The Ceremony Must Be Found:
After Humanism

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The ceremony must be found
that will wed Desdemona to the huge Moor...
O, it is not enough
that they should meet naked, at dead of night
in a small inn on a dark canal....
The ceremony must be found
Traditional, with all its symbols
ancient as the metaphors in dreams;
strange with never before heard music, continuous
until the torches deaden at the bedroom door.

John Peale Bishop, "Speaking of Poetry"

It would be the fact of the ceremony that Henry
would balk at; Bon knew this. It... would be the
ceremony, a ceremony entered into, to be sure, with a
negro, yet still a ceremony.

William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom

These doctors of philosophy never concede the
moon to be less polished than a mirror; they want it to be more so if that can be imagined, for they deem that only perfect shapes can suit perfect bodies. Hence the sphericity of the heavenly globes must be absolute.

Galileo, *Dialogues*

The establishment of a royal cult (the Bakama) was an economically demanding development. None the less the political advantages accruing ... appear to be substantial. This when added to the other ritual oppositions ... neutralized the Bacwezi as a politico-religious force.... The (new) fundamental relationship can be reduced to: *Bakama*: Purity/and Safety, Culture. *Bacwezi*: Putrid/and Danger, Nature.

Peter Schmidt, *Historical Archaeology: A Structural Approach to African Culture*

As a result of rallies we got courses in ‘black literature’ and ‘black history’ and a special black adviser for black students and a black cultural center ... a rotting white washed house on the nether edge of campus ... reachable ... by way of a scramble up a muddy bank ... And all those new courses did was exempt the departments from the unsettling necessity of altering existing ones, so they could go right on advertising a course in “American Fiction” that explicitly includes “Hawthorne, Clemens, James, Wharton, Hemingway, Fitzgerald, and implicitly excludes Chesnutt, Hurston, Richard Wright and Ralph Ellison.”

David Bradley, “Black and American, 1982”

I. The Studia Humanitatis: From Heresy to Orthodoxy

The crisis of irrelevance and of growing student defection to the vocational areas of education is part of an overall crisis of the episteme/organization of knowledge that was put in place, as Foucault shows, in the nineteenth century (Foucault, 1973). This episteme, based on the triad, biology, economics and philology/Literary Studies, found what Vandamme calls—in the frame of his concept of the efficiency theory of truth—its efficiency criterion (Vandamme, 1983), in the context of the rise and expansion of the Industrial Age. And the crisis of our times is precisely that of the self-dissolution of this Age.

Sir Stafford Beer summed up the extent of this crisis in his introduction to a book by the Chilean biologists, Maturana and Varela.
He argued that contemporary scholarship is trapped in its present organization of knowledge in which, while a man "who can lay claim to knowledge about some categorized bit of the world, however tiny, which is greater than anyone else's knowledge of that bit, is safe for life," and in which, while papers increase exponentially, and knowledge grows by "infinitesimals," our understanding of the world "actually recedes." And, because our world is "an interacting system" in dynamic change, our system of scholarship "rooted in its own sanctified categories, is, in a large part, unavailing to the needs of mankind." If, he concludes, we are to "understand a newer and still evolving world; if we are to educate people to live in that world; if we are to abandon categories and institutions that belong to a vanished world as it is well nigh desperate that we should... then knowledge must be rewritten."¹

The main hypothesis of the argument is that it was such a rewriting of knowledge that constituted the founding heresy of the original Studia Humanitatis, seen in their broader sense as human knowledge of its sociohuman world, the heresy that laid the foundations of our modern rational world, whose ordering discourses were no longer to be interwoven with the mythos and the theologos (Habermas, 1979).

The term "heresy" is used here in the context in which it is used by the Polish philosopher, Kolakowski. He argues that all realms of culture, philosophy, as much as art and customs, exemplify a fundamental antagonism, whereby everything that is new grows out of the permanent need to question all existing absolutes, with every current of thought that tries to break away from "existing finalities coming in turn to establish other ones of its own," so that though "every rebellion is therefore metamorphosed into a conservative state," nevertheless "each of these movements makes room for the next phase where its own absolutes will, in return, be the target of criticism."² This movement can therefore be defined as a dynamic one in which the Jester's role in the pursuit of human knowledge alternates with the Priest's role—transforming heresies into new orthodoxies, the contingent into modes of the Absolute.

Hans Blumenberg illustrates this dynamic, arguing that the movement of secularization that we know as the phenomenon of humanism, together with its "teaching office" (Heidegger, 1977), the Studia, can only be understood in the context of the crisis of the Late Middle Ages. That age was one of those epochs in human history that might be called a "phase of objectification," a phase in which events and their functioning spin out of the control of human motivation and purpose. At all such times, a great counter-exertion is needed to bring these events back to serving the logic of human purposes rather than the reverse.

Blumenberg points to the signs of this objectification, to the theological Absolutism of late Scholastic thought with its positing of the Maximal God—as the Aristotelian Final Cause (Reidl/Kaspar, 1984), rather than the image of the Caring Father—and therefore to the downgrading of human existence represented as almost the
incidental by-product of a God who created for the sake of his own Glory. This was the hegemonic system of theology against which the discourse of Humanism and the institutionalized system of lay learning came into being as a counter-exerting force, as the Jester, pulling the “high seriousness” and the self-justifying pathos (Bakhtin, 1981) of heresies staled into orthodox Absolutes, down to earth (Blumenberg, 1983). Blumenberg also makes a key comparison between the phase of objectification embodied in the theological Absolutism of the late Middle Ages and the parallel phase of our own times, one dominated by the Absolute of the Technological rationality, which, increasingly directed to the purposes of its own goal-seeking rather than by human purposes, determine Events that are once more out of the control of human motivation (Blumenberg, 1983).

While it is the absolutism of this technological rationality that is leaving the humanities “naked in the market place,” this rationality is itself only the culminating form or Summa of the new ordering (ordonnance) system of knowledge initiated by the Studia, in the overall context of the secularization of the human Subject—one whose mode of being would be no longer guaranteed by the “higher system” of the divinely sanctioned mythos and theologos. While this first secular form of the Subject has been transumed (Bloom, 1982) into differing variants—from man defined as “natural Man,” the generic possessor of Reason, to man as defined since the nineteenth century as a “natural being” on the analogy of a living organism (Foucault, 1973)—it is this first form of the definition of the human being, its related “rational world view” (Reid/Kaspar, 1984), and its ordering body of knowledge, that is now in crisis. As a result, the re-writing of knowledge for which Stafford Beer calls, and towards which our own growing irrelevance compels us, must necessarily entail the un/writing of our present normative defining of the secular mode of the Subject. Defining, rather than definition, because the latter does not exist as a reality except by and through our collective system of behaviors, systems which are themselves oriented by the ordering modes of knowing or epistemes of each human system. And the ordering epistemes are themselves reciprocally “verified” by those collective systems of behaviors which Derrida defines as “writing” in the broader sense, that is, by our putting into play the classificatory principle of Sameness and Difference, or systemic code about which each human system-ensemble, as a trans-subject’s entity, effects what Maturana and Varela call the autopoesis through which all that lives realizes its mode of being (Maturana & Varela, 1980). For it is our putting into play the classifying principle that bonds us as such a Group-Subject that we define ourselves as such a normative mode of the Subject, about which each system-ensemble auto-institutes itself reciprocally, bringing that specific normative template of identity into living being.

Because of the dynamic reciprocal interaction of our modes of being/knowing, the de-structuring of the principle of Sameness and Difference which ontologizes us as specific modes of the I/We—in our
case the I/We as “natural beings”—necessarily entails the de-
stucturing also of the ratiomorphic apparatus or rational world view, through which the mode of the Subject or template of human auto-
speciation, like the speciating template of all things living, knows the
world in relation to the telos of its realization as a dynamic living
entity. It is this destructuring that is implied, therefore, in the call for a
rewriting of knowledge, the same destructuring/restructuring that was
effected by the great mutation embodied in the discourse of
humanism and, dynamically, in the practice of the Studia.

For the Jester’s heresy of the Studia, as indeed of the one to
which we are now challenged, should be seen in the wider context of
the evolution of the cognitive mechanisms of living organisms, of a
process as old as Life itself (Riedl/Kaspar, 1984), as well as in the con-
text of a process unique to the human. That is, it should be under-
stood within the context of the process of human evolutionary episte-
ology/modes of self-troping, in which the rupture with the higher
system of the theologos implicit in the practice of the Studia was a
mutation at the level of the cognitive mechanisms through which each
human Group-Subject knows the world, as do biological organisms, in
relation to the securing of the conditions of the realization/actuali-
zation of their mode of being (Reidl/Kaspar, 1984): genetically consti-
tuted in the case of biological organisms, rhetorico-symbolically in
the case of humans.

As Lanham points out, with the cultural revolution of the
Renaissance, “rhetorical man,” who had been proscribed at the
margins by the canonical dogmas of theologies, at last left the
margins. The delights of the original humanists in rhetoric was, there-
fore, something that went beyond that of a mere fad. For the humanist
had glimpsed here that, contrary to Plato, man was indeed double;
that he invented for himself a second self and then acted to verify this
self, acting “from role sustaining motives in a dramatic reality”
(Lanham, 1976).

In his analysis of the role played by the discipline of rhetoric in
the cultural revolution effected by the humanists, Ernesto Grassi
traces the heretical role that their involvement with rhetoric, their turn
to the model of Cicero and to his insistence on the complementary
nature of rhetoric and philosophy (since their common original
function consisted in recognizing and “analysing the meaning of
language in the historical process”) played. This emphasis on
rhetoric was to serve, then, like Kolakowski’s Jester, as a questioning
of the temporal absolutes of medieval philosophy, above all revaluing
the historicity of the human community—humanitas as contrasted to
divinitas—and of the knowledge to be gained from studying this
historicity, against its negative stigmatization by the then ruling order
of knowledge.

“Natural Man” and his works, as pertaining to the category of
the post-Adamic Fallen Flesh (only redeemable by the rebirth in
Christian Baptism) was thereby being revalued and brought into being
as the first secular definition of Lanham’s rhetorical man, constituted
no longer by the Divine Name, Christ, but by the Verbal Symbol Man

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(Whyte, 1950). Since, as O.D. Creutzfeld points out, it is the mode of symbolic self-representation which functions as the external loop that links up with the neurophysiological machinery of the brain to create our “worlds of mind” or modes of consciousness, the world views through which we know Self/World and orient our behavior, the shift from the Divine Name to the Verbal Symbol Man—as in 1917, from Man to the Verbal Symbol, Proletarian”—was a shift to the first secular mode of human consciousness.

This self-imaged, self-troping Self now came to function as the Final/Formal cause which determined behavior for the human, as the mode of genetic speciation had determined behaviors for other biological organisms. For the hominid-into-human, psychogeny replaced philogeny as the determinant of its cognitive mechanisms or ratiomorphic apparatuses. And the related inheritable programs would be stored in the systems of figuration, encoded in the body of traditions/knowledges that would be called “culture.” There was one central continuity, however, to which we have already referred: that the cognitive mechanisms of human groups respond to a law that is applicable to those of all biological organisms. They therefore must know the world, too, in response to the telos of securing the conditions of the subject’s realizing its system-specific mode of being, as imagined in its governing template of identity. And this law applies whether one was an Iron Age Bahaya, now defined through the royal, rather than the local Baconi template of identity; or Galileo’s Aristotelian antagonists who insisted on the if/then linear abductive inference of the founding structural opposition (the perfection of the lunar realms, the degradation of the terrestrial) on which the Christian medieval template had been based; or the naturally noble monarchical Subject, Othello; or the Puritan Southern slave-owning “empirico-transcendental man” (Foucault, 1973) that was Faulkner’s Henry. And they would therefore each act upon the world in the mode of the template’s categorical imperative, obeying its related proscriptions and prescriptions, so as to fulfill the role-sustaining motives of the mode of the self in a “dramatic reality.”

Paolo Valesio has pointed out, in the context of his proposal for the disciplinary matrix of a new rhetoric, that all human orders are held together by specific macro-organizing topoi which are the necessary conditions of our shared and common human nature(s) (Valesio, 1980). And since meaning preexisted the utterance of the first word/speech, we must recognize the complex relation of language to pre-linguistic biological processes. The argument here is that the link of continuity/discontinuity is the shift from genetic to rhetorical-figurative systems of group bonding, with the latter carrying affective loadings from the former and the inheritable programs which determined cognition/behaviors being transferred to the governing systems of figuration called religion. For it was this system of figuration which now took the place of the environment of its rewards/punishment sanction systems, replacing it with the sanction systems of the gods and then of the Single God.

First Whyte and later Habermas pointed to a formative
tendency or evolutionary process at work which correlates the evolution of human cognitive mechanisms with the evolution of human modes of co-identification, from the relatively closed aesthetic orders of the particularistic Paleolithic groups to the increasingly more inclusive ones. Monotheism, White argues, marked a high point in the evolution of human cognitive mechanisms. Once a Single Divine Name had been postulated, the human could now come to know the world in relation to a single universal correlator; the concept of universality could then itself come into being. But because the varying monotheisms had come into being amongst different peoples in response to different needs, their universalities remained finally particularistic. What was needed was a single defining impersonal principle which would take the place of the Divine Names; of their specific conceptions of Life/Death; of the absolutization apparatus of the higher sanction system of the mythos (the Logos of Paleolithic systems of identity) and of the theologos: that of creedal systems of identity.

What we refer to as the founding Jester heresy of humanism and the Studia Humanitatis is sited here. For as Riedl/Kaspar point out, once humans had broken with genetically sanctioned inheritable programs and cognitive mechanisms, a risk factor had now entered the evolutionary processes of life. This was due to the fact that “our conscious cognitive powers,” because they were the most recent superstructures in a continuum of cognitive processes contemporaneous with the emergence of life (with human reason, as a late-comer, being the least refined and tested against the real world), the potential for self-deception and the dysfunctionality of human world views could spell disaster in the context of humans’ increasing mastery over the environment.

The sanction system of religion had, therefore, been isomorphic with the hominization process of the human itself. It enabled this new mode of being, the bearer of self-consciousness, to win its way from more closed to more open programs of co-identification and of cognition, handing down what it had won, as Gowllett notes, as a human cultural heritage in the long perspective of the processes—many terrible and idiotic as Nietzsche notes, yet constituting that “morality of mores” by which the human made himself calculable—of the human’s collective self-making (Gowllett, 1984). The heresy of the Studia was, therefore, to lie in its break with the higher system of divinely sanctioned identity and with its absolutized world views or ratiomorphic apparatus; in its release of rhetorical man from the margins, orienting his behaviors by a new ordering secular Logos, the Natural Logos of Humanism which took the place of the Christian Theologos.

A co-Christianity was made possible by the central Figure/Image of a new baptismal birth in which Christians were reborn in the spirit, leaving behind the “natural man” of the Flesh, itself degraded by the Original Sin, inherited by all mankind from Adam’s Fall. This bonding topos of the medieval Christian Group Subject was sanctioned by “the authoritative light of the
suprasensory” (Heidegger, 1977). So, too, was the “inheritable program” of stored pre-judgments based on the interpretation of the Bible and on canonical dogma as well as on the overall system of knowledge of Christian medieval society.

The normative order of knowledge, which was embodied in theology, expressed the founding structural opposition generated from the bonding topos of the order: the opposition between the category of the “Spirit” (the new “life” to which one attained, pari passu, with Christian baptism) and the “Flesh” (the life of unregenerate “natural” man before rebirth, a life that was now “death”). According to the inferential logic of its system of figuration—Bateson’s abduction schema, Sperber’s symbolic mode of knowledge, a mode largely expressed through the right hemispheric functioning of the brain—the Spirit/Flesh order of value was also expressed in a parallel order of value: between theology—as knowledge of things Divine, celestial, of the category of the Spirit—and lay knowledge, the knowledge carried by the laity—as knowledge of the category Flesh, i.e., of the socio-human world whose Works were the Works of natural unregenerate man, knowledge, then, that was marginal, secondary and partaking of the inferiority of all things terrestrial.

For the Christian principle of spiritual Sameness and fleshly Difference—in the same way as traditional Neolithic orders had made use of what Levi-Strauss calls the “totemic operator” of the stable system of differences of the animal species to at once conceptualize (Levi-Strauss, 1960) and absolutize the principle of Sameness/Difference encoded in their bonding topoi—here made use of the represented planetary system of Sameness/Difference to at once conceptualize and absolutize itself. Verified in Christian Ptolemaic astronomy, this planetary grid, as a represented physico-ontological difference of substance between the degraded fallen category of the earth, subject to the corruptibility of material generation, change and decay (as contrasted to the incorruptible perfect lunar world) expressed a Divinely caused principle of Christian Sameness (the realm of the perfection of the Spirit), and of Difference (that realm which marked the Negation that was Natural man, unregenerate). This structural opposition then came to function as the ordering principle of the status-organizing processes of medieval societies. It determined the Clergy/Laity order of value, also expressed in the represented difference of substance between Noble Blood and non-noble, which underpinned the system of castes/orders of the feudal system; just as, at the same time, the Christian medieval template of identity which had become fused and interwoven with the Feudal mode of the Subject—its aristocratic conception of Life/Death—psychogenetically determined the ratiomorphic apparatus of the order.

Peter Winch points out that all human groups institute their social orders about specific conceptions of “Life/Death” which take the place of their biological life, orienting their behaviors. These conceptions in all human orders are encoded in founding structural oppositions, defined by Uspenskij et al, as the inclusion/exclusion of an-
tithesis, by and through which alone human orders are enabled to define themselves into being, each type of culture having to create its "corresponding" type of "chaos" which "represents" just as active a "creation" as that of the order itself (Uspenskij et al, 1978). All founding oppositions, such as that of the Bakama/Bacwezi cults of the Bahaya peoples of Iron Age East Africa or of the lunar/sublunar of Galileo's antagonists, express the fact that human as organized orders not only struggle against the opposing "chaos," but have need of it as well, not only destroying but also continually creating it (Uspenskij et al, 1978). For it is the specific "type of non-culture" which enables its self-definition as that specific type of culture. Hence the oppositions, seen from inside cultures as culture/nature, done/undone, raw/cooked, or, as in our case, Spirit/Flesh or Civilized/primitive, are oppositions through which the order/chaos, entropy/ectropy, seen from a point of view external to the domain of the cultures, are enabled to function as the order-informing systemic code or replicator unit (Dawkins, 1983).

Others, like Hayden White, have followed upon Levi-Strauss's analysis of these oppositions, which in all cases express the conception of Life/Death. Peter Schmidt, in his study of the corpus of myths which reach back to Iron Age East Africa, has shown how the triumph of the mode of organization of a new royal dynasty over that of the local indigenous peoples organized about the spirit-medium cults of the Bacwezi, the canonizers of the local template of identity, only fully succeeded when, as the narrative representations of the myths reveal, it had managed to transform the conceptions of Life/Death, Order/Chaos, with its newly created Bakama cult coming to signify Culture/Safety and the Bacwezi coming to be figured as a "dangerous uncivilized force" against which the royal order needs to confirm its legitimacy as the bearer of "Life" to Bacwezi "death." In the shift, the local template of identity has been made into the Deilos to the new Agathos of a royally mediated identity (Schmidt, 1978)

The title of this paper, borrowed from the multi-level meanings of Bishop's fine poem, here refers to the fact that once these structural oppositions have been put in place, they must then function according to laws applicable to all human systems, from that of the royal dynasty of Iron Age East Africa to that of Christian medieval Europe or to that of our own. By marking the mode of Desire—the desire of Life and of Aversion to Death—these structural oppositional codes function to orient the parameters of motivations/behaviors of the order. They are thus the very condition of the collective behaviors through which each human system realizes itself as such a system. The basic law of their functioning must therefore be the interdiction of any ceremony which might yoke the antithetical signifiers and breach the dynamics of order/Chaos, through which the order brings itself into living being; a dynamics which functions like the code of the presence/absence of butyric acid for the tick, for example, to prescribe the seeking/avoiding behavior through which one realizes oneself as one or the other form of the self-troping rhetorical human.

The ceremonies therefore cannot be found for the doctors of
philosophy to wed the Earth to the Moon, for Othello to remain wedded to Desdemona, for Bon to marry a "negro," since the group Subjects to which they belong are bonded by a system of meaning or semantic charter (Maranda, 1980) which determines the meaning of their meaning\(^5\) on the basis of these oppositions (Derrida, 1976). For it is these behavior-orienting oppositions which, through the mediation of their connotative system of good/evil, induce stable and shared desiring/aversive endogenous waveshapes in the brain (Thatcher/John, 1977), and constitute the morphogenetic fantasy or mode of the cultural imagination through which the group Subjects are led to imagine themselves\(^6\) as such a Group Subject: one which, internally mediated by these structural oppositions and their related imagery/figuration system, is defined by the fact that its members participate in the same mode of mimetic desire (Girard, 1965) and of aversion (Fanon, 1964).

The order/chaos figuration of a physico-ontological principle of Sameness and Difference was the axiom about which the mode of cultural imagination, the status-organizing process, the aesthetic and the conceptual ordering rational world view of Christian Medieval world, was founded and represented as divinely caused/ordered. The lay knowledge of Natural Man of the human historical world belonged to the category of "chaos" which defined the order as such an order.

The heresy of the discourse of Humanism and of the Studia lay in their deconstruction of this principle or systemic code, by the Studia's very coming into being as an alternative system of learning whose referential authority was no longer that of Christian theology. The heresy was not anti-Christian as Kristeller points out. Many, like Erasmus, only wanted to get back to a reading of the original text, uncontaminated by some of the later interpretations, back to the simple piety of the early father and to the original Greek texts believed to be able to elucidate pristine meanings. Yet it was here that a mutation occurred in that a reversal had taken place. Instead of subordinating the lay activity of learning to the authority of theology, theology was now being submitted to the authority of the lay activity of textual and philological scrutiny in the name of the accuracy of historical meaning. The category of the celestial was being submitted to the activity of the humanista, bearers of the inferior mode of knowledge, a mode which had now begun to constitute itself as a new ordo or studium.

Even more, a new higher sanction system, one based on the self-correcting processes of human knowledge was here being proposed and put in place, in the context of a normative knowledge whose axiom, as Waterston points out, had been that God had ordered the world according to certain principles, and the role of fallen man was merely to decipher these principles and abide by them, but not seek to question and have knowledge of things celestial which, unaided, his corrupted human knowledge could not encompass. Indeed, according to this axiom, fallen man could not hope to know the laws by which God had ordered his Creation.\(^7\) Neither could the Works of Man as a creature of the degraded Earth
be of efficacy to the true telos of the Christian, that of the original humanists lay in their use of the Back-to-Rome/Greece movement in order to revindicate this Natural Man, using the auctoritas of their non-Christian legacy of the Graeco-Roman tradition of thought and literature to project an alternative mode of life and being. And the revindication of the mode of learning of fallen Natural Man, of his Works, was effected by a counter-system of figuration, in which, through the great writings of the ancients, one underwent a new Counter-Birth, a renaissance, in which one now became not Christian, but more humane/rational, shifting, in this central re-figuring, the conception of Order/Chaos, bringing in the first form of a secular imaging of Life/Death.

The return to the ancient models, the founding basis of the Studia, even their borrowing of the term, Studia Humanitatis, from the Romans (who had used it with the same valorizing intention), was, at the level of figuration, a return which, so to speak, gave to the secularizing European man his Scriptures and “patristic” literatures, as a counter-exertion which enabled the projection of Maximal Man over against that of the Maximal God. Here the very implementing of a lay system of knowledge, the knowledge of Natural man, and of his arts of rhetoric, philosophy, profane literature, as a valorizing activity in its own right, constituted, before Copernicus, a breach of the physico-ontological principle of Sameness/Difference. It was also a breach with the principle of Divine Causality which this latter principle had encoded, and by this, a rupture with all other human cognitive mechanisms hitherto sanctioned by the “authoritative light of the suprasensory.”

The word humanista coined on the model of legista (since the study of law based on the revised Justinian codes had been the first order of knowledge to begin to claim autonomy from the referential authority of theology) was therefore itself the expression of this heretical violation of the earlier order of value, in which knowledge of the Works of Natural unregenerate Man was, relatively, the “chaos” to the true knowledge or the knowledge of the Divine.

The rewriting of knowledge of the Studia was therefore a counter-writing to the order of knowledge of the clergy, the new knowledge in whose context a new template of Identity, that of Natural Man, was being brought into existence in the new narrative representations of Renaissance Europe. In whatever forms, whether humanist or platonic, the common thrust was directed towards the valorization of the new emerging sense of self, of that which defined itself no longer as Spirit but as Natural Reason carefully cultivated. Hence the motif of the “dignity of Man” as a counter to the motif of fallen man;18 and the valorization by the original humanists of the practice of rhetorics and of their worship of style, the style by which the new secular mode was writing itself into being (Lanham, 1976).

Walter Ullman links the origins of humanism and of the Studia to the political humanism of the Middle Ages, which accompanied the rise of a new socio-historical force, that of the new men of the City States, in the context of the beginning Urban Commercial Revolution.
These new men, having no legitimate place in the feudal Christian order of things, wanting to be citizens with political rights, struggled for a revaluation of Natural Man in political terms. Neither nobly born nor peasant, these freemen, without a lord, came to define themselves by the Verbal Symbol “man”—in opposition to “noble”—universalizing it, in opposition to Christian, as the first non-religious definition of the human that was ostensibly universally applicable. Since the Christian Word was interwoven with the Feudal category structure or representational system, their valorization of Natural Man logically moved outside the Christian schema, both in political and commercial terms, as the new socially mobile and rapidly enriching men also began to detach allegiance, in key aspects of their lives, from the ordering religio-Christian schema (Ullman, 1977). In other words, there was a conjuncture in which an overall challenge was being mounted to the founding structural opposition of the order, absolutized by the instituting analogy (Bateson, 1979) of a divinely determined physico-ontological principle of Difference, a difference in substance between the degraded matter of the earth and the crystalline perfection of the lunar and supra-lunar realms.

Here one might speak of the figurative impact of the Studia, its counter-figurative schema, of a rebirth of Man through profane Works, one that spoke of a new kind of freedom, that of human reason, and of its power to gain knowledge of all things including things celestial. As Hubner points out, the epistemological break of Copernicus can only be understood in this wider emancipatory context of the new ordering discourse of humanism “which aims at bringing man closer to God,” thus at once contradicting “Ptolemaic astronomy for which the earth is coincidental with the place of a status corruptiones,” contradicting, then, an “astronomy tied to the theology of its times.” That Copernicus was himself a bearer of this new discourse and its telos can be seen in the fact that when faced with having to eliminate a contradiction—that between “the humanism of his time and the existing astronomy”—he sought to resolve the contradiction in a way favorable to humanism, even if he had to do this with difficulty, with new problems arising from his resolution.

As Hans Jonas has pointed out, the really revolutionary movement of the Copernican break was his revelation that Nature offered no empirical support for the represented physico-ontological principle of Difference that, in fact, as Galileo’s telescope was to verify and Newton’s equally applicable laws to confirm, the earth was a star, and the stars were earths. Humanism and the Studia’s projection of Natural Man with his Natural Logos was, therefore, as Hubner notes, part of a comprehensive thrust in which “the entire world had begun to transform itself” pari passu with the “discovery of new continents and new seas,” which was to bring in changes that shook the hitherto entrenched “sacred” structures of society, as the secularization of the State and the printing presses and the rise of the middle classes destroyed the “old hierarchies and privileged classes.” Out of this train of events, a mutation of the human cognitive mechanisms was set in motion, one in which the idea rose “that the Divine Creation,
like the construction of a great cosmic machine had to be understandable by and through human reason” (Hubner, 1983). It was in the context of this special and overall mutation of the cultural imagination of the human, that the discontinuity that would constitute the new order of the natural sciences had begun, and that the later technology of Galileo’s telescope had its origins.

Central to the comprehensive attempt to bring men nearer to God, to breach the interdiction of ceremonies between the Agathos/Delios categories of the celestial and the terrestrial, was to be the rise of the vernacular narrative representations, pari passu with the Studia’s turn to the ancient models and its valorization of profane letters and the auctoritas of their deployment— their valorization, then, of the works of the human imagination vis à vis the Scriptures as Divine Revelation.

Even though the early humanists would mainly write in Latin, the valorization of profane letters was to contribute to the breaching of another order of value, that between Latin as the language of the Church and the vernacular. Already with Dante the vernacular had been canonized poetically. But with the Renaissance, the earlier founding works began to be drawn together, as a mutation now took place. This was to be the shift out of the religio-aesthetic ordering of the modes of the human imagination to the purely aesthetic ordering, with the rise to centrality of the new profane narrative representations that we have come to call “literature”—a secular figurative order that would no longer function as an adjunct and contestatory twin to the theological system of figuration but would gradually become hegemonic, taking its place.

Hans Blumenberg has pointed out that the counter-exertion to bring men nearer to God had already begun in the fourteenth century with Nicholas of Cusa, who went as far as was possible to re-form the mode of thinking within the traditional schema, to re-translate its internal logic.21 His projection of the dialogue figure of the layman wiser than the theologian, within the antithetical concept of wise ignorance, was paralleled by ongoing transformations in the systems of figuration of the narrative discourses, by the projection of carnivalesque upside down figures.

Bakhtin points to the existence in these modes of a dialectic of rigidification and rupture, beginning in the Middle Ages with the co-development of “forms of high literature” together with the contestation of “low folkloric and semi-folkloric forms” that tended towards satire and parody, with the latter, rising from the dregs of society and giving rise to the projection of subversive “prominent types” such as the rogue, the clown and the fool. These types, while they were to be central to the later development of European literature, were also types whose “images go back even further... into the depths of a folklore” emerging from the represented “chaos” against which the vertical medieval order instituted itself as such an order.

For what Habermas sees as the coexistence of an evolutionary process based on Piaget’s analogy of the ontogenesis of the child—in
which the human, as it moves into more widely inclusive aesthetic structures, begins to divest itself of the centricities of the cognitive mechanisms of the closed aesthetic orders of more local modes of being—was quite clearly here at work in the evolution of precisely these aesthetic-affective orders which program the limits of co-identification (Habermas, 1979), by means of systems of figuration or group-boundary maintaining imagery systems.

These newly projected figures served here as the subversive detonating force that began the destructuring of the boundary-maintaining system as it was imagined/experienced by the Christian-medieval Group-Subject. And they initiated that transformation of the “imagery system” of the governing religious order of the imagination, replacing it at the public level with the “figuration Work” of that ordering of the now secular imagination that can be described as the function of “literature” only if we describe the “imagining Subject” as a function of that ordering.

The psycho-aesthetic structures that sustained the increasingly ossified Christian-feudal order of things was the target of these parodic anti-types erupting from the “chaos” of the margins with their ludic weapon of laughter. Their form of the Jester heresy lay, Bakhtin argues, in the new right that they claimed to be “other” in the feudal world, and “not make common cause with any single one of the existing categories,” since “none of these categories suits them.” Their parodic laughter and stance of “not understanding” the social logic/illogic of the existing structures, begins to make visible the “vulgar conventionality” that deformed human life in the decaying feudal structure, a structure which canonized its own rigidified order in the context of a new environment in which both its epistemic and aesthetic orders were anachronistic and dysfunctional. The resulting falsehood and duplicity of the governing mode of the cultural imagination led to a situation in which real life, denied creative imaginative directives, became “crude and bestial” (Bakhtin, 1981). Against this falsehood that had “come to saturate all human relationships,” fabliaux and Schwanke satiric verses, parodic cycles in the folk traditions, began to clear the ground, as new forms such as the novel, with the antitypes of rogues, clowns, and fools as the major protagonists, carrying over the original carnivalesque inversion function, breached the interdictions, the vertical structuring principle, by parodying the “high seriousness” of its self-justifying discourse.

The theological absolutism of the Late Middle Ages, which had taken the “simple executive solution” of repressing any awareness that “causes come to us from many sides” and that humans live in a “multi-linear, multi-reinforcing causal world” (Riedl with Kaspar, 1984), had opted for the solution of a single original Cause, made into the Final Cause, of which the Maximal God was the exemplar. This led to an orienting “practico-theoretic logic” of extreme idealism which negated the existence/validity both of the temporal material world and of the complementary nature, along with the “spiritual,” a negation of their causal inputs (Riedl with Kaspar, 1984). Over against the “over-value of this representation” (Ricoeur, 1979), the projection of the
figures of clown/rogue/Fool now paved the way for an inversion, for
the novel’s appropriation of that “spatio-temporal world,” the world of
“Natural Man,” the world in which, consequent with this mutation in
the figuration of Self and World, as Hubner writes, “America was
being discovered, a sea route to India opened up, new fields of the
natural sciences and mathematics were being established. And the
way was being prepared for an utterly new way of seeing.”22 It was to
be an utterly new way of feeling, of imagining Self and World, and a
mode of imagination that would no longer find its referential figu-
rativing auctoritas in the great religious schemas and symbols, but
rather in a new referential figurative auctoritas, that of the fictional
poetic/dramatic schemas of the phenomenon we call “literature.”
Literature in its new role/ordering function, and the Studia were, there-
fore, to be twin forms of each other, forms through whose internal
mediation, the human, who had hitherto imagined its mode of being
through mythic/theological figurative schemas, would now come to
imagine itself—and to act upon the world in the mode of that imagi-
nation—through the great poetic schemas which refigured and con-
figured the first form of the secularly chartered human being: the
world of its order of things. For it is not, as Marx thought, the Earthly
Family that holds the secret of the projection of the Holy Family. It is,
rather, the reverse.

The cap and bells of Bakhtin’s parodic figures was to trans-
form the modes of projection/figuration of Self/Group self and, there-
fore, of the mode of Not-The-Self, the entropic Chaos to the order of
the dominant model of Being. They were, then, to refigure the
aesthetic order, expanding the limits of the boundary-maintaining
system of the We, and its new spatial extracultural space (Uspenskij
et al, 1978). In this they were performing an aesthetic function
analogous to that of the original humanists, who, in turning to the
auctoritas of their pagan legacy to legitimate the heresy of the study
of profane letters which no longer found its sanction system in
theology, but rather in what the Spanish humanist, Sepúlveda, called
the purely “literary,” were to transform the mode of functioning of
human cognitive mechanism: our aesthetemes, to coin a phrase, and
our epistemes.

Once the authoritative light of the suprasensory had been dis-
placed, something, as Heidegger points out, had to take the empty
place of its vanished authority. Here the authority of Reason,23 the
Reason coded by the Natural Logos of humanism based on the
explanatory principle of a Natural Causality verified by the truth of
empirical reality, moved into the place of the vanished authority. And
the configured macro-concept of Natural Causality now took the
place of Divine Causality as the Original Cause, the extra-human
source of the new principle of Sameness and Difference, expressed in
a new structural opposition, that of Reason and its Lack-state.

A central rhetorical strategy (analyzed by Valesio in another
context as that of the topos of iconicity, a topos which is able to yoke
a member of a class with the class of classes, to configure the part of
the whole)24 now projected the image of the new men as the image of
man-in-general. It also projected the ratiomorphic apparatus or mode of reason, which functioned to orient the autopoeisis of this new mode of human being, as isomorphic with reason-in-general, with the reason of Nature herself: nature “as life... bursting forth with existence” (Valesio, 1980). It was a reason ostensibly attached to the figures of the mercantile upper bourgeoisie and newly landed gentry. In fact, it was the mode of reason of the template of identity of Natural Man, the first self-representation of the secular human, one which would absolutize itself no longer through the auctoritas of the gods but through that of a Mono-Logos/Reason, which stigmatized any alternative mode of the Logos/Reason as the Lack-state of its reason and, therefore, of Reason-in-general.

A shift now took place. Since physical nature, knowledge of which had been freed from serving a verifying function in the order/chaos dynamics of the system-ensemble, another mode of nature, human nature, would now be installed in its place. The representation of a naturally ordered distribution of degrees of reason between different human groups enables what might be called a homo-ontological principle of Sameness/Difference, figured as a by/nature difference of superiority/inferiority between groups, and could now function tautologically as the verifying proof of an infrasensorily ontologized, naturally caused status-organizing principle, a principle based on differential endowment of Reason (rather than of Noble Blood) and verified dynamically in the empirical reality of the order.

The figuration of this reason, as reason-in-general, was now effected by a series of great internments (Foucault, 1971). First, that of the New World peoples in encomienda systems. Here began that re-enactment of Ptolemaic astronomy which Foucault analyzes in his book dealing with the internment of the Mad in seventeenth-century France: that of a new order of discourse whose function was now to encode the homo-ontological principle of Sameness/Difference and the basic structural opposition of order/chaos. For if, as Foucault argues, a society’s self-imaging or identity rests (as Said explains further) upon its detachment from what was not itself, the “rational” discourse of every order must function “lawfully,” in response to the governing system of figuration generated from the structural opposition of the imaging of Self and Other, to domesticate the representations of the Other, whose mode of difference alone enables the mode of Sameness, expressed in the bonding topos of the order, to be imagined/experienced as a mode of conspecific sameness. In other words, the representation of the Other must function in a rule-governed manner to domesticate its figuration-Work to the exigencies of the ordering made of discourse which charts the mode of the Self/Group Self.

Hence the humanist Ginés de Supúlveda was the first to re-enact in humanist rather than in theological terms, the function of Ptolemaic astronomy, and to fit the representation of the New World peoples to the exigencies of a discourse whose function was to legitimate their internment, on the basis of a projected by/nature difference which had ordained that they should be “natural slaves.” His
“proofs” of this were taken from the empirical reality of the cultural
differences of two vastly different modes of life, a difference which he
defined as a hierarchy, coding his symbolic mode of logic in a series
of rhetorical antitheses. The New World peoples were *homunculi*
(little men) when compared to the man, the magnanimous Spaniards;
as women to men/children to parents/monkeys to men. The proof of
this was that they lacked Letters and written monuments to their
history. The fact that they offered humans as a sacrifice to their gods
proved that they Lacked Natural Reason.\textsuperscript{27}

Uspenskij et al point out that the expansion of any sphere of
cultural organization leads to the expansion of a sphere of non-
organization. If the “narrow world of Hellenic civilization” had its cor-
responding narrow sphere of encircling “barbarians,” the spatial
growth of ancient Mediterranean civilization was accompanied by the
growth of the “extracultural world.” With the shift of Mediterranean
man into a planetary dimension, the Greek Barbarians would be re-
figured as the homunculi-natives, defined not by their lack of the
Greek mode of order, but by their Lack-state of the first form of
secular human reason, projected as isomorphic with Natural Reason:
as the irrational Chaos, then, to the naturally rational order of the
human.

The internment of the New World peoples would be followed by
that of the African lineage groups, homogenized under the com-
mercial trade name of “negro.” This objectification of the human was
justified at first in religious terms as divinely caused by the Curse
placed on Ham. Soon the shift would be made to the humanist con-
cept of Natural Causality, of a by/nature determined difference of
reason, in which the African mode of cultural reason was seen as a
non-reason; and his internment in the plantation system as slave
labor, as being carried out for the purpose of rationalizing him/her as
an inferior mode of being in need of rational human baptism.

The great internments of the encomienda/plantation archi-
elago was followed in Europe itself, within the internal logic of the
same ordering discourse, with that of the Mad as the opposed icon of
that Defect of Natural Reason, which mnenomically equated the
secular humanist mode of reason with reason-in-general.\textsuperscript{28} Interned
with the mad were also the jobless and the poor. The three categories,
the homunculi/native/negro, the Mad, the poor and the jobless,
functioned to express what might be called a ratio-ontological
principle of Sameness and Difference: to express, and empirically
verify the rhetorical macro-Figure of a Natural Causality which dif-
ferentiated human groups along a continuum of different degrees of
rationality, a differentiation which was part of a universal law of
Nature beyond human control.\textsuperscript{29}

Natural Reason and the degrees of its possession—and this
was verified by one’s position in the social structure—functioned,
therefore, as Noble Blood had done, as the criterion for the status
stratigraphy of the order. In this order of figuration the “negro,” al-
though equated with the missing link between Man and Ape, was
made, in the Linnean system, the Negative Order on the basis of his
lack of Reason. While his Lack of Reason excluded him from governing himself, as the European could, he was nevertheless incorporated into the same table of being, the schema of the structural opposition between Reason/Lack-of-reason and of the discourses generated from its related Classical *episteme*.

A mutation would occur, however, with the transumption of the principle of Sameness/Difference to a new bio-ontological form. In this new form that would underlie the expansion of the Industrial Age, the figure of Chaos would no longer function as the Icon of a Defect of Natural Reason, since with the rise of purely middle class culture, the Defect or Lack-state of the Fullness of being was now to be that of the Lack of a mode of human being, the Indo-European, now made isomorphic with Being human itself.

As Mosse shows, in his book on the Nazi holocaust and on the enabling discourses that made the holocaust possible, the Figure of the Semite and the “Negro” now in the context of this shift, functioned as the Chaos to the new Norm of the human; as the negative antitypes to the “aesthetic criteria” of the Greeks, whose classical sculpture was now made isomorphic, phylogenetically speaking, with being human. And an entire range of the heroes/heroines, based on the equation made by the pseudoscience of phrenology between the Ideal external physiognomy and moral innocence and moral evil, from Ivanhoe to Star Wars, was now being put in place. In the overall range of this bio-aesthetic system of figuration, the Negro/Semitic’s physiognomy would now come to be experienced as equated with moral evil (Mousse, 1978) and, therefore, lynchable, exterminable.

For with the rise and expansion of the Industrial Age and the rise to hegemony of the groups who spearheaded the Industrial Revolution, a transumption of humanism’s “natural Man” took place. The new template of identity was based on the imagining of the Self/Group-Self on the analogy of a living organism. As the State became a service function of the new regulatory activity of the economic life—the expression of the conception of Life/Death on the analogy of a biological organism, impelled by the reflex impulse of hunger and of self-preservation—the former Reasons-of-State political *Logos* now gave way to a new Reasons-of-the-organic-community *Logos* whose structural oppositions governed the organization of knowledge in the new episteme or ratiomorphic apparatus. It was a *Logos* in which the Indo-European mode of human being was canonized through the discourse of philologists and literary scholars, such as Schlegel and his pupil Lassen, as the expression of the most perfect “organic” realization of that biogenetic *élan vital* that was the superior/will being of its peoples. This was incarnated in the great Aryan/Sanskrit language family that was as unique to their being as was the epic literature which distinguished itself and them from the more rootless egoistic, non-epic-owning Semite Other. At this level of Otherness the “negro” was not even considered, since he was not imagined even to have languages worth studying, nor to partake in culture, so total was his mode of Nigger Chaos.
The social behaviors that were to verify this *topos* of iconicity which yoked the Indo-European mode of being to human being in general, and the new middle class model of identity to the exemplary Norm of this new “empirico-transcendental doublet,” man (Foucault, 1984) (imagined/experienced as if a “natural being”), would be carried out by the complementary non-discursive practices of a new wave of great internments of native labors in new plantations orders (native wage labor), and by the massacres of the colonial era—leading logically to their *Summa* in the Auchwitz/Belsen and in the Gulag/Cambodia archipelagoes.

Through all this, different forms of segregating the Ultimate Chaos that was the Black—from the *apartheid* of the South to the lynchings in both North and South, to their deprivation of the vote, and confinement in an inferior secondary educational sphere, to the logic of the jobless/ghetto/drugs/crime/prison archipelagoes of today—ensured that, as Uspenskij *et al* note, the “active creation” of the type of Chaos, which the dominant model needs for the replication of its own system, would continue. It thus averted any effort to find the ceremonies which could wed the structural oppositions, liberating the Black from his Chaos function, since this function was the key to the dynamics of its own order of being. As Las Casas had argued against Sepúlveda—when refuting the latter’s humanist theory that human sacrifice carried out by the New World peoples was proof of the fact of their *Lack* of Natural Reason and, therefore, that it was just to make war against them to protect the innocents who were sacrificed and to take over their territory—“to sacrifice innocents for the good of the commonwealth is not opposed to natural reason, is not something abominable and contrary to nature, but is an error that has its origin in natural reason itself.” It is an error, then, not in the speaking/behaving subjects, but in the ratiomorphic apparatus generic to the human, the cognitive mechanism that is the “most recent superstructure in a continuum of cognitive processes as old as life on this planet,” and, as such, “the least tested and refined against the real world” (Riedl/Kaspar, 1984). And it is only with science, as Riedl and Kaspar (quoting Roman Sexl) observe, that there is ever any true “victory over the ratiomorphic apparatus”—such as that of Galileo’s and his telescope over the abductive logic of the if/then sequence of inference dictated behind the backs of their consciousness to the Aristotelian doctors of philosophy as the speaking subjects of the Christian-medieval system ensemble.

II. Re-enacting Heresy: The New Studies and the *Studia* as a Science of Human Systems

The main proposal here is that the calls made in the 1960s and 1970s for new areas/programs of studies, was, although non-consciously so at the time, calls which re-enacted in the context of our times a parallel counter-exertion, a parallel Jester’s heresy to that of the *Studia*’s. But because of our non-consciousness of the real
dimensions of what we were about, we asked at first only to be incorporated into the normative order of the present organization of knowledge as add-ons, so to speak. We became entrapped, as a result, in Bantustan enclaves labelled “ethnic” and “gender” and/or “minority studies.” These enclaves then functioned, as David Bradley notes, \textit{inter alia}, to exempt English Departments from having to alter their existing definition of American literature. Even more, these enclaves functioned to exempt the callers for the new studies from taking cognizance of the anomaly that confronted us, with respect to a definition of American literature which lawfully functioned to exclude not only Blacks, but all the other groups whose “diverse modalities of protest” (Detienne, 1979) in the 1960s and 1970s had fueled the call for new studies.

Thomas Kuhn points out that the recognition of anomalies is the first step which leads to changes in the paradigms of the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{38} And in the same context the linguistic scholar Whatmough has argued that human observers are parts of the cosmos which they observe, that since all the knowledge that orders our behavior is gained from these human observers, such knowledge must either be solipsistic or reduce man to a part of his environment. This knowledge is, therefore, not to be trusted unless the observer in his role as knower finds the means to convert himself into an “external observer.” Among the means which he proposes is the taking of the “all pervading regularity noted in language,” rather than the speaking subject, as the object of investigation. And these regularities appear “all along the road through the hierarchy of language, from everyday chit chat through law, and religions, liturgy and homily, poetry, ‘literature,’ science and philosophy to logic and mathematics.”\textsuperscript{39} These regularities, he goes on, will enable the knower to make use of what he calls the \textit{mathematike techne}, which enables her/him to treat languages like chemistry, for example, according to their grammars of regularities, as if man, i.e. the speaking/thinking/representing subject, “did not exist at all.” One problem remained, however: that of the \textit{perception} of these regularities. For, because the regularities are, so to speak, “built in” to the discourses, the users of these discourses cannot normally isolate the existence of these regularities (Whatmough, 1967). And, as Foucault reminds us, this problem is applicable not only for the boundary maintaining “true discourse” of the positivism inherited from the nineteenth-century \textit{episteme}, but also for the eschatology of positivism’s counter-discourse, Marxism, both generated from the same ground (Foucault, 1973) of a materialist metaphysics, and each dialectically the condition of the post-atomic dysfunctional sovereignty of the “grammar of regularities” of the other.

The anthropologist, Legesse, has pointed to the extent to which we are trapped in the ordering “categories and prescriptions” of our epistemic orders. He notes, however, that the liminal groups of any order are the ones most able to “free us” from these prescriptions, since it is they who existentially experience the “injustice inherent in structure” (Legasse, 1973), that is, in the very ordering of
the order which dictates the “grammar of regularities” through which the systemic subjects perceive their mode of reality as isomorphic with reality in general. The normative categories of any order—for example the aristocratic category of European feudalism—are normative precisely because the structure of their lived experience is isomorphic with the representation that the order gives itself of itself. The liminal categories like those of the bourgeoisie in the feudal order of things, on the other hand, experience a structural contradiction between their lived experience and the grammar of representations which generate the mode of reality by prescribing the parameters of collective behaviors that dynamically bring that “reality” into being. The liminal frame of reference, therefore, unlike the normative, can provide what Uspenskij et al call the “outer view,” from which perspective the grammars of regularities of boundary and structure-maintaining discourses are perceptible, and Whatmough’s “external observer’s position” made possible.

What the calls for New Studies at first overlooked, however, was precisely the regularities which emerged into view in the wake of the “diverse modalities of protest” whose non-coordinated yet spontaneous eruption now brought into unconcealedness—not only the lawlike rule-governed nature of the exclusion of the diverse protesting groups/categories as group-subjects from any access to the means of representation, but also the regularities of the exclusion of their frames of reference and historical/cultural past from the normative curriculum, an exclusion so consistent as to be clearly also rule-governed. This consistency was reinforced by the emergence of the equation between the group/categories excluded from the means of representation and the ratios of their degrees of socio-economic empowerment/disempowerment in the world outside.

The dynamic presence of rule-governed correlations which determined rules of in/exclusion, was, however, only perceivable by the non-orchestrated calls for New Studies, calls like “the diverse modalities of protest” in the Greek city states analysed by Detienne, which, by breaching parallel dietary and other rules, not only called the ontology of the religio-political order of the city-state into question, but made perceivable, through what they protested against, the founding Order/Chaos oppositional categories which underpinned the boundary/structure maintaining dynamics of the polis (Detienne, 1979).

These regularities pointed to a fundamental question which, at the time, remained unasked. It had to do with the anomalous implication that they were determined by rules which transcended the conscious intention of the academics who enacted the decision-making processes as to what to in/exclude, just as the rules of inference of Galileo’s doctors of philosophy were dictated by the ratiomorphic apparatus or rational world view based on the a priori of an order of value between the imperfect terrestrial and the crystalline perfection of the lunar realm: the Order/Chaos opposition of the autopoietic dynamics of the Christian medieval-system ensemble. What, in this case, then, determined the rules which determined the decision-
making processes by which individual scholars, working with integrity and according to the criteria of objective standards, in/excluded? What determined what should and should not be defined as American Fiction, and the mode of measure of the "objective" standards of individual scholars?

The question was not to be asked, however, until the after side of the experience of disillusion which the callers all underwent and which David Bradley traces in his article, "Black and American in 1982." For it was to be a recognition, made by us all on the other side of that experience, of the existence of objective limits to the incorporation of Blacks into the normative order of being/knowing of the present order, that would lead to our further recognition of the need for an epistemological break.

Bradley was one of a group of Blacks for whom Affirmative Action, by countering the "inbuilt distribution bias" of the dynamics of the order, had worked. The interference of Affirmative Action with the normative functioning of the order with respect to the distribution—at the group category level—of unequal ratios of access to educational empowerment, had enabled Bradley, together with a group of young Blacks like himself, to breach the rule-governed nature of the proscription which confined Blacks-as-a-group to a secondary educational orbit, relative to their White peers-as-a-group. Bradley at the time, observing his father's great joy, had determined to do everything to prove his father's and his own private hope true. His father's hope was that at long last Blacks were to be allowed to break out of the secondary orbit to which their lives and dreams had been confined, and if this hope would not be realized in time for his own life to be graced by the change, it would in time at least be realized for his son's. Bradley's own hope had been that once Blacks were included in vast numbers in the highest levels of higher education, and had worked hard and proved themselves, they would be so numerous, so no longer the token exception, that they would eventually have to be distinguished by criteria other than by "the uniform of skin." However, he experienced on the campus both the overt and covert forms of anathematization which met the breaching of the interdiction that the black presence-as-a-group implied (since what Hofstadter calls the category structure of the "representational system" "America" is based on the dynamics of the contradiction between individual equality and group hierarchy). These experiences slowly stripped away the illusion of any fundamental change in the ordering of group relations. The shouts of "Nigger! Nigger!" in the citadel of reason in the heart of the non-redneck campus, the phoned bomb threats, the fragile defenselessness of the Black students in the face of a mindless hostility, the ineffective wringing of hands of concerned Liberal Whites, were paralleled by the more discreet acts of partition (Dettienne, 1979) by university administrators, whose proscription of the financially starved Black Culture Center, always a whitewashed rotting house to be reached by a scramble up a muddy bank, mainly always on the nether edge of campus, once again gave the rule-governed regularity of the game away.
Blacks would be allowed on the campus as a group, admitted to have even a culture, as long as this “culture” and its related enclave studies could be made to function as the extra-cultural space, in relation, no longer to a Wasp, but now more inclusively to a White American, normatively Euroamerican intra-cultural space; as the mode of Chaos imperative to the latter’s new self-ordering. (The re-adapted Western culture Core Curriculum is the non-conscious expression of this more “democratizing” shift from Wasp to Euro.) Indeed once this marginalization had been effected, the order of value recycled in different terms, with the category homeostasis returning to its “built in normalcy,” the abuse and the bomb threats ceased. Order and Chaos were once more in their relational interdefining places, stably expressing the bio-ontological principle of Sameness and Difference of the present order, as the rule-governed discourse of Galileo’s doctors of philosophy functioned to verify the physico-ontological mode of Sameness and Difference on which the Christian medieval order rested before the Studia and Copernicus, before the Jester’s heresy of the figures of rogue/clown/fool, had pulled the “high seriousness” of its self-justifying self-representation down to earth.

Bradley now recognized that he had been wrong to hope that Black lives, from his father’s to his own, had to “run along the same line... one that rises and falls like a sine wave,” one that is “a graphed function not of a mathematical relation between sides and angles but of a social relationship between Blacks and American society itself.” Sometimes the line could be “on the positive side of the base line,” at other times on the negative side. If the effects were different, the function had always to remain the same. Thus his hope for the next generation of Blacks, in this case for his young godson, would have to be cut down to realistic size. His hope could only now be that by the time his godson came of age, the “graph of black will once again be on the upswing,” giving him, as Bradley himself had had, “a little time to gain some strength, some knowledge, some color to hold inside himself.” For that would/could be, “all the hope there is.”

Yet the beginning of hope also lay here. The recognition of the regularities pointed outside the “functional rhetoric” of the Liberal creed to the existence of objective limits and, therefore, of laws of functioning which, beyond the conscious intentionalities of their subjects—White or Black—determined the limits to the order’s normative incorporation of those whose lives in a “free” country had to be made to serve as the “graphed function” of the boundary maintaining system, as its markers of Chaos, the Not-U5s.

The Spanish historian Américo Castro had noted the existence of this systemic function of Blacks in the comparison he made between their function and that of Jew and Moor in sixteenth-century Spain. Although converted Christians and, therefore, “according to the gospel and the sacraments of the Church,” forming a part of the “mystical Body of Christ and His Church,” these categories had been stigmatized as being of unclean blood and heretical descent (i.e., not
Spanish-Christian). Their proscribed lives—they were excluded from jobs; many were burnt at the stake by the Inquisition for "heresy"—enabled them to function as the mode of Difference from which the new secularizing bonding principle of limpieza, which came to constitute the “boundary maintaining system” of the Statal Group Subject of monarchical Spain, could be generated as an ontologized principle of Sameness. Here Américo Castro pointed to the regularity of the parallel by which the subordination of the lives of the category-bearers of difference to their “grasped function” is repeated in the lives of present day American Blacks, who are today re-enacting and “living a drama similar to that of the Spanish moriscos and Jews,” even though according to the Constitution they form part of the American We (Américo Castro, 1977) or group-Subject.

Only with their complete strategic marginalization did the by now bantustanized enclave studies begin to rethink their function: to grasp a connection with that of the Liminal outsider Jester’s role of the original Studia, a role to which they were heir. This became clear as they began to take as their parallel objects of inquiry the representations which had been made of their groups by the order of discourse of mainstream scholarship; as they began to find that these representations, too, functioned according to across the board, objective rules.

What was here revealed, when taken all together, were the regularities of the “figuring” of an Other excluded series, with the discourse functioning to constitute them as a “human species” totemic operator which paralleled that of the “animal species” totemic operator of traditional Neolithic societies as well as the planetary grid of the Christian medieval order. This discourse, then, operated to serve the same extra-cognitive function of Ptolemaic astronomy in the Middle Ages. It re-enacted the celestial/terrestrial physico-ontological principle of Difference in new terms: this time in terms of a bi-ontological principle of Sameness/Difference, expressed, not in the Spirit/Flesh order of value of the Christian-medieval order, but in the rational/irrational mode of Order/Chaos of our own.

Whatever the group—women, natives, niggers—whatever the category—the Orient, Africa, the tropics—the ordering principle of the discourse was the same: the figuration of an ontological order of value between the groups who were markers of “rationality” and those who were the markers of its Lack-State. And the analyses which had begun to perceive the lawlike regularities of these ordering discourses went from Virginia Woolf’s observation of the compulsive insistence by “angry male professors” on the mental inferiority of women, through Carter G. Woodson’s diagnosis (1935) of the lawlike manner in which the curriculum in American schools distorted history so as to represent the Whites as everything and the Blacks as nothing, to Aime Cesaire’s Discourse on Colonialism, which again diagnosed the regularities with which the colonizers rewrote the past to show themselves as having done everything and the colonized nothing, and, more recently Abdel Malek’s/Edward Said’s dissection of the phenomenon of Orientalism. What began to come clear was
the reality of the reflex automatic functioning of rules of figuration, parallel to those of Galileo’s doctors of philosophy, which went beyond the intentionality of the objectively rational scholar, rules which then revealed that the objectivity was that of the ratiomorphic apparatus or cognitive mechanism of our present organization of knowledge, one by which we are all, including the liminal Others, non-consciously governed.

A parallel suspicion of something automatic functioning beyond the conscious control of the human had impelled the exchange of letters between Einstein and Freud, which was to be published under the title, *Why War?*. In the early decades of the century Einstein had written Freud, asking if his new discipline could provide some hope with respect to, and in the context of, the acceleration of the phenomenon of inter-human wars. Freud had responded that there was his theory of the instincts but that as yet he had no overall answer. Psychology as a discipline, however, was to confront the question by focussing on the connection between the phenomenon of nationalism and the processes of socialization which exacerbated nationalist allegiances as a primary causal factor. And in his *History of Sexuality*, Michel Foucault suggested that with the shift from the monarchical order of things to the bourgeois order in its pure state—the transposition from a governing figurative “symbolic of blood” to what might be called a “metaphorics of naturality” in which the bourgeoisie comes to image its boundary-maintaining Group-Subject system on the analogy of a living organism—the imperative of the self-preservation of the “natural community” (nation-Volk, race, culture) metaphorically ontologized as a “biological” Body, had led to the acceleration of wars between men who were now led to imagine themselves, for the first time in human history, as “natural beings.”

Recently Lewis Thomas, the biologist, has again focussed on the connection between nationalism—which he sees as an evolutionary blind alley for the human as a species—and the threat of nuclear extinction. Like Einstein earlier, Thomas has glimpsed that hope, if it is to exist, would have to be found in a new order of knowledge. And he suggests that the disciplines that were concerned with the problems of human behavior, although still in a groping uncertain stage, are the only ones capable of providing an answer to mankind’s quest for social hope; that one day there would emerge from these uncertain attempts, a “solid” discipline as “hard” as physics, plagued “as physics still is with ambiguities” yet with new rules “and new ways of getting things done, such as for instance getting rid of patriotic rhetoric and thermonuclear warfare all at once.”

The proposal I am making is that such a discipline can only emerge with an overall rewriting of knowledge, as the re-enacting of the original heresy of a *Studia*, reinvented as a science of human systems, from the liminal perspective of the “base” (Dewey, 1950) new Studies, whose revelatory heresy lies in their definition of themselves away from the Chaos roles in which they had been defined—Black from Negro, Chicano from Mexican-American, Feminists from
Women, etc. For these have revealed the connection between the way we identify ourselves and the way we act upon/know the world. They have made clear that we are governed in the way we know the world by the templates of identity or modes of self-troping speciation, about which each human system auto-institutes itself, effecting the dynamics of an autopoetics, whose imperative of stable reproduction has hitherto transcended the imperatives of the human subjects who collectively put it into dynamic play. The proposed science of human systems, therefore, decenters the systemic subject. Instead, it takes as the object of its inquiry the modes of symbolic self-representation (Creutzfeld, 1979), about which each human system auto-institutes itself, the modes of self-troping rhetoricity through which the Subject (individual/collective) actualizes its mode of being as a living entity. In addition, it takes the ratiomorphic apparatus or episteme, which exists as the enabling rational world view of the self-troping mode of being as an object of inquiry in the comparative context in which it is definable as one of the cognitive mechanisms determined by the “psychogeny” of the human rather than by the phylogeny of purely biological organisms.

Taking the connection that Thomas makes between “patriotic rhetoric” and “thermo-nuclear warfare” as a key linkage, a science of human systems will take most crucially as an object of its inquiry the modes of cultural imagination of human systems—Jerison’s “imagery systems”—together with the laws of functioning of the rhetorically coded mode of figuration, which, with its internal mediation of the mimesis of Desire (Girard, 1965) and of Aversion (Fanon, 1967), orients the normative seeking/avoiding/knowing behaviors of the systemic subjects. For it is this governing system of figuration generated from the mode of self-definition which integrates with the neurophysiological machinery of the brain, that functions as the shared integrative mechanism, determining not only the mode of consciousness or “world of mind” of the order, but serving also, at the aesthetico-affective level of the order, to stabilize the response to the target-stimuli of Desire for all that is the Self/Order and of Aversion to all that is the Chaos of the Self, the Death of its Life. It is by thereby securing shared and predictably functioning endogenous waveshapes in the brain (Thatcher/John, 1977), of the normative Subject of the order, that the system of figuration sets limits to that Subject’s mode of imagining its Self/Group-Self and, therefore, to the knowledge that it can have of its world.

A science of human systems which takes the laws of figuration of human systems as its objects of inquiry must, therefore, adopt a synthetic rather than categorized approach to its subject. In order to study their rhetor-neurophysiological laws of functioning, it must above all breach the distinction between brain/minds, the natural and the human sciences. For one of its major hypotheses is that systems of figuration and their group-speciating Figuration-Work essentially constitute the shared governing rhetor-neurophysiological programs or abduction schemas through which human Group Subjects realize themselves as boundary maintaining systems.
These governing rhetor-neurophysiological programs—which can often function as regressive defects of social fantasy (Thatcher/John 1977), as in the case of limpieza de sangre and of Aryaness, as well as of an ontologized “whiteness”—are the mechanisms which determine the limits of the figuratively coded “boundary-maintaining” systems. They then function, as in the case of the American order, to set objective limits (such as those to Bradley’s hopes) to the definition of its fiction; and to the possible non-proscription of the Black Culture Center at the nether edge of the campus, as the physical expression of the rhetorical configuration of the mode of chaos to the order’s self-trooping definition of itself. Hence the paradox of the major proposal that we make: that it is the literary humanities which should be the umbrella site for the trans-disciplinary realization of a science of human systems.

The archaeologist McNeill argues that the representational arts have played a central role in all human orders, reaching from simple tribal societies to our more complex contemporary ones, and this role has been that of explaining the world not in terms of factuality but of religious schemas from some mythology. These schemas—the phenomenon defined by Bateson as the informing morphogenetic fantasy, by Winch as the schemas which encode the order’s conception of Life/Death—once in place, function as the “independently real” (Winch, 1970) for that society, orienting behaviors. McNeill further argues that “literature and the humanities in general,” as the modern form of these representational arts, should be “studied objectively from the outside” just as ethnographers would investigate “the parallel arts in tribal societies” (McNeill, 1981). If these propositions have validity, the major paradox would seem to be that the literary humanities, as they were organized in the context of the nineteenth century’s re-ordering of the episteme—a conceptual-organizational frame in which they still function—were set up precisely to guard against any such heretical co-identification. It was a frame that posited the “civilized,” defined by its having a written literature, against the “primitive,” defined by its Lack; human groups studiable from the external observer’s position of Western anthropologists against the West’s “native model of reality” seeable by its native subjects within the limits of its governing episteme as isomorphic with reality itself (Legesse, 1974). A reality (and its literary artifacts) then, without the possibility of an external observer’s position, with the latter ungraspable as a unique variant of the continuum of the representational arts common to all modes of human-kind.

Since the 1960s, however, with the advent of structuralism and of deconstruction, literary studies have become the discipline most aware of the problem of the “external observer”; of how to find a metalinguage which could enable the human observer to step outside the “normative pathos” of the order of discourse of the “figural domain” (Norris, 1982). The dimensions of this break must be seen in the context of the normative order against which it transgressed. As Foucault points out, with the mutation of the episteme in the nineteenth
century, and the reorganization of the system of knowledge whose new function was to constitute “man” as an “empirico-
transcendental doublet,” literary studies came to play a specific role/function in the overall schema of the new episteme (Foucault, 1973). For in the new system of figuration and of its conception of Life/Death—in which man was imagined as a “natural being”—“literature” came to function as the transcendentalized index of the degree of “Culture” which the biological heredity of the Group Subject was imagined to have led it to achieve. For Culture, in the new episteme, now took the place that Reason had played in the Classical episteme, as the index of the degree of that human being which “knew” Self/World in the context of the program of prejudices of the new rational world view; as the index, therefore, of the Group-Subject’s ratio of bio-ontological value, the value which enables it to transcend the mere physical materiality of less endowed human Group Subjects.

In this projected schema literature was the highest manifestation of language, as differing languages (e.g., Schlegel’s “organic” and noble Indo-European languages versus the non-organic and egoistic Semitic) were now the index of the superior or inferior Will or élan vital of differing peoples, of “the fundamental will that keeps a whole people alive and gives it the power to speak a language belonging solely to itself” (Foucault, 1973). And “Literature” was the very incarnation of this defining language, of the collective dynamic impulse of a people represented as incarnated in its poetry, drama, fiction, in a word in its “high” Culture which expressed the unique self-transcendence of a particular people.

Further, as philology’s subject, language became more and more knowable; literature as the Incarnation of transcendence was now represented as having no other law, except that of “affirming its own precipitous existence.” Thus as the transcendent expression of the Group Self, studied in national departments of literature, as such, literature became more and more impenetrable to knowledge. No longer having anything to do with values as in the eighteenth century its discourse became totally unyoked from that of ideas (Foucault, 1973). And its narrative representations, set apart from all other forms of discourse, were now to be deciphered—rather than cognized as artifacts/powerfacts—with taste and sensibility, within what de Man defines as the “ethical coercion of their normative pathos” (Norris, 1982).

The humanist, Blackham, argued that while literature is comprised of works in which man makes an object of himself, the study of these objects, unlike the objects of the natural sciences, can be of no public utility since they can provide “no formulate truths about man,” that, rather, their study was instead intended to “humanize” by enabling the “contemplation of Man in his Works.” This formulation precisely expresses the role in which literary studies had been “interned” in the knowledge order of the nineteenth-century episteme. And from this would grow the conviction of its irrelevance, that it had nothing to contribute to the kind of knowledge “available to the needs of mankind.”
Here, too, can be seen the logic of the definition of American Fiction, since the contemplation of Man in his Works was the contemplation of the natural/national Group Subject in its works. Literature now functioned as the transcendent expression of the Group Subject as a boundary-maintaining system which set itself apart from that which was Not-the-Self, demarcating the Group Subject from the Chaos of the merely physical animality of those—the raw to its cooked, the nature to its culture—who had not attained to such an expression by reason of an innately determined biogenetic principle of difference. Thus those groups who were the markers of its mode of Nature to its mode of Culture had, figuratively and logically, to be excluded from any such co-definition.  

Here, too, a regularity appears between the exigencies of the rules of definition/exclusion and of the exigencies of the figuring of the Other (Said, 1975) in each human order of discourse. For if the exigencies of the latter must domesticate the figuring of the Other to the structuring logic of the Order/Chaos modality of the specific human system, the exigency of the former, that is, to define itself by detaching itself from what it is not, is quite clearly carried out by the definition of American Literature.

Hegel’s “analysis” of the “negro,” in his *The Philosophy of World History*, as “the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state,” is to the point. Since “nothing harmonious with humanity [was] to be found in his character,” so that even if the Mohammedan religion had managed to bring him within the range of culture, left to himself, the “negro’s lack of self control” made him “impossible of development or culture.” As we note in this discourse, Lack-of-Culture has taken the place of Lack-of-Reason as the Chaos state of the new order, as in the royal dynastic order of Iron Age East Africa in which Lack-of-the-Bakama-cult had taken the place of the earlier template of identity, Lack-of-the-Bacwezi, as the new figuration of the conception of Life/Death, the conception whose laws of Order/Chaos figuration are universally applicable to human systems.

If the Hegelian discourse functions to fit the Black to the exigencies of expressing the *a priori* of a bioontological principle of Sameness and Difference, it is within the same governing laws of figuration and its internal logic that the Black Culture Center was proscribed to exist on the nether edge of the campus. It functioned as the target stimuli of aversion, with respect to the Euroamerican order at the center of the campus, which is then enabled to function as the object stimuli of desire. The relation, functioning dually at empirical and at valorizing levels, if stably kept in phase, ensures the stable production of the same shared endogenous waveshapes, in Black students as well as Whites—the same shared normative seeking/valuing, avoiding/devaluing behaviors. Hence the paradox that, after the turbulence of the 1960s and the 1970s the Black Culture Centers in their nether-edge-of-the-campus place function to enable the recycling (in cultural rather than racial terms) of the Order/Chaos dynamics of the system-ensemble. In effect they functioned/function to return it to the in-phase coherence of a category-structure in which Black would remain to White, Afro- to Euro-, non-Western cultures to
Western, as the Bacwezi to the Bakama of the Iron Age royal dynasty.

Since the proscription is effected and kept in play by a governing mode of the cultural imagination induced by the rhetorical strategies of the Figuration-Work of its abduction schema or morphogenetic fantasy (Bateson, 1979), it is only the discipline of literary scholarship, whose normalizing role is ordered by this very schema, that possesses the rhetorical technē, inherited from the founding heresy of the Studia as well as from the long practice of working with the figurative logic of poetry and fiction, not only to take our governing modes of figuration and their feats of "semantic engineering" (Maranda, 1980) as the objects of inquiry, but also to reveal the laws of human behavior as that behavior is ordered by projected verbal-rhetorical schemas: the laws of human systems, whose structuring Order/Chaos oppositions are the human version of what Dawkins calls the universally applicable replicator units or systemic codes (Dawkins, 1983) which everywhere function to absolutize the modes of our always rhetorical "natures"; the natures whose bonding topoi determine how we think about Self/World.

As Norris points out, this key question of the metaphoricity of our thought, a proposal which at once re-enacts the heresy of the original humanists' equation of rhetoric and philosophy, had been raised quite some time ago by I.A. Richards. The latter had pointed out that all thought was metaphoric, proposing that an attempt should be made to secure a "discussable science" which could develop the implications of this with respect to human knowledge. The problem that Richards overlooked, however, Norris argues, was that of finding a metalanguage by which one "could step outside the limits of the figural domain and survey its peculiar contours" (Norris, 1982).

Piaget points out that the child moves out of the stage of his body-ego bound centricity in which he reduces the object to his perception of it, only when he experiences friction between how he sees the object and how others see it. The proposal here is that the positing of an "external observer" with respect to the inside of the "figural domain" of each human order can be effected by adopting the bootstrap model offered by some quantum physicists. This model envisages the bringing together of that which is observed from many different observer positions, enabling each to extend and to cancel out elements of the other. In this context it can be seen that it was only when the observations made from the differing perspectives of all those who called for new areas of Studies were brought together, that each group was able to escape its own form of solipsism and to observe regularities and common features pointing to the functioning of rules of discourse beyond the conscious awareness of the discursive Subject, rules which were "built in" and therefore normally invisible.

These observations, from differing observer positions yet all pointing to a rule-governed discourse generated from the normative observer position of mainstream scholarship, could now begin to provide it—and in this sense, Said's Orientalism, although limited to one aspect, was an Event—with the kind of friction that would enable
it to become conscious of the relativity of its own viewpoint as the viewpoint of the ratiomorphic apparatus of a specific template of human identity.

The spearheading of this thrust towards an external observer position will be necessarily carried out by those Liminal categories who existentially experience the mode of Chaos to the mode of order of the governing system of figuration, whose will to affirmation, like that of the original humanists, depends on the unwriting/rewriting of the present schema and order of knowledge.

As Dewey points out, the insistence on the knowability of the celestial laws of functioning of the Divine Creation by means of “mechanical formulae” was necessarily spearheaded by the “base” artisans who had to do with mechanics, or by those not too distant in the social sphere, all of whose will to affirmation was confined in the social parallelism of the conceptual schema according to which the celestial creation was unknowable by merely human cognition. Thus while knowing the heavens by base mechanical formulae would seem sacrilegious to the normative groups of the order, it would be the “base” fellows who would have an interest in effecting this knowability, sweeping away the order of value between the highest, the “celestial,” and the lowest, the sphere of the earth, of the mechanical (Dewey, 1950).

Equally, the New Studies, stigmatized as “subjective”—with the most stigmatized of all sited in the Black Culture center—will have every interest in challenging an order of figuration which programs their own negation, in sweeping away the distinction of objective/subjective within the general question of the metaphoricity and relativity of all human modes of knowledge. It will also have every interest in proposing that we come to know the sociohuman world we inhabit according to laws of functioning made graspable from an external observer’s position, itself made possible by the application of “rhetorical formulae” to the regularities of representation whose authority of reference is the abductive schemas or morphogenetic fantasy that function to ontologize and absolutize the instituting analogy—man as a natural being—in relation to which, normatively, we infer the world according to the analogy’s oppositional conception of Life/Death, Order/Chaos, and to its necessarily materialist metaphysics.

As Dewey also points out, it was the democratizing movement of social transformation which emancipated human knowledge of Nature from its subordination to metaphysical purposes. This egalitarian movement was to be the condition of possibility for the rise of the natural sciences and, with the insight from Copernicus to Galileo to Newton, for the conclusion that there was no ontological order of value between the heavens and the Earth, since there is a “homogeneity of material processes everywhere throughout the world.”

It is in this context, from the frame of reference of the Black Culture Center—which refuses the stigmatization of so-called “primitive” cultures as the Lack-state of the civilized, and sees itself as the
bearer, in Gowlett’s terms, of the “long perspective” on the human—that a re-definition of the concept of the *Studia Humanitatis* is proposed, one which reenacts in different terms the founding heresy of the *Studia*. For it proposes the long processes of the self-making (i.e., the hominization of the human and of its corpus of narrative representations, all functioning according to equally applicable laws, from the figuration-work of Iron Age East Africa to that of Hegel’s philosophy) as the proper sphere of the humanitas now conceived as isomorphic with the global human rather than with merely its Indo-European expression.

But since the “negro” as a category of the human was only constituted and constitutable by the great rupture that transformed the *mythos* and *theologos* into a secular order of things, it also insists on the uniqueness of those narratives defined as “literature” precisely because of the new role that these ordering narratives of secular man, whose mode of being would be imperatively global, would play. Here the view from the Black Culture Center puts the emphasis on the new function of literature—in a world no longer sustained by the *uctoritas* of the suprasensory—as itself the new *uctoritas* for the secular modes of the cultural imagination. The absolutization apparatus of such an imagination was no longer the higher system of the gods, but rather the powerful rhetorical strategies of the systems of figuration which imaged the new secular conceptions of Life/Death by which the human would now orient itself. Its mode of human being would be mediated not by gods but by metaphors. The view from the Black Culture Center therefore insists, heretically, that far from “literature having no function,” as it is assumed, it is we who are the function. It is as specific modes of imagining subjects of the aesthetic orders which literature’s figuration-Word weaves in great feats of rhetorical engineering that we come to imagine/experience ourselves, our modes of being.

Since it is in the narrative representations of literature that the data exists, it is here that “formulable truths” are to be made about the laws of functioning of human motivations/behaviors, as well as about the modes of cultural imagination through which the human is constituted as Subject. And this leads to a new conceptual synthesis.” It is by taking as the object of our inquiry the mode of imagination of each order as it is constituted by the governing imagery/figuration systems generated from the bonding *topoi* and their related structural oppositions—the integrative mechanisms which, working with the neurological hyperneurons of the brain, produce the phenomenon we know as mind or, rather, modes of mind—that the psychogenetic reality of the human can be known.

While the laws of figuration are quite clearly applicable from myth to a present day poem, literature in secular societies would have to play a role/function no longer sustained by the gods. One might say it would have to take their place. For if, as Creutzfeld argues, our brains function by and through the modes of symbolical self-representation, and if their constitution of world is as real to us as is physical reality, then the mode of self-representation through which
the first form of secular man auto-speciated it/himself, as well as the "real world" this new form constitutes, would have now to be canonized, no longer in religio-aesthetic, but in purely aesthetic terms. Hence, in secular society, literature as well as the arts in general would come to play a ritual canonizing function. In place of the religious schemas, whose systems of figuration would become increasingly privatized, it would generate powerful new imaginary schemas. And their conception of Life/Death would now orient behaviors. At the same time, their rhetorically powerful hero-figures—in the same way as Christian saints had functioned for the suprasensorily guaranteed medieval society—would incarnate secular normative ideals/models of identity generated from the emerging topos underlying the more inclusive orders of European post-feudal society. These new systems of figuration would thereby effect an ongoing evolutionary shift at the level of the aesthetic processes of co-identification, which would accompany the evolution- ary processes of human epistemology.

Since these aesthetic orders are coded by our narrative representations, with the shift to the secular order, literary critics took, in a sense, the place of the theologians in keeping the new imaginative schemas in phase and free from aesthetic pollution, an ever present danger from Hitler's Germany to today's mass pornography. Within the context of a science of human systems, however, literary critics would now have to function, in Paolo Valesio's terms, as rhetoricians rather than as rhetors, diagnosticians rather than as "grammarians" (Legesse, 1973), outside what de Man calls the "normative pathos" of the figural domain that constitutes each order. They would have to find the view of the external observer, using the rhetorical/neurophysiological techne, which takes the Figuration-Work of the texts, whose projected schemas function as the auctoritas of the mode of self-imaging of the secular human subject, as its domain of investigation. It would then seek for the regularities of practices by which old templates of identity are stabilized and new templates and their modes of imagining are brought into being by the rupture precipitated by great feats of poetic semantic engineering. It would, that is, seek for the modes of imagining, knowledge of which would make human behavior predictable. For it is the mode of the imagining of Self/Not Self that constitutes the integrative unthought and rhetorical structural opposition encoded in the analogue system of the brain's right hemisphere. And it is these that orient and stabilize the mode of mimetic desire (Girard, 1966) and mimetic aversion (Fanon, 1964): at once the human form of the seeking/avoiding mechanisms of biological organisms and the dynamic expression of the conception of Life/Death, of Agathos/Deilos, that is everywhere the Original Cause (Riedl/Kaspar, 1984) and telos-orienting purpose which motivates all modes of the psychogenetic behaviors we define as "human."

For the first time in the history of humankind we are now confronted with a common environment. As a post-atomic one, it challenges us with the demand that we reinvent our present conflictive
modes of group integration. This demand implies that we must now consciously alter our mode of self-troping, together with the related orienting desire/aversion machinery of our orders of discourse and the related semantic charter (Maranda, 1980) or rhetor-neuro-physiological program that constitutes our "world of mind." This is the price, in the face of the possibility of our extinction, of our self-realization as a species. Thus, re-reading the texts from the perspective of their configuring function in the rhetorico-symbolic processes of human auto-speciation constitutes for literary criticism its Copernican epistemological break. It is this break, we propose, that would enable the literary humanities to appropriate the "external observer's" multiple and polyglossic (Bakhtin, 1981) frame of reference, the frame inserted by the "base" new studies, as well as by the Derridean and de Manian de-figurationism, the Girardian thesis of human desire as always mimetic, and the Fanonian concept of learned self-aversion (with all these giving new turns to Levi-Strauss's founding binary oppositions) within the overall context of Valesio's proposed new disciplinary matrix of a rhetorics. It is this break/turn that would enable the literary humanities to re-enact the original heresy of the Studia and to recapture its contestatory dynamic within the matrix of a science of human systems.

Such an epistemological break would call for the kind of re-reading of all texts and narrative representations of the past that could isolate and identify the feats/strategies of poetic and semantic engineering (Maranda, 1980) by which discontinuities were effected from one order of discourse to the other; by which an earlier and more particularistic conception of Life/Death and figuration of Desire/Aversion was re-figured into a new and more inclusive mode of "human nature," as one aesthetic-affective order based on an imagined mode of Sameness/Difference and its related "world of mind" (Creutzfeld, 1979) was configured, transumed/sublated into another.

There has been no other discontinuity more dramatic and epoch-making than the shift effected by the figurative discourse that was humanism, by its teaching office, the Studia, and by what Dewey called the "daring astronomers." This discontinuity was simply the shift from the traditionally religious conception of Life/Death to the first form of a secular one. And the mutation at the level of the aesthetic-affective—the most recalcitrant to transformation—was, as Bakhtin reminds us, effected by the carnivalesque projection of the parodic forms of the Clown, the Fool, the Rogue; forms which pulled the high seriousness of the self-dissolving Late Middle Ages down to earth (Bakhtin, 1981), clearing the space for the retroping, the re-imagining of the Self/Group-Self.

However, after the medieval mode of imagination had been undermined by subversive laughter, a new space, a new ordering discourse and self-projection had to be re-constituted. And this was to be the central function of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European dramatic genre with its new range of heroes/villains, incarnating the structural oppositions that configured and gave expres-
sion to the first forms of the secular conception of Life/Death, re-
modelling the post-theological logical mode of the human
imagination in its first dynamic form. Thus old interdictions gave way
to new.

If in Golden Age Spain (sixteenth/seventeenth centuries),
where the structural opposition shifted—in the context of the rise of
the more inclusive order which displaced that of the medieval system
ensemble—from Noble/Non-Noble, Spirit/Flesh to Limpio/non Limpio
(Clean/not clean, of descent and Christian faith), and a real life Black
figure, Juan Latino, a slave, Humanist/poet, and Professor of Latin,
projected as a hero figure in a play of the same name,” can wed his
Desdemona, with the villain figures being Jew and Moor, in the
parallel case of Shakespeare’s Othello the outcome is more
complexly other. If the ceremony is found within the logic of the meta-
phorics of the Spanish play, in Othello—the play whose post-
Reformation referential life world, England, is already caught up in the
dynamic of a thorough-going secularizing historical process which
will determine its rise to world supremacy as Spain’s empire begins to
decline—the ceremony, as Bishop finely images, is found only
clandestinely. It is then lost, and only “found” poetically with
Othello’s “dying upon a kiss.” For the outcome of both plays is pre-
determined by the differing bonding topos from which these are
generated.

The metaphorics of the first play is generated from the specific
bonding topos of conlimpieza (we-who-are-the-same-clean descent/
Faith-nature) of the post-feudal Spanish monarchical order. Here the
shift from the Noble as Norm to the Limpio monarchical Subject as
Norm (from Noble Blood to Clean Blood as the metaphysical measure
of Being) was socially emancipatory for the non-nobly-born Spaniards,
especially the new letrado category (Men-of-Letters vs. the Noble
Men-of-Arms) who staffed the Church and State of the first world
empire; the category of whom, the “naturally” intelligent, naturally
loyal/orthodox Juan Latino is the projection and “instrumental
signifier.” In Othello, the religio-secular topos of the Spanish play is
displaced—although Othello is the earlier play“—by the fully secular
topos of connaturality (we-who-are-of-the-same-naturally-noble-
nature), in this the first of its many to be transsumed variants. And if
Othello, in the context of these variants, functions on the one hand as
the projection of a new rising social force, that of the newly landed
gentry/upper mercantile bourgeoisie—for whom the codes of “natural
nobility” and of “natural honor” verified by honorable behavior, as
against the more exclusive nobility of birth, blood and honor as the
prerogative of descent, was emancipatory—he functions, on the other
hand, in relation to Iago as an other, marginalized, and yet prophetic
projection.

In the first projection, Othello incarnates the shift taking place
from Lanham’s “centered Christian self” to “rhetorical man,” and
from a suprasensorily ordered world to a secular self-ordering one. He
therefore self-orders his behavior according to the first secular self-
regulating code, that of Honor,” i.e., nihil magis honore. In this code
he is expected, if the configured natural-metaphysical order of the monarchical state is to be sustained, and Chaos not come again, to make use of his Natural Reason to order and govern both his household, his general’s command, and the passions of his lower “nature.” By doing this he acts as the Norm Subject of the order to put into play the “natural” ratio-ontological principle of Sameness that bonds the caste of the gentry and of Difference that separates this caste from the lower order. For it is this principle about which the secularizing new order auto-institutes itself, transmuting the earlier Spirit/Flesh opposition of the medieval topos of co-Christianity. The “tragic flaw” of Othello is that, in allowing the passion of his “unbookish” jealousy to cloud his reason, he makes it possible for his judgment of truth/non-truth to be manipulated by Iago. Thus, believing in the “ocular proof” of the handkerchief and in the abductive logic of Iago’s fabricated system of “evidence,” he infers/judges wrongly. He thereby transforms what, in the internal logic of the play was the obligation of honor to execute a wife caught in adultery, into a murder, one which, transgressing the State’s justice, “traduced” the State.

As the apotheosis of the self-regulating man of honor, Othello redeems himself at the end of the play by this time judging truly, sentencing and executing himself—“that in Aleppo once, where a malignant . . . Turk/ . . . traduc’d the state/ . . . I smote him, thus,”152 As the Othello manipulated by Iago, on the other hand, he functions as the inverse of this projection. In this dimension Othello is made “egregiously an ass” by Iago, a man of the middling classes aspiring to be professionally mobile in a world arranged to privilege the well-born Cassio or gifted nobly-born strangers like Othello, a man for whom success depends on his manipulating the honor code, feigning “honesty,” his word never his bond—“I am not what I am.” For by his animalizing of Othello—“a black ram topping a white ewe”—Iago, excluded from the caste of the noble gentry both allies himself with the senator Brabantio and the wealthy Rodrigo, ensuring their help in his attempt to secure the downfall of Othello, and bonds/classes himself with them on the basis of a new emergent code, that of a shared “natural value” rather than “nobility.” This code, which anticipates the full-fledged realization of the bourgeois over the monarchical order, makes possible a bio-ontological principle of Sameness and Difference, one whose figurative function is to transmute the caste principle of Noble Blood into the “race” principle of an innate biologically determined shared superiority, a mode of Sameness made possible by the mode of Difference of metaphysically excluded Others. As a result, while in the Spanish play, Juan Latino, the hero figure, the Metaphysical Other of Jew/Moor projected as villains, functions as the Lack-state of the naturally “clean” Spanish-born monarchical Subjects, the figure of Othello, represented in his animalized dimension (as contrasted with his apotheosis and self-execution as an Ideal man of honor) is projected as the very Lack of the human, as bio-ontologically inferior to the Venetians. He Thus prefigures, however briefly, the degrading “internments” of Undermen, under-classes, underpeoples, under-cultures, under-
creeds, that will be legitimated and determined by the abduction schema whose instituting analogy was to be that of the human as a "natural being" (Foucault, 1973).

It is in the "figural domain" of this mode of self/group/Self imagining, and of its mode of Sameness and Difference that the ceremony is still unfindable. Othello and Desdemona still meet clandestinely, and Black culture centers remain proscribed by the laws of a Godelian type of internal consistency on the nether edge of the campuses; proscribed along with the revelatory heresy of the self-defining, self-trooping, yet always systemic rhetoricity of all modes of human being. And it is this definition, made into a priestly Absolute, together with its related bio-ontological principle of Sameness and Difference, which traverses its speaking/imagining subjects and pre-determines the rule of in- and of ex-clusion that define American fiction. It is a definition, as Bradley noted, that, therefore, logically excludes Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*, a novel whose ludic moment of conversion (Girard, 1965) comes when the Narrator, awakening from the mimetic desire which had him chasing his "natural" and/or his "proletarian" and/or his "black" identity, breaks through all the interdictions and eats the proscribed Southern baked yam in the streets. He thereby re-enacts the subversive laughter of all the rogues/fools/clowns that ever brought the priestly forms of "high seriousness" down to earth, quipping "I Yam what I Yam!" The novel here parodically pulls down to earth the canonical models of Identity: the incest-dreaming Mr. Norton, the glass-eye-wearing Brother Jack, and, with them, the "true discourses" of Liberal positivism and Marxian eschatologism, laughing away the self-justifying pathos of their twin and conjoined heresies staled into orthodoxy. And it takes as the object of its irreverence the very system of figuration (the "inner eyes with which they look through their very physical eyes upon reality") whose rule-governed principle of Sameness and Difference excluded it from the definition "American Fiction." In the basement underworld of the novel's counter-metaphorics, the urban margins of Lanham's rhetorical man, the sound of Louis Armstrong's trumpet, that "lyrical beam of light," and his gravelly voice ("My only sin is in my skin/What did I do/To be so Black and blue?") re-enacts Galileo's telescope, challenging ontologies with the subversive sounds of the lumper-poetics of the Blues.

Both the Bakama/Bacwezi mythic narratives and the dramatic plots of the two plays, *Juan Latino* and *Othello*, all too briefly discussed here, reveal the "formulable truth" that all changes in human affairs—Bateson's mutation of abduction schemas when "thought itself becomes impossible" (Bateson, 1979)—although always brought about by a conjunction of factors, are experienced by humans as primarily transformations of the governing systems of figuration and of the shared systems of meaning of each order's semantic charter. The antithetical projection of hero-figures whose external "begrimed visages" contrast, in the one case, with the innate "natural limpieza" revealed by limpio/loyal behaviors, by a "natural" intelligence "unharmed as to salutary doctrine," and in the other, of
an innate villainy of an Iago whose exterior “fairness of visage” contradicts his “true” nature, effects an epochal shift from the explanatory hypothesis of Divine Causality to that of a Natural Causality, the shift which heralded the first form, at the level of the human, of the secular “order of things.” It is by means of such transformations as that from the religio-feudal to the secularizing monarchical order of figuration effected by the poetic re-engineering of the two seventeenth-century European plays referred to that the evolution of more inclusive modes of group integration, which are themselves linked, as Whyte and Habermas note, to increasingly generalizable concepts and evolutionary advances in the thrust of human cognitive mechanisms towards what Gellner calls “the autonomy and extra-territoriality of human cognition” (Gellner, 1974), are achieved. Nevertheless, as Habermas also notes, once put in place, systems of figuration/integration and their related system-preserving behaviors and “worlds of mind” or codes of knowledge/modes of imagination, can, even after they have lost their validity in a now transformed environment, remain as powerful barriers to the emancipation of the new human energies called for. Thus we remain in our present crisis, enthralled and made captive by the secular abductive schema of the nineteenth-century epistemese, and the self-regulating codes of Natural/Labor value, the codes which replaced that of “natural honor” just as Othello was replaced in the system of inference engineered by Iago until his disenchantment, by what one critic aptly calls the exorcism of Emilia, who, dying, deconstructs the system of inference and releases Othello and the world of the play from the wordcraft of Iago. For in that world, as in ours, “truth” was no longer guaranteed by the higher system of the suprasensory. From here on it would be up to the self-correcting processes of the cognitive mechanisms of the human.

Yet in a world in which even the self-correcting process of the natural sciences finds itself threatened by the increasing hegemony of a technoscientific which seeks to manipulate the physical processes of nature in order to enhance the military and economic power of some human groups over others, a counter-exertion is called for parallel to that of the Studia’s original heresy. The Studia must be reinvented as a higher order of human knowledge, able to provide an “outer view” which takes the human rather than any one of its variations as Subject; must be re-formulated as a science of human systems, which makes use of multiple frames of reference and of Valesio’s proposed rhetorical techne—the techne, perhaps of a rhetor-neuroscience?—to attain to the position of an external observer, at once inside/outside the figural domain of our order. As such a new cognitive mechanism it must, as we have proposed, take as its proper sphere what Gowlett calls the “long perspective” of the hominid-into-human self-making/modelling/figuring as this is documented and enacted in narrative representations, in art and ways of life, and in the laws of functioning of human behaviors which enable the autopoesis of each mode of the human. It is only, we propose, through the counter-exertion of such a new science that Bishop’s
ceremonies will be findable, that the hope sought by Bradley, Einstein, Freud, and Lewis Thomas, will be realizable, enabling us to write in our traumatic time with something of the certainty with which a Francis Bacon wrote in his:

And therefore it is fit that I set forth these conjectures of mine which make hope in this matter reasonable; just as Columbus did before that wonderful voyage of his across the Atlantic, when he gave the reasons for his conviction that new lands and continents might be discovered besides those which were known before; which reasons though rejected at first, were afterwards made good by experience, and were the causes and beginnings of great events.” (Francis Bacon, Novum Organon, 1620)

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NOTES


3 The phrase was used by Professor Christopher J. Lucas of the University of Missouri-Columbia, at an invitational seminar on civic learning and education of the teaching profession, hosted by the Hoover Institution, on November 11th, 1984. Lucas pointed out that “with the wholesale vocationalism of higher education, predictably has come the loss of a constituency for Liberal Studies generally and the humanities in particular. They have been left naked in the marketplace.” See the Stanford University Campus Report, Nov. 14, 1984.

4 Sir Stafford Beer explains the main underlying concept of “autopoiesis” put forward by Maturana and Varela. An autopoietic system is a homeostat, i.e., “a device for holding a critical system variable within physiological limits,” and in the case of autopoietic homeostasis the “critical variable is the system’s own organization.” Thus even if every “measurable property of that organizational structure changes utterly in the system’s process of continuing adaptation” it survives, i.e., the mode of organization which is its identity. Implicit in this context is that the living’s imperative is its realization rather than its mere self-preservation. As Maturana points out in his introduction, he and Varela were in search of a word which could formally define the central “feature of the organization of the living which is autonomy.” One day whilst talking with a literary critic who defined Don Quixote’s choice as that between arms (praxis) or letters (poesis), Maturana was struck by the power of the word “poiesis” and “invented the word that we needed, autopoiesis,” a word that “could directly mean what takes place in the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems” (Maturana and Varela. Autopoiesis, p. xvii).

5 The concept of human autopsiation is developed on the basis of the biologist Mayr’s concept of those “isolating mechanisms by means of which potentially inter-breeding organisms separate themselves off, placing reproductive barriers between themselves, with these barriers defining their boundaries,” i.e., speciating them. Analogously, human cultural systems or systems of
figuration are seen as doing the same thing for human groups, bonding them in shared systems of meaning, or “imagery systems” which place intercommunicating barriers between themselves and other human groups. See Mayr, *Evolution and the Diversity of Life: Selected Essays* (Cambridge, MA., 1976).

E. Grassi, *Humanismo y Marxismo: Critica de la Independización de la Ciencia* (Madrid, 1977), p. 79. Grassi’s main point is that Humanism in its original form has been misread and devalued by rationalist and Idealist thought, since the main target of this original humanism which took Cicero as its guide was its attack on all forms of abstract philosophy, and aprioristic thought, on their lack of local and temporal reference.

See G. Haupt, “In What Sense and To What Degree was the Russian Revolution a Proletarian Revolution,” in *Review*, Journal of the Ferdinand Braudel Study of Economics, Historical Systems and Civilizations, 111, No. 1 (1979). Haupt reveals the extent to which the Verbal Symbol “Proletarian,” used as the generic name for the many different forces which made up the Revolution, i.e., the peasants, the national minorities, and the relatively small force of industrial workers proper, was the decisive strategic weapon that Lenin used to organize support for the consolidation of Bolshevik power, to the detriment of both the peasants and the national minorities, all of whom lacked the powerful legitimating discourse based on the concept of the proletariat as the bearers of “Labor value” made into an ontological principle. This concept made degrees of skill and education the new criterion of status, leading to the hegemony of the New Class, that is of the *credential* rather than capital-owning middle classes. The thrust towards popular democracy of the Soviets was thereby stifled and displaced by the totalitarian regime of the Party, as the power fact of the credential middle classes.

In the Foreword to their book, Riedl/Kaspar differentiate their position from that of philosophical epistemology. Their intention is to “examine the basis of reason not merely from its internal principles, but from a comparative phylogenetic study of all cognitive processes.” What they study is therefore no longer identical “with the subject that gathers knowledge” but lies outside, whilst their method “remains that of a comparative natural science, avoiding the limitations arising when reason must establish itself on its own.” See Riedl, R. with Kaspar, R., *Biology of Knowledge: The Evolutionary Basis of Reason* (Chichester, New York, 1984).

Harold Morowitz, in support of his argument that the emergence of mind or consciousness with the human was a radical discontinuity in evolution, points out that the evolutionary biologist, Lawrence B. Slobodkin, identified the new feature at the origin of reflective thought, as a discontinuity which changed the rules, as that of an “introspective self-image.” It was this new property which made it impossible to assign major historical events to causes inherent in *biological* evolutionary laws. See Morowitz, H., “Rediscovering the Mind” in D. Hofstader and C. Dennett, eds. *The Mind’s Eye: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul* (New York, 1981).

Valesio developed this point in the course of contradicting Sartre’s attack on commonplaces as the enforcers of predictable behaviors i.e., “the valves lick!”). Valesio’s point here reinforces that of Lacan who argues that the “subject is not a ‘self’ which takes language from society as a tool since that language which generates the subject also constitutes society or culture” with the subject always having his language “in common with other subjects.” This is the relation defined by Collingwood as “collaboration,” Grice as the “cooperative principle” and Polanyi as “conviviality.” (This latter point is made by Loy D. Martin, in an article “Literary Invention: The Illusion of the Individual Talent” in Critical Inquiry, No. 4 (Summer, 1980).) See also P. Valesio, *Nova Antiqua: Rhetorics as a Contemporary Theory* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1980).

Daniel Sperber uses the term “symbolic mode of knowledge” to make a dis-
tinction between three modes of human knowing. The three are the encyclopedic, the semantic and the symbolic. Whilst the first deals with facts about the world and the second with facts about categories (a fox is an animal) the third deals with facts about other facts, with connotations such as, “cunning like a fox.” Such a term is an objectified construct, dependent on its being taken whole, with its logic being associational, functioning within a system of inference shared by all the other speakers. This kind of logic, it is proposed here, is related to the functions being attributed to the right hemisphere of the brain as research on this matter continues. Thus as M. Moskovich points out in his paper, “Stages of Processing and Hemispheric Differences in Language in the Normal Subject,” in M. Studdert-Kennedy, Psychobiology of Language (Cambridge, MA, 1983), pp. 103-04: “Apart from memory, the domain in which the right hemisphere’s contributions to verbal performance are most evident is not that of traditional linguistics, such as phonology, syntax and semantics, but rather the para-linguistic aspects of language such as intonation, emotional tone, context, inference, and connotation—in short those aspects of language that may be included as part of pragmatics, the discourse function of language. . . . Patients with right hemisphere damage . . . seem to have no difficulty comprehending individual sentences; but they do have difficulty relating a sentence to a larger context, understanding its emotional connotation, and drawing the proper inferences from it (Wapner et al, in press.) Without the right hemisphere, communication in its broadest sense, seems not to proceed normally.” See also Daniel Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism, trans. Morton (New York 1977).

12 Lévi-Strauss, in his explanation of the phenomenon known as “totemism,” points out that the reason why natural species are chosen has nothing to do with the fact of their being “good to eat” and everything to do with their being “good to think.” The proposal here is that the animal species grid and its system of differences and similarities are also chosen because they are good to absolutize with, enabling the humanly invented social divisions and status-organizing process to be represented as isomorphic with the divisions determined by physical nature. See C. Levi-Strauss, Totemism (Harmondsworth, 1969).


14 Schmidt brings up here a key question asked by Gilsenan, as to whether myth itself might not be an epiphenomenon, manipulable by the “ideologues who control oral tradition” and points out that the assumption of his own study is that “the pseudohistorical genealogical myths of the Bahaya are interwoven into the political and social fabric of Bahaya life through time, and that a structural analysis will reveal unconscious representative structure through time which are tied to structural change in political life.” See P. R. Schmidt, Historical Archaeology: A Structural Approach in an African Culture (Westport, CT, 1978).

15 Derrida, in discussing Foucault’s Folie et Deraison, the internment of the Mad and the Cartesian Cogito, points out that in fact there is no real anxiety in Descartes about the “subversion of insanity” since “if discourse and philosophical communication are to . . . conform to their vocation as discourse, they must in fact and in principle, escape madness . . . must carry normality within themselves.” For this is “an essential and universal necessity from which no discourse can escape ‘since’ it belongs to the meaning of meaning.” Indeed it is the “destiny of speaking Philosophy” to live “only by imprisoning madness,” with every “new speech liberating a previous madness while enclosing within itself, in its present existence, the madman of the day.” All systems of finite thought—of modes of human being, one might add—“can be established only on the basis of the more or less disguised internment, humiliation, fettering and mockery of the madman within us . . . who can only be the fool of a logos,

A phrase invented by Adreinne Rich, i.e., "how we have been led to imagine ourselves," quoted by Elaine Showalter in an article, was a key influence on the development of the concept of modes of cultural imagination.

See G.C. Waterston, *Order and Counter-Order: Dualism in Western Culture* (New York, 1966), p. 25. See also pp. 41 to 45 where he discusses the transformation in the twelfth century when, with the establishment of the universities, a new agency, the *Studium* was now added to the two other great agencies, that of the Sacerdotium and of the Imperium. With this, the schools of law and legal scholars—who were now given opportunities for mobility in a social order which had grown almost static—were the first to begin to gain autonomy from the theological ordering of knowledge. For their careers made them "*representatives* of the constitutions of men rather than . . . delegates of the city of God." The *humanista* was to borrow his name and find precedence for his revalorization of the study of the Works of Natural Man, from the *legista* model.


See Hubner, *Critique*, p. 121.

See H. Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. R.M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA, 1983), pp. 483-547. And see especially pp. 509-10, where he points out that, whilst keeping the overall structure of the traditional Ptolemaic schema, Nicholas of Cusa had replaced the earth as center with God, and had proposed that the earth was "a world body of the same rank as the heavenly bodies." This formulation was judged to be heretical.


The *topos* of iconicity is one of the central formulations of Valesio. He reveals the functioning of this figure in his analysis of a fragment from Heraclitus in which a specific mode of life, related to the bow, is made synonymous with the process of life itself. This strategy should be linked to the formulation made by Whitehead and Russell with respect to the difference that exists between a class of classes (i.e., "machinery") and a mere member of the class (i.e., tractors, cranes, etc.). The *topos* of iconicity absolutizes a mode of life, a member of the class with the class of classes, human life in general, thereby enabling, in Todorov's terms, the conflation of species with genus, genus with species. See in this respect, Paolo Valesio, *Nova Antique: Rhetorics as Contemporary Theory* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1980); and Todorov, *Theories of the Symbol*, trans. C. Porter (Ithaca, New York, 1982).

As with the suprasensory before, knowledge of this ontologized difference was inferential, to be grasped by the intellectual understanding rather than seen by the physical eyes. The *a priori* of a by/nature difference functions in a parallel manner. That is, while the principle of Sameness and Difference founds the order, it itself is not a fact that is empirically known but only abductively inferred as the axiom which makes the order of discourse of contemporary society discoursable.

See Anthony Padgen, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the
Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge, England, 1982), pp. 109-18. Pagden points out that a dialogue written by Sepúlveda—Democritus secundus sive de justis causis belli apud Indos, probably written about 1544—was used in the central debate in 1551-1552 at Valladolid, between Las Casas and Sepúlveda with respect to Spanish sovereignty over the Indies. The latter was a monarchical humanist, and his dialogue put forward the Aristotelian thesis that the American Indians were “barbarians,” who as such, were by nature slaves. In this argument Sepúlveda had moved outside theological arguments—Christian theology could not legitimately declare the Indians to be another kind of being—presenting his dialogue, in as he himself said, “literary terms,” and putting the goal of the Indians “becoming more human” rather than more Christian, as the criterion for their being treated “with greater freedom and liberty.”

The claim by Sepúlveda that the customs of the new world peoples revealed them to be lacking in Natural Reason, interred the New World peoples as the Other to the Western Logos, long before the Mad, as the Icon of the defect of Natural reason was to be internalized in France—and in the Cartesian discourse.

Here the strategy of Iconicity analysed by Valesio is at work also. By conflating a first mode of secular human reason with reason-in-general, the post-theological world stabilized itself by representing its modes of reason as reason-in-general, either as the “natural reason” of Liberalism or the “scientific truth” of Marxism-Leninism.

See Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, pp. 112-13.

See Linneaus, Systema Naturae (Uppsala, 1758), p. 22, where the Black is placed at the bottom of the human scale as the one least able to govern himself since he governs himself arbitrarily.

Harold Bloom puts forward the rhetorical figure of transumption as the American answer to the “imported mode of deconstruction.” He notes that “transumption or metalepesis” is the legitimate and traditional name in rhetoric for what John Hollander calls the “figure of interpretative allusion.” Transumptive chains point toward the “diachronic concept of rhetoric, in which the irony of one age can become the ennobled synecdoche of another.” Whilst transumptive chains abound, certain “central linkages . . . vital to tradition, and the crossings over in and between traditions keep the continuity going by means of its retroping of earlier tropes.” See H. Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels (Chicago, 1982).

G.L. Mosse’s Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism (New York, 1978), traces in detail the development of the discourse that would make the Holocaust thinkable. He makes the parallel point made by Carter G. Woodson, the Black educator, in 1933, when the latter pointed out that there would be no lynching in American society if it had not been prepared for by the school curriculum which taught white Americans to see Blacks as inferior—as legitimately lynchable.

The function played by the concept of self-preservation adapted from the mechanistic materialism that informed the nineteenth-century episteme in the mode of imagining/representing the Self/Group-Self, as well as in encoding the bio-ontological principle of Sameness/Difference that underlay the rise of national/corporate Liberalism (as a transumption of the Lockean type individual Liberalism which had prevailed before, a transumption which accompanied the rise and expansion of the “mechanizing” Industrial Age) has not yet been the subject of a holistic treatment. G.E. Allen has however analyzed the role of mechanistic materialism in Darwinian biology, revealing its co-existence in Darwinian thought with parallel elements from both holistic and dialectical materialism. He points out that the mechanistic outlook of Darwin involved “first and foremost his atomistic view of the living world, which he saw as composed of individual organisms, each acting in its own right and for its
own survival” with each organism as an atomized unit of evolution interacting with each other “through the process of struggle for existence and competition.” Even more, Allen shows how this outlook was modelled on the paradigm of classical nineteenth-century political economy, “a field itself dominated by mechanistic philosophy;” and especially on its concept of “division of labor, a notion that atomizes the totality of the labour process into separate component parts.”

Central to this philosophy was the idea that the organism was impelled by the Final cause of its “hunger” as well as its need to preserve its life, as in political economy the worker was supposed to be coerced into working by the impulse of hunger. Here Maturana/Varela’s concept of the realization-imperative of all things living is an epistemological break with the axiom of self-preservation, one which has political implications. For quite clearly, mechanistic materialism was the epistemic correlate of the template of identity of the Industrial Age, i.e., that of the middle class modality of human identity, with its emphasis on the atomized unit, individual and corporate, and on its natural impulse/preference as the causal motor of secular human society. See G.E. Allen, “The Several Faces of Darwin; Materialism in Nineteenth-and Twentieth-Century Evolutionary Theory,” in D.S. Bendall, ed. Evolution from Molecules to Atom (Cambridge, England, 1983).


The “strategy set” at work in the discourse traced by Mosse functions at the level of the abduction schema or system of figuration to displace the Biblical Genesis myth of origin and what might be called the figurative hegemony of Hebrew and of the Jews as the bearers of this myth—and as its Chosen People—with a new schema which “elects” the Indo-European as the Chosen people by Otherizing the Semite. The mode of knowing was however to be no longer that of religious revelation but ostensibly that of empirical, “scientific” knowledge. Hence the paradox of the “blindness and insight” that was to accompany the new field of philology, leading to the development of the pseudoscience of eugenics which abstracts “gene pools” from their specific interacting environment in which alone they can be “judged.” Hitlerian Aryanism was essentially the result of this dys-science. And as Mosse shows, the discourse which orders this dys-science continues to our day, and flows on into the future, and will only cease when the episteme is deconstructed and knowledge re-written.

The Holocaust in the heart of Europe and the Gulag Archipelago are genealogically related to the first large scale internment of the encomienda and the plantation, and to the massacres that accompanied their being put in place. The massacre of the Hereros as “natives” by the German colonizers in 1904; one in which out of a group numbering 80,000, only some 15,000 survived, a remnant that was then distributed to the settlers as slave labor, must be seen as part of that extra-European “massacre Archipelago” by which non-European groups were reduced to the status of native labor; and which would serve to domesticate the human psyche to the large scale horrors which have marked our century as the underside of men walking on the moon.

The arguments with respect to human sacrifice were first developed in the Apologia which Las Casas presented at the debate, held in 1551-1552 at Valladolid, concerning the legality of Spain’s sovereignty over the New World lands and peoples. Las Casas’s arguments here were to antedate by centuries the concept of the “relativity of all human systems of perception including our own,” together with the concept of necessary areas of blindness, even if, for Las Casas, Christian revelation and the light of Divine reason still provided a touchstone of certainty and Truth. See Wynter, S., “New Seville and the Conversion Experience of Bartolome de las Casas,” in Jamaica Journal 17, no. 2 (May 1984), 26.

As Todorov also points out, Las Casas’s arguments—that it was “the limitations of the light of nature itself,” rather than the lack of this light of
Nature which “dictates and teaches those who do not have faith, grace or doctrine” that they ought to offer “to the false god who is thought to be true” the “supremely precious thing” which is the life of man, since “nothing in nature is greater or more valuable”—introduced a conceptually daring perspective into the heart of religion, practicing here a kind of “religious anthropology” which is “the first step towards the abandonment of religious discourse itself.” See T. Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, trans. R. Howard (New York, Harper Books, 1984).


Hofstadter asks “What is it like to be China,” and answers that a country has thoughts and beliefs in the sense that it has a representational system. By this he means “an active, self-updating collection of structures, organized to ‘mirror’ the world as it evolves.” As such “it is built on categories” and it sifts incoming data into these categories with its “representations” or “symbols” interacting among themselves according to their own “internal logic.” This internal logic then functions as the referential authority rather than the external reality, and the function of this logic is to create a “faithful enough model of the way the world works”; and to keep its symbols in phase with the world “they are supposed to be mirroring.” In effect, the internal logic prescribes behavior so as to keep the world view and its reality, in phase. See Hofstadter and Dennet, The Mind’s Eye: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul (New York, 1981).

See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York, 1978). He cites the earlier article by Abdel Malek in which the phenomenon was first isolated and identified.


This exclusion functioned as the “isolating mechanism” or “remark of belonging” which, in defining the boundaries of the “national literature” defines the boundaries of the national/natural self. The exclusion of Ellison and the others is a key mechanism by which the “genrelessness” of the figured Group-Self is put into play. For as Derrida points out, the most general concept of the law of genre links it to genos which could just as well be equated with birth, and “birth in turn with the generous force of engenderment of generation-physics, in fact—as with face, familial membership, classificatory genealogy or class, age class (generation) or social class.” The negation of a co-definition is therefore part of the classificatory mechanism, and the exclusion is put in place by human agents possessing the generic classificatory competence which defines them as subjects. See J. Derrida, “The Law of Genre,” Critical Inquiry, Autumn, 1980.


The concept of a new conceptual synthesis is, of course, a reformulation of the one proposed by E.O. Wilson of sociobiology fame. Here, the disciplinary matrix of a science of human systems enables the insights of sociobiology to be drawn into a new framework, keeping the continuity of the human with biological organisms, but only in the context of the psychogenetic discontinuity that the human represents, i.e., his rhetorical/behavioral rather than genetic modes of speciation.
The play *Juan Latino* was written by Diego Ximénez de Enciso. The playwright died in 1634, but the play was not published until mid-century. The most accessible edition is that of 1951, edited by Ecuardo Julia Martínez. (See References.)

The date given for *Othello*’s composition is usually 1603-1604.


See the Hispantist E. M. Wilson’s fine comparative reading of the play, one in which his wide knowledge of parallel “wife-murder” plays in the Spanish Golden Age enabled him to grasp the fundamental nature of the role of the honor code in the organizing dynamics of *Othello*.

See the edition of *Othello* by Christopher Bentley (Sydney: Sydney Univ. Press, 1982), p. 158.

Juan Latino was a real life figure who lived in sixteenth-century Granada, and was a slave in the dual house of Sessa. He was a humanist, poet—he wrote a Latin epic, *The Auseriad*, to celebrate the Spanish-Christian victory over the Islamic Turks at Lepanto—and famous professor of Latin, marrying his Desdemona, Dona Ana de Carlobal. He is said to have written his epitaph in Latin in which he, *inter alia*, testifies to the orthodoxy of his Christian-humanist doctrine, i.e., *Infans ilaeus praeccepta salutis*. See Velaurez B. Spratlin, *Juan Latino: Slave and Humanist* (New York, 1938).

The figuration-Work, with which a transcendent Divine Causality as the explanatory hypothesis of the status-ordering of the Christian Medieval ensembe was replaced by what might be called an immanent transcendent Causality, that of “Nature,” would be effected by projections beginning with those of Juan Latino and Othello—as the naturally, rather than primarily Christianly orthodox and normative monarchical subject, and as the naturally “Noble Moor,” Othello. The later variant of these would be that of the “Noble Savage,” a projection central to the French and American Revolutions, since it canonized the new code of “Natural Value” that functions as the self-regulating code of Liberal republican democracy in its pure form; the code that embodies the metaphysics of the pursuit no longer of honor, but of profit (capital) as well as that of primacy, from Nobel prizes to sports to warfare, to the keeping up with the Jones’s ownership of nuclear bombs. Hayden White has noted the centrality of the projection of the Noble Savage, and has analysed what he defines as the “fetishistic nature” of its functioning in eighteenth-century thought. He emphasizes the role which its antithesis of Noble/Savage played in deconstructing an order still dominated psychosocially by the “gentry.” (See References.) Bateson’s concept of abduction is however more generalizable. It enables us to grasp the principle at work in all variants of these antithetical, exterior appearance/true interior nature strategies, and of their politico-metaphysical function. Thus the Nazi projection of the Blood-and-Soil True non-cosmopolitan and non-corrupt Aryan vs. the corrupting artificial urban Jew, was meaningful in the highly urbanized and technological society of Germany, only because it was able to replace the system of figuration of the bourgeois code of “Natural Value” which functioned to select the global middle classes for hegemony, with the new system of figuration needed by the socially mobile, educated stratum of the German lower-middle classes, if they were to achieve hegemony as a new stratum. Aryanism therefore expressed a code, that of the biogenetic superior value of Aryan descent, which reformulated the code of “natural Value.” Stalin would effect the same strategy with his projection of the Party member of “true Proletarian origin” canonized by his Labor value (the criterion of skills, credentials) rather than by his natural value (the criterion of the ownership of property/capital). He thereby conflated the hypothesis of Natural Causality
with that of a historical Causality in which the destined Aryan Volk of a Hitler—an extension of the manifest destiny of England and the United States and of the apartheid of South Africa—was replaced with the destined of Proletarian-origin class, whose highest manifestation was the Vanguard Party. Hence the logic of the “internments” of the Auschwitz-Belsen and the Gulag complexes, which like the “internment” of the global poor in their archipelagoes of shanty-town rural poverty and mass starvation—a phenomenon generated by and imperative to the functioning verification of the code of “natural value/non-value”—function as the negations which verify the Absolute of the biogenetically ordained superior value of the True Aryan, of biogenetic causality, and of the historically ordained “Labor” value of those of “true Proletarian origin”; function then to incarnate the secural ordering representations/figuration of Natural/Historical Causality, repressing awareness of the rhetoricity and systemic relativity of these figurations.

55 Bateson’s concept of abduction schemas, or systems of inference as the defining characteristic of cultural systems, is being borne out by new discoveries in the field of artificial intelligence, with respect to the roles of semantic networks, frames etc., in modelling reasoning by analogy. See The Economist, 11-17th May, 1985, pp. 92-93.

56 The proposal here is that the concepts of “labor” and “capital” function dually at empirical and metaphysical levels. At the latter level they function like the honor code to regulate human behavior by equating degrees of both with ratios of human being, within the natural/material definition of the human. They therefore function according to the ethic, impervious, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase, to “philosophical discourse.” For they are the parallel in human systems of the integrating codes which enable the dynamic autopoiesis of all forms of the living. The making-conscious of the functioning of these codes will enable humans to determine these self-regulating codes rather than to be determined by them. This would be the central goal of a science of human systems.

57 See John Gwinston. Ascent to Civilization: The Archaeology of Early Man (New York, 1984). Gwinston makes clear that, in spite of his title, what he is studying is far more comprehensively the great ruptures that enabled the discontinuity at the level of life itself, of the processes of hominization by which the hominid transformed itself into the human.

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