is a new working class. I believe you yourself spoke of it in Berlin, if I may for a moment leaf through your lecture. You said that those were the engineers and technicians in the material production who possess key positions. These however, as you said yourself, are the favorite children of the system...
I'm: That's precisely it.

PM: How do you expect to bring them into this revolution?

IIM: You have here the objective contradiction that these groups are the favored child of the system, that they are the best paid and far extremely well. To a large degree they are dependent on support from the government and from industry, in their scientific work. At the same time, precisely the same people, although not today, but in terms of the tendency of things, will occupy key positions in the production process, positions which would enable them to produce a change if they wanted it. But the contradiction exists and naturally we must not cover it over.

PM: In your lecture in Berlin, you said that the preaching of total non-violence only reinforces the existent power which generally is identified as suppression. Does that not mean, in a concrete application to the state of affairs in America, that you in fact recommend to the blacks to resort to violence?

HM: What the blacks are doing in America today has nothing to do with any recommendation; it doesn't even need a specially organized propaganda. But, it is simply a rebellion against a state of affairs and against conditions which have become insufferable. It is indeed up to now a spontaneous movement. The attempt of giving this movement a political character is, as you know, of recent date, and so far we cannot see how large the number will be of blacks and other minorities which will follow this new lead.

PM: But in principle, you affirm a positive terror, a terror which could liberate repressive society from some repression.

IIM: I would not call that terror. I am for any movement, any possibility which could mitigate or maybe even suspend the existing terror and the existing repression.

PM: If necessary, even by means of terror?

HM: If necessary, yes. But then one would have to define very precisely what the [word] 'necessary' means. We can see that it is very easy to trap me in these things. And I do not want to avoid that. There is a revolutionary terror: it has existed in every revolution; it existed in the American revolution, in the French and English revolutions. This terror is very far removed from cruelty, from brutality, from torture or the slaughtering of the innocent, whatever it may be.

PM: Up to which point did the terror of the French Revolution become positive?

IIM: The terror in the French Revolution was positive only to the point where in fact it concerned those who actively worked for the reconstitution of the monarchy.

PM: When the revolution devoured its children...

IIM: When the revolution devoured its children, then it began to become a truly brutal terror.
The developing countries play a particular role in the theory and strategy of the new left. I believe that you yourself once indicated that there could be an alliance between the agricultural proletariat in the underdeveloped countries and the opposition to the system in the capitalist centers.

Yes. Such an alliance, in my opinion, is essential and, in my opinion, essentially bases itself on a common interest. The liberation fronts in the developing countries also fight for the elimination of insufferable living conditions, as do the blacks and other minorities in the highest developed industrial countries. In other words, this is not an artificial or political alliance but an alliance which results from the solidarity of interests. After all, any effective organizational ties are as yet nonexistent. We can merely see the beginnings.

But, in concrete application to the American situation, does that not mean that radical black leaders would have to ally themselves with Fidel Castro and the guerillas in the mountains of Bolivia?

It only seems natural to me that ties have been made, and that there have been attempts to develop somehow a common strategy, or at least—if you don’t like the word theory—for a common evaluation of the global situation. And, for example, the black leaders who have done that, in this case simply followed historical conditions.

This suggests the vision of the possible reality of the new society, precisely because of this pact, even if that is in the distant future. And that reminds me a little of a Chinese theory which speaks of a rise of the world village against the world city, i.e., of a rise of the young underdeveloped nations against the established capitalist ones, but also against nations such as the Soviet nation, which consequently is already doing well, and which has developed properly. How do you stand in relation to Mao?

Now you want to identify me with Mao. In principle, I don’t mind. The leader of the Chinese revolution, whatever he may do, is one of the great world historical personalities. The theory which you mentioned, I consider not adequate. For it underestimates the role which the developed industrial countries themselves have to play. In spite of all objections and limitations, I do believe that Marx was correct in relation to this. That is the fact that if the transformation does not occur in the highest developed industrial countries themselves, all attacks, all forces, from the underdeveloped or developing countries would come to no avail. They can accelerate the process but in my opinion, true change still depends on a change in the industrial countries themselves.

* * *
HERBERT MARCUSE: PHILOSOPHER OF THE NEW LEFT
(KCET, MAY 1968)

Tom Pettit (v/o): Herbert Marcuse who is almost unknown to the general public has profoundly influenced student protest movements throughout the world. He is the philosopher of the New Left.

Herbert Marcuse: But I don’t refuse to make a moral judgment on violence. I think we cannot make a moral judgment on violence in general. You would have to tell me what kind of violence and where it was practiced and why.

TP (v/o): Professor Marcuse teaches philosophy at the San Diego campus of the University of California. His writings about the frustrations of modern man in contemporary Western society have been especially popular in Europe. Deeply influenced by Marx and by Freud, the German born Marcuse takes a radical and pessimistic view of life in 1968.

HM: Nobody can tell.

TP: Why are you so pessimistic? Don’t we live better today than say 1910 or 1900. Isn’t life better today. Aren’t people healthier. Don’t they live longer.

HM: If you tell me who is the we, I may be able to answer more specifically. But let me give right away my general answer. If you take the world as a whole and do not focus on the richest and most prosperous society today, I think I would say that mankind is not better.

TP: Why?

HM: Well, let me give you a very few examples. Since, you said 1910. We had two world wars with the greatest number of victims ever proportionately we ever had in history. We had the Nazi concentration camps, eh. We had the massacre in Indonesia. We have the war in Vietnam.

*Editors’ note: "Herbert Marcuse: Philosopher of the New Left," contains a previously unpublished ten-page transcript of an interview Marcuse gave to the public television affiliate KCET in Southern California in May 1968 with Tom Pettit. This interview provides another example of how even the liberal media of his day framed Marcuse as a fringe, revolutionary activist who advocated unmeasured violence against the state. Marcuse offers one of his most candid responses to the claim that his thought and politics promoted the view that, as the interviewer Tom Pettit quipped, "counter-violence is ok, in your view?" Marcuse uprooted this flimsy liberal version of tolerance and violence, arguing: "it is not a question of when and where it [violence] is necessary. Necessary in order to keep alive yourself and what you stand for." Pettit’s simple reply of “Ah hah, I have it now. Sometimes it’s...” was cut off by Marcuse stating “You don’t have it because you will never get me. Not because I’m afraid, but because I want to be honest. You will never get me to say that I advocate violence.” Again, both this interview and the previous one demonstrate Marcuse’s ability as a public intellectual to cogently undermine lazy and misleading interpretations of his work and political views.
Vietnam. We still have the ghettos in the United States, and as I think is amply demonstrated, the gap between the rich and the poor populations of the world has got bigger and not smaller. In other words the poor are really getting poorer and the rich are getting richer, and that gives the impression that we both live better generally than before.

TP: How does the student revolution fit into that?

HM: It fits in because precisely these boys and girls have a very clear consciousness. Or, let me add a very strong unconscious feeling of what is going on and what they can expect in their life later on that they will probably, if they are lucky, land good jobs in which they cannot live as human beings, which make them work from morning to evening, and work which they consider, and I think correctly, as inhuman, as nerve-wracking, as stupefying, and so on. And that their life will be in all its comfort and prosperity, empty, meaningless, miserable in view with all the great capabilities society has to create decent living conditions for free human beings.

TP: A lot of people seem to think that student energies ought to be channeled into more traditional projects, and there's been some expression of happiness, say, a lot of the students have gone to work for political candidates, like Senator McCarthy or Senator Kennedy. What do you make of that student involvement?

HM: I don't know. I mean, the students I know here and with whom I work, would consider this as spending time and energy within the establishment. And they would have a very strong feeling that neither Kennedy nor McCarthy would really change very much, maybe variations and modifications in policy, domestic and foreign. But what they object to and what they find increasingly intolerable wouldn't change.

TP: Do you think it's a waste of time to work through the established political parties?

HM: That depends on your objectives. If your objectives are, and by no means that is the general objective of the student movement, not only reforms but indeed a change of the society as a whole, then indeed it's not a way to get.

TP: What about the Republican party? What do you think of Richard Nixon?

HM: Don't ask me about American election politics, because I will easily appear even more negative than I am anyway.

TP: Ah... That's a proper subject for discussion...

HM: Yes, but I don't think it's a terribly important subject...eh... to tell you...eh... very seriously. I don't think it's terribly important in view of what's going on in the world at large today. I mean, if you look at what is going on in France today, what is going on in China today, what is going on in Czechoslovakia today, in Vietnam, the question whether
Kennedy makes it or McCarthy makes it is of minor importance. I would consider indeed the election of Nixon, not to mention other non-candidates in the Republican camp, as disastrous and as a step towards a regime in this country, which although...you should not call it fascist, would very definitely be highly repressive.

TP: Professor Marcuse, what do you make of the poor people's march in Washington? There don't seem to be very many young people in it.

HM: No, there are not many young people in it and, you see, I think that is again working with means which today just don't work anymore. I mean the way things are shaping up is already, I think, pretty bad. I doubt that they will exert any real pressure on congress, that too, I would say, today is appearing as weak.

TP: Do you think that non-violence, as an effective mode of civil rights work is passè?

HM: In the first place, I don't think we have a free choice. In the second place, you know the well-known phrase that violence breeds violence. I think that we have seen abundantly clear, that non-violence also breeds violence. So, there doesn't seem to be a choice. I mean, this society is so permeated with violence, that you are forced to make the distinction between the violence of defense and the violence of aggression, or between violence and counter-violence. In the one way or the other unfortunately it is there.

TP: Oh... is Martin Luther King wrong?

HM: He wasn't wrong, but even he, as you see, could not prevent violence; as usual there was violence on the one side or the other. He was killed. That is violence.

TP: What is the relationship between the black revolution or the civil rights movement, however you care to describe it, and the student revolution?

HM: I think you can only try to establish a connection between the militant ghetto movement and the student movement. There I see the common ground in the rejection not only of certain evils of society, but also of the whole way of life. They demand a different way of living. They demand different values, different objectives and not only certain reforms. This is a vast difference and is, I think, a common ground.

TP: Did the student revolution spring out of the civil rights movement?

HM: Yes, I think it was sparked by the civil rights movement, where they for the first time saw the American democracy in action at least in the south. And was then even more sparked by the war in Vietnam. And that it still is to a great extent.

TP: Is that true abroad as in this country?

HM: Abroad, there is a big difference. There is no risk conflict. Neither in France, nor in Germany, nor are these two countries directly involved in the war in Vietnam.

TP: But how do you account for the emergence of the student movement?
HM: Because the basic features of the society are the same. In Germany as well as in France they feel the pressure of a very strong authoritarianism, that does not visibly assert itself in a dictatorial government, it is much more the pressure of a standardized conformist and, in the view of the students, a highly corrupt and hypocritical society. And they experience this immediately enough in order to revolt.

TP: Czechoslovakia?

HM: There it is quite different. I mean, there it is the attempt to get rid of the still existing features of Stalinist repression. Direct repression – and a very stupid one.

TP: How important are you personally for the students? How do you assess your role?

HM: That I don’t know. I assess my own role as a man, as a social and political philosopher trying to understand what is going on and to criticize our society on a verbal scale without being committed to any ideology. And, I think that it somehow has a ???* that I’m trying to give it at a route of what I think is evil today without being committed to any orthodoxy – be it socialist or otherwise.

TP: You are aware of those saying: Marx, Mao and Marcuse?

HM: I know, you can never prevent propaganda. Never anticipate what turn it would take. I mean, I am, as known, a student of Marx. I have read Mao. The internal connection between him and me is not entirely clear to me, but, as I say, I cannot do anything about these things. But with Mao they probably mean (I think that in that respect it is understandable), the un-orthodox, non-Stalinist approach to socialism.

TP: Well, how is it, professor, that in this country of unprecedented prosperity that there can emerge so powerful forces of discontent?

HM: I believe that it is precisely because of the prosperity that you have a so tremendous spread of discontent. Because this prosperity gives people, consciously or unconsciously an idea of a society which is so rich technically as well as materially could really do to create a decent way of life for free human beings. And this prosperity at the same time, consciously or unconsciously, shows them how many resources are wasted, methodically wasted, abused. How instead of construction, destruction is practiced on an ever enlarged scale. And, this leads to a kind of schizophrenic existence, that constantly vacillates between experiencing what could be done, experiencing the evils of society, and at the same time enjoying the relative comfort and the relative casiness of society.

TP: What are you saying? Is it better for everyone to be uniformly poor?

* Editors' note:
The question marks are in the original transcript.
HM: It is never better to be poor. Never. What I do say is that a great deal of our productive forces today are wasted and channeled into destructive forces, and that indeed, these abused dimensions of the productive forces could be cut out altogether.

TP: What do you mean destructive uses?

HM: For example, the entire military establishment.

TP: Well, setting that aside.

HM: For example, planned obsolescence. For example, the production of innumerable brands and gadgets who are in the last analysis all the same. The production of innumerable different marks of automobiles which in the last analysis does not warrant this waste of time, energy and capital simply in order to make some slight change in the model and the looks of whatever it is, and the incredible amount of time, intelligence are wasted in publicity for all these things. All of that out, you would achieve a budget with which you can, without much exaggeration, eliminate much of the poverty and misery on earth today. I only wanted to point out, I believe that in this society an incredible amount of aggressiveness and destructiveness is accumulated precisely because of the empty prosperity which then simply erupts, and erupts on an international level, for example in the war in Vietnam. It erupts on a very different level here at home. For example, the language of our newspapers, in the violent words and images of our televisions, and so on, and so on.

TP: Well, there's a theory which I gather has some currency among young people both white and black that violence is not only a positive good, but it is a therapeutic value for the participants in violence. Do you agree with that theory?

HM: I must tell you, I can't think of anyone I know who would say that violence itself is a good. The way it presents itself to those kids I know and those people I know, is that violence is there anyway. Violence is there as institutionalized in the establishment, in the police. And sooner or later, they will have to confront this violence unless their protest remains merely a harmless ritual without any affect. And they are getting sick and tired of waiting and working within the framework of the increasingly narrow democratic legality. But they certainly do not like violence, certainly don't exult in violence. It is a fact. And with a fact you have to cope.

TP: If I understand the theory, there is supposed to be some redeeming virtue for participants in violence. That it lets them work out their frustrations and get them out of their systems. And that this somehow does them some good. That therefore, it is a positive social good to engage in violence.

HM: No, you see that I consider a vulgar psychological interpretation which is in addition not applicable because it completely overlooks the motives and objectives of the protest movement. Neither consciously
or unconsciously can you explain that in terms of personal frustration, of hatred against daddy, or love to mommy, or whatever it may be. I mean this is a childish application of psychoanalysis which does not take into consideration the very real political issues and the very real experiences one feels.

**TP:** I gather you are a bit ambivalent about the use of violence?

**HM:** What do you mean by ambivalent?

**TP:** That you have mixed feelings. That you sometimes think it is good, and other times think it's not.

**HM:** I think that anyone who loves violence for the sake of violence is a fatally sick human being. I don't know of anyone who would preach violence for the sake of violence. What we are confronted with is sometimes the dire necessity of defending one's self against violence. And if you defend yourself against violence, you are yourself violent. If somebody falls upon you on the street, and tries to strangle you, and you want to get rid of him, you don't turn your other cheek. You become yourself violent. But there is we talked about the difference between the violence of defense and the violence of aggression. There is that well known proposition, I don't know where it originated, whether in this country or in Europe, but I certainly found it widely accepted in Europe on the part of the protest movement. "Violence against things, yes. Violence against persons, no." That seems to me [to] indicate very clearly what that movement has in mind.

**TP:** Well, there certainly was violence against people in the Paris riots.

**HM:** Counter-violence. That I have seen. The students were perfectly peaceful, and the police got orders, first to clear the corridor of the Sorbonne, and then to clear the streets. And you know that they don't do that in the way of a nursemaid singing the baby to sleep.

**TP:** Counter-violence is ok, in your view.

**HM:** It is not a question whether or not it is ok. It is a question of when and where it is necessary. Necessary in order to keep alive yourself and what you stand for.

**TP:** Ah hah, I have it now. Sometimes it's ... 

**HM:** You don't have it because you will never get me. Not because I'm afraid, but because I want to be honest. You will never get me to say that I advocate violence. If I did I would say so. In this respect, I am by no means a coward, but I don’t think that I can take the responsibility of advocating violence, and I think I have made it quite clear in the last sentence of the essay on "Repressive Tolerance" I wrote. The kids of today who go out on the street and risk their heads and perhaps even their life in protesting for what they believe in know what they are doing, and nobody, at least the educator, has the right to tell them not to do that. Theirs is a risk. I sitting in an armchair here and taking no risk whatsoever have no right to interfere.
TP: How do you see the student protest movement in terms of goals. Most people seem to feel that they have no constructive aim. It seems to be a lot of restless thrashing about, and that there is no positive program, is there one that is not visible to most of us, or is it a characteristic of the student revolution that there is no singleness of purpose?

HM: You see I believe that this accusation of being only negative or too negative and having nothing positive to offer is a very easy way of denouncing the whole movement of the opposition. If you want to change the established conditions, you have to at first be negative. That is to say whatever they may be, that would have to be specified, they have to be changed, they have to be eliminated. Negative. Now, in selecting the means for alteration, the positive goal must already be present. Otherwise you would indeed have exactly what you said, merely a situation in which all you know and all you do is work for the destruction of the established conditions, and don't give a damn about what is coming after. Nor do you know what is coming after, or know what you want. But this is certainly not the case with the student movement. They know perfectly well what they want, and I think we talked about it before. They want a society without this methodical and systematic waste of resources, without this constant creation of brutalizing and moralizing needs and satisfaction, a society in which human beings can really determine the way they want to live. And not only in a very nebulous philosophical way, but literally determine the way in which they work, what kind of work they want to do, how they want to seek and define their satisfactions. All of this to me now belongs to the concept of freedom, and without that they think our concept of freedom is mere ideology within the revolution, and in addition, we believe that today such a society could indeed be created. Under such conditions the traditional concepts collapse completely.

TP: What replaces them?

HM: What replaces, that is why I believe the events in Paris are so highly significant. There you had a beginning with the student movement in sort confined to the university and to the badly needed university reforms. And then realizing, experiencing, that the university is one part, aspect of the society as a whole, and going beyond the university, and taking as target the evils of the entire society. Now, the whole thing was spontaneous. There were nuclei of organization, but whatever leaders there were came up to prominence in the process of the struggle itself. They were not those really in any conspiratorial way organizing the movement. And then, it spread, and nobody really knows how, from the students to the workers. Again, against the organized tribunals. And especially the Communist-controlled tribunals. The Communists controlled the CGT in France, first opposed the strike and the occupation internally, and gave in only after they were afraid the movement would get out of hand.
What we don’t know yet ...

A spontaneous, how do you call that, internal combustion. That one day everything suddenly stops functioning as it did in France. France was perfectly well for years and years. And now this little, elegantly little thing the student movement sparks, starting with occupations and other means of protest and opposition which paralyzed the whole country. That is very different from the established pattern of Marxist, as well as non-Marxist [politics].

But from what you have said so far, there is no definition of concrete goals other than destruction of the present system.

Listen I must tell you frankly, and I think I speak not only for myself, that to us, whether you want to say the New Left or my students, or I, or whatever you want to, a society which does have to wage the war in Vietnam, a society which does not have to intervene, set up, or support corrupt military dictatorships in all corners of the globe. A society which can move, which can eliminate the ghettos, and which can bring the subsistence level of the one third of the American population that still lives in hunger, up to a human, humane level. This is a very positive goal. I don’t see anything negative, or vague, or abstract about it. No? You still are not convinced. I give up.

Herbert Marcuse who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s, is a frank advocate of the political left. It is ironic that he proposes denying free speech and academic freedom for the radical right. Yet, in an essay published three years ago he said the rights of free speech and assembly should be withdrawn from what he termed regressive movements. His view of the means necessary to attain his view of freedom is the truly controversial idea of Herbert Marcuse. Goodnight.

* * *

VARIETIES OF HUMANISM: HERBERT MARCUSE TALKS WITH HARVEY WHEELER*

Can dialogue replace cold war in the confrontation between Eastern and Western Europe? Recently a group of Europeans and Americans met at the Center to explore the possibilities. The following articles were prepared for, or grew out of, their meeting.

Editors' note:
In “Varieties of Humanism” (published in Center Magazine 1, 5 (July 1968) pp. 12–15) Herbert Marcuse talks with political scientist and Center Magazine fellow Harvey Wheeler on different versions of Marxist politics in the East and West. As part of a special issue for the Center Magazine, a publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. Wheeler and Marcuse discuss
Professor Marcuse, you are considered one of the most influential people in a relatively recent movement that is sometimes called Marxist Humanism. The first thing I'd like to find out about is what the term means. How does it differ from other kinds of Marxism? How does it differ from other kinds of Humanism?

M: I am not happy about the term Marxist Humanism. To me it is redundant. I disagree with the widespread tendency to read only the early writings of Marx and find the humanism only there, completely disregarding the fact that what Marxist Humanism really is appears in Das Kapital and in his later writings, namely, to put it as simply as possible, the building of a world without the domination or the exploitation of man by man. And inasmuch as this new world would require a completely different society with completely different institutions and completely different human relationships, Marxist Humanism is at the same time the theory and the strategy of revolution.

W: There are probably thousands of kinds of humanism, but three of them, I'd say, are most prominent: Renaissance Humanism, Christian Humanism, and more recently, Existentialist Humanism. Is it possible to distinguish these humanisms from what you have in mind?

M: Yes. Marxist Humanism is different because it calls for a form of existence in which men can determine their own way of living, their own needs, their own way of satisfying and developing these needs, and so exist as free human beings. This distinguishes Marxist Humanism definitely and ultimately from Christianity.

W: From Christian Humanism, but not necessarily from Renaissance Humanism.

M: Renaissance Humanism was a very confined humanism. It was limited to an intellectual elite because a vast majority of the population had neither the means nor the time to develop their personalitics; they were the ones engaged in the dirty work. Only a very small number was capable of achieving the humanist ideal.

W: You would say, then, that what is shared by Marxist and Renaissance Humanism becomes, in Marxist Humanism, thoroughly democratized.

M: Yes. Thoroughly democratized.

key differences between the New Left in the U.S. and Europe, as well as the label attributed to Marcuse as the leader of both. In this interview, Marcuse continues his longtime disagreement with various strains of Marxist humanism (and humanism in general), and argues that Marx should not be separated into a "young" and "old" period, where the former is his humanist phase and the latter his critique of political economy—rather Marcuse asserts here again that the Marx of Capital Volume 1, for example, is just as much a humanist as Marx of the 1844 Economic and Philosophy Manuscritps.
Jean-Paul Sartre is a Marxist, and I suppose it follows from the title of his book, *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, that he is a Marxist Humanist. But is there some distinction in your mind between Marxist Humanism and the existentialist variety?

There is a considerable distinction. In the first place I don't think it is fair to refer to Sartre's book today because he has explicitly and implicitly indicated that he no longer holds this position. Politically and theoretically he has gone far beyond it.

In that case we have to refer to the life that this doctrine has of its own, without regard to Sartre's own beliefs.

I agree with what has been said about the way in which existentialism has defined man's freedom—that it is a dreadful freedom. One of the most objectionable of Sartre's concepts was that man can be free even in a concentration camp, because he always retains the liberty to reject his fate by protesting and being shot. I think this is a caricature of human freedom. But today Sartre has gone far beyond this.

You've become celebrated in somewhat unlikely places, namely *Time* and *Life*.

Yes. I'm very much worried about this. At the same time it is a beautiful verification of my philosophy, which is that in this society everything can be co-opted, everything can be digested.

And you become part of the Establishment.

That's right. I can become part of the Establishment and it serves me right.

*Time* has referred to you as the prophet of Europe's New Left, and of course we know that Europe's New Left is now in revolt. What is new about Europe's New Left and how is it different from the American New Left?

Common to both is that they no longer adhere to the old ideologies, including the Marxist ideology, where these ideologies are obviously denied by the facts. There is no longer, for example, the exclusive focusing on the working classes as the only agents of change. What seems to me most important in the European New Left is the deep conviction that unless a socialist society is *essentially* different from the established society, no matter how good it may be it is not worth fighting for.

Is this a criticism of the Eastern collectivist democracies?

Yes. Because the New Left sees them mainly as replacing one form of control and domination by another. At the same time the New Left believes, and I share this belief, that the socialist societies of the East still have the potential of developing into a genuine socialism.

They don't have the original sin of property relationship at their core and this gives them a possibility of ultimate freedom. As you say, they have abandoned the traditional element in Marxism of class. But what can be the agency of revolutionary change if the working class is no longer regarded in this way?
M: I have been bothered about this for a long time, and I'm afraid I cannot give you a satisfactory answer. The only thing I can say is that it seems to me wrong to go around looking for agents of historical change. They probably will arise and become identifiable only during the process of change itself. At the same time one cannot become defeatist and say there are no visible agents of change. Our work, as it proceeds, probably helps to create them.

W: If one actually abandons the dialectical mechanism producing a revolutionary class, one has abandoned a great deal of Marxist theory. What would you make of the hypothesis that the agency of revolution is no longer to be found inside the nation-state but rather on a world level, where the third world, so-called, becomes the external proletariat and is, in effect, the “working class”—in the Marxist definition—of the entire industrial combine of the West?

M: I would go a long way with this conception. In fact, I think it is a genuine dialectical development of the Marxian concept. Corporate capitalism is now a global system, and what may appear today as an external proletariat is actually an internal proletariat in terms of the world, in terms of the global interests and global power of capitalism. The third world forces, the heirs of the Marxian proletariat, are in this sense very definitely within the dominion of corporate capitalism as it exists today.

W: This makes an interesting tie between the struggle of the African people for independence and freedom and the struggle of the minority group inside America, the Negroes. In terms of the world struggle they cease to become a minority. The argument we always make against the Negro revolution is that a minority cannot pull off a revolution. But in the terms we have been following here, they cease to be a minority and become a potentially effective vanguard of a revolutionary movement.

M: On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that at this stage the links between the black people in this country and the black people in Africa are practically non-existent.

W: That's true ... Let's go back to the New Left because I would like to know what differences there are between the European New Left and the American New Left. One of them, I take it, is that the American New Left is not Marxist in foundation and the European New Left apparently has—what?—a developing or an evolutionary Marxist orientation.

M: Yes, I would call it a neo-Marxist development.

W: Are there other differences? The American New Left, for example, is very emotionally involved in the struggle for participatory democracy in a striving for community, for building new communities that are democratic and unalienated. Is there any of this in the European New Left?

M: There is, but in a very different way because the European New Left operates in a very different context. It operates in societies where a large
part of the labor movement is still at least potentially radical and Marxist, and so participatory democracy can assume much more concrete and real forms; for example, in the participation of labor in management. This is very strong in Yugoslavia, among other places, but in the United States it wouldn't make any sense, because the participation of labor in management would not mean any radical political change for the better; in fact, it would probably result in worse.

W: At this particular moment the papers are full of the demonstrations in West Germany over the incident that involved one of your disciples, Rudi Dutschke. Why is he so significant in the New Left? He appears to have almost a prophetic role.

M: I met Rudi only about a year ago, in Berlin. He is a highly intelligent, honest, and active student, one of the great hopes of all those who work for a better society. The way in which he organized demonstrations and found new forms of organization and so on is absolutely amazing. The Springer Press, which has a monopoly, I believe, of about 70 per cent of the decisive opinion-making newspapers and magazines in Berlin and West Germany and has been fully supporting the war in Vietnam, has waged a vicious campaign for more than a year against the student opposition, which has been led by Dutschke. The writings in the Springer papers have been so inflammatory that the attempted assassination of Dutschke didn't come as a surprise to me at all.

W: The Springer Press is not neo-Nazi though, is it?

M: If you identify Nazism with anti-Semitism, no. Springer has given large amounts of money to Israel and to Brandeis University. But the Press is the exponent of all the regressive and aggressive policies in Germany.

W: We are told that a very exciting and vital dialogue is taking place in Europe between Christians and Marxists, and indeed spreading to America; in fact, it may be that it is already becoming a little too fashionable ...

M: That's what I'm afraid of. I am afraid that this dialogue may end by glossing over the real differences. Don't misunderstand me. It definitely is better to have these dialogues than not to have them. Nevertheless, I can hardly imagine Christianity without its transcendent element, without the commitment to Christ as the Messiah and the faith in a world hereafter, and this is absolutely contrary to Marxism, which believes that the human condition can and should be improved through man's own powers and that any promise of a world hereafter can only serve to prolong man's suffering on earth.

W: There is a possibility of suggesting that a man named Herbert Marcuse in a book called *Reason and Revolution* had a doctrine of transcendence in some sense, isn't there?

M: Yes, you're quite right, I did, but the transcendance I was talking of was an empirical historical transcendance to a different form of society, whereas the Christian transcendance is out of this world to another world.
W: Is the supposedly new breed of Christian theologian perhaps developing or reducing or transforming the transcendence of Christianity into your kind of doctrine?

M: But then I am at a loss to say in what terms they are still Christian.

W: That's a good point. But the fact remains, does it not, that the most exciting developments in Christian theology are along this line, and is among the people who are making these theological developments that the Christian-Marxist dialogue is taking place most actively and fruitfully?

M: Yes, that is true. However, I would say that the really great change Christianity is represented by those Christians, priests and others, who actually join the guerrillas in Latin America, for example, and fight with them.

W: What puzzles me about the Christian-Marxist dialogue is what difference it makes. How many Christians are left in the world, anyway? And where is Christianity going? And why would Marxists want to become engaged with it?

M: If you take Kierkegaard's definition, very few Christians would be left here on earth. But the dialogue between Christians and Marxists is significant at least in that it brings us together with our counterparts in the East. There is a real exchange of ideas, and out of this we are finding ways of preventing or delaying the outbreak of nuclear war, the intensification of hostile coexistence, or whatever. On the other hand, we should not overrate the importance of this dialogue.

W: One of the most active leaders in the Christian-Marxist dialogue is Roger Garaudy of France, and one of the interesting aspects of his work is that he has seized upon Teilhard de Chardin as a bridge between Christians and Marxists. Teilhard was a priest, a biologist, a theorist of evolution. Some people say he wasn't any good at any of these but he wrote brilliant books and had exciting ideas. Do you feel that Garaudy's intuition is sound here?

M: I have read a little of Teilhard de Chardin, and I cannot find by any stretch of the imagination why he is so important in the Christian-Marxist dialogue, why he should be so important to Marxists. What he was doing was transforming Marxism into a semi-Christian doctrine rather than radicalizing Christianity. The real issue, in any case, is not Christianity versus Marxism, nor even East versus West, but capitalism versus socialism. There is an entirely new dialogue that is cutting across the East and the West. This is the dialogue among the alternative forms of socialism that are emerging in the first two worlds as well as in the third world, alternatives that the young generation in particular is experiencing in Cuba, in Vietnam, in the struggle that Che Guevar symbolizes, and so on. This cannot be correlated with the East-West conflict or the East-West dialogue because it cuts straight across the two worlds.
Herbert Marcuse took time out from the East-West conference to talk with Harvey Wheeler, political scientist and Center Fellow. Dr. Marcuse, who is now professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, is the author of many influential books, including *Eros and Civilization*, *One-Dimensional Man*, and *Reason and Revolution*.

* * *

**REVOLUTION 1969: DISCUSSION WITH HENRICH VON NUSSBAUM (COLOGNE)**

*Editors' note:*

"Revolution 1969: Discussion with Henrich von Nussbaum" interview with Marcuse first published in *Neues Forum*, 16, 181 (Vienna: January 1969, pp. 26–29). The interview Marcuse gave which largely focuses on the revolutionary potential (and failure) of various groups such as students in France, the African American liberation movement, and the “third world.” This discussion took place the same year Marcuse published his brilliant *An Essay on Liberation* where he theorized a historical materialist notion of revolution that was erupting across the globe in the late 1960s and were driven by (and many times joined by the working class) students, racial minorities, and the global poor. Here Marcuse also responds to von Nussbaum’s questions regarding the potential source for the creation of a socialist or communist society where he enumerates the need for the creation of new human beings with alternative values to capitalist society. Marcuse calls this an educational project that must take place “both outside and within the walls” of traditional educational institutions. It is interesting and important to note that Marcuse sees revolution as including a type of societal and cultural counter-education to the sick and distorted values of capitalist and imperialist societies.
This is an education which does not remain in the classroom or the walls of the university, but an education which spontaneously reaches over into action, into practice, and which extends to social groups outside of the university.

N: You mean outside of existing organisations?
M: Certainly not only outside. In the universities, for example, a structural reform could be accomplished which would work counter to the technocratic educational system which leads to training rather than education. This can occur by means of increased pressure from student groups within the framework of the already existing universities. I don't see any other way of breaking the domination of false consciousness.

N: By means of an educational dictatorship?
M: Naturally, one is immediately accused of being undemocratic, of wanting to build an intellectual elite, of aiming for a sort of Platonized educational dictatorship, or the like. There I have to confess frankly that I see nothing wrong with intellectual leadership. I even believe that the widespread resentment against intellectuals, in large parts of the labor movement is a reason for the fact that we find this movement in such sad conditions.

N: Don't you think that the success reached so far in schools and universities is in danger of being cancelled out again by the draft and the drill of military training.
M: Every draft has a repressive and reactionary character. I agree with you fully.

N: Do you feel confirmed by the May unrests in France in 1968?
M: I pointed to the importance of the student movement since 1964 and I have said that, in my opinion, there is much more and something altogether different at hand than a conflict of generation as we know it all too well from our tradition. I have stressed that here, truly political elements are activated which are activated in no other societal group or class. Apart from that, I have referred to the fact that the integration of the working class has progressed the most in the United States while that integration is still wanting in France and in Italy, to a large degree. Thus I was not surprised that it was precisely in France that the student movement led to a large political movement of the workers also. I did not foresee this; I believe nobody foresaw it. Not even the leaders of the student movement foresaw that within a week ten million workers would be on strike.

Consequences of the Defeat

N: What conclusions do you draw from the final defeat of this movement?
M: I wouldn't call it a defeat, for the simple reason that the revolutionary value of this movement is of enormous dimensions. I would even go
so far as to maintain that the days in May of 1968 represent a turning point in the political development of opposition within capitalism. They demonstrated the fact that a potentially revolutionary movement can start even outside of the working class and that it can then draw into its camp the working class or, let us be cautious, a segment of the working class. Apart from that, it was shown that altogether new forms of opposition can have such a far-reaching success. It was a defeat only in the sense that the student movement did not directly continue itself into a permanent opposition of the working class. But we all know why that did not happen.

N: Do we really know that.

M: The Communist Party and the communist unions buffered the movement as soon as they saw that they could no longer control it. That was the moment in which the political rather than the economic demands of the workers were in the foreground, when it was not merely a question of occupying factories, but a question of self-administration in economic as well as political terms. I believe that it is the task of a labor party today, more than ever, to work against the integration of the working class into the existing order instead of fortifying this integration as it is done by the Communist Party and the communist unions.

N: Is it possible to draw certain general conclusions from this “buffering” of the revolutionary action? Can one assert that there is a law according to which the undecided are again drawn to the side of an ever-so-weak legality for fear of anarchy, at the point that the success of the revolutionary movement begins to decline.

M: You mean, one should avoid such defeats because they lead into defeatism. I believe that one cannot avoid such defeats.

It is a nonsensical idea to conceive of the revolutionary process as a chain of successes. Precisely in a situation in which society is armed against a radical change as never before, defeats are unavoidable. It is only important to estimate when one can risk such defeats and when not.

N: Is it possible that, in your opinion, there could have been an essentially different outcome if there had been a stronger observation of Lenin’s idea of a double rule for example, an attempt to organize outside of such existing organizations as CGT union and the Communist Party?

M: You mean the institution of some committee consisting of students and workers?

N: Yes, but without the ruling cadres of the Communist Party which did not play the game. I mean an ad hoc organization which then could be a negotiating partner or the motive force for continuing the general strike.

M: Without such a secondary power as you say, it is impossible. But even here there remains the question as to why did it not come to that? We can’t just simply say one should have instituted it. At any rate, if such a situation should reoccur, one would at least take precautions for such a secondary power and do some intelligence work.
N: Would you insist therefore that in the future there will be revolutions?
M: I would have to be a miserable Marxist and also a miserable intellectual if I were to assume that in the future, revolutions are no longer possible. On the contrary, in the present era the contradictions of capitalism are probably greater than ever. They may be suspended and administered, but there are limits to this suspension and administration. Thus I believe that our time is indeed an objective revolutionary time. Precisely because of this, the existing systems are armed to the teeth.

N: Does Marx's crisis theory still have any importance for your revolutionary prognosis? After all, pioneer capitalism transformed itself into a fashionable and enlightened neo-capitalism and concomitantly developed a multitude of regulatory instruments which mean to play the mechanism of Marx's model.

M: Such regulations do exist. But if that is to mean that existent capitalism is safe from crisis, that I would deny. A capitalism which is safe from crisis is capitalism no longer. I would like to point to the international money crisis which has not been eliminated by far. That is one crisis factor. The other one is the following. If there is really going to be peace in Vietnam, that would lead to serious disruptions and to a recession and depression in American economy. The third factor is found in the developments in the Third World, which also represent a heavy burden on the capitalist system. Fourthly, there are the present events in Czechoslovakia which point to the extremely dangerous nature of the coexistence of the two super powers. In my opinion all this points to the fact that capitalism is certainly not safe from crisis.

N: Jurgen Habermas spoke of the fact that capitalism no longer suffers from the traditional difficulties of the realization of capital.

M: I can't agree with him. Precisely in recent years there have been difficulties in terms of the realization of capital and in terms of profit increase, particularly in the USA. After all, there are good reasons that the United States buys up half of the French economy. For the profits are considerably higher than in the USA. This is the most powerful imperialism which the world has ever experienced. And it cannot be broken by the Third World alone. But the latter is a decisive factor in connection with the inner weakening of the imperialist powers which remains the primary condition for a global revolution.

N: It is astonishing nonetheless that observers of the stock exchange predict rising chances for the Japanese as well as American shares if the Vietnam war is ended, with the exception of course of the immediate war industry. They believe that the necessary reconstruction of Vietnam and the possibility of being able to concentrate completely on space research and computer development would create a relatively quick equalization of the trade balance for the Americans.

M: That may be the case. I don't understand a thing about the stock exchange and I don't want to understand too much about it. But I tend
to trust those of my friends that tell me that the stock exchange as it is today has little to do with the real economic situation.

N: Can we actually consider it proven that there is a causal connection between the stability of the developed capitalist countries and the catastrophic situation in the Third World? Habermas questioned this condition upon which rested the student strategy altogether.

M: There can be hardly any doubt that there exists a horrendous causal connection. That is one of the greatest crimes of the First World of the old and of the new imperialism. I don’t see how it is at all possible to get the idea that this connection does not exist.

N: Does imperialism depend on waste by means of war in a purely economic aspect? Could it also not engage itself peacefully in such a manner that these possibilities of wasting would be available to it since it needs them to maintain its mechanism?

M: If my aunt had wheels she’d be a bus. What I mean is that if imperialism were not imperialism then everything would be different. Certainly there is the possibility of a peace economy, but it demands a radical change, maybe even a revolution in the advanced capitalist countries. From a “purely economic” point of view, imperialism has nothing to do in Vietnam today. Only, there is no such thing any longer as a “purely economic” point of view. What is at stake is the following: a preventive securing of marketing areas, of the origins of natural resources, and even a political securing. All of this is simply the vital interest of capitalism, that potentially rich countries with natural resources, and not only those, do not fall into the hands of communism. That is what one wants to prevent at all costs. In this case, military, political, and economic aspects are tied together so closely that the expression “purely economic” is no longer applicable.

N: Habermas called for the elimination of the achievement (Leistungs) ideology in the future society. Don’t you think that is a wishful dream that can not be accommodated in the present state of either the developing countries or of the highly civilized countries? Che Guevara considered discipline and (work) ethic indispensible.

M: The elimination of the achievement principle is desirable insofar as achievement principle means competition as existential struggle, under conditions where it is no longer necessary and where it merely serves the preservation of a repressive system. Elimination of the achievement principle in this sense is an essential characteristic of a truly socialist society in distinction from all class societies. The fact that this demand is not executed today explains itself largely from the competition (co-existence) of the two Superpowers, which demands a continued escalation of arms in both camps. Thus it seems to make impossible any transformation of the nominally socialist societies into free societies.

N: At the present state of technology, can it be avoided that the reduction of authoritarian structures would be followed by a loss of rationality and efficiency?
M: Rationality and efficiency are no absolute concepts, and first of all means rationality and efficiency within the existing system. Any radical change would of course infringe upon this rationality and efficiency. The question is only whether such an infringement, that is, an infringement upon the repressive rationality and efficiency could not be true progress.

N: In the socialist countries, socialization has always meant economic regression after a short period of the revolutionary impulse. In the DDR, for example, this led to the New Economic Politics (NEP) which is an attempt to bring again into play “individual interestedness.” Do you think those are transitional phenomena?

M: Individual interestedness is too abstract a concept for me. That can be produced by means of a system of bonuses, or incentives, as in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But it can also be the consequence of true solidarity, that is, the consequence of the cooperation of free human beings, each of whom has an individual interest which no longer stands in antagonistic opposition to the interests of the others.

N: The student movement largely flared up from the problems of the Third World. Does the Third World in turn support the student movements optimally?

M: The Third World is so immediately busy with the brutal problem of simply staying alive that we shouldn’t ask whether it is doing its share in supporting the protest movements of the First World. We should do everything to support the Third World.

N: But it is such a bitter thing to have to watch how the Third World uses up invested capital.

M: Certainly. But that is a result of the competing co-existence of the two Superpowers. Unless something happens within these powers, there will be no change in the Third World. Marx is right in this sense when he says that the decisive changes have to come about in the developed countries. Only then can one imagine true and enduring and successful independence of the Third World.

N: Thus you limit the effects of the setback which the revolutionary movement in Latin America seems to suffer. Since after all, you are concerned mainly with Europe and the United States. Are you not depressed about the fact that there are hardly any guerrillas left in Latin America since Guevara?

M: That is one of the defeats which are almost self-understood. They will simply lead to a new reflection and to a better preparation. The question is not so much of a shift of stress than that of recognizing that only the cooperation of the Third World with the oppositional forces of the First World can produce any results.

N: How do you judge the necessity and success of violence?
M: Here I can retreat to the old statement—I don't know for sure whether it Marx's or Engels' that revolutions are always exactly as violent as the violence which they encounter. There is a semantic ideology which is developing today out of the concept of violence. One does not call violence what occurs in Vietnam; one does not call violence what is done by the police; one does not call violence the devastations, torturings, humiliations which occur daily in capitalism. For one limits the expression "violence" to the opposition. For me it is hypocritical to name the violence of defense in the same breath as the violence of aggression. The two are completely different.

N: Which mots d'ordre would you pass on to the extra-parliamentary movement for the next phase?

M: None. It is one of the most beautiful characteristics of this new movement that it is not dependent on others, on authorities who give it mots d'ordre, but that this movement finds out its own mots d'ordre in the process of struggle.

* * *

ACLU CONFERENCE: MAY 21 1969

Problems:
- the subordination of dissent to the "democratic process"
- the equalization of the Right and the Left
- the equalization of Fascism and Socialism under the one universal category of "civil liberties"
- the concepts violence -- counter violence.

* Editors' note:
"ACLU Conference presentation on civil liberties" (May 21, 1969) constitutes an address Marcuse gave at the ACLU conference in 1969. The text demonstrates his political commitment to supporting repressed political groups and positions where he asserts that the expansion of civil rights is part of a larger historical project against totalitarian regimes. Marcuse sees civil rights, as they are established and controlled in the totally administered society under advanced capitalism, as masking "these practitioners and propagandists of truly murderous and suicidal violence on a global scale," and insists that such forces "have neither the civil nor the moral right to call for the violent suppression of campus unrest!" For Marcuse, the true expressions of civil rights emerge historically from suppressed groups of society who produce the dialectical negation of the established society's civil rights and advance rights for groups who were previously denied their rights. Marcuse is addressing issues in this text raised by his book A Critique of Pure Tolerance, co-authored with Barrington Moore and Robert Paul Wolff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965; a Beacon Press paperback appeared in 1968 with a new Postscript by Marcuse titled "Repressive Tolerance").
Civil liberties indeed inseparable from democratization
- originated in the struggle against secular and clerical absolutism:
  to extend the freedom of certain oppressed or disadvantaged social
  groups,
And, subsequently,
  in their universalized form, to extend and protect the freedom of the
  whole; i.e., all citizens.
With the triumph of liberal democracy in the 19th century,
- the civil liberties came to be one of the vehicles of change,
  used to reduce, and eventually eliminate the new inequality and
  oppression developing within the advancing industrial society;
  and to extend political democracy to economic democracy.
Thus,
  as the struggle against censorship, and for the equal right of assembly
  and organization,
  - the defense of civil liberties became one of the chief policies of
    socialism.
It follows that
  freedom of speech and assembly were never ends in themselves,
  - but means to assure and extend the freedom and progress of society
    for all its citizens — provided their speech and assembly were not
    demonstrably destructive of this goal!
In the light of this proviso,
  - the distinction between speech and action, word and deed appeared as
    highly tenuous:
    - the distance between speech, and action resulting from speech was
      in many cases too short to prevent serious injury:
    - the "clear and present danger" clause reaffirmed the
      subordination of the freedom of speech to the overriding
      common interest; or: to the ruling interests (Mill!!)
Today, the "clear and present danger" clause reveals its explosive political
connotation:
- namely, the necessary qualification, limitation of freedom of speech in
  cases where not only the action but already the speech threaten peace,
  equality, and justice,
- necessary because the new technological controls of public opinion
  subjects the majority of the population to an institutional indoctrination
  which justifies and promotes aggressive and exploitative policies, domestic as well as foreign.
At the same time (as I shall try to show), this situation demands the extension
of the concept of "civil liberties" to include "civil disobedience" and
"direct action" if aimed against the established policies of aggression and
exploitation.
Marxism, Revolution and the Contemporary Moment

BUT:

_who_ decides on this necessity?

Naturally, the _law, the courts._

However,

in a liberal democracy under representative government, they themselves are subject to, and product of the _democratic process._

This means that

the decision on freedom and suppression, progress and regression comes to rest with the _majority_,

resulting from, and changed by free, general elections.

The democratic process sets up the majority of the people as the _ultimate judge_ on what is good or evil for all,

at the same time, protecting the minorities in their right, _and power_, to make its dissent generally known, and thus,

by persuasion, information, argument, _to change the majority_ along their line.

Now,

this is indeed the most rational, the least repressive mode of decision,

- provided only that the deciding majority is really _sovereign_ in its decisions, _and_,

that the majority is really the result of the _free formation of public opinion_; i.e.

- every citizen's _own opinion._

If _these_ conditions _do not prevail_,

- the majority has _no legitimation_ for its decision, and, in fact,

  the actual decision rests with the _ruling groups_ which _make_ the majority,

  an indoctrinated, brainwashed majority.

Or, then, the "democratic process" does not exist,

- it has only to be created _against_ the "false", indoctrinated majority;

  and the disagreeable question is: in such a situation,

- _can this change in the majority itself come about within the limits of a democratic process?_

U.S.A.:

- the immunized, insulated, self-perpetuating conservative majority:

  vast majority of the population receives all information from two or three chains of mass media serving the established national and corporate interest

- either self-censorship, or direct censorship from Washington (Vietnam!)

- incessant stream of commercials extend indoctrination to the needs and aspirations of the individuals

- serious deviations from the established standards are punished with loss of job, no promotion, etc.
Thus,

democracy in America de facto organized and administered by a small
power stratum with converging interests:

- "military-industrial-labor conglomerate."

*Popular sovereignty* is exercised *within this framework*
- opposition is free within this framework ...
  which means:

the democratic process is arrested at the point where the established
framework itself would be at stake;
- all change is confined to changes within the existing social structure.

Now this may be good, and the best we can get for many people,
but: what about the others?

Don’t we have to take more seriously the criticism on the New Left,
according to which

The most efficient, global effort to stop the wheel of history requires
escalating controls,
- political, military, economic, psychological.
  - Behind the technological veil: domination and servitude; prosperity
    and comfort at the cost of intensified struggle for existence, persistent
    inequality, war, brutalization of the entire society – tolerated
    endorsed, renewed by the mandate of a taylor-made majority!

Now, to be able to revive this petrified structure,
to "persuade" the petrified majority,

the radical opposition must have the possibility
- of *equal access* to the mass media
- of *equal time* to make itself heard
- of *equal facilities* of propaganda
- of *equal chance* of candidacy to government ...

in other words:

- equal funds and equal power to break the oligopoly of information and
  indoctrination.
- a possibility which is obviously *precluded* by the established power
  structure!

Thus, just as the majority is a self-perpetuating majority (shifting within a
closed system),
- so is the minority, within this system, condemned to remain a minority
*progress* beyond the status quo is "*contained*” by the status quo!

But we remember that it was precisely *the historical function*, the "end" of
civil liberties to assure the possibility of "*qualitative*" progress
by freeing the formation of opinion from institutionalized indoctrination and self-censorship,
- by removing the fetters of free inquiry imposed on it by its link to vested interests,
- by enabling the mature citizen, through truly general education, to become the sole judge of the common interest.

Under the preconditions, and only under the preconditions of real freedom and equality could the majority emerge as the best possible guarantor of progress in the common interest.

On the other hand,
- if the transcending function of the civil liberties is cut off at its very roots in the individual,
  - if the citizen only parrots desired opinion and goals,
  - radical policies seem necessary to recapture the historical role of civil liberty – including
- civil disobedience to an illegitimate majority.
  - illegitimate in as much as it is not the expression of popular sovereignty,
  - but rather the expression of the powers over popular sovereignty,
    - for sovereignty begins, not at the voting box, but in the mind and instincts of the individual,
    - begins at home – without the television box which delivers the goods to him,
    - and him to the goods.

In view of the petrification of the democratic process,
- in order to recall attention to the change in the social effectiveness of
civil liberties,
I suggested
  - not their abolition,
    - but their discriminatory application.
In order to restore the balance now heavily
weighted in favor of conservatism and the political Right,
- I suggested “withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from
groups and movements which promote aggressive policies* ... (p.100)
Examples!

This outrageous suggestion assumes:
(1) that the scope and the potential effectiveness of free speech are a priori reduced, even canceled, by the existing oligopolistic structure;
(2) that this structure sustain a repressive and regressive society, all but closed against radical change;

* Editors' note:
Marcuse is referencing a cite from his book A Critique of Pure Tolerance.
(3) that the distance between speech and action is no longer an effective safeguard, owing to the weakening of individual resistance to aggressive indoctrination;

(4) that the “definition” of aggressive movements can be established according to objective criteria,

- available to every citizen “in the maturity of his faculties” – not brainwashed.

Admit the “unrealistic” character of my suggestion – to serve as “regulative principle” or “maxime” only;

- before leaving it alone,

let me reformulate it as an “imperative”:

- the Right and the Left should not be equated with respect to their social position, power, goals, and functions,

and civil rights should not include the right to advocate aggressive war, racism, exploitation, brutality ... violence?!

Here the most serious effect of the blocking of the democratic process:

(1) the mobilization of violence in the preservation of the established society and policy; and:

(2) the mobilization of counter-violence in the opposition against this society.

Re (1):

This primary violence is manifest in:

- the war in Vietnam, and the reporting on it;
- the images and words of the mass media;
- the destructive direction of scientific research and its technical application;
- the militarization of the forces of order;
- the spread of gratuitous crime ...

- This is primary violence in as much as it results from the repression of the conflict, inherent in the system, between

- vast social wealth, and its repressive utilization,
- the need for war, and the possibility of peace,
- the possibility of relaxing the competitive struggle for existence, and its actual intensification.

Re (2):

The conflict is not at all repressed, but motivates throughout the opposition of the young militants.

And behind all the widely different grievances and actions is the one radical protest against their society as a whole:

- its crimes in Vietnam,
- its racism, hypocritical morality,
- waste, frustrations, etc.
Faced with separation from the media of persuasion,
Faced with the apathy and hostility of an immune majority,
- the opposition often advocates a strategy of “direct action”, “extra parliamentary action”;
- acts of disruption, trespassing, occupation of buildings –
- in the effort to arouse awareness of the prevailing injustice, corruption, dehumanization,
- of the mental and physical pollution caused by this society.

This opposition feels that it defends itself against the pervasive, institutionalized violence of society,
- which strikes whenever “direct action” transcend the limits of legality,
  which reduce it to the ineffectiveness of a ritual!
Violence indeed breeds counter-violence!

This leads to the argument of the “backlash”
- logically and historically untenable on two grounds:

(1) every action engenders re-action, leftist action engenders rightist re-action
- the reaction to be met by another action.¹
  The strategic problem:
    to increase, in the course of action
    the strength to overcome re-action!

(2) student unrest is itself the backlash against preceding and prevailing lashes. ...

Without any qualification and discrimination, civil liberties can work only under two conditions:
- in a society which is composed only of citizens in the “maturity of their faculties”, forming and expressing their own opinion; or
- in a society which is standardized and administered to such an extent that radical dissenting opinion is bound to remain ineffective.

The present trend is strongly toward the second form of society.
Under these circumstances, the concept of “civil liberty” transcends parliamentary toward
a. extra-parliamentary action, and “direct” expression of opinion by the radical minorities;

¹ And a weak action may well produce an unproportionally violent backlash (i.e., “preventive counter-revolutions;” the invasion of Czechoslovakia).
b. discriminatory application of civil liberties in accordance with the
demonstrable goals of these minorities.
- **Negatively:** no defense of demonstrably racist, fascist, genocidal,
opinions!

To be sure: *no* protection and defense of violence; *but*
- combatting, not the symptoms but the *causes* of violence, in the social
structure itself,
- its expression in the war, the arms race, escalated militarization,
- in the language of those who advocate this violence.

These practitioners and propagandists of truly murderous and suicidal
violence on a global scale
- have neither the civil nor the moral right to call for the violent suppression
  of campus unrest!

By the mass media, and the politicians

this unrest is almost exclusively treated
without any reference to the basic
conditions against which the student protest.

Such treatment
is brutally *propagandistic*, prejudiced, deceiving.

In my view,
the only way to eliminate campus counter-violence is to eliminate the
primary violence which causes and reproduces secondary violence:
quit Vietnam,
stop the arms race, and the conquest of outer space,
abolish the ghettos!

In the meantime:
- to work for the uncompromising implementation of civil liberties,
- especially there where they are used to suppress forms of protest and
dissent which go beyond the law and order of "business as usual",
which has become *incompatible* with freedom,
an education for freedom. **Meaning:**
- defense of such disruptions in the course of protests against ROTC and
  recruitment for the Armed Forces on campus,
- defense of the demands of oppressed minorities even if they do not fall in
  line with traditional academic principles.

We should ask the *question*
- whether academic freedom, free inquiry, equality of education are not
  violated by the *existing practices* rather than by the protest against them.

**Conclusion:**

*We have a truly lost generation!*
This lost generation may well become a loss which cannot be retrieved unless we recognize, and act accordingly, that in and behind their often bizarre and explosive forms of protest,
- they voice the demand that this society, finally and thoroughly, uses its vast resources for the abolition of misery and oppression rather than their prolongation.

* * *

INTERVIEW WITH PIERRE VIANSSON-PONTE

Q. You have been bracketed with Marx and Mao. When people talk of the “Three Ms” what is your reaction?

Marcuse: I do not understand. Marx? I have studied his work deeply. But Mao? Certainly today every Marxist who is not a communist of strict obedience is a Maoist. I have always thought there was an alternative, and in my books I have not kept to the old Marxist ideology. Socialist societies as they are set up today do not seem to me what I call “qualitatively different” from other capitalist societies. They allow one type of domination to exist instead of another; that is all. True socialism is something else again. I am convinced that it is possible from now on to construct a truly socialist society without going through a Stalinist type period. A socialist society must be founded on true solidarity, on true cooperation: the Cuban revolution seems to me to be moving in that direction. As for “Che,” he was the symbol of it, very far from the Stalinist bureaucrats, very near to socialist man.

Q. Are you only trying to explain the world we live in, or are you trying to change it?

Editors’ note:
"Interview with Pierre Viansson-Ponte" was published in L'En Monde, June 1969 and was found on Harold Marcuse's website with the inscriptions "Transcribed: by Harrison Fluss 2012; Translated: by Anne Fremande (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/marcuse/works/1969/interview.htm). The interview situates Marcuse within Marxism, and interrogates his relation to Marx, Mao, the Cuban revolution and inquires into the relevance of Marxism and socialism in the contemporary epoch. Among most interviews of the period, Marcuse is queried concerning "black power" and "student power," and discusses positively student uprisings, insisting "I am not a defeatist, ever" in regard to repression of students and the New Left by the existing system.
Marcuse That is a big question. Every real explanation must lead to the search for a transformation, and there is evidently an interior relation between the explanation and the transformation. For myself, it is true that for a long time now I have not been a militant activist. I write, I teach, I give lectures, I talk to the students: these are normal activities of an intellectual in the United States because in that country the situation is in no sense revolutionary, it is not even pre-revolutionary. Therefore an intellectual’s duty is first of all a mission of radical education. We are, in America, entering into a new “period of illumination.”

Q. And in Europe?
Marcuse In Europe, the situation is different because there politics are still largely determined by the working class. Also, there are big differences between one country and another: West Germany is very close to the American “model,” Italy is fairly close. France is much further away. I know Rudi Dutschke and his friends well, and the boys of the [German] SDS, the left-wing student organisation. He is very kind, very sensitive, not at all a demagogue. And he is someone who has done a lot of work and thought a lot; for him and his comrades, the link between theory and action is solidly established. It is said that they took months to forge it. This is not true: they took eight years. In France, have your angry students also worked? Have they also established solid ideological bases? I do not have the impression that they have.

Q. Have you sometimes the feeling of having been overtaken by those who proclaim your theses?
Marcuse Perhaps. If they are violent, it is because they are desperate. And despair powers effective political action. Take the inhabitants of the black ghettos in the US; they set fire to their own areas, they burn their own houses. This is not a revolutionary action, but it is an act of despair, and a political act. Moreover, in the USA, the uneasiness is not limited to students. The students are not in revolt against a poor and badly organized society, but against a quite rich society quite well organized in its luxury and waste, while 25% of the population live in the poverty of the ghettos. Their revolt is not directed against the misery which this society provokes, but against its benefits. This is a new phenomenon, belonging only to what is called “the affluent society.” In Germany, the process is the same. In France, I do not think it is, because French society is not yet an affluent society.

Q. What do you think about what has been called, by analogy with “Black Power,” “Student Power”?
Marcuse That slogan seems dangerous to me. Everywhere, always, the great majority of students is conservative, even reactionary. Therefore “Student Power,” if it were democratic, would be conservative, even reactionary. “Student Power” means that the left in no way opposes the University administration, but opposes the students themselves.
Otherwise it would be necessary for it to outflank the democratic process. There is here a fundamental contradiction.

Q. What is, in your opinion, the basic reason for these violent student demonstrations in so many countries?

Marcuse For American and West German students, whom I know better, it is a requirement that is not merely intellectual, but "instinctual." They want an entirely different kind of existence. They reject a life that is simply a struggle for existence, they refuse to enter what the English call the Establishment, because they think it is no longer necessary. They feel their whole life will be overwhelmed by the requirements of the industrial society and exclusively in the interests of big business, the military, and the politicians. Take the hippies. Their rebellion is directed against puritan morality, against American society where one washes ten times a day, and at the same time burns and kills in Vietnam purely and simply. So they methodically protest against this hypocrisy by keeping their hair long, growing beards, not washing and refusing to go to war. To them the contradictions are blinding. But, as with the students, this is true only of a very small minority. The students know that society absorbs opposition and offers the irrational as rational. They feel more or less clearly that the "one dimensional" man has lost his power of negation, his possibility of saying no. So they refuse to let themselves become integrated in this society.

Q. What reply would you give to students if they came to you and asked whether their manifestations [i.e. demonstrations] make sense and could help to transform society?

Marcuse I would tell them first that one cannot expect anything but big manifestations like those which are taking place pretty well everywhere, even in France, in a situation which is not even pre - or counterrevolutionary. But I am not a defeatist, ever. In the US, the growing opposition to the Vietnam war has already succeeded in provoking, at least in part, change in American policy. One must not have illusions; but one must not be a defeatist, either. It is useless to expect, in such a confrontation, that the masses should join the movement and participate in the process. Something of the kind can be seen, it seems to me, in the present student revolts. Yet they are completely spontaneous revolts. In the United States there is no coordination, no organization acting on a national scale, not even on a nation wide scale, and one is very far from any kind of international organization. This kind of revolt certainly does not lead to the creation of a revolutionary force. But it converges with the movements of the "Third World" and with activity in the ghettos. It is a powerful force for disintegration.

* * *
Dear Horkheimer:

Thanks for your letter. I too think that it was necessary that I went East, however the result may be. I have the feeling that it is getting dark around us with supreme rapidity. The time still left to us is running short (I believe that I shall be in the army within five months, for deferment will be granted not primarily for dependency but for occupational reasons). That is why I am particularly eager to write down what I am able to say. And that is why I am still reluctant to interrupt my paper on operational thinking and social domination. I have looked up several books for concrete material on the problem of rackets, but the available sources here are utterly insufficient. The theoretical thesis we want to expound is so daring that it seems to me not enough to quote some

*Editors' note: Marcuse's Letter to Max Horkheimer, dated September 9, 1942, cites a pessimistic feeling, shared by Horkheimer and Adorno and the inner circle of the Frankfurt School, that "it is getting dark around us with supreme rapidity," at a time when Hitler and the Nazis were taking over Europe and the U.S. would soon be drawn into a World War. Marcuse muses that he may be "in the army within five months," and thus is currently interested in writing down his thoughts on "operational thinking and social domination." This text was never found in Marcuse's archive and perhaps never written, although ideas on the topic noted in his letters appeared in One-Dimensional Man. On Marcuse and the Frankfurt School, see Herbert Marcuse, Toward a Critical Theory of Society. Volume Two, Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, edited with Introduction by Douglas Kellner (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
more or less well known books, and I wonder whether you should not ask Kirchheimer or Gurland to collect the material in New York. However, I shall do my best and gather whatever I can find.

My paper would, I hope, fit into the planned publication, for I try to make it a contribution to an understanding of the present forms of social control. But it is far from ready, although it is rather extensive. I want to bring it up to a certain point, which I have probably reached within a week, and then discuss the whole thing with you.

Here, everything is alright. In case of danger, I shall protect your wife with all available weapons.

Very cordially,
With best regards from my family,
Yours,
Herbert Marcuse

* * *

CORRESPONDENCE WITH RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA, JUNE 7, JUNE 11, OCTOBER 7 AND OCTOBER 11, 1957

June 7, 1957

Dear R.D.

Would you do me a favor? In writing the Preface, I want to recapitulate the gist of your book as adequately as possible in such a small space. Could you send me a brief statement on what you consider to be the main thesis (or theses) and the basic trend of thought in your book? This would greatly expedite matters. Sorry to bother you with additional work at this important juncture.

Greetings,

HM

* * *

As it turned out, Marcuse would not join the army but U.S. intelligence services for the duration of World War II (on Marcuse's work during the war against fascism, see Herbert Marcuse, *Technology, War, and Fascism*. Volume One, *Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*, edited with Introduction by Douglas Kellner (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

*Editors' note: We publish here some extracts from Marcuse's Correspondence with Raya Dunayevskaya at the time that he was writing the Preface to her *Marxism and Freedom*
June 11, 1957

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

It was good to hear from you. I'm sure that you are well acquainted with the fact that it is much easier to write 100, if not 500, pages than it is to summarize the gist of a book on which one has worked for some 15 years, in a page or two. But I will try.

1. The central point, the pivot around which everything else in Marxism and Freedom revolves, is of course, the philosophic foundation of Marxism. As I put it in my introductory note, “The aim of this book is to re-establish the original form of Marxism which Marx called ‘thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism.’”

This runs like a red thread throughout the book. Thus Part I begins with the French Revolution and Hegel and ends with Marx's Early Economic Philosophic Essays: A New Humanism. It constitutes his answer to classical political economy as well as to the Utopian socialists and vulgar Communists of his day and establishes a new world outlook, Marxian philosophy, which is distinguished from the Hegelian dialectic and closely knit with it. What is established as the thesis of the young Marx then reappears in Part III, Marxism, the Unity of Theory and Practice, where, in The Dialectical Humanism of [Capital] Volume I, I show that not only are Marx's economic categories social categories but they are thoroughly permeated with the humanism that came out of the working-class struggles for the shortening of the working day. As

which we are publishing in this volume and which we discuss above (sec pp. 98-103). In a letter sent to Dunayevskaya on June 7, 1957, Marcuse asked her to send a brief statement and summary of her main theses. Dunayevskaya responded on June 11, 1957, with a several page summary of her work. In an exchange of letters published here, we present an October 9, 1957, letter to Dunayevskaya where he indicates unease concerning publicity for the book on “the American roots of Marxism.” We follow with Dunayevskaya's October 11, 1957, letter where she briskly defends her theses, evoking a response from Marcuse that he is not completely satisfied with her answer, concluding the letter with a comment that he and other colleagues who were criticizing her work did it in an attitude of scholarly critique and not to promote attacks against her which were coming from both rightwing critics, as well as those on the left against whom Dunayevskaya had polemized for years. For the full correspondence between Marcuse and Dunayevskaya, see The Marcuse–Dunayevskaya–Fromm Correspondence, 1954–1978. Dialogues on Hegel, Marx, and Critical Theory, edited by Kevin B. Anderson and Russell Rockwell (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2012). The Notes to Dunayevskaya's letters published here are by the editors of this volume.

1 This description by Marx of his philosophical position appears in the 1844 “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic,” M&F 1958, p. 313; see also M&CW 3, p. 336.
Marx put it, the mere question, when does my day begin and when does it end, was on a higher philosophic level than "the pompous catalogue of the Declaration of the Rights of Man." What is true of Volume I of *Capital* is true of the Logic and Scope of Volumes II and III, including Theories of Surplus Value, where I show that all of history to Marx was the struggle for freedom, which, as its basis, is the shortening of the working day, and only from there do we go from the realm of necessity to that of freedom.

Lenin learned the critical importance of the philosophic foundations the hard way—when the Second International actually collapsed and, to reconstitute his own reason, had to return to Hegel's *Science of Logic*. The chapter, A Mind in Action, then traces what the philosophic foundations meant to Lenin and the Russian Revolution and ends with the thought that just as Marxism without its philosophic foundation is meaningless, so is Leninism. Neither is an “economist.” Finally when we come to our own age, which I call Automation and the New Humanism, I show the methodology of Marxism and the compulsion of our own age for a total outlook.

II. Subordinate to this main theme of the book, and running parallel with it, is the division between the radical intellectual like Proudhon and the Marxist intellectual. I contend that Marxism is not only the theoretical expression of the working-class striving to establish a new society on socialist beginnings, but it is that which gave intellectuals a new dimension. That new dimension arose precisely because he did not divide theory from history, including the current class struggles. The relationship of theory to history is seen as a live element that changes the very structure of Marx's greatest theoretical work. In 1863 and 1866 when he fundamentally revised that structure and 1872–75 when he wrote the French edition of *Capital*—the period from the Civil War in the United States through the Paris Commune—is proof of this relationship of theory to history and at the same time shows that what the young Marx established in the Early Essays [of 1844] when he held that never again must society be counter-posed to the individual and which in 1848 he emblazoned on his *Communist Manifesto* as the thesis that the development of the individual is the condition for the development of all reappears in his “most

---


4 Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* cites Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto*: "The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (p. 65; see also *MECW* 6, p. 506).
economic" work which is preferred by the academic economists—Volume II of *Capital.*

Again, when I move from Marx's time to that of Lenin's time I show that the contribution of the Second International—Organization—was taken over by Lenin in his concept of the so-called Vanguard Theory in 1902-03, but as the actual Russian Revolutions occurred, he threw it overboard—or at least radically revised his theory no less than 6 times so that in 1917 he says the workers on the outside are more revolutionary than the vanguard party [M&F, p. 190] and by 1923 says that unless the party work is checked by the non-party masses the bureaucracy will yet bring the workers' state down and they will retrogress to capitalism [M&F, p. 40]. In any case, our problem is certainly not will there be a revolution: but *what will happen after:* are we always to be confronted with a Napoleon or a Stalin? In a word, without relating the spontaneous self-organization of the proletariat and its quest for universality in the manner in which Marx did it for his time, we can expect nothing but totalitarianist results.

III. In my introductory note I state that the 3 main strands of thought in the book are: 1) Classical Political Economy, Hegelian Philosophy, and the French Revolutionary doctrines in relationship to the actual social and economic conditions of its time, the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution and up to the first capitalist crisis. 2) Marxism in relationship to the class struggles of his day, the period of his maturity, 1843-1883, as well as Marxism in the period from 1889-1923; and 3) The methodology of Marxism to our era which I call the period of state capitalism and workers revolt, the analysis of the Five Year Plans of Russia and the revolts in East Germany, and Vorkuta following Stalin's death; finally the analysis of Automation but this is a comparatively free and easy essay. I think this too in a way can be summed up in the introductory note where I explain the method in which this book is written—that research began in 1939 when I broke with Trotsky over the "Russian Question" but that it did not assume the form of Marxism and Freedom until 1950-53 when the miners' strike

5 Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* cites *Capital*, Vol. III, where Marx wrote of "development of human power which is its own end, the true realm of freedom" (M&F, p. 145).

6 Marx wrote of the worker's "quest for universality, the tendency toward an integral development of the individual," this after "the automatic workshop wipes out specialists and craft-idiocy" in 1847 in the *Poverty of Philosophy* (MECW 6, p. 190).

7 Chapter 13 of *Marxism and Freedom*, "Russian State-Capitalism vs. Workers' Revolt."

8 In July 1953, some 10,000 miners went on strike at the forced labor camps in Vorkuta in northern Russia (M&F, pp. 252-254).

on automation and the revolts in Eastern Europe from their separate vantage points led me to present all my ideas to groups of workers who checked and discussed the material. “No theoretician, today more than ever before, can write out of his own head. Theory requires constant shaping and reshaping of ideas on the basis of what the workers themselves are doing and thinking” [M&E, p. 23]. I return to Hegel (page 73 footnote in the Science of Logic) where he shows that those who took Kant’s results without the process did so as a “pillow for intellectual sloth” [SLM, p. 62; SL1, p. 73] and that if the intellectual sloth which has accumulated in the Marxist movement concerned only Marxists then we wouldn’t be confronting the H-bomb threat without ideological backwardness showing. The need is for a new unity of theory and practice which must begin with the new impulses coming from the working-class, that this, far from being intellectual abdication, would mark the actual fructification of theory. Once the theoretician gets that, his work does not end, but first begins.

In a word, I have no prescriptions of rhetorical conclusions. I show a method at work and appeal to the intellectuals to use that dialectic method as a basis to view the contemporary scene, to get out from under domination of either the Russian totalitarian or the American “democratic” bomb threats in their thinking. The workers by themselves can do a lot but they too have not achieved a new social order, but if the movement from practice to theory met the movement from theory to practice, then a serious start could be made.

There are naturally other points in the work—from the American roots of Marxism to the Communist perversions both of Marx’s Early Works and Capital—since it tries to deal with our machine age since the Industrial Revolution to Automation, but I do not believe anything germane to the book is lost once one grasps the central point, the philosophic foundation.

I know the effect that your Reason and Revolution had in 1941. They could neither treat Hegel as an “old dog” nor Marx’s Early Writings as mere humanitarian adjuncts to “the great scientific economic theories.” But then it was a philosopher speaking and not “a solid economist” like me. When the two were combined, glory, hallelujah—there was havoc. But the academicians need not think themselves any smarter—they all fell into

---

10 A nine month-long strike, the longest since the creation of the C10 in the 1930s, broke out in West Virginia, where the largest coal company, Consol, had introduced automation in the form of the “continuous miner.” (See M&E, Ch. 16, “Automation and the New Humanism.”)

11 Dunayevskaya refers to the June 17, 1953 East German workers’ uprising for “bread and freedom,” the July 1953 strikes in the Vorkuta forced-labor camp in northern Russia, and the November 1956 Hungarian Revolution, as discussed in M&E, Ch. 15, “The Beginning of the End of Russian Totalitarianism.”
it is not possible to fight Russian totalitarianism or any other kind without some solid theoretic foundation and social vision. I naturally cannot say whether I succeeded in doing what I aimed at but if intentions were indeed achievement then I could say that what was new in Marxism and Freedom was 1) the re-establishment of the philosophic foundation of Marxism in Hegel in so concrete a way that the origins of our machine age as well as the latest period of automation came alive; 2) the summation of all three volumes of Marx's Capital in a manner that the reader knows Marxism both as theory and as methodology; and 3) the new dimension Marxism endows the intellectual with became so real to him that he could indeed discern the movement from practice to theory and as eagerly long for the unity of the two as does the worker. I hope this in some way answers what you wanted me to do in recapitulating the gist of the work. I also enclose the introductory note to the bibliography so that you can see all my problems there.

Looking forward to your Preface very eagerly,

* * *

---

12 From 1934-39, the Stalinized Communist International (Comintern) established the "Popular Front" against fascism. During this period, Communist Parties allied themselves with reformist Socialist Parties and liberals in the name of democracy and anti-fascism. At the same time, the Popular Fronts, which achieved state power in Spain during the Civil War and briefly in France, kept silent about the repression inside the Soviet Union. The Popular Fronts also excluded anarchists and anti-Stalinist Marxists, especially Trotskyists. In Spain, the Republic, which had a USSR-supported Popular Front government that included Communists and Socialists, became involved in a Civil War with fascists supported by Germany and Italy. The Popular Front government in Spain refused to support radical social changes like land seizures by peasants or worker control of factories, something that far leftists like Dunayevskaya believed would have energized the Republic in its anti-fascist struggle. For their part, Stalinists accused these far leftists of being fascist agents who were attempting to divide the Left. In 1939, after the fascists had defeated the republicans in the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union reversed course, abandoning its Popular Front policy and forging the Hitler-Stalin Pact. In this way, the USSR effectively gave up the struggle against fascism for two years, until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. As a result, anti-Stalinist leftists like Dunayevskaya saw the Popular Front as a failed policy that had led to defeat in Spain, and in which independent leftists had been used by the Comintern.
October 9, 1957

Dear R.D.

To tell you the truth, I am getting a little uneasy about the publicity with the "American roots of Marxism" and the statement that Marx "completely recreated the structure" of *Capital* under the impact of the American civil war. I do not remember whether your book actually justifies these formulations—when I read it, I did not have this impression; but then my memory may be at fault. The little and very unsystematic checking I did recently has not been very successful: I did not find any evidence which would corroborate such statement. My friends bombard me with questions, and I myself am naturally rather sensitive about the Americanization of Marx!

You would do me a great favor if you would sum up very briefly your evidence or just jot down the main references—either in Marx's correspondence or elsewhere.

Sorry to bother you—but since you are through with the page proofs and with the index, this may not be too much of an imposition. If it is, please forget about it.

With best wishes,

HM

* * *

October 11, 1957

Dear H.M.

Thank you very much for your letter of the 9th which gives me the opportunity to trace briefly the American roots of Marxism. Heretofore I have concentrated on the warp and woof of the book—the philosophy, dialectics, Humanism of Marxism. As publication date approaches, it is time to indicate the complementary thesis. I use the structure of *Capital* to illustrate this. The changes in the structure of this work meant nothing to the Second International, reformist and revolutionary wings alike. Until Rosa Luxemburg, in 1913, began to question what Engels "had made out" of the

---

13 Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919), important German and Polish Marxist thinker and leader, who critiqued reformism and elaborated a theory of revolutionary spontaneity in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1905. Also a fierce opponent of imperialism and war, Luxemburg was assassinated in 1919 while helping to lead a socialist uprising in Berlin. In addition, she opposed all forms
material left him by Marx, all Marxists treated the changes in the structure as a "literary question." The Communists continued this tradition (cf. Leontiev in Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopaedia). The battle of quotations with which Rosa Luxemburg was attacked, both by the Second and Third Internationals, never went into the structure of Capital until Henryk Grossman, in 1929. His was the first serious analysis of the changes in the structure. However, his interest was primarily economic; it was directed against Luxemburg's underconsumptionism and the re-establishment of the decline in the rate of profit as central to the theory of accumulation in its Marxist form. Now let us look at these changes in structure during the late 1850s when he worked on the Grundrisse and Critique and in the 1860s when Capital took final shape:


of nationalism as obsolete, including in her native Poland, then under foreign rule. Before her death, she made some very discerning criticisms of the one-party state established by Lenin and Trotsky in Soviet Russia, written while serving a prison sentence for speaking out against German militarism. Her most outstanding economic work is Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to the Economic Explanation of Imperialism (1913); English trans. by Agnes Schwarzschild (London: Routledge, 1951).


The notion that economic crises arise due to insufficient consumer demand, critiqued as superficial and ultimately incorrect by Dunayevskaya in Marxism and Freedom, Ch. 8, where she wrote: "What Marx did, in disproving the underconsumptionist theory was to demonstrate there is no direct connection between production and consumption" (p. 131). This is because production creates its own market, and the part of the surplus product that cannot be consumed by workers and capitalists is consumed by capital itself through a process referred to by Marx (and other economists) as productive consumption. Dunayevskaya also considered Luxemburg to have been ultimately an underconsumptionist, whose economic theories anticipated Keynesianism. For more on Dunayevskaya's critique of Luxemburg, see "Marx's and Luxemburg's Theories of Accumulation of Capital, Its Crises and Its Inevitable Downfall," Ch. 3 of her Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991, orig. 1982), hereafter RLWLKM.

Marx's Grundrisse, trans. by Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin, 1973) is an early draft of Marx's critique of political economy composed in 1857-8. Marx's Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) was a shorter work that was the first published version of his critique of political economy.
1) As you know, both in his letter to Engels (4/2/58) [MECW 40, p. 296] and in the Preface to Critique, he shows that the first draft of *Capital* was to have 6 volumes, thus: I. *Capital*; II. Landed Property; III. Wage labor; IV. State; V. International Trade; VI, World Market.

As he shows in Introduction to the Critique which he did not allow to be published, even here the United States played its role as the illumination for the category of labor: "This state of affairs has found its highest development in the most modern of bourgeois societies, the United States. It is only here that the abstraction of the category 'labor,' 'labor in general,' labor *sans phrase*, the starting point of modern political economy, becomes realized in practice." 18

2) My Chapter V, The Impact of the Civil War on the Structure of *Capital* shows that the decade of the 1860’s was decisive for the structure of *Capital*. It was the period of the Civil War in the United States, the great mobilizations of English workers on the side of the North, the Polish insurrection, the unrest in France, and the creation of the First International. Marx himself best describes the newness of this decade when on January 11, 1860 he writes to Engels: "In my opinion, the biggest things that are happening in the world today are on the one hand the movement of the slaves in America started by the death of John Brown and, on the other, the movement of the serfs in Russia" [MECW 41, p. 3]. Two years later (7/30/62) he argues with Lassalle as to the contribution of the “Yankees” [MECW 41, p. 388]. This is climaxed by his letter to Engels on August 15, 1863 where he directly involves the structure of *Capital*: “when I look at this compilation and see how I have had to turn everything around and how I had to make even the *historical* part out of material of which some was quite unknown, then he (Lassalle) does seem funny with ‘his’ economy already in his pocket” [MECW 41, P. 488].

I show what “turning everything around” was by contrasting the structure of Critique with *Capital*. I base myself on the letters and the listing of the materials by Engels in the Preface to *Capital*. There is also in the Archives II (VII), 19 besides the first ending of *Capital*, the outline of his changes; Leontiev on *Capital* also lists Notebooks and changes. 20 Also not to be left out is Marx’s reporting of the Civil War for the Vienna Press 21 where he reproduces the speeches of the Abolitionists, especially Wendell Phillips, upon whom he comments “In the present state of affairs Wendell Phillips’

---

18 *Marx, Grundrisse*, p. 105; see also MECW 28, p. 41. This text is now known to have been the introduction to the *Grundrisse*.
19 *Arkhipy Marksa-Engelsa*, ed. V. V. Adoratsky (Moscow, 1933).
21 *Die Presse*, a Vienna newspaper in which many of Marx’s Civil War writings appeared.
speech is of greater importance than a battle bulletin."22 (This, along with his letter to Abraham Lincoln, and other letters are reproduced in his Civil War in the United States, Int. Pub.23.) As you know, in contrast to some emigré Marxists in America who avoided any involvement in the Civil War under the abstraction that they were "opposed to all slavery, wage and chattel." [M&F, p. 84], he participated actively in the mass movement abroad. This contrasts to the 1850s when he kept away from the emigré circles and their type of activity. As I show at the beginning of that chapter dealing with the impact of the Civil War on structure of Capital, "No one is more blind to the greatness of Marx's contribution than those who praise him to the skies for his genius as if that genius matured outside of the actual struggles of the period in which he lived. As if he gained the impulses from the sheer development of his own thoughts instead of from living workers changing living reality by their action ... He who glorifies theory and genius but fails to recognize the limits of theoretical work, fails likewise to recognize the indispensability of the theoretician." [M&F, p. 89].

3) After three intensive years—1863–66—of reworking Capital, Marx is still not satisfied. On February 10, 1866, we hear why: "Historically I developed a part about the working day which did not enter into my first plan" [M&F, p. 88; MECW 42, p. 224]. After he has finished working out the immense section on Working Day he writes again to Engels and shows how happy he is that the American workers “by correct instinct” came to the same formulation on the eight hour day that he had worked out for the Geneva Congress of the First International.24 This he brings directly into Capital (end of Ch. X [on “The Working Day”]) when he quotes that Baltimore

22 Wendell Phillips (1811-84), prominent abolitionist, labor, and women’s rights advocate who briefly joined Marx’s First International. Dunayevskaya cites Phillips in M&F, Ch. 5, “The Impact of the Civil War in the United States on Structure of Capital.”


24 Dunayevskaya appears to be referring to a letter to the German socialist Ludwig Kugelmann of October 9, 1866, where Marx wrote: “The American Workers’ Congress at Baltimore, which took place at the same time [as the Geneva Congress of the First International] caused me great joy. The slogan there was organization for the struggle against capital, and remarkably enough, most of the demands which I drew up for Geneva were also put forward there by the correct instinct of the workers” (MECW 42, p. 326). Marx also wrote in Capital, in the chapter on “The Working Day”: “Thus the working-class movement on both sides of the Atlantic, which had grown instinctively out of the relations of production themselves, set its seal on the words of the factory inspector, R. J. Saunders; ‘further steps toward a reformation of society can never be carried out with any hope of success, unless the hours of labor be limited, and the prescribed limit strictly enforced’” (MCII, p. 415; MCIK, p. 329).
Resolution, ties it in with the First International “Thus the movement of the working class on both sides of the Atlantic…” and further ties in white and black labor “Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded. But out of the death of slavery a new life at once arose. The first fruit of the Civil War was the eight hour agitation…”

4) Finally the American roots are not only in the finished (by himself) Volume I but in the unfinished Volumes II and III.26 In the [chapter on the] Logic and Scope of those volumes I quote from his letter to Danielson where he asks him not to wait for Volume II before translating Volume I because of the mass of material he received from Russia and the United States: “The United States at present have overtaken England … the masses are quicker and have greater political means in their hands to resent the form of a progress that is accomplished at their expense.” I then say that it is clear that Russia and America were to play roles in Volumes II and III that England played in Volume I, that Lenin filled out Volume II for Russia and that I believe American workers are concretizing it for America in their attitude to Automation (M&F, p. 148). In the final chapter on Automation and the New Humanism where I deal with the 1929 crash and the division between Planners and rank and file workers building their own organization—CIO28—and in the 1940s when they turn against their labor leaders who have become the bureaucracy that oppresses them even as the managers in the shops—I approach the final section called “Toward A New Unity of Theory and Practice in the Abolitionist and Marxist Tradition.”

As I wrote you once before I have neither blueprints nor banners which scream “Follow me,” but that I sketch out only where to gather new impulses—
from the workers: "The American working class has long been a mystery to the European, worker and intellectual. Until the formation of the CIO, Europeans used to "prove the backwardness of the American worker by virtue of the fact that he had not built industrial unions ... Because the American worker has built no mass party, he seems apolitical. Because he is largely unacquainted with the doctrines of Karl Marx, he seems non-socialist [up to here, M&F, pp. 276-77] ... It is not Marxists who have compelled society at last to face with sober senses the conditions of workers and relations of men with each other."

The seal of bankruptcy of contemporary civilization, including the so-called Vanguard Parties, is the bankruptcy of its thought. The void in the Marxist movement since Lenin's death would have a significance only for Marxists except that Marxism is in the daily lives and aspirations of working people. Marxism is neither in the pathetic little theses gathering dust in small radical organizations, nor in impressively big tomes gathering dust on the shelves of large conservative universities" [M&F, p. 282]. For my part I explain the method used to write Marxism and Freedom and I call the American workers and student youth who collaborated on it its true co-authors.

Now, if I may, I would like to add a personal note since although the book has not yet been published the attack on me has already begun. Your friends bombard you on the American roots of Marxism while the Communists are bombarding publisher and distributor with "true stories," that I supposedly escaped from Russia in 1917 because I had "white blood running in her veins." I hope I will not have to return to the cloak and dagger days when I was Trotsky's secretary and had to carry a gun and learn how to shoot it. The American Economic Review had its own kind of experience in 1944 when they published my translation of the Russian revision of Marxism with my commentary. Between the Soviet Embassy accusing me of being a fascist and the State Department telling the review that Russia and America were "allies" and publication would not help, the editors needed all the intellectual integrity and courage to proceed with the work. As a good general—philosophers these days must be good strategists—I trust nothing that comes with the publication will surprise you. Your Preface speaks for itself, and I trust my book does well for itself.

Yours,

Raya

* * *

29 See Marcuse's letter to Dunayevskaya of October 9, 1957.
30 A suggestion that as an opponent of Stalin, Dunayevskaya was really a conservative "White Russian."
October 15, 1957

Dear R.D.

Thanks for your prompt reply. It seems to me that your references do not corroborate the statement that the structure of *Capital* was completely recreated *under the impact of the American Civil War*. It is certainly true that the original plan or plans were thoroughly revised between 1857 and 1866, but I found no evidence that this change was decisively influenced by American developments. In point of fact, going through Marx's letters written during this period, I am struck by the rather casual references to the United States. Or, if you deny the "casual": such references seem to me in no way different from others to contemporary European events. Sorry!

A personal remark on your personal remark: there is no rational ground on which you can associate the questions of my friends with the recollection of attacks on your life and on your carrying a gun! They took your announcement as that of a scholarly (*sit venia verbo!*\(^{31}\)) interpretation of Marx, subject to intelligent critique. Believe me, they wanted information, not attack and counterattack. You should be the last to resent this or to obliterate the difference between their attitude and the other.

Greetings!

HM

* * *

**CORRESPONDENCE WITH RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA,**

**MARCH 6, 1961**

Dear R.D.

Thanks for your letter and enclosures. *But I must express my utter disagreement with your article on the Moscow Manifesto. This disagreement turns into outright revulsion against your remarks on I. Deutscher.*\(^{32}\) They amount to a plain

---

31 May I be forgiven the word.
32 Marcuse was referring to Dunayevskaya's Two Worlds column, "The New Russian Communist Manifesto," *News & Letters* 6:1 (January 1961), in which she attacked Isaac Deutscher (1907-1967), the well-known Anglo-Polish author of biographies of Trotsky and of Stalin. Deutscher's own politics were generally Trotskyist, albeit with more than usual appreciation for Stalin as well, which placed him at sharp variance to Dunayevskaya, who had been a part of left-wing Trotskyism and who had criticized Trotsky's own defense of the Hitler-Stalin
denunciation in the all too popular McCarthy style: Deutscher has "so organic a communist mentality that he might as well carry a party card instead of a scholastic one." That is to say: although he is (probably) not a card-carrying member, he might well be one. Photo! Pfiu! That goes into Edgar Hoover's file. I guess it is because I wrote the preface to your book that I still feel concerned with such things on your part: with the company you keep, from McCarthy to the FBI. Here too, the Weltgeist asserts itself. He is always on the right side and founds the right alliances. And since I am none of the Weltgeist's boys, I wish to state that, in my view, Deutscher is not only a great scholar but also a great human being who dares to speak out of tune with the chorus of the lackeys on the Right and on the Left... As to the substance: it is perfectly legitimate to compare the Leninist International and the present international organization, since an internal development connects the two. It is also legitimate, as you do, to contrast the two. But by no stretch and squeeze of the truth can one, as you do, contrast the two by presenting the former as the organ of a "workers' state," a paragon of revolutionary socialist democracy (in 1928!!) etc. To use your own language: "nothing can be further from the truth" (as you damn well know, or should know).

Is there still some chance that, someday, you might get over your emotional predilections and settle down to a genuine analysis—an analysis worthy of the names which you claim? It is the absence of such an analysis which, in your News & Letters, renders possible, among other horrors, the lumping together of the "dictatorships of Castro and Trujillo"—Marx and Hegel

Pact of 1939. In her column, Dunayevskaya characterized Deutscher as someone "who passes for an anti-Stalinist, semi-Trotskyst 'independent' thinker, but who has so organic a Communist mentality that he might as well carry a party card instead of a scholastic one." She ridiculed Deutscher's comparison of the 1960 meeting of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow to the Communist International of the 1920s, arguing that he had wrongly merged together "a computer-revolutionary, established state-capitalism, and a workers' state newly born from the greatest spontaneous revolution in history." The bulk of her column, however, was devoted to Russia and China's attempts to influence anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World.

Marcuse was probably referring to the brief article, "Haiti," by Peter Mallory [John Dwyer] in his "Our Life & Times" column, News & Letters 6:2 (February 1961), which described student protests against the Duvalier regime, calling Haiti "a country, which lies between the dictatorships of Castro and Trujillo." Dunayevskaya had published her first major criticism of what she called the top-down "administrative mentality" of Fidel Castro in her "Two Worlds" column, "The Cuban Revolution One Year After," News & Letters 5:10 (Dec. 1960). After the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion later in 1961, Dunayevskaya defended Cuba in a signed editorial, "The Kennedy Administration and Castro's Cuba," News & Letters 6:5 (May 1961), in which she wrote that "Marxist Humanists opposed, and will continue to oppose any American imperialist invasion of Cuba," while also criticizing Castro's increasing ties to Russia and expressing worry that the Cuban Revolution was being strangled from within.
would turn in their grave if they would see this sample of "working class" in-sight. I wonder whether, sometimes, you are not slightly worried about the vicinity of such formulations with those of the State Department and CIA—but perhaps I am unjust to these agencies: I think they indeed see the difference (the essential one!).

Sorry! Shall I go to a psychiatrist to have my "organic communist mentality" diagnosed, or shall I swear that I do not, never have, never will be "just as well" carry a party card?

HM

* * *

PREFACE TO FRANZ NEUMANN,
THE DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN STATE

On September 2, 1954, Franz Neumann died in an automobile accident in Switzerland. He was fifty-five years old.

He was in a rare sense a political scholar. From the beginning, his theoretical work was animated by a political interest; for him, politics was a life element, and he consistently tried to fuse his academic work with practical activity. After graduating from the University of Frankfurt, where he was greatly influenced by his friend and teacher, Hugo Sinzheimer, the founder of German labor law, he taught at the Academy of Labor from 1925 to 1927 and then settled down in Berlin as a labor lawyer. From 1928 on, he taught at the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin. The fate of the Weimar Republic, the decline of democratic socialism, the struggle against the Nazi regime became

* Editors' note:
"Preface" to Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State, was published in a text edited by Herbert Marcuse (New York: Free Press, 1957) pp. vii-x, of a collection of papers by his good friend Franz Neumann. Marcuse opens by noting Neumann's tragic death in an automobile accident on September 2, 1954 in Switzerland when he was only fifty-five years old. Marcuse then discusses Neumann's political importance as a labor lawyer for the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Weimar, Germany, and his work in exile with the Institute for Social Research, the Office of Strategic Services, and Department of State in World War II, and Neumann's tenure with the Columbia University government department after the war. Marcuse highlights the significance of Neumann's magisterial study of National Socialism, Behemoth, which attempted "to identify the economic and political roots of totalitarianism in contemporary industrial society as well as in the historical conditions of its rise in Germany." On Marcuse's close relation with Neumann and their collaboration on various projects in the 1940s, see Technology, War, and Fascism. Volume One, Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, edited with Introduction by Douglas Kellner (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
part of his daily existence. He worked as legal adviser for the executive of the Social Democratic Party, was arrested in April 1933, but was able to escape from Germany in May. Franz Neumann was one of the first whom the Hitler government deprived of citizenship. The exile did not weaken his intense political passion: he tried to advise the anti-Nazi emigration, to help wherever he could, in practice and in the theoretical orientation. At the same time, he studied at the London School of Economics, chiefly under Harold Laski, whom he admired and who became his friend.

In 1936, Franz Neumann came to the United States and joined the Institute of Social Research, then affiliated with Columbia University in New York. In his relation to the Institute, to its director, Max Horkheimer, and to its staff, theoretical, political, and personal ties remained inextricably intertwined; it was Frederick Pollock of the Institute who, at the time of Neumann’s death, was in Switzerland and spoke at his funeral.

The Institute had set itself the task of elaborating a theoretical conception which was capable of comprehending the economic, political, and cultural institutions of modern society as a specific historical structure from which the prospective trends of development could be derived. This undertaking was based on certain notions common to all members of the staff, notably that a theory of history was the prerequisite for an adequate understanding of social phenomena, and that such a theory would provide the standards for an objective critique of given social institutions which would measure their function and their aims against the historical potentialities of human freedom.

In the Institute of Social Research, Neumann wrote his Behemoth, an attempt to identify the economic and political roots of totalitarianism in contemporary industrial society as well as in the historical conditions of its rise in Germany. During his work in the Office of Strategic Services and later in the Department of State (1942–1946), Neumann applied the insights gained in these studies to the analysis and anticipation of German developments. He devoted most of his efforts to plans for a democratization of Germany which would avoid the failures of the Weimar Republic; he tried to demonstrate that denazification, in order to be effective, must be more than a purge of personnel and an abolition of Nazi legislation—that it must strike at the roots of German fascism by eliminating the economic foundations of the anti-democratic policy of German big industry. Neumann saw that the efforts to attain this objective failed, but he continued to work for strengthening the genuinely democratic forces in Germany in the narrow field still open for such efforts. As American liaison man with the Free University in Berlin, he contributed greatly to the rise of this institution and he was instrumental in the establishment of the Institute of Political Science in Berlin. He re-established contacts with the German trade unions and the Social Democratic Party and advised American and German friends and officials on the aggravating political situation in the divided country.

After the war, Neumann joined the faculty of Columbia University, whose Government department became a second home to him. His personality and
his ideas gained him the friendship of his colleagues and of his students; he communicated to them his conviction that political theory was not simply a sum total of opinions and evaluations, but the indispensable foundation of politics. For politics decided the fate of humanity, and the decision grew out of the objective laws which governed the historical process. This conviction was strengthened by the experience of the fascist and post-fascist era: the defeat of democratic socialism and the general trend toward totalitarianism. To Neumann this experience caused a wound that never healed. In his last years, he tried to find the answer to the terrible question why human freedom and happiness declined at the stage of mature civilization when the objective conditions for their realization were greater than ever before. He worked on a comprehensive study of dictatorship—its forms, functions, and its social roots. He saw that the traditional opposition of democracy and totalitarianism was inadequate in the face of the historical facts. The work was not completed, but several articles, assembled in this volume, show the direction in which he searched for the answer. Compared with the Behemoth, the emphasis on the economic determinants has receded, but only in order to place these determinants in a more concrete framework. He collected much historical material related to the various forms of dictatorship, material which was to deepen the understanding of present-day totalitarianism. One of the problems with which he was most concerned was the support for dictatorship from among the under-privileged masses. In this connection, he re-examined the development of the modern labor movement, especially the dissolution of the Marxian tradition in the Social Democratic parties and trade unions. His last undertaking in this field was a study, on the spot, of the ideology and practice of Mitbestimmungsrecht (co-determination of labor in management) in the postwar German industries of the Ruhr region. He was appalled at the decline of political thought and action among organized labor, but he also knew that it was not explained simply by disillusionment, apathy, corruption. There were structural changes in contemporary society whose theory had still to be elaborated. And this theory, in turn, was to furnish guidance for the politics of freedom. Political theory remained to him what it was at the beginning: an indispensable weapon in the struggle for a better world. He was an intellectual in the proudest sense of the word, one of those whose disappearance makes the present poorer and less hopeful.

Most of the papers collected in this volume were chosen and prepared by Franz Neumann himself. I have added the following:

- "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship." Although this is a very fragmentary manuscript, it shows the direction in which Neumann's theoretical efforts were developing during the last years of his life.
- "Intellectual and Political Freedom," after a speech given by Neumann within the framework of the Bicentennial of Columbia University in Bonn, Germany. The paper supplements the essay on "The Concept of Political Freedom."
• "Economics and Politics in the Twentieth Century," the abridged version of a speech given at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 1951, in Berlin. The speech seems to me a good example of Neumann's concrete political thinking.

With the exception of minor editorial changes, especially in "Anxiety and Politics," the available text was retained even where it did not exist in final form. This involved some overlappings and repetitions, which could not be eliminated without breaking the context of the respective articles.

I wish to thank Julian Franklin and Peter Gay, both of Columbia University, for editing and translating "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship" (Julian Franklin), "Intellectual and Political Freedom" (Peter Gay), and "Economics and Politics in the Twentieth Century" (Peter Gay).


Herbert Marcuse

Brandeis University
Waltham, Mass.
September, 1956

* * *
Sirs:

I should like to correct some of the misstatements and misreadings of my book[34] which occur in Mr. Inkeles’s review (PR, Fall 1958).

“The main point of Mr. Marcuse’s book is that Soviet Marxism represents a coherent theory consistent with Leninism and the earlier body of Marxian doctrine.”

While I do treat Soviet Marxism as a coherent theory, my “main point” is the opposite of what Mr. Inkeles makes it in the second part of his statement. Apart from the fact that I emphasized the decisive difference between Leninism and the “earlier body of Marxism doctrine” (p. 29 ff.), I tried to show, for example, (1) that the dialectic, in which I see the center of Marxian thought, is, in Soviet Marxism, the opposite of what it was in Marx (chapter 7, esp. pp. 150 ff.), (2) that the changes in the structure and function of the proletariat which have taken place since the First World War have led to an essential redefinition of the Marxian notions concerning the “historical agent” of the socialist revolution and the course of this revolution (chapter 1 and 6, especially pp. 34 ff. and 126 ff.); (3) that, in sharp contrast to the trend envisaged by Marx, the state has again become a “reified, hypostatized power”—as has society itself (p. 105); (4) that Soviet society has not reversed but retained the oppressive relationship between the laborer and the means of his labor in which Marx saw the root of exploitation (p. 97); (5) that, consequently, the very notion of socialism and of the historical relation of socialism to capitalism has been fundamentally changed (chapter 1 and passim); (6) that the rationality of the Soviet system is technological, not socialist rationality, and that nationalization (which I emphatically distinguish from socialization) and industrialization still mean “progress in domination” rather than the withering away of domination (chapter 7, especially p. 84); etc.

* Editors’ note:
“Soviet Theory and Practice” was published in Partisan Review, 26, 1 (New York: Winter 1959) pp. 157–8. It provided a response to criticisms of his 1958 book Soviet Marxism by Alex Inkeles, which had been published in Partisan Review, 25, 4 (New York: Fall 1958. Marcuse claims that Inkeles was completely wrong in asserting that Marcuse argued that “Soviet Marxism represents a coherent theory consistent with Leninism and the ‘earlier body of Marxian doctrine,’” as Marcuse claims to have argued the opposite. The response provides a cogent summary of Marcuse’s theses on Soviet Marxism.

However, I have indeed attempted to explain these developments and, in doing so, to go a little beyond the mere statement of betrayal, rejection, contradiction, propaganda, etc. And in the attempts to explain, I have tried to point up the “objective” factors in the national and international situation which “determined” the construction of Soviet society and the redefinition of Marxian theory. And in doing so, I have earned the indictment that I am a “historical determinist.” The old whipping horse is pulled out of the stable. “With an unerring sense of direction,” I fall in all the pitfalls “into which determinists generally stumble.” It is “most characteristic” that I succumb to the “tendency to define a crucial historical decision, as an ‘objective fact,’ and then treat it as though it were in a class with such things as climate, universal resources, and population.” I plead guilty to the first half of this indictment: it is my idea of historical or sociological scholarship to explain historical decisions as what they are: “objective facts.” Thus I interpreted the Stalinist policy of terroristic industrialization in terms of “objective facts,” i.e., in terms of the conditions under which the decision was made. Against my interpretation, Mr. Inkeles asserts that the “rapid industrialization was undertaken because Stalin decided on it ...” I took it for granted that knowledge and awareness of this fact is widespread. But I was not satisfied with a statement of fact, nor with the equally familiar corollary that Stalin imposed his decision “through his control over the Communist apparatus.” I wanted to learn how this decision came about, why it was made; and I felt that an explanation in terms of Stalin’s personality, his mental make-up, his greed for power, etc., was not an adequate answer. If this is determinism, I am glad to be called a determinist. But I protest Mr. Inkeles’s assertion that I treat historical decisions like climate, universal resources, etc.—in other words, that I deny the element of human freedom and responsibility. The very notion of historical laws has meaning only against the background of human freedom and responsibility in history. May I quote? “Within the institutional framework which men have given themselves in interaction with the prevailing natural and historical conditions, the development proceeds through the action of men—they are the historical agents, and theirs are the alternatives and decisions” (p. 5; italics added).

Mr. Inkeles asks why I “bother” to “square” Soviet developments with the original Marxian doctrine. In the first place, I don’t bother to “square” them but to explain them within the historical continuum in which they occurred. Secondly, I “bother” to do that for (I suppose) the same reasons Mr. Inkeles “bothers” to interview and/or to analyze the interviews with hundreds of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain and to “square” the results with his theoretical hypothesis—namely because I wanted to understand what was happening and what is happening, and because I was not satisfied with what we already know or believe we know. However, our theoretical hypotheses are very different.

Herbert Marcuse
Letters, Testimonies, and Responses to Critics

Sirs:

Mr. Marcuse says (on p. 11): "The fact is that the Bolshevik Party and the Bolshevik Revolution were, to a considerable degree, developed according to Marxist principles, and that the Stalinist reconstruction of Soviet society based itself on Leninism, which was a specific interpretation of Marxian theory and practice." Later, in discussing the Soviet conception of the dialectic, he says (p. 154): "It should be noted, however, that the Soviet Marxian revision is theoretically consistent with the Marxian conception." Statements similar to this, explicitly asserting the consistency of Soviet theory and practice with Marxism and Leninism, may be found in every chapter and in some many times over. This hardly suggests that I was misstating and misreading when I said that Marcuse presents Soviet Marxism as "consistent with Leninism and the earlier body of Marxian doctrine."

Indeed, if it comes to misstatement, I must point out that Mr. Marcuse misstates my position. In my review I did not say that he denies the element of freedom and responsibility, only that he neglects it. And as for the quotation he gives from page 5, it needs to be brought into perspective in the light of page 8, where he says: "There were alternatives, but they were in an emphatic sense historical alternatives—'choices' presented to the classes which fought the great social struggles of the inter-war period rather than choices at the discretion of the Soviet leadership" (ital. mine).

Of course the issue cannot be settled by confronting one quotation with another, especially when they are out of context. The crucial question is what is the impact of the book taken as a whole. I do not believe that I have given a misleading impression of where it seems to lead. If that impression is not representative of what Mr. Marcuse really meant, it is because his book, not I, gives a false picture of his true views. On rereading most of the book I am left more than ever with the complaint I voiced in my review, that Mr. Marcuse regularly leaves his reader "in complete confusion as to whether a given passage represents what Soviet theorists actually say, or what they don't say but mean, or what Mr. Marcuse thinks they really are saying, or what he himself thinks."

Alex Inkeles

* * *

* * *
LETTER TO KAREN KOSIK

Herbert Marcuse
26 Magnolia Ave.
Newton 58, Mass.
March 22, 1963

Dr. Karel Kosik
Filosoficky ustav CSAV
Hradcanske nam. 11
Praha 1, Czechoslovakia

My Dear Sir, Dr. Karel Kosik:

I am happy to respond to your letter of the 6th of March regarding my interpretation of Heidegger in 1928. I no longer have access to the passage and therefore cannot comment upon it, but I would like to provide some idea of my current position. Today I would reject any attempt to assert an intrinsic (or extrinsic!) affinity between Heidegger and Marx. Heidegger’s affirmative stance with regard to Nazism, is in my opinion, nothing but an expression of the deeply anti-humane, anti-intellectual, historically reactionary, and life-repudiating tendencies of his philosophy. In recent decades, this philosophy, stripped of its political dimension, is without substance and cannot be taken seriously: endlessly repeating meaningless questions that endlessly remain unanswered because they are not genuine questions. Beyond that, wordplay that gropes in the dark and does violence to the language while engaged in a Teutonic phantasy (in every other language this wordplay is lost and it simply becomes untranslatable!). My position today may best be represented

*Editors’ note: Marcuse’s letter to Karel Kosik (1926–2003), dated March 22, 1963 and translated by Charles Reitz, responds to a previous letter from the Czech philosopher asking about his current views on the relation between Heidegger and Marx. Marcuse makes clear that he would today “reject any attempt to assert an intrinsic (or extrinsic!) Affinity between Heidegger and Marx,” arguing that Heidegger’s affirmative response to Nazism is “nothing but an expression of the deeply anti-humane, anti-intellectual, historically reactionary, and life-repudiating tendencies of his philosophy.” Marcuse suggests that his position on contemporary theory is best expressed in his 1955 book Eros and Civilization and tells Kosik that a forthcoming book “will appear this December on the structure and ideology of advanced industrial society,” signaling the publication of One-Dimensional Man (1964). In 1963, Karel Kosik published Dialektika konkretniho (Dialectics of the Concrete) (Prague 1963, 1965, 1966) translated into English in 1976 (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company). Kosik’s book, like Marcuse’s early work, combined phenomenology and Marxism, and as the 1960s went on, Kosik emerged as a major spokesmen for democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia leading to his dismissal from University teaching in 1970 before he returned in 1990, widely respected as a major intellectual and activist of his era.
by my book, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Even more so by my work which will appear this December on the structure and ideology of advanced industrial society. If you would like, I could gladly have the former sent to you. It is very good to know that people are somewhat aware of my Hegel-book where you are.

With regard to your question about the relationship between Heidegger and Lukács, I remember having heard from Heidegger himself that he had never read Lukács. I have no reason to doubt that.

Please don’t hesitate to write me again if you have further questions.

With my best regards and best wishes,

[Herbert Marcuse]

* * *

**A TRIBUTE TO PAUL BARAN**

Herbert Marcuse is a professor of philosophy and political science at Brandeis University. He and Paul Baran were close friends from the time in the early 1930’s when they were both associated with the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) at Frankfurt am Main in Germany.

Paul Baran is dead. I wish to retain his image as I knew it, the image of one who could not live without being painfully conscious of what was going on behind the façade of freedom, without denouncing the falsehood of the established systems, without examining and re-examining its causes and the


chances of liberation. Paul recaptured and preserved the idea of the scholar, the intellectual: for him there was no scholarship, no intelligence which was not radically critical of a social order that was organized to counteract the emergence of a humane society. This kind of scholarship and intelligence demands courage. Paul had courage: he never compromised. He knew that today, as in the past, an objective analysis of the facts is an indictment of the facts and of those who make them—today perhaps more than in the past because progress, productivity, and the defense economy conceal so effectively regression, misery, and aggression; because the insanity of this world is so terribly sane, its irrationality so terribly rational. For Paul, Marxian theory provided the conceptual instruments for understanding the mechanisms which link production to destruction, prosperity to exploitation, freedom to repression; for him, Marxian theory also defined the chances of breaking the fatal link, and of constructing a better society. Paul remained loyal to those who fought for it. Knowledge sustained hope, and science preserved faith—faith not in any superhuman and supra-historical power but faith in man. The union of intelligence and hope, of uncompromising indictment and tenderness, made him one of the most lovable human beings I ever met; it also gave him that wonderful humor which is the token of love: he could smile and laugh and joke like those who are truly serious. In his relentless, acid criticism, in his refusal and accusation, he was without aggression, without resentment. There was generosity in his intelligence—the generosity which gives hope.

* * *

ON CHANGING THE WORLD: A REPLY TO KARL MILLER*

The review of One Dimensional Man, written under the pseudonym of Karl Miller (MONTHLY REVIEW, June 1967) would not deserve a reply, were it not for the fact that it appeared in MONTHLY REVIEW, a magazine devoted to the development of independent socialist thought. In my view, this task demands the rebuttal of all attempts to stifle socialist thought by the uncritical use

* Editors’ note:
In “On Changing the World: A Reply to Karl Miller,” Marcuse published in Monthly Review, 19, 5 (New York: October 1967) pp. 42-8, a response to a June 1967 critique of One-Dimensional Man (1964) published under “the pseudonym of Karl Miller.” Marcuse fiercely defends his book against charges that he “does not know the facts,” and that his position leads to “quietism,” providing a strong Marxian defense of his analysis of contemporary advanced industrial society. In a detailed analysis, Marcuse presents a series of examples where he believed “Miller” misrepresents his work and is concerned to show a much more positive relation between Marxism and One-Dimensional Man than in Miller’s critique.
of concepts inadequate to the understanding of prevalent social forces and tendencies. I have been anxious to see a critique of *One-Dimensional Man* which would have shown that I was wrong, that I overrated the cohesion and power of advanced capitalism and underrated the strength and the prospects of the opposition. Karl Miller offers the caricature of such a critique: he misrepresents my position, builds up straw men which he then violently attacks, pours out angry invective instead of engaging in a substantial discussion. His arguments fall, roughly speaking, into two categories:

1. That I do not know the facts, or disdain facts altogether, or don’t give “details” and “evidence,” or don’t ask the “relevant and important questions” (the relevant and important questions being those which the reviewer considers relevant and important). In short, that I am stupid. Now this may well be the case, but I don’t think that Karl Miller has proved his point.

2. That my position leads to “quietism” and is therefore detrimental to a theory which aims at radical social change: in other words, my position contributes to strengthening the established system rather than the opposition.

My critic deems it necessary to remind me of Karl Marx’s “dictum” that “philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point, however, is to change it.” He contends, that I reverse this proposition. It so happened that it was with this “dictum” in mind that I wrote the book—an intention which may indeed be entirely lost on a reader who imputes to me the claim that the world cannot be changed (p. 57). Only an unwillingness or inability to read without preconceptions can lead to this conclusion. And it is precisely recognition of the fact that changing the world is perhaps more necessary today than ever before which should commit the socialist scholar to the uncomfortable task of comprehending and defining the conditions and prospects of change—the new conditions and prospects engendered by the actual development of capitalism and socialism—and to do so without fostering illusions.

In order to demonstrate that my “thesis” is not only false but contradictory in itself, Karl Miller begins with an exercise in undialectical logic—an exercise which plays havoc with the most elementary concepts of Marxian thought. Here is how he demolishes my thesis: if “the goal of radical change is to be a real alternative,” “there must be agents of change.” But according to my thesis, advanced capitalism “has all but perfected” the means for “taming those internal conflicts which might have made for its radical transformation” (p. 49) and thereby for taming the agents of radical change. Ergo, radical social change is no real alternative, is “not on the agenda.” “On the other hand,” if we cannot rule out the possibility that “more and more people” will come to feel the need for radical change, then such change is “on the agenda,” and my thesis is false.
This sort of logic might do for rhetoric, but it is blind to the Marxian concept of reality and of understanding reality. Karl Miller submits to the reader and to me the profound truism that “(a) social and economic relationships are complex and interwoven, and (b) the relationship between men and their social institutions is dialectical and not linear” (p. 55). I only wish he had kept this in mind, for then he might have remembered that the reality of capitalist society is its dynamic of antagonistic tendencies at all levels that these tendencies generate the internal contradiction of the system, and that one such contradiction is properly that between the (precarious and temporary!) containment of radical social change on the one hand, and the ever more pressing alternative of radical social change on the other. Socialist theory is the theory of tendencies toward change; if it cannot define the agents of change as active in a given historical situation, if in reality the objective and subjective factors do not coincide, this situation (only too well known in the history of class struggles!) does not negate the historical tendency toward change. And if, instead of trying to analyze and define the reasons for this constellation and thus to prepare for its transformation, the socialist scholar, unwilling to face the facts, sets out to present “agents of change” without grounding his presentation in a critical analysis of their position and function in the social process of production, he acts irresponsibly in view of the precarious and dangerous prospects of radical change in the present period.

Throughout his review, Miller attributes to me a position which is not mine and sometimes even the opposite of mine. A few examples:

(1) He maintains that I make the “apparatus” into a Frankenstein which is “generating and satisfying bogus needs” (p. 50), thereby imputing to me a technological determinism. In fact, however, I consider the “apparatus” an instrument of domination in the hands of the ruling classes, and I emphasize the extent to which the needs generated by it have become real needs.

(2) He maintains that I consider no “advanced society” immune to the “technological terror,” “whatever the form of ownership of its productive resources” may be (p. 50). In fact however, I stressed the essentially different potentialities of the socialist societies—while at the same time suggesting that, as long as the apparatus remains an instrument of domination, the social relationships will remain repressive in spite of the different forms of ownership of the productive resources.

(3) He maintains that, in my evaluation of the conditions for change in the underdeveloped countries, I engage in a “Rousseauean search for the noble savage” (p. 52). I fail to see what the notion of possible alternative ways of modernization and industrialization has to do with such a search—except being the opposite of it.

(4) He asserts that I have an “unwarranted disdain for facts as such” (p. 51)—to which I can only reply that Karl Miller must have a strange notion of facts indeed.
(5) I am supposed to apply in my analysis a simple stimulus and response relation, without pointing out to my readers that the "classically simple S-R theory" does not always "hold sway," and that such "simple causal determinism" today is rejected, as in cybernetics and information theory, in favor of "a model which integrates causal and purposive explanation" (p. 55). I admit I did not point this out to my readers, for throughout my analysis I used precisely this more complex "model" which belongs to the ABC of dialectical thinking. For example, I do not picture the people "entering the present industrial phase" (my italics) as preconditioned receptacles of long standing (p. 54), but I try to show how this preconditioning occurs in the social process itself. I also try to show that this is not a one-way determination, but that the preconditioned in turn act upon the conditioners—an interrelation of systematically "purposive" character.

(6) I am supposed to present this preconditioning as "terror," whereas I stress the non-terroristic, democratic character of the one-dimensional society, in which the integration of the underlying population takes place on a very material basis of satisfaction.

But it is time to come to the one serious criticism offered by my critic, namely, my failure to pay adequate attention to and evaluate correctly the "growing Negro agitation" and the national liberation struggles in the Third World.

(a) The Negro agitation. Karl Miller thinks that it "could very well become the most significant countervailing trend in the United States" (p. 51). The term "countervailing trend" is vague: such trends include all those groupings and forces which allegedly balance each other in an allegedly "pluralistic society," that is to say, trends operating within the framework of the established society without transcending it by virtue of the respective interests, aspirations, and capabilities. My book is concerned precisely with the potentially transcending forces which may bring about a change of the established system and not within it. Even a cursory analysis of the role of the Negroes in the basic social process of production, of their organization, and of their vital interests makes it appear highly dubious that the Negro movement is an even potential "agent of change" in the abolition of the capitalist system. Moreover, it seems very likely that this system is capable of coping with the Negro agitation—not only by way of brutal suppression but also, if and when the threat becomes more serious, by making considerable concessions and improvements. That such concessions and improvements would shatter the capitalist economy and its social and political institutions is an unwarranted conclusion. After two years of spreading riots, has the system become any weaker? Is it not significant for its undiminished strength that (according to Le Monde of August 13/14, 1967) "in Los Angeles, a curious kind of festival, which is supposed to last six days, has opened Friday. It is meant to commemorate
the bloody riots which exactly two years ago caused 34 dead in the Negro
quarter of Watts. An exhibit, jazz concerts, shows are on the program.
Some whites are among those taking part in this entertainment, which is
taking place in the most perfect order." Is the supercilious slogan "there
is a lot of money in poverty" not expressing a terrible reality? To be sure,
the problem is largely one of unemployment in an economy increasingly
threatened by technological unemployment, but the possibilities of
retraining and of creating new jobs are still there. To be sure, also, the
efforts to drive the movement toward political consciousness and goals are
intensified, but can we minimize the facts that only a small minority among
the Negroes themselves support these efforts, that effective ties with the
anti-imperialist struggles in the neo-colonial world are non-existent, and
that the prospects are dim for a long time to come? Any declaration of
our part to the effect that we support these efforts is silly and superfluous
because it is self-understood, but it is our responsibility to evaluate their
chances without illusions.

(b) The underdeveloped capitalist colonies. Here too, Karl Miller builds
up the straw man which he sets out to destroy. Who are the Communists,
"young radicals," and liberals who "want a quiet time of it" by seeing in
neo-colonialism "a purely geopolitical escapade indulged in by the Soviet
Union and the West" (p. 52)? Whoever may entertain such a notion, it is
not I. Moreover, Karl Miller criticizes me for failure to "see these societies
as part of the capitalist world—and a vital part at that" (p. 52), only
to blame me on the very same page for overrating the extent to which
progress in these societies depends on the two great industrial power blocs,
the capitalist and the socialist. First, it is simply false to see these societies
merely as a vital part of the capitalist world and to remain silent on their
relation to the socialist world. Secondly, in order to "prove" my failure
to see them as a vital part of the capitalist world, Miller has to impute to
me an unwarranted degree of silliness. When I said that the abandonment
of neo-colonialism would presuppose that the United States abandon its
"policy," I did not believe that a reviewer writing for the MONTHLY REVIEW
would not know that such a policy is not something that "can be turned on
and off" (p. 53)! Indeed, when I used the term "policy," I was aware of the
elementary fact that the imperialist "policy" is rooted in the very structure
of the system.

As to the substance of the argument: the national liberation struggles are
certainly today the most active forces operating against the global system
of capitalism. They have not yet shaken the system (MONTHLY REVIEW itself
has pointed out to what extent the war in Vietnam is good business for the
United States!). And their prospects? What has happened in Indonesia, the
Dominican Republic, in the Congo, Nigeria, Ghana, South America? The
Cuban achievement has remained isolated, it has put the rulers on guard: as
far as they are concerned, it will not be allowed to happen again anywhere
else—and they still have the power and the will, the ever more brutal
power and the ever more aggressive will, to prevent it. For how long? I cannot answer the question, and I believe nobody can. Perhaps Karl Miller should ask for the text of Paul Sweezy’s speech at the recent Congress on the “Dialectic of Liberation” (July 1967 in London): if I remember correctly, he spoke of 50 or 100 years until we can envisage independent progress in these countries. In any case, not forever—no social system is immune to change— a truisim which is worth repeating. I have tried to point out the full strength of the enemy, the terrifying reservoir of power at his disposal, the present weakness of the opposition, the brute fact that organized labor in the United States does not take up the cause of radical change and thus deprives the opposition of its material basis. If this is “quietism,” I profess it. But I believe it is simply the truth, or at least a decisive part of the truth, and that for all those who want to contribute to the radical transformation of an ever more inhuman social system, only a relentless evaluation of the real strength of the system will do. To be afraid of being too negative, the understandable wish to be a little more comforting and to find revolutionary forces—these good intentions foster illusions, divert and weaken the opposition, and play into the hands of the Establishment.

Note

Herbert Marcuse, the distinguished professor of philosophy, is currently teaching in the University of California, San Diego.

* * *

THE GUARDIAN, DECEMBER 5, 1968.
REPLY TO CRITICS

My friends never cease asking me why I do not reply to the steady flow of vilifications from the Right, from P.L., and from the Center. I should like to give here my answer (I hope once and for all): because I have more important things to do. I want to continue analyzing and discussing the conditions

* Editors’ note: A folder in Herbert Marcuse’s private collection titled “Guardian. Dec. 5, 1968. Reply to Critics,” contains a two-page type-written transcript with Marcuse’s handwritten corrections that respond to criticisms of Marcuse from the right, left, and center. Presumably intended for the British Guardian, which published articles by Marcuse during this period, the text provides a rare example of Marcuse criticizing mainstream critics of his work, as well as the Maoist splinter group P.L. (Progressive Labor). As far as we know, this text was not published as it did not appear in previous bibliographies of Marcuse’s work.
and prospects of the Left, without fetishes, deceptions, and illusions—in the spirit of Marxian theory. And in fact, the vilifications encourage me in this effort. Somehow and somewhere, what I say must really hit and hurt, must drive home some unwelcome truths, and the reaction is, not argument from the brain but foam from the mouth. The Right accuses me of being an agent of Moscow or Peking; in the Center, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. reproaches me for advocating violence and undermining democracy, and PRAVDA denounces me for undermining the revolution by reformist and revisionist theories. The Right believes that I am fomenting student rebellions all over the place, while P.L. knows that I am trying to stop them in the service of C.I.A. The procedures are all too familiar: the Right adopts the techniques of McCarthyism; the Center raises again the cry of “Typhoid Mary” (see Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s column in the New York Post of September 2, 1951), while P.L. adopts, in exact repetition but with different targets, the methods of defamation used in the Stalin and Stalinist purges. We know by now that, against these methods, refutation is a waste of time. Thus, whether I am charged with working for the Pentagon or for the Kremlin, for the Nazis or for the Chinese, for or against the students; whether I am accused of having eaten my father or my son, I shall do with these charges what they deserve—nothing.

**THE DIALECTICS OF LIBERATION AND RADICAL ACTIVISM: AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN HERBERT MARCUSE AND LEO LÖWENTHAL**

*Abstract:* Warm regards are exchanged between old friends who are seriously bent on changing the world, not merely analyzing it. Mutual appreciation is evident, as is some tension. Herbert Marcuse’s militant critique of US war-making, waste-making, and poverty is taking Europe by storm. Leo Löwenthal tips his hat with subtle irony and humor to Marcuse’s 1967 triumphs as a public intellectual and political theorist. Activist students give Marcuse great credit because other Frankfurt theorists like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno have remained aloof from this protest. Löwenthal remains more skeptical than Marcuse about the goals of the student movement, which seem to him too ideological and insufficiently radical.


I. Herbert Marcuse, Letter to Leo Löwenthal

August 10, 1967

Leo dear:

There is too much to relate—too much for writing! A most exciting week in Berlin, where I was received like a Messiah, talking to 5000 students. A complete, mad, partly psychedelic Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation in London. Max and Teddie, on account of their political (or rather unpolitical) perspective, dismissed by the worked-up students—leaflets against Teddie! I am attempting to get together with them in Switzerland in order to discuss our political differences—but Max seems not quite ready!

These archival documents are published with the permission of the Literary Estate of Herbert Marcuse, of which Peter Marcuse is executor, whose permission is required for any further publication. Supplementary material from previously unpublished work of Herbert Marcuse, much of which is now in the archives at the library of Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main, is being published by Routledge Publishers, England, in a six-volume series edited by Douglas Kellner, and in a German series edited by Peter-Irwin Jansen published by zu Klampen Verlag, Germany. All rights to further publication are retained by the Estate. The editors express their appreciation to Peter Marcuse, Peter-Irwin Jansen, and Susanne Löwenthal for facilitating the publication of these documents. With respect to the two documents presented here, note that the spelling and punctuation are presented exactly as they appear in the original source material.—Eds.
In the meantime we are trying to rest up here in Zermatt—until our departure for the Humanism Conference in Salzburg. There is much in Old Europe that is still quite lively—And you? See you in September.

Much love to Marjorie—also from Inge

Yours,
Herbert

II. Leo Löwenthal, Letter of Reply to Herbert Marcuse

Berkeley
August 16, 1967

Dear Herbert,

To the appellation “Messiah” in your warm letter of August 10, you must add another “M.” In a German newspaper I saw an article reporting on this new “M”—tradition, namely: Marx, Mao, and Marcuse! This evokes a deep reverence in me! By the way, I infer from press reports that you have the same feelings as I do vis-à-vis our young friends in Germany, who cannot see the forest of a qualitatively different life, because of the trees of global ideologies.

Yours,
Leo

* * *

COMMENTARY ON HENRY KISSINGER

Henry Kissinger’s press conference of December 16, 1972 is an Orwellian nightmare. A huge mass of detail, “linguistic difficulties”, “protocols” as

*Editors’ note:
A two-page typed manuscript found in Marcuse’s personal collection provides a commentary on Henry Kissinger, dated December 19, 1972, and signed “Herbert Marcuse, La Jolla, Calif 92037.” The text appears to be written as a critique of Henry Kissinger’s role in the Vietnam war when he served as National Security advisor for Richard Nixon. As far as we know, this was never published and contains a sharp critique of Kissinger and the strategy of U.S. bombing of Vietnam that intensified in December 1972 when Marcuse wrote this.
Letters, Testimonies, and Responses to Critics

Letters, Testimonies, and Responses to Critics

Letters, Testimonies, and Responses to Critics

distinguished from “technical instruments” serve to arouse faith in the exactness and truth of the report and to bury the one decisive fact, namely, that it is not Hanoi but Washington which is responsible for the delay of the settlement. Kissinger himself states the fact: at the end of October, Hanoi was ready to sign the agreement when Washington suddenly found difficulties and refused. Kissinger: “we ... proposed one other round of negotiations” “we proposed three categories of clarification” (my emphasis). A newspaper editorial is even more outspoken:

it is now clear that President Nixon could have nailed down the nine-point peace plan on October 31 ... But Mr. Nixon chose not to take it, and in effect rejected on October 22 what he had accepted two days before ... (L. A. Times. December 18, 1972)

Why? because of “fresh evidence of a North Vietnamese troop build-up in South Vietnam” (ibid.; this evidence is also cited in Kissinger’s report).

Now such evidence is of course a matter of the highest secrecy and could probably have been furnished only by military intelligence, the credibility of which is not exactly without blemish. And if the report is true: why should the North Vietnamese and their allies sit still while the other side is engaged in a huge build-up? The U.S.A. is strengthening its military base in Thailand, across the border of Vietnam, where the headquarters of the U.S. airforce is to be transferred (L.A. Times, December 17, 1972). An increasingly massive attack on Vietnam has been launched, before and after the end of October, by the U.S. airforce. Every week, one “heaviest” bombing raid has followed the other, and war material has been pouring into South Vietnam (see the preliminary report in the N.Y. Times, October 27, 1972) without interruption (requiring even night shifts in loading). Did Kissinger, who was so preoccupied with linguistic difficulties, perhaps mix up the subjects of his proposition? Who practised the “blackmail” which he attributes to Hanoi? Have the American bombing raids nothing to do with the negotiations, nothing with softening up the enemy?

At one point, Kissinger abandons for a while the severe exactness of his report and ventures into depth psychology. He suggests that perhaps “the people of Vietnam, north and south,” after having fought so long, find “the risks and perils of war, however difficult (sic!), more bearable to them than the uncertainties and the risks and perils of peace.” A relapse into German Hegelianism? Did Kissinger remember Hegel’s praise of war and his warning against the bad effects of peace? In any case, the eye witness reports on the burned villages of Vietnam and the mutilated remains of their inhabitants do not exactly support Kissinger’s speculations.

The Orwellian deceptions culminate in a report by the office of the unbelievable Herbert G. Klein. It issues an assessment of the Nixon Administration, according to which “American involvement in the Vietnam war has been wound down” (L.A. Times, December 17, 1972). The continuous
"heaviest" bombing raids and the pre-Christmas bombing of North Vietnam apparently are effective methods of "winding down".

Whom are they trying to deceive? The people know, or could know what is going on. But they are silent, they have abdicated. They buy, they sell; they celebrate. But the noisy and gay celebration of Christmas, the prayers to the Prince of Peace ritually attended by the princes of war cannot out-shout their deadly silence. It is louder than the words of the politicians and their media; and it speaks the truth about this society.

December 19, 1972

Herbert Marcuse
La Jolla, Calif. 92037

* * *

CORRESPONDENCE WITH RUDI DUTSCHKE

8831 Cliffridge Ave.
La Jolla, Cal. 92037

11. April 1970

Dear Rudi,

I have an awfully bad conscience: three months have already gone by and I have not answered your letter... . I am again so deeply involved in things political that I don't get to anything else. In all the main ways we have

* Editors' note: From Marcuse's personal collection of correspondence, we publish here letters that Marcuse sent to German activist Rudi Dutschke (1940–1979), dated April 11, 1970, April 16, 1971, and February 24, 1973, translated by Charles Reitz. Dutschke was one of the most important leaders of the German radical student movement of the 1960s and was known for his strategy of "the long march through the institutions," a concept that Marcuse also used. Surviving an assassination attempt in 1968, Dutschke continued to be active and met with Marcuse during his visits to Germany in the late 1960s. Marcuse had a very high opinion of Dutschke as his friendly and solicitous letters indicate. The letters are also noteworthy for their concrete/practical suggestions concerning the student movement, showing Marcuse's deep involvement with the New Left. On the latter topic, see Herbert Marcuse, The New Left and the 1960s. Volume Three, Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, edited with Introduction by Douglas Kellner (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

37 These German language letters and more are published in Peter-Erwin Jansen, Herbert Marcuse: Nachgelassene Schriften, Band 4, Die Studentenbewegung und ihre Folgen (Springe: zu Klampen! Verlag, 2004).
here the same situation that you describe in your letter; the same kind of splintering of the movement not for substantive reasons that could undergird actual alternatives (this is unavoidable), but rather all-too-often because of the sectarian interests of factions. Here we also have an extremist wing that sees taking on the system through individual acts of terror as the only effective means left, while the majority holds firmly to the idea of using more or less democratic forms (though these forms are becoming increasingly flimsy). And then we have the prominent conflicts between spontaneity and radical discipline, between anarchy and organization, and the especially notable conflicts between personal and political liberation, the specific interests of particular groups and the general situation. These conflicts are suffused throughout the whole commune movement and have led to the sharpening contradiction between the hippies and the militants. Still the communes have a powerful potential, but this can only come to fruition if they maintain their connection to the “outside” political movement. Politization, in its concrete sense, does not mean that Marx and Mao are to be continuously studied in the communes, but rather that these communes actually, though temporarily, become units of production that reconstruct not only personal affairs but also the common work. Learning how to farm, even small-scale industrial labor, how to operate computers and become familiar with technology not to attain a romantic regime of guilds and craftsmanship but in order to be able to enter into society’s fabrication processes at a later date and to be able to work in the right manner in the transition to socialist production. In these ways the communes could impart a practical socialism and give it a trial run. In this manner you can connect personal life (and individual relationships) to the life of the particular community and to the world “outside.” A commune must organize itself with a view to its future Aufhebung [transformation into a higher form]. Personal liberation, instead of being bogged down in self-indulgence, can direct itself towards the common good through autonomy and discipline. And to do all of this in the complete awareness that one’s efforts are only of a preparatory sort and the societal processes are of detestably long duration. For quite a while things will still go wrong….

That’s what things look like. We need to be cautious with our ideas: the tendency to wield them as clichés is getting stronger and stronger. Still I speak out, without a second thought, about the rapidly intensifying fascist-like powers in this country: from the highest places (Nixon administration) to the governments of the states, to local levels of the power structure. Government grounded in the “rule of law” is rapidly being dismantled: there are emergency rulings in effect, the police are above the law, legalized or semi-legalized violence, the courts as instruments of political repression. I take it that you are informed about these affairs (if not, I can send you materials, still what you read in the papers will suffice). The economic situation is getting more intense, so too the resistance of the rank and file workers to the union misleaders, inflation is climbing without interruption, and the war in Vietnam is being extended into Cambodia and Laos. The opposition by the blacks and browns
has become more and more outspoken. And those of us on the Left are getting more and more disoriented... Enough.

But how are things with you and your family? Please let me know about your plans. We are hoping to be in London from the 13th to the 15th of June. It would be immensely meaningful if we could get together for a real discussion. We could also meet if you must stay on the continent.

With warm regards and best wishes, also from my wife,

Yours,

* * *

16. April 1971

Dear Rudi,

Your letter made us very happy. It makes clear that you are "engaged in what matters" once again, and that the new surroundings are doing you good. Denmark really does appear to be an oasis. We think fancifully about relocating there as well, since it is getting more and more grim here. With regard to your question about whether I am working on "Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back," the answer is no. The phrase makes no sense. Probably I said the current regression in the student movement was one of those situations in which it had to take a step backward in order to be able to make two steps forward (a paraphrase of Lenin of course). The book that I am working on is hopefully a Marxist analysis of the radical movement within advancing monopoly capitalism. The discussion will avoid fetishizing Marxist concepts especially the reification of the "revolutionary subject." As if that was something one could find if one only looked around properly. Instead, this is something that can only emerge from practice. In this new book I want to get into questions of strategy as concretely as possible. Let me tell you this: that I regard your notion of the "long march through the institutions" as the only effective way, now more than ever. 38 Most important is an analysis of the altered structure of the working class and the (integrally interrelated) foundation for revolution:

---

38 In his 1972 Counterrevolution and Revolt, Herbert Marcuse writes: "To extend the base of the student movement Rudi Dutschke has proposed the strategy of the long march through the institutions: working against the established institutions while working within them, but not simply by 'boring from within,' rather by 'doing the job,' learning (how to program and read computers, how to teach at all levels of education, how to use the mass media, how to organize production, how to recognize and eschew planned obsolescence, how to design, et cetera), and at the same time preserving one's own consciousness in working with others. The long march includes the concerted effort to build up counterinstitutions... . This is especially important for the development of radical, 'free' media... Similarly with the development of independent schools and 'free universities.'" (CR 55-56).
no longer in material wretchedness, and from the very beginning, no longer quantitative steps forward, but a qualitative leap. I believe that up to this point the platform of the "Il Manifesto" group is the only one having explored a non-ritualized Marxist analysis. Your own work regarding the "dictatorship of the proletariat" also fits into this category of course. Even Marx foresaw the "Aufhebung" [supersession] of the proletariat within advanced capitalism as a result of technological progress in the material processes of production and the growth of "unproductive work" in the society as a whole. I would have liked to have been able to discuss all of this with you. I will be in West Germany probably the beginning of June (Köln-Düsseldorf for two or three days). Can you travel?

It's unfortunate, but there is little news about Angela Davis. Her co-defendant was able to disqualify the judge. A new judge must now be named, and this means the proceedings will probably only begin after the summer break.

8831 Cliffridge Ave.
La Jolla, Calif. 92037

24. February 1973
Dear Rudi,

Many thanks for your two letters. I wish I could answer them in depth and detail. I can't. Inge is suffering from an incurable cancer of the stomach, and this is also devouring my energies. You will understand.

I agree with you: it is not the student movement and its intentions that are "outmoded," on the contrary, it's the sectarian factions who want to put it down as obsolete who are. Naturally that sounds somewhat self-serving, as if we are objecting about being obsolete. It doesn't matter, we must remain steadfast that the sectarians will one day finally see that they are living in a fantasy world, that they have turned Marxist theory into a ritualized ideology. What we must defend and preserve against them is the recognition of the fundamental fact that the working class in monopoly state capitalism is no longer the Marxist proletariat. The changes have not just taken place in the ideological "sphere of consumption," but rather are an aspect of the structural modifications of capitalism (and of Soviet socialism!). Today the theoretical need is for a class analysis that does not simply "apply" Marxist [theory] but rather dialectically develops its own concepts.

I believe there is one positive thing that might be said for the sectarians, they have learned that nothing can be done without organization, and the new forms of organization must be devised (here also one cannot simply take up the old forms once more).
How avidly I would have liked to discuss all of these things with you ... perhaps still this summer in Europe. What are your plans (I cannot make any)? You write that you have not received my book Counterrevolution and Revolt. You were on the priority list to get one! In any case I'll send you another copy of the American edition (a German version is coming out soon). I look forward to your critical comments ... 

In solidarity always,

* * *

JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LETTER TO HERBERT MARCUSE, JULY 10 [1978]“

Dear Herbert,

I don't know if you are aware of just how important you have been to my philosophical life. Please let me take the occasion of your birthday to thank you for it.

* Editors' note:
A letter sent to Marcuse from Jürgen Habermas and dated July 10, 1978, contains a very touching expression of Habermas's admiration for Marcuse and summary of their meetings over the years.

39 This 1978 letter was recently found by Peter-Erwin Jansen in the Frankfurt Marcuse archive. It is published with permission of Jürgen Habermas who sent Jansen a note dated 21 June 2012, Starnberg. The note read: “Dear Mr. Jansen, Certainly I remember you. I have also followed your Marcuse publications project. I would be happy to have you publish the attached letter to Herbert. Our earliest encounters, as described there, are also noted in my essay on the German Jewish immigrants in the New Zurich Tribune [Neue Zürcher Zeitung] of 2 July 2011. Warmly, Jürgen Habermas.”

In Habermas's Neue Zürcher Zeitung article he writes: “...one only has to remember that at that time psychoanalysis was in full flower and that it was internationally regarded a key discipline in the explication of anthropological and social-psychological questions as well as political ones in the largest sense. ... [T]wo lectures by a philosopher on “The Idea of Progress in Light of Psychoanalysis” electrified me as have few others before or since. It was then that I saw Herbert Marcuse for the first time presenting ideas from his as yet unpublished book, Eros and Civilization. I had begun my work with the Institute just two months earlier.... The image that we hold of Marcuse, as students during that period of political engagement, distracts somewhat from the soundness of his scholarly work and the excellent philosophical education he received in Freiburg. Within the circle of the “old” critical theorists of Frankfurt, it was Marcuse who held most rigorously to the standards of conventional scholarship—Reason and Revolution is the best example. Without this solid scholarship, also exemplified eight years later in his lecture on ‘Industrialization and Capitalism,’ it seems to me Marcuse would not have found such an echo within this historical context or have had such an impact.”
During your 1956 lectures on Freud, I heard you speak for the first time—two presentations that contained the substance of *Eros and Civilization*. You cannot imagine the dreary impression of Freud and “depth psychology” that we came away with after study at a traditional university (like Bonn). Your lectures guided me to the discovery of a new continent! I distinctly remember my total amazement in seeing that there were people who studied Freud *systematically*, who took Freud *seriously*.

A year after that you came to Frankfurt, and this time I had the good fortune to speak with you, to get to know you. At that point I hadn’t been in Frankfurt long, I was skeptical about Horkheimer and admired Adorno, but I felt *two* missing links prevented me from entering into Adorno’s dialectical exertions with my whole heart rather than just intellectually: the link connecting contemporary philosophy (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, etc.) to the work of the Frankfurt School, and the link from Frankfurt theory to the questions of political practice, to our demonstrations against atomic weaponry, the military, against the war in Algeria, etc. Then I read you—and met you—and found both: the full context of philosophy *after* Bergson (with whom Adorno had somehow gotten “stuck” in spite of the work on Husserl) and wonderfully profound political engagement in spite of pessimism.

At that time I called you a “Heideggerian Marxist.” Naturally, this implied some distancing from your own philosophical trajectory. But more than that, it expressed enthusiasm about *both*: here was one of the “old” Frankfurt theorists who embodied continuity with the philosophy I grew up with (Heidegger) and incorporated also the refusal of the cowardly unpatriotic mind-set. You were a Marxist, and you proclaimed it.

One only has to recall the Eisenhower-Dulles-Adenauer era to understand how a young German in the middle of total destruction found such liberation in getting to know a man like yourself, when otherwise I felt I would suffocate. Ten years later you had an authentic impact on yet a different generation. In my generation I feel your influence was rather more personal and exceptional—and I wanted to be sure to tell you so.

Have a fine celebration with Ricky, Lettau, and friends.

You have already received our little yellow book from Busch.40

We’re thinking of you, Happy Birthday

Ute and Jürgen Habermas

---

40 Note from Peter-Erwin Jansen: The “little yellow book” Busch brought to Marcuse in 1978 was quite probably Suhrkamp’s *Gespräche mit Herbert Marcuse* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978). This volume published transcripts of several roundtable discussions featuring Marcuse, Habermas, and others. Günther Busch was the editor with Suhrkamp Verlag who had also invited Habermas to compile a *Festschrift* for Marcuse’s 70th birthday ten years earlier. This appeared as Jürgen Habermas (editor), *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968).
V

MARXISM AND REVOLUTION IN AN ERA OF COUNTERREVOLUTION

Marcuse in the 1970s

MARXISM AND THE NEW HUMANITY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION*

In the context of the contemporary situation, and with the special emphasis on the present student movement, what is the relationship between Marxism and the western tradition? Marxism itself once defined, relatively simply, its relationship to the liberal tradition and its place in it. Marxism claimed, namely, to translate the progressive ideas of liberalism into reality, to take them out of the sphere of mere values (professed but rarely practiced), out of the entire ideological sphere, and to make the concepts of freedom, equality, and justice for all real. Marx considered this translation of liberal ideas

*Editors’ note:
into reality impossible under the social system from which liberalism had emerged and with which liberalism remained connected: capitalism.

Within capitalist society, the liberal ideas of freedom, equality, and justice remain abstract and ideological. This is so because in such a society the great majority of people remain dependent on the class owning and controlling the process of production, a class whose very rule is based on the continuation of this control. There is, therefore, underlying this system, a factual, basic inequality within the system itself that cannot be eliminated, and it is this factual and basic inequality that vitiates the progressive ideas of liberalism and leads to an increasing restriction of their substance and function.

Without dwelling on the way in which Marx demonstrated this thesis, it can be recalled that Marx accepted the idea of freedom as self-determination and of democracy as the form of government of a free society. But the existing society is not free; therefore, an authentic democracy does not exist and cannot prevail in this society. In addition, Marx considered civil rights and liberties an essential part of democracy but, unless implemented in an economic democracy, freedom, equality, and justice would remain privileges, and popular sovereignty an illusion. Marx broke with the liberal tradition by insisting, that only a revolution could establish real freedom, equality, and justice.

An Unfinished Revolution

However it appears today that this break with the liberal tradition is incomplete, and that the ways of translating liberal ideas into reality are no longer those envisaged by Marx. Today, for example, it can be seen that existing socialist societies succumb to repressive forces within their own system. It appears that these repressive tendencies are not due merely to the fact of coexistence, to competition with capitalism, but that there is something in the basic Marxian concept itself which seems to justify the extension of repressive tendencies from the old societies to the new. It also appears that the present rebellion of militant youth is directed largely against this intrusion the old into the new society. Or, to put it another way, this rebellion invokes neglected goals and ideas, invokes forgotten liberating and libertarian forces in Marxian theory itself.

It may be noted that this opposition to Marxism among the New Left often appears as a return from the mature to the early Marx. Really radical and revolutionary ideas are to be found much more in the early Marx than in *Das Kapital*, so that a reading today of early Marxist writings reveals not a soft Marxian humanism but rather a truly and authentically radical concept.

The ingress of the old society into new provides a continuity rooted in the concept of reason which underlies the Marxian theory—a concept that still pays tribute to the rationality of scarcity and domination. In what way? The key is found in the notion “development of the productive forces.” The
socialist society is characterized by a rational, unfettered development of 
the productive forces, a development which, under capitalism, is becoming 
more and more repressive and destructive. 

It is this notion of the development of the productive forces which extends 
the past into the future. This is clearly revealed in Marx's distinction between 
the two phases in the construction of socialism: the phase of creation of 
economic equality, and the phase of creation of the society beyond necessity. 
According to this concept, the new socialist society is supposed, in the first 
phase, to create the material conditions for freedom and equality, the material 
conditions for implementation of the socialist principle "to each according 
to his needs." Vast social wealth would obviously be required to translate 
this ideal "to each according to his needs" into reality. During the period 
of creation of this wealth, during the creation of the material conditions 
for freedom, repression would continue, inequality would continue, because 
society would not yet be rich enough to afford socialism. 

The dangers of this concept of the two phases are known today. For one 
thing, the first phase, especially under prevailing international conditions, 
could apparently be prolonged indefinitely. But there is more to it than that. 
Even in the fully developed socialist society, Marx assumed, there is one area 
in which there cannot be real freedom: the area of socially necessary work, 
socially necessary labor. The famous formulation in the third volume of Das 
Kapital is evidence of this. According to that formulation there can be no 
freedom in this realm; it remains a realm of necessity. 

Technical progress is a prerequisite for the progressive reduction of the 
working day; this, and the collective control of the productive forces by the 
producers themselves, would essentially change the character of work, but 
would remain beyond and outside the realm of necessity, beyond and outside 
the realm of socially necessary work. 

There is a technological continuity between capitalism and socialism. The 
socialist society presupposes the largest possible automation of labor and the 
scientific computation of material resources available for the satisfaction of 
needs. While socialism destroys the political apparatus of capitalism, it takes 
over (and it has to take over) in order to be able to develop the productive 
forces, the technical and technological apparatus whose construction has 
been the great historic achievement of capitalism, and without which no free 
society is imaginable. 

There is, however, one hitch in this thinking. Today it becomes constantly 
clearer that the technological apparatus of production, distribution, and 
consumption is by no means a technical, scientific, and technological apparatus 
only, but that it is increasingly the apparatus of political control, as well. And 
since it is working as apparatus of political control, it contributes to the 
achievement of late capitalism in the most advanced industrial countries— 
namely, to reconcile and integrate into the capitalist system precisely those 
social classes in which Marx saw the agent, the historic subject of revolution: 
the industrial working classes.
Under the impact of the overwhelming productivity of capitalism and its ability to raise the standard of living, the very class that was supposed to be free for the revolution (because it had no vested interests in the existing system) has, in the most advanced industrial countries, developed such vested interest. So long as this development continues, the industrial working class is without that quality and qualification which Marx considered an absolutely necessary factor of revolution.

A New Type of Man

Since we are again confronted with a repressed or minimized element in Marxian theory, a succinct restatement of this theory is in order. The industrial working class, according to Marx, is the historic agent of revolution, not only because it constitutes the human basis of the process of production, but also because it is free from the competitive and aggressive needs generated by the capitalist system and satisfied in that system. In other words, the proletariat, according to Marx, is a class that, in this sense, is already free prior to its liberation; and it is this freedom from the satisfactions of the capitalist system which makes it the historic subject of revolution. This idea implies that socialism represents a qualitatively different society, one which can never be a mere by-product of new institutions and relationships, no matter how basic. The development of socialist institutions and relationships requires, rather, a new type of man, a different type of human being, with new needs, capable of finding a qualitative different way of life, and of constructing a qualitatively different environment. Unless socialism is built by such a new type of human being, the transition from capitalism to socialism would mean only replacing one form of domination by another form of domination, perhaps more efficient, perhaps even more egalitarian than the capitalist controls (and this of itself would be a great contribution). But by no means would this yet be the qualitatively different life, the life of authentic freedom, that Marx envisaged as the substance of socialism.

If this often forgotten idea, this insistence on a new type of human being as prerequisite to the transition to socialism, is reexamined, the radical libertarian trend in Marxian theory must be recognized. This trend is telescoped in the concept of the "all-around individual." Marx explained this concept by another difficult, strange, and provocative term. He spoke of "the sensuous species being of man." "Sensuous species being"—a type of man who fulfills the potentialities of the human species not only in and with his mental faculties but also in and with his senses, in his sensibility and sensitivity. And among these potentialities of man as species being is precisely the capability of transforming his environment, his world, into a universe where his sensibility can freely develop. This would be a peaceful universe, a universe to be enjoyed.
This means, according to Marx, that the construction of a socialist society is a creation rather than a production, a creation expressing and activating not only man's rationality, not only his vital material needs, but all his senses, his reason, his imagination. In the same period and in the same work from which the description of the sensuous species being is quoted, The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts, there is another note by Marx which sounds very strange indeed to our ears and which is a comment rarely noticed. In discussing the broad outline of a socialist society as a creation in the literal sense, Marx stated that man not only produces in accordance with his vital needs, he also produces "in accordance with the laws of beauty."

Here is a vision of socialism as a society where the realm of freedom would not lie beyond and outside the realm of necessary labour. There would be, rather, an entrance of freedom into the realm of necessity, so that rational organization of the process of production would respond to and shape the sensibility of man without twisting it to the demands of exploitation. This would mean development of the productive forces, indeed, but a development directed toward the goal of taking man out of the material process of production, making him the supervisor, the experimenter with the technique and technology of production. It would mean directing the process of production first toward the abolition of poverty and toil the globe over, and then toward the total reconstruction of the spiritually and physically polluted environment of capitalist society.

This vision of a socialist society in which a different type of human being will have emerged, a man with a new sensibility and sensitivity, physiologically incapable of tolerating an ugly, noisy, and polluted universe—this is the radical libertarian element in Marxian theory, an element so often concealed by the rationalistic (and today already largely obsolescent) emphasis on the perpetual growth of productivity and production.

In other words, the relationship between capitalism and socialism indicates not only an economic rupture, not only a political rupture, and not merely an ascending curve of development of productive forces, but, in addition to this, an essential redirection of the process of production, redirection toward the goals just indicated. For the technically most highly developed (even overdeveloped) capitalist countries, that would mean perhaps not further development of the productive forces but rather their retrenchment according to goals requiring the elimination of the waste and planned obsolescence which this system retains—both abroad and at home—in the face of misery, hunger, and oppression. It would indeed mean (and I think we should be frank about this) a reduction in the standard of living, but a reduction in the standard of living for those who live on profitable waste, luxury, and destruction.
Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution

Marxism and Radical Religion

This libertarian radicalism seems to link Marxism with a quite different western tradition. This would be not so much the liberal tradition (which still contains much of the repressive puritanism with which it was once connected), but the great radical heretic movements which, since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, have become an essential element in the western tradition: libertarian trends in Christianity, libertarian humanism, Brothers of the Free Spirit, Edomites, and others.

While Marxian theory remains irreconcilable with Christian dogma and its institution, it finds an ally in those tendencies, groups, and individuals committed to the part of the Christian teaching that stands uncompromisingly against inhuman, exploitative power. In our times these radical religious tendencies have come to life in the priests and ministers who have joined the struggle against fascism in all its forms, and those who have made common cause with the liberation movements in the Third World, especially in Latin America. They are part of the global anti-authoritarian movement against the self-perpetuating power structure, east and west, which is less and less interested in human progress. This anti-authoritarian character brings to life long-forgotten or reduced anarchist, heretic tendencies.

Even the bizarre, extreme forms which the student opposition assumes today must be taken very seriously. They express, it seems, the fact that the young militants have lost patience with the traditional forms of opposition which go on and on without really changing the essentials—which go on and on, still sustaining the ghettos, still sustaining and even extending poverty and misery—which still go on while hundreds are daily killed, tortured, and burned in an immoral and illegal war. Whether we like it or not, this opposition exists.

This brings us full circle. There is indeed a force in this opposition with which religion and the churches should properly come to grips, because there is a strong moral element in it, a moral element which has for too long been neglected or overlooked. This moral element has now become a political force.

* * *
Herbert Marcuse is a professor of philosophy at UCSD. Since he came to San Diego five years ago he has become "internationally famous." Locally, he has been vilified by the Copley Newspaper as a "dangerous man." To his students, to young people around the world he is one of the major theoreticians of the struggle for liberation in the West. When the students of Rome shouted his name in the streets, the U.S. media went berserk. At last they had found the guru of the "New Left."

Editors' note: "The Interview with Street Journal & San Diego Free Press, April 17-23, 1970" has a boldface MARCUSE ON, followed by a list of boldfaced topics arranged vertically, encompassing "The University, Music, New Culture, Ecology, Personal & Social liberation, Workers, The Mideast." The interview, as evidenced by the language of the young questioner, was posing issues from the point of view of the radical counterculture, the only such interview that we are aware of in which Marcuse is directly addressing young representatives from the counterculture who pose an array of issues of contemporary relevance. Marcuse's FBI file contains an entry under the subject COINTELPRO-NEW LEFT Re San Diego letter to the Bureau 7/30/70 on "POTENTIAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTION" describing:

The People's Commune housing a group of individuals who print the "San Diego Street Journal," an underground type newspaper in San Diego, continues to be an appropriate target for counterintelligence operation. The Bureau has been previously advised that the commune was located in the 3200 block of Second and Third Avenues in San Diego and that they had moved to 2412 J Street, San Diego. They have now moved out of 2412 J Street and are living at various locations.

Thus both Marcuse and the young Street Journal & San Diego Free Press people interviewing him were under COINTELPRO-NEW LEFT FBI surveillance! On Marcuse's FBI file, which was obtained by Douglas Kellner, see Stephen Gennero and Douglas Kellner, "Under Surveillance: Herbert Marcuse and the FBI," Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Volume 26, edited by Harry F. Dahms, Emerald: Bingley UK, 2009, pp. 283-314.
When Copley finally heard about it, he made Marcuse the living Devil—the commie lurking in the closet—and eventually provoked our world famous "radical fringe" to threaten his life.

The following is an interview-conversation with Marcuse. It covers a number of subjects all of them immediately relevant to the Movement. We present it here because we feel it provides an example of a unique dialectical and perspective. A bibliography follows for those interested in going to the rest of this man's views.

Marcuse has been working for years on what he terms "critical social theory." It is so critical, in fact, that he is frowned upon in Moscow as much as he is in Washington (or San Diego). Part of that unflinching criticism has enabled him to discuss the real possibilities of a truly human society. At the same time his dialectical perspective gives a new dimension to the traditional radical economic analysis.

The University

Street Journal: The criticism of the University by revolutionary students has been mounting over the years. The University is either being abandoned or attacked in such a way that opposition to it is becoming total. Do you feel that there is still any worthwhile function for the University? Must it control the consciousness of the students?

Marcuse: The University can only control the consciousness of the students if they allow it to be controlled. To the degree to which the university still promotes thinking, critical thinking, it still allows the students to see through the indoctrination which is going on. It is an all too easy rationalization to condemn the University in toto. I know quite a few students who have escaped indoctrination. They have developed their consciousness in the University against the Establishment and then put their knowledge to work.

It is true that the University is getting more and more reactionary, but that is the fault of the faculties. They seem to lack the slightest bit of backbone. Look at the increasing dictatorship of the Regents on educational policy. Such actions should have been met immediately with a strike on the part of the faculty. Instead, the faculty has taken everything lying down; at best passing resolutions of regret and complaint.

Music

Street Journal: Music has been one of the creations of the new revolutionary community in the US. The concerts bring people together. There is a unity between the audience and the band. Many people see this development as being a revolution in itself or at least revolutionary. A
few weeks ago for instance a band from Long Beach, OF THE PEOPLE, came down to San Diego and brought together politics and culture; the performers and the audience. How do you view the music and the revolutionary effect of culture?

Marcuse: What I am really interested in is this togetherness between the band and the audience, and the togetherness of the audience itself. In other words, I am interested in the relation between rock music and political radicalism. Where does this music “belong”: to the Establishment or to its adversaries? I know of Woodstock, I know how the radicals have elevated this festival to the rank of a national, revolutionary event (or myth?); I still want to know ... Massive togetherness: massive unity fomented by rock music is still immediate massification, immediate union—not per se political, not radical, not the appearance of a radically different humanity. Lots of release, relaxation, fun: nothing wrong with it, but again, what about its political function?

Music can be inherently radical, as music, apart from all politics. This is the case of Schönberg, Webern, Stockhausen. Music can be explicitly political: the Internationale, songs from the Spanish Civil War, Bob Dylan’s songs of protest. Rock is neither one. By immediately activating the body as vehicle or receptacle of constantly repeated rhythmical movements, it allows release from repression, instant actualization, but it does so by suspending the mental reflections, intermediaries which alone are capable of relating the individual, personal release, to the social repression and the protest against it. And this mental development is not recognized and then “bracketed” in favor of the beautiful moment, it is rather violently suppressed by the mere noise of the music, and by the masses succumbing to it. The individuals are made into hypnotized, objects—pleasurable reification, but reification nevertheless. They really share rock with the Establishment. I wonder.

We must understand that these kind of things go very fast. To me—and I may be utterly old-fashioned and reactionary—the songs of protest of Dylan were the most radical stage of contemporary popular music.

Street Journal: But Dylan’s music and performance is just that. The people just sat there. There was no unification in the experience.

Marcuse: No, that is not essential. I believe in the effect of listening in silence, and in the powers of my memory. Memory is part of the whole organism, and it affects it as much as physical participation. What do you want people to do? Is there anything wrong with sitting there and listening? Dylan’s lyrics stick. They have contributed to changing people’s minds as well as their senses. At no point is the political impact of his songs lost, while in these “rock festivals” almost all such impact has disappeared.

Street Journal: Yes, I can agree with that, but there is also the vibrations ... the mass communication that can take place between all the people and the musicians.
Marcuse: Vibrations can be very nice, but what are radical vibrations? And just what is it that is being communicated? Communication per se is not necessarily of political value. The mere establishment of mass communication is done by the mass media. That is the effective means of such communication.

New Culture

Street Journal: You do not see any real value, liberation, then in the "new culture" and its ability to communicate without words?

Marcuse: I see great value in the "new culture", and we should make all effort to separate it from its distorters and its commercial purveyors.

There is indeed such a thing as communication without words. Music is one of them. But what matters is not only the way but also the content of communication. Again, what is the radical "message" of a rock festival?

Street Journal: Since Bob Dylan the nature of the music as well as the demonstrations has changed. Silent vigils and Joan Baez have become street fighting and the Rolling Stones; concerts which were once just that have become "total experiences".

Marcuse: I don't like the phrase "total experience": it belongs to the vocabulary of totalitarianism.

You are right in trying to correlate the change in music and that in the radical strategy. But the forms of change are very different in the cultural end in the political action. There can be; there is violence in music, but such violence is not necessarily radical in any sense.

I would like to say something about the Rolling Stones. I have seen this incredibly lousy film, *Sympathy for the Devil*. I have been told that their manager refused to have anything to do with politics. I have also been told that they refused to play when they were asked to help the Black Panther Party. The Rolling Stones are certainly not pacifists, but their violence, in my view, has no revolutionary value.

Street Journal: Sure, but what does that mean? More and more people are hip to what the Stones are—to the money-trip. Kids today know that the drug scene isn't all groovy, that seconal and acid cut with speed and poisons are all around. People are getting smarter or at least they are questioning things more directly. Isn't it amazing that calling a policeman a "pig" is routine among High School students?

Marcuse: You said "routine". That's it! And again, that is not necessarily of any political value. Moreover, you should give some thought to the question the establishment may not mind the drug business too much?

Street Journal: You don't see a contradiction then between the spread of drugs and the maintenance of the American Empire? For example, the troops over Vietnam are loaded on grass, etc.?
Marcuse: Has this prevented them from bombing North Vietnam or invading Cambodia and Laos. All this does not contribute really to the weakening of the establishment. It may speed up the tendency for them to abolish the draft and replace it with a volunteer army, which is much more dangerous.

Ecology

Street Journal: Ecology is becoming one of the areas that is developing people's consciousness of just how destructive capitalist society is. However it has developed many different interpretations, from the Nixon Administration view to that of revolutionary groups. How do you view this new "issue"?

Marcuse: As you said ecology is a highly ambivalent affair. On the one hand, it has been taken over by the Establishment, the management of US Steel and of Dow Chemical is in favour of it for instance. We have to take this into account. We have to realise that ecology by itself does not necessarily develop political consciousness. We must insist that no decent human and natural environment can be created until the real sources of pollution have been eliminated. Even the most beautiful war factory remains a source of pollution, and the cleanest hydrogen bomb remains a hydrogen bomb. Unless the very institutions and the political forces which make for pollutions are eliminated we cannot hope for a clean environment for free human beings. And don't forget: mental pollution is a part of the growing wave of pollution.

Street Journal: How would pollution be curbed in a truly socialist society? Would it be necessary to limit industrial production and growth?

Marcuse: I don't think the same conditions would apply. In a real socialist society, productivity and production are no longer bound to the requirements of the private profit, and if these requirements no longer govern society all the factors change. Pollution in such a society would be minimal and well-controlled—without limiting technological or industrial developments. It is precisely the profit interests in this society which make large scale pollution inevitable.

Street Journal: In a genuine socialist society, then, the whole idea of nature and the way people relate to it would be transformed?

Marcuse: Nature in the present capitalist society is dealt with merely as stuff, material for domination and exploitation or, at best, as a precariously protected tourist reservation. In a fully developed socialist society, nature would exist in its own right, not only as living space for human beings and animals, but also for its own creations—nature protected from violation and destruction.

Street Journal: This does not mean, then, "going back to nature" or a new primitivism?
Marcuse: On the contrary, I have always said that the liberation of nature is possible only on the basis of the achievements of technology. The new relationship between man and nature would also mean a new relationship between man and technique, liberation of technical progress from capitalist waste and abuse.

Personal & Social Liberation

Street Journal: The culture has been a way of uniting the personal and political, the individual and social aspects of what people want. The importance of personal liberation is emphasized by the development of communes which act politically.

Marcuse: Well, what I really want to discuss is the relationship between personal, individual liberation and social, political liberation. It is here where the New Left is in danger of collapsing. I will stick to what I have written. I cannot imagine any social liberation without personal liberation: We must uncover the roots of liberation in the individual. But here, the problem begins!

The problem is a group of people whose sole aim is to preserve their lives “outside” of the establishment; they do not want to participate in any way in supporting the establishment. I do not believe that this is a political act, nor that it is for any length of time possible. We have reached the point, which must come in every radical movement, where the correct balance must be found between self-imposed discipline and individual liberation. The personal and particular “self-realization” must be subordinated with the common political goal—which is not only that of one commune, or of all communes, but that of the movement as a whole and, in the last analysis, of the society as a whole. Nobody can be free, for himself and some others, in an unfree society: awareness of this brute fact must penetrate the existence of every radical group. In its actions and values, it must be responsible not only to itself and its likes but also to the historical cause of which it is a past. The balance between individual and political action must be found if the whole movement is not to disintegrate.

Street Journal: That is real too. For it is exactly what we have found in San Diego to be a key both in keeping the Street Journal and ourselves going.

Marcuse: Well, the San Diego Commune is a typical example of such a balance at least right now. As I understand it the Commune publishes the Street Journal. You have a situation where people subject their personal concerns to working together for the political concerns beyond the particular commune.

As the communes isolate and depoliticize themselves, they become easy prey for the Establishment. If the power structure considers them dangerous, it can destroy them at any moment. Such isolated groups become, for their very existence, dependent on the establishment.
They do no serious harm to the Establishment. When such a group has no concern for the human life of the others, when it has decided to go off on its own and build a little society for itself, it has taken itself out of the movement.

_Street Journal:_ Is this the way you see such things as the “Manson Family”?

_Marcuse:_ It has absolutely nothing to do with the movement—except that it serves to discredit it. There is after all still an essential difference between crimes and political offenses. A criminal may be an outcast and in this sense not “belong” to the Establishment. He is still “of the Establishment”, its false and abstract negation. As such, he pays tribute to the bourgeois society which made him a criminal.

_Street Journal:_ Then, as with music, you see the necessity of a definite political context for whatever is happening? Can you at the same time see the necessity and political function of communes?

_Marcuse:_ I still believe that the communes are potential nuclei of radical social transformation: laboratories of self-education, of experiments in possible socialist relationships—at work and otherwise. I still believe in “doing one’s thing”, but I believe the time has come to realize that not every thing that I feel like doing (even badly feel like doing) I must do and can do. I must realize that my thing necessarily involves others, involves the movement in which I want to participate. And there is such a thing as revolutionary morality, even revolutionary self-repression. These aspects must be emphasized precisely because the movement has objectively become stronger, a greater threat to the Establishment. The consciousness of the movement lags behind its objective potential.

Workers

_Street Journal:_ The concept of the working class has become a central part of revolutionary political theory in this country. But many people—including the people in the Commune—feel that is being vulgarized. It has become a concept without content. In other words, there is a lot of rhetoric around.

_Marcuse:_ Well, I am fighting against those people who reduce Marxist concepts to clichés, Marxist theory to rhetoric, Marxist discussion to ritual sermons.

The working class which, under advanced monopoly capitalism, forms the human base of the process of material production is no longer that of the preceding stages of capitalist development; today, it includes a growing number of “middle class” employees: technicians, engineers, scientists, researchers, even administrators. They all participate in the creation of surplus value for capital. Moreover, monopoly capitalism, especially in the USA, is still capable of sustaining a relatively high standard of living (although under increasing difficulties on a global scale). The social existence determines the consciousness: we should finally take this proposition seriously and not forget it implies re-examination—painful
re-examination. Class consciousness is not something that is simply there with the class; it develops, and it changes with the social process. The subjective (political consciousness) and objective factor (the economic and political conditions) coincide (optimally) only in the revolution itself. The American working class today is not a revolutionary force by any stretch of the imagination—it can (and must) become one when the system of monopoly capitalism begins to disintegrate. By patient political education, the consciousness becomes itself a factor in this disintegration.

Leftist groups become isolated when they refuse to think things over. With some of these people all you have to do is press a button and out comes “capitalism” or “imperialism”; press another one and out comes male chauvinism. They just throw these words around and expect everyone to bite. People will not accept things which they don’t understand.

You see we have to understand unpleasant realities. Just because you use the word capitalism does not mean that people understand that it is something bad. Almost the entire American system has presented Capitalism as something good, with no better alternative. Capitalism does not have the negative connotation in the US that it has with the European working class.

We must remember that what has been accomplished in the last five years has largely been done by the student movement: by “talking” as well as by action. Change in the US is going to take a long time. It will be a long struggle. Therefore, the need for education, the need for organization. New forms of organization, flexible and decentralized, not the traditional parties. It should at least be possible to organize unity on specific issues and actions. Today we must avoid ideological rigidity and the kind of self-destructiveness which is still and unmastered revolt against daddy. Much of it is just silly.

You cannot fight imperialism by walking down the aisle of an airplane and taking food from the passengers. There is a difference between a funny act and political activity. We must concentrate on developing real political consciousness also among ourselves, through education as well as action.

The Mideast

Street Journal: What about these Arab-Israeli wars?
Marcuse: Up to now I have always defended Israel, because I cannot forget the fact that 6 million Jews were exterminated and that under no circumstances should conditions arise in which the same may happen again. That is to say, as much as is humanly possible, the Jews must be protected against the recurrence of such a massacre. But it seems to me now, that the Israeli policy, far from preventing the recurrence of such conditions, may very well work toward their recurrence, unless
the policies toward the Arabs radically change. I state that clearly now, because of two things that happened recently: the bombing of a school near Cairo where 32 children were killed. According to the newspapers, the Israeli government simply denied the charge, whereas I heard a radio report by an international group of journalists who had visited the scene and saw the bodies of the children.

The second event is a report on the torturing of Arab prisoners, a report disseminated by the Amnesty group.

I would like to add a third, and that is that the Israeli government rejected or refused to authorize in any way the visit of Nachum Goldman, who reportedly had the understanding of Nasser, to Cairo. I find this absolutely unbelievable even though Nachum Goldman does not represent official Israeli policy. It was a chance for an Israeli, and not an unimportant one either, to talk directly with Nasser, and that opportunity should have been taken.

Now if these reports are correct, it seems to me that precisely as a Jew, and as a member of the New Left, I can no longer defend Israeli policies, and that I have to agree with those who are radically critical of Israel.

Street Journal: Now that 32 children have been killed in the bombing raids, you are opposed. But isn't the core of the Israeli matter the claim by some Arabs and the Palestinian commandos, and the Panthers in the US and others around the world, that the Israelis have become a tool of the US foreign policy and the oil interests there?

Marcuse: I don't see why they have become a tool of the oil interests of the US. Israel has no oil, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Yemen have oil, and they certainly are not Jewish states.

Street Journal: Yes, but the analysis is that the Israeli military power, and the Israeli threat and the Israeli expulsion of the Palestinians from Israel, keeps the Arab consciousness on the level of the nationalism—the question of fighting the Israelis, rather than on the international questions such as the organization of their society.

Marcuse: That I don't see, and in addition I think US policy is changing in favor of the Arabs, certainly not in favor of Israel. Since the advent of the Nixon administration, this is a very clear trait.

Street Journal: So you see another slaughter coming for the Jews?

Marcuse: I would say that unless Israel finally makes up its mind and goes out of its way to establish human relations with the Arabs and treat them as human beings, I am afraid that sooner or later such a condition may reoccur.

* * *
These are excerpts from a debate appearing in *The New Statesman* between Herbert Marcuse, professor of philosophy at the University of California at San Diego, and Raymond Aron, professor of philosophy at the Collège de France.

**Marcuse:** I do believe that a democratic Communism is a real historical possibility. Worse still, I believe that only in a fully developed Communist society is a general democracy possible. My analysis of the present situation is that practically all the resources necessary to create a decent society, a free society, for all human beings—these resources are there. That such a society has not yet been created is due to two main circumstances: first, the repressive and destructive use that is made of the available resources and, secondly, the fact of the coexistence between the capitalist and the Communist systems of today, a coexistence which is called peaceful but which seems to compel both the capitalist as well as the Communist states to devote an ever larger part of their resources to the building up of the military and strategic potential and therefore reducing the possibility of developing into a free and democratic society.

**Aron:** What is the type of society which would be, at the same time, a socialist economy and a liberal political regime?

I would put the question to you in this form: (a) do you believe that the historical movements are going in the direction of revolution in the way Marx did believe? And (b) if the historical movement is going in the direction of revolution either in Eastern Europe or the United States and the Western world, are you in favor of this revolution or not? So

"Editors' note: "Marx and Para-Marx on Capitalist Contradictions," are excerpts from a debate between Herbert Marcuse and the French intellectual, philosopher, and journalist Raymond Aron (author of the 1955 book *The Opium of the Intellectuals*) that first appeared in full in *The New Statesman*, and then was published in abbreviated form in *The New York Times* on August 15, 1972, which we are publishing here. The text shows Marcuse and Aron's differing views on the ability of Marxist thought and politics to create an existing alternative to capitalist society. Aron, toward the end of the debate, suggests that the biggest difference between his and Marcuse's position on Marxism is that Marcuse starts from a utopian position of believing in a better possible new world whereas Aron starts from the present conditions of existing society and is unsure that these contain alternative emancipatory forces of the sort which Marcuse perceives as capable of producing a freer society."
are you basing your case on the trend of the historic revolution or on the conviction that the postrevolutionary regime will be better than the present one?

Marcuse: I do believe that Marx was right in saying that capitalism will come to an end by virtue of its own internal contradictions, and that if there will be any progress at all—there is a big "if" here—that the alternative will be a socialist regime, with collective ownership of the means of production and collective control of central planning. I do believe that the tendencies which point in this direction can be demonstrated.

Aron: Please do it.

Marcuse: I shall try. In the first place I spoke of the growth of the internal contradictions. The blatant contrast between the unbelievable social wealth of the Western world today and the repressive and destructive use made of this wealth is obvious—it is so obvious that it begins to penetrate the consciousness and even the unconscious of larger and larger strata of the population.

The realization that the established organization of labor—in Marxian terms "alienated labor," stupid dehumanizing labor in the majority of cases—is no longer necessary: one can live much better and much happier if one does not have to make oneself any more an instrument of labor. A more humane exploitation of the available resources and of the social product could change the present situation entirely. I see the aggravating contradictions in the endemic inflation, in the endemic unemployment which seems to be rising, in the international monetary crisis, in the growing resistance in the Third World.

Aron: You said that you are following the Marxian analysis. The fact is that, according to what you wrote some years ago, the capitalist system is not paralyzed by its contradictions. It is producing more and more, and what Marxians and yourself thought some years ago was that, because of the permanent increase of production, there was no revolutionary tendency in Western society. So in the last six or seven years you have jumped from one position to another—because of some accidental events which I, taking a Marxian perception of the long term, believe to be just episodes in the history of the Western world.

It is perfectly true that there is a very large discrepancy between the well-off people inside the Western world and a minority which is poor. It is perfectly true that there is a great disparity of richness between the developed world and the underdeveloped world, but if you look at the Soviet system you would find an enormous disparity between the poor peasants and the well-off people in the cities. The only difference will be, I would say, that in the Western world, 60 to 70 per cent of the people are taking some profit from the general increase of richness. I believe that the percentage is smaller in the Russian world.

Then you take the monetary crisis as a sign of the crisis of capitalism. My dear Marcuse, that's not your level. The monetary crisis is one crisis
among so many of the capitalist world—to take it as a symptom of the crumbling down of capitalism reminds me of the childish prediction of the Social Democrats of the Weimar Republic.

You give as an example that the worker class in America is not revolutionary—it was your conviction five years ago that the catastrophe for your Marxism was that the workers were not Marxists and were not revolutionary, so you have changed everything. When you have millions of students who are disappointed with the gratification of their degrees, it is perfectly normal that they should be slightly revolutionary and that they should read Marcuse. That is a pleasure for them, it is perfectly all right. But with the final crisis of capitalism it has nothing to do. Be a better Marxist, my dear.

“There is a disparity of richness between the developed and the underdeveloped.”

Marcuse: In the first place I never said that capitalism has solved its internal contradictions. I said that in the present period capitalism has been able to manage these contradictions. I believe that at least since 1968 this management, this manipulation of contradictions, is becoming increasingly difficult. I did not say that the international monetary crisis indicates a final crisis of capitalism. It is one item among many others and as you certainly will know as a Marxist or former Marxist, ...

Aron: Para-Marxist.

Marcuse: ... as a para-Marxist that the final crisis or capitalism may well cover a period of thirty, fifty—perhaps even one hundred—years. I’m sorry but there is no shortcut. Now to the question of the working class. I said, and I still say it today, that the American working class is not a revolutionary class. Nor have Marx and Engels ever maintained that any and every working class at every and any moment must be a revolutionary class.

I said that in the present situation, in view of the fact that the American working class is not a revolutionary class, it so happens that the political consciousness, the radical political consciousness, is concentrated among minority nonintegrated groups such as the students, such as the black and brown minorities, such as women and so on. This is to be explained in terms of the power of integration, a power itself based on the relatively high standard of living and the material goods the system can still produce.

You said, see how strong capitalism is—it produces and produces more and more. The Marxian answer is: It will suffocate in its own wealth—and I think that is exactly what is going to happen, because let’s not forget that Marx believed that the historical destiny of capitalism will have come when the system has succeeded in satisfying the material needs of the majority of the population.
Aron: Probably the origin of our differences comes from the fact that, being skeptical about the full democracy of the Utopian type, I am putting myself in the present historical situation, and trying to work inside the reality. I would say that my old contradicctor, colleague and friend Marcuse prefers to put himself at the end of the process and dream of what men could do with all the means they possess.

Marcuse: But I think that such a radical transformation of values is taking place before our eyes, namely the human beings who are overcoming the aggressive, repressive, competitive values of the established societies, and who know that they can live in peace without this endless self-propelling productivity, are increasing. Now I may admit in this case you may call me utopian, but I have had too many experiences along this line and I think that really such a radical transformation of values is taking place.

Aron: I would just say that I'm not in opposition to the idea or the diagnosis that there may be before us some changes in the value systems. I believe that is normal in a society in which production is going higher and higher. The obsession with production, with productivity, could ease, be reduced, so it is possible that there could be a change in the social values of the coming generation and I would be in favor of this change of values. But I would not hold it a change in human nature, because we know by studying the many societies which the anthropologists are studying that the competitive spirit of the Western society was only one of the value systems in the history of mankind. There was always war, there were always certain degrees of repression, but it may well be that the Western society is changing before our eyes, and I would be glad if that were the case.

* * *

LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE

Can we speak of a repression, or system of repression, specific to the U.S.A.? It seems that the American system and its mechanism is only by degree, quantitatively different from the other advanced (monopoly capitalist)

* Editors' note:
A six-page type-written text with Marcuse’s handwritten corrections was found in his personal archive with handwriting across the top reading “Sent to Pierre Dommerque [sic] on May 18, '76 for Le Monde Diplomatique.” A set of letters stapled to the text in Marcuse’s private files indicate that he received a letter marked “le 8 avril 1976” from Pierre Dommerques inviting him to contribute to a special July 4, 1976 issue of Le Monde Diplomatique that would “celebrate” the United States on the occasion of the 200 anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. The word “celebrate” was used ironically as Le Monde Diplomatique theme was to be inequality in the United States
countries. Common to all of them is the conjunction of the traditional forms of political repression by the forces of law and order, ranging all the way from violent suppression, class justice, discrimination, economic sanctions, to the constantly perfected technical and ideological apparatus of indoctrination (the media, schools, etc.). Specific to the U.S.A. seems to be the ease and scope with which the dependent population is, in its largest part, integrated into the established social system. This integration proceeds on a dual foundation: (1) the ruthless suppression of a militant labor movement, in the past, and (2) the overwhelming productive power of the capitalist process, capable of sustaining (in spite of increasing difficulties) a relatively high standard of living.

But the same tendencies that facilitate and perpetuate integration undermine its basis. It is precisely the repressive power of the “consumer society,” the enslavement of the consumer as self-propelling buyer of self-propelling merchandize, the creation of ever new needs which aggravate the contradictions within the system and, consequently, necessitate intensified repressive controls.

To the degree to which the necessities of life (material as well as cultural) are available to the majority of the population, to that degree the enlarged accumulation of capital enforces the production of “luxuries” over and above the subsistence goods. Within the capitalist framework, this means accelerated production of waste, planned obsolescence, gadgets, and the merchandize of destruction. Luxuries become necessities which have to be bought lest the individual lose his or her “status” on the competitive market—at work and at leisure. This in turn means perpetuation of a life-long existence in alienated, dehumanized performances; required to obtain the adequate purchasing power; to find and hold the job which reproduces enslavement and the enslaving system. American Capitalism has thus created a new dimension of repression: the concerted use of the technical conquest of scarcity (satisfaction of vital subsistence needs) for the perpetuation of life-long dependence.

today. The paper had invited Marcuse, Sam Bowles, Richard Edwards, Carol Lopate, Howard Zinn, Paul Sweezy, Stanley Aronowitz and other radical critics of U.S. society to contribute to their special issue. Marcuse initially responded in an April 28, 1976 letter: “Let me tell you right away that I was pleased and honored by your invitation to write an opening article to your issue devoted to the American Bicentennial. I would love to do it but the deadline of the end of May is quite impossible. The task is such a difficult and responsible one that it should not be taken on too fast or too easily.” Nonetheless, Marcuse took on the task and typed out a blistering critique of the “system of repression” evident in contemporary U.S. capitalist society, but also other “advanced (monopoly capitalist) countries.” Marcuse described the system of repression and its contradictions, but does not valorize, as with many of his interviews and articles of the era, forces of resistance. The text was published in French as “Un nouvel ordre,” Le Monde Diplomatique, no. 268 (July 1976), and is published here for the first time in English from Marcuse’s original corrected manuscript.
The contradiction between a productivity which could abolish the subjection of men and women to the instruments of their labor, and the conditions under which this very productivity promotes and perpetuates alienation and repression—this contradiction has penetrated the consciousness and subconscious of the underlying population. The evidence is in the widely observed decline of the “work ethic,” spontaneous acts of sabotage, pervasive violence, etc. in short: a disintegration of the operational values on which the functioning of the society depends.

However, it would be very wrong to assume that the weakening of social cohesion, of the capitalist ideology and its hierarchy of values would constitute by itself a revolutionary force. Diffused among the population at large without effective organization, unarticulated and cutting across traditional class lines, it is still kept within the boundaries of subjectivity. The target of protest is less the very structure of the system, its mode of production, than personal behavior and attitudes (supervisors, bosses, “they”, etc.). Worse still, to a great extent, those in the lower echelons of exploited labor blame themselves for their “failure” not to have risen in the hierarchy (Sennett and Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class). A sense of guilt is thus built up which serves well the Establishment: self-repression supports the repression imposed from above.

However, the self-propelling reproduction of repression itself operates under objective conditions which place severe limits on its progress. The ever greater need for raising the productivity of labor calls for measures and methods which invoke possibilities of emancipation: if pursued on a larger scale, they may prove to be self-defeating. They include extended automation and the reorganization of work with the (apparent) goal of “humanization”: giving the worker more responsibility for his or her job, reducing specialization, etc. Within the framework of capitalism, both methods have their internal limits: automation, sustained at its technical optimum, would reduce the rate of surplus value and increase unemployment to a degree intolerable for capital accumulation. The “humanizing” reorganization of work, if pushed beyond the psychological gadgets of industrial relations, would lead to a scope and scale of autogestion which would clash with the capitalist hierarchy within and outside the work world.

It is only in conjunction with this objective dynamic that the emancipatory ideological forces show their radical potential and promise. The images of a qualitatively different human existence, of a life no longer spent in earning a living, the reduction of alienated labor to a minimum, and consequently, the emergence of a new sensibility, a new morality, the rediscovery of the body and of nature as life enhancing and life protecting powers now appear as the historical anticipation of a society under a new Reality Principle—the heir of capitalism, the consummation of its achievement.

Concretized in the economic, political, and cultural struggle against repression, they foreshadow a revolution which, in depth and scope, would surpass all preceding revolutions: it would indeed be the qualitative leap
into freedom. Confronted with this real possibility, the established power
culture strengthens the system of repression into the dimension where the
needs and satisfactions of the individual are formed. Just as, in the material
culture, they must be made to fit the goods turned out by the system, so,
in the intellectual culture, “transcending” needs and satisfactions which are
useless or threatening to the Establishment must be curtailed in favor of
modes of thought and values required in the process of social reproduction.
A concerted attack is under way to bend schools and universities to training
for jobs, to reduce the humanities and social sciences, to lower the standards
of nonprofessional education. The steadily increasing vast labor force which
sustains the system is thus adjusted, from childhood on, to their job of
reproducing, in themselves, their social existence, their servitude: through
the language they are taught to speak, the feelings they are shown to have,
the satisfaction they are trained to desire.

But can the monstrous scientific and pseudo-scientific apparatus of
repression, can the incessant recreation of needs and satisfactions which
make palatable the enslavement indefinitely obscure the destructiveness of
the system and the ways to abolish it? The Sixties have left a heritage of refusal
and renewal which continues to operate under the surface of integration.
The radical potential has shifted: the industrial (blue collar) “proletariat” no
longer has the sole historical privilege of revolution; it shares this privilege
with other groups of the working class: the intelligentsia, esp. students,
women, youth, racial and national minorities. Their activation indicates the
enlarged scope of the rebellion: totalization of change; turn of quantity into
quality.

Today, the initiative is with the other side: totalization of controls. A
new social system may well be in the making: a neo- or semi-fascist regime
on a broad popular basis. There are signs pointing in this direction: the
narrowing of the possibilities of capital expansion, the growth of the
dependent population, the alliance of Mafia and legitimate business, the
spread of violence, continued racism, the concentration of the weapons of
annihilation in the hands of the powers that be, the pervasive corruption of
the democratic process. Against the specter of a fascism American-style, the
Left is waging an uphill fight: divided in itself, without effective organization.
Its main weapon is still political education—countereducation—in theory
and practice: the slow painful process of making people aware of the fact
that the repressions required for maintaining the established society are
no longer necessary, that they can be abolished without being replaced by
another system of domination.

* * *
AN INTERVIEW WITH HERBERT MARCUSE
BY GIANGUIDO PIANI

To begin with, the first question I ask Prof. Marcuse is on what he thinks about the actual policy of the Italian Communist Party and its longing for cooperation in the government.

II.M.: What I would say you have to take it with great qualifications, given the fact that I do not personally know the situations. The decisive question for me is: is there in your country any kind of mass support for the policy to the left of the Communist Party? This is for me decisive, because it is the same situation in France in this respect. Now all these groups you just mentioned I know of them, and as far as I know none of them can claim to have mass support.

G.P.: That's right.

H.M.: Now, for me, a Marxist, and I'm still supposed to be a Marxist, this is decisive, it has to dictate your policy. So what do you do if you can't count on any support by the masses, be it revolutionary workers, or peasants, or the lower middle classes, whatever it is. If you don't have this support, for the strategy of the Left, it's almost a question of survival. You see.

G.P.: Yeah.

H.M.: And it seems to me that the present policy of the CPI is also very well aware of the fact that the alternative today is not socialism but a new form of fascism, the threat of a new form of fascism, and in order to prevent that, at least indirect influence, real influence on a still democratic government seems to be decisive.

Nor can you, in this situation, come out with a great program of nationalization of industry, become that in itself—you already had that in Italy, partly—recently, it doesn't change much, as long as the general framework remains that of a capitalist country.

G.P.: Exactly what do you mean by “a new form of fascism” maybe more constructive centrist governments?

* Editors’ note:
We found in Marcuse's personal archive an unpublished text titled “An Interview with Herbert Marcuse by Gianguido Piani, April 1978.” The interviewer was apparently from the Italian non-communist Left and opened the discussion with a question concerning Marcuse’s opinion on “the actual policy of the Italian communist Party and its longing for cooperation in the government.” Marcuse deflects this and some of the other questions, engaging in a discussion from the standpoint of leftwing autonomous Marxism on contemporary issues concerning leftwing politics in Europe and elsewhere in the world. It is one of the most revealing interviews on contemporary politics from the era and is published in English for the first time, using Marcuse’s typed and heavily handwritten-corrected manuscript of seven pages of interview with some inserts.
H.M.: Maybe more democratic, in quotation marks. It is not absolutely necessary that things as concentration camps repeat themselves. You can do it today with the more perfect technical weapons, by weapons I mean also and perhaps primarily psychological weapons that prepare and repress the population much better.

G.P.: Are you maybe thinking about what happened in the Stammheim prison against the Baader-Meinhof group?  
H.M.: What happened I do not know and as long as I don’t have any real evidence of the contrary, and I don’t think anyone has it, I have to believe that it was suicide.

G.P.: By a “new form of fascism” so you mean a new form of authoritarian government.

H.M.: Authoritarian government, a much more complete integration of the population, and a coordination, gleichschaltung of the unions.

G.P.: The world has now to face many big problems, overpopulation, lack of natural resources, lack of energy and so on. Do you see more probable in the next decade a general trend toward socialism as a means of sharing the available resources or a trend toward anarchy and then to a more authoritarian form of government and control?

H.M.: No, I think the—what may happen is that we again have to revise our image of socialism in the advanced capitalist countries. Thus it is not a question of constantly extending the productive forces (in the underdeveloped countries, the situation is entirely different). It is indeed the question of more equal distribution of the still available resources. That sounds terribly reformistic, but I think as Marxists we must also be empiricists and take into consideration the actual situation. You know, it would be kind of funny if good old capitalism would collapse not because of its internal contradictions but because of its exhaustion of resources, oil, electricity and whatever it is.

G.P.: But we will have to face this exhausting of resources, at least in the next century.

H.M.: Actually nobody knows how long it will take, but it seems to me, as a real danger. But to come back to the changing image of socialism: not a society of abundance but a society of justice, equality, and freedom. This does not necessarily presuppose abundance. And a radical redistribution of the social wealth presupposed revolution. It cannot possibly be gotten from the existing governments. Take this country.

---

1 The question refers to the infamous German Baader-Meinhof group whose leaders were arrested in 1976 on charges of terrorism; one of the leaders, Ulrike Meinhof, was found hanged in her prison cell in Stammheim in 1978 just before her trial, raising the question of whether she had committed suicide or been hung by state execution.
You cannot even get relatively adequate laws on conservation of energy because they are being sabotaged by the special interests.

**G.P.:** Let's go ahead. I think you heard about the Red brigades and the abduction of the ex-premier Noro. Do you think that Red brigades could ever get popular support through the mean of terrorism?

**H.M.:** Well, if you ask me and unless the situation in Italy is entirely different from that in West Germany, I would say no. I think that this kind of terrorism has nothing to do with socialist strategy. It's simply criminal. Marxism has always objected to individual terrorism. And the same is true for West Germany. I mean, the first generation of terrorists, there might have been political. But from the beginning, the terror certainly wasn't socialist strategy, and the last killings have in reality, nothing to do with leftist politics. Terror is the weapon of the right.

**G.P.:** Do you think that terrorists are people joined together because of their ideals or are they controlled by someone else?

**H.M.:** I don't know. I think there are signs that this is more or less international movement. But who controls it, I do not know. Do you have any guess?

**G.P.:** I can't have any. It's really confusing.

**H.M.:** What is the opinion of these groups left of the PCI, on this terror, Lotta Continua for example?

**G.P.:** Well. Many of them say, or at least they were saying when I left the country that they're comrades on a wrong way but anyway, they're comrades. Others like Manifesto, they hold positions against this kind of terrorism.

**H.M.:** Well, whether or not these terrorists are comrades this is precisely what I doubt. If you call them, say you empty the term comrade of its original meaning.

**G.P.:** Among the leftist groups there is a big concern, it was a big issue last year, on how terrorists are kept in prison, about their rights as prisoners, about their rights during trials. In Italy we're going to have special prisons for particularly dangerous criminals. Among the left there is a will to know what's really happening behind the bars. For example, Baader's suicide left many dark points...

**H.M.:** I mean that for me there is not the slightest doubt that while rejecting rigidly these terrorists the left has to fight against any kind of inhuman conditions in imprisonment, against any kind of torture, total, isolation, sensory deprivation.

We have to fight for the rights of the prisoners, but this has nothing to do with the absolute rejection of their weapons.

**G.P.:** I took the chance to see an Italian newspaper recently, after the abduction of Moro, and there were articles of the most eminent politicians and there were articles telling about death penalty and new special laws restricting personal freedoms. Are these special
laws justified? Will they increase the danger of terrorism? Will they eliminate it?

H.M.: I don’t think this kind of terrorism can be eliminated that easily. What effect it will have, I don’t know yet.

G.P.: We’ll have to see later. I want to ask you something about relationships between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. In this country there is such a kind of a fear of the Soviets...

H.M.: Yes, but that is artificially exploited by the powers that be. I don’t think that anybody in his right mind could assume that the Soviet Union would now engage in a major war with the U.S.A. That’s ridiculous. But one has to affirm it in order to get the military budget approved every year. And “national security” means also big business on international scale!

G.P.: And so General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas...

H.M.: There is a very strange relation between the two superpowers. On the one hand relations have gotten much worse, on the other hand there are also common interests that make for cooperation.

G.P.: Have you been in Soviet Union?

H.M.: No.

G.P.: Do you think that there is such kind of Marxism or Socialism or the lack of personal freedom can’t be justified with the achievement of economic growth?

H.M.: I think that what is happening in Soviet Union since decades can no longer by any stretch of imagination be justified as promoting socialism. That I don’t believe.

G.P.: What do you think about the situation in the Middle East? Do you think that Begin and Sadat are sincere or they are going more to get personal results?

H.M.: I think they are sincere. But, in my view, Begin’s policy may well be fatal... This doesn’t mean that I would support the positions of Arafat and the P.L.O. and in any case Israeli policy today seems disastrous.

G.P.: Naturally you disagree both with Israeli retaliations in Lebanon and with the Palestinian attacks against Israeli people.

H.M.: Well, this retaliation is an integral part of Begin’s policy, always has been.

G.P.: Generally speaking, do you think that the world of tomorrow will be better than the world of today, or not. Let’s take everything, from atomic weapons...

H.M.: I’m neither optimistic nor pessimistic but I’m realistic and I think the chances are that it will get worse. The transition to socialism would require not only a change in the institutions and the production relations, but also in the mind of the people who support and tolerate (for very telling reasons) the capitalist systems. Their radicalization would be possible under different economic and social conditions,
if you really have a severe crisis of capitalism, there may be another way for radicalization. I mean in a real crisis. What's happening now I don’t consider a crisis of capitalism. It’s a crisis for the people but not for capital and even then, when the radicalization comes, it may well go to the right and not to the left.

G.P.: What is the most free country in the world?

H.M.: Today, the freest?

G.P.: Yeah.

H.M.: Relatively free, for today there is no really free coming in the world. Relatively speaking, I would call the U.S.A., England, the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Belgium. We have to face the fact that the capitalist countries can still allow a degree of freedom which is denied in the existing socialist countries.

G.P.: It is just making a joke of what the Interior Minister of Italy said last [??] Italy is the freest country in the world.

H.M.: That I do not believe as far of what I recall or what I know.

G.P.: I don’t believe it either.

H.M.: But in the countries I mentioned, there are a hell of a lot of things that are permitted and that are not permitted in any other country. However I don’t know whether the question was actually faith with respect to socialism. It may well be that real social justice can go together with restricted freedom, and what is even more important, one should also ask: are there any countries where at least the foundations for a free and just society are being laid. In which case I would indeed mention China, probably also Cuba. However as far as both are concerned, especially China, it seems to me we see there the same we have seen so many times, namely the priority of repressive modernization over liberating socialization: A technocratic authoritarian trend, at the expense of socialism.

G.P.: Are there civil rights in China?

H.M.: Yes, there are civil rights in every single God damn constitution. The question is: are they translated into reality or not? The Stalin constitution had civil rights.

G.P.: Well, there are namely a few civil rights and they’re not put into practice. So in China, there are the conditions to become a very free country.

H.M.: The conditions I wouldn’t say. What I would say is that out of what they have done and achieved, there may come a socialist society as we already discussed it, with a higher degree of equality, and for distribution term of [??] and opportunities. But it remains to be seen how strong the present [??] trend, which does not go in this direction, is going to prevail.

G.P.: What about the state of relationship between China and U.S.S.R.? Both those countries claim to be following the paths of Marxism-Leninism but they see themselves as the worst enemies.
H.M.: Well, I don’t think this conflict has anything to do with socialism, I think that is really mainly strategic I don’t understand it anyway. It seems to me that the principle is that the Chinese support everything that the Soviet Union doesn’t support and the other way around. But that’s not a socialist policy.


H.M.: A European state, I don’t know. There are too many national, at least potential national conflicts, that I do believe that Europe is and will remain for a long time a very faithful competitor for the U.S. This is one of the contradictions we can observe with our own eyes, in the otherwise so effectively restabilized capitalisms. The conflict between European capital and Japanese on one side and American on the other and that is not in any way mitigated by the multinational corporations.

G.P.: I read a few of your books, One-Dimensional Man for example. Your ideas about communist parties and, well, about realism and idealism were pretty different.

H.M.: Different from what?

G.P.: Now you seem to be more realistic and in those books you weren’t so realistic. What about this change of opinion?

H.M.: I don’t know whether that is a change. I still am one of those who do not believe that the new left is dead and that 1968 is gone forever. I don’t believe it. 1968 has changed the whole system of values, in the individual at least, in their own life, in their own consciousness and also the consciousness of the real possibilities for radical change. The movements of the Sixties have begun to undermine the operational values of capitalism, especially the hypocritical “work ethic”. The insistence on a “new sensibility,” on qualitatively different relationships between human beings, the awareness that one can live without full-time labor, the protest against the destruction of the life environment testified to a new idea of liberation, corresponding to the new possibilities of freedom and happiness at this stage of the historical development. And, perhaps the most important “message” of these movements: the industrial working class no longer has the monopoly of liberation; it has become part of a vastly enlarged working class, including, in growing proportion, white collar workers, the intelligentsia. An effective bourgeois opposition, the feminist movement, the militant students constitute, in conjunction with the industrial working class, a greatly increased anti-capitalist potential. This potential is activated in demonstrations and occupations, in the takeover of factories by the workers, in their autogestion, in widespread absenteeism, in acts of spontaneous and concealed sabotage. The deterioration of quality is a sign of the decline of capitalist production and the increasing
creation of waste. The American automobile industry reportedly had to recall more than nine million cars in 1977.

The weakening of the social morale essential to the normal functioning of the system indicates an element of destabilization, perhaps even of disintegration.

G.P.: Because of action groups like Nader's?

T.I.M.: No. Because of conditions and actions at the work place itself.

* * *

HERBERT MARCUSE IN 1978: AN INTERVIEW
BY MYRIAM MIEDZIAN MALINOVICH

In the early 1960s when I was a graduate student at Columbia University I attended a series of lectures on Marx given by Herbert Marcuse. I had never read Marcuse previously; inspired by the exceptionally lucid, insightful, and careful quality of his lectures, I went out and bought Eros and Civilization. While I was captivated by the argument of the book—it was my first encounter with the “literature of liberation”—I was also perplexed. How could the same person who gave such crystal-clear lectures write in such a difficult, heavy, turgid style?

About seven years later when I moved to La Jolla, California, where I met and became a friend of Marcuse and his wife Inge—he had by then retired from Brandeis and was teaching at the University of California at San Diego—I found myself perplexed once again. While I had read about Marx and others whose conservative personal lives contrasted sharply with their fiery revolutionary tracts, the real-life juxtaposition of Marcuse the conservative, considerate, responsible private person and Marcuse the author of hyperbolic and controversial radical works was nevertheless striking. The contrast between the published and the private Marcuse was

* Editors' note:

"Herbert Marcuse in 1978: An Interview" by Myriam Miedzian Malinovich was first published in Social Research (Summer 1981, Vol. 48, No. 2). An email from Myriam Miedzian dated April 15, 2013 explained that she and Herbert and Inge Marcuse were friends who all lived in La Jolla in the late 1960s and early 1970s and were connected to the University of California at San Diego (UCSD). In 1978, Miedzian arranged to do a series of interviews with Marcuse and flew out to California from New York City where she was then living. The interviews were held at Marcuse's UCSD office. His wife Ricky Sherover—Inge had passed away in 1972—was present one time, and a few of her comments are included at the end of the interview. Among the major themes addressed were the accusations made by some, that Marcuse had inspired the Baader-Meinhof group to commit acts of terrorism. Miedzian wanted to give Marcuse an opportunity to respond to these accusations.
Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution

a topic that frequently came up among his friends. I still remember some of us being taken aback when the man who was perhaps the main hero of the various counterculture and liberation movements of the sixties had many of the same reactions that any bourgeois parent might have when his stepson and daughter-in-law joined a commune.

When in April 1978 I went back to La Jolla to interview Marcuse I found myself surprised by the man once again. I did not expect to hear the author of One-Dimensional Man tell me that the United States is one of the freest countries in the world. Nor did I expect him to agree to the suggestion that only about 25 percent or so of the Third World countries' problems are attributable to Western imperialism.

At times I found his interpretations of his works to be considerably milder than my own understanding of them, or that of many if not most of his readers and critics. In private he emphasized qualifications which in his writings would tend to get lost amid the hyperboles.

On the other hand, while I was well aware of the tendency to loosely phrased statements and offhand judgments in his best-known written works, I found this tendency particularly disconcerting in conversation. In discussing Repressive Tolerance I was shocked to find Marcuse quite unclear about some of the basic arguments of the essay.

For example, he told me that he had not made it clear that “this essay already presupposes at least politically a very different society”—one which has already abolished capitalism. But then he also told me that he was “intentionally provocative” in the essay because he saw the danger of a tendency mainly in Germany “of a new toleration of Nazi and pro-Nazi movements.” But clearly he could not have it both ways—if one of his primary concerns was with the toleration of Nazi movements in liberal democracies then the essay could not be exclusively about postrevolutionary society. I also could not help but wonder why, if he believed that “there are certainly refinements not only possible but necessary” in the essay, he had

Miedzian explained that initially the interview was intended for a New York Times Magazine article at the time when the Baader-Meinhof group were in the news, accused and then imprisoned for a series of terror attacks and kidnappings in West Germany. Her article was intended to give Marcuse the opportunity to respond to the accusations, but although she had a contract for the piece, Miedzian’s NYT editor, Lynda Obst, unfortunately quit her position just as Miedzian finished the interview and article, and went to Hollywood to become a film producer. Miedzian concludes: “Without going into detail, the editor who took over was not very sympathetic to the article. I was afraid he wanted a hatchet job, or something close to it; soon some NYT employees went on a strike that lasted three months! At some point I withdrew the article; I had no intention of being more critical of Marcuse than I thought was appropriate, and the strike dragged on for so long, by the time it was over, I figured the Baader-Meinhof would be past history for a weekly magazine. So I eventually edited my tapes into an interview format which was published by Social Research. Needless to say this turn of events was disappointing to me and to Herbert.”
not included these refinements in the 1968 postscript to the second edition. Given the highly provocative nature of the thesis of *Repressive Tolerance* and the fact that many young people saw it as a justification for the disruption of university classes, it seemed irresponsible not to have clarified his position.

One could simply stop there and say that Marcuse was irresponsible; this would certainly not make him unique among social theorists. What makes his case more perplexing is that, in his day-to-day behavior, he was so very responsible a person. When there were student uprisings at UCSD, “Marcuse was often a calming factor,” Herbert York, a professor of physics and government adviser who was the first chancellor of the UCSD campus, told me. This opinion was seconded by William Leiss, a former student of Marcuse’s who is now a professor at York University in Toronto, as well as everyone else I spoke to. “In terms of incitement to action, he’s probably the most careful person I ever saw,” Leiss told me. Leiss wrote his thesis under Marcuse and was one of a circle of UCSD graduate students and young faculty members who were involved in leftist politics in the late sixties and were particularly close to Marcuse. He has since gone on to publish two books on themes related to Marcuse’s work.

In Marcuse’s best known and most influential works, Leiss, like so many others, finds a tendency to “offhand treatment of empirical material,” “blanket snap judgments,” “loose or careless formulations.” But then Leiss states: “At the same time … I am enormously impressed with the man … enormously grateful for the education I got. I think it’s a direct result of Marcuse’s way of teaching that I’m able to develop my own approach, including a criticism of his own work.” Like the other former students I spoke to, Leiss found Marcuse extremely careful as a teacher (“When we studied Kant and Hegel we did five pages a night for a three-hour seminar, … It was thoroughly undogmatic training; he would never refer to his own books in class”), a first-rate scholar (“His first book on Hegel is incredibly tightly reasoned, as is *Reason and Revolution*”), and extremely lucid in his lectures (“His lecture style is so different from his writings—much clearer, milder, and more open”).

After my interviews with Marcuse, and after hearing Leiss and others speak about the contrasts in the man, I came away with the feeling that there existed two professors Marcuse. One was an exceptionally decent, responsible, lucid, open-minded scholar and teacher. The other Marcuse was a German professor of philosophy who in his writings was given to obscure language and all-encompassing grandiose theories which combined romantic flights of the imagination with a deep underlying faith in human beings’ potential for rationality. It was Marcuse the German professor who refused to cater to his audience, who seemed both unaware and unconcerned with how his writings might lend themselves to extreme interpretations. For example, when I questioned him about the wisdom of having used the term “totalitarian” to describe Western societies, I could not help but feel that, behind his refusal to give any acknowledgment to
its misleading quality, lay an unrealistic and somewhat haughty assumption that the reader will or should be able to pick up all the fine nuances of the text. But reality is different, especially in the case of very difficult but popular works which only a small percentage of readers will read from cover to cover.

In retrospect it seems a pity that Marcuse the careful scholar and Marcuse the grandiose theorist were unable to come together in his more popular writings. For many of his readers who were alienated by his exaggerations would, I think, have found many of his criticisms of Western society both perceptive and foresightful had he stated them in a more careful and qualified form.

Richard Goodwin once wrote of Marcuse: "This radical philosopher appears at heart to be a deeply conservative man, committed to reason as the only corrective and willing to follow that reason wherever it may lead, ... Are people indoctrinated?—then we will, for a time, have a dictatorship of the educated elite. Is human nature too frail for freedom?—then we must create a new man. It is all very logical, but you cannot organize the sea."

This last sentence now strikes me as especially pertinent when applied to Marcuse himself. For I have come to realize that my own futile attempts at making sense of Marcuse's conflicting facets are based on my mistaken presupposition of his rationality and consistency. In fact the particularly sharp contrasts between Marcuse the private man and the public figure, between the teacher and the writer, are a testimony to just that psychological complexity and irrationality of human beings which Goodman and so many others see as an insuperable obstacle to the creation of the rational society Marcuse outlined.

**Eros and Civilization**

*Malinovich:* You have been criticized for being too extreme and too distorting both in your characterizations of human beings in contemporary capitalist societies—the complete one-dimensionality, total moronization, etc.—and in your description of the "liberated human being" in *Eros and Civilization*. The ensuing contrast between total oppression in the present and the real possibility of total liberation in the future, it has been argued, is misleading to young people.

---


3 This is a reference to accusations that Marcuse's analysis of Western society influenced young people to commit terrorist acts. In the section on terrorism, Marcuse responds at length to this accusation.
Marcuse: Not unless these young people believe, which I do not believe, that revolution is on the agenda. It isn’t, and for years I have pointed out in my books that this is the first thing that we have, as Marxists, to learn, that we are not living in a revolutionary situation and that we need years and years and years of education and enlightenment to get to the point where you can no longer say: this is mere utopia.

Malinovich: In other words you’re saying that we need years and years to get to the point where the kind of society or person you describe in *Eros and Civilization* would be a real possibility.

Marcuse: Yes, well there we have to be careful. A real possibility, in a sense, it is even today, ... You could have a decent and better society already today were it not for the fact that the whole system is mobilized against it.

Malinovich: You mean it’s materially and psychologically possible for this utopia or state that you described in *Eros and Civilization* to exist.

Marcuse: I would say materially; psychologically is doubtful.

Malinovich: The people who criticize you, one of the points they make is that it’s more complicated than you claim it to be—

Marcuse: I would not deny that it is complicated. It is an almost desperate task to oppose actively a system that is as strong as can possibly be imagined and that still delivers the goods. At least in the advanced capitalist countries the basic needs of a large majority of the population are satisfied.

Malinovich: I think that what they mean by complicated is that they think that you attribute some of the shortcomings which are due to human nature, or at least where the evidence is unclear, that you attribute these shortcomings almost exclusively to capitalist society.

Marcuse: There is no such thing as an immutable human nature. You can make with human beings whatever you want to, and unfortunately in history we have seen that. There is a natural sphere of human existence, certainly. I mean human beings are also animals, but that does not mean that this is unchangeable. It only means that the development of human beings is inexorably linked with the development of nature and of the natural sphere. The human being is also nature, but nature can be changed.

Malinovich: The criticism that has been made is that you don’t sufficiently deal with the possibility that there are aggressive instincts.

Marcuse: Of course there are aggressive instincts, but these aggressive instincts can be put to socially useful purposes. For example, in the development of technology, or in a socialist competition. The instinct is there, but it doesn’t have to assume the entirely destructive forms it assumes in an oppressive society. By the way, I do not go terribly much beyond Freud [in *Eros and Civilization*]; I only try to bring out what is in my view implied in Freud’s own late theory of instincts. He himself speaks—I think in one of the letters to Einstein or perhaps it is at the end of *Civilization and Its Discontents*—of the possibility that Eros will assert itself again against its immortal adversary.
Malinovich: I want to get your reaction to another criticism that has been made. Your Utopian vision as expressed in *Eros and Civilization* has been criticized for being very vague. For example, one of the things that people will say is: What are people going to do in this utopia, how will they occupy their time?

Marcuse: In this kind of criticism you take people as they are today—managed, greatly repressed, and so on and transpose them to a free society which will not only have entirely different institutions, but also entirely different human beings. Today of course it is possible to say: If this man or woman doesn’t have a full-time job anymore, all they will do is sit in front of the television set. It may be the case today; it certainly doesn’t have to be the case in an entirely different society. They will damn well know what to do. There is such a thing as creative work.

Malinovich: What about the view that your model is very much the artist or the very creative person, and that most people are far more mediocre than you give them credit for.

Marcuse: If they are mediocre this does not exclude that this mediocrity may be remedied. Otherwise you couldn’t have a free society. People will have to change, and I think they are in the process of changing.

Malinovich: Brandon called you a philosopher of anarchy and said that the Baader-Meinhof scorned all social bonds and family authority; the implication was that they got this from you. I would imagine that he would get this from your position in *Eros and Civilization*—it’s so vague and you’re for the abolition of all surplus repression and sometimes you talk of the abolition of repression, so it gives the impression of an anarchist quality—everybody is “doing their own thing.”

Marcuse: That’s a silly concept of anarchism, but if by anarchism he means that I am against a society geared and governed by a vast bureaucracy which is in reality no longer responsible to the people, he is correct in saying that I am against it. Otherwise I’m not stupid enough to assume that you could really change society without some organization, nor am I stupid enough to assume that in a free society no administration whatsoever would be necessary. That’s an idiotic use of the term anarchism.

Malinovich: You never meant that in a free society there would be no form of structured social organization?

---

4 The interview took place about six months after the deaths in prison of the three remaining Baader-Meinhof terrorist leaders. At the time Henry Brandon, chief North American correspondent for the *Sunday Times* of London, as well as a number of other writers and academics, had attempted to link Marcuse’s writings to the activities of the Baader-Meinhof gang.
Marcuse: Of course not; I'm not feebleminded, ... Some things have to remain vague because the theoretician is not a prophet. It's more important to say things in a vague way than not to say them at all.

Malinovich: Any description in the present is going to still be largely within the mental structures that are developed, or are influenced by the present social context, so that it would be very difficult for anyone in the present situation to outline what life would be like for a liberated person?

Marcuse: Certainly.

Malinovich: Here's another question which grows out of the same kind of interpretation of your work. Some of the feminist writers, for example Juliet Mitchell, have advocated the lifting of all incest taboos and the abolition of the family. Now was that in any way in your mind in Eros and Civilization, that in order to get rid of the repression involved in the Oedipal complex, the incest taboo should be lifted and the family abolished?

Marcuse: I never said such a thing. I neither advocated the abolition of the family nor the lifting of the incest taboos. On the contrary, I remember quite well that on several occasions I stressed the historical fact that during long periods of development the family was progressive and may well become again progressive if it protects the child and the grown-ups in the family from the oppressive management of their lives by the established society—the sphere of privacy, of intimacy as a protection and perhaps even as a point of departure for opposition... Who destroys the family today? If the family life is confined to watching television, that's the destruction of the family.

Malinovich: ... Now I did come across a passage in Eros and Civilization where you say that "the change in value and scope of libidinal relations would lead to a disintegration of the institutions in which the private interpersonal relations have been organized, particularly the monogamic and patriarchal family." How would you interpret that?

Marcuse: That is no advocacy; that is an interpretation. I don't advocate it. In addition we should not underrate the other trend that is mainly in Horkheimer, but I subscribe to it, and I wrote it recently again—in many situations the family can also be protective, ... So you have to formulate that a little dialectically, because both aspects are true. There is the repressive aspect of the patriarchal family and there is a degree to which the family still protects children from the influence of the media, peer groups, and so on.

Malinovich: When you say it was not advocacy, just an interpretation, the point is in the book you do advocate this new kind of society. That's the kind of passage that leads to the accusation that you are against the family.

Marcuse: I wouldn't bother with these accusations. What is going to happen in a free society, I don't know and we don't know and we cannot prophesize.
Malinovich: Does it seem to you that ecological problems have any bearing on your view that advanced technology makes it possible to live by the pleasure principle—the thesis of *Eros and Civilization*?

Marcuse: I never formulated it this way—"to live by the pleasure principle"—because the other principle remains there too.

Malinovich: But don’t you say something to the effect that the pleasure principle would become a reality principle?

Marcuse: Well, it would make for a different reality principle, but it wouldn’t simply be a realization of the pleasure principle. That I never said.

Malinovich: Let’s put it in terms of the thesis you did put forth in *Eros and Civilization*, that because of advances in technology the pleasure principle could play a far greater role in human life. Does that seem at all endangered by present ecological problems? Doesn’t it seem that we might be entering a new age of scarcity? You wrote that book 24 years ago.

Marcuse: Yes, well I nowhere say that a free society is a society of abundance. With the available resources, technical as well as natural, we can start the struggle for such a society practically immediately. It does not require abundance. With the argument that there is not enough social wealth one has postponed this task of reconstruction again and again.

Malinovich: But you did say, in *Eros and Civilization*, that the kind of society that is possible at this historical point was not possible before because what makes it possible is technology.

Marcuse: That’s correct. That’s one of the reasons I gave.

Malinovich: But if that’s the case, take the kinds of problems we have with oil, all the energy problems we have.

Marcuse: Well, it’s a choice here—do you want a free society or do you want a comfortable and rich society at the expense of freedom? We’ll have to learn to do with the available resources instead of wasting as we do now.

Malinovich: What I’m suggesting is that at least part of your thesis in *Eros and Civilization* seems to be that work in the sense of labor as Marx put it could be virtually abolished or diminished to an extreme degree because of technological developments. But if we start to run out of energy sources, doesn’t it seem a possibility these ecological dangers could endanger that position?

Marcuse: No doubt there is such a danger. If we run out of natural resources we will have to reduce our standard of living considerably, in the meantime hoping that we find replacements.

Malinovich: Wouldn’t it be more than just reducing our standard of living? Isn’t it possible that people would simply have to do unpleasant work? That the kind of repression which is necessary in order to get people to do unpleasant work might become historically necessary again?

Marcuse: Why does the work then have to be more unpleasant than the work today on the assembly line? I don’t see that.

Malinovich: No, not more unpleasant but just that it would make your Utopian vision less likely.
Marcuse: Well, I never said that in a free society alienated labor could be abolished altogether. It can only be reduced, but reduced considerably. I don't think we should speculate on whether it is reduced a little bit more or a little bit less. In any case the fact will remain that alienated labor will have to be done but it could be done on a qualitatively reduced scale.

One-Dimensional Man

Malinovich: A common criticism of One-Dimensional Man is that it is too much of an armchair sociology—that you didn't have enough data in the book and that your characterizations are exaggerated. I discussed that criticism at length with Dykstra, and I have the feeling that probably your answer would be along the same lines as his—that the very idea of having to do a sociology on a "scientific model" where you send out questionnaires and do long-range studies is itself an example of a manipulated consciousness.

Marcuse: I would agree to that. As far as the exaggerations are concerned, I would quote, I think it was Adorno who said that in psychoanalysis only the exaggerations are true, and to a certain extent I would like to apply that too to the critique of society.

Malinovich: In terms of the methodology of the book, would you agree with Dykstra that it's a theoretical analysis based on a personal perception which is tested within the social realm?

Marcuse: Not only a personal perception. I mean a helluva lot of people have the same perception. I'm not alone. It's a perception which has been trained and developed in innumerable discussions with others. I wouldn't use the term "personal" unless you explain it in this way.

Malinovich: But to you doesn't it seem a drawback that your characterizations were not supported by extensive data?

Marcuse: What is meant by extensive? Of course I collected enough material. It is not simply taken out of my imagination or whatever.

Malinovich: They mean sociological studies, questionnaires.

Marcuse: I even read sociological studies. That they don't appear quoted in the book is a different story. It doesn't mean that I hadn't read them.

Malinovich: I was thinking with respect to this that a lot of the things you said have been corroborated since then. There have been a lot of studies on the effects of TV violence on children. There's enormous concern now with the effects of television. Now the studies are being done which corroborate a lot of what you said at a much earlier point in time.

5 Bram Dykstra is a professor of comparative literature at UCSD and was a friend of Marcuse.
Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution

Marcuse: That’s right.
Malinovich: One of the things Dykstra said was that the idea of having to verify theories on the model of the behavioral sciences—
Marcuse: You have to verify a theory, but that doesn’t mean that you have to verify it in terms of behavioral sociology.
Malinovich: What do you mean by verify? Could you say a little more?
Marcuse: Demonstrate it so that every and any man or woman who is not a half-wit, totally illiterate, can see it. It doesn’t mean verify in terms of the natural sciences or psychological experiments.
Malinovich: In other words, if you describe the phenomenon, intelligent people can corroborate it through their own experience. Is that in a sense what you’re saying?
Marcuse: Through their own experience and through having understood what is said. Sure. They don’t have to agree with it, but at least they have to know what it’s all about.
Malinovich: Do you have any regrets about having used the word totalitarian with respect to Western societies?
Marcuse: Well, there are many forms of totalitarianism; it doesn’t have to be a fascist and Nazi one. You can build up almost total control over the population, for example, by the new technology, the use of the media or computers, or whatever it is. It’s in that sense, not in the fascist and Nazi sense.
Malinovich: So you don’t feel that the use of the word totalitarian was misleading.
Marcuse: Not unless you identify it with Nazi and fascist, but you can speak and I think I did of a democratic totalitarianism, or of a totalitarian democracy.
Malinovich: What about the idea that when you speak about moronization and so forth, that you don’t show sufficient appreciation of freedom in the West? Do you have any regrets about that?
Marcuse: I certainly do appreciate the freedom we still do have in the West, otherwise I couldn’t exist and certainly couldn’t write here, so that is wrong. I know perfectly well that as things stand today this country, as well as England, are still probably among the freest—relatively speaking—countries in the world.
Malinovich: And you don’t feel that in One-Dimensional Man you gave a mistaken impression?
Marcuse: No, I tried to outline tendencies toward authoritarianism and totalitarianism, and I would still stick to it.
Malinovich: In light of your writing about the moronization of the people, how do you explain things like the women’s movement—?
Marcuse: These are oppositional movements. That is exactly the opposition which in this country is still permitted and which may become very important if economic conditions continue to deteriorate and there is a radicalization on a larger level.
Malinovich: But the women's movement has affected many women who are not in any sense political radicals.

Marcuse: Which only means that potentially the opposition spreads among the larger population. It affects strata which before—for example, women—were to a large extent unpolitical and submissive.

Malinovich: They're not more political, in the sense of being socialist.

Marcuse: In fact it's also a political movement because the ultimate goals of the feminist movement cannot be achieved within the framework of this society, ... I speak of a radical transformation of values.

Malinovich: I think it was in that Psychology Today interview, when you spoke of moronization, you also spoke of the increasing dehumanization of the society. It seems to me that there are ways in which the society has become more humanized. For example, laws for the handicapped—when I was a student at Berkeley, there were no handicapped students; now Berkeley is swarming with wheelchairs. The handicapped have been totally accommodated. There are laws now that demand that all public buildings be made accessible to the handicapped.

Marcuse: There's absolutely no reason to deny that there are such elements. The decisive question is: Is this tendency going to prevail because it is embedded in the system, or the opposite? And I would make the point that the opposite tendency is the dominant tendency. For example, the laws against the pollution of the environment, the very poor legislation that has been passed, is rescinded or reduced as soon as they hit the interests of the big corporations, especially nuclear energy.

Malinovich: But it's still true that the United States has the strongest ecological laws, or pharmaceutical laws. For example in Europe you can buy drugs or cosmetics which are far less tested and which are banned here.

Marcuse: I wouldn't deny that. But these tendencies have inherent limits—they are not allowed to violate basic interests of corporations. If it really hurts the corporations, it doesn't have a ghost of a chance.

Malinovich: What do you think of affirmative action? Does that seem like a progressive measure to you?

Marcuse: I'm certainly in favor of that; because it tries at least to undo some of the injustice done for centuries.

Malinovich: Have you in any way changed your views in terms of the highly repressive nature of the society psychologically? Do you still feel as strongly as you did in One-Dimensional Man?

Marcuse: I don't think I've changed my mind. As I've said, the only change I can detect is that, after '68, I am a little more optimistic that things are going to change.
Malinovich: Here’s a quote from *Repressive Tolerance*: “While it [tolerance] is more or less quietly and constitutionally withdrawn from the opposition, it is made compulsory behavior with respect to established policies.” And then in *Counter-revolution and Revolt*, in the last pages you speak of the intensified repression of rebellion. Doesn’t that contradict what you said about this being one of the freest countries?

Marcuse: I said relatively free. There is no such thing as a free country in the world today. There are societies that come closer to it than others. And compared with Stalinist Russia, and even post-Stalinist Russia, certainly this is a freer society. And the management of the population still proceeds largely with democratic and constitutional means. So this is by no means a fascist or protofascist society. That’s nonsense. Those who say that don’t know what fascism is—namely, a monolithic society in which they couldn’t say this anymore.

Malinovich: If I compare your quote from *Repressive Tolerance* which I just read to you where you seem to be saying something very strong—you’re saying that tolerance is “more or less quietly and constitutionally withdrawn from the opposition” and you’re speaking, one assumes, about American society—

Marcuse: Alright, you can provide the examples: let’s start with the immediate situation—revamping of education. The fact that it is more and more difficult, practically impossible as a Marxist or a so-called Marxist to get an academic position.

Malinovich: It is?

Marcuse: It is. The fact that recent documents have made very clear the extent of FBI and CIA supervision of the entire allegedly suspicious population.

Malinovich: I have the feeling that sometimes when you write, instead of qualifying a statement you’re making, you will tend to make almost two opposite statements, thinking of different things. For example, on the one hand, in *Repressive Tolerance* you’re saying this society tolerates anything. Every idiot can get on television and say what he thinks, and you seem to be saying that there really is this indiscriminate tolerance. On the other hand, in a statement like this, you seem to be saying that there isn’t. Do you see what I mean?

Marcuse: No. If I make that impression that is not what I mean. This society, in this country, still has outlets for opposition. That is why I stress so strongly that it is not by any means a fascist society. But you see, tolerance does become oppressive, and this again you can take as an example—if on the same screen they have the inmate of a concentration camp talking and then the next hour or the next day someone who tells you that it’s all exaggerated or invented. One appearance destroys the other.
Malinovich: Then when in *Counterrevolution and Revolt* you were speaking about the intensified repression of the rebellion, what did you have in mind? Can you give me some more examples?

Marcuse: The increasingly efficient control and supervision of the entire population. You don't have to give examples—all the material that came out on the CIA and FBI espionage in this country is well known.

Malinovich: Have you changed your mind at all about anything you said in *Repressive Tolerance*?

Marcuse: I can only say, certainly not consciously. Definitely no major change.

Malinovich: I have found it difficult to get clear on certain points of what you're saying in *Repressive Tolerance*. Let me give you an example. In the beginning of the essay you state that "indiscriminate tolerance is justified in harmless debate, in conversation, in academic discussion" but later on in the essay you state that "the restoration of freedom of thought may necessitate new and rigid restrictions on teaching and practices in the educational institutions which by their very methods and concepts serve to enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse." Now it seems to me that you're saying two different things here. In the first statement you seem to be saying that on an academic level there should be indiscriminate tolerance.

Marcuse: The second statement refers to the period in which the restoration of freedom of thought is indeed on the way, is a social fact. And the teaching here refers to teaching which is obviously propaganda. There was teaching under Hitler. There's a difference between teaching and teaching.

Malinovich: Doesn't that in many situations become a difficult distinction to make?

Marcuse: Yes, but in these things it is very easy to mention extremely marginal cases in order to throw away the whole thing, so one should not always orient oneself on marginal cases where it is difficult to distinguish. But in reality in a majority of cases it's not so difficult to distinguish.

Malinovich: I'm not sure I get you correctly. When you say indiscriminate tolerance, it sounds like what you're saying is total tolerance of any academic discussion, but what you're saying now is indiscriminate tolerance of an academic discussion which is not propaganda.

Marcuse: Well, I wouldn't call propaganda an academic occupation.

Malinovich: Doesn't it seem quite possible that a person might genuinely hold a position on a subject which is highly conservative, a person might be a sincere and honest conservative economist?

Marcuse: Then it's certainly not under my category of movements which should not be tolerated.

Malinovich: Yes, but later on the same page you say that you advocate "withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups ... which promote ... discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc." That passage is often quoted in attacking you—in *Repressive Tolerance*.
you make the point that if someone is against socialized medicine then tolerance should be withdrawn!

Marcuse: Tolerance should be withdrawn doesn’t mean that the man should be eliminated.

Malinovich: Yes, but that he should not be allowed to express his views. Isn’t that what it means? Or then what does it mean if it doesn’t mean that?

Marcuse: In the first place let’s be clear about that. If somebody in the present situation with over six or seven million unemployed and still great inequality advocates cutting down of the already minimum social services, this is indeed something one should fight.

Malinovich: Yes, but fighting it is different from not tolerating it. When you say it shouldn’t be tolerated, don’t you mean that a person should not be allowed to express that view?

Marcuse: Yes, or he should express his view but he damn better justify it, and I don’t think it can be justified. I know this sentence is constantly quoted and I find it obscene in the present situation to come out against a really effective social-welfare program.

Malinovich: Right now this is a little confusing, ... Take something like New York City being bankrupt. In order to get money from the federal government there has to be a cutting down of some of the services. They have to balance their budget. If someone in New York says that we have to make conditions more stringent for welfare or we have to cut down on certain public services, or if we have to cut down on public housing—which in fact they’ve had to do—now are these statements which you believe should not be tolerated? Aren’t there a lot of contexts in which statements of that kind can’t be interpreted as protofascistic?

Marcuse: Well, if it is a mere academic statement it would fall under the category of situations in which it can be tolerated, but we have to see it in a much larger context, namely, as a general trend toward a cutting down of social services rather than balancing the budget or whatever it is, ... Under these circumstances the statement that propaganda against social welfare should not be tolerated seems to me to make sense. I think I would stick to it, because this is not an academic situation, this is a very urgent social situation which affects millions and millions of underprivileged.

Malinovich: What if a conservative economics professor wants to argue that we should have cut downs on certain social services?

Marcuse: I would say the same thing. Inasmuch as this worsens the already miserable conditions of millions of underprivileged, the statement is not in order.

Malinovich: So he should not be permitted.

Marcuse: Yes. Again, as an academic teacher yes, but as a propagandist no. That’s an important distinction.

Malinovich: I’m really having trouble with this. Can you say more about that distinction?
Marcuse: You know the trouble in this whole discussion is that it is again the question of relatively marginal and harmless cases, which are really not in the center of my discussion. It's a question of movements like the neo-Nazi movement.

Malinovich: But then I don't understand what you mean because there are a lot of conservative economists who would come out and say we have to cut down on welfare.

Marcuse: And if they do it in their lectures and allow a perfectly free criticism and discussion, they can be tolerated.

Malinovich: Even if they were against extended social—

Marcuse: Even if they argue against, yes, ... You can say that I was intentionally provocative in this essay because I saw the danger of a tendency, not in this country, but mainly in Germany of a new toleration of Nazi and proto-Nazi movements, ... There are refinements not only possible but necessary, but I had in mind what happened in the Weimar Republic with the toleration of the Nazi movement and other military movements on the right.

Malinovich: That's just what I was wondering about. Whether a lot of what you say in there was influenced by the Weimar Republic and you really have a fascist model in mind.

Marcuse: Yes, because that is the most realistic model.

Malinovich: But the way you state it it doesn't come across that way. It comes across much stronger.

Marcuse: Yes, I know.

Malinovich: Would you say that you didn't really mean it to be that strong?

Marcuse: I certainly agree that refinements and qualifications may be possible or necessary, but I certainly would not give up the position as a whole, ... You see, another thing that is not clear is that what I say in this essay already presupposes, at least politically, a very different society. Certainly the present government wouldn't implement anything like that. So it is very definitely a projection into the future. From the beginning to the end it already presupposes a different society.

Malinovich: And the different society would I suppose be what you refer to as the dictatorship of an elite. What you talk about toward the end of the book. Is that the different society?

Marcuse: No, I mean a society which struggles far more to remedy and abolish the basic impediments to human progress today and a society which has to struggle against—that's important—other social systems that threaten it. Like the Weimar Republic.

Malinovich: You mean threatened from the inside?

Marcuse: From the outside and the inside.

Malinovich: Would it be correct to say that at least one item you had in mind by refinements and qualifications would be what you said before—that, for example, in university lectures where free discussion was possible,
that there any position short of an outright fascist position or something like that would be acceptable for discussion?

Marcuse: In what society?

Malinovich: In the different society that you say this presupposes.

Marcuse: Yes, I would say so.

Malinovich: But certainly not a fascist position.

Marcuse: Certainly not.

Malinovich: Again in *Repressive Tolerance* you say: "The conditions under which tolerance can again become a liberating and humanizing force still have to be created." Now are you saying that there's going to be a transition period during which it is necessary to have intolerance?

Marcuse: Exactly.

Malinovich: In order to, so to speak, get rid of reactionary forces, but then once that is done with, then—

Marcuse: Yes, but I don't know that because I'm not a prophet, but that is the general idea. If you have a genuine socialist society the whole problem wouldn't exist, ... Because there's no reason for fascism in a socialist society.

Malinovich: It seems at least possible to you that in a genuine socialist society you could have indiscriminate tolerance.

Marcuse: It's not only possible, it belongs to the essence of a socialist society.

Malinovich: And that's based on the premise that in a socialist society you simply would not have fascist—

Marcuse: Neither the economic nor the political conditions are there for fascism. But we are talking about a society that doesn't exist so we cannot go into details.

Malinovich: When toward the end of *Repressive Tolerance* you say, and this is a kind of rhetorical question: "Is there any alternative other than the dictatorship of an elite over the people?", and then you point out that what we have right now is a kind of dictatorship of business and monopolies and so forth, I gather that what you have in mind there is a temporary dictatorship. Right? But doesn't that worry you in terms of being analogous to a dictatorship of the proletariat and then the withering away of the state, except that it doesn't seem to happen that way. Or in terms of what you said yesterday to the effect that the end has to be present already in the means otherwise the end gets destroyed, is lost. Wouldn't it seem that if you had to go through a dictatorship of an elite, you might just end up with nothing more than that?

Marcuse: Well, the way I use the term elite is in a way ironical, but largely it refers to groups and individuals who have already proven their qualifications as possible agents of liberation. The term elite is for me in no way a curse word, on the contrary. We are certainly governed by an elite as you just said—corporate, political, and so on, so it would only be a change from one elite to another.
Malinovich: Except that we do have, as you pointed out, a certain degree of liberal democracy.

Marcuse: Yes, but that doesn't change the fact that it is well steered and managed by an elite. The elite is not yet in any way handcuffed by the democratic rules.

Malinovich: Well, Nixon was removed.

Marcuse: He was removed precisely because he no longer qualified for the established elite. He was a dangerous parasite or whatever.

Malinovich: So you don't see his removal as in any way a change—

Marcuse: A change in the system, not at all.

Malinovich: But when you speak about the dictatorship of an elite, if you combine that with what you say in *Repressive Tolerance*, then you do end up with an elite governing and you don't have indiscriminate tolerance. They have even more power.

Marcuse: They would have much much less power because they would remain responsible to below, to the people.

Malinovich: This is probably the other major item on which you have been constantly criticized—the fact that you have far too generous a view of human nature, and of intellectuals in particular.

Marcuse: We went through that before, that I don't believe there is a human nature.

Malinovich: In the late sixties when you were politically involved, when there was political activism, you said before that you felt that a kind of new consciousness had emerged, and I think you say that in the *Essay on Liberation*. So is it your feeling that some of the people who were involved in the radical movement in the sixties were the kind of people whose nature had to some extent been changed, whose consciousness had been raised, and who in a sense, as you just said, proved their qualifications? Some of the student leaders? Some of the radical faculty?

Marcuse: Some certainly, yes, and some simply crawled back into the establishment in one way or another. Or some became just dropouts.

Malinovich: You see, one of the problems you addressed yourself to is that in order to get this change started you need a new consciousness, but how are you going to get the new consciousness without the change? I think you refer to it as the chicken and the egg problem.

Marcuse: I object to this chicken and the egg business. It is not impossible; it is a fact that you can change within the established system. There is no outside; it's a ridiculous formulation.

Malinovich: You're saying it is possible to have some real changes in human nature within the system.

Marcuse: At least the precondition for that. Yes, certainly. It has to be within the established system. Where do you want to go? Even the moon today belongs to the established system.
Malinovich: If I understand you correctly, you’re saying that in the sixties at least some of the people who were involved in the movement were the kind of people you would want to look upon as potential elite leaders.

Marcuse: Yes. But I don’t want to formulate it in terms of personalities; that wouldn’t work.

Malinovich: Then how would you formulate it?

Marcuse: That there were such people. You don’t have to go into details. There were enough people who started with experimenting, for example, on nonalienated relationships between the sexes, between the races, whatever it is. We don’t have to go into personalities here.

The Student Movement

Malinovich: These are questions about the student movement in the sixties.

Marcuse: My evaluation of the student movement you find best in the French text I gave you.

Malinovich: I ran through that last night. If I understood you correctly, you feel that it has had a long-range effect.

Marcuse: Definitely. I think that is already in Counterrevolution and Revolt.

Malinovich: In a debate with Raymond Aron in the New Statesman, somewhere around 1971, you said that a radical transformation of values is taking place before your eyes. And you were speaking about an overcoming of aggressive, repressive values. Would you still take that strong a position?

Marcuse: Yes, more than ever before. I insist that a better society, or socialist society, would be qualitatively different from all preceding and present social systems.

Malinovich: But would you agree with the idea that in the late sixties and early seventies the students had really attained a kind of new consciousness?

Marcuse: Yes, and not only the students. Also women and racial and national minorities, also part of the intelligentsia as a whole.

Malinovich: My feeling was that you were not just speaking of a political consciousness but that you were speaking of a change in the psychological—

Marcuse: A change in the entire mental structure. If you want, you can go back and quote it in Freudian terms—an ascent of Eros in the struggle with aggressiveness and destructiveness.

---

6 This is a reference to a text that Marcuse had been asked to write on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the French student and workers uprising. It had been read on French television.
Malinovich: Do you still feel now that that change was a deep one, that it was more than a superficial change?
Marcuse: Yes, I do. It was on a very deep level, but did not come to adequate realization as a political movement.
Malinovich: If that's still your feeling, then how do you explain that the student movement has kind of fizzled out. Recent Gallup polls indicate that students are much more conservative.
Marcuse: I would consider this a temporary relapse. The situation may very well change with a worsening of economic conditions.
Malinovich: How would you explain the fact that it came to an end?
Marcuse: There are many reasons. First, the end of the war in Vietnam, and the end of the draft. Secondly, the stabilization of the capitalist system.
Malinovich: What do you mean by that?
Marcuse: Economically as well as politically a turn to the right, and with that an intensification of repression.
Malinovich: Do you have some specific thing in mind when you speak of intensification of repression? Something like Kent State?
Marcuse: In this country still in a constitutional and democratic way we have no such thing as a Berufsverbot. However, I think it is an understatement to say that a Marxist scholar will find it very difficult to get a job or even a promotion.
Malinovich: Could you say something about what your hopes were for the student movement back in the sixties? At that time what seemed to you to be the possibilities for the movement? For example, in a lecture in Germany you said: "I see the possibility of an effective revolutionary force only in the combination of what is going on in the Third World with the explosive forces in the centers of the highly developed world." Did you in the sixties have hope that somehow the student movement in conjunction with the Third World or the ghetto population could conceivably have led to a real revolution?
Marcuse: Not in this county. The situation was different in France. It was not in itself in this country a revolutionary movement, but one of the catalyst groups which for the first time articulated this transformation of needs and values, with such slogans as "the new sensibility," for example.
Malinovich: When you talk about the new sensibility are you saying that, while the students today are more politically conservative or less politically involved, they still are in some psychological sense on a more advanced level than students before the sixties?
Marcuse: Again, it is not so much a psychological question as the changing needs and aspirations, and a skepticism concerning all the competitive needs and values of the capitalist system, and the insistence on the right of sensibility, a sensuousness—that the emancipation of these from the established alienation is a decisive element in the struggle for a better
society. This kind of change is still there. Its political expression is largely repressed, but it is certainly there, and not only among the students. That is also in the French text.

Malinovich: You talked about the workers.
Marcuse: And strata of the dependent bourgeoisie.
Malinovich: So what you said about France is at least as true about the United States?
Marcuse: Not everything I say there about France would apply to the United States. You cannot say that it was a revolutionary movement here; in France it may well have been, and in Italy too.
Malinovich: So even in the sixties you never believed that the U.S. student movement was a revolutionary movement, but would it be correct to say that you felt it would be a step in the right direction, a consciousness-raising experience?
Marcuse: Even more, I would say the expression of a qualitatively different struggle and qualitatively different aims.
Malinovich: I gather from what you've said so far then that you're not disappointed by what happened.
Marcuse: For me disappointed or not disappointed is much too personal and private. It makes no difference if I'm disappointed or not disappointed, so I wouldn't use this term.
Malinovich: Did you have greater expectations?
Marcuse: I think everyone at that time had greater expectations.
Malinovich: A lot of the critics of the student movement now say that the student movement just fizzled out, so obviously it was a superficial, generational thing.
Marcuse: Not everything that fizzles out owing to repression is thereby refuted in its substance.
Malinovich: You're really attributing the fizzling out mainly to repression, the end of the Vietnam War, the end of the draft?
Marcuse: Yes.

On Terrorism

Malinovich: Henry Brandon, the head of the London bureau of the New York Times, wrote an article right after the Baader-Meinhof incidents saying that "insofar as they have a political outlook it's yours," and referred to you as "a philosopher of anarchy."
Marcuse: Well, I have never advocated anarchism; I have never advocated terror. As a Marxist I know full well that terror is no political weapon, and certainly not a political weapon for socialists. I believe that in the struggle for socialism, the end has to be present in the means. And you cannot possibly in the image of a humane and free society in any way
I have stated this in a recent issue of Die Zeit, ... I remember at a mass meeting in Frankfurt at the time of the release of Angela Davis I made a statement against terrorism. That was 1970, I think.

Malinovich: What about the last sentences of Repressive Tolerance?

Marcuse: There I say—and that is written in connection with the civil rights movements of the sixties—that if these black people and their sympathizers use violence it is in order to break the chain of violence and not to perpetuate it. That is a sentence which is constantly quoted. Now in the first place there is a difference between violence and terror. The occupation of a building, the clash with the police can be violent, but it isn't terror unless one simply doesn't know the meaning of words. Terror is a political weapon only if supported by the masses, the people themselves, at least a majority of them. For example, the Jacobin terror in the French Revolution. You cannot compare that in any way with Baader-Meinhof, who are totally isolated, connected only with tiny groups of bourgeois intellectuals who were frustrated.

Malinovich: The point your critics make is that if contemporary advanced capitalist society is really responsible for the total moronization, dehumanization, manipulation of man, then people like Aldo Moro and other political leaders and the governments of the Western capitalist countries are guilty of preventing the realization of what could be almost an immediate utopia.

Marcuse: Well, it is not the leaders and politicians that are responsible. The oppression is germane to the system itself. Capitalism today cannot function without this constant management and steering and repressing of human needs and aspirations. It certainly can satisfy the material and even the cultural needs for a large part of the population, but at what cost. At the cost of alienated labor, a full-time occupation.

Malinovich: But what about the idea that your general theoretical outlook is one which could lead young people to commit such acts? For example the Baader-Meinhof—one of their first activities was the bombing of a Frankfurt department store. They claimed this was a symbolic attack on consumerism.

Marcuse: It doesn't make any difference; it's totally incompatible with what I say, because the Baader-Meinhof were completely isolated from almost the entire population. To derive even theoretically a defense of terrorism is simply malicious, and in addition forgets the difference between violence and terror.

Malinovich: This distinction between violence and terror, let's use a concrete example such as Algeria.

Marcuse: In Algeria you had both violence and terror. Violence is much more general—if students or workers resist force, that is violence and not terror.

Malinovich: Bombing a department store in Algeria would be terror, but it would be terror supported by the masses?
Marcuse: That's correct. But again you should be aware that you don't present it in such a way that I justify or approve of it, ... I want to make the difference clear, but I certainly wouldn't say that I recommend the bombing of department stores.

Malinovich: But in Algeria it's a different situation.

Marcuse: It was open warfare.

Malinovich: So that the bombing of a department store there would have a different political meaning from the Baader-Meinhof bombing of a department store.

Marcuse: I think you can say that.

Malinovich: But you don't want to be put on record as saying that you think the Algerian bombing of a department store is morally OK.

Marcuse: No, I don't want to be put on record as saying that. Definitely not. Victims are still mostly innocent persons.

Malinovich: Are there any conditions under which terrorism would be morally justifiable—for example, Hitler or Franco or some situation like that?

Marcuse: ... Personally, I would say yes, ... You can put it this way. There are moral and political reasons overriding the established morality. For example, work in the illegal resistance. To disobey orders to kill Jews is in terms of the established regime illegal, the whole civil disobedience is in terms of the established morality illegal.

Malinovich: But I gather from what you've said and from the article in Die Zeit that you would consider any of the contemporary acts of terrorism, whether it be Palestinians or Irish or the Moluccans in Holland, as being counterproductive.

Marcuse: Yes.

Miscellaneous

Malinovich: Do you consider that Third World economic and social problems are caused to a very large extent by colonialism or Western imperialism?

Marcuse: Not exclusively, but to a considerable extent, yes. I would not, for example, in any way put what is going on today in Uganda on the account of colonialism. That's ridiculous.

Malinovich: A political-scientist friend of mine estimates that the contribution of colonialism has been in the area of 25 percent. His analysis is that about 75 percent of the troubles of the Third World would have been there anyway.

Marcuse: I think I agree to that. I don't know if it's 25 percent or 35 percent, but essentially I agree.

Malinovich: You've spoken of a "new consciousness" of ghetto people and Third World people. Now it's often been said that what ghetto or Third World people want is just a bigger share of the pie. They don't really have a new consciousness.
Marcuse: Well, as far as I can see, there are very few groups in this country among the blacks which are revolutionary in the sense that their aim would be the abolition of the entire system. I would rather formulate it this way—not with "a bigger slice of the pie." That refers to this country, not to the Third World. There it's different.

Malinovich: You think that there's more evidence of a new consciousness there?

Marcuse: Yes, and revolutionary aims.

Marcuse: I am very definitely in favor of the protection and integrity of Israel as a state, but I certainly don't agree with its present policy, because it seems to me self-defeating. In my view the greatest justification for Israel is to create conditions under which the Holocaust will not be repeated. But I'm afraid much of the present policy may precisely lead to a repetition, although not on that scale perhaps of the concentration camps.

Marcuse: Have you seen the TV film, "Holocaust"? It was excellent. And I would like to say, as a long-standing critic of the mass media and without compromise, that the showing of this film was a great service to the people of this country and a proof that the mass media can also be a hopefully effective means of countereducation, enlightenment, and so on. They even go into the I. G. Farben business, that the German industry simply requested Jews from the concentration camps as cheap laborers. They even got in that the British didn't do anything about it, because possibly they were secretly in sympathy with what the Nazis were doing. That is something!

With Erica Sherover?

Malinovich: Were you especially interested in the sixties in the development of communes?

Marcuse: Yes I was—as an experiment in nonalienated living. Communes, collectives, cooperatives, all these were experiments within capitalist society to create islands of nonalienation, ... In a funny way you can add that it seems that in some cases nonalienated living is infinitely more complex and difficult than alienated living.

Sherover: That's stolen from his wife!

Marcuse: Yes. That is what she says, but I agree with her entirely—it's infinitely more nerve-racking and energy-spending and whatever than a good juicy alienated life.

---

7 Marcuse married Erica Sherover a few years before his death. She had been a student of his both at Brandeis and at UCSD. Inge Marcuse died of cancer in 1973.
Malinovich: Why not stay alienated then?
Marcuse: Because in the last analysis it is more than a question of one or two or twelve persons; it is a question of society as a whole. In order to make the nonalienation experiments really meaningful and enduring, you have to create in the large context a better society.
Sherover: In the present situation a so-called nonalienated existence reeks of concern with the self; one retires to the country and experiments on the back of the laboring population, and since one isn’t doing anything except discovering oneself therefore it’s more complicated, endless discovery of self.
Marcuse: That’s very good, the way she just formulated it. It has an escapist quality.
Sherover: It seems to me that the difficulties the left had in the sixties and also in the ‘thirties are precisely because there wasn’t in the Marxist tradition a theory of the development of subjectivity, ... It didn’t deal with how do you transform people’s consciousness? How do we actually transform our own consciousness? And it seems to me that that is the weakness of the Frankfurt School, that they didn’t really devote any attention to this problematic. I’ve been at many gatherings where students will say to Herbert, “But what shall we do?” and Herbert says, “You know what to do.”
Marcuse: That’s not the way I left it, by simply saying, “You know what to do.”
Sherover: You often say, “You know what to do; do political education.” But what constitutes political education is always left vague. It isn’t just reading Kapital. It’s something that happens in, I would call, consciousness-raising groups, and things like that, ... I’m talking about a practice which would think about how people actually do get rid of unaware racism, unaware sexism, and unintentional classism and things like that, ... That’s the general topic of my dissertation and my work—that’s what I do. I teach a radical kind of counseling.
Malinovich: It seems to me that a lot of the people who were involved in leftist movements in the sixties had a very old consciousness.
Marcuse: Exactly.
Malinovich: What do you think about what Ricky is doing? Do you like it?
Marcuse: Yes.
Sherover: But ... you have this notion that (for example) women can do it by themselves. If she doesn’t like it why does she stay with it is the notion here, and it’s real individualist. It’s not that women together need support, and actually to work through things in common, ...
Marcuse: I never objected to that. I never criticized that. What I criticized was overoccupation with one’s soul or the other’s soul.

* * *
I will start with a restatement of the reified concept of the proletariat: the proletariat is, by its very existence, a (the) potentially revolutionary force—this quality being definitive of its very existence. Given its existence, its (potential) function in the transformation of society is also given—realisation of its existence. Now I want to defend this reification, which has at least the advantage that it stops the desperate search for the lost revolutionary Subject: a loss held to be due to the prevalent integration of the working class into the capitalist system. The working class still is the "ontological" antagonist of capital, and the potentially revolutionary Subject: but it is a vastly expanded working class, which no longer corresponds directly to the Marxian proletariat.

Late capitalism has re-defined the working class: today, in the advanced countries industrial labourers are no longer the great majority of this class. The "deproletarianization" of the working class is indicated not only in the higher standard of living, in the sphere of consumption: it is a trend rooted in the development of the production process itself, which integrates large strata of non-proletarian worker into the working class: White collar employees, technicians, engineers, and the steadily growing private and public bureaucracy which assures the creation as well as realisation of surplus value. All these have to sell their labour power and are separated from the control of the means of production. In this greatly enlarged working class, the gap between intellectual and material labour is being reduced, knowledge and education are generalized; however, these achievements are invalidated to the degree to which the system reproduces itself through the productivity of unproductive labour, which does not increase the social wealth, but rather destroys and abuses it through the production of waste, planned obsolescence, a self-propelling armament industry, management of consciousness and subconsciousness, etc.

The capitalist mode of production, through the increasing mechanization and intellectualization of labour, accumulates an increasing quantity of general ability, skills, knowledge—a human potential which cannot be developed within the established apparatus of production, because it would conflict with the need for full-time de-humanized labour. A large part of it is

*Editors' note:*
"The Reification of the Proletariat" was presented as a talk presented at the American Philosophical Association Convention, San Francisco, March 23, 1978, attended by Douglas Kellner who interviewed Marcuse while he was sunbathing on the roof of the St. Francis Hotel the next day, receiving a massage from his third wife Erica Sherover. The text was published as "The Reification of the Proletariat" in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory, 3, 1 (Winnipeg: Winter 1979) pp. 20-3. Marcuse critiques here the kind of ossified Marxism that he believed was a theoretical and practical obstacle to the New Left.
channeled into unnecessary work, unnecessary in that it is not required for the construction and preservation of a better society but is necessitated only by the requirements of capitalist production.

Under these circumstances, a “counter-consciousness” emerges among the dependent population (today about 90% of the total?), an awareness of the ever more blatant obsolescence of the established social division and organization of work. Rudolf Bahro, the militant East German dissident (he was immediately jailed after the publication, in West Germany, of his book *The Alternative*) uses the term *surplus-consciousness* to designate this (still largely vague and diffused) awareness. He defines it as “the growing quantity of free mental energy which is no longer tied up in necessary labour and hierarchical knowledge” (*New Left Review*, no. 106, November–December 1977).

“Surplus Consciousness” does not describe an ideological entity, signifying a relapse into idealism. Rather, this strange term designates a quality of the mental energy expressed in the actual behaviour of men and women under the impact of the mode of production in late capitalism. This energy is “surplus” over and above the energy spent daily in the alienated performances required by the established production relations. Blocked in finding satisfying ways of effective realisation, it becomes, among the dependent population, consciousness of frustration, humiliation, and waste. At the same time, capitalist mass production constantly stimulates this consciousness by the display of an ever larger offer of commodities over and above the necessities (and even amenities) of life. The system is thus compelled, by the requirements of enlarged competitive accumulation, to create and to renew constantly the *needs* for “luxuries”, which are all but inaccessible to those who lack the necessary purchasing power. Late capitalism invokes the images of an easier, less repressive, less inhuman life, while perpetuating the alienated labour which denies this satisfaction. In short, late capitalism daily demonstrates the fact that the wherewithal for a better society is available, but that the very society which has created these resources of freedom must preclude their use for the enhancement (and today even for the protection) of life.

In this form, the consciousness of the underlying population is penetrated by the inherent contradictions of capitalism. To be sure, their appearance does not correspond to their essence; surplus consciousness does not conceptualize the dynamics of late capitalist production. Nonetheless, surplus consciousness tends to become a material force, not primarily as class consciousness, but rather as the consciousness of an opposition which expressed itself in new (or recaptured) modes of action, initiated not by any specific class, but by a precarious and temporary “alliance” of groups among the dependent population. Such actions include the “citizens initiatives” (e.g., the organized protest against nuclear energy installations, against capitalist urban renewal), the fight against racism and sexism, the students’ protest, etc. At the same time, workers’ initiatives transcend the merely economic class struggle in the demands for the self-organization (autogestion) of work.
Under the concentrated power of corporate capitalism, its productivity and destructiveness, the opposition is effectively contained. There is no room for a radicalism which would be supported by the people, and the range of movement as well as the demands which result easily appear ideological and reformist. Is this a throwback to previous stages of bourgeois democracy?

In this situation the classical Marxist “time table” of historical revolutions gains new significance. According to this time table, a bourgeois-democratic revolution precedes the proletarian-socialist revolution. The former is to create the pre-conditions for the ideological, political, economic, and organizational transition to socialism (assertion and enlargement of civil rights and liberties, reduction of monopoly capital, institutionalization and extension of equality and of public services, emancipation of oppressed racial and national minorities). Today, the subjection of the majority of the bourgeoisie to the hegemony of corporate capital, and the increasingly totalitarian character of the capitalist state threaten to cancel the achievements of the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries: they are to be recaptured and radicalized. The loss of economic power sustained by large sections of the bourgeoisie, and the intensified exploitation of the working class (old and new) make for the formation of a popular base for change. Thus, the “historic compromise”, the alliance with bourgeois forces, the rejection of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in the strategy of Eurocommunism has roots in the very structure of late capitalism. “Eurocommunism” does not aim at replacing the revolution by the vote, nor does it necessarily project features of the revolution itself. It rather claims to be a theory and praxis responding to a whole (and probably long) period during which capitalism mobilizes its entire economic, technological, and military power to make the world—its world—safe for enlarged accumulation. This implies, on the part of capital, the need to contain the class struggle within economic forms, to obtain and maintain the collaboration of the working class by dividing it into a privileged population in the advanced capitalist countries, and an underprivileged population both in these countries and abroad. Within the global system, the multi-national corporations keep the competitive conflicts from becoming explosive.

This overall capitalist policy is largely successful. The subjection of the petty and middle bourgeoisie to monopoly capital has not led to their “proletarianization”. The material achievements of capitalism: its life-and-death power, and the apparent absence of a better alternative stabilize the system. Within the global framework, however, a vast reservoir of anti-capitalist sentiment is built up. In the developed capitalist countries, it does not result in a revolutionary movement, if by “revolutionary” we understand commitment to the mass struggle for the overthrow of the established social system.

Eurocommunism aims at articulating and winning over this large anticapitalist (but not yet socialist) opposition outside the “proletariat”. The changes are promising. One reason: the “surplus consciousness” has negated the reification which veiled the real mechanism of domination
behind the facade of free, objective exchange relationships. Can there still be any mystification of who is governing and in whose interests, of what is the base of their power? Not only is the ideology of capitalism wearing thin (inalienable human rights? the "invisible" hand of free competition? private enterprise? equality?)—the very reality of the system no longer conceals its utter destructiveness (the proliferation of nuclear energy, the poisoning of the life environment, chronic unemployment and inflation, perfected control of the population, etc.).

To conclude: The tendency is to the Right. It meets an enlarged opposition, qualitatively weakened by internal division, and by the lack of an organization adapted to the conditions of corporate capitalism. At the same time, the global conflicts between the capitalist powers, and with the Third World tend to weaken the stabilization of the system, without, however, posing a serious threat. The life-and-death question for the Left is: Can the transformation of the corporate State into a neo-fascist State be prevented? The question, as well as the possible answers do not arise from a revision of Marxian theory, they are posed by Marxian theory itself!

Philosophy

University of California, San Diego

PROTOSOCIALISM AND LATE CAPITALISM: TOWARD A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS BASED ON BAHRO’S ANALYSIS

Bahro’s Significance for an Analysis of Late Capitalism

The following text focuses on issues in Bahro’s book that have a universal significance extending beyond his analysis of the GDR. This means that concepts articulated by him, which in his framework (that of “actually existing socialism”) could not be further developed, can be shown to have relevance

* Editors’ note:

"Protosocialism and Late Capitalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis Based on Bahro’s Analysis" was first published as “Protosozialismus und Spatkapitalismus. Versuch einer Revolutionstheoretischen Synthese von Bahros Ansatz,” Kritik, 19 (Berlin: 1979) pp. 5-27 with an English translation published in Rudolf Bahro: Critical Responses, ed. Ulf Wolter (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1980) pp. 24-48. The last article that Marcuse prepared for publication before his death, the Bahro article shows Marcuse searching for new forces of revolution beyond the proletariat and new concepts of revolutionary subjectivity which he found in the East German dissident Rudolf Bahro who had been imprisoned and exiled from his sharp critique of “actually existing communism” and proposed for more democratic and emancipatory models of socialism, a project Marcuse long shared. For a detailed discussion of Bahro and Marcuse and the context in which Marcuse’s reflections on Bahro were published, see Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and London: Macmillan Press, 1984).
to late capitalism as well. The second part of this essay is my contribution to an analysis of those tendencies in late capitalism which correspond to the tendencies noted by Bahro in protosocialism. His book is not merely a critique of "actually existing socialism," it is at the same time a Marxist analysis of the transition period to integral socialism. It is the most important contribution to Marxist theory and practice to appear in several decades.

Bahro's Transformation of Method

When one says that much of Bahro's critique applies, mutatis mutandis, to late capitalism and that, mutatis mutandis, the alternative is valid for both social systems, this does not mean that Bahro outlines some sort of convergence theory. Rather, he has demonstrated that unity between progress and destruction, productivity and repression, gratification and want, which is rooted in the structures of both of these (very different) societies. This unity, which in very different forms, is common to both societies (and whose stabilizing potential Marxism has fatally underestimated), can be broken only in a socialism that does not yet actually exist.

Does "not yet" exist: thus the concrete utopia (and its monstrous negation in existing society) becomes the guiding thread of the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis itself reveals that the transcendence [Aufhebung] of utopia is an already existing, real possibility—indeed a necessity. The conclusive demonstration of this possibility is the result of a revolution in method: socialism shows itself to be a real possibility, and the basis of utopia is revealed in what already exists only when the most extreme, integral, "utopian" conception of socialism informs the analysis. For it is not the abolition of private ownership of the means of production (though this remains the indispensable precondition of socialism) which as such determines the essential difference between the two systems; it is rather the way in which the material and intellectual forces of production are used.

... the entire perspective under which we have so far seen the transition to communism stands in need of correction and in no way just with respect to the time factor. The dissolution of private property in the means of production on the one hand and universal human emancipation on the other, are separated by an entire epoch.8

Bahro finally breaks with the distinction (which has long since become a repressive ideology) between socialism and communism. Socialism is

communism from the very beginning—and vice versa. The essence and goal of a socialist society—the "total individual." The encroachment of the realm of freedom into the realm of necessity—must (and can) already here and now become the project and guideline of communist policy and strategy.

This revolution in method in fact returns Marxism from ideology to theory—and to praxis. What transpires in the course of Bahro's analysis of class relations in the GDR is the recapturing of the concrete, its liberation from ideology. The absence of all jargon, of mere rumination over Marxist concepts (or better, words) testifies to the grounding of the analysis in social reality. Instead of stubbornly hanging onto theses that have long since become historically obsolete, Bahro's analysis develops the Marxian concepts in confrontation with the changed structure of the postcapitalist society of the GDR—and of late capitalism! A decisive result is that historical materialism makes a genuine advance: the relationship between base and superstructure is redefined, the focal point of the social dynamic is shifted from the objectivity of political economy to subjectivity, to consciousness as a potential material force for radical change.

It [the human race—H.M.] must continue its ascent as a "journey inwards."

The leap into the realm of freedom is conceivable only on the basis of a balance between the human species and its environment, with its dynamic decisively shifted toward the qualitative and subjective aspect.\(^9\)

In this shift, Bahro sees socialism's "essentially aesthetic motivation, oriented to the totality and to the return of activities to the self."\(^{10}\)

This marks the retrieval of the element of idealism originally in historical materialism: the liberation from the economy that is the aim of historical materialism. Historical materialism remains intact; it is the dynamic of the base itself, the organization of the ever-increasing productivity of labor, which makes the activity of self-emancipating subjectivity the focal point of change.

As Bahro's analysis proceeds it becomes apparent to what degree the turn toward subjectivity applies to late capitalism as well. Even more than in actually existing socialism, in the highly developed capitalist countries liberation has become contingent on the spread of a form of consciousness that is rooted in yet at the same time transcends the process of material production. Bahro calls this "surplus consciousness" [überschüssiges Bewusstsein]. It is "that free human [psychische] capacity which is no longer absorbed by the struggle for existence" which is to be translated into practice. The industrial, technological-scientific mode of production,

\(^9\) Ibid., p. 266.
\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 288.
in which intellectual labor becomes an essential factor, engenders in the producers (the “collective worker”) qualities, skills, forms of imagination, and capacities for activity and enjoyment that are stifled or perverted in capitalist and repressive noncapitalist societies. These press beyond their inhuman realization toward a truly human one.

In the subjectivity of surplus consciousness, compensatory and emancipatory interests are forced together into a unity. Compensatory interests concern mainly the sphere of material goods: bigger and better consumption, careers, competition, profit, “status symbols,” etc. They can (at least for the time being!) be satisfied within the framework of the existing system: they compensate for dehumanization. Thus, they contradict the emancipatory interests. Nonetheless, Bahro insists that compensatory interests cannot simply be reduced and rechanneled in the interest of emancipation; they are a form of the demand for happiness and gratification that is deeply rooted in the psyche. Through them, what exists receives its legitimation. The revolution cannot be carried through on the backs of the people; but the power of compensatory interests and their satisfaction stifles the realization of emancipatory interests. The revolution presupposes a rupture with this power—a rupture which in turn can only be the result of revolution!

This, then, is the vicious circle that recurs so often and is formulated in so many different ways in Bahro’s book. It is the central historical problem of revolutionary theory in our time. Between today and tomorrow, between “unfreedom” and emancipation, lies not only the revolution but also the radical transformation of needs, the rupture with “subaltern” consciousness, the catastrophe of subjectivity. The contradiction between an overwhelming productivity and social wealth on the one hand, and its miserable and destructive uses on the other, is not propelled toward this catastrophe with the necessity of a historical law—not even when it is guided by a Marxist-Leninist strategy. The increase in productivity and the abolition of private ownership of the means of production do not have to lead to socialism: they do not necessarily break the chains of domination, the subjugation of human beings to labor. Bahro suggests that there is a tendency in Marx that implies such a continuity—the idea of ever-growing productivity and ever more efficient (and more egalitarian) production.

At the height of industrial civilization, subordination to labor is demanded by no other reason than the reason of the ruling class and the preservation of its power. In actually existing socialism, subjugation is justified by the lag in the economic, military, and technological competition with capitalism. But once a new form of domination is established, necessity is transformed into virtue: the “first stage” is prolonged into an indefinite future. The qualitative difference of a socialist society is lost, and all the more rapidly the more this socialism adopts the consumption model of the highly developed capitalist countries. Compensatory interests work against emancipation. The vicious circle exists in both societies. How can it be broken?
The question takes us back to Bahro's concept of "surplus consciousness" as a transforming power. This consciousness has its material base in the scientific, technological mode of production, in its "intellectualization." At this stage, it is "embodied" (but not reflected) in the "intellectualized layers of the collective worker." Beyond this, surplus consciousness exists in all strata of the dependent population, in an obstructed and inactive form. There is a dim awareness that there is no longer any need to live the way we do—that an alternative exists. This dim awareness becomes a certainty in the catalyst groups (the expression is my own—H.M.) of the opposition: the student movement, women's liberation, citizens' initiatives, concerned scientists, etc.

Wherever the great majority of the working class is integrated into the existing system, class relations tend toward an elitist structure in which the intelligentsia plays a leading role as a part of the collective worker. Bahro defends the provocative thesis that the intellectualized layers "set the tone" during the preparatory and transitional period and that they assume a leading role in the reconstruction of society.

The intelligentsia plays a leading role for two reasons:

1. More than ever before, knowledge is power. Information about the scientific and technological, economic and psychological mechanisms that reproduce the developed industrial society gives the possessors of such information knowledge of the objective possibilities for change. Of course, knowledge alone is not enough to realize this potentiality. But the intelligentsia does not function in isolation. It is the process of production itself which becomes "intellectualized," and in it the intellectualized strata play an increasingly important role. In the GDR they are a part of the apparatus that controls the means of production: and among them (according to Bahro) there is a considerable opposition to the dictatorship of the political bureaucracy.

2. For the intelligentsia, the realization of their compensatory interests is no longer a matter of daily concern. They share with the party functionaries the high-level privileges in the material and intellectual culture. In capitalist countries this is the case only to a very limited degree, and then only for a small circle of more or less conformist intelligentsia. The majority of the not-so-privileged strata at least have the privilege of education, which can open the otherwise closed horizon of knowledge that transcends the existing state of things.

11 Ibid., p. 329.
12 Ibid., pp. 329, 400.
The creation of the space and time required for the development of emancipatory interests beyond the material sphere, which today determines all and everything, is the task of socialist education and a socialist division of labor. Even in its transitional period, socialism is basically a problem of the economy of time. The new distribution and organization of labor aims at reversing the proportional amount of time spent in necessary and emancipatory labor in the interests of the "total individual." Insofar as this redistribution of time on an overall social scale also requires a radical reorganization of necessary labor (Bahro gives very concrete suggestions for such a reorganization), the new economy of time would amount to the emergence of the realm of freedom within the realm of necessity. And insofar as it would be carried out throughout all strata of the society, it would demolish the privileged position of the intelligentsia by universalizing it.

**Domination, State, and Antistate**

Bahro rejects any conception of the transitional period that purports to be able to dispense with a communist party, a bureaucracy, and the state, as anarchism and adventurist left radicalism. He even speaks of the state as the "taskmaster of society in its technical and social modernization"—modernization meaning the creation of emancipatory institutions. Such a state would be a "taskmaster" in the form of a truly universal educational system, embracing the material as well as the intellectual culture, and having as its goal the liberation of needs from their class-determined psychic base. The absence of initiative among the masses and the absorption of the working class into the prevailing system of compensatory needs rob the idea of the "withering away of the state" of its empirical historical rationale. Socialism must create its own antistate and its own system of administration. "People and functionaries—this is the unavoidable dichotomy of every protosocialist society." Only the protosocialist? That would be a reversion to the two-stages theory.

Bahro's conception seems to imply that universality will still be institutionalized even in a fully developed socialist society: the antistate as state. The state is antistate insofar as it contributes to the further unfolding of emancipatory needs and gives wider play to spontaneity and individual autonomy; it is state inasmuch as it organizes this process in the interests of society as a whole (in setting priorities, distributing work, education, etc.), and indeed does so with a binding authority legitimated by the people. In the antistate the dialectic of the autonomy and dependency of needs repeats

---

13 Ibid., p. 129.
14 Ibid., p. 241.
Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution

itself: The socialist state "makes note of" the needs of individuals in the form in which they appear within the prevailing system of needs and "transcends" them [hebt sie auf] in new emancipatory forms, which then in turn become the individuals' own needs.

Bahro sees the requisite rational hierarchy still needed even under integral socialism as the counter-image of the established apparatus of domination in actually existing socialism. He envisages a democratically constituted and controlled hierarchy from the base to the top. At the summit, this hierarchy becomes a dual power [Doppelherrschaft]: the communist party and a "league of communists." The latter would be independent of the party, recruited from those members of the intelligentsia in all strata of society whose consciousness is most advanced. This league is the brain of the whole: a democratic elite, with a decisive voice in the discussion of plans, education, the redistribution of work, etc.

The inertia and powerlessness of the masses, their dependency, manifested in the dichotomy "ruling class-people" in the capitalist countries, and the dichotomy "bureaucrat-people" in actually existing socialism, gives rise to an almost inevitable tendency for the top level to become autonomous. Bahro examines this tendency where it has already evolved into full-fledged domination: in protosocialist society. He believes that this tendency may be counteracted by the gradual building up of a kind of council organization (self-management, cooperatives) whose rudimentary forms already exist within the existing system. He shows convincingly that the traditional concept of social democracy is too exclusively oriented to the sphere of material production and hence remains the representative of particular interests. The situation under protosocialism (and under late capitalism—H.M.) with its expanded working class in which the intelligentsia is a decisive factor in the production process should make it possible to broaden council democracy. A relatively small number of scientists, technicians, engineers, and indeed even media agents could, if organized, disrupt the reproduction process of the system and perhaps even bring it to a standstill. But "that's not the way things are." It is precisely their integration [Einordnung] into the production process, to say nothing of their privileged income, that works against the radicalization of this group. Nevertheless, the social position of these groups gives them a leading role in the revolution.

During its preparatory and transitional periods, the revolution requires a leadership that can stand up against the compensatory interests of the masses as well. It too must face up to the necessity of repression, repression of "subaltern consciousness," unreflected spontaneity, and bourgeois and petit bourgeois egoism.

Obviously, at this central point, Bahro's analysis falls back on a position that has been tabooed by both Marxism and liberalism: Plato's position (an educational dictatorship of the most intelligent) and Rousseau's (people must be forced to be free). In fact, the educational function of the socialist state is inconceivable without a recognized authority; for Bahro that authority
is grounded in an elite of intelligence. However consistently Bahro may insist that the league as well as the party leadership must come from all social groups and remain accountable to the people at all levels, the scandal remains and must be sustained.

**The Question of the Subject of the Revolution**

It is precisely here—where Bahro’s interpretation of socialism is so vulnerable to defamation and ridicule—that the full radicalism of his approach, and his fidelity to Marxian theory, stand out clearly. The question of the subject of the revolution, which the integration of the working class has put on the agenda, finds its answer here on the level of actual historical development. The fetishism that says that the working class, by virtue of its “ontological position,” is predestined by the iron logic of economic and political development to be the subject of the revolution—this stipulated unity between the logical and the historical (according to which “what appears as finished from the logical point of view must immediately be historically finished too”15)—this fetishism is abolished not by dictum but by the course of history itself. “The fact has since become quite evident enough that the proletariat cannot be a ruling class.”16 In capitalist countries the working class is “too narrow a base for transforming society (do not specifically working class interests often even play a conservative role?).”17 The radical turn toward emancipatory interests lies beyond the reach of subaltern consciousness; it takes place as part of a process of “internal emancipation,” as a condition for external emancipation. Given the social conditions of the class (alienating “full-time” labor, exclusion from educational privilege, unemployment), only a minority can accomplish this rupture.

No particular class can be the subject of the universal emancipation which has become possible at the present historical stage. The identity between the proletariat and the universal interest has been superseded—if indeed it ever existed at all. Universal emancipation is today no longer a question of “securing the material basis of existence,” although this remains the “unalterable presupposition” of emancipation. The problem is rather: what sort of existence? It is a matter of the reconciliation of human being and nature, of nonalienated labor as creative activity, the creation of human relationships freed from the struggle for existence. It is a matter of rending asunder the beguiling coherence of aggression and destruction. It is a matter of

---

15 Ibid., p. 44.
16 Ibid., p. 196.
17 Ibid., p. 258. An alternative rendering of this passage: “do not specific working class interests play, ever more frequently, a basically conservative role?”—E.S.M.
the potentially comprehensive appropriation of the essential human powers objectified in other individuals, in objects, modes of behavior and relationships, their transformation into subjectivity, into a possession ... of the intellectual and ethical individuality, which presses in its turn for more productive transformation.18

This is orthodox Marxism: the "universal individual" as the goal of socialism. Bahro's revolutionary method transposes the ultimate goal to the beginning. Inasmuch as he consistently conceives of the revolution as a "cultural revolution," he invests it from the outset with a meaning totally different from the Maoist sense of this concept with regard to subjectivity and its demands for happiness and the possibilities of happiness. Even the very first measures of socialist construction should free human beings from the "extensive dynamic of the economy." The fundamental measures in this direction are: universal participation in simple work: shortening of psychologically unproductive labor time within the necessary labor time; definition of needs, differentiating only with regard to age, sex, and talent.19 Once again the libertarian idealism which announces the telos of historical materialism, finds expression:

The problem is to drive forward the "overproduction" of consciousness, so as to put the whole historical past "on its head," and make the idea into the decisive material force, to guide things to a radical transformation that goes still deeper than the customary transition from one formation to another within one and the same civilization. What we are now facing, and what has in fact already begun, is a cultural revolution in the truest sense of the term: a transformation of the entire subjective form of life of the masses, ... 20

Bahro repudiates unequivocally the simplistic argument that a country having to engage in more or less hostile competition with the economically and militarily stronger capitalist countries cannot afford the construction of an integral socialism. This is said to be the situation of actually existing socialism with regard to Western capitalism. Bahro answers with a generally repressed yet nonetheless illuminating hypothesis: The situation could be just the reverse, namely, the construction of a free socialist society could exert a "transforming pressure" on Western countries.21

18 Ibid., p. 272.
19 Ibid., p. 415.
20 Ibid., p. 257. An alternative rendering of the first part of this passage: "It is a matter of forcing the 'overproduction' of consciousness so as to stand the historical process 'on its head,' and making the idea into the decisive material force. Things are tending toward a radical transformation from one system to another within one and the same civilization."—E.S.M.
21 Ibid., p. 431.
Bahro’s analysis implies the provocative thesis that socialist strategy is essentially the same before and after the revolution. The cultural revolution is a total transformation, but even before the revolution, its collective subject is oriented in its consciousness and its behavior toward the final goal. This is what occurs in the praxis of catalyst groups in all strata of the population, albeit in forms that are more or less isolated from the society as a whole and hence are precarious and often unauthentic. The work of these groups is essentially to demystify and enlighten—in theory and practice. Here again the focus of revolution is on subjectivity. The goal of giving “priority to the all-round development of human beings” and “to the increase in their positive capacities for happiness” already determines the elementary stages of subjective emancipation. Rather than serving as a means of escape and privatization of the political, of pottering about with and mollycoddling the ego, the “journey inwards” serves to politicize surplus consciousness and imagination:

For much as the “journey inwards,” the internalization of individual existence, involves a component of emotional abstraction from everything objective, its fundamental content naturally is and remains the same overcoming of alienation, the same metamorphosis of the civilization created by our species, that Hegel saw as the major work of the subjective spirit.

Political education requires a radical “mental upswing,” an “emotional uplift,” which “particularly inspires the majority of young people directly at the level of the political and philosophical ideal.”

The revolution of subjectivity is the revolution of needs which Bahro sees as the precondition of universal emancipation. The main tendency of such a revolution of needs is clearly indicated: “away from the appropriation of the material means of subsistence and enjoyment that is characterized principally by consumption” and “towards the appropriation of culture”; in other words, the “far-reaching elimination of material incentives.” The domination of compensatory interests, which reproduce material incentive over and over again, must be broken: not through a policy of reducing consumption but through a “genuine equalization in the distribution of those consumer goods which determine the standard of living.” In all the talk about the insatiability of human needs, Bahro see only a “reaction to existing conditions.”

23 Ibid., p. 267.
24 Ibid., p. 375. An alternative rendering of this passage: “Political education requires a radical ‘psychic impetus [Aufschwung], an ‘emotional uplifting’ [Erbreung], which raises the majority of the youth in particular directly onto the plane of the politico-philosophical ideal.”—F.S.M.
25 Ibid., pp. 402ff.
The reconciliation of material and intellectual culture within material culture requires the abolition of the performance principle with regard to income distribution, and its realization with respect to the development of nonalienated creative work and nonalienated enjoyment. The reduction of necessary labor time and the burden of alienated labor makes possible this reversal; it also heals the rift between subjectivity and objectivity by the “opening up of a general space for freedom for self-realization and growth in personality in the realm of necessity itself,” and through the incorporation of nature into this free space.

Bahro ridicules the anxiety among the New (and Old) Left over reintroducing bourgeois, or even petit bourgeois concepts such as personality, mind, and inwardness into Marxism; indeed, it is within Marxism that these concepts can be authentically transcended. He wastes no words on the reproach of idealistic deviations, etc. He uses these terms, not in order to rescue once again the humanistic young Marx, but in order to develop the transcending content of the categories of political economy. Exploitation, surplus value, profit, abstract labor, are not only categories of inhumanity that have acquired objective form under capitalism; they are also the negation of that inhumanity by that socialism which has now become an objective possibility. The realization of this socialism, which is blocked under capitalism, is the object of the cultural revolution.

The cultural revolution encompasses the ethical and aesthetic dimensions as well. Bahro makes only a suggestive allusion to the ethics of personal relations: Eros, education and marriage are, as far as possible, to be brought “into harmony with one another.” Aesthetic motivation becomes operative in

... a shift of priorities away from the exploitation of nature by material production towards the adaptation of production to the natural cycle, from expanded reproduction to simple reproduction, from the raising of labor productivity to care for the conditions and culture of labor,...

Production also “according to the laws of beauty” (Marx). The precondition for this is a science and technology suited to human beings and nature.

It is time to pose the key question: Assuming that Bahro’s theory of the foundation of socialism has been conceptually and empirically demonstrated, how can the transition from the existing order be conceived? Revolution

---

26 Ibid., p. 406. An alternative rendering of this passage: by “opening up a general free space for the self-realization and growth of personality in the realm of necessity as well.”—E.S.M.

27 Ibid., p. 291.

28 Ibid., p. 407.
remains the precondition: now more than ever before, it is true that a revolution is necessary to obtain reforms. For the countries of actually existing socialism, where private ownership of the means of production has been abolished, the fall of the dictatorship of the political bureaucracy would already be the first revolution. Bahro believes that the opposition within the bureaucracy is widespread enough for such an overthrow to be a real possibility. But what is the situation in the capitalist countries, whose objective “ripeness” for revolution has long since been recognized? Both question and answer lie beyond the bounds of Bahro’s analysis, but it provides some important indications.

A Summing Up of the Critique of the Marxist-Leninist Model of Revolution

Today it is evident to what degree the Marxist-Leninist model for revolution has become historically obsolete. There are two major reasons for this:

(1) In countries where the ruling class has at its disposal strong military and paramilitary organizations equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and on whose loyalty it can count, armed rebellions and seizure of power by the revolutionary masses are beyond the realm of real possibility. This is the case in the most highly developed countries.

(2) With its tremendous productivity, late capitalism has created a broad material basis for the integration of diverse interests within the dependent population. The very concept of revolutionary masses has become questionable for these countries. This does not mean that the (expanded) working class has “made its peace” with the system. The policy of economic cooperation and confrontation may very well become political and yet not transcend the system itself in the direction of socialism. The tendency is rather toward a new populism; a popular rather than class opposition, for which armed uprising is not on the horizon, to say nothing of the seizure of power.

Toward an Analysis of Late Capitalism and a New Concept of Revolution

Working Class, Intelligentsia, the Collective Worker, and the People

Is it possible to develop another model of revolution on the basis of the current tendencies in class relations?

The construction of such a model requires that we revise the traditional Marxian concept of class, and proceeding from there, that we develop a concept appropriate to late capitalism. This is especially necessary for the concept of the working class. It is sufficient to briefly mention the well known facts:
The nonidentity of the working class and the proletariat. Into the twentieth century, "proletariat" remained the orthodox and official Marxian term for the working class. But integral to the Marxian concept is the misery, the deprivation of rights, the negation of bourgeois society, by virtue of which the proletariat is not a class of this society. For today's working class this is no longer true.

According to Marx, the proletariat constitutes the majority of the population in developed capitalism. The category of workers which today most closely corresponds to the proletariat, that is, those directly engaged in the process of material production, no longer comprises the majority.29

The restriction of the concept of "working class" to "productive" workers, i.e., to those who create surplus value, is untenable. The creation and realization of surplus value are not two separate processes, but rather two phases and stages of the same overall process: the accumulation of capital.

In late capitalism the separation between manual and intellectual labor has been diminished by the "intellectualization" of the labor process itself, and by the growing number of intellectuals employed in that process. While-collar workers, salaried employees, even those who are "unproductive," whose incomes are often lower than those of blue-collar workers, belong to the working class insofar as they do not share decision-making power over the means of production. But even the more highly paid white-collar workers in the distribution and administrative processes belong to the working class: they are divorced from the means of production and sell their labor power to capital or its institutions. This expanded working class comprises the great majority of the population.

Class consciousness? The (expanded) working class is itself split into manifold layers, with very different, and in some cases opposing, interests. The trend is toward a dominance of compensatory interests, which seek satisfaction through active or passive participation in the system. Petit bourgeois rather than radical consciousness prevails.

In fact, late capitalism has expanded the labor necessary for its reproduction through the growth of the sector comprising the middle layers between the small class that actually rules and the industrial workers. The society reproduces itself by generating more and more unproductive work and spreading it throughout the population. The fundamental contradiction

29 In 1972, 60% of the gainfully employed in the USA were in the services sector. The Congressional Joint Economic Committee estimates a figure of 80% for 1980 (cited in Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, and Al Goodman, in In These Times, October 18–24, 1978).
between capital and labor continues to exist in all its sharpness, but in this period it has become totalized: almost the entirety of the dependent population is "labor" in opposition to capital. This would also redeem the Marxian concept of a socialist revolution as a transformation carried through by the majority of the population.

This dichotomy characterizes late capitalist society, which is reproduced by the "collective worker" and controlled by a small clique. The collective worker becomes the people, constituted by the dependent layers of the population. Within this unity contradictions are rise. There is no people's consciousness [Volksbewusstsein] which would correspond to a class consciousness. The various compensatory interests extend over the full range of material and intellectual culture, from radicalism to conservatism and fascism, from the will to achieve to the desire to abolish work. Democratic integration allows for such a differentiation within the unity of dependency. Can the interest in a universal emancipation [burst forth within it].

In all likelihood, social reproduction at the customary level of consumption will become ever more difficult: late capitalism itself gives rise to oversaturation of the market and the increasing difficulty of accumulation. The system will become more repressive and will bring the contradiction between the capitalist mode of production and the real possibilities of liberation ever more explosively into consciousness.

Class Consciousness and Rebellious Subjectivity

Whose consciousness? Not the consciousness of a particular class (the industrial proletariat in late capitalism is a particular class within the all-embracing totality of "the people"), but the consciousness of individuals from all strata. Just as universal emancipation, in accordance with its telos, aims at the emancipation-in-solidarity [solidarische Befreiung] of the individual as individual, so the preparation for that emancipation is also grounded in individuals: individuals from all strata, who, despite all differences, constitute a potential unity by virtue of their common interest. They are the potential subject of an oppositional praxis, which is often still concentrated in and limited to unorganized groups and movements. Here, in these groups and movements, exists the "collective intellectual."

Bahro defines the collective intellectual primarily in terms of the otherness of a consciousness and an instinctual structure, which rebel against subjugation and press toward a renunciatory praxis. A quite unacademic definition but one devoid of that ever popular and cheap ridicule of "eggheads," armchair socialists, etc., which has always served to defame the concrete utopia and to sacrifice the idea of revolution to the existing order.

The diffuse, almost organizationless opposition of the collective intellectual has no mass base, and the charge of elitism and voluntarism is all too easy. This is the expression of a fetishism of the masses and stands in direct
contradiction to the history of revolutionary movements under capitalism, which have acquired their mass base only in the process of revolution itself. The basis on which the initiative of the masses can become a determining force for socialist emancipation emerges out of an antistate politics which from the very outset implements measures that deprive the traditional mentality and its affirmation of their social foundation, in the first place (as already mentioned) through a radical reorganization of labor (abolition of its hierarchical organization) and a new "economy of time." But, if the principle of self-determination is otherwise to remain a leading principle, this means that centralization must be abolished: to be reconstituted, however, as the institution of the plan, which represents and serves the general interest. This centralization is the nucleus of socialist dictatorship: in it, necessary and surplus repression are forced together.

The intelligentsia can fulfill its preparatory function only if it preserves its own surplus consciousness, in which the existing order is concretely transcended. Its prerevolutionary potential and its ambivalent, often contradictory relationship to the masses is rooted in the structure of society. The privilege of education, the result of the separation between intellectual and manual labor, isolates the intelligentsia from the masses. However, this has also given it the opportunity to think freely, to learn, to understand the facts in their social context, and—to transmit this knowledge. This opportunity must be won in struggle against the institutionalized education system (and on its terrain!). Participation in the privilege of education is today a question not only of income but also of time, which the masses, exploited full time, do not have at their disposal. Democratization of the educational system must therefore go hand in hand with a reduction in labor time. Democratization does not require the popularization of learning and knowledge. This has always led to a leveling of the transcendent content of thought, the enervation of surplus consciousness and emancipatory interests, and has served to reproduce the existing order. Rather, the human beings who are imprisoned in their societies, must be brought to the point where they can make unmutilated knowledge and imagination their own—which in turn already presupposes the revolution.

Knowledge and the communication of knowledge have evolved within a horizon of social relations which codetermine the course of research and inquiry. Theoretical and applied science are two phases in the same process: in late capitalism the difference between the two is reduced by the growing role of intellectual labor, the process of material production. Accordingly, it has become necessary to broaden the privilege of education through "general education." Hand in hand with the democratization, however, goes a decline in the emancipatory power of knowledge. A large number of the achievements of science and technology have benefited aggression and destruction, or have served as gadgets, as toys, and sports for the compensatory interests of the dependent population and their gratification, and have reinforced subaltern consciousness.
The unity of progress and repression facilitates the management of the politico-economic contradictions within the global structure of late capitalism. The question "For how much longer?" cannot be answered rationally: theory is not prophecy. Nonetheless, it remains true (and the facts point in the general direction) that capitalism produces its own gravediggers. However, these are no longer the proletariat, but the collective worker, and the consciousness damned up within it—rebellious subjectivity. Just as capitalist progress itself creates the objective conditions for its own abolition (structural unemployment, saturation of the market, inflation, intracapitalist conflicts, competition with communism...), so it creates the subjective conditions as well. "Surplus consciousness" is only one component of subjectivity: its emancipatory interest extends to the knowledge of what is happening now and what must happen, but the domination of compensatory interests prevents the translation of consciousness into practice. The subjective side of the revolution is not only a matter of consciousness, and of action guided by knowledge; it is also a question of the emotions, of instinctual structure, at each of the two levels of change: (a) the radical critique of things as they are; (b) the positive and concrete anticipation of freedom, i.e., the presence of the goal in the here and now of life.

The sociohistorical "ripeness" of subjective conditions includes not only political consciousness, but also the vital, existential need for a revolution, anchored in the instinctual structure of individuals; it includes (at least in the twentieth century) not only the will to survive and prosper, but also the cessation of the struggle for existence, of enslaving production, and the endless process of exchange; in short, the desire for a joyous freedom, for self-determination.

"To say that something is anchored in the instinctual structure (assuming the truth of Freudian theory) is to say that in class society the revolution is "invested" with Eros' drive for emancipation from socially determined surplus repression, for gratification and intensification of the life instincts. (Primary civilizing repression, such as the incest taboo, toilet training, and certain forms of social intercourse, are no longer obstacles to emancipation.) The essential demands of the revolution—abolition of alienated labor, equal opportunities for self-determination, pacification of nature, solidarity—thus have an erotic basis in subjectivity (just as fascism has its roots in the destructive character structure). Society, and emancipation as a sociohistorical process, act through Eros itself—in sharp distinction to sexuality and sexual liberation, which can take place just as well within class society. The unfolding of the life instincts, Eros, requires social change, revolution; the revolution requires the instinctual foundation.

Social change is not merely a change in human nature; it is also a change in external nature. The kind of nature that is suitable to capitalism may very well turn out to be an insurmountable limit of the system. To be sure, it is
very efficiently subordinated to the interests of capital, but there remains an unmastered residue that could become decisive for further development.

The natural limits of capitalism become visible in those protest movements in which nature becomes a potential force for the transformation of society. Nature becomes such a force as the concrete counter-image of its incorporation into the capitalist production process, and not only in the sense that the organized defense of nature threatens the profits of big industry and the interests of the military. In the rebellion against nuclear energy and the general poisoning of the environment, the struggle for nature is at the same time a struggle against the existing society, while the protection of nature is at the same time a challenge to capital.

But even apart from this, the ecology movement has psychological roots as well. Nature, experienced as the domain of happiness, fulfillment, and gratification, is the environment of Eros—the antithesis of the performance principle applied to nature. This antithesis (for the most part unarticulated, and even repressed) is also alive in the women's movement. The performance principle is the historically developed form of patriarchal domination. To be sure, socialist society will also have its performance principle—the negation of the present one. It would determine precisely that dimension of social life which is devalued or blocked under capitalism: competition in the unfolding and enjoyment of the creative faculties of individuals and the creation of preconditions for using the scientific-technical achievements of capitalism in the service of the common interest, instead of in the service of the private interests of capital. Under capitalism, the overcoming of the performance principle appears only in false garb, embodied in the contrasts and fantasies that have become stylized as "woman's nature" (receptivity, sensitivity, emotional capacity, closeness to nature, etc.). These images reveal the biopsychological dimension of the women's movement. Latent in women's struggle for true equality and equal rights, for universal emancipation in all domains of culture, is the rebellion of nature which has been made into an object.

The anti-authoritarian movement, the ecology movement, and the women's movement have intrinsic links with one another: they are the manifestation (still very unorganized and diffuse) of an instinctual structure, the ground of a transformed consciousness which is shaking the domination of the performance principle and of alienated productivity. This opposition thus mobilizes the forces of revolution in a dimension which has been neglected by Marxism (and not only by Marxism), a dimension that could halt capitalist progress in the late stage of its development: rebellious human and external nature.

In reestablishing nature as a factor in political praxis these movements distinguish themselves fundamentally from the escapist movements in the New Left, where nature, elevated to absolute status, becomes the criterion of a nonalienated, authentic existence. The escapist movements invoke nature (both inner and external) against intellect, immediacy against reflection. They cultivate the very dichotomy that is supposed to be abolished in the process of emancipation. The cult of immediacy is reactionary: it is a retreat from nature as a force in the social dynamic (as subject-object), and a reversion to nature as pure subjectivity, which as such already represents the true and the good against the false and the evil in society. But in pure immediacy the false and the evil are not overcome, they are only repressed or shifted onto others.

The "theses on the alternative and escapist movements" criticize this ambivalence, which prevails throughout the movement:

The criterion of political action has long since ceased to be correct theoretical analysis, in particular, a critical analysis of the economy; it has been replaced by the subjective experiences of the respective individuals. Thus one wants to experience, preferably in one's own person, that for which one is supposed to act. However, what at one stage had represented an extremely important politicizing and critical factor with regard to orthodoxy and dogmatism, has today been transformed into a problematic cult of needs in many areas. No longer accessible to theoretical analysis and rejecting every irritating element of reflection, experience has been reduced to the average quantum of emotional stimuli. It has thus lost its refractory quality and to a large extent it has become amenable to integration. Thus absolutized, experience has been transformed from a medium of autonomy into a medium of integration and adaptation.31

The proposition that capitalist domination and exploitation of nature is *eo ipso* domination and exploitation of human beings as well, can now be put more concretely. Capitalist progress is the transformation of nature under the principle of increased productivity and profitability. Nature becomes mere objectivity: a universe of things and relations among things, whose *telos* is service in the process of production and reproduction (nature as organized re-creation). This requires the suppression of nature as resistance to the performance principle. Since inner and external nature constitute a (historical) totality, the performance principle operates *against* Eros' striving to develop itself in the life-world, against emancipation from the omnipotence of alienated labor. Hence the increasingly internalized repression imposed by society on human beings. Nature must be destroyed,

Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution

it must be assimilated to the destructive society. That nature which is still whole (although not immune to the possibility of its own destruction), must not be allowed to become a countercultural life-world in which individuals find happiness and fulfillment in opposition to the well-being provided by society. But the more obvious the possibilities created by capitalism for emancipation from the performance principle become, and the more the expanded reproduction of capitalism propels the destruction of nature, the more pressing becomes the overactivation of destructive energies. The “blend” of the two primary drives becomes denser: Eros itself seems to be charged with an aggressivity that individuals often direct against their own bodies (rock and punk music, brutality in sports, drugs ... ).

The anchoring of the opposition in an emancipatory instinctual structure should make possible qualitative change, the totality of the revolution. But the development of an emancipatory instinctual structure is only conceivable as a social process, and it is precisely this process which produces and reproduces the repressive instinctual structure that internalizes capitalism. Again, the vicious circle: how can an emancipatory instinctual structure emerge in and against a repressive society whose rulers (unlike the opposition) have long since learned to mobilize the psyche?

Only personal experience [Erlebnis] the experience of individuals that breaks through subaltern consciousness, leads or forces the individual to see and feel things and people in a different way, to think other thoughts. Bahro quotes Gorky:

Everything unusual prevents people from living the way they would wish. Their aspirations, when they have such, are never for fundamental change in their social habits, but always simply for more of the same. The basic theme of all their moans and complaints is: “Don’t stop us from living the way we’re accustomed!” Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was a man who knew like no one before him how to stop people living their accustomed life.32

The development of the instinctual structure is linked throughout to that of consciousness: erotic and destructive energies are realized within already existing social frameworks. The instinctual structure becomes emancipatory only in union with an emancipatory consciousness which defines the possibilities and limits of this realization and absorbs that which is merely instinctual into itself.

The social process of revolution begins in those individuals for whom emancipation has become a vital need. However, it is just these individuals who have advanced beyond the Ego. The emancipatory instinctual structure makes solidarity the force of the life instincts. Although they are “value

32 Bahro, p. 100.
free,” the primary drives themselves already imply other human beings. This holds true for Eros and for destructive energy alike. They contain the universal: they are drives of the individual, but of the individual as “species being.”

The foundational experience \([\text{Erfahrung}]\) which roots the need to refuse in the psyche of individuals, thus never remains at the level of personal subjective experience \([\text{Erlebnis}]\), the level of an immediate relation to the self. In the Ego the “journey inwards” encounters others and the Other (society and nature) not as mere limits to the Ego but as powers constitutive of it. The foundational immediate experience, in which relevance for the concrete individual could serve as the verifying criterion, is such only as \(\text{mediated} \) immediacy, and the behavior that motivates this experience is that of a comprehending subjectivity that goes beyond the Ego. “Politics in the first person” is a contradiction \(\text{in adjecto}\). The journey inwards is necessary, because the dynamic of Ego and Id is obscured by efficient social control and because individuality itself becomes a commodity under late capitalism.\(^33\) If, however, the journey stops at the unmediated Ego, and the manifestations of that Ego are proclaimed as authentic, the journey falls short of its goal: it succumbs to the fetishism of the commodity world and the counterculture built up on that basis becomes part and parcel of the established culture.

In conclusion, I have emphasized the ambivalence in the turn toward subjectivity. Here too there is the danger of making a virtue of necessity. The necessity resides in the isolation of the radical emancipation movements (especially the socialist ones) from the masses and in the structural weakness of these movements in the face of the material and ideological might of the established apparatus of domination. In the light of this constellation, protest and rebellion beyond (or this side of) the political and economic class struggle appear as \(\text{retreat}\). This holds even for the militant opposition within the industrial working class (local self-management, factory takeovers, wildcat strikes). Compared with the great mass actions in the history of the labor movement, these seem to be feeble trailings of a revolutionary tradition.

But the appearance is not the whole. Movements such as the worker opposition, citizens’ initiatives, communes, student protests, are authentic forms of rebellion determined by the particular social situation, counterblows against the centralization and totalization of the apparatus of domination. Not being strong enough to oppose this apparatus with an effective centralized force of its own, the rebellion concentrates itself in local and regional bases, where there is still a certain latitude and freedom of movement and room to act. And precisely this retrogression \(\text{anticipates}\) the objective tendencies toward disintegration in the existing society.

\(^33\) Kraushaar, pp. 37ff.
namely the crumbling away of the formation of economic and social units of autonomous control. Such a development would mean that the concept of "the masses" had indeed been transcended, and hence that one aspect of liberation had already been achieved: a mode of life in which individuals feel and act in solidarity with one another.

**Summary**

Bahro's analysis breaks through the fetishism of Marxist pseudo-orthodoxy and the counterculture of immediacy. His dialectical analysis leads to an authentic "internal" advance of Marxist theory, informed by the comprehended reality. The radicalism of its perceptions is primarily revealed in the following key points of theory and praxis:

(1) The rejection of the Marxist-Leninist model of proletarian revolution, which has long since been surpassed in advanced industrial society (seizure of power by the revolutionary masses, dictatorship of the proletariat). The elaboration of a new model corresponding to real social trends.

(2) A new definition of class relations (both in actually existing socialism and in late capitalism); the expanded working class; the proletariat as a minority in it; the integration and extension of dependency; the transformation of the working class into the "people": its conservatism.

(3) The key role of intelligentsia in the transitional period, corresponding to its position in the process of production. The fetishism of the masses.

(4) The shift of the focal point of the social dynamic onto subjectivity: the "journey inwards" and its ambivalence; consciousness as a revolutionary force.

(5) The new formulation (and answer?) of the question of the subject of the revolution—the consequence of point 2.

(6) The demonstration that integral socialism is a real possibility if decisive measures are implemented (redistribution of work and income, gradual abolition of the performance principle, a democratic educational system, a council system expanded the factory ... ). The new economy as an economy of time: progressive reduction of socially necessary labor time. The realm of freedom within the realm of necessity.

* * *
A CONVERSATION WITH HERBERT MARCUSE:
ON PLURALISM, FUTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY

In March, 1979 I travelled to San Diego by the invitation of the Political Science Department of the University of California, San Diego. After a previous consultation with the Department of Philosophy I was received by Professor Herbert Marcuse. We had an hour long talk in his office in the so-called Library-Building on the campus. I publish here the translation (= Hungarian translation) of my notes of the talk.

H.: First of all I'd like to thank you for seeing me and sacrificing from your time ...

M.: What do you want to speak about?

H.: I'd be pleased to hear the opinion of you, who could follow the history of this century, on the contemporary social movements, on the role of philosophy, and on the future.

M.: Go on and ask.

H.: More than a decade passed since the student revolts in 1968. At that time the slogans of the students were inspired by the ideas of Marx and Mao as well as yours. Do these ideas inspire also today?

M.: One cannot speak about any kind of one joint effect.

H.: But the three letters "M" were together ...

M.: You bring up again this old story. Let me show somebody at least one evidence of that! I always acknowledged what is common in my thinking with Marx. I have never denied what kind of influence the Marxian thoughts have borne in the shaping of my views. There is, however, nothing common between Mao and me. First, I hardly know his views, second, what is called today Maoism has been brought about in such a fundamentally different environment and economic setting that there is no possibility to link our views.

H.: It is no such link that both of you tried to deal with the problems of creating a new human being?

M.: I say over again, I do not admit any common link with Mao.

H.: I see. And how do you see that the students are going to be more and more conservative? I have the experience that the contemporary

* Editors' note:
"A conversation with Herbert Marcuse. On pluralism, future, and philosophy." A five-page typewritten manuscript was found in Marcuse's private collection, apparently by a Hungarian scholar who noted that he travelled to San Diego to interview Marcuse in March, 1979. Of Marcuse's late interviews, this is the one most focused on philosophy and he offers his views on many different philosophies and philosophical issues, including Marxist philosophers such as Bloch and Lukács. We have corrected some of the English and spelling of the Hungarian scholar but left some text as it was.
American students are more or less apolitical and their basic aim is adapting themselves to the system.

M.: I do not agree. I see students who are very sensitive and who think the same way as their forerunners did it ten years ago. Perhaps today their protest is not so apparent, but deep inside it is as effective as it was earlier. No, I do not think so that they would be conservative.

H.: You guess the students' movement is still alive?

M.: It is a matter of fact. Students have a more and more significant role all over the world. Perhaps they are not as organized as they were in 1968–69 but there are no unimportant factors both socially and politically in the emancipatory movements.

H.: You consider the feminist movements as very significant, by some people you even overestimate their significance. Could you explain why they are so important?

M.: In the Western industrial societies political emancipation not only covers a system which destroy our natural conditions of life and which makes aggressivity sanctioned but it presents the system as chosen by ourselves that is accepted by us. Feminist movement as well as student movements or as in part the environmentalists call attention to the partial and illusory character of emancipation and they refuse the legitimacy of the established system by the demand of a real emancipation.

H.: The feminists have never questioned the legitimacy of the established political framework. On the contrary, they want to fit it not only through a formal but a real, overall emancipation. They attack the prevailing views just because they suppose they are in contradiction with a value system the legitimate concept of which is just the civil political emancipation.

M.: It can happen to appear like this. But it is a much more fundamental phenomenon the feminists themselves may guess. In a final analysis women are fighting for a free life which can be established only by changing the present value system what presupposes the transformation of drives and needs, an organic development where life principle defeats destruction principle. The change in the relations of sexes has a revolutionary potential which promotes the realization of a new human being. Feminist movement represents the erotic energy which only can transform destructive energies and create happy human relations. That is the real significance of the feminist movement.

H.: Neither the feminists themselves nor the critics of the movements, political scientists have ever applied such allegories to characterize the movement. Why should we interpret it like this?

M.: What kind of allegory do you mean?

H.: Eros, Thanatos, erotic energies, destructive energies, as far as they serve as philosophical explanatory principles.

M.: Could you tell me why are they allegories?

H.: Should I call them facts?
M.: Why, what do you consider as fact? You have to see that we are compelled to reevaluate the facts in the light of the emancipatory efforts, that is we have to learn how to discover facts, how to discover the truth in facts and that means criticism, that means political standpoint. But tell me, what are you dealing with?

H.: With pluralism as a political system and the theories of pluralism.

M.: Hm. And that is why you are here in the U.S.?

H.: They say it is the place where one can see pluralism in function. By the way it is an old problem of mine, how could we generalize any kind of value system in a pluralist society, restricting the meaning of pluralism here to a system where the plurality of value systems is legally accepted and sanctioned?

M.: Every society where you can find a legal system determines general values at least in the form of laws, not to mention other forms.

H.: Yes, but in pluralism, it seems to me, it means a formal contradiction. One of the prerequisites of pluralism is to consider the pluralist political framework as generally accepted. Accepting it, however, means accepting values of compulsory character and this is in contradiction with the free choice of values, with the principles of heterodoxy. Or one should state that the only one generalized value statement in a pluralist society is the tolerance of plurality?

M.: Pluralism exists only on the surface. Tolerance in its essence is also repression. The most pluralist system too turns to be repressive immediately as the dissenters multiply and gain political significance. Dissent is tolerated only when it does not threaten the system itself. Many kinds of groups are tolerated in the U.S., communists too, because they have no practical political impact.

H.: It may well be true but these practical evidences are no theoretical refutation of pluralism. It may also be the case that pluralism permits heterodoxy and a system which does not tolerate it - your cases - is not a pluralist system.

M.: I do not believe in the possibility, in the theoretical possibility of pluralism.

H.: Does it mean that you refuse not only political pluralism but philosophical too?

M.: I do not refuse political pluralism but just say it cannot be realized even in Western societies. And though I do not know what do you mean on philosophical pluralism but probably I do refuse that.

H.: I mean the following: Opposing views can be tolerated because every view is the part of some kind of "total truth", because all views can be integrated into a general value system, or they can be tolerated just because there is no such kind of truth, no universal value system? The latter may fit better the "pluralist universe" but if that is the case we can speak about preferences only in political choices.

M.: What you see is the crisis of a form of civilization when values become empty, when the meaning of reality disappears. This civilization has no
future. That is why I stress the radical change of drives and needs. And that is the function of theory: to make it clear to everybody what are our general interests. The present society represses the efforts to realize these interests, creating the appearance that these societies have no general values.

H.: You mean Western civilization has no future or industrial society in general has no future?

M.: Industrial society is Western society even if eastern or African nations try to establish it. It seems to be desirable only through Western ideology even if traditional value systems would dictate a different pattern. Yes, I say Western civilization, industrial civilization has no future and I judge its possibility rather pessimistic.

H.: Values held by you are not derived from the same civilization the fate of which you judge pessimistic? Or you think these values are inherent values of human existence which are present, overtly or covertly, in every historical situation?

M.: Man is an emerging being. Man creates his values and unfolds his history. Creating his values he creates a unified history and unfolds his potential nature. Historical concreteness may help or may repress this process. Western civilization is the civilization of repression, forcing the natural way of emergence into artificial mutation.

H.: And how can man “emerge” from this situation?

M.: In Western civilization there is no way out, that is why I am pessimistic considering our future.

H.: And transcending this civilization?

M.: We mentioned it already.

H.: Yes, but my question also means: is it possible to let everybody accept the general, hypothetical, values of human existence, not depending on social and cultural conditions?

M.: I do not speak about general values, but values emerging in concrete situations, values which have drives and foundations in human existence. Everybody can rationally apprehend them.

H.: Though it is no theoretical objection, sometimes the members of a close cultural community cannot agree [on] their mutual values. But also theoretically one can object that it is not possible to justify with a logical necessity why just those values or interests should be the general values or interest of every human being which you speak about.

M.: Reason, instinctual drives; psychic structure fundamentally are identical in every human, in every age. The forms of their manifestation depends on time and space, but their basic identity creates the possibility of human relations, the possibility of common language and common understanding.

H.: A basic problem of modern epistemology (which is the highest in level, no doubt, in contemporary American philosophical trends) is to understand certainty. Do you think it is possible to avoid the epistemological problem in any philosophy?
M.: What I speak about are no epistemological problems. And as far as I see philosophical problems here they are not the ones which are analyzed by the trend you appreciate so much.

H.: Shall I mean it so that the task of philosophy is the ideation of the possibilities mentioned by you, or even to contribute to the realization of these possibilities by conceptualizing the general interests and values?

M.: It is no task of philosophy to conceptualize them. Men have to realize them themselves.

H.: Then what is the task of philosophy?

M.: To conceptualize theoretically the concrete limitations of the realization of the general interests and the possibilities of liberation from these limitations and repressions.

H.: Have you had this opinion already when you joined the Frankfurt Institute?

M.: I spoke about it on other occasions.

H.: But do not you mind a personal question relating to these topics?

M.: What?

H.: Is there any relation of this critical view with your living here, in California?

M.: I feel fine here, I can work very well.

H.: Does not it mean a kind of exile?

M.: I can work here free. A critical distance is the condition of intellectual fertility.

H.: Would you have no possibility for it in Germany?

M.: I could not live in Germany as a dissident.

H.: Coming back to philosophy, who do you consider as the last significant philosopher?

M.: Sartre.

H.: And who else?

M.: How far going back?

H.: Say in the whole twentieth century.

M.: Heidegger.

H.: Russell?


H.: Wittgenstein?

M.: Wittgenstein was no philosopher.

H.: Not even the late Wittgenstein ...

M.: It could be interesting what he did but he was no philosopher.

H.: Then who else?

M.: Bloch.

H.: What is the link between say Heidegger, Sartre, and Bloch?

M.: All of them tried to find the ontological foundations of human being. Heidegger put the meaning of history, of the historical world and gave a concrete subject in his ontology ...

H.: It was not your opinion that Heidegger's ontology was abstract?

M.: On the contrary. After a long vacuum in philosophy he presented a concrete ontology even if without the immediacy of concreteness what,
in turn, was characteristic to Sartre. Sartre transformed the Heideggerian construct onto everyday situations.

H.: When you mention Sartre as a significant philosopher, you do it because he performed a similar experiment in philosophy to yours?

M.: What have you in mind?

H.: Well, you in your pre-Frankfurt years and Sartre after World War Two tried to fit phenomenology and Marxism.

M.: I do not think you can justify that Sartre wanted to reconcile phenomenology with Marxism. Anyhow, similarity in efforts does not mean too much; it is more important the similarity of solutions. Sartre attracted me because he created an ontology which was not neutral, as Heidegger's was, but there existed a short way from philosophy to politics. Sartre's aggressive pour-soi meant the transformation of social potential, which, as I see, has a concrete importance in freeing human being from repressions, say in reinterpretation of sexuality, say in feminist movement.

H.: If you consider ontologies, especially historical concrete ontologies as important, how do you judge Lukács?

M.: I have not read his ontology. How is he evaluated in Hungary?

H.: He is officially fully accepted, even he became the celebrated Marxist philosopher of the after-World War Two period. Lukács-research is institutionalized; there exists an independent Lukács-archives.

M.: Em. There were no difficulties integrating him into official Marxism?

H.: As far as I see no. The great debates were over still in the sixties, and it was shown just by his ontology, probably in spite of the expectation of some of his pupils that he did not change at all or did not renew traditional Marxism with his late works. Lukács is Marxist also by official appraisal, as he really was since the writing of the *Geschichte*.

M.: Probably. And, tell me, how do they consider me?

H.: Your name is very well-known; you have a good reputation though nothing is translated into Hungarian.

M.: Nothing?

H.: Probably two selections in a reader or textbook, but none of your works are independently published.

M.: Not even the *One-Dimensional Man*? It expressed a rather severe critique of capitalist society.

H.: One can read most of your works in German or English in the libraries. But let me return to Bloch. Why do you consider him so significant?

M.: Well, recently I study Bloch's works. He noticed that mere negation in the present world can lose its critical strength, not to mention that by negation it is impossible to find a real inwardness, the meaning of human being.

H.: As to Habermas, the philosophy of hope of Bloch is founded in the definite negation of the existing.

M.: It is true as far as there are no positive guarantees of a better future; hope is expressed only by the negation of the givenness. Hope has only a final
point of relation which contradicts what is realized up to now. One can reach this point only through negation. And even if this aim seems to be irrational you have to try to grasp it rationally.

H.: And what is the role of Marxism in Bloch’s philosophy of hope?

M.: Bloch actually continued what Marx started in the last century. He tried to conceive theoretically the realization of the unity of human being, of the unfolding of human essence in a changed historical setting. He was the real Marxist of the twentieth century. He could see in Marxism more than political orientation.

H.: During our conversation you characterized human being as “emerging”. May I ask you, is this notion the Marcusean counterpart of Bloch’s notion of “sich ausexperimentiert”, of the unfolding world explicated in Experimentum Mundi?

M.: Bloch presented this thought much earlier, not first in Experimentum Mundi. I would even say he made variations on this theme throughout his life. I think the two notions are not identical though there are clear points of link. But, I suppose it is time to finish our conversation.

H.: Thank you for your patience, thank you for the talk.

* * *

HERBERT MARCUSE LEAD BY BILL RITTER

The walls of his office are lined with pictures of hippopotami; hardly what one would expect from one of the world’s foremost and respected Marxist philosophers.

Yet, like nearly everything else in Herbert Marcuse’s life, there is a logical and philosophical explanation.

“They are my favorite animals, in addition to giraffes and elephants,” he says. “They are passive, non-violent creatures, only violently aroused when they are attacked or threatened.”

* Editors’ note:
“Herbert Marcuse Lead by Bill Ritter,” consists of a 17 typewritten page interview, with handwritten edits by Marcuse, that appears to have taken place in 1977, according to references within the interview (see below). In a two-page opening statement, Ritter provides an overview of Marcuse’s thought, and notes that Marcuse conducted two sessions for the interview. Ritter indicates that Marcuse’s wife Erica Sherover and student Carol Becker were present for the last interview, and that teacher and Marcuse student George Katsiaficas helped to prepare interview topics and questions. Emails from Bill Ritter on April 17, 2013, indicate that the interview was intended for publication in San Diego Magazine, but that it was apparently not published, so it appears in print here for the first time. Ritter’s interview is
Author, teacher and mentor for an entire generation of New Leftists, the 79-year-old semi-retired philosophy professor from the University of California at San Diego, has been interviewed rarely in recent years.

His daily schedule isn’t nearly as hectic as it was back when Herbert Marcuse was the philosophy instructor around campus; when students clamored to hear his lectures, to read his books and essays, to understand his analysis of U.S. capitalism and what he calls the only alternative.

His support of the fledgling student movement of the sixties brought him worldwide recognition. He was in Paris and Berlin when students seized their own kind of power in 1967 and 1968. His prize students in the U.S., Angela Davis, made her own headlines when the University of California at Los Angeles fired her for her ties to the Communist Party.

The combination of these events made Herbert Marcuse the leading philosophical proponent of New Left ideology.

Marcuse himself was pinned up against the wall in the late sixties, when conservative San Diegans, eyeing his role in the international and domestic student movements, called for his dismissal. But protest against Marcuse wasn’t limited to mere vocal channels. Right wing organizations mounted their own anti-Marcuse campaign, including an effigy burning, telephone harassment, and even a death threat from the Ku Klux Klan.

Although the FBI was called in on the case (Marcuse says he reluctantly agreed to bring the bureau in, “But they didn’t call them on my phone; I wouldn’t permit that!”), his students began their own protection service for Marcuse.

He was constantly escorted around campus, observed in class, and guarded by day in his office and by night at his home. This elaborate security system included, unknown at the time to Marcuse, armed student guards.

Criticism of Marcuse wasn’t limited to domestic forces, however. Pravda, the Soviet Union’s official newspaper, attacked Marcuse as a “werewolf” and a “phony prophet” of Marxism, and cited his trip to Paris during the student rebellion of 1968 as evidence that Marcuse felt “the working class cannot play a revolutionary part anymore.”

wide-ranging, covering contemporary politics in detail and concretion rarely found in Marcuse’s published interviews. There are also considerable segments devoted to Marcuse’s life and involvement in the German revolution of 1918, and the rise of fascism and the Second World War. The interview finally cuts to discuss Marcuse’s forthcoming book on art and liberation, The Aesthetic Dimension, published in 1979. Concerning the time of the interview, in an email from Hill Ritter on July 2, 2013 he writes: “there’s a reference in one of my questions to his f[i.e. Marcuse’s] endorsement of Tom Hayden in California’s U.S. Senate race in 1976. I said ‘last year’ when I asked him about his endorsement. That means the interview would have been in 1977.” In a succeeding email on July 2, Ritter notes that he was one of Hayden’s press secretaries during the campaign.
Marcuse dismissed the criticism as but another example of rigid Soviet Marxism.

Marcuse conducted two sessions for the following interview; during the second one we were joined by his wife Erica, and I.T.T. staffer Carol Becker. Special thanks to U.C.S.D. teacher and Marcuse student George Katsiaficas for his assistance in helping prepare the interview topics and questions.

Q: Ten years ago, in an in-depth interview, you analyzed how close the United States was to a pre-revolutionary condition. How has that analysis changed in the last decade?

A: As far as I can see, all of the pre-conditions for a revolutionary condition—in Marxist terms—do not prevail in the U.S. The classical conditions are: A ruling class which is no longer capable of assuring the normal reproduction of society; an impoverished working class, making up the majority of the population; and a working class within a highly developed political consciousness.

Normally, for the ruling class to govern means to do so without terror, without unmanageable internal crisis, and without suicidal war. It can still do as, moreover, a counter-revolutionary tendency prevails on a global scale, a preventive counter revolution, with no effective organized opposition.

This does not mean that American capitalism and capitalism at large will not face worsening conditions. But this is, in terms of time, a long process, and I don’t see any indication that the ruling groups would not be capable of handling these danger zones for quite some time.

Q: How does that take into account the shrinking power of the U.S.?

A: Now, wait a minute. Where is the shrinking power?

Q: Certainly, the U.S. doesn’t control like it did ten years ago.

A: No? It seems to me that the U.S., after the Vietnam intervention failure, has helped in setting up a dictatorship in Chile, the entire Latin America continent is open for American management. The Portugal revolution has been liquidated, and replaced by a pro-American bourgeois democracy. So what do you mean shrinking power?

I don’t even think the possibility of landing the Marines is over. Now things may change if, for example, things in Europe change. I think Europe is one of the big differences in the world situation between 1967 and today. Europe plays a much greater role than it did ten years ago, and that is mainly because of the phenomenon of so-called Euro-communism; that is to say the emergence of a communist movement and communist strategy insisting on their own strategy and policies and becoming independent of the Soviet Union’s leadership.

Q: How does that affect U.S. policy and strategy?

A: The relationship between the U.S. and Europe as far as potential conflict is concerned, is primarily economic. It is West Germany on the one side and the U.S. on the other. Politically, I don’t see a considerable
Marxism and Revolution in an Era of Counterrevolution

weakening there either. Things will change if in France and Italy the left would really take over the government.

Q: And what would that mean in terms of balance of power?
A: According to the present communist strategy, it would not, at least for some time, mean a radical change. The communist party in France has endorsed NATO; that is, France will not quit NATO, probably in accord with widespread sentiment of the French population that the destruction of NATO would open western Europe to attack by the Soviet Union.

Q: They view the Soviet Union as that big a threat?
A: Well you see, the left in France does not only comprise the communists. There are other groups. The socialist party is even stronger in the present coalition. In order to win, they must rely on strata outside the populace. And it is their feeling that there is a danger of Soviet attack.

Q: How do you view the relationship of the super powers to each other?
A: We are saying that the Soviet Union is building up a huge overkill military potential and they are saying that we are. So it is a stalemate.

Q: Much like a cold war mentality.
A: It is a return to the cold war, quite right. It is because of the Pentagon's function. It plays an integral role in the economy of this country, not only in terms of goods produced and sold—arms today is one of the largest items—but also in terms of jobs. I think the Pentagon is still the largest single industrial entrepreneur in this country.

Q: China says that this situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will lead to a war between the two.
A: I don't see that at all. I think that the two super powers have too many common interests; the common interest being the suppression of all really radical and revolutionary tendencies. And why should they wage war against each other when they get the necessary armament budget anyway, without war? They know perfectly well that war may well be the end of both of them. Local wars will continue. But nuclear war between the super powers? No.

Q: Briefly, how do you view the recent events inside China?
A: It seems to me, and this is only according to what I read, that it is a discarding of some of the most dated policies of Mao and the return to a policy that gives priority to modernization and industrialization over socialism. That is the basis of the recent purges, but as I say this is only tentative because I get my knowledge from the newspapers.

Q: You mentioned earlier that an impoverished working class was a classical pre-condition for revolution, as was a ruling class which could no longer manage without crisis. Won’t these two trends continue?
A: If you say that the trend is toward the situation in which the ruling class can make fewer concessions, I agree with you. But what you say is a very dangerous assumption. Namely, that the higher degree of impoverishment, the more revolutionary the consciousness of the working class. This is historically incorrect. In fact, as far as I can see, with some
exceptions, revolutions were not made by the most impoverished strata of the population. The seeming exceptions are the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions. There the situation was different because that was in the wake of a lost war and a total disintegration of the entire social structure.

But in Germany in 1918 the Austrian and French revolutions, and the English revolution—these were not made by the most impoverished.

Q: And what does that mean for people organizing in the U.S. today?
A: That you cannot simply wait until the working class gets impoverished. It’s very strange strategy anyway. We have to get used to the idea of greater expectations. The consciousness is radicalized not on the basis of impoverishment, but in awareness of the obvious potentialities of a better life.

Q: But these greater expectations are in a world of increasing limitations. Doesn’t that mean that the ruling class is going to hand out and disperse less?
A: Well, certainly, I agree. The limits of concessions by the ruling class will be narrower than they are now. But this does not mean that you will have a radicalized working class. What it will mean is an intensified reversion.

Q: How do you think the Carter administration will handle this?
A: We cannot say yet, he has not yet delivered the goods. I can tell you right now, I do not see the beginning of a new era. Basically, the foreign policy and the domestic policy will be continued because, as you know, that is not a matter of personality and changes of personality. A huge apparatus operates under its own inertia and it will not permit any radical change.

Q: Many leftists are advancing the theory that the unemployed are an organizable force. Do you think they are?
A: Historically, I would say it is doubtful. We know, for example, that in the last years before Hitler came to power in Germany, the unemployed, probably the majority of them, switched from the communist side to the Nazi side. They became some of the first supporters of the regime, many young people among them. And here, in the U.S., the unemployed are mitigated by unemployment insurance.

Q: Last year you endorsed Tom Hayden in his unsuccessful race against California Senator John Tunney. In your endorsement speech you said that the struggle today is not socialism vs. capitalism, but bourgeois democracy vs. fascism.
A: Today, in this country’s present situation, yes, that is true. There is no revolutionary situation here, in any sense. Nor is there any large stratum of the population that is pro-socialist. And the repression and the power concentrated in the forces of law and order and the government are so tremendous that no such movement at the present can possibly arise.

It has to be prepared, carefully prepared, and for that an alliance with the liberal democratic forces is indispensable. It is one of the situations where the lesser evil’s policy is a sensible policy.
Q: What about the long term implications of a Hayden drive for the senate. Does it mean that radicals should get involved trying to take political office?

A: Only on the local or regional level. The strategy should not be to work within the established Democratic Party nationally. Because in a country where you need millions of dollars to become a relatively serious contender, it is a waste of time and energy.

Q: How do you think the women's movement has impacted society, in terms of family structure and the labor force?

A: It has been a step towards same reorganization of capitalism because, in one way or another, they will have to see to it that after women have achieved equality in employments throughout, that institutions are created to take care of children, to take care even of the most necessary household tasks. And this would mean same change in the structure of society, a step towards collectivization, the weakening of private enterprise as far as the family is part of the whole environment. The family is not being broken down, but it continually is undermined by this. I'm speaking of the time not as it is, but when equal job opportunity has been achieved.

How this is going to work with nine million people out of work, I don't know. Like all things, this works in favor of the establishment, because the women who want employment can exert pressure on the labor force. And this is used as another division among the working class.

Q: You saw students rise up in Paris, you were in Berlin when students were very active there, and you were teaching in the U.S. when the student movement was rising up. Many students saw you as a mentor, advocating a strategy which thrust students into the vanguard. What's happened to the student movement and what is their legacy?

A: Many say that the student movement has completely petered out. I do not share this view. I think the movement is living on in different forms and with a different strategy. Not organized, but showing new attempts at organization. And the reasons for the failure of the sixties and early seventies are quite clear.

In the first place, there was a completely wrong evaluation of the situation. Namely, that there was a revolutionary situation in this country, which there wasn't. They believed that the revolution was just around the corner. They were terribly frustrated when it turned out that this wasn't the case. And they quit, or they engaged in more or less enjoyable escapist attitudes, such as the various forms of guruism, transcendental meditation, pseudo-religions, sensitivity training groups, and so on.

Secondly, they never had a mass base in this country other than themselves. Someone has said that I had, at the time, maintained that the students would be some kind of substitute for the working class in
the revolutionary movement. But that is, of course, nonsense; I have never said anything like it. I said that the students operate as a catalyst. They are indeed, by virtue of their privileged position and advanced consciousness, some sort of avant-garde. Again, it is a fact that today, students are in the forefront of revolutionary movements wherever these movements exist. That was the case in Latin America, it still is to a great extent. That was the case in Africa, in Indonesia, and of course in France and Italy.

Q: Much of the thrust of the student movement then was to challenge what role the university was playing in society. You maintained, while you agreed with their criticisms, that students should realize that the university was the last bastion of freedom.

A: I was speaking of the American universities, and I still think the same. I was critical of students who were directly attacking the university per se. I understood the demonstrations and raising of questions, but at the same time, they are still some of the very, very few institutions where you can say what you think and where you can learn.

Of course, they are coming to be transformed into professional schools, and humanities and social scientists are being reduced as unnecessary and perhaps even dangerous.

Q: What about students' attitudes today? They seem to be a very conservative lot.

A: They are correctly concerned about jobs, because they know if they have anything too radical in their records, they wouldn't get a job. And that operates very well as a repressive mechanism.

The mood of the campus today is subdued. But there are still enough individuals and groups which can be politically effective by themselves and with others.

Q: Are there intellectuals coming out of universities today like the new leftists of a decade ago?

A: I still think so, but they are much less spectacular, much less colorful, far more subdued. But they know what is going on and what you can and should do about it. They just don't have a voice like they did before. And the basic issues aren't there. A decade ago, there was the war and draft, coming right after the civil rights era.

Q: How did you initially get involved with Marxism and philosophy?

A: I left school when I was 17 because I was drafted into the army during the first world war. At the end of the war, when the German revolution broke out, I got elected to a local soldiers council in Berlin. At the time I was quite political. After a short time, however, the council members started to elect all the former officers from the army into the council. At which point I quit.

I remember standing with a rifle in Berlin on the Alexander Platz and during all that time I began to be more and more interested in Marx. When the German revolution was gradually—or not so gradually—
defeated, suppressed, and their leaders assassinated, I withdrew and devoted myself practically entirely to study at the university. That is where I started writing.

Q: What made Marxism first appeal to you?
A: I considered it, as I do today, the only really valuable analysis of capitalist society. And the only real alternative.

Q: How did you relate to the Soviet Union then?
A: Very positively, as long as Lenin was alive. And even beyond that, until Stalin showed himself for what he was: a liquidator.

Q: How did all that lead to writing?
A: Because I thought we had to know why the German revolution had failed. That's why I started a more systematic study of Marxism. My first published work was in 1928.

I wrote and worked at the university until 1932, until it was quite obvious that Hitler would come to power and there wouldn't be a ghost of a chance for me to get a faculty position. Had I stayed, I would have ended up in a concentration camp, no doubt about that. I emigrated from Germany in 1932, and went to Switzerland, and then to the U.S. in 1934.

Q: When the fascists came to power in Germany, what kinds of organized left presence was there?
A: There were two great (progressive) parties at the time: the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. The Spartacist League existed, but was very soon dissolved. There were some splits in the Social Democratic Party, and people founded the Independent Social Democratic Party, which didn't last long either. But the main struggle was between the two big parties.

Rosa Luxemberg was a member of the Social Democratic Party, and then became one of the founders of the Spartacist League. I only attended one of their meetings.

At the time there were student movements, but it wasn't widespread in an organized fashion countrywide.

Q: What did you do when you came to the U.S.?
A: When I got to the U.S., I worked for the Institute of Social Research, an affiliate of Columbia University. That lasted until the outbreak of the war. In 1941, I went to Washington, D.C., first to the Office of War Information, and then to the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S., the predecessor to the C.I.A.).

Q: How did you feel working for the U.S.?
A: I was delighted. Why do so many people ask me that? Because they don't remember that at the time the American government was fighting the Nazis and facism, where today it is doing the opposite.

Q: You were critical of Pres. Roosevelt's sluggishness to save the Jews, correct?
A: Yes, and all that is documented. We protested, but there was nothing to be done.
Q: Was there any kind of organized activity to raise the question, officially?
A: We wrote letters, but that was all we could do.
Q: But people were providing the U.S. with intelligence on the Nazis; and wasn’t there sentiment that the government wasn’t moving fast enough on the information you were supplying?
A: Yes, strong sentiment. We were working on de-Nazification; drawing up lists and information about Nazi and anti-Nazi groups. We drew up lists of Nazi economic and war criminals. And apparently this information disappeared in some government filing cabinet and was never used. And some of the people we considered as primary economic and war criminals, are today in some of the most powerful international positions.

What I’m saying is that at that time the forces had already changed, and the anti-fascist war was no longer on the agenda. It was the beginning of the cold war and anti-Communism.

Q: The OSS had assembled experts on European countries for intelligence gathering and you are saying that these experts were hardly utilized?
A: Yes. What they did was get hold of the most conspicuous Nazi leaders, but didn’t bother about the other, less conspicuous ones.

Q: At the same time you were providing intelligence on the Nazis, weren’t Nazi officials already working with the U.S. government against the communists?
A: Not so much early on; they were lying low. But they came in gradually. There were two trends. One was to disarm and destroy the German war potential completely. Two, there was a fear of the Soviet Union.

That was until 1950. And then, more and more, the OSS worked on communism. We worked on a paper which, at that time in 1948, said that we could not expect any communist takeover in Europe, that the radical potential was declining.

I considered it a very useful job, my contribution to the fight against fascism. And I still don’t regret it. But most of our studies disappeared in the filing cabinets.

Our division in OSS was the best assembling of intellectuals ever gathered under one roof. Every single one of them has become a full professor of reputation, a writer, or whatever.

Q: Was there any work going on in regards to Indochina?
A: Yes, in one of the branches of OSS. There was a strong position to support Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam at the time. The U.S. thought he could unite the country and keep order, and probably keep the Chinese out. They thought he was just a nationalist, much like the Castro experience.

Q: When did you leave the OSS?
A: In 1950, I went to New York and got a job at the Russian Research Institute at Columbia University, where I worked for two years. Then I spent 18 months at Harvard in the Russian Research Center. I was

Q: You just finished work on a new book about aesthetics. way on that subject, after all your Marxist political and philosophical works?

A: The book tries to open up a whole dimension of ideas, of visions, even of truth which I find neither in philosophy, nor in sociology, nor in religion, nor in any other disciplines or fields.

I started with aesthetics and literature in my first published work in 1928. And now I have come full circle. Actually, I find it an absolutely necessary ingredient of any radical or revolutionary movement. Take 1968, when you had exactly that juncture between art and revolution. It was all power to the imagination. It was the piano player at the foot of the barricades. Surrealism. That is in opposition and depth to the existing society, couched in terms which don’t appear to be political or revolutionary.

The thesis of the book is that the social potential of art lies precisely not in the content, but in the aesthetic form, and that art is largely autonomous, vis-à-vis the established social relations. Art can have a strong social and political impact, yet not analyze society in terms of production.

Q: After all your works, your witnessing of some important and historic events, the thousands of students who look at you as their mentor, how would you like to be remembered?

A: Frankly, I never gave that any thought. What happens to me after my death doesn’t interest me at all. I am very proud, however, to produce excellent salads and soups. And chopped chicken liver. Ooohh, now you are talking!

* * *
Afterword

Peter Marcuse

This volume, the last in a set of six, is the end piece of a remarkable achievement—actually, two remarkable achievements. Most immediately, it is Doug Kellner’s achievement in researching, assembling, and organizing an enormous range of pieces, written by a remarkably sophisticated, articulate, and active mind over a period of almost 60 years, in two different languages, ranging from abstruse (to be honest!) professional and academic journal articles, contributions to books, popular OpEd-type pieces, interviews, newspaper articles, participation in debates, lecture notes, letters, and drafts of unpublished as well as published pieces. They have been put together, with the full accompaniment of admirable detailed notes as to the circumstances of their origin and production, in six well-organized volumes. They are not simply publications of archival collections of material chronologically arranged, but organized around themes and introduced by illuminating discussions of their origins, the controversies out of which they arose, the evolution of the thoughts they represent, their reception and role in many still on-going and deeply-felt debates. They range from discussions of questions embedded in complex classic philosophical texts to interventions in quite current debates about strategy and tactics in ongoing political controversies. And they sometimes make available, in abbreviated and more accessible fashion, some of the important themes set forth in more detail in the big books: Reason and Revolution, Eros and Civilization, and One-Dimensional Man.

Few will read these six volumes from beginning to end, although it would be a productive undertaking. But even to skim their tables of contents, and to pick out those with intriguing titles, or to randomly thumb through as particular paragraphs or quotes catch the eye, is a rewarding experience. I
summarize what I think I have learned from these volumes below, but others will find quite different aperçus in them, and be provoked to quite different thoughts – and perhaps even actions. In any event, Doug Kellner’s decades-long work in making these materials available is one that deserves much appreciation. Doug is also to be commended in working with other scholars as participants in the series, with Clayton Pierce working as co-editor in the last two volumes and co-authoring the Introduction and Notes, thus getting younger scholars involved in Marcuse scholarship.

But these volumes also represent another achievement: that of the author whose work they are. I can hardly claim objectivity in evaluating that achievement. But looking at that achievement not as a philosopher, which I am not, but as someone teaching urban planning and urban policy as an activist with the political concerns of the second decade of the twenty-first century, I believe the contributions these volumes make is very substantial and very immediately relevant. They illuminate the key struggles which will determine both what the outcomes of long-term social struggles will be, but also how short-term strategic goals and strategies will relate to them.

The contributions of these six volumes may be summarized under three headings: political conflicts, economic conflicts, and cultural conflicts – and, quite centrally and profoundly, how these conflicts relate to each other. I am tempted to write, as three dimensions of a single historical development, but Marcuse uses “dimension” in quite a different sense, with the other dimension being the alternatives that are possible, so I will leave it as “aspects,” aspects of a single reality. And I would argue that differentiating among these aspects and consciously dealing with each of them can be a major help in formulating a strategy of protest and change.

The three aspects are:

(1) The material: the economic structure of the system, how it produces, what it produces, how it distributes its production, to what extent the material conditions of life are satisfied for society’s members. The means of production and the conditions of consumption. The conflict between people as actual or potential workers/employees against capital/employers, between workers and those profiting from their labor, between, at the top, the one percent and those from whose work they profit (in classic Marxist terminology, the conflict over the acquisition of the surplus created over and above the social costs of the reproduction of labor);

(2) The political: the governmental structure of the system, how decisions are made, who holds the power of the state, what counter forces are potentially or actually present, what strategies are used. The conflict between the political power elite, at the top the one percent, and the actual or potential citizenry, the ninety-nine percent.

(3) The cultural: the social structure, the multiple forces part of and shaping people’s psyches. They include: the individual’s motivations,
the contents of their happiness, their reactions to the conditions of everyday life, the ideological, the work of the media, the universities, the school systems, the advertising industry, artists and the cultural industry conventionally defined, religions, ethnic, racial, gender, age, relationships. Again, the conflict is between the same one percent, those feeling the system fundamentally gives them a satisfying and rich life as against those who are discontent and feel limited, repressed, exploited, fundamentally insecure and unhappy, by the way things are going.

There is rich material in every one of the six volumes that Kellner has assembled here, with rich editorial background provided. They all share a single consistent world view: that capitalism has proven an enormously productive organization of society, opening possibilities for what earlier might have been considered entirely utopian human existence, but that capitalism has exhausted its possibilities in that direction and has rather limited than extended the possibilities of human happiness by its one-dimension fixation on growth and profit as its motor. Much better alternatives are available to humankind today. The questions are how to break through the one-dimensional restrictions on freedom that capitalism has imposed, and who can lead in that breakthrough, who has the will and who has the power to lead the struggle for that alternative. That world-view and those questions are present in everything set forth in these volumes, sometimes explicitly, always implicitly.

This sixth volume is no exception. Look at the range of contributions collected here, in a volume that in a sense expresses the purpose of the entire opus: Marxism, Revolution, Utopia. Marxism as the tool, revolution as the means, utopia as the end. The six volumes are all of one piece, and the strands come together here.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>absolute idea</td>
<td>87, 147, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abstract labor time</td>
<td>73, 237, 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>achievement ideology</td>
<td>69, 235, 287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ACLU Conference Presentation on Civil Liberties” (Marcuse 1969)</td>
<td>289-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adieux au Proletariat (Gorz 1980)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adler, Max</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adorno, Theodor</td>
<td>123, 330, 339, 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advanced industrial countries</td>
<td>170, 185-6, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affluent society</td>
<td>192, 194, 197-8, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans: black movement</td>
<td>267-8, 272, 298; educational system 79; liberation movements of 50; agitation 327-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agents of change</td>
<td>204-6, 279-80, 325-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggressiveness/aggressive movements</td>
<td>109, 197, 246-7, 274, 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agitation</td>
<td>327-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>339, 388-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alienated labor: abolition of</td>
<td>121, 162, 171, 204, 256, 260, 376, 410; in capitalist society 27-8, 31-3, 192; conservation of 173; cost of 388; liberation from 252; needs and values with 247, 251; omnipotence of 412; organization of 249; perpetuation of 393, 405; reduction of 52-3, 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Althusser, Louis</td>
<td>128, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American capitalism</td>
<td>see capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Economic Review</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American New Left see New Left movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anarchy/anarchism: abolition of</td>
<td>373; advocacy of 387, 400; anti-authoritarian character 345; bourgeois choice over 118; fear of 285; Marxist theory 101; negation and 131; organization vs. 335; rehabilitation of 256, 257; societal tendencies toward 254; trend toward 363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antagonistic contradictions (conflicts)</td>
<td>85, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antagonistic society</td>
<td>105, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anthropological revolution</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-authoritarian movement</td>
<td>345, 411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anticolonial movements</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-communism</td>
<td>35-6, 38, 41, 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-Semitism</td>
<td>156, 159, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-Soviet propagandists</td>
<td>38, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-western revolutionary movements</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Israeli wars</td>
<td>353-4, 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Uprisings (2011)</td>
<td>2, 64-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle (Greek philosopher)</td>
<td>108, 134-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnason, Johann</td>
<td>38u96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aron, Raymond</td>
<td>355-8, 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian revolution</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Social Democracy</td>
<td>80, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austro-Marxists</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian state</td>
<td>119, 287, 315-18, 363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
autonomous subjectification 59
awareness: as catalyst 399;
consciousness and 102, 197, 393; of self-efforts 59, 335, 426; as subjective factor 200
Baader-Meinhold group 373, 373n3, 388–9
Bahrain 66
Bahro, Rudolf 8–9, 41, 57, 116, 395–406
Banowsky, William S. 218–21
Baran, Paul 323–4
Banega, Nothingness (Sartre 1943) 166
Being and Time (Heidegger 1927) 18, 24
Belgium 366
Benjamin, Walter 35
biotechnology 5–6, 9, 50, 52
black movement 267–8, 272, 298
Black Panther Party 212, 349
Bloch, Ernst 2, 35, 42, 420, 422
Bolshevik policy (Bolshevism) 75, 77, 80, 82, 84
Bolshevik Revolution 84, 90, 97, 321
Bonaparte, Louis 117, 119, 121
bourgeois society: democracy and 394, 424, 426; development of 129–30, 309; economics of 28, 251; liquidation of 117–21; Marxist theory in 15, 17, 22; negation of 407; petit-bourgeois mortality 71, 257, 401, 405, 407; political economy 27–8, 394; proletariat and 62; socialist democracy and 102; the state and 146; value and exchange value in 72–3; women's movement and 163–4, 166; see also middle class
Brandon, Henry 387
Brecht, Bertolt 35
Brückling, Ulrich 4
Brothers of the Free Spirit 345
Cambodia 335, 350
Camus, Albert 157
capital, defined 86
capitalism: alienation, exploitation and oppression under 32; communism vs. 173, 195; confrontation with 223; in contemporary society 27; continuity with socialism 342–4; crisis of 366; development of 83–4, 114, 190; dialectics of 85; disintegrating tendencies of 191; final stage of 199–200; forms of control 51; internal contradictions of 56, 91, 96, 114, 194, 200, 203, 357, 363; Marx analysis of 149; modifications in 112; monopoly capitalism 175, 215, 352; natural limits of 411; negation of 95, 249; negative forces within 255; neoliberal capitalism 3, 7, 12, 67; neoliberal stage of 56; opposition within 285; partial vs. whole 130–1; safe from crisis 286; shifting of 55; social relationships and 189; structural change in 174, 356–7; theory of 34; see also late capitalism
capitalist industrialization 97, 194, 241, 253, 256
capitalist production: decline of 367–8; human labor and 203; material process of production 252; Nature and 411; negation and 90; new material for growth 4; potential within 53–4; socialist freedom link 95; socialist productivity within 129; unnecessary work in 393
Carr, E. H. 75, 78–80
Castro, Fidel 154, 269
Catholic Church 118
Central European Democracy and Its Background (Schlesinger 2003) 80–1
Central European revolutions 84, 97
Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions 175
Chiang Kai-shek 154
China 113, 206, 366–7, 425
Chinese Revolution 258, 269
Christian Humanism 278
Christianity 108, 138, 281–2, 345
civil disobedience 290, 293, 389
civil liberties 159, 289–97
civil rights movement 55, 272, 388
Civil society 94
Civil War 309–11, 313
class consciousness: changes to 353; defined 407–8; democracy
Index

and 200; function in dialectical process 150–1, 243; Marxist theory and 236; of proletariat 84; rebellious subjectivity and 408–9; of working classes 197; see also bourgeois society; middle class

class struggles: in advanced industrial countries 170; aspirations of class society 198; class-consciousness 151; collapse of capitalism and 191; feudalism and 118; for material things 127; middle class 3; see also working class

Cold War 10, 36, 38, 40, 183

Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse (Marcuse 1998) 10

collective worker concept 406–8

colonialism 113, 175, 224, 328, 389

Comintern policy 80

Committee on Un-American Activities 159

communes 58–9, 390–1

communism: anti-communism 35–6, 38, 41, 430; capitalism vs. 175, 195; development of 77; domination and control in 4; Eurocommunism 394–5; historical development of 98; Marx's reflections on 33; real potentialities of 76; recent literature on 74–82, 355–8; soviet communism 35–6, 35n90; transition to 91, 215–16; US fight against 153

Communist Manifesto (Marx 1848) 70, 303

Communist Party: communist unions and 285; composition of 77; Italian Communist Party 361–8; liberalizing trends 38, 40; role of 88; world outlook of 86

compensatory interests 8, 398–401, 404, 407–10

competitive market society 51, 359

"Conclusions on Science and Society" (Marcuse 1969) 217–18

crude utopia 44, 396, 408

the Congo 328

Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation 331

consciousness: development of 257; identity of 141; liberation of 258; new consciousness 384–5, 389–90; radical political consciousness 198; revolutionary consciousness 94–7, 102, 223; subaltern consciousness 401, 403; surplus consciousness 7–9, 57, 116, 393, 398–400; see also class consciousness

conservatism 218, 220, 293, 408, 415

continuum of progress 249

A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx 1859) 100


Copley Newspaper 346–7

council organization system 401

countereducation practice 50, 59–60, 66–7, 361, 390

counterrevolution 217, 242; see also Marxism, in era of counterrevolution

Counterrevolution and Revolt (Marcuse 1972) 51, 336n38

counter violence 270, 272, 275, 289, 295, 299

critical social theory 1, 9, 12, 347

critical theory of society 2, 11n16, 12, 20

Critique of Violence (Benjamin 1964) 123–7

Cuba 206, 366

Cuban Revolution 258, 297

Cuba protest meeting: defamed minority 158–9; funeral of democracy 157–60; introduction 153–7; McCarthyism and 160; procedural facts 158; weapon of slander 159–60

cultural progress 109
cybernetics and computers 252, 327

Czechoslovakia invasion (1968) 40, 273

d'Ailly, Pierre 118

Davis, Angela 9, 11, 213–17
defamed minority 158–9
definite negation 113, 190, 200, 204, 421
democracy: bourgeois society and 394, 424, 426; class consciousness and 200;
educational system and 409;
funeral of 157-60; liberal democracy 211, 290, 291, 369, 384, 426; mass democracy 46, 98; as preparation for socialism 102; Social Democracy 80, 81, 177; Social Democratic Party 13, 81, 177, 316-17; of utopia 358

democratic pluralism 171-3
de-Stalinization 39, 182
Deutscher, Isaac 39
Dialectical Logic 91
dialectical materialism: fundamental thesis 21-3; material basis in 130; as metaphysical rest 100; as series of general assumptions 86-7
dialectical theory of revolution 6-7
dialectics: of capitalism 85; concept of 130; history of 132-52; logic in Marxism and 82-93; materialistic dialectics 149-51; paradoxical character of 132-3; Plato and Aristotle 134-6; Stoics and Plotinus 136-8; systematic portrayal of 134; Transcendental Dialectic 139-40; of Zeno, Sophists, Socrates 132-4
Dialectics of Liberation conference 53
Dialectics of Nature (Engel 1883) 87
“Discussion Between Herbert Marcuse and Peter Merseburger” (Marcuse 1968) 264-9
domination system 162, 400-2
Dominican Republic 154, 328
dualism 22, 45, 125
Dunayevskaya, Raya 61n 148, 98-103, 301-15
Dutschke, Rudi 58, 281, 298, 334-8
Dyksra, Bram 376-7, 376n4
Dylan, Bob 348

Eastern European Marxists 26n56
ecology concerns 350-1, 375, 411
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (Marx 1844) 23-9, 31-4, 344

Economism 28, 75, 84
Economy of time 399-400

Edomites 345
educational system: of African Americans 79; countereducation practice 50, 59-60, 66-7, 361, 390; democracy and 409; neoliberal educational reform 4; reform 7, 409
Ego and lid 414
Egypt 64-6
emancipated society 2, 5, 33, 264
“The Emancipation of Women in a Repressive Society” (Marcuse 1962) 161-9
emancipatory socialism 44-5, 48
“The End of Utopia” (Marcuse 1967) 249-63
Engels, Friedrich 87, 96, 104, 253
England 311, 331, 366, 377
English pop movement 254
Eunzenberger, Hans Magnus 61, 63
Eros and Civilization (Marcuse 1955) 10, 42, 161, 180, 323, 368
eschatological speculation 105
An Essay on Liberation (Marcuse 1969) 3, 43, 210-11, 384
the Establishment 299, 351-2, 361
ethics of self-care 609, 52n136
Eurocommunism 394-5
European New Left 279-81
exchange value 5, 67, 72-3, 189, 192, 235
Existentialism Is a Humanism (Sartre 1946) 279

Factory Act 54
Farr, Arnold 11

fascism: American style of 50, 361; communism and 79; counterrevolution and 217, 242; defeat of 94; defined 379; destructive character structure and 410; equalization of 289; German fascism 13-14, 316; new form of 362, 363; during Second World War 127; struggle against 345; as stunted 126; triumph of 64
feminist movement 367, 378, 417, 421
fetishism 17, 402, 408, 414-15
Fetscher, Iring 25n54
Feudalism 118, 149
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 138-47
Five Year Plans of Russia 304
food sovereignty movement 58
Ford, Gerald 112, 114
Formal Logic 91-2
Foucault, Michel 52n36
Fourier, Charles 48, 126, 184, 253-4
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research 10, 11n16, 17, 420
freedom: capitalist production link 95; of choice 168; leap into
115; liberal ideas of 341; limits of 219-21; Reason and Freedom
94-5, 98, 232; structure of
89-90; in totalitarianism 46, 94; unfreedom 45, 97, 107,
125, 264, 398; see also human
freedom
French Revolution 232, 268, 302,
426
From Lenin to Malenkov (Seton-
Watson 1953) 79
für sich, defined 197
Furth, Peter 161-9
Garaudy, Roger 282
German communism 81-2
German fascism 13-14, 316
German idealism 34, 137, 141, 232
German Revolution 123, 428-9
German Social Democracy 80, 81
Germany 80, 167, 272-3, 298
Ghana 328
ghetto violence 298
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 110
Goldman, Nachum 354
Goldwin, Richard 371
Gorz, André 46n121, 63
Gramsci, Antonio 116

“great refusal” 5, 12, 50
Greece 58, 214
Grundrisse (Marx 1939) 45, 252
Guatemala 154
Guattari, Félix 66
Habermas, Jürgen 62, 286, 338-9,
421
Haiti 154, 314
Haraway, Donna 4
Hardt, Michael 2, 57, 65-6, 65n156
Hayden, Tom 426-7
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich:
bourgeois society and 130;
dialectics and 138-9, 142-8;
idealism 28; identity between
thought and its object 85-6;
philosophy 1, 10, 26, 129-30,
304; theory of alienation 29-30
Hegelian Marxian distinction 20
Heidegger, Martin 14-15, 19, 322,
420
“Herbert Marcuse: Philosopher of
the New Left” (Marcuse 1968)
270-7
“Herbert Marcuse in 1978: An
Interview” (Malinovich
1981) 368-91; communes
390-1; eros and civilization
371-6; introduction 368-71;
miscellaneous topics 389-90;
One-Dimensional Man criticism
376-8; “Repressive Tolerance”
criticism 379-85; student
revolution/movement 385-7; on
terrorism 387-9
“Herbert Marcuse Lead by Bill Ritter”
(Ritter 1977) 422-31
Hilferding, Rudolf 188, 237
historical materialism: application
of 55; dialectic of 243;
discussion over meaning of
24; force of personality 70;
messianic immobilization 126;
representative articles on 83; as
sociology 71; in Soviet Marxism
87
History and Class Consciousness
(Lukács 1971) 13, 17
History of Soviet Russia (Carr 1950)
75, 78-80
Ho Chi Minh 430
holism 146
Holland 366, 389
Holloway, Antonio 2
Homo economicus 7
Horkheimer, Max 35, 300-1, 330,
339
Hughes, Stuart 156
human freedom: background of 320;
consciousness of 180; decline of
317; defined 279; early notions
of 184; historical potentialities
of 316; increase in 46-7, 150;
materialistic dialectic 152;
practical power of 140
humanism: as concrete social force
131; as historical fact 100-1;
libertarian humanism 345;
of Marxism 307; Marxist
of 97; saving of labor time
101–2; wage labor 61–2, 125, 309; see also alienated labor;
non-alienated labor; proletariat; working class
labour aristocracy 81, 174–5
Lamas, Andrew 11
Laos 155, 335, 350
late capitalism: achievement of 342; developments of 128, 130–1; introduction 5–8; possible freedom of 162; problems with 55; production of 393–4; proletariat and 62; working class and 392; see also "Protosocialism and Late Capitalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis Based on Bahro's Analysis"
Latin America 58, 154, 288, 345
Lazzarato, Maurizio 57
leap into freedom 115
left-wing intelligentsia 253
left-wing political movements 19, 216
Leiss, William 370
"Le Monde Diplomatique" (Marcuse 1976) 358–61
Lenin, Vladimir: death of 312; economism 75, 84; instinctual structure and 413; labor aristocracy 81; theory of imperialism 188; Vanguard Theory 304
Leninism: beginnings of 79; capitalism and 84; Communist Party and 17; interplay between theory and reality 102; Marxist theory and 96, 303, 321; Marxism-Leninism 37, 40, 366, 406; Stalinism and 84, 102–3
“Letter to Max Horkheimer” (Marcuse 1942) 300–1
liberal democracy 211, 290, 291, 369, 384, 426
liberation: African American movements of 50; from alienated labor 252; Communist Party trends 38, 40; of consciousness 238; human liberation 19, 27–8, 46–7, 99, 111; oppression vs. 371; personal and social liberation 351–2; self-liberation 146; women’s liberation movement 163, 378, 417
Libya 64, 66
Lichttheim, George 104–5
limits of freedom 219–21
limits of growth 113
living standards and war 109
London Central Committee 120
Löwenthal, Leo 36, 330–2
Lubasz, Heinz 63n152
Lukács, Georg 13, 15, 22, 55
Luxemburg, Rosa 32, 32n83, 188, 307n13, 429
McCarthy, Joseph 271–2
McCarthy, Timothy 63
McCarthyism 10, 36, 160, 314, 330
Malinovich, Myriam Miedzian 368–91
Mallet, Serge 177, 262
Man and Nature 85
Mannheim, Karl 20, 43
Maoists/Maoism 297, 416
Marcuse, Herbert: Brandeis Farewell Lecture 235–48; critical theory of society 2, 11n16, 12; Dunayevskaya, Raya, correspondences 301–15; encounter with Marxism 13–18; historical materialism 18–23; humanism 106–17; interpretation of Marx’s Manuscripts of 1844 23–9; introduction 1–12; Löwenthal, Leo, correspondences 330–2; Marxist anthropology 21, 29–34; Marxism and contemporary history 60–8; neoliberal subjectification 49–60; phenomenological existentialism 14–15, 19–23; philosophical views of 416–22; safety and privacy concerns 208–9; utopia, technology and socialism 42–9
Marcuse, Inge S. 208–9, 390n6
Marx, Karl: biography of 69–72; capitalist production 53–5; dialectic of capitalism 85; dialectics, meaning of 147–52; doctrines of 312; humanism 100–1; Manuscripts of 1844 23–9; materialism 21n44; materialistic interpretation of history 88–9
“Marx and para-Marx on Capitalist Contradictions” (Marcuse 1955) 353–8
Index

of 223, 236; see also bourgeois society
militant labor movement 359
Mill, John Stuart 105
Miller, Karl 324–9
Mills, John Stuart 7
Mintz, Norbert 155
Mitchell, Juliet 374
monopoly capitalism 175, 215, 352
Moore, Barrington, Jr. 77–8
moral-sexual rebellion 255
More, Thomas 2
moreonization 371, 377–8, 388

National Socialism 81, 94, 315
Nazism (Nazi movement) 322, 377, 82, 430
negation: of bourgeois society 407; of capitalism 95, 249; capitalist production and 90; definite negation 113, 190, 200, 204, 421; of the negation 90, 129–31; power of 299
Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Marcuse 1968) 45
Negativity: dialectic of 128–31, 149; final blessing of 148; movement of reality 144; of the old 146; power of 94–5, 97; as precondition of improvement 111; subjectivity of 145
Negri, Antonio 2, 57, 65–6, 65n156
neo-imperialism 216, 239
neoliberal capitalism 3, 7, 12, 67
neoliberal educational reform 4
neoliberal subjectification 49–60
neo-Nazi movement 382
Neumann, Franz 36, 315–18
new concept of revolution 406–8
new consciousness 384–5, 389–90
New Culture 49, 346, 349–50
New Humanism 12, 49, 283, 302–5, 311
New Left movement: critics of 37, 270–7; escapist movements in 412; industrial society and 267; liberation and 210; Marcuse, Herbert, involvement in 334, 346; opposition to Marxism 341; in revolt 279–80; Vietnam war and 264
Newtonian physics 139
New York Times 155, 387
Nigeria 328
Nixon, Richard (administration) 55, 112, 271–2, 333, 350
Nomos (norm) 187
non-alienated labor: creative activity 402; Marxian distinction 192; pre-industrial concept 244; self-fulfilling 45, 47–8
nonantagonistic contradictions 83, 85, 90
normative concept of non-alienated human being 19
Obama, Barack 7
objectification concept 28, 28n70
objective identity 183
“The Obsolescence of Marxism” (Lobkowicz 1967) 188–5
“Obsolescence of Socialism” (Marcuse 1965) 235–48
Occupy movements 2, 11, 64
Oedipal complex 374
“On Changing the World: a Reply to Karl Miller” (Marcuse 1967) 324–9
One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964): capitalism and 51, 53; communism in 367; consciousness in workforce 116; criticism of 376–8; end of utopia 43; liberation and 48; negation and 299; review of 324–5; socialist humanism 180; subject analysis of 165n4; trends in 40–1
ontological-essentialist tendencies 30–1
oppression: alienated labor and 388; alternatives to 6; under capitalism 32; criticism of 10, 32, 162; development of 290; happiness and 125; liberation vs. 371; racial oppression 57, 59, 61; revolutionary forces in 61–2, 66; sexual oppression 57, 61; struggle against 58, 213–15, 261–2, 344; of women 162–3
Oriental despotism 78
orthodox Marxism 23, 88, 92, 403
pacifism 124, 247, 264, 349
Paris Commune (1871) 63, 122, 303
parliamentary regime 118–19
peace economy 287
“people power” movements 65
People's Commune 346
pernicious unity of antitheses 170
personal and social liberation 351–2
petit-bourgeois morality 71, 257, 401, 405, 407
phenomenological existentialism 14–15, 19–23
Philippines 113
Phillips, Wendell 309–10, 310n22
Piani, Gianguido 361–8
planned obsolescence: economic surplus and 242; elimination of 344; by military establishment 194; poverty and 233; in productive process 247, 274, 359, 392; wastefulness of 113, 173, 186, 231
Plato (Greek philosopher) 2, 133–6
Platz., Alexander 428
Plotinus 137–8
pluralism: conversation over 416–22; democratic pluralism 171–3; harmonious society without 261
polity of time, surplus consciousness, and intelligentsia 399–400; instinctual structure and revolution 410–15; Marxist-Leninist model for revolution 406; significance in 395–406; the subject of the revolution 402–6; summary 415; toward new concept of revolution 406–8; transformation of method 396–8
“pure” violence 124
racism: advocacy against 219, 294, 391, 393; life-destroying power of 67; opposition to 212; patriarchy and 11n16; social movements against 3, 59; spread of 361
radicalism: intelligentsia and 194–5, 242; as opposition 215; political consciousness 198; political radicalism 348, 378; radical religion 345; with student groups 50; working class and 128
rational authority 262
“Rat Marcuse” hate mail example 207
Reagan, Ronald 9, 41, 112, 208, 212
Reality and Idea 85, 134–5
Reason and Freedom 94–5, 98, 232
Reason and Revolution (Marcuse 1941) 94–8, 180, 281, 305
Reason of domination 122
rebellious subjectivity 408–9, 410
reductionistic materialism 21, 22n46
“Re-Examination of the Concept of Revolution” (Marcuse 1969): agents of change 204–6; final stage of capitalism and 199–200; global context 201–2; opposition in the metropoles 202–3; working class and revolution 203–4
reification: in capitalism 33; music and 348; of proletariat 56–7, 392–5; with revolution 261; theory/concept of 16–17, 172, 336
“The Reification of the Proletariat” (Marcuse 1978) 392–5
Reitz, Charles 55n140, 215–17
Index

Renaissance Humanism 278
"Reply to Critics" (Marcuse 1968) 329–30
repression 109, 186, 360–1, 373
repressive tolerance 275, 369–70, 388, 418
“Repressive Tolerance” (Marcuse 1965) 379–85

revolution: anthropological revolution 33; anti-western revolutionary movements 79; Austrian revolution 426; Bolshevik Revolution 84, 90, 97, 321; Central European revolutions 84, 97; Chinese Revolution 258, 269; counterrevolution and 217, 242; Cuban Revolution 258, 297; dialectical theory of revolution 6–7; forces in oppression 61–2, 66; French Revolution 232, 268, 302, 426; German Revolution 123, 428–9; Hungarian Revolution 159; Industrial Revolution 253, 260, 304, 320; instinctual structure and 410–15; internal contradictions 206; Marxist-Leninist model for revolution 406; Marxist theory of revolution 5–6, 15n25; new concept of revolution 406–8; privilege of 361; Russian Revolution 13, 67, 303–4, 307; stabilization vs. 178–9; the subject of the revolution 402–6; working class and 203–4, 361; see also “Re-Examination of the Concept of Revolution”; student revolution/movement

“Revolution 1969: Discussion with Henrich von Nussbaum” (Marcuse 1969) 283–9

revolutionary consciousness 94–7, 102, 223

“Revolutionary Subject and Self-Governance” (Marcuse 1969) 196–9

revolutionary subjectivity 5, 8, 12, 55–63, 66, 196

Ritter, Bill 422–31
Rose, Nikolas 6n9
Rousset, David 157
Rühlle, Otto 71

Russia: Five Year Plans of 304; government changes 266; influence by 14; producers and 218; socialism in 75, 80

Russian Institute at Columbia University 36
Russian Research Center 36, 77, 180
Russian Research Institute 430
Russian Revolution 13, 67, 303–4, 307

Russian totalitarianism 305–6

safe from crisis 286
San Diego Commune 351
Sartre, Jean-Paul 166, 279, 420, 421
saving of labor time 101–2
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 330
Schlesinger, Rudolf 80–1
Schwarz, Fred 218
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 7
scientific socialism 15, 18, 24, 72, 253
Second International Marxism 22, 304

self-liberation 146
self-realization 16, 184, 351, 405
Seton-Watson, Hugh 79

sexism (sexual oppression) 3, 57, 59, 61, 391, 393
sexual taboos 165, 374, 410
Sherovcr, Erica 390n6
Sinzheimer, Hugo 315

slavery 46, 108, 121–2, 150, 310–11

Smith, Adam 7, 27
Social Democratic Party 13, 81, 177, 316–17

socialism: abolition in 101; class-consciousness and 151; construction of 92–3; continuity with capitalism 342–4; democracy as preparation for 102; development of 84; discussions about 112–17; domination and control in 4; emancipatory socialism 44–5, 48; idea of 244–7; identity of 183; international Socialism 169, 183; labor philosophy of 33; as leap into freedom 115; National Socialism 81, 94, 315; objective identity of 183; objective prerequisites for 193–4; "Obsolescence of Socialism" 235–48; protosocialism 7–8, 41, 395–6, 400–1; redefinition'
total transvaluation of values 205
trade unions: bureaucracy of 190, 203; co-operation among 175-7, 204; dissolution of 317; growth of 84; process of production and 62; sectional organizations 81
Transcendental Analytic 140-1
Transcendental Dialectic 139-40
Transcendental Logic 140
The Transition Theory 241-3
"The True Nature of Tolerance" (Marcuse 1970) 218-21, 379-85
Tunisia 64-6
'Tunney, John 426
Turkey 58
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party 38
unfreedom 45, 97, 107, 125, 264, 398
universal suffrage 119-20
University of California 112, 155-6, 265
utopia: conception of, in socialism 396; concrete utopia 44, 396, 408; democracy of 358; End of Utopia 249-63; "The End of Utopia" 249-63; false vs. genuine 262; full democracy of 358; possibility of 372; technology and socialism 42-9
values: with alienated labor 247, 251; exchange value 5, 67, 72-3, 189, 192, 235; total transvaluation of values 205
Vanguard Theory 304
"Varieties of Humanism" (Marcuse 1968) 277-83
Vietnam 260, 295
Vietnam War 112, 195, 216, 263-4, 333
violence: ambivalence over 275; counter violence 270, 272, 275, 289, 295, 299; ghetto violence 298; in history 124-5; institutionalized violence 295; "pure" violence 124; socialist violence 181
Vorländer, Karl 69-72
wage labor 61-2, 125, 309
Watergate scandal 112
Weimar Republic 80-1, 265, 315, 382
Welfare/Warfare state 3
Western, Cal 217
Western communism 77
Western Marxism 35, 55
Wheeler, Harvey 283
Wittfogel, Karl 35
women's liberation movement 163, 378, 417
Worker Councils movement 13
working class: anti-capitalist potential of 367; concept of 352-3; European understanding of 312; expansion of 56-7; as labour aristocracy 174-5; late capitalism and 392, 406-8; new perceptions of 63-4; privilege of revolution 361; radicalism and 128; redistribution of wealth 3; revolution and 203-4; see also proletariat
Yemen 66, 354
York, Herbert 370
Zeno of Elea 132
Zizek, Slavoj 64, 65, 65n155