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

DISCOVERING EXISTENCE WITH HUSSERL

Emmanuel Levinas

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Contents

Translators' Notes

Fidelity to the original, including occasional "sentences" without verbs. Clarity. Levinas's translations of Husserl rendered directly from Levinas rather than taken from existing Husserl translations. Reference notes to German texts utilized by Levinas, and wherever possible reference to English translation. Levinas's capitalizations retained. Dorian Cairns's *Guide for Translating Husserl* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) followed, except to render "*Evidenz*" (Levinas's "*evidence*") with "self-evidence," and "*Erkenntnis*" (Levinas's "*connaissance*") with "knowledge." Levinas's "*viser*" ("to aim at") rendered as "to intend." André Laland's *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* consulted.

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"On *Ideas*" as "Sur les 'Ideen' de M.E. Husserl," in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger*, CVII (1929), 54th year, no. 3–4, March–April, pp. 230–65.

"Freiburg, Husserl, and Phenomenology" as "Freibourg, Husserl et la phenomenologie," in *Revue d'Allemagne des pays de langue allemande*, 5 (1931), no. 43, May 15, pp.402–14.

"Phenomenology" as "Phenomenologie," in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger*, CXVII (1934), 59th year, no.11–12, November–December, pp. 414–20.

"The Work of Edmund Husserl" as "L'oeuvre d'Edmond Husserl," in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger*, 129, nos. 1–2, 65th year

(January–February, 1940), 33–85. Reprinted in *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* [hereafter EDEHH] (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), 7–52.

"Reflections on Phenomenological 'Technique' " as "Reflexions sur la 'technique' phenomenologique," in *Husserl* (Paris: Minuit, 1959), 95–107. Reprinted in EDEHH, 111–23.

"The Ruin of Representation" as "La ruine de la representation," in *Edmund Husserl 1859–1959* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 73–85. Reprinted in EDEHH, 125–35.

"Intentionality and Metaphysics" as "Intentionalité et métaphysique," in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger*, 149, no. 4, 84th year (October–December, 1959), 471–79. Reprinted in EDEHH, 137–44.

"The Permanent and the Human in Husserl" as "Le permanent et l'humain chez Husserl," in *L'Age Nouveau* 110 (July–September, 1960), 51–56.

"Intentionality and Sensation" as "Intentionalite et sensation," in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 19, nos. 1–2 (1965), 34–54. Reprinted in EDEHH, 145–62.

"From Consciousness to Wakefulness" as "De la conscience a la veille. A partir de Husserl," in *Bijdragen* 35, nos. 3–4 (July–December, 1974) 235–49.

"Philosophy and Awakening" as "La philosophie et l'eveil," in *Etudes philosophiques*, no. 3 (1977), 307–17.

Introduction

Richard A. Cohen

Levinas is one of the leading expositors of twentieth-century phenomenology, and one of the most influential. Almost singlehandedly he introduced Husserlian (and to a lesser extent Heideggerian) phenomenology to France. The publication in 1973 of Andre Orianne's English translation of Levinas's prize winning book of 1930, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*,[1] also helped introduce phenomenology to America. At the same time Levinas is in his own right one of the great philosophers of the twentieth century, producing a profound and far-reaching ethical metaphysics, faithful in its own way to the phenomenological movement. The articles collected in the present volume show Levinas as both expositor and philosopher, and thus they present both Husserl and Levinas: Husserl through and otherwise than Levinas, Levinas through and beyond Husserl. We shall also see how Levinas combines the roles of expositor and philosopher.

The title of the present volume is a truncated version of the title of Levinas's first collection of essays, *Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger*,[2] from which five chapters are taken. The expression "discovering existence" provides us a first clue to Levinas's vision of phenomenology, and to the limits of phenomenology that Levinas's ethical metaphysics surpass. Husserl takes phenomenology to be the most advanced outpost of the Western quest for knowledge, science. This title suggests an essential ambiguity at the heart of that quest, that is to say, at the heart of cognition: between construction and reception, interest and disinterest, self and other. In Levinas's hands both terms—discovery and existence—will reflect this ambiguity, reflect, that is to say, the meeting of activity and passivity at work in the origin of meaning. Realism and idealism, including realist and idealist appropriations of phenomenology,

however sophisticated, including Husserl's own, would thus be rejected as one-sided. But notice, in Levinas's hands phenomenology itself repulses these distortions. Discovery is both receptive and constructive. So, too, the things discovered, "the things themselves," solicit and surrender to meaning. In this introduction I would like to show that the term "exegesis," which Levinas favors late in his career, best captures his sense of phenomenology, where sense and sensibility, explanation and understanding, spirit and letter, are intertwined, one nourishing the other. At the same time, let us note also that for Levinas exegesis is inseparable from ethics,[3] and in this way it goes beyond Husserl's phenomenology.

To indicate the true originality of Levinas's reading of Husserl, where fidelity and originality nurture one another, instead of looking to one of the later writings, where Levinas's originality is clearly in view, in this introduction I am going to focus almost exclusively on a relatively early piece: "The Work of Edmund Husserl," published in 1940. It is chapter 4 in the present volume.[4] Because it is primarily expository it is located in part 1, entitled "Husserl's Phenomenology," but already at this early stage, so it seems to me, a distinctively Levinasian reading of Husserl, what I have called "Levinas's Husserl," the title of part 2, and even "Beyond Husserl," the title to part 3, make their distant but, as I hope to show, unmistakable appearance on the horizon of Levinas's exposition. "The Work of Edmund Husserl" appeared in France at a time when the physical power of Nazi Germany was approaching its apogee and, though after *Kristallnacht*, when Germany's spiritual decline—so diametrically opposed to the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology—had hardly reached its grim perigee. It appeared before Levinas's wartime captivity, and thus prior to the postwar elaboration of his own philosophy in *Existence and Existents* (1947), *Time and the Other* (1947), *Totality and Infinity* (1961), and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* (1974). Unlike several of Levinas's later articles, such as the three from 1959 which appear in this volume (chapters 5–7), one cannot claim to find in it the influence of the philosophy of ambiguity that Merleau-Ponty had not yet formulated. In other words, one is tempted to see in "The Work of Edmund Husserl" pure exposition. And for this reason one must look at it more closely to see just how much more than exposition there really is to Levinas's expositions.

I am suggesting that the term "exegesis," taken from religious hermeneutics, and for Levinas exemplified by the discussions of the talmudic rabbis (and by Levinas's own "talmudic readings"),[5] best captures the specifically Levinasian manner of phenomenology, of "doing" phenomenology. But in "The Work of Edmund Husserl" neither religious themes nor religious language appear. This is just as one would expect

from an exposition of the phenomenology Husserl proposed as rigorous science and philosophy of science. It is true, of course, that certain "religious" terms and references occasionally appear. In section 6, for instance, Levinas writes: "The miracle of clarity is the very miracle of thought," but obviously the term "miracle" is here used in a metaphorical rather than a supernatural sense. In section 7, Levinas notes that because to perceive external things is necessarily to "synthesize diverse successive aspects of things," even God's perception of external things would unravel in like manner. But surely this invocation bears witness to nothing more (and nothing less) than Levinas making a Husserlian variation on a familiar Bergsonian theme. In section 9, while contrasting Husserl's notion of intentionality with the medieval notion of intentionality, Levinas parenthetically refers to "Saint Anselm's argument" regarding levels of being. But this reference is not developed and stands as an allusion. Finally, in section 13, Levinas again mentions God, but only to say that one "cannot take seriously the brief indications Husserl gives about God in the *Ideas*." It is surely not to these remarks, little more than asides, that we must turn to see the essential links joining exposition, phenomenology, and exegesis.

Rather, one must enter into the *work* of Edmund Husserl, attending not to passing remarks or allusions, but to an existence discovered and to the discovering of it. In section 6, entitled "Intentionality," Levinas's discussion begins with intentionality and ends with intuition. Certainly these are two pillars of phenomenology. That, in any event, is precisely how Levinas presented them in *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology* a decade earlier. For these two reasons we will focus our attention here. By now we are all familiar with the phenomenological account of consciousness as intentionality: to be conscious is always to be conscious of . . . something. It is in all the introductions to phenomenology. But Levinas wants to make sure that we grasp the true sense of intentionality. It is *not* a celebration of the *relation* of subject to object, since for Husserl intentionality "is nothing like the relations between real objects." Rather, and Levinas underlines this point: "*It is essentially the act of bestowing a meaning.*" Hence the exteriority of the "object" of intentionality has a different sense than that of the object of the prephenomenological attitude, the naively encountered so-called "real" object. The intentional object of consciousness is the object as meant, whether that object be meant as perceived, judged, felt, desired, etc..

Levinas continues: to bestow meaning is to *identify*. "For Husserl to think is to identify." Furthermore, to identify is to *synthesize*, to gather together the diverse, to find unity in multiplicity. And it turns out that this endeavor—meaning as identifying, identifying as synthesizing—is

precisely what Husserl means by *representation*. Highlighting these profound connections with such simple yet striking formulations, Levinas allows us to see how for Husserl representation is "at once universal and primary." While there are many different kinds of intentionality, e.g., perceiving-perceived, desiring-desired, feeling-felt, judging-judged, each with its own regional integrity, inasmuch as each revolves around synthesizing acts, "representation, in the sense we have just specified, is found necessarily at the basis of intention, even nontheoretical intention." "Through this synthesis all mental life participates in representation."

Consciousness as intentionality thus lends itself to two foci: the various nontheoretical intentions in their regional integrity and interrelationships, and the transregional representational core of all intentionality. As we know, without neglecting substantial studies of the former, Husserl tended not only to concentrate on the latter but ofttimes to exaggerate its significance. This duality within phenomenology accounts both for phenomenology's great fecundity and for the often wide divergences separating Husserl's disciples. Emphasis on the intentional integrity of nontheoretical regions of signification played, according to Levinas, "a considerable role in the phenomenologies of Scheler and Heidegger," for example. (In contrast, emphasis on the representational core of consciousness serves, it seems to me, as the centerpiece of Sartre's phenomenology.) By grasping will, feeling, desire, judgment, etc., not as real things but as meanings legitimate in their own right—naive realism or realist science would otherwise reduce them to "subjective" opinions or "secondary qualities"—whole new regions of signification could now be taken no less seriously by phenomenological science than the more limited set of significations, such as "space," "physical object," "force," etc., which are reducible to quantification, whose pedigree alone had hitherto been taken seriously by modern natural science. Phenomenology, then, would be genuine science, comprehensive knowledge, not by rejecting but by integrating the natural sciences into its proper and broader horizon. Indeed, Levinas will claim that precisely the legitimation of multiple nontheoretical regions of signification, overturning the naively realist prejudices of the natural attitude and prephenomenological science, "is perhaps the most fecund idea contributed by phenomenology," despite Husserl's own predilection for the representational core of consciousness.

But Levinas's "exposition" does not stop here, where many others have chosen to deride or derail Husserl. Levinas probes further in an effort not to shadow but to shed light on the significance of the primacy Husserl gives to representation. Phenomenology is an ongoing and joint venture, science in the best sense, where results are not given once and

for all, or taken as oracular pronouncements, but remain as more or less secure hypotheses to be verified, confirmed, disconfirmed, deepened, broadened, recontextualized, reconstructed, and otherwise reworked by seekers of truth who are themselves always part of a larger community of inquirers, and of humanity more widely. Thus, in the spirit of Husserlian phenomenology, Levinas asks a Husserlian question of Husserl: "What is the significance of the presence of the act of identification at the basis of intentions that have nothing intellectual about them?" Answering this, Levinas reveals the final link joining identification and intuition.

If representation lies at the bottom of all forms of consciousness it is because identification culminates in self-evidence, in the self-evident. De facto consciousness always has a stop, is conscious of . . . something. If it is to have a stop for a scientific consciousness, that stop must be with controlled repeatable intuitions into self-evident givens. "The process of identification can be infinite," Levinas notes, "but it is concluded in self-evidence—in the presence of the object in person before consciousness." Despite the logical or formal temptation to deny this, and despite the wilder seductive appeal of a Heraclitean vertigo or deferral, Husserlian intentionality is not reducible to some interesting or provocative form of the "bad infinite," is not reducible to a strict or striking version of some fancied regress of consciousness of . . . consciousness of . . . consciousness of . . . ad infinitum. There is meaning. Meaning makes sense. The philosophical task is not to make nonsense of sense, which is easy enough, but to make sense of sense. There is meaning, Husserl claims, because representation, which is the ultimate movement of consciousness, ends in self-evidence. Thus intentionality and intuition, representation and self-evidence, are linked, in a meeting neither arbitrary, prudent nor weak. Levinas succinctly captures this connection: "Self-evidence realizes, as it were, the aspirations of identification." Thus we reach the answer to the probing question of the privileged status of representation: "To say that at the basis of every intention—even affective or relative intentions—representation is found, is to conceive the whole of mental life on the model of light." (Here, too, by the way, is where Levinas makes the remark cited above: "The miracle of clarity is the very miracle of thought.") Intentionality qua representation, consciousness undergirded by intuition ending in self-evidence, "is the very penetration to the true." "The theory of intentionality in Husserl," Levinas writes, "identifies mind with intellection, and intellection with light."

Having penetrated thus far, it is precisely at this point in his exposition, at the real depths of Husserl's thought, that Levinas will suggest a novel interpretation. What Levinas suggests is that with Husserl's theory of intentional consciousness, linked as it is to intuition and hence to

self-evidence, a new way is opened to mediate the difference between *constituting and constituted meaning.* A new path is opened for philosophy to surpass both realism and idealism. Levinas writes:

> If we wanted to distance ourselves from Husserl's terminology and characteristic mode of expression, we would say that self-evidence is a unique situation: in the case of self-evidence the mind, *while receiving something foreign, is also the origin of what it receives* [my italics]. It is always active. The fact that in self-evidence the world is a given, that there is always a given for the mind, is not only found to be in agreement with the idea of activity, but is presupposed by that activity. A given world is a world where we can be free without this freedom being purely negative. The self-evidence of a given world—more than the nonengagement of the mind in things—is the positive accomplishment of freedom.
>
> The primacy of theory in Husserl's philosophy is ultimately linked to the liberal inspiration that we are seeking to make clear through this essay. The light of self-evidence is the sole tie with being that posits us as an origin of being, that is as freedom.

That consciousness has a stop in the light of truth, that consciousness ends in the intuition of a given that gives itself to a bestowal of meaning, is thus the very meaning of human freedom. As such it is the "liberal inspiration" of Husserlian phenomenology and the inspiration that drives the exegetical illumination Levinas finds to be inseparable from meaningful life. Freedom thus means neither an absorption in the real—whether Spinoza's substance, Hegel's spirit, or Heidegger's being or fourfold—nor a "nonengagement of the mind in things"—whether Kant's transcendental apperception, Brunschvicg's judgment, or Sartre's for-itself. Freedom is neither in-the-world nor out-of-the-world, but both at the same time, constituted by what it constitutes, "the origin of what it receives." One sees here *in nuce,* in a 1940 Husserlian meditation, a central motif Levinas in his later thought will call "finite freedom"[6] and "difficult freedom."[7]

It is further developed in section 11 as follows: "Thought is thus not simply a domain in which the ego manifests its freedom; the fact of having meaning—is the very manifestation of freedom. The opposition between activity and theory is eliminated by Husserl in his conception of self-evidence. This is the whole originality of his theory of intentionality and freedom. Intentionality is nothing but the very accomplishment of freedom." Freedom and meaning are linked, arise together and are bound to one another. To separate them is to create abstractions of both, dividing consciousness from itself into a purely passive receptivity, on the one side, or purely productive activity, on the other, thereby reducing meaning to an arbitrary construct or an infallible oracle.

Levinas sees the concrete intersection of freedom and meaning to be especially evident at the level of consciousness Husserl takes to be ultimate, namely, consciousness in its temporal self-constitution. "[N]ote," Levinas writes, "that the antinomy of spontaneity and passivity is eliminated in the mind grasped at the level of the *Urimpression.*" Bringing this Husserlian insight to bear against what is surely Heidegger's conception of fundamental historicity, Levinas's commentary continues: "Here also Husserl remains faithful to his fundamental metaphysical intentions: mind is the inwardness of a meaning to thought, the freedom of intellection. Time accomplishes this freedom; it does not exist prior to the mind, does not engage it in a history in which it could be overwhelmed. Historical time is constituted. History is explained by thought." That history does not overwhelm consciousness, that historical time is both constituting and constituted, does this not mean that consciousness as real freedom, as the zero point and unity of activity and passivity, is at once made by history and makes the history it is made by? And does this not mean, as one sees in Levinas's later works, going beyond Husserl, that a truly human freedom is one capable of judging history, and that when it does ethics precedes ontology?

In later chapters of the present volume, Levinas will challenge Husserl for his interpretation of the hidden horizons at the heart of intentionality, the intersection of constituting and constituted, as a "little perception" (as Levinas calls it in chapter 7), a reading which reproduces and does not undercut the consciousness whose excess it discovered. Though we see Levinas fully acknowledging the "great contribution" that Husserlian intentionality is, because it forever undermines a subject-object interpretation of consciousness and meaning, Levinas will join Kant in characterizing its alterity in moral rather than theoretical terms. "Kant refuses to interpret transcendental activity as intuitive. . . . Here Kant is bolder than Husserl."[8] The excess Husserl himself calls "transcendence within immanence," for Levinas, as for Kant, can no longer make sense within an epistemological field, but rather comes as the imposition of a moral exigency and hence requires a moral reading.

Nevertheless, beyond their formal agreement, Levinas and Kant quickly part company regarding the character of the morality that exceeds representational consciousness. For Kant, as we know, the transcendence of morality transpires as respect for self-legislated law, the same in the other as in oneself. For Levinas, in contrast, the rupture of transcendence occurs as the very alterity of the other person, an alterity that impinges on me as moral obligation, hence as my responsibility to and for the

other. But already as early as 1940, discovering existence in Husserl, we have encountered consciousness conceived in relation to horizons which exceed its synthetic power, consciousness humbled, one might say, by an excess not fully its own yet still meaningful, even if Husserl reinscribed that horizon and excess in the space of epistemology.

The path we see Levinas blazing in 1940 through Husserl obviously will be further developed and will have far reaching repercussions for the subsequent positive direction and elaboration of Levinas's thought. At the same time it will serve as a powerful wedge for a radical critique of the dominant post-Husserlian phenomenologies of the early and mid-twentieth century: the ontology initiated by Heidegger's account of anxious finitude in *Being and Time*, on the side of a philosophical construction built on regional phenomenology, and the existentialism of Sartre's[9] (and, for that matter, the idealism of Leon Brunschvicg's) pure freedom, on the side of a philosophical construction built on the primacy of representation, on the other. In offering an alternative route for thought between the regional and the representative, ontology and existentialism, by critical contrast, are shown to be one-sided and abstract (despite the concretude they repeatedly claimed for themselves under the rubric of phenomenology). In addition, Levinas's new path, far from being influenced by Merleau-Ponty, anticipates and accords with the latter's central dialectic of embodied and historical ambiguity, though for Levinas the significance of that dialectic is primarily ethical while for Merleau-Ponty (who in this regard remained closer to Husserl and Heidegger) it is ontological. Levinas's 1940 reflections also provide us a glimpse into the intimate relation between phenomenology and the disciplined freedom characteristic of talmudic commentary and life, exegesis in the broad sense.

Eliciting and elicited eliciting one another. Letters calling for spirit, spirit finding itself through letters. Is this not the consciousness Husserl describes, even if he remained bound to epistemology to interpret his discovery? The infinite ability of consciousness to identify stopped by intuition into the self-evident, yet at the same time stopped by its own light, in a difficult freedom, a bound variable, where one is bound by that from which one is free, and freed by that to which one is bound. Though the knowing subject becomes the origin—*Arche*—of meaning, meaning nonetheless begins prior to that origin, more deeply, in a beginning—*Beresheit*—lived concretely as the priority of moral exigency. Selfhood is thus conditioned—or reconditioned—in the continual upheaval Levinas in *Totality and Infinity* calls the "*anterior posteriorly*,"[10] or what in his later writings he will call "dia-chrony,"[11] modality of intersubjectivity, ethics, exegesis.

Is this Husserlian meditation of 1940, "The Work of Edmund Husserl," this "exposition," this commentary, so far, then, from the "figure of inspiration" about which Levinas reminds us commenting on a commentary: "They say the Levites who carried the Holy Ark of the Tabernacle across the desert were also carried by that Ark: a parable that is probably the true figure of inspiration"?[12] Is it not also a recognizable though distant version—in that wide range of writing and meaning which nonetheless forms a continuum—of what Levinas indicates when he writes that "there is an inseparable bond between God's descent and his elevation"?[13]

Completed in Charlotte, North Carolina, 13 December 1996, on the *yahrzeit* of Emmanuel Levinas.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of titles of English works are given in roman print; non-English in italic.

Works by Husserl

CM	*Cartesian Meditations*, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).
CR	*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
EJ	*Experience and Judgment*, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
FT	*Formale und Transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929).
FT	*Formal and Transcendental Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
HU	*Gesammelte Werke*, Collection *Husserliana* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950–).
ID	*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913).
ID	*Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1982).
KR	*Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in de phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. W. Biemel (*Husserliana*, vol. 6, 1954; 2d printing, 1962).

LI	*Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, 2 vols. with consecutive pagination (New York: Humanities Press, 1970).
LU	*Logische Untersuchungen*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Halle: Niemeyer, 1912, 1921). The second part of vol. II, published in 1921, is referred to by Levinas as vol. III; thus references to this work are abbreviated as *LU*, I, II, and III.
MC	*Méditations Cartésiennes*, 4th ed., trans. G. Peiffer, E. Levinas (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969).
PCP	*Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Q. Lauer (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
PITC	*The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, ed. M. Heidegger, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).
PW	"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," in *Logos*, 1 (1910).
RL	*Recherches Logiques*, trans. Elie, Kelkel, and Scherer (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Collection Epimethée, 1961).
ZB	*Husserls Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbrunßtseins*, ed. M. Heidegger, in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 9 (Halle, 1928).

Works by Levinas

AE	*Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
OB	*Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
TI	*Totalité et infini* (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).
TI	*Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

PART 1

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

1

On *Ideas*

The first volume of Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*—the only one which has appeared—is an introductory book to *phenomenology*, the new science that in the author's thought is preeminently philosophical: the foundation of the sciences of nature and mind, logic, psychology, theory of knowledge, and even metaphysics.

In proposing to present the essential ideas of this book that has had, and continues to have, a major influence on German philosophy, I cannot claim to exhaust its riches. I must leave aside what is perhaps of greatest interest in it, namely the multitude of minute and scrupulous concrete *phenomenological analyses*, which defy summarizing. They would have to be translated in their entirety. Moreover, I shall restrict myself to mere mention of the passages where it is a question of problems such as the nature of God, the constitution of *immanent time* (cf. § 24),[1] the relationship between *apophantic logic* and *formal ontology* (cf. § 26), the possibility of *practical* and *aesthetic truths* and their relation to theoretical consciousness. After arduous analysis, this latter relation is presented as the universal form into which every act of consciousness can be recast. None of these questions, despite the profundity and originality with which they are posed and treated by Husserl, are central to his preoccupations in *Ideas*.

I shall hold to the author's general plan, and only deviate when introducing ideas that have been elaborated in his earlier works. My exposition is divided into four sections, corresponding to the four parts of the book, but I subdivide them in my own way. To keep from weighing down the exposition, I shall use Husserl's terminology, so uncommon in France, only when it is required to avoid confusion. For the same reason I shall make few quotations.

The better to promote an understanding of the book's overall spirit, I emphasize from the start that it does not claim to be, nor is it, a "system of philosophy." Each page of *Ideas* sets out to show that philosophical

problems can be posed in a new way, a way that renders them amenable to solution; but, on the other hand, that solution can only be presented in the form of positive work, the work of generations, as is the case in the exact sciences.[2] The book of *Ideas* means to be an invitation to work.

1. The plan of *Ideas*

The four sections of the book examine in turn: (I) The meaning and value of the sciences that have essences for their object (*Wesenswissenschaften*): the "eidetic" sciences,[3] in Husserl's terminology, or more simply, "eidetics." This general topic concerns phenomenology, inasmuch as phenomenology is first of all an eidetic science. In this section the fundamental notions thereafter brought into play are elaborated: it will have to be summarized with care. (II) The object sui generis of phenomenology. (III) Phenomenology's specific method. (IV) The formulation of the central problems of phenomenology, *the problems of reason and reality*—which in the phenomenological attitude are posed and solved in a totally new way.

I. Essence and Knowledge of Essences

2. The notion of essence

The contingent structure that is *essentially* proper to individual objects and facts of nature reveals nevertheless a necessary and constant "style." Besides "empirical types" of purely inductive generality (such as lion, chair, star), we find true essences (*Eidos, Wesen*) that belong necessarily to individual objects and that, in each domain, are the very condition of the possibility of these *contingent types*. Color, materiality, perception, memory, etc., can serve as examples of essences. But the essence of an individual object is not itself an individual object. The essence or the necessary structure of the object is given as something ideal, supratemporal, and supraspatial.

But the term *ideal essence* must not be understood in the sense of a metaphysics—Platonic[4] or otherwise—for neither the existence of the individual object nor that of the ideal object, nor the relationship between these two existences, is in question. Here we must place ourselves in the original attitude Husserl maintained in his first phenomenological work, the *Logical Investigations*.[5] All thought *intends* something, and *that* which it intends—whether it exists or not—is its object. But that object, *envisaged*

qua object, as a *pure signification of our thought*, can have characteristics: we can speak of its properties, its possibility of being predicable, its way of being given as "existent," "individual," and "ideal." To speak of existence, ideality, and reality in this way is beyond all metaphysical positions and claims about existence.

In the sense outlined above, we can speak of ideal essences, and characterize them as follows: the essence of an object is a set of essential predicates "which must belong to it, so that other secondary relative determinations can be attributed to it."[6] In sound, for example, we can vary the pitch, without making the sound cease being a sound. Yet it would be absurd to extend the variation to the point of denying "pitch" in general to a sound; a sound so modified would no longer be a sound. Pitch thus belongs necessarily to the structure of sound, to its essence; and this essence is presupposed by all the other contingent predicates which can belong to sound.

Ideas does not give us concrete phenomenological analyses of the method to follow for finding the "essences" of things; nor does it make the distinction between "essences" and "types of purely inductive generality," with which I began this section. Husserl's subsequent publications provide clarification. Let the following few remarks suffice. To arrive at the essence of the object, we begin with the individual (perceived or imagined) object. By abstracting from its existence we consider it as purely imaginary and we modify different attributes *in phantasy*. But throughout all the possible modifications of an attribute something remains invariable, identical, the necessary basis of the variation itself. Its invariable character is given as something general, precisely because it is one identical "moment" in a series, *in principle infinite*, of imaginary variations; it has infinite extension within "possibles." To apprehend essences is to grasp these "invariables" in variations. The knowledge that we can have of them is an intuition, as the following section will show.

3. The intuition of essences (*Wesenschau, Wesensanschauung*)

The intuition of essences is one of the discoveries of the *Logical Investigations*.[7] In the perception of the individual object, this individual object can fulfill the function of being the object, but we can also apprehend its essence as an object. The essence of red is intuited in the concrete red of this fabric in front of me—or in an imagined red—through the variations we have just noted. The individual red perceived or imagined serves only as an example for my perception of the essence "red," which is the new object of a new act of knowledge, an *act of ideation*. The truths which concern this new object—eidetic truths—are *consequently independent of*

the facticity of the individual object, and are assuredly not inductive truths. *For the facticity of the example here does not play the role of premise*—no more than the facticity of the triangle on the blackboard is the premise of geometrical reasoning.

But if the individual example is indispensable as the basis of ideation, the knowledge of essences is no less an intuition. In the knowledge of essences we find the same properties that characterize sensuous intuition as intuition. The knowledge of essences is a "vision" of its object which is not only *signified* or *intended* (cf. § 30), but *given* "clearly and distinctly" with self-evidence. It can even have its object in that privileged way that is proper to perception, where the object is not only seen "clearly and distinctly," but is given as it were "in person" (*selbst da*)—"originarily given," as Husserl says. Yet it is *in the very nature* of essence to require examples in order to be grasped. To suppose that for a divine intelligence essences would be given "without examples" is to suppose that for such an intelligence a circle could be square.

4. The notion of truth

Not only essences, but also categorial forms, such as the synthetic form that binds the subject and predicate of a judgment, are intuitable. It is true that the *intellectual intuition* which grasps them requires, by its nature, the sensuous intuition upon which it is founded. But it does not thereby cease to be an intuition—just as the intuition of essences retains its intuitive character despite the "need for examples" that is part of its nature.

The extension of the concept of intuition to the sphere of essences and categorial forms has enabled Husserl to see in intuition the essential moment of true knowledge. All knowledge consists in the presence of an object before consciousness, and every *true* statement concerning an object can only arise out of the structure of the object itself, seen in intuition. This is so of the individual object as well as of essences. We say truly, "All color is necessarily extended," for we see this in the essence of color; the proposition "The tree is green" is justified by the sensuous perception that observes it.

Thus phenomenology affirms that truth depends on its object. But let us emphasize right away that this does not at all imply a realist metaphysics. That truth depends on its object means only that before any theory about the existence or nonexistence of objects, every thought, in its very essence, is oriented toward its object, which alone can create the truth of the thought's intentions. A truth's necessary character does not arise out of some sort of thought mechanism that permits the binding

of a subject to a predicate; it arises out of the necessary structure of its object. Deductive demonstration can only be a mode of bringing a truth back to its origin in intuition.

In this view rationalism and empiricism are in a way reconciled. The source of knowledge is indeed experience, but experience in the broad sense of the term, understood as intuition, which can see essences and categories in addition to sensuous empirical facts.

5. The relation of eidetic truths to individual truths: regional ontologies

Essences can be more or less general. The essence "material thing" is more general than the essence "white thing." The essences of higher generality are called *regions*. On the other hand, the essence specified as, for example, a "white thing of a determinate shade," is still something ideal and should not be confused with the empirical fact which individualizes it.

Nevertheless, empirical facts can be envisaged as singularizations or individuations of specified essences. This is why eidetic laws, such as the laws of geometry, are also valid for real space. Facts, as individuations of essences, are determined by the eidetic truths of their respective regions. Factual sciences thus depend on eidetic sciences—and these eidetic sciences rationalize the factual sciences.

Modern physics owes its development to the fact that the essence "space," which is part of the region "material thing," has been the object of a developed eidetic science since antiquity. But it does not exhaust the region "material thing," whose other constitutive essences must also supply eidetics. Moreover, regions like "society," "animality," "culture," etc., should likewise become objects of eidetic sciences which will contribute to the development of the corresponding factual sciences and grant them scientific dignity. One of the functions of phenomenology in Husserl's sense of the term is to be the eidetic science that will rationalize empirical psychology.

Husserl calls all these *regional eidetics*, which are still only *desiderata*, "*regional ontologies*." Setting up these ontologies will open up an extensive field of work.

6. Formal ontology

The factual sciences depend on eidetic sciences in still another sense: their objects, independent of their matter, comply with the laws of the eidetic science that studies "the form of the object in general." They depend on logic. Whatever their matter may be, all the sciences comply

with the eidetic science of the region "form of the object in general." Such forms as "object," "relation," "order," "property," "predicative synthesis," etc., are found in the objects of every region, and are regulated by eidetic laws. The study of the eidetic relations between forms is the task of *formal ontology*.

Formal ontology is at bottom nothing other than "pure logic understood in its full extention, up to a *mathesis universalis*."[8] Pure logic is thus identified with a *mathesis universalis* and understood as a science of forms. This is one of the results of the *Prolegomena* of the *Logical Investigations*. Traditional logic, according to this conception, is only a very small part of the *mathesis universalis*; it is only an *apophansis*. It only studies the pure forms of the significations (*Bedeutungen*) which are part of assertions.

All the truths of "formal ontology" can be reduced to a certain number of axioms. Husserl calls the concepts that constitute these axioms *analytic categories*.

7. Genus and form

The idea of form as it figures in this exposition should be clearly distinguished from the idea of genus. Each region presents a hierarchical structure from genus to species which ends, at one extreme, with the highest genus, and, at the other, with the last difference. The "form of the object in general" is not the highest genus of all regions; *it is form*. Filling this form with a material content is a completely different operation from the specification of a genus. The relation of the form "S is P" to the physical proposition "All bodies have weight," is different from the relation of the genus "color" to the species "red." Similarly, in mathematics "the transition from space to the concept of Euclidian multiplicity is not a generalization but a formalization."[9]

Thus we have three concepts of extension: (1) eidetic extension, i.e., extension of generic essence to the specific essences; (2) mathematical extension, i.e., of form to its material contents; and (3) empirical extension, i.e., of essence—a last difference—to the objects which individuate it.

8. Analytic and synthetic knowledge

The regional ontologies are determined by the *material essence* of each region, and not only by the "pure form of the object in general" common to all. As sciences which advance with the help of eidetic intuition, "regional ontologies" are a priori, that is, independent of empirical experience. Thus the regional ontologies present a type of cognition one could call synthetic a priori, by contrast with the *analytic* cognition which, by virtue

of the laws of formal ontology, draws its conclusions *vi formae* [by the power of form]. At this level of thought, the synthetic categories which we can oppose to the analytic ones (cf. § 6) can be none other than the fundamental concepts of the axioms to which the regional ontologies are reducible. The number of categories will thus be much greater than Kant believed. There will be as many groups of categories as there are regions.

The field of synthetic a priori cognition is thus found to be greatly broadened owing to the new conception of a priori cognition, identified with the intuition of material and formal essences. Husserl's first disciples, those of the period of the *Logical Investigations*, were particularly taken with the idea of this "material a priori" which is evidently possible in the domain of pure *essences* but not in that of *general types* (cf. § 2), and with the possibility of the "ontologies" it brought about. While following Husserl in his conception of phenomenology with a few reservations, their contributions published in his journal were nothing but "regional ontologies" exploring different regions of objects. The phenomenology Husserl wanted was something else. It had to be an absolutely certain foundation for all the sciences. The "ontologies," though far more rational than factual sciences, needed a foundation, as we shall now show.

9. Critical remarks against the naturalism that denies essences

The points that we have just raised are themselves already the result of intuition. The "naturalism" that contests them, and that denies particularly the objectivity of essences, was subjected to lengthy critique in the *Logical Investigations*.[10] The *Ideas* repeats the main points made in the earlier critique.

First, naturalism, which issues from the correct intention to only trust experience, betrays this positivist principle by *dogmatically* identifying "experience" and "sensuous experience." Dogmatism is opposed by true positivism, which prior to all theory makes use of the intuitionist principle of experience in the broad sense of the term (cf. § 4). To intuit, to interrogate the things themselves, is the only way to *begin* without presuppositions, to reach *principles*.

All skepticism is absurd, for it refutes itself.[11] Now, the negation of essences, and consequently of general truths, leads to skepticism. For sensuous experience, which under the naturalist hypothesis is the sole source of truth, will never be able to guarantee the generality of the truths it establishes, for the principles of sensuous experience, the principles of induction themselves, cannot be declared to be absolutely certain.

Moreover, naturalism is wrong when it believes it can account for essence with a psychologistic theory which sees in an essence a sort of

individual psychological fact; this would be to confuse the *act* of cognition with its *object*.[12] The act of knowing, for example, the act of counting, is indeed psychological and temporal, but the object of knowledge, the number, is ideal and transcendent to the act. This same distinction enables us to understand why an essence, while being the product of our spontaneity applying itself to the empirical given, is not a fiction created by us. For it is the act and not the essence that is the product of our spontaneity, since an essence can be the object of true or false knowing, in geometrical thought for example.

In addition to the rights of individual intuition, the rights of eidetic intuition are justified. Eidetic intuition (for the world of essences), like individual intuition (for the world of facts), gives us its objects with self-evidence. Intuition is the primary source of any right that knowledge has to truth; it is the "principle of principles."[13]

10. Transition to phenomenology in the Husserlian sense of the term[14]

Science does in fact follow this intuitive method, making use of eidetic intuition (in mathematics) as well as individual intuition. It is only in his reflections on his procedures that a scientist is a naturalist and consequently a skeptic (cf. § 9). It is not the nature of his objects but *their way of being given and of existing* for consciousness that he wrongly interprets. Consequently, to overcome definitively these erroneous interpretations, and their ensuing skepticism, *the way in which the object is given to consciousness and the meaning of its objectivity must themselves become the objects of intuitive inquiry*. But for this, the intuitive gaze must be turned to the consciousness to which objects are given, and see at the very source what "to be given to consciousness" means. Phenomenology in Husserl's sense of the term will do just that.

The "regional ontologies," directed as they are toward their objects, do not have consciousness as their theme, and cannot oppose the skepticism nourished by empiricist dogmatism with any certain intuitions or strength of their own. This is why Husserl characterizes the attitude of the eidetic ontologies as well as that of the factual sciences as naive and dogmatic: although they are right in the propositions they establish, the *meaning of the objectivity* of these propositions escapes them. They see what is given but not how, as given, this given is given.

The new science to be implemented will have for its theme the consciousness wherein objects are given; it alone will be able to determine the meaning of their objectivity and their cognition. Thus, first of all, skepticism will be overcome. But the solution to the problems confronted by phenomenology, by virtue of its being the foundation of

the sciences and the elucidation of their meaning, is at the same time the solution to the great philosophical problem concerning the meaning of the transcendence claimed for objects in relation to consciousness.

This new direction of research is preeminently philosophical. With it, one returns to the very sources of all existence for consciousness. One studies the way things become manifest, which all the other sciences presuppose without clarifying.

But there is more. To ask what it means that objects are given *to consciousness*, what their transcendence or objectivity means *for consciousness*, is to inquire at the same time about the meaning of the bare existence of things. For the existence about which one can reasonably speak can only be the existence which is revealed to consciousness; one can only try to grasp exactly its modes of being revealed in consciousness. To suppose that things in themselves exist otherwise than as revealed is to misunderstand the "in themselves" character that things given to consciousness have, and to imagine that they are given as images or signs of another world. Our cognition is directed to *given* things; its intention is to grasp *them*—the given things which we posit as existing, but whose existence is never the theme of the naive or scientific attitude. Our sole problem is to clarify the meaning of their existence. We must take it exactly as it gives itself to consciousness (cf. § 26).

II. Fundamental Phenomenological Considerations

11. Preliminary remarks

We have just shown that we must divert our intuitive gaze from things and the sciences, and fix it on the consciousness that thinks things and makes the sciences. We have also shown the philosophical purpose of such a change of attitude. But in seeking now to determine in what sense consciousness will become our object, we should keep in mind that one of the concerns we began with was to overcome skepticism. Thus in our transition to phenomenology we shall have to choose, from among the paths that lead us to it, the path in which the absolute character of this new science, its absolute resistance to all skepticism, will be continually illuminated.

12. The natural and the phenomenological attitude

The natural attitude in which we live, and in which we remain while engaged in science, is unaware of the question of the meaning of

consciousness and of transcendence. In this attitude we find an *existing* world before us to which we belong along with other men and all animate nature. Its existence is implied in each of our acts that has the world as its object. *The existence of the world is the general thesis that characterizes the natural attitude.*

This attitude must be radically changed. First, the meaning of this *existential thesis* which the natural attitude naively presupposes—the meaning of existence—must be clarified. Second, we must overcome the skepticism which is possible precisely because the meaning of this thesis is obscure.

These two concerns determine a new attitude. It has something of the Cartesian doubt, without being identical to it. We no longer live in the existential thesis, which is not absolutely certain—but we do not reject it or move to its antithesis. We make this thesis itself the object of our investigations. The thesis open to doubt is thus "put out of action" (*ausser Action gesetzt*), "excluded" (*ausgeschaltet*), "put between parentheses" (*eingeklammert*)—but it does not totally disappear. Without living in it, we can speak of it and of its properties. Husserl calls this attitude the *phenomenological* ἐποχή [*epoché*].

The phenomenological ἐποχή applies to all the existential positions of the natural attitude. Scientific, aesthetic, moral, and other judgments are put between parentheses; we do not allow ourselves to live in them. But we do not cease considering them: without siding for or against their value, *without living* in them, as we did in the natural attitude, we consider *this life* itself—this consciousness that posits all these propositions—in its concrete aspect. We also consider these propositions as posited by consciousness and *exactly in the way they are posited by consciousness, in which they are presented and given in it.* Seen from this perspective, these propositions are no longer what they were in the natural attitude; they are "phenomenologically reduced." The phenomenological ἐποχή is also called the "phenomenological reduction."

Thus the ἐποχή, which denies us all existential theses about the world, presents us positional consciousness itself as an object of investigation.

But have we in this way also met our second requirement, that of resisting all skepticism in our investigations? Is not consciousness itself a part of the existing world? Must not the ἐποχή "put in parentheses" every affirmation having consciousness for an object? And consequently does it not render impossible any phenomenology understood as the indubitable science of consciousness? The following pages will respond to these questions.

13. The essence of consciousness: intentionality

A study of the nature of consciousness will show us that consciousness, considered from a certain point of view, resists the ἐποχή, as the field of absolute certitude.

Husserl takes the term "consciousness" to cover the sphere of the "*cogito*" in the Cartesian sense of the term: I think, I understand, I conceive, I deny, I want, I do not want, I imagine, I feel, etc. The characteristic that necessarily belongs to the whole sphere of *consciousness*—both *actual* (attentive) and *potential* (the whole sphere of consciousness's *possible acts*, without which actual consciousness would be unthinkable)—is to be always "consciousness of something." Every perception is perception of the "perceived"; every desire is desire of the "desired," etc. Husserl calls this fundamental property of consciousness *intentionality*.

But it must be clearly understood that intentionality is not a bond between two psychological states, one of which is the act and the other the object. Nor is it a bond between consciousness on one side and the real object on the other. Husserl's great originality is to see that the "relation to the object" is not something inserted between consciousness and the object; it is consciousness itself. *It is the relation to the object that is the primitive phenomenon—and not a subject and an object that would supposedly move toward one another.*

Let us say at once that this view exposes the falseness of the traditional formulation of the problem of knowledge. For the fact that the subject reaches the object cannot be a problem. What becomes *the theme of the theory of knowledge is the concrete study of different structures of that primitive phenomenon, the "relation to the object," or intentionality.* This study, as we will see later, is the main problem of phenomenology.

But for the moment that is not our concern. We must see the essence of consciousness insofar as it withstands doubt, as opposed to the world and its objects. How can one distinguish consciousness from the object toward which it is directed? And in the special case of the world, toward which consciousness is directed as toward an object, and to which it is bound in animate being—is consciousness truly distinct from it?

14. Consciousness and the perceptual world

If we are to believe the account given by the philosophy of primary and secondary qualities, secondary qualities (and since Berkeley also the primary qualities) should be identified with the content of consciousness. Consciousness would be a sort of box in which these qualities, which at the

same time belong to the world, are enclosed. But a precise analysis shows us that quality is already on a different level with respect to consciousness. For an identical quality can be given in a changing stream of perceptions. "The same color," Husserl says, "appears in continuous multiplicities of color adumbrations [*Abschattungen*]."[15] Red and the perception of red are two different things.[16] What belongs to the real content of consciousness are "*Abschattungen*" [adumbrations] *or sensations*; an *intention animates them* and lends them a representative function. But these sensations are moments of life and not of space; therefore they are not the object's still nonobjectified qualities, as the sensationalists believed. The objective quality is not a part of consciousness, not boxed up in it; it is already transcendent to consciousness. The nature of consciousness thus presents itself as totally different from the perceptual world—that manifold of primary and secondary qualities—which is its object.

15. Immanent perception and transcendent perception

Yet consciousness—*sensations and intentions*—can itself become an object of perception, memory, imagination, etc.. These acts are then acts of *reflection*. But if in acts of reflection the object is to be distinguished from the act, the object's transcendence from the reflective act is different from the spatial object's transcendence from its perception. The object of reflection (*immanent perception*) may itself belong to the stream of consciousness, whereas this is *by essence* impossible for the spatial object. For that reason we call the latter a *transcendent* object, and the perception which grasps it *transcendent perception*.

A remark of primary importance follows from these eidetic laws: it is absurd to suppose that our transcendent perception, because it is transcendent, does not reach the thing in itself, and that a perfect intelligence would perceive it in an immanent act. This is absurd, for it would be to suppose that the transcendent thing could be given in an immanent way. Another decisive point which we have already made (cf. § 10) is that the world of things is not given with the trait of being an image or symbol of another world, but always with that of being an "in itself." *It is indeed the world of things such as it is given in perception that is the object of our knowledge.*[17]

16. Comparative study of immanent and transcendent perception

The transcendent object is given *by essence* in an inadequate way. We cannot, in a single act, grasp all the sides of a table; to do this a continuous series of looks would be necessary, a series which *by essence* is infinite.

Moreover, the transcendent object is given as something relative: there are only aspects, without it being possible to say, except by convention, what it is in itself. The sound of a violin, for example, depends on the place in the room where I hear it, but all its "aspects" which are revealed to me have the same right to be called "the sound such as it is in itself."

The immanent object, on the contrary, is given in an adequate way and as something not revealed in a series of aspects, but as absolute. Moreover, the *immanent object* is given as already having existed before reflection, as having an existence independent of reflection. By contrast, the meaning of the *transcendent object's* existence lies in the fact that it is the *object of an actual consciousness*, or that it belongs to its most immediate possibilities. If we speak of the existence of transcendent objects which are not objects of an actual or immediately possible consciousness, it is because their perceptibility is *motivated* in actual or potential perception.

17. The absolute existence of consciousness and the ideal existence of the world

From the preceding analyses two consequences follow.

1. In the case of a transcendent object (or the world), the meaning of its existence is exhausted in being subject to an actual, potential, or motivated perception. The existence of a transcendent object is always relative to a consciousness (see the example of "sound," above); its *esse* is always a *percipi* (not in Berkeley's sense of the term, since the *esse* is not enclosed in the *percipi*, but transcends it) and thus presupposes a consciousness. Consciousness, on the contrary, is given as existing independently of the reflection that perceives it, existing through its own nature; *nulla res indiget ad existendum* [nothing is lacking in existence]. Thus Husserl goes back to the Cartesian *cogito*, which he considers as the necessary starting point for all philosophy.

2. But not only is the existence of a transcendent object exhausted in its existence for consciousness; this existence itself presents itself as contingent. Since the transcendent object is never given in an adequate way, but always relative to a series of "aspects" which are successively discovered, its "existence for consciousness" can at each moment appear illusory. The subsequent perceptions can *in principle* repudiate the preceding ones. Consciousness alone is given in an adequate and absolute way, independent of a continuity of aspects.

These results are of great importance for our initial concerns (cf. § 12, above). If the positing of the world's existence is always open to doubt, the positing of consciousness's existence resists all doubt. *Consciousness is thus given as the residuum that resists the phenomenological* ἐποχή,

and every truth concerning it is absolutely certain. The following expansions will serve to prevent any misunderstanding.

18. Psychological consciousness and absolute consciousness

Our analyses have shown us that being as consciousness has a totally different meaning than being as nature. Not only does consciousness not depend on nature, as naturalism would have it, but the being of nature depends on the being of consciousness—without dependence having a mythological sense. But under these conditions, how are we to understand the consciousness that in animate nature and man presents itself as a part of nature?

The fact is that consciousness—absolute being—can apperceive itself in its relation to nature in a special act of apperception. As the object of this apperception, without losing anything of its essence, it is apperceived as modified, tied to nature, and thus participating in the transcendence of the latter. The consciousness dealt with in the absolute self-evidence of the *cogito* is not this consciousness in nature, for all nature is *by essence* susceptible to doubt. *This consciousness which is part of nature is the object of a natural science: psychology.*

Thus, the consciousness that phenomenology studies is not identical with that studied by psychology: it is *absolute consciousness*, or *pure transcendental consciousness*. This distinction clarifies the difference between these two attitudes. Reflection on the consciousness used in phenomenology is not simply psychological reflection, for it is directed not upon nature but upon absolute consciousness which is independent of nature, and *to which all nature is given.*

The distinction between psychological and phenomenological consciousness is fundamental in Husserl. It makes possible the overcoming of all naturalism, for the consciousness the phenomenologist studies is not part of nature. But the originality of Husserl's conception lies also in the fact that it is not an abstract consciousness—the idea of consciousness—that his phenomenology opposes to psychological consciousness, in the manner sciences delimit their domains with the help of abstractions, nor is it Fichte's "absolute I." The consciousness the phenomenologist studies is an individual consciousness, which each of us finds in himself in the *cogito*, the individual consciousness to which psychological consciousness itself owes its existence. According to Husserl it was Descartes's great error to have identified, at the very outset of the *Meditations*[18]—a work that according to Husserl inaugurated modern philosophy, and of which phenomenology is only an expansion—the "ego," given in an intuition which is certain, with the "animus," that is part of nature.

19. The successive reductions

In studying pure absolute consciousness, phenomenology's object, we naturally exclude all propositions which have nature for their object (the natural sciences), but we will also make no use of logic or formal ontology, for our new science, *although eidetic, will be purely descriptive*, and will not make use of deduction. As for logical axioms, which every object qua object must obey (for example, the law of contradiction), we will intuit them directly in each object of our study. We then proceed to exclude every affirmation concerning God, both as principle of finality and as the object of religious experience, and leave aside the question of the "pure ego," which is a moment necessarily belonging to every act of consciousness. Finally, we will also dispense with "regional ontologies," whose true meaning will not be clarified prior to the study of the essence of pure consciousness—which is the object of phenomenology.

20. Phenomenology—*prima philosophia*

Following these reflections, phenomenology is presented as a science independent of every extraneous premise, an absolutely certain science which will furnish the critique and foundation of all other sciences. These latter, carried on within the natural attitude, directed exclusively toward their objects, can never pose the critical question of the meaning of knowledge, the structure of intentionality, and consequently the meaning of objectivity in each region of objects. Both its independence from all the other sciences, and by the fundamental nature of the problems with which it deals, phenomenology must, according to Husserl, be the realization of the ideal of *prima philosophia.*

III. The Method and Problems of Pure Phenomenology

21. Phenomenology as an intuitive science

Phenomenology proceeds by intuitions. But intuition admits of degrees of clarity—its object can appear with the internal characteristic of "far" or "near." As we assign a fixed, univocal terminology to the objects which the field of pure consciousness presents to us, we do so in an intuition of absolute clarity, in which the object is given to us in an absolute "proximity."

But phenomenology is not a science of the facts of pure consciousness: it intends to study the essence of pure consciousness. Therefore the

intuition it uses is not individual, but eidetic (cf. § 3): setting out from individual "states of consciousness" (*Erlebnisse*), it grasps in them, as in an example, their essence. The *Erlebnisse* which serve as examples do not necessarily have to be given in a perceptual (originary) intuition. Purely imagined *Erlebnisse* can serve as the basis for ideation as well as those of perception. This remark is of great methodological importance, for with it phenomenology acquires more freedom, and is not bound, in its investigations, to perception. And it shows us once again that the eidetic sciences do not have individual perception as their premise. "Fiction," Husserl says paradoxically, "makes up the vital element of phenomenology as it does of every other eidetic science."[19]

22. The possibility of a descriptive eidetics

Phenomenology is a descriptive, eidetic science. However, in the eidetics which we possess—geometry, logic—there is no question of description. These sciences, for example geometry, fix some primary essences that enter into the fundamental axioms, and deduce from these essences all those belonging to the same domain. Husserl calls the domains, e.g., space, which by their very nature lend themselves to such determination from a finite number of axioms, *definite or mathematical multiplicities*. An essential characteristic of a mathematical multiplicity is to allow the formation of *exact concepts*. The exact concepts in a science do not depend solely on the logical art of the scientist but on the essence of the domain of studies itself. These concepts are possible in a "definite multiplicity" and are formed by the procedure of *idealization*, which must be distinguished from the procedure of *ideation* of which I spoke at the beginning of this exposition. *Idealizing* does not consist simply in grasping the essence of the individual thing, concretely given in perception, but much more in grasping the limit-degree of its essence—as one grasps geometrical ideas in concrete space. The concept thus elaborated is an "idea in the Kantian sense of the term," which must be distinguished from essence as we have considered it up until now, as "idea in the Platonic sense of the term." Individual things can approach the Kantian idea, but never realize it.

The eidetic sciences known by traditional philosophy had "mathematical multiplicities" for their object and dealt with exact concepts, the results of idealization. This is why traditional philosophy equated a priori science with deductive science. Now, the analyses of section I have shown that a priori science means science independent of all facticity, and proceeding by eidetic intuition. Therefore deduction is not the necessary characteristic of an a priori science, and "exact concepts" are not the only scientific ones.

Husserl's great discovery was the existence of inexact "concepts," which are obtained not by idealization but by ideation.[20] Thus, for example, in studying the essence of a "state of consciousness" (*Erlebnis*), ideation starts with an individual *Erlebnis* and, dropping its individuality, raises it to the essence in all its concreteness and in all the vagueness which essentially belongs to it. Phenomenology cannot consist in deducing the essence of this or that state of consciousness on the basis of some axiom, but in describing its necessary structure. And as our description is guided by an eidetic intuition, we produce an eidetics, while making a description.

23. Reflection

In order to be sure of the indubitable character of phenomenology, some remarks are indispensable concerning the act by which pure consciousness is studied: reflection (in the sense of § 18).

"States of consciousness" (*Erlebnisse*) are lived by the "I," but become its objects only in reflection.

Yet under the eye of reflection conscious life is modified: our anger grasped by reflection no longer has the vivacity it had before reflection. Moreover, conscious life continually flows in time, and reflection can grasp it only through acts of *protention*, waiting for the moments of duration to come, and through acts of *retention*, as it were retaining those which have just slipped away. But both the moments to come and those gone by present themselves to consciousness as modified: with the form of "past" or "future."

These modifications, which *by themselves form an extensive field for study*, nevertheless do not prevent the state of consciousness modified by reflection from being given precisely as such. *Reflection grasps consciousness in its nonmodified form through modifications.*

This possibility of grasping a state of consciousness such as it was in reality prior to reflection and independent of temporal modifications—a possibility so essential to phenomenology's claim to grasp consciousness such as it really exists—cannot be denied. A negation would in fact be absurd, for it would suppose what it denies. To say one doubts reflection is to suppose that reflection at least gives us this doubt itself. Furthermore, when one says that states of consciousness are modified by reflection, one presupposes that the non-modified states are known, for otherwise one could not even suspect the modification, nor even the possibility of reflection itself.

The possibility that each state of consciousness can be given to reflection such as it is, is a *necessity* of essence. Reflection is the only

means of knowing consciousness, and it would be absurd to consider the modifications it imposes by essence on its object to be the shortcomings of a given psychological constitution.

24. Subjectively oriented phenomenology

The preceding developments justify phenomenology as a descriptive eidetic science of pure consciousness, having reflection as its method.

Pure consciousness can nevertheless be envisaged in different ways. Our initial concern was to study it as a relation to the object, as intentionality. This is the theme of the infinite investigations of *objectively oriented phenomenology*, with which the first volume of the *Ideas* is principally concerned.

Nevertheless, consciousness presents yet another aspect in that it always belongs to an "I" from which acts go forth, so to speak; in that it fills out a duration; and in that one finds in it elements such as sensations, which are in some way material elements, "hyletic" in Husserlian terminology. This "hyletic stratum" belongs not only to perception, but is found in all domains of conscious life. All this is the topic of lengthy investigations of *subjectively oriented phenomenology*. Problems and investigations such as the relation of the "I" to the consciousness that fills time, above all the problem of the "I" as personality, the problem of the constitution of time as duration, which is different from cosmic time, and whose moments interpenetrate in a relation of intentionality sui generis[21]—all these are already mentioned in *Ideas*, and are treated in works Husserl has not yet published. They were available in manuscript form to his collaborators and students, and have thus exercised a most powerful influence before publication.[22]

25. Objectively oriented phenomenology

Still, our primary interest is in consciousness inasmuch as it is "relation to an object," or intentionality. I have already emphasized (cf. § 13) that intentionality must not be understood as a bridge between consciousness and an object; the relation to the object itself is the primitive phenomenon. But intention, the relation of consciousness to the object, is not an empty look upon the object whose sole function is to supply that object, to which the purely qualitative and subjective moments of joy, desire, judgment, etc. would be added afterwards. Hence, in order to study how the object is given to consciousness it does not suffice to study this "empty look," this intention common to every consciousness. *Joy, desire, judgment, etc., are themselves intentions; in each of them the object*

is given differently; the relation to the object itself is different. And if, as Husserl thinks, the act of pure representation is the necessary foundation of acts of joy, valorization, will, etc., this means that these acts are complex, that they are composed of a multiplicity of interconnected intentions. But each of these intentions, and not only the act of representation, has the function of giving the object. It is precisely for this reason that the problem of knowledge—the study of the relation to the object—opens up an infinite field of research. Not restricting ourselves to a general indication of the meaning of intentionality, we must study the special mode by which consciousness possesses its object for each genus of intention and, consequently, the meaning of the object's objectivity in each of them. Moreover, each category of object is given in a determined type of act, in a complex of intentions having a necessary structure. Thus for each category of transcendent objects the question of *their constitution for pure transcendental consciousness* is to be considered.

These "*constitutional problems*" consist in studying how sensuous (hyletic) data are animated with intentions, how these intentions are bound together to give consciousness one sole, selfsame object, how the acts are characterized and bound together when the object constituted by them is given as *existing*, as known with *reason*, and what the acts are that give it as pure appearance. Thus objectively oriented phenomenology will find itself engaged in studying, under constitutional problems, the meaning of "reason," "appearance," and "existence" for each region of objects and for each science of the natural attitude. It will thus realize what, at the beginning of this exposition (cf. § 10) was presented as the task of philosophy.

But this science, which will study the necessary essence of the different structures of knowledge, will at the same time be a critique of those structures. For, as I just said, it will study the meaning and eidetic laws of all valid knowledge (see section IV, below) which are at the same time the norms of all knowledge laying claim to truth.

The theory and critique of knowledge, in the Husserlian sense of the term, asks, as does the whole philosophical tradition: How can thought reach an object that is transcendent to it? But for Husserl the problem consists not in the fact that thought transcends itself, *for thought is synonymous with thought that transcends itself*, but in the clarification of the necessary structure of each act of thought that transcends itself and reaches its object. The existence and transcendence of the object are not metaphysically presupposed, as in the traditional position of the problem, but, prior to all metaphysics, the very meaning of this existence and transcendence becomes the object of study.

The infinite number of problems which are opened up in this way demand positive work, the work of generations.

26. Noema and noesis

Everything I have said about the intentional character of consciousness, consciousness understood as "the relation with an object itself," is a response to the following question, which might have occurred to the reader at the beginning of section II: How can one study the relation with the transcendental object, and consequently the meaning of its objectivity, if the transcendent object is excluded by the phenomenological reduction and consciousness alone subsists as the residuum? We see now that this is a difficulty only for the traditional conception of consciousness, in which consciousness is a sort of substance resting in itself. Husserl's originality lay in seeing that the first phenomenon given to direct reflection upon consciousness is not an "I think" (*ego cogito*), but an "I think an object" (*ego cogito cogitatum*). The object of each cogitation, without being contained in that cogitation, nevertheless presents itself as its necessary characteristic and is as such necessarily given—and given in its mode of self-presentation to consciousness—in reflection upon consciousness. What is new in this view is that the idea of immanent intuition, whose indubitable character was discovered by Descartes, is here fecundated by the idea that the intentional character of consciousness, the "relation to the object," is its very essence. Thus the "relation to the object," intentionality, in all the wealth of its modifications and forms, becomes accessible to immanent intuition. This intuitive study of intentionality—is phenomenology.

So if we, as phenomenologists, do not allow ourselves to live the perception of a garden, for example, and to make determinations about this garden, we do make statements about the perception of the garden itself in its relation to the perceived garden. The garden, excluded in the passage to the phenomenological attitude, is recovered in that attitude as "perceived"—more generally as what it was for consciousness (which is precisely what interests us in it), and its specific way of being an object becomes the theme of our investigation. The "perceived as perceived," or the "judged as judged," etc., which Husserl calls *noema*, is thus inseparable from the act of consciousness. The *noema* is distinguished from the act of consciousness itself, which is called the *noesis*.

The world, the objects of the natural sciences and ontologies, excluded by "reduction," reappear—"in quotes," as Husserl puts it—within the immanent sphere of consciousness, where they are studied as noemata. Our attention now directed to the consciousness of the garden, we

find "the garden" in quotes, as a noema. But this means that the study of consciousness permits us to grasp the way of being of each category of objects in consciousness, and thus to study the meaning of the existence of things.[23]

The problems of the constitution of the different regions of objects for pure consciousness are thus reduced to the eidetic descriptive study of the noetic-noematic structures of consciousness.

This structure is found in all acts of consciousness: perception, memory, imagination, desire, will, etc. Everywhere the noesis is given with its intentional correlate, the noema: the noesis of desire with the noema "the desired as desired," the noesis of willing with the noema "the willed as willed," etc. A study of the nature of consciousness shows us a *rigorous parallelism* between the noemata and the noeses in all the domains of consciousness. But that does not allow us to study the noemata by themselves and to postulate the corresponding noeses—or the inverse; our study must be intuitive and postulate nothing.

27. Judgment

The limits of this exposition force us to leave aside the concrete noetic-noematic analyses which are outlined at the end of part 3 of *Ideas*. There Husserl studies the fundamental structure of the noema and noesis, attentional modifications, the structure of complex acts such as willing and judging, and the way in which all the objects of consciousness—aesthetic, moral, desired, willed objects, etc.—can be given at the same time in a purely representative way, and thus lend themselves to *theoretical judgment*.

Several remarks are required, however, concerning the noetic-noematic structure of the theoretical judgment, so as to clarify further the notion of truth such as we have presented it in § 4 of this exposition.

The judgment "the tree is green," as a noesis, an act of consciousness, has an intentional correlate: the judgment as a noema. But what in this noema presents itself as the object of the act of judgment (the noesis) is neither an S (a tree) nor a P (the greenness), which could also be given in simple perceptions; it is "the fact that S is P" (*Das P-sein des S*), which Husserl calls the *Sachverhalt* (state of affairs). This must be underscored, for the fact that the act of judging has for its object a "*Sachverhalt*"—a notion which does not coincide with the objects found in this *Sachverhalt*—means that the proper function of the act of judging is not a sort of spontaneous joining of disparate data (as is ordinarily thought); rather it consists in *intending*, in *thinking* (*vermeinen*) the predicative synthesis which belongs to the objective synthesis of this act, to the *judgment as a Sachverhalt*.

Under these conditions, however, the truth of a judgment is not its conformity with I know not what laws of linkage that would define reason, but in the intuition of a *Sachverhalt* whose categorial elements can be as intuitively given as its sensuous elements (cf. § 4). Deduction itself is only one mode of bringing a *Sachverhalt* to intuitive clarity once again.

28. Problems of reason and reality

I have just touched upon the question of truth. In doing so, I cross over into the domain of part 4 of *Ideas*. The noetic-noematic analyses, whose themes I have just enumerated, and whose execution by Husserl is but a blocking out of the work yet to be done, do not yet pose the problem of truth; they study more generally the question of the relation to the object. But to be in relation to the object is not in itself to know truth, and "to be object" is not yet to exist. Only true cognition has being as its object. All the problems of phenomenology serve as a preparation for the essential problem: *How does cognition reach being with truth? What does "being" signify?*

This must be correctly understood. In making a distinction between the pure and simple relation to the object, on the one hand, and truth or "the relation to the existing object," on the other, we do not mean to say that the relation to the existing object is something that transcends intentionality itself. We do not want to return to the scholastic distinction between the immanent object and the real object, and imagine that consciousness, which is the "relation to the object" itself, is a closed world which would require yet another intentionality to arrive at the real object. Phenomenology's entire novelty consists precisely in having gone beyond this distinction. The fact that the relation to the object is a relation to the existing object can only be a characteristic immanent to intentionality itself. And what the relation to the existing object means—this is indeed what phenomenological analysis must establish, by studying, for example, the manner in which the object is given as existing to perception.

The problem of reason and reality is thus put in a new way. It is not a question of asking how knowledge can reach being that is transcendent to it, for an intentionality that reaches it, as does perception, for example, is the primitive phenomenon, given to intuition in an indubitable way. It is only a question of making explicit *what consciousness thinks when it thinks a real object, how the intentionality that reaches being is to be characterized.* How can the character of truth be described, and what does it mean? What, correlatively, does it mean that the object exists? More particularly, what do knowledge and existence mean for each region of objects? These

are the problems that the phenomenology of reason takes up, and that intuition will be able to solve.

IV. Reason and Reality

29. The claim of consciousness to reach its object

In order to outline a phenomenology of reason, and especially in order to show the broad outline of the problems which are posed and which can be resolved by the phenomenological method, we must ask ourselves—before showing how to characterize the act of consciousness when its claim to be reasonable, to posit its object rightly, is justified—Of what does this claim consist?

The "noema of consciousness" is not the same thing as the "object of consciousness." Different acts have different noemata, but can be directed to the same object; the same object "tree" can be given in a perception, a memory, in phantasy, etc. Hence, one must distinguish in the noema different layers and a nucleus (*Kern*) which can be common to different noemata. The terms which serve to describe this nucleus are borrowed from the language of the sciences of the natural attitude: "object," "thing," "figure," "hard," "colored," "good," "perfect," etc. One avoids such characteristics as "clearly given," "given in memory," etc., even though they, too, belong to the noema and are nowise the result of reflection. These latter are added onto the nucleus and are properly its ways of being given; with the nucleus they form what Husserl calls the *complete noema* (*das volle Noema*). The complete noema of a perception of the tree will be "the tree perceived with all the characteristics it has as perceived." Its "nucleus" is the tree itself, the "object simply" (*Gegenstand schlechthin*), which can also be recovered in the memory of the same tree.

But the set of predicates which form the noematic nucleus are necessarily predicates of something. Thus a still deeper moment can be described in the noema, a sort of X which bears the predicates and which Husserl, to avoid any metaphysical or realist equivocation associated with the term "X," later called "the object pole of the intention." This "pole" is unavoidable in an exact description of the phenomenon. It is inseparable from its predicates; it is what remains identical when the predicates change. This "pole" is, as it were, the object's substance; it cannot be omitted by a description that would be exact. We say that different acts are related to the same object when the "object pole" is common to all

these acts. In synthetic acts, in judging, for example, each articulation has its pole, while the synthesis also has a comprehensive pole.

The object thus described, as the pole with the set of its predicates, can be given in a consciousness that *posits it as existing*, in what Husserl calls a thetic consciousness. The claim of knowledge to truth can only consist in the claim of not only positing its object as existing, but of having a right to do so. The question confronting us now is: How is the act characterized in which this claim is justified? In what does this right of consciousness to posit its object as existing consist?

30. Originary intuition as the source of all truth

The moment has come to return here to results arrived at in the *Logical Investigations*. In that book Husserl distinguishes two types of acts.

First, there are significative acts, which are not related immediately to their objects but only *think* (*meinen*) them, *signify* (*bedeuten*) them, *intend* them without seeing them. These are empty, nonrealized intentions (*unerfüllte Intentionen*). Thus in a conversation we think of the objects of our sentences, such as things, relations, ideas, *Sachverhalt*, but while being directed toward them in a series of intentions, we do not, so to speak, see them.

Second, there are intuitive acts, in which the object is not only intended but seen with self-evidence (in imagination, for example). The Cartesian notion of intuition, clear and distinct knowledge, recurs here. The preferred case of intuition is originary intuition or perception (cf. § 3). It is characterized not only by the fact of seeing its object immediately, but by seeing it "in the original," "in person" (*selbstgegeben*), "in flesh and blood" (*leibhaftgegeben*). Let us note in passing that in the phenomenological attitude perception can be described as the intentionality which possesses its object in the original. The "intuitive presence" of consciousness before things is no more mysterious than its "signitive presence"—the relation of pure thought (*vermeinen*)—in these things.

But purely signitive intention can have the same object as intuitive intention. In this case a fulfillment (*Erfüllung*) of the signitive intention in intuition is possible. The judgment in which the fact that $2 \times 2 = 4$ is only mediately intended and signified, can develop into a judgment in which the fact that $2 \times 2 = 4$ is perceived with self-evidence. But there can be signitive acts which are never fulfilled; for example, the "square circle" is an object which one can intend (for to think a "square circle" is indeed to think something), but this object can never be given intuitively.

To return to our initial question, we can now say: what justifies the positing of the object as existing by consciousness is the intuitive vision,

the perception of the object "in the original." The act of reason is the intuitive act. What characterizes the essence of reason is then not a certain form, or a certain law of thought or logical category; *it is a certain way of relating to the object where this object is given with self-evidence and is present "in person" before consciousness.* The analyses of section I above have shown how the concept of perception extends to the sphere of essences and categorial forms; we need not return to them here.

But the meaning of reason and, correlatively, of reality, is not resolved with these general indications. A broad field of problems now opens out before us. For *each category* of objects the question of reality arises. And to see what truth signifies in each of these regions one must, by focusing on transcendental consciousness, show and describe the noetic and noematic structure of the intuitive acts which constitute the objects of the respective regions. We shall return to the main groups of problems which the phenomenology of reason poses. Some general remarks are first required.

31. Adequate and inadequate self-evidence

Adequate self-evidence, which we have in mathematical reasoning, is characterized by the fact that the object intended is entirely covered by the object seen; the signitive intention is entirely realized. The positing of the object as existing is justified in this case in an exceptional way, excluding the contrary positing. Inadequate intuition, the only kind possible for a transcendental object, is essentially incapable of fulfilling the entire signitive intention: the whole of the object can only be intended, and solely one of its sides is seen. This is why the positing of the object is never totally justified, and its existence is never certain.

Our distinction accounts for the distinction between apodictic and assertoric self-evidence.

32. Mediate self-evidence

Besides immediate—adequate or inadequate—self-evidence, one can speak of mediate self-evidence, which is always justified by a return to immediate and originary self-evidence, the only source of truth. Such is the self-evidence of memory, which draws all its force from perception, which is at its basis, and to which one must return in order for its truth to be denied or confirmed. Here investigations are called for, to describe the structure of this confirmation and its opposite, the structure of this type of mediate self-evidence, etc.

But self-evidence may be mediate by virtue of the very essence of its object. In geometry, for example, the fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles cannot be immediately evident, even for a divine understanding. The return to immediate self-evidence is in this case a movement, whose every step is evident, toward originary self-evidence. The *noetic-noematic* structure of such a mediate justification forms a field of investigations for the phenomenology of reason.

33. Broad outlines of the problems of the phenomenology of reason

I now leave aside the general developments of the phenomenology of reason, to show the broad outlines of the problems which arise—which is seldom possible without a preliminary sketch of the descriptions to be worked out.

What has to be carried out is a description of the constitution of the different categories of objects for pure consciousness, in order to see how these objects exist.

First of all, apophantic logic and formal ontology (cf. § 6) will be phenomenologically clarified. While the logician in the naive attitude grasps the pure forms of objects (formal ontology) or judgments (apophansis), establishing for them the apodictic axioms of their value, the phenomenologist's aim is the *meaning of this value,* that is, the noetic-noematic structure of the intuitive acts which give us a particular logical axiom. Phenomenology will show us the essence and the eidetic relations of concepts such as knowledge, self-evidence, truth, being, (object, *Sachverhalt,* etc.).[24] It will study how in each particular case the signitive intentions must, by their essential necessity, be realized in intuitive content, and which type of self-evidence is possible in each case. The phenomenological position of the problem opens before us a broad field of work.

The problems of reason are then set forth in material ontologies. Each region of objects has *as its essence* a special but necessarily determinate way of being given to intuitive consciousness. These intuitive acts in which reality is constituted as existing must be studied to clarify the meaning of the knowledge and the existence of these objects.

To show how constitutional problems are formulated, let us take an example: the region of "material thing." While acts of consciousness are always given in an adequate way (which allowed me to speak from the start of the absolute existence of pure consciousness [cf. § 17]), objects of the region "material thing" can never be adequately given. This inadequation of intuition is essential to the material thing. Only one side of the object is given to us in immediate perception, while the rest of the object is only intended. When a new phase of the thing enters

the sphere of perception, the phase perceived earlier leaves it *by essence.* It is again *by essence* that this series of continuous perceptions can never come to an end. The material thing is thus only a *sui generis* synthesis of a continuous series of noemata. In this way phenomenological analysis uncovers for us the general meaning of the existence of the material thing. The material thing cannot *by essence* have the character of absolute existence, for the existence of each phase depends on the existence of the whole, and the whole can never be given completely. Each positing of the object as existing is presented as valid only so long as the rest of the series of perceptions does not contradict it. Its existence can only be the concordance of the series of perceptions that the perceiving "I" registers. But this is only one very general characteristic of the existence of the material thing which our no less general analysis permits us to formulate. A field of infinite investigations opens here, the goal of which is to see concretely: how perception of the object takes place within a continuous series of partial perceptions, the different modes wherein the synthesis of these perceptions is made; how the force of the existential position increases with the concordance of these perceptions, or, to the contrary, how new experience contradicts preceding experience and the object presumed to exist "explodes" (illusion); how, after contradictory perceptions, those perceptions which before fitted together are now modified; how the unity of experience is reestablished, etc.

These questions, where what is to be established is not the "facticity" of consciousness but its *essential nature,* have, let me repeat, this peculiarity, that it is not one region among others that they intend to explore. It is not a matter of knowing the laws of consciousness as one knows geometrical or chemical laws, for with consciousness we are dealing with intentionality and not with a sort of substance which rests in itself. It is the way consciousness relates to its object in each of the modes which we have to describe that interests us—how the object is conceived in the concordance of intuitions, how it is present in the explosion, etc. The meaning of existence—a notion as general as it is empty for the naive attitude which presupposes it—becomes in phenomenology the principal object of investigation and must be made explicit by the phenomenology of reason.

The problems that I have just enumerated can be grouped under the heading "constitution of the region 'material thing' for pure consciousness" (cf. § 25). But analogous problems arise in other regions. The meaning of truth and existence for regions such as "man," "animality," "culture," "society," etc., must become the object of phenomenology, which will seek to clarify the intuitions that constitute the objects in question as existing and as true.

These different regions are not independent of one another. The regions "animality," "man," and "collectivity," are "founded" in the region "material thing." The phenomenology of the region "material thing" also governs the others to the extent that they are founded in it. But each of these regions, such as, for example, the region "collectivity," is irreducibly original in its being and its way of being known, and requires a special phenomenology in which its constitution for pure consciousness would be established.

34. The intersubjective reduction

The pure consciousness that has been the subject matter of my exposition is not a logically invented "universal consciousness," but a real "ego" that I am. Hence, of course, the reality that is constituted for this "ego," and that consists, as our analysis has shown, in the concordance of the continuous series of the acts of this "ego," does not exhaust the meaning of the objectivity of this reality. For objectivity presupposes not only the concordance of the intuitive acts of a single "ego," but the concordance of the acts of a multiplicity of egos. It is in the essence of objective truth to be truth for everyone; this intersubjective world is thus ideally presupposed in the very essence of truth.

If, therefore, phenomenology truly wants to study the meaning of truth and being, if it wants to exhaust their content, it must pass beyond the quasisolipsistic attitude in which the phenomenological reduction, which may be called the "egological reduction," leaves us. This attitude is only the first step toward the phenomenology of reason, a first step that is nonetheless indispensable, and poses an infinity of problems that are nonetheless real. But all the investigations of egological phenomenology must be subordinated to the "intersubjective phenomenology" which alone will be able to exhaust the meaning of truth and reality.

This idea, found in but a half-page outline in *Ideas*, becomes central in the later development of Husserl's thought. A theory of "*Einfühlung*,"[25] promised in the first volume of *Ideas* and worked out in Husserl's unpublished works, describes how the individual consciousness, the ego, the monad that knows itself in reflection, leaves itself, to find, in an absolutely certain way, an intersubjective world of monads around it. But this intersubjective world is to real society understood as part of nature, what transcendental consciousness is to psychological consciousness. It is for this "intersubjective consciousness" that the following phenomenological problems of reason arise. How is the existence of the object confirmed in the concordance of subjective experiences belonging to different egos? How does the presumed existence of the object, even if it is found

confirmed in a series of subjective acts (in a hallucination, for example), "explode" in intersubjective consciousness, etc. All the "constitutional" problems must be formulated for the absolute sphere of intersubjective consciousness which precedes all worlds and all nature, and in which all worlds and all nature are constituted. It is the study of the constitution of each region of objects for intersubjective consciousness that will clarify for us their meaning in knowledge and in being.

2

Freiburg, Husserl, and Phenomenology

The "wildly romantic" Black Forest surrounds the town of Freiburg, slips into the city and rises in its very center. It is a wild romanticism, but it has been tamed. The most uncertain footpaths abound with signs such as "Halt! To the right a splendid view of the valley," or "See the sunset!" Thus Culture, attaining a truly perfect universality, recovers what it repudiates and makes Nature herself give all that Nature can give.

The town is small, tidy, and pretty. Visited by skiers in winter, in summer it attracts numerous tourists who take walks in the most beautiful mountains in the world and view a jewel of a cathedral, "of rosy beauty like that of a betrothed," whose lacelike transparent tower is the work of good master Erwin of Strasbourg. But it is the university that supplies the vitality, and creates that rhythm of the little German university town so often celebrated in writing, song, and film. Students flock there from everywhere; the various departments promise them all the riches of the sciences and the arts. Solemnly standing at the main entrance to the university, Aristotle and Homer seem to guarantee them its good traditions and classical purity. Freiburg is still a town of medicine, chemistry, and many other sciences. But above all it is *the city of Phenomenology*.

Even for a town of intellectual industriousness, this specialty is somewhat surprising, for phenomenology is hardly well known. This is because to popularize the phenomenological doctrine would be to offend the scientific conscience of its creator, Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology wants precisely to extract *wisdom* from the fleeting loves, the lively games and the compromising frequentation of worldly-wise lecturers and fashionable speakers. It wants, between *wisdom* and Socrates, a union "for life"; it requires all the seriousness such a union involves.[1]

But a few words about the most general intentions of the phenomenological movement perhaps will not necessarily lead to a fall into vulgar half-science.

Phenomenology means the science of phenomena. All things given, shown, or revealed to our gaze are phenomena. But then is everything a phenomenon and every science a phenomenology? Not at all. What is given to consciousness only deserves the name phenomenon if one grasps it through the role it plays and the function it exercises in the individual and affective life of which it is the object. Otherwise it is an abstraction; the significance, the scope and, as it were, the weight of its existence escape us. A *constructed* philosophical interpretation, introduced from the outside, betrays its meaning. *Construction* deforms the phenomenon.

To save the phenomena, phenomenology is guided by the conviction that the philosophical and final meaning of a *phenomenon* is reached when we place it back within conscious life, within what is individual and indivisible in our concrete existence.[2]

This reverses the scientific attitude. Newton's physics precisely turns away from the subject for the greater glory of the object. It decrees the expulsion of every so-called subjective element from the object. For example, it wipes out from space every subjective heresy: "top" and "bottom," "right" and "left," "far" and "near." Thus purified, objective space and the objective world see no limits to their ever-purer objectivity. Physics alone approaches objective space and the objective world by speaking the mysterious language of certain and mathematically precise truths.

But do we truly comprehend that language? Is not that world which transcends our ambient world also beyond the specific comprehension which we have of the individual, the historic and the human—in which the real is presented not only as a chain of propositions but as an existence that has worth and weight?

The question is legitimate; great minds have raised it in the course of the history of philosophy. Berkeley attacked Newton. Ideal lines and mathematical points, and the infinitely small are, for Berkeley, emptiness, convention, and fiction. The ascent of science toward the regions of pure objects is equivalent to a leap into nothingness. Berkeley substituted a geometry that is somewhat baroque, but that is a geometry of being, for the geometry of nothingness. The point will henceforth be a small solid of a defined minimum size; the line will be composed of a finite number of these points. If this number is odd, the line cannot be divided into two equal parts. One will no longer speak of equal triangles, for to superimpose them is to transform them into a single and unique triangle.

The sensationalism of Berkeley and Hume has often been placed at the origin of experimental positivism. The moving pages—moving, because they do not recoil before the impossible—in which these philosophers try to reconstitute the sensible elements, the "ideas" and

"impressions" of our geometrical concepts, have mainly been interpreted as the demonstration of the empirical origin of our knowledge. It has been deemed satisfactory to read them as a debate over the a priori or a posteriori character of geometry. But is sensationalism identical with empiricism? Does Berkeley's geometry and very analogous developments in Hume, who also conceived only of a space constituted of the sensible, and consequently of limited divisibility, not have another aspect? The sensible which was the center of interest not only has the virtues of a fact; it is above all an immediate and tangible element of consciousness. And consequently did not the profound thrust, the metaphysical will of sensationalism consist in affirming the immediate, the individual, and the human as the sphere wherein all true comprehension must move and through which every object must be grasped in order to have meaning? The condemnation of traditional mathematics was only a contingency; what is essential is that Berkeley and Hume sought the concrete elements of so-called abstract objects.

But this feeling of deep-seated incomprehension of the *abstract considered in itself* brings sensationalists and phenomenologists together. This feeling is beginning to penetrate modern science itself, which is troubled by "crises" and "paradoxes," and disturbed to see that the very meaning of its judgments, despite their being so certain, eludes it. It often asks, as did Berkeley long ago, if that of which it speaks is anything but nothingness, convention and fiction.

The fact remains that the philosophy of Berkeley and Hume leaned toward the most naive sort of empiricism. Hume begot Stuart Mill and Stuart Mill begot psychologism. And it is against psychologism that phenomenology rose in revolt.

The human, which Hume and Berkeley believed they had reached in the sensible, as they imagined it, was but a crude application of the categories of exterior things to man. *They considered human facts to be like things.* If they were right to see in the individual, the immediate, and the concrete the very atmosphere of comprehension into which the ideal objects of mathematics had to be reintroduced in order to be understood, they were wrong to believe that the *sensation-thing* was that individual, that immediate, that concrete.

Phenomenologists understood their first task to be the determination of the true nature of the human, the proper essence of consciousness. We know their answer: everything that is consciousness does not turn in upon itself, like a thing, but *tends* toward the world. What is supremely concrete in man is his transcendence in relation to himself—or, as the phenomenologists say, intentionality.

This is an apparently paradoxical thesis. That theoretical knowledge tends toward an object, and especially that this tension is synonymous with the very existence of knowledge, will perhaps be granted. But feelings—love, fear, anxiety—are, in their intimate warmth, directed toward nothing. They are, according to psychologists, subjective states, affective tonalities, and seem entirely contrary to intentionality. Feeling is not knowledge—this is what this objection means. But neither do the phenomenologists maintain such an absurdity. On the contrary, their fundamental idea is to affirm and respect the specificity of the *relation to the world* that feeling brings about. But they firmly maintain that there is a *relation* there, that feelings as such "want to get some place," and *as such* constitute our transcendence with respect to ourselves, our inherence in the world. Phenomenologists consequently maintain that the world itself, the objective world, is not produced on the model of a theoretical object, but is constituted by means of far richer structures which only these intentional feelings are able to grasp. Anxiety, which a lazy analysis would declare to have no object, to be a simple effect of organic states, palpitations or fatigue, appeared to phenomenologists as a privileged intention, a sovereignly metaphysical attitude. It is anxiety that reveals to us the mark of nothingness in the world, hidden to the eyes of contemplation, which means to discover something absolute. Contemplation is blind to nothingness; nothingness is not in the world as an entity. It cannot be conceived (as the ancients were right to say); it can only be anguishing.

Thus *intentionality* is the concrete element starting from which the world must be understood. A consciousness consisting of sensations deprived of meaning, not aiming at anything, turned in on itself—Taines's "polypary of images" or even Bergson's *duration*—cannot make us comprehend the world, which is not a content of consciousness. Here intentionality opens up possibilities to us. And concrete geometry, rather than being ridiculous, will be one of its first achievements. Geometrical space is indeed an abstraction. The *concrete* situation which reveals extension to us is *our presence in space.* This presence is not reducible to a simple inherence of an extended thing in another more extended thing which envelops it. It is, above all, a *complex of intentions,* the sole type of intention appropriate to intending space—just as sight alone discovers light and anxiety alone apprehends nothingness. Hence we have only to make explicit what is implied in these intentions. We will have a space that is above all an ambiance made up of our possibilities of motility, of distancing ourselves or approaching, therefore a nonhomogeneous space with a top and a bottom, a right and a left, entirely relative to the usual objects that solicit

our possibilities of moving and turning. Will it be said that this concrete space presupposes geometrical space? But that would be to believe that the former is given to a theoretical but obscure contemplation; it would be to forget the totally different root which attaches it to our life, the irreducible specificity of "presence in space." It would be like confusing touch with an imperfect vision.

Nevertheless this discovery, or rather this rehabilitation of concrete space, will not amount to a condemnation of geometry, just as the phenomenological analysis of the world will not lead to a scorn of science. Still, to comprehend the weight, scope, and meaning of scientific truths one has to see how scientific activity goes beyond the concrete world of our life, and how the objects of science relate to immediate objects. *Through an analysis of intentionality one will have to discover the meaning of that situation in which geometrical space is revealed starting from immediate space.* This does not mean that the phenomenologist will be interested in the feelings and passions of the geometrician, but that he will seek the root of the geometrical attitude in general, in the concrete totality of human existence, an existence richer than pure and serene contemplation. Thus the aspiration for the concrete that we have sensed in Berkeley will be realized. If Berkeley felt compelled to reject Newton's science, it is because his conception of a "reified" consciousness and his ignorance of intentionality did not allow him to conceive how a world not "encased" within consciousness can refer to consciousness and draw its meaning from it.

To analyze the intentionalities which *constitute* any given object is to do phenomenology. These problems of "constitution," much discussed in Freiburg, will renew philosophy; they will teach us to consider phenomena in their concrete freshness, in their irreducible originality. The whole of being, when considered as it emerges from our concrete life, is not the accumulation of facts that only the sciences of nature would be able to grasp. Along with space, time, and causality, the objectivity of notions like the "usual," the "aesthetic," the "sacred," etc., is also asserted. These characteristics are integral parts of objects, and phenomenologists see in them not "purely subjective" determinations of our knowledge of things, but the constitutive *categories* of the things themselves. The world overflows nature, recapturing all the contours and richness that it has in our concrete life; it is a world of things interesting and boring, useful and useless, beautiful and ugly, loved and hated, ridiculous and anguishing. The phenomenological method wants to destroy the world falsified and impoverished by the naturalist tendencies of our time—which certainly have their rights, but also their limits. It wants to rebuild; it wants to recover the lost world of our concrete life.

But the world, like the temple, is neither destroyed nor rebuilt in three days. "Work" is the motto in Freiburg. The word assumes a special savor when applied to philosophy, especially when what is meant is something other than an historical study of all the Aristotelian or Kantian subtleties. The young phenomenologists, disciples of Husserl, believe they can work for philosophy as scientists work for the sciences. They clear the land obstructed by scientific construction, mold the philosophical clay and slowly and laboriously lay foundations. They desire to realize, in this way, the dream of their master Husserl, the dream of a scientific philosophy that would be the work of generations of laborers, each one contributing a small piece to the edifice of philosophy, to that edifice which the philosophers of the tradition, emulating fairy tale gnomes, had the ambition of completing in a single night.

But what do we mean by "molding the philosophical clay"? Now we understand: each word employed, each concept of general usage, each truth which seems self-evident must pass the test of phenomenological analysis—an analysis which the worker accomplishes through hard labor, bent over on the fabric of concrete conscious life, over the tangle of "intentionalities" of which it is composed. The phenomenologists, opposing those ideas whose philosophical fortunes are based solely on specious, uncertain, nonintuitive reasoning—the very sort of reasoning disdainfully labeled "construction" at Freiburg—raise their rallying cries: "Down with constructions," and "To the things themselves!" And in cases in which such notions are in fact legitimate, the phenomenologists are careful lest they be extended to orders of reality they are unable to express. The phenomenologist tries to distinguish everything that is susceptible of distinction, without being afraid to face the hopeless complexity revealed by a supposedly banal phenomenon the moment it is touched by the analytic finger. "Philosophy is a science of truisms," Edmund Husserl somewhere says.

That intoxication of work is shot through with joy and enthusiasm. For the young Germans I met in Freiburg, this new philosophy is more than a new theory; it is a new ideal of life, a new page of history, almost a new religion.

This world that phenomenology rediscovered in its freshness, too big for scientific categories, overflows the scholasticism of the nineteenth century. Its sudden discovery gives young philosophers the illusion of reliving the times of the Renaissance. "The spirits awaken. How good to be alive!" These words of Ulrich von Hutten have often been the closing ones in my long discussions with one young phenomenologist—a great worker, one of the most gifted and also one of the most enthusiastic. "Spengler's success," he would tell me, "is the success of a false prophet. The proof of

that is phenomenology. We live under the sign of phenomenology: to be a phenomenologist is to put everything in question again, though not in the spirit of skepticism; it is to believe in a possible answer, without having one ready made. Only the periods of creation, of personal individuality and style, receive the gifts of the spirit of inquiry. The previous century could no longer encounter the problems; it was an incurious century, a sterile age of imitation and eclecticism. The twentieth century has rediscovered its style: modernism in architecture and painting is also phenomenology. One speaks often of barbaric centuries; I know but one: the nineteenth!"

If the best minds are attracted by the doctrine, the crowds are fascinated by its success.

In 1900–1901 Edmund Husserl, then *privat-docent* at the University of Halle, published the *Logical Investigations*, in which the new way of philosophizing first found expression. It produced a great upheaval; enthusiastic students flocked to Göttingen, where the young master taught until 1916. Then, from year to year, phenomenology won over the new philosophy departments of Germany, and its influence extended beyond philosophy properly speaking into history, sociology, psychology, philology, and law. It also stretched beyond the German borders, even beyond those of Europe. (Already in 1911 Victor Delbos wrote about Husserl in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.*)[3] In 1916 Husserl settled in Freiburg, and after having turned down a chair at the University of Berlin, continued living there up to the present.

I arrived in Freiburg just after the master had given up his regular teaching to devote himself to the publication of his numerous manuscripts. I had the good fortune to attend several lectures that he gave from time to time to an always eager audience.

His chair was passed on to Martin Heidegger, his most original disciple, whose name is now the glory of Germany. A man of exceptional intellectual power, his teaching and his works are the best proof of the fecundity of the phenomenological method. Already his considerable success gives evidence to his extraordinary prestige: to be sure of having a seat at his lectures, which took place in one of the largest rooms of the university at five o'clock in the afternoon, I had to occupy it by ten o'clock in the morning at the latest. At the seminar, to which only the privileged were admitted, all nations were represented, mostly by professors: the United States and Argentina, Japan and England, Hungary and Spain, Italy and Russia, even Australia. Observing this brilliant assembly, I understood that German student whom I had met on the Berlin-Basel express on route to Freiburg. When asked where he was going, he answered without batting an eye: "I am going to the home of the greatest philosopher in the world."

3

Phenomenology

Although it is difficult and arbitrary to divide a philosophical movement into well-defined phases, we can distinguish three phases in the phenomenological current. The first corresponds to the early works of Husserl, and was predominantly a rehabilitation of the *essences* that intuition, the celebrated *Wesenschau*, was supposed to make it possible to describe *in all their nuances.* This is the period of nuanced or subtle phenomenological descriptions.

A transcendental idealism (Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, published in 1913) followed the realism of the first period. The realm of ideas is set back within the transcendental consciousness in which it is constituted. *The problems of transcendental constitution* concern the ideal and the real world whose foundation they are called upon to elucidate. Finally, with *Being and Time* (1926), Martin Heidegger inaugurates a third period, that of *existential phenomenology.* This thinker, faithful to the method of phenomenological description, but no less preoccupied with the philosophical dignity of the subject, reforms the very idea of the subject and conceives the goal of philosophy in an unexpected and original way. For him the subject is no longer the transcendental and purely contemplative consciousness of Kant or Husserl, but a concrete *existence* doomed to death and caring about the very fact of its being. A phenomenological analysis of this existence, an existence that is familiar with the being which preoccupies it, will permit us to clarify the very meaning of the notion of being. The study of this meaning, ontology, is philosophy itself.

The influence of *existential phenomenology* in Germany is considerable. However, in the succession of phases we have just enumerated, it would not be rigorously impartial to see anything more than a chronological succession. For the progress accomplished by the phenomenological movement has not compromised the autonomous value of the former positions in which philosophers still find sustenance. The *Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 11 (1931),[1] which I shall analyze

here, furnishes a striking proof of this. It includes five studies which, while included under the same phenomenological rubric, represent the three tendencies I have just mentioned, and which often try to ignore one another.

The first and the longest (238 pages), entitled "Über das Wesen der Idee" ("On the Essence of the Idea"), is by H. Spiegelberg, a young philosopher who attaches himself nonetheless to the realist period of the movement. A veritable microscopic labor in which scholastic methods too often show through, this study has nonetheless an incontestable vigor and interest.

The nominalist conception of ideas has been ruptured since Husserl's work.

In what then does the ideality of the idea consist? How does, for example, the idea of red differ from a concrete red? The difference is to be sought neither in the content nor in a new configuration of its elements, because our author establishes the existence of absolutely simple ideas. Nor can abstraction confer ideality onto a concrete content, for *quidquid in individuo est individuatum est* (whatever is an individual is undivided). The principle of ideality is *anumerality*. The unity of the idea does not even participate in the number one. A unique individual object is already numbered, for it can be multiplied in imagination. This makes no sense for an idea.

But what then becomes of the intuition of essences? Husserl claims that one grasps an idea in an individual which one subjects to imaginary variations. For Spiegelberg this is impossible, for varying the numerical can never get us out of the domain of number. He resolves the issue by further emphasizing Platonic realism. Variation only furnishes an idea's content; but at a certain moment it is necessary to break with the world of the individual to encounter the idea itself, as a ready-made reality. There is a conversion to the idea.

However, the intuition of ideas is not indifferent to their content. There are in fact concrete ideas whose content is identical with that of individual objects; such is the idea of this piece of paper which is in front of me. Spiegelberg calls them *eidos*, for they are objects of intuition in the strong sense of the term: they are almost seen. Higher ideas, the genus-ideas, are not given in the same way: they are indeterminate, but not as individual objects are. In criticizing Locke's triangle in general, Berkeley confused the indetermination of the idea with that of the individual. The indetermination of the genus-idea is not a lack but a surplus of content. It is made up of a certain number of constant elements and a certain rule for combining a multitude of other elements which the idea does not contain, but which it governs. Thus—a curious consequence—extension

is not in inverse ratio to comprehension; unless one deliberately desires to take into account the constant elements only, neglecting the elements whose combinations the idea governs, and to forget that the higher idea is essentially *normative*.

This distinction between *eidos* and idea is quite interesting. First of all, it seems to us to clarify the relations between and the limits of image and idea. Furthermore, by insisting on the normative structure of the higher idea, on the *alternating* elements which compose it alongside the constant elements, this distinction answers the criticism that to think by abstract concepts is to think in a void. But this distinction compromises the possibility of a formal logic entirely independent of the objects of thought (and the possibility of Husserl's formal ontology and pure logic). For the formal, far from being the emptiest, is, to the contrary, the richest in content—but in a content wholly *alternating*. It is purely normative. In sum, among the options of nominalism, which denies the general idea, for it can only admit an *eidos* akin to the image, conceptualism, which ignores the normative structure of the idea, and realism, which also admits empty ideas—phenomenological analysis finds a fourth way.

The second work of the collection is by Eugen Fink.[2] It is entitled "Vergegenwärtigung und Bild" ("Representation and Image: Contribution to the Phenomenology of Unreality"). It sets out to clarify the equivocal notion of *re-presentation*. But according to Fink, a philosophical equivocation cannot be resolved by a simple effort of attention, for it is not due to a philosopher's lapse but to the very structure of consciousness. In other words, the study of a phenomenon leads us back to the study of its constitution. In this way, Fink moves away from the early phenomenologists and their naive confidence in intuition directed upon the objective side of phenomena.

But what is the nature of the consciousness to which he is led back? Is it the concrete consciousness of our daily existence, which is familiar with itself prior to any reflection, dispersed in everyday occupations, capable of pulling itself together in the anxiety of death before the injunctions of an inner voice? Is it concrete, finite, and mortal? Is it not, on the contrary, the transcendental consciousness, which is independent of the world and which, before being part of the world, constitutes it? Here lies the whole opposition between Heidegger and Husserl. Fink is a Husserlian: finite existence is already a product of transcendental consciousness, which *humanizes* itself and perceives itself in the world. But nourished by Heideggerian philosophy, Fink does not envision this *humanization* of transcendental consciousness as something inoffensive; we are entirely chained to our finite and mortal condition. And if philosophy according to Fink can go beyond this existence, it is at the price of

a veritable revolution. For Fink, philosophical liberation is accomplished in Husserl's phenomenological reduction: we leave the human condition for a transcendental existence. Thus the reduction remains for Fink the essential step of philosophy; enduring the fatality of the human condition, it raises us to the transcendental sphere where this very condition is constituted.

I emphasize this part of Fink's article because it characterizes the plane on which philosophic thought in Germany is now moving. A philosopher finds himself obliged to take a position with regard to questions of this sort before entering into analyses of detail. These detailed analyses are, moreover, very fine in the work of our author. Representations, for Fink, are the set of our powers to make present what is no longer or not yet present—the powers of memory or anticipation. These are modes of experience. They are experiences of the past and future, ways of having access to them and revealing them in their very nature as past and future. Hence there is a complexity of structures. For a past object does not appear alone, but in the world and within the horizons of time which once were its own. It is involved in a world and a time in which the subject currently lived. Between these two there are conflicts or confirmations. The future of the past world is already past for the current world, etc. This aspect, too neglected by traditional psychology, constitutes what is essential to memory, for it determines the very tonality of the memory as being an experience of the past. Analyses of the same kind are sketched out for anticipations.

The structure of imagination is different, because the world and time of the imagined event never belonged and never will belong to the world and to personal time; they are floating. Thus Fink begins the study of *unreality* which is, to him, not a pure and simple negation of reality. The second part of his work promises interesting insights in this domain. Meanwhile, the study of dreams and "painted images" moves us several steps in this direction. A *painted image,* belonging by its material reality to the real world, reveals to us at the same time an unreal world and time; it takes its place between two worlds. Fink speaks of its "fenestral" character.

Reduced to its chapter titles, this is the content of Fink's very fine work. In working out the details, he never loses sight of the whole. "Nowhere is the monograph more absurd than in philosophy," he says at the beginning of this article.

Fink is one of the rare disciples of Husserl who remained faithful to the master, even after the success of Heidegger's philosophy. But he is nonetheless imbued with the latter. The effects of this double influence are curious. Under Fink's pen, Husserl's most well-worn themes regain a new and personal force and relief. We have seen this above with

the phenomenological theory of reduction. The very use of a mixed terminology, Heideggerian and Husserlian, sets up a circuit which makes the one resonate in the other in unexpected ways.

I have a less favorable impresion of the article "Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant" ("The Imagination in Kant"), by Hermann Mörchen. It is an example of the Heideggerian method in the history of philosophy. It sets out with that view that the living past is not forever immobilized, that it is somehow a function of the present. One must then situate the systems of the past in a perspective ordered by current thought, and even interpret them with the help of a modern terminology. Heidegger practices this method with a great deal of talent. Hermann Mörchen's work, although written before the publication of Heidegger's new interpretation of Kantianism, is very closely inspired by the courses taught for a long time on this subject by the master.

We have said that for Heidegger philosophy is ontology, the study of the meaning of being. It takes philosophical anthropology as its point of departure, because human existence, which is finite and mortal, constantly cares about its being and consequently comprehends its meaning. Time is the mark of this finitude, and constitutes the very subjectivity of the human subject. For Mörchen as for Heidegger, the principle interest of Kantianism lies in having elaborated, for the first time, the notion of a finite subject.

The subject's finitude is supposedly affirmed as early as in the first lines of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: in addition to the spontaneity which characterizes our power of knowing, there is the receptivity of the senses. One would thus falsify the spirit of Kantianism by ignoring this receptivity—a grave sin of which the neo-Kantians are guilty.

But the simple division of the mind into receptivity and spontaneity, and their juxtaposition, could not satisfy Kantian thought, which was absorbed with recovering the unity and the ontological significance of the human condition. Thus, already in his earliest works (the "Anthropology," and the "Metaphysics," published by Pölitz) one can see that Kant assigns an important role to the imagination: to fill the void between understanding and sensibility. Indeed, the imagination does not easily enter into the sensibility-understanding schema. Instances of hesitation about the place of the imagination in the system of faculties can be found throughout Kant's writings; and we see him increasingly prompted to revise the very notion of subjectivity which he had accepted in dividing the soul into receptivity and spontaneity.

The role of the imagination becomes fundamental in the transcendental deduction. Through a series of ingenious interpretations of the most obscure passages of the transcendental analytic, Mörchen, faithful

to the spirit and almost the letter of Heidegger's thought, attempts to demonstrate that the imagination—at once receptivity and spontaneity—is the finite subject itself, and not a notion brought about ad hoc by a penchant for the architecture of blind windows. He tries to show that the function of the imagination is essentially transcendental, for it expresses only the projection of the mind toward what will be given to it, the creation of a whole in which a particular being could appear to a finite subject that is incapable of creating being. In other words, the imagination is the *condition of knowledge*, the "ingredient of perception," *intentionality*. Indeed, whenever it is a question of comprehending the relationship between the unity of apperception to time and to the sensible world, Kant has recourse to the imagination, even in the second edition of the *Critique*, in which the transcendental function of the imagination is toned down.

But Mörchen tries to show still more: in this projection of the imagination, which is the very function of the subject, he discerns three phases, the three "ecstases" of Heideggerian time. He claims that Kant has a premonition of the identity of the imagination of time and of the subject, and that if he maintains the distinction between them it is because he remains nonetheless subservient to the notion of a subject-substance and a linear time that goes by as a series of present instants.

Mörchen's study of the imagination in the critique of the faculty of judgment confirms his thesis: the imagination appears to him to be the basis not only of the knowing subject, but of the subject altogether.

Thus Kant, setting out from the duality between receptivity and spontaneity, would have made the discovery of the subject itself in its adequate mode of existing. He constantly draws back before the unknown whose veil he succeeded in raising a little; he seeks refuge in traditional philosophy with its substance-subject and its linear time. This creates the uncertainties or obscurity in the texts.

One cannot deny the interest of endeavors such as those of Heidegger and Mörchen. Fustel de Coulanges said contemptuously that to philosophize is to think whatever one wants. And now we also have philosophy making others say whatever we please. Before the talent displayed by Heidegger, contempt is perhaps excessive. But whatever may be the philosophy of history one professes, it is incorrect to give the name history of philosophy to these studies, which are of a new genre. They cannot replace the investigations to which we devote ourselves under this name in France, distrusting, as Delbos[5] said, the enterprises that, under the pretext of discovering the deep significance of a philosophy, begin by neglecting its precise meaning.

The short study on the logic of modalities which follows Mörchen's work comes from the pen of Oskar Becker,[4] one of the most informed and

refined minds of the phenomenological movement, one whose scientific culture rivals in richness his linguistic and historical knowledge. In his major work on *Mathematical Existence* (1926), he tried to apply to the philosophy of mathematics the methods of Heidegger's thought by situating the mathematical object back in the *temporal and finite existence* whose mark it must bear. Analogous preoccupations inspire his article on the "Logic of Modalities." The problem is first treated by means of a method opposed to phenomenology: logical calculus. But it is completed by the phenomenological method of "mathematical existence." He relates logical modalities to modalities of time—not to the linear time of physics or psychology with respect to which logic is indeed "supratemporal," but to the "original" time of Heidegger's philosophy. It is symptomatic that in Germany they refer to this "original time" as naturally as do, for example, the French to Bergsonian duration. Let us note the very fine passage on the notion of *dynamis* in modern philosophy. In opposition to ancient philosophy, modern philosophy here for the first time breaks away from Eleaticism: *dynamis* is no longer a "lesser being," but the primary being.

The short study that ends the collection is by Husserl himself. It is the preface to the English edition of his early and principal work, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913). This text is devoted to answering objections and clarifying misunderstandings. Just as in his celebrated article of 1910 on "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," Husserl upholds the scientific character of philosophy, as the basis of all the other sciences. It consists in a return to "transcendental life," the field of absolute certainty, for the purpose of overcoming all skepticism and all crises in the sciences. Thus he dissociates himself, as he explicitly states, from every philosophy of "existence" that does not wish to carry out the phenomenological reduction, that remains within the human and does not attain the transcendental. The objections raised against Husserl by the partisans of Heidegger's thought are thus null and void, proceeding as they do from a totally extrinsic spirit.

Next, taking up the different points of his doctrine to clarify them, Husserl insists at length on his idealism, which in 1913 alienated him from some of his earliest students. He is convinced that it was the solipsism implicated in idealism that was the sole cause of the misunderstanding; the acceptance of transcendental intersubjectivity would clear it up. He does not even suspect that the difficulties raised by transcendental idealism lie elsewhere. More interesting is Husserl's remark concerning the significance of his idealism; it clarifies, in his view, the meaning of the world's existence, rather than denying or diminishing it.

In closing let us take note of Husserl's attitude with regard to Brentano's descriptive psychology. Husserl is quite conscious of having

made an advance which consists in no longer putting phenomenological or psychological description at the service of an explanatory psychology, and in insisting on the philosophical horizons that it opens up in its own right.

All these remarks reveal the independence that Husserl's thought has succeeded in preserving amidst the philosophies it has engendered—those philosophies to which the collection I have analyzed bears eloquent witness. They express the clarity and salient features of a thought that has become fully conscious of its intentions and originality.

4

The Work of Edmund Husserl

1. The Themes

With the passing of time, Edmund Husserl's work, as revolutionary in its content as in its influence, nonetheless appears faithful to the essential teachings of European civilization both in its themes and its treatment of them.

Convinced of the excellence of the Western intellectual tradition, of the supreme dignity of the scientific spirit, Husserl was concerned about the unstable bases on which the edifice of knowledge rests. His need to found the sciences on a universal and absolute doctrine links him with Descartes.[1] His philosophy purports to bring us to the primary self-evidence without which science would not be worthy of its name. Logic, the "science of science," in which he discerned early on in his career, through Leibniz, the germ of a *mathesis universalis*,[2] was to remain the major preoccupation of his life. Transcendental phenomenology would be a *mathesis universalis* thought through to the end. Hence that conception of philosophical work set forth in his famous article on "philosophy as a rigorous science," destined for such great acclaim. The vain succession of systems presents a distressing spectacle, unworthy of the philosopher. True philosophy does not emerge fully developed from the head of a single thinker; philosophy, like science, is the work of teams and generations of philosophers.[3]

But Husserl approaches the problem of certainty and the foundation of knowledge in a manner foreign to Descartes. For the former, the problem is less that of guaranteeing the certainty of propositions than that of determining the *meaning* which certainty and truth can have for each domain of being. As in Kant's critical philosophy, one must consider the conditions under which, and the sense in which, thought's claims to truth are justified. Instead of comprehending truth as a single model and its diverse types as approximations, Husserl envisions the

alleged uncertainties intrinsic to certain kinds of knowledge as positive and characteristic modes of the revelation of their objects.[4] Instead of measuring them with respect to an ideal of certainty, he studies the positive significance of their truth, which defines the meaning of the existence to which they have access. This, more than any other aspect of his doctrine, is what makes Husserl bring forth a new way of questioning and philosophizing.

But in connection with this attitude, one can see a third theme in Husserl's work. Deepening our knowledge of things and their being, phenomenology constitutes for man a *way of existing* through which he attains his spiritual destiny. While founding the natural sciences, phenomenology serves as the basis of the moral sciences; furthermore, it is the very life of the mind which finds itself and exists in conformity with its vocation. It brings forth a discipline through which the mind takes cognizance of itself (*Selbstbesinnung*), assumes responsibility for itself and ultimately for its freedom.[5] In this too, Husserl rejoins the great currents of Western idealism.

Yet it is remarkable that at the same time he takes the main intuitions that give value to contemporary realism into account. To a great extent he has paved the way for it. The sense that "being" is something that has consistency, is valid and somehow weighty, that the real world is ineluctable, that "intelligible relations" draw all their significance from the relations which we, concrete humans, maintain with concrete reality—the whole current of ideas that Jean Wahl has characterized as going "toward the concrete"—this sense also sustains Husserl's meditations.

We shall be concerned with investigating the unity of these diverse themes, or the principal theme which dominates them. I do not think that the unity of Husserlian phenomenology is merely due to its method. In Husserl's mind phenomenology was never a pure *organon*, a way of setting up in philosophy the rule of prudence which recommends that one deliberately limit oneself to the description of phenomena as they appear. He was concerned with the way in which phenomena are approached and reasons why they are approached in that way. Husserl wanted to contribute a general philosophy of being and mind. In this philosophy, the phenomenological method is not a "procedure" that discovers a certain number of true propositions, but the very *existence* of this philosophy.[6] I hope in this way to be able to put the diverse theories of Husserl, which for some summarize his entire thought, in their natural place: his antipsychologism, his doctrine of the intuition into essences, his idealism, his theory of transcendental reduction, etc. We are not pursuing the vain enterprise of a Husserlian "doxography," or an inventory of all the "results" of his analyses. In a body of work devoted to so many problems, we will attempt to bring out the unity of the phenomenological inspiration, its physiognomy, its message.

2. Psychological Content and Thought

It is a Kantian idea, foreshadowed to a great extent by British empiricism, that the *meaning* of a notion is not exhausted when the elements it contains are analyzed with clarity and distinction. In addition to its content, a concept possesses an "objective signification," a claim to existence which the direct analysis of the content could not discover. A tradition, again both empiricist and critical, invites us to seek this meaning, which eludes the consciousness that is directed upon the notions themselves, in the subject and in the subjective origin of notions. Husserl has remained attached to these ideas since the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. He did not disown them when, in publishing the *Logical Investigations*, he was most severe toward the British empiricism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The opposition between direct, naively-lived self-evidence, and reflective self-evidence, which opens a new dimension of rationality, is pivotal to all phenomenological problems.[7] Phenomenology's main concern will be to set notions—however self-evident they are for the knowledge which determines them—back again within the perspective in which they appeared to the subject.

Husserl applied this method in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* to clarify the notion of number. He himself recognized later that in that work he was already proceeding as a phenomenologist. In it, he goes back to the mental act through which number is understood; the meaning of number is grasped in the acts of collecting and enumerating which at once constitute numbers and complete the original contact of the mind with those "realities." Already the idea of *categorial intuition* appears on the horizon, since the procedure of collecting has nothing of the *immediacy* of the sensible, and yet constitutes the original access to arithmetical formations.[8] But, above all, the notion of the subjective contrasts strongly with that of the psychologism of the period. Subjectivity is not dealt with as a content of consciousness, but as a *noesis* which conceives some objective unity and reaches it to a certain extent or in a *certain sense*. Arithmetic is not reducible to an interplay of psychological causalities, but to units of meaning. They are related to the subject only through their meaning and insofar as the subject is thought. When the general theses of psychologism prevent us from understanding the relationship between the multiplicity of acts of consciousness and the unity of theory,

Husserl will denounce them. But already in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* these theses play practically no role. The intentionality of consciousness, which in the *Logical Investigations* will make possible the understanding of the existence of the ideal and its situation with respect to thought, and thus the reconciling of the unity of the idea with the multiplicity of the acts which think it, in fact already informs the *Philosophy of Arithmetic.*[9] While still professing the psychologism which he was to fight ten years later, Husserl takes from it only its element of truth: the importance of investigations into subjectivity to clarify the origin of representations. Already in this recourse to the subject, he catches a glimpse of the specifically phenomenological dimension of intelligibility. In the *Logical Investigations* he will oppose not the fact that the logical refers to the subjective, but that it refers to it through its *content.* He will maintain that "one ought not . . . to confuse the psychological presuppositions or components of the *assertion* of a law with the logical 'moments' of its *content.*"[10] The object refers to the subject not at all through its content, by the fact that it has such and such a meaning, but by the very fact that it has a meaning.

Viewed from the perspective which the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* opens onto the entirety of Husserl's work, the publication of the *Logical Investigations* thus does not mark a transition as clear as it often seemed to, neither from his first work, nor toward his later work—in which according to some, Husserl returned to psychologism.[11] In attacking psychologism in logic in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations,*[12] Husserl's argumentation, which reduces the fundamental theses of psychologism to absurdity because they undermine "the manifest conditions for the possibility of a theory in general,"[13] tends to separate the logical order, that is, that in which "science constitutes itself as science,"[14] from a simple play of psychological causality whose driving forces would be logical laws.[15] In other words, scientific propositions are objects of thought and not its very substance; and truth is, first and foremost, the conscious perception of the order that rules in the objective sphere. In sum, Husserl maintains that the mind is thought and intellection.

3. Pure Logic

Thus the psychology of thought, understood as the science of psychic facts, cannot serve as a foundation for logic. Logic constitutes "a special domain of truths,"[16] a domain of ideal relations, comparable to the world of mathematical relations.[17] These are objects of thought whose unities

do not exclude the psychological multiplicities which intend them. Like the mathematician, the logician states nothing about the succession of thoughts directed upon the mathematical object. His eyes are fixed on the object; he identifies it through the variations of his consciousness; he seeks to penetrate its laws.[18]

The object of logic is not determined by any content. When one considers the demonstrations given in the most diverse domains, one finds a style common to them—a style therefore not due to the content of these domains.[19] Thus they reveal the common form which clothes them, independent of all content,[20] and which is due to the fact that any object whatsoever is a "something in general."

The distinction between matter and form we have just noted is, to Husserl, a radical one.[21] Form does not result from a process of generalization pushed to the extreme, for the highest genus still has content. The "something in general" transcends every genus, but obeys its own lawfulness. Pure logic is the science of this lawfulness.

Pure logic is the condition of truth insofar as truth is the adequation of thought and object, and the formal structures of an object belong to its being. If logic can thus serve as the norm of truth it is not in and for itself normative; it is theoretical like mathematics.[22] It is as a science of form, and not as a normative discipline, that pure logic is above all the sciences which have to do with contents. It states the laws that any science must obey, for whatever the characteristics of its object, it falls qua object within the jurisdiction of logic.[23] Logic is independent with regard to psychology because the empty *form* is a moment of the object and not absence of object; the logical is separated from every science having to do with things because it is *empty* form.

As early as in the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl draws logic nearer to mathematical formalism which, detached from the idea of number,[24] in "set theory" concerns relations governing the world of "something in general."[25] In the general domain of the formal, the *Ideas* and especially the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* will later contribute new distinctions. In particular Husserl will distinguish a logic of pure consequence, in which the mind disassociates itself from the problem of truth in order to weave the network of formal relations in conformity with the law of noncontradiction, and the logic of truth, which is situated on the level of possible experience and a unity of experience. The logic of truth is thus found to presuppose transcendental conditions and to possess a material element.

But this last distinction presupposes a new method of investigation. It implies the problem of the objective meaning of logical forms; it is the response to an investigation of the mental horizons within which they

are situated. This problem is not within the province of the logician, it is phenomenological; but the establishment of logic such as Husserl conceives it, whose characteristics we have barely sketched here, imposes it. In bringing out the reasons which lead to it, we will attempt to surprise the very secret of the phenomenological manner of philosophizing.

4. The Necessity of a Phenomenology

In situating logic on the level of the object, Husserl does not so much aspire to support the realism of forms as to present logic and science as works of the mind. They are not the product of psychic forces or of a psychological mechanism. They relate to the mind as unities of meaning. The psychological fact does not condition the logical phenomenon by its reality, but by the meaning which animates it. The object of thought is not a *psychological content*. The content of thought, sensations, for example, are "lived," the objects are "ideally" present in these contents. "The simple presence of a content in a psychic context [*Zusammenhang*] is very far from being a thought of that object."[26] The distinction between what is lived and what is thought dominates the critique Husserl addresses to psychologism. It makes it possible to posit consciousness as thought, as endowed with meaning.[27] It may be said that phenomenology is primarily the practice of considering the life of the mind as endowed with thought.[28] The critique of psychologism has no other goal.

The first volume of the *Logical Investigations* was directed toward a theory of consciousness determined by the notion of intentionality. Consciousness cannot be considered as a pure and simple reality. All its spirituality resides in the meaning it thinks. It intends and leads toward something. The situation is not comparable to that of a moving body which is dynamically beyond each of its positions and in sight of its goal, nor to that of a symbol which "has a meaning" because it refers thought to the object it symbolizes; rather in this case, the notions of intending and leading toward are borrowed from thought to the degree that thought has meaning, that is, thinks *something*. The exteriority of this something is ordered by the interiority of meaning. And this dialectic of interiority and exteriority determines the very notion of the mind.

But, this being the case, a reflection on thought that directs itself to the world of logical relations, without substituting itself for logic, is not indifferent to the latter's constitution. The abandonment of psychology does not exempt us from another science of the subject which analyzes it as intention and thought.[29]

As early as in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* this necessity of putting pure logic back within the intentions which constitute it is clearly stated. The marvelous edifice of Bolzano's pure logic—to which Husserl renders an eloquent homage—while possessing a mathematical rigor, does not clarify "the specific justification of this discipline, the essence of its objects and problems."[30]

The philosophical insufficiency of pure logic is due, first of all, to the equivocations that taint its fundamental terms. "The phenomenology of the psychic life that is aware of the logical has, as its goal, to enable us, thanks to a description carried out as far as necessary, to understand that life and the meaning inherent in it, in order to furnish all the fundamental concepts of logic with fixed meanings."[31] However, these equivocations cannot be attributed to the negligence of the investigator. "The most complete self-evidence can become muddled, the objects it grasps be falsely interpreted, its decisive testimony denied."[32] These are inevitable confusions for the scientist who is not a philosopher. The equivocation in question is not due to bad terminology. Only reflection on consciousness will make its dissipation possible.[33]

Thus the self-evidence by which we fathom the nature of given objects is not immune to deviation and confusion, the possibility of which it bears within itself; it remains, according to Husserl's characteristic expression, essentially *naive*. The pure logic that self-evidence makes it possible to establish is the work of an intellectual technique, the result of logical *operations*. The meaning of its truth remains obscure. The logician's self-evidence does not inform him about the mental horizons from which it emerges, the network of self-evidence from which it derives its complete meaning. When we live naively in self-evidence, the goals thought intends and that which is reached are superimposed without possible distinction. To unravel this entanglement behind the *self-evidence–synopsis* known by the logician is to retrieve the complete meaning of notions, their real constitution beyond the equivocal surface which they offer to the logician's gaze; it is "to return to the things themselves."[34]

Logical forms, which are works of the subject by reason of their very objectivity, possess an objective signification intrinsic to them. The logician-mathematician, directed toward them, handles them as a technician handles ready-made objects. He fails to recognize both the primary intentions of thought, which are, as it were, "the fountainhead from which the laws of pure logic flow,"[35] and the complex play of intentions which determine the perspective—or, as Husserl will later say, the horizons—in which these objects appear. The constitution of a notion's signification based on its origin will make its true meaning understandable to us. A

reflection on logical thought which analyzes the intentions of which it is composed—its intentions and not contents—emerges as the method of the philosophical critique of logic and the definition of phenomenology. In awakening primary self-evidence it uncovers these intentions; it measures their legitimacy and fixes the sense in which they are legitimate; it compares what they intend to what they reach. It assumes the function of a theory and a critique of knowledge in a new way.[36]

This is to say that formal logic must be complemented by a transcendental logic or a phenomenology of logic. The meaning of the essential principles of logic requires an analysis of the very meaning of the activity by which they are thought out. "Turning aside reflectively from the only themes given straightforwardly (which may become shifted importantly) to the activity constituting them with its intending and fulfillment—the activity that is hidden (or, as we may also say, "anonymous") throughout naive doing and only now becomes a theme in its own right—we examine that activity after the fact. That is to say, we examine the self-evidence awakened by our reflection, we ask it what it was intending and what it reached."[37] The structure of self-evidence which constitutes the concepts of logic must thus be clarified by a systematic analysis.

It is obvious that phenomenological analysis does not merely result in a more fixed and precise terminology. It introduces us to a new dimension of intelligibility of which we were afforded a glimpse by the orientation of Western philosophy from Locke to Kant. The equivocation to be dissipated does not involve the content of notions, since, Husserl concedes, the logician's self-evidence is in large part sufficient for his operations. The confusion occurs on another level. Psychologism furnishes an excellent example of such confusion. "A misinterpretation due to equivocation may distort the meaning of the propositions of pure logic (perhaps turning them into empirical, psychological propositions) and may lead us to abandon the previously experienced self-evidence and the unique significance of all that belongs to pure logic."[38] But psychologism is not a failure to recognize logical truths; it is a false interpretation of their meaning. It is thus less the nature of any given logical relation than its rank in reality, the significance of its objectivity, that escapes unreflective self-evidence. It is the significance of truth, the *meaning of being*, as Husserl will later say (the *Seinssinn*), that is discovered by phenomenological analysis reflecting on the sense in which thought understands, posits and verifies its object. Thanks to this analysis, Husserl will be able to add to the antipsychologism of the *Logical Investigations* a positive theory of the meaning of the different forms of logic, their function, and the rank which falls to them. The psychic entanglement that this analysis will unravel is not a complex of causes and effects, but a complex of intentions.

To unravel it is to situate the object in a perspective of thoughts; it is to determine its ontological place.

For Husserl phenomenology is the extension of this method, beyond formal objects, to all possible objects—an investigation of their meaning based on the self-evidence that constitutes them. One finds everywhere the opposition between naive self-evidence and the phenomenological self-evidence of reflection; this double viewpoint about self-evidence conditions the problematic of phenomenology throughout.

But the discovery of an insufficiency in all naive self-evidence, of which psychologism, notably, is a consequence and which reflection must remedy, allows us to foresee a conception of knowledge that realizes its entire essence only in self-reflection. Knowledge is achieved, or rather finds its primary foundation, not in the establishment of a general principle from which it results by way of consequence, a principle that *explains* it; knowledge lies in the clarification of its own meaning, and the description of the psychic life which the latter animates. Such knowledge is a phenomenology whose ideal no longer lies in the always naive *explanation of facts*, but in the *clarification of meaning*, which is the philosophical mode of knowledge.[39] Later we will see the role that the notion of light and clarity introduced here plays throughout Husserl's philosophy.

The examination of the "intentions" of mental life opens onto the objects of science itself a perspective which could never be that of science. Here we go beyond the philosophy that conceived exteriority on a single model and the relation between subject and object as always being uniform. Both find themselves henceforth determined by the meaning of thought, which must be investigated without prejudging anything of its structure. This structure, which cannot be expressed in terms of causality, makes it possible to penetrate a new dimension of intelligibility that phenomenology strives to unveil.

It is, in any event, by setting out from the intention of logical thought and its meaning, that Husserl discovered, as early as in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*, the specific existence of the ideal and formal object which is not to be found in nature. It is the inherent meaning of the intention of logical thought[40] that he constantly adduces to combat psychologistic argumentation, to affirm that logical laws are exact,[41] a priori,[42] and timelessly valid. Husserl constantly relies upon this as upon an Archimedean point.[43] It was not the return to the Platonic realism of ideas, essences, and logical forms that would have sufficed to give the work its interest. It was exemplary as a method of much broader significance, authorizing the transformation of the very idea of reality and truth by recourse to the intention of the thought that posits them. From then on it became possible to set every objective truth back into the context

of the real intentions that constitute it, and in which the meaning of its objectivity becomes visible; to place objects within thought qua thought and intention; to investigate their meaning by the examination not of objects but of acts of thought in "what they are and contain in and for themselves"[44]—the very method of phenomenology.

But with this a second point is established which is no less important for the further evolution of phenomenology. The meaning inherent in mental life is not the pure and simple equivalent of the relation between subject and object known to classical philosophy. Husserl does not start out from these two terms in order to inquire into their relation. The notion of objectivity is in itself vague and without precise meaning. The objective counterpart of thought is to be determined entirely by the meaning of thought and by all its implications, its "horizons." The "meaning" of a thought does not necessarily announce the presence of spatial-temporal objects.[45] There is henceforth the possibility of totally separating "meaning" from "knowledge of an object," "thought" from "objective thought," "revelation" from "revelation of beings." When in Scheler and Heidegger phenomenology discovers a life of the mind that is essentially defined by the meaning that animates it without being defined as a knowledge of beings, when phenomenology in its very spirit appears as an experience of values or as an attitude of man with regard to his existence, it is to the conquests of the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* that it is indebted.

5. Essences

Like the objectivity of the formal, the objectivity of the idea, established in the second Investigation, is specified by reference to the intention that intends it. An idea cannot be interpreted as a modification of an individual by reason of the specific and irreducible intention that intends it (*wir meinen es in einer neuartigen Bewußtseinsweise* [we mean it in a new *manner* of consciousness].[46] Husserl's quite vigorous polemic against the empiricist theories of concepts, which we cannot reproduce here, is accompanied by an argumentation which calls upon the meaning of the thought that operates on ideas. Ideality resides neither in abstraction,[47] nor in generality,[48] nor in the "vagueness" of "generic images."[49] If the idea is irreducible to an individual, it is because it is understood as ideal. "The essential lies in the intention."[50] Husserl reproaches nominalism not only for losing itself in the blind play of association, where the word becomes a simple verbal sound, but for failing to recognize the consciousness sui

generis that intends or reaches the ideal as such.[51] "One cannot deny that we speak of the *species* in a distinct manner, that in a great number of cases we both mean and name not the particular but its idea, and that that ideal unity is the subject of our assertions just as the particular can be."[52] We state truths which concern ideal objects;[53] in this sense ideal objects truly exist.[54] What one could call Husserl's Platonic realism thus results from reflection on the intention that intends the ideal object.[55] It has a phenomenological basis.

Moreover, the method will allow precise definition of the ideality which it discovers. Soon the difference will be established between the essential structure of an object, or its *eidos*, and its empirical concept, wherein the essential and the accidental are mixed.

The ideality of the genus will be distinguished from the ideality of the essence qua species,[56] which in turn is different from the ideality belonging to every verbal signification even when it designates an individual object.[57] Later, in the *Ideas*, the essence in the Platonic sense, or *eidos*, which has indeterminate limits but is close to individual data, will be contrasted with the essence whose quality is pushed to its ideal limit of purity and called an idea in the Kantian sense (the idea of red opposed to ideal red). Finally, in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* the notion of the ideality of all cultural objects—a symphony, for example—will appear.

These essences are not formal like the objects of logic. They have a material content with a necessary structure, a structure which justifies certain relations between objects. That all color is extended is a truth which, material as it may be, is no less independent of experience. The intuition of essence is thus at the origin of a knowledge which Husserl calls a priori, for like knowledge of the formal it does not depend on the simple acknowledgment of the effective reality of a relation.[58] But it is a priori in yet another sense.

The third Investigation puts relations of foundation at the basis of all relations between essences.[59] The contents of objects cannot all exist independently. The distinction between dependent and independent objects is a radical one;[60] the color of an object exists only on a particular surface, which in turn requires a volume. These relations between essences are, in this well-determined sense, abstract.[61] To exist they need other contents as their bases, and require these contents for their very meaning. The existence of the concrete object and the empirical fact presupposes a whole series of conditions which the study of the essences of contents reveals. This study is thus a priori in the sense that it concerns the a priori conditions for objects; above and beyond the objects, the intuition of essences concerns their conditions of existence. The empirical sciences

are unable to deal with this question. This is why Husserl in the *Ideas* will confer on the sciences of essence—*eidetic* sciences—an ontological dignity. Phenomenology itself as an analysis of constituting consciousness will be, according to Husserl, an ontology and an eidetic science. It will describe the essence of consciousness, its necessary structures.

The notion of essence and of relations between essences is found at the basis of the much-discussed *material* a priori which is added on to the *formal* a priori of logic. The latter determines the conditions for analytic truth; the former defines the notion of synthetic a priori judgments, whose field is infinitely broader than Kant had supposed. The particular, which always has an essence—since it is determined in a certain way—obeys the laws of essences. Thus there exists the possibility of a universal science which after having determined the formal conditions for all things—the analytic laws—establishes their material conditions—the synthetic laws.

What is important for us to highlight in the third and fourth *Investigations*, which establish the principal rules of the intuition of essences and a first contribution to the *mathesis universalis* of forms, is that the necessity in essential relations does not result from their agreement with some principle of intelligibility. Intelligibility resides in the very vision of an essence. Seeing an object already constitutes a way of comprehending it, but not by reason of the judgment inherent in all vision. Vision—or rather self-evidence—is not a feeling that accompanies rational comprehension. Self-evidence itself is the penetration of the true; the notion of reason is defined by it.

6. Intentionality

The famous proposition that "all consciousness is consciousness of something," or that intentionality essentially characterizes consciousness, sums up the Husserlian theory of mental life: every perception is perception of a perceived, every judgment is judgment of a state of affairs judged, every desire is desire for a desired. This is not a correlation of words, but a *description* of phenomena.[62] At all levels of mental life, whether at the stage of sensation or of mathematical thought, thought is *aim* and intention.[63]

The first descriptions of intentionality in the first Investigation (which is too often neglected as purely preparatory) begin with the domain of verbal significations. Moreover, for Husserl—as he expressly says in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*—this domain covers the whole

domain of intentionality, except that of the constitution of immanent time. To understand the fact that a word signifies something is to grasp the very movement of intentionality. The phenomenon of the word's meaning will remain the key to this notion.

The word is not a *flatus vocis*. Its meaning is not to be confused with an image associated with the auditory or visual perception of the word. It is not the "sign" of its signification. To express is not to symbolize.[64] The word as an expression is not perceived for itself; it is like a window *through* which we see what it signifies. The signification of the word is then a relation not between two psychological facts nor between two objects of which one is the sign of the other, but a relation between thought and what it thinks. This is what is wholly original in intention by comparison with association, even by comparison with the notion of association as renewed by Husserl.[65] *That which is thought* is ideally present in thought. Intentionality is the way for thought to *contain ideally something other than itself*. It is not an exterior object entering into relation with consciousness, nor, within consciousness, the establishing of a relation between two psychic contents, mutually interlocked. The relation of intentionality is nothing like the relations between real objects. *It is essentially the act of bestowing a meaning* (the *Sinngebung*). The exteriority of the object represents the very exteriority of what is thought with respect to the thought that intends it. The object thus constitutes an ineluctable moment of the very phenomenon of meaning. The affirmation of the object is not, in Husserl, the expression of any sort of realism. The object appears in his philosophy as determined by the very structure of thought having a meaning orienting itself around a pole of identity which it posits. To elaborate on the idea of transcendence, Husserl's point of departure is not the reality of the object, but the notion of meaning. Moreover, this notion will come to be separated from that of the object in the further development of the phenomenological movement in Scheler and especially Heidegger.[66]

To Husserl, the fact of meaning is characterized by the phenomenon of identification, a process in which the object is constituted. The identity of a unity across multiplicity represents the fundamental event of all thought. For Husserl, to think is to identify. And we will see at once why "to identify" and to have a "meaning" amount to the same thing. The intentionality of consciousness is the fact that across the multiplicity of mental life there can be found an ideal identity, the synthesis of which the multiplicity does nothing more than bring about.

The act of positing the object, the objectifying act, is a synthesis of identification. Through this synthesis all mental life participates in representation; indeed, in the last analysis, Husserl determines the very

notion of representation by that of synthesis. Thus representation is not a concept opposed to action or feeling; it is prior to them.

Intentionality is then not the prerogative of representational thought. All feeling is feeling of a felt, all desire is desire for a desired, etc.. What is intended here is not a contemplated object. The felt, the willed, the desired, are not things. This thesis has played a considerable role in the phenomenologies of Scheler and Heidegger; it is perhaps the most fecund idea contributed by phenomenology. However, for Husserl, representation, in the sense we have just specified, is found necessarily at the basis of intention, even nontheoretical intention. It is not that representation alone brings about the relation with the object, and that purely "lived" feeling and desire then come to be associated with it and color it.[67] Affective states harbor intentions in their inner dynamism. "They owe their intentional relation to certain underlying representations. But to say that they owe is to affirm rightly that they themselves *have* what they owe to something else."[68]

It is no less true that representation plays a preponderate role in intentionality. All of Husserl's work underscores this. As early as in the fifth Investigation, in the discussion of the role of the objectifying act, Husserl maintains that every intention is either an objectifying act or supported by one. Intentions cannot subsist by themselves; dependent intentions are grafted onto the objectifying act. The positing of a value, the affirming of a will, harbors, according to the *Ideas*, a doxic thesis, the positing of the object which is the pole of the synthesis of identification. There is thus the possibility of these acts appearing in their turn as theoretical notions. What is desired appears as an object having the attribute of desire, a desirable object. To be sure, these attributes belong properly to the object; they are not due to reflection on the reactions of the subject, but conform to the inner sense of desire, will, etc.. But to Husserl the desirable and the willed are open to theory and contemplation.

In the theory of the experience of immanent time, and in his investigations of prejudicative experience—the primary experience—this primordial role of representation is likewise affirmed. And it is not by chance that the theory of intentionality is developed starting with verbal significations. Thus, in Husserl, theoretical consciousness is at once universal and primary.

Here we touch on one of the most characteristic points of Husserl's philosophy—one that gives his work its own physiognomy in the midst of the phenomenological movement that has developed out of it. Perhaps it would be unjust to qualify it as intellectualism, since the primacy accorded to the notion of meaning over the notion of object to characterize thought prevents this. The intention of a desire, the intention of a feeling, qua

desire and feeling, harbor an original meaning which is not objective in the narrow sense of the term. For it was Husserl who introduced into philosophy the idea that thought can have a meaning, can intend something even when this something is absolutely undetermined, a quasi-absence of object,[69] and we know the role this idea has played in Scheler's and Heidegger's phenomenologies.

But what is the significance of the presence of the act of identification at the basis of intentions that have nothing intellectual about them?

The nature of identification and its relations with self-evidence allows us to answer this question. The process of identification can be infinite. But it is concluded in self-evidence—in the presence of the object in person before consciousness. Self-evidence realizes, as it were, the aspirations of identification. The meaning of thought is understood in it.

Henceforth the relation between intentionality and self-evidence becomes obvious. Every intention is a self-evidence being sought, a light that tends to make itself known. To say that at the basis of every intention—even affective or relative intentions—representation is found, is to conceive the whole of mental life on the model of light.

Self-evidence is not some indescribable intellectual feeling;[70] it is the very penetration to the true.[71] The miracle of clarity is the very miracle of thought. The relation between an object and a subject is not a simple presence of one to the other, but the comprehension of one by the other, intellection; and this intellection is self-evidence. The theory of intentionality in Husserl, linked so closely to his theory of self-evidence, in the final analysis, identifies mind with intellection, and intellection with light. If we wanted to distance ourselves from Husserl's terminology and characteristic mode of expression, we would say that self-evidence is a unique situation: in the case of self-evidence the mind, while receiving something foreign, is also the origin of what it receives. It is always active. The fact that in self-evidence the world is a given, that there is always a given for the mind, is not only found to be in agreement with the idea of activity, but is presupposed by that activity. A given world is a world where we can be free without this freedom being purely negative. The self-evidence of a given world, more than the nonengagement of the mind in things, is the positive accomplishment of freedom.

The primacy of theory in Husserl's philosophy is ultimately linked to the liberal inspiration that we are seeking to make clear throughout this essay. The light of self-evidence is the sole tie with being that posits us as an origin of being, that is, as freedom.

Here Husserl's philosophy is radically opposed to that of Heidegger, where man is submerged by existence from the start. In an existence

made up of comprehension, that is, entirely reducible to powers, a *foundation cannot be possible*, but is always preexisting; it determines man as being and not only as consciousness, knowledge, and freedom. The primordial role Husserl causes representation to play is not an accident or a philosopher's obstinacy, to be the despair of his disciples, but one of his most characteristic positions, without which his work would remain incomprehensible.

The analysis Husserl gives of the intentionality that intervenes in the constitution of time, which we find in *Zeitbewußtsein* (time-consciousness),[72] confirms our interpretation of intentionality. Through the idea of intentionality Husserl goes beyond the traditional opposition between the activity and passivity of knowledge. We understand the sense in which he affirms that the world is constituted by the subject—that it is the *work* of self-evidence, or that self-evidence is operative or at work (*leistende Evidenz*).

The notion of transcendence is too vague and general to describe the objectivity of the object intended by intention. Transcendence is the result of a complex entanglement of significations and a long history of thought—not history as causal and psychological genesis, but as constitution of a unity of meaning from the partial meanings which it implies.[73] That is a fundamental characteristic of intentionality: in its direct intending of at the object it abbreviates a considerable intellectual accomplishment that we must uncover in all its ramifications in order to discover the true meaning of this object. We must place the intending of an object back again within the whole of mental life, in "all its horizons," without which it is only a pale and often inexact abstraction. The affirmation of the existence of the object cannot be the end of philosophical investigation. Existence "permits and requires a further phenomenological analysis."[74] Phenomenology is called upon to clarify the sense in which that transcendence is understood in each case, and what it ultimately signifies. Intentionality is thus very much more profound than the "relation of subject to object" which finds its place in it. The inwardness of thought and the exteriority of the object are abstractions drawn from the concrete fact of the mental life that meaning is.

7. Intuition and Truth, Categorial Intuition

The presence of being to thought is not an event that breaks in upon the play of thought. It is rational, that is, it has meaning for thought. In the process of identification which is the dynamism of thought, the presence

of being marks something on the order of a fulfillment. It is a situation where being *in person* presents itself to consciousness, and confirms the thought that was intending it in an indirect way, that was "just thinking" it without seeing it. The truth is *adequatio rei et intellectus*. Such is the conception the sixth Investigation brings us after the first Investigations traced its broad outlines.

The sense in which consciousness relates to an object can indeed be different, precisely because intention is not purely and simply the relation to an object, but a certain meaning. In understanding a word we are related to an object, for example, but it is a relation which one could call empty. We are not directed to an image in our minds, to be sure, but to an object. Every intention is like a perception, or a modified self-evidence. But this object is not given to us in person. It is simply signified. This does not mean that we have a confused representation of it; we can think distinctly with the help of words. Our way of relating to the object and identifying it is alone at issue here; we designate it rather than have it before our eyes. This attitude characterizes not only the understanding of words, but a general mode of thinking, the symbolism of our everyday intellectual activity supported by signs that announce things, but are content to do no more than that.

The vision of the object as it is, whether in imagination or perception, stands in contrast to this purely symbolic thought. Imagination and perception are not defined by the "sensuous contents" that concretize the object simply intended by empty intention. They are defined by the thought's intention to relate to the object as it is, to maintain the object in front of itself and to see it face-to-face. Perception is defined by thought's intention to see the object in itself, in the circumstances of time and place in which its existence is fulfilled. If symbolic intention is empty, intuitive intention gives us the fullness of the object. That is why Husserl calls the elements that distinguish thought from intuition "intuitive fullness." Thus the adequation of thought and object will be the confirmation of a symbolic intention by an intuitive intention. In it, the object is found to be as it was intended.

The locus of truth is thus not in the judgment that connects two concepts, but in the intention that grasps the object. It is more comparable to perception than to judgment. The truth of judgment presupposes intuition and self-evidence.[75]

But can this intuitionism of truth account for the truth of judgment? The object of a judgment is not a simple material content accessible to perception; it is the relation between two objects. We already know that besides material contents all objects are clothed in forms, and that they constitute diverse groups thanks to these forms. In an object there is a set

of formal elements which Husserl includes under the title "categorial." Does there exist an intuition of the categorial?

The concept of intuition is not defined by the characteristics that are peculiar to sense perception, but by the intention that confers the fullness of presence upon the object intended. "There must be an act which fulfills the same function with respect to the categorial elements of meaning that purely sensuous perception fulfills with respect to the material elements."[76] The thought which by virtue of its meaning has access to categorial forms deserves the name and the dignity of intuition. Will it be said that it is not in the same sense that sensuous intention and categorial intention reach their objects?

It is precisely here that all the originality of the phenomenological conception of the relation between thought and its object appears. Phenomenological analysis seeks to discover the sense in which an object is reached and, consequently, the sense in which it is posited as existing. For thought is not a psychological interplay which must reflect in us an exterior object as faithfully as possible. It is not by the fact of being reflected that the relation between object and thought is defined, but by the meaning of the object and its existence. Hence what we have to know is not whether the object is faithfully reflected in consciousness, but the meaning in which it appears. Each object is thus only accessible to a determinate type of thought; it cannot, without absurdity, be given in a thought of another structure. If it is absurd that sounds should be seen or colors heard, it is just as absurd that categorial forms be grasped like colors and sounds; each object, precisely because it has a meaning, is accessible in its specificity only to a thought of a determinate type.[77] The specificity of an object is guaranteed against every false interpretation through the analysis of thought, and not through that naive vision which affirms existence while ignoring its meaning and mental horizons. This is one of phenomenology's fundamental theses to which Heidegger himself is most profoundly indebted; thanks to it, one can respect the specific meaning of the "object" of emotion or anxiety. It is what makes it possible to pass beyond the suspicion that "naive idealism" casts on our knowledge when it supposes that a divine intelligence could attain objects in a way other than by human intelligence. Each object with a determinate meaning *essentially* has its own way of being given. If, for example, God were to perceive things in the exterior world, like us, he could do so only by synthesizing the diverse successive aspects of things, which is the mode appropriate to their perception. Otherwise, God would see something completely different.

The distinction between categorial and sensuous intention, which Husserl establishes at the same time that he maintains the existence of

intellectual intuition, is an example of the application of the method which consists in establishing, on the basis of the meaning of thought, the mode of existence of objects at the very level on which they are intended by thought.

What characterizes sensuous intuition phenomenologically is that its object is directly and *straightaway* exposed to the look. It suffices to open one's eyes to see. The mind is not invited to take any measures. To be sure, for Husserl the sensuous object is constituted. An essential thesis of his theory of sense perception is the affirmation of the radical impossibility, founded in the very meaning of a thing, of grasping it in a single act. The perception of a thing is an infinite process. We have access to the thing only through the infinite aspects it presents to us. One must go around it. The consciousness of the "I can go around it" is constitutive of our knowledge of things, and expresses what is eternally unfinished about perception. Indeed, the relativity of the exterior world's existence resides in this. Nothing guarantees in principle that the thing's subsequently realized aspects will not later contradict what has been constituted up until then. The object is, in sum, only the identical "pole"—as Husserl later says—of these multiple aspects. Its perception indeed thus supposes a certain unfinished synthesis. But the synthesis which occurs at the time of perception remains at the stage and the level of the sensuous. It is direct and given at the same time as each aspect of the thing. Acts follow one another, fuse and do not remain separate, as if they were awaiting a new act which would effect their synthesis. Their union is a whole which does not allow the articulations that constitute it to be seen. They are like a single act that drags on.

What characterizes intellectual intuition, by contrast to sensuous intention, is that it is in conformity with the very meaning of its object, and is essentially *founded* on sensuous perception. The conjunction in which we discern the *and*, the disjunction in which we discern the *or*, thus intend objects that by essence could not be given *straightaway* and through sensuous acts. They are of the second degree. This characteristic of the act and of the founded object is essential to the categorial act and object. It also defines the intuition of essences. This always rests on the intuition of the individual which serves as an example, and upon which the specific intention of the general is constructed.[78] Husserl also shows the phenomenological difference that separates the categorial intuition of logical forms from the intuition of essences. It would take too long to develop this here; let us only note that this whole theory of categorial intuition reveals the underlying meaning of the "logicism" and "Platonism" of the first studies of the *Logical Investigations*. These did not consist so much in affirming the existence of logical forms and Platonic

ideas, as in showing their rank in existence by means of a reflection on the meaning of the thought that posits them; that is, showing the significance of their reality such as it is willed by the thought that posits it. Here also we see an excellent example of the application of the phenomenological method, which determines the concept of sensibility—that knowledge realized straightaway—by a pure analysis of its inner meaning, without reference to the existence of the sense organs.

8. The Concrete

What we have just seen is characteristic of the place that Husserl grants to the concrete in his theory of knowledge and being. The intellectual can never be taken for an absolute. It is incomprehensible without the concrete basis with which, to be sure, it is not to be identified, but upon which it rests. The absolutely dematerialized objects of science, conceived by means of mathematical functions, are also not objects which purely and simply replace the sensuous world. To posit them as absolute is to fail to recognize the true meaning of the objects of physics. In reality, these objects refer constantly to the data of perceptions which cannot be neglected if we are to comprehend the authentic meaning of physical objects.[79]

Moreover, Husserl foresees a special discipline, which he calls transcendental aesthetics, that describes the world as a world given straightaway, a world of ordinary objects, values, things loved, hated, interesting, sad, etc. It is through this relation to the world of transcendental aesthetics, a world that is ineluctable at its level of reality, that the ultimate meaning of the scientific object could be understood. According to Husserl, all the objects of our knowledge must be studied in their constitution on the basis of their reality as it is given straightaway and, in a sense, beforehand.

9. Phenomenological Idealism

It is true then, as idealism thought, that logical forms are not given as are colors and sounds. But it is false to say that they are a construction of the mind. At most one may say that construction is the original mode of their apprehension.

Here we come upon a fundamental idea: each domain of being has its own way of being intended.

The conception according to which each category of objects has its particular type of self-evidence, a self-evidence not connected to the empirical constitution of our minds but to the structure peculiar to its object, has perhaps been one of the most fecund conceptions Husserl has contributed; it is in any case one of the most characteristic of phenomenology. It is closely dependent upon his notion of consciousness and intentionality.

The intentionality that medieval philosophy knew rested on the distinction between the mental and the real object. Intentionality consisted in the presence of a mental object in consciousness. The mental object there duplicated the real object; but the *ens in mente* was (think of St. Anselm's argument) an inferior mode of existence. Brentano, Husserl's teacher, who introduced the idea of intentionality into a psychology that was hitherto empiricist and sensationalist, presents intentionality itself above all as a property of consciousness inevitable in description. It affirms nothing about the relation between mind and reality, and remains devoid of value for the theory of knowledge. It presupposes that relation. To Brentano, psychological life and intentionality itself appear as passivities resulting from the activity of things on us.[80] To Husserl, intentionality harbors the secret of our relation with the world. But under these conditions mental life is situated apart. In order to grasp it, it is not enough to forge concepts appropriate to the type of reality which it represents. The intention is not, properly speaking, a being. There is more to its content than what it is as a temporal event. In addition, it is a thought about something, and by reason of the meaning that animates it, it is not enclosed within the time it lasts, indeed, nor even in the dimension of time.

To approach consciousness as a reality is to close one's eyes to the specific dimension of meaning in which the mentality of the mind is exercised. It would thus be a misunderstanding of the true inspiration of phenomenology to see it as a kind of transcendental positivism. To be sure, the possibility of misunderstanding does lie in certain of Husserl's own formulas. They present consciousness as a reality, the object of an eidetic science. In speaking of the phenomenological content of a fact of consciousness, Husserl distinguished that which is a *real* part of it (sensations and intentions as contents extended in time) from the object which is transcendent to it.[81] The wavering one perceives in the *Logical Investigations* concerning the role of sensations—inert elements bereft of meaning, whose function in conscious life is very poorly defined (is it enough to say that intentions animate them,[82] or that they are the "building-stones of acts"?)[83]—may induce us to take literally a language that needs to be interpreted. But what cannot mislead us as to the

genuine meaning of Husserl's thought is the subordination of the world of sensation to the phenomenology of intentions,[84] and the appearance of the play of intentions and identification at the core of sensation itself. Consciousness, to Husserl, is the very phenomenon of meaning. It does not weigh like reality; it signifies through the intention it contains.

That being the case, all the diversity of psychological life is not a multiplicity of contents, but a multiplicity of significations. Consciousness is not a reality set before the objective reality on which it can close in. Its contents are not simply animated with significations, but are significations. They are thus inseparable from the particular essences they signify and intend. Their structure is nothing other than this fact of intending or understanding this or that. What was taken as an imperfection of human knowledge measured by a certain ideal of self-evidence and certitude becomes a positive characteristic of the approach of a certain type of reality that would not be what it is if it were revealed in another way.[85]

Thus, in conceiving in a radical manner the notion of the intentionality of consciousness, Husserl determined the very method that, in the manner of proceeding of all of his disciples, appears as the most characteristic method for phenomenology. In placing all the reality of a psychological fact in its signifying function, Husserl has made it possible to find a meaning for its qualitative elements, for everything in mental life that had a density of being and of nature. Once that is done, it becomes possible to see a gnoseological value in affectivity and activity. What in these forms of mental life appeared as devoid of all objective value precisely signifies "noemata," irreducible to things, but admitting of identifications and self-evidence.

Thought, then, cannot enter into a relationship with the meaningless, with the irrational. Husserl's idealism is the affirmation that every object, the pole of a synthesis of identifications, is permeable to the mind; or, conversely, that the mind can encounter nothing without comprehending it. Being can never shock the mind, because it always has a meaning for the mind. The shock itself is a way of comprehending. "Having a meaning" is not, moreover, a reduction to some unknown mathematical transparency or to a finality. The notion of such a transparency is itself borrowed from the phenomenon of self-evidence.

The very contact with things is their intellection. Otherwise, the object could not "affect" thought, could not become internal to it, and the very notion of interiority would remain unexplained.

In sensationalist idealism the presence of the object in thought, interiority, depends on matter common to the object and to consciousness—on *sensible matter.* Everything is sensation, and every sensation is affectivity and all affectivity is interior. Thought is not the thought of a meaning,

but a set of contents that mingles with the contents of objects, though it is unclear in what way they are more mental than those objects themselves. That everything is reducible to the subject is not for Husserl, as it is for Berkeley, the simple fact that the mind knows only its own states; it is that nothing in the world could be absolutely foreign to the subject. "There exists no imaginable place where conscious life could have or should have been pierced, and in which we would have arrived at a transcendence that could have had any other meaning than that of the intentional unity appearing within subjectivity."[86] The object refers to consciousness not through its sensuous content, but through its objectivity. Phenomenological idealism thus is not the result of the fact that the subject is enclosed within itself. It is commanded by a theory of the subject, by the fact that it is open to everything, is universal and related to everything.

Hence, in Husserl's idealism the analysis of intention makes it possible at each moment to define in what sense an object is intended and posited, in what sense its existence is open to verification. In linking the subject with an object through the intermediary of meaning, Husserl brings on a new moment in idealism: the possibility of clarifying the inmost meaning of transcendence, the meaning that the very interiority of the exterior can have for each category of objects.

Also, henceforth we can understand the universal scope that the method applied by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* for the elucidation of the meaning of logical notions can acquire. The method applies to all the objects whose constitution it proposes to pursue, and transforms itself into phenomenology qua general philosophy. The existence of objects outside of thought which idealism denies, or affirms in thought without, however, in any way clarifying their signification, becomes something precise in phenomenological idealism. The doubling back upon the thought that posits this existence, that is, that understands it in a certain way, makes it possible in each case to grasp the precise meaning of that existence, the rather characteristic synthesis of self-evidences, to which it is necessary to return in order to recover the authentic meaning of that synthesis. Then the object is understood not as an abstraction, but in the nature of its meaning. The object has all of its significance in the mental life that thinks it. Without this, equivocation creeps into thought—and does so inevitably. In envisaging the object as a determinate meaning of conscious life, Husserl puts the study of every object back into the description of the meaning in which it is posited and that constitutes it. Idealism is therefore a universal science; it is an invitation to philosophical investigation, and not a thesis that sums it up. Nor is it a simple theory of knowledge, called upon to guarantee the certainty of scientific procedures. Phenomenology—discovered in connection with

a reflection on the logic of the objective sciences, and subject to those sciences, which, in Husserl, have furnished it with a guideline—is not an auxiliary of the sciences. It determines the meaning of objectivity and of the existence of objects.

In this sense phenomenology is not only as broad as the entire gamut of the sciences; it alone permits their realization as science, that is, as a discipline of knowledge that admits nothing that is unclarified. It is the final realization of the dream of *mathesis universalis* that haunted Husserl as early as the first page of the *Logical Investigations.*

Yet I shall show that phenomenology has not had the Cartesian ideal of science as the final motive of its inspiration. Rather the ideal of Cartesian science is itself (we shall see why presently) in the path of the destiny of the mind as such. Husserl's phenomenology wants above all to be the expression of this spiritual destiny.

10. The Phenomenological Reduction

In an influential study which appeared in 1910 in the first volume of the German periodical *Logos* under the title "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," Husserl, foreshadowing the ideas he would express three years later in the *Ideas,* describes the special plane on which phenomenological analysis as a universal method moves. He shows, on the one hand, the inability of traditional or modern psychology to supply the universal critique of the sciences, and in the second part of the work, rises in opposition to historicism, which, like psychologism itself, leads to the impossibility of an absolute philosophy, to the relativity of philosophy with respect to the diverse epochs of human history. Husserl conceives of a phenomenological philosophy that will be constituted like science itself, thanks to the successive efforts of generations of scientists, and that will be opposed to the *Weltanschauung,* the way of perceiving the world, that man needs for his immediate action but that does not replace science. This conception reflects, on the one hand, that need for science so deeply anchored in Husserl's soul. But, on the other hand, and chiefly—despite whatever exaggeration there may be in certain of his formulations, which the subsequent evolution of his thought will to some degree diminish—it testifies to his distrust of history as the condition of philosophy. In this the universality of the idea of transcendental constitution is already being affirmed. History itself is constituted by a thought; it in no way commands the fact of intentionality and intellection themselves. The genetic phenomenology through which Husserl will later seek to discover

the "sedimentary" history of thought, deposited in constituted things, will not surmount his antihistoricism. Genetic phenomenology will seek to make the becoming of consciousness understandable, but if the unfolding of this becoming is not reduced to a logical or dialectical process, it will nonetheless be a process of *Sinngebung* and the identification of moments by thought. This process will be identified, as we shall later see, with the very fact of becoming aware. Thus, the mind, in Husserl, ultimately appears as foreign to history. It is the intimate relationship of a meaning with thought, and not an event going beyond thought or presupposed by it.

In this respect, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" heralds the theory of the *phenomenological reduction.* The consciousness of which phenomenology supplies the analysis is in no way engaged in reality, or compromised by things or by history. It is not man's psychological consciousness, but unreal, pure, transcendental consciousness. The critique Husserl addresses to psychologism in this study does not just concern its failure to recognize the ideal world, but its claim to make psychology, which is itself a science of the world, the basis of the critique of the sciences.

The great contribution of the *Ideas* is the establishment of the notion of transcendental consciousness and the sense in which it is to be approached by reflection. Its first section is devoted to perfecting the theory of the intuition of essences, whose principal elements had already been furnished by the *Logical Investigations.* The essence, or the *eidos* as Husserl calls it in the *Ideas* for reasons of terminology, is the individual object's ideal condition of existence. The set of genera on which an individual object depends constitutes a region of being. This latter is explored by an eidetic science, a regional ontology; nature, animality, and humanity are so many regions of being. Besides them, the empty form of the object in general is the region of formal ontology which has the closest ties to logic.

But the perspectives thus opened by phenomenology onto a whole series of new *a priori* sciences is not yet the fulfillment of its true vocation. Its vocation lies rather in grasping the meaning of objects by putting them back into the intentions in which they are constituted, and thus grasping them in their origin in the mind, in self-evidence.

Mental life is the act of bestowing meaning. But am I not something besides this act? As a human being, I am a being among other beings with whom I am interacting, a mind in some sense already understood, and, consequently in some respects an object. Thus, my thought as a constituted human being is no longer the pure act of bestowing a meaning; it is an operation accomplished on the world and in the world,

an interaction with the real. Intentionality becomes an activity between beings. My thought no longer knows itself as thought. It is directed toward objects as beings, and not as a synthesis of noemata. Our mental life is transformed into an exercise of thought; it becomes a technique. It knows of being and states propositions about it without worrying about the meaning of its always naively admitted objectivity. It is this natural attitude, this "innate dogmatism" of man that the phenomenological reduction will have to overturn.

The natural attitude is characterized much less by realism than by the *naivete* of this realism, by the fact that in its natural attitude the mind finds itself always before a ready-made object without asking about the meaning of its objectivity; that is, without grasping its objectivity in the self-evidence in which it is constituted. This attitude is that of perception, but it also characterizes the sciences. It matters little what the object of these sciences is, whether concrete or abstract, mathematical or logical, sensible or intellectual, or even metaphysical like God. All these sciences are dogmatic: they posit their objects without worrying about the self-evidences that allowed that position, and of which they lose sight. And thus they are insufficient as science. The natural attitude is at the origin of the equivocations and crises in which the very meaning of the operations escape the scientist who, as a technician of theory, carries them out with certainty. From this, in particular, comes the naturalization of consciousness, which is placed on the same plane of reality as things; the hypostasis of nature, the naturalization of logic by psychologism: an ignorance of the objective meaning of logical and mathematical truths.[87] Here we find again the primary inspiration of phenomenology, which is to liberate the notion of existence from the narrowness of the natural object, and to relate this notion to the meaning of the thought that thinks an object in self-evidence.

To resolve the crises occasioned by the natural attitude, one must radically change this attitude. If my intellectual life has been transformed into a technique and I exercise my thought on certain objects instead of having all the clarity necessary for my spiritual life, this is because I find myself in the world like a being among other beings. It is thus necessary that I recover the original thought in which this situation was constituted, that I recover the primary self-evidences that have made it possible for me to posit myself as object.

The phenomenological reduction is a violence which man—a being among other beings—does to himself in order to find himself again as pure thought. To find himself again in this purity it will not suffice for him to reflect on himself, for reflection itself does not suspend his involvement in the world, does not reestablish the world in its role as

point of identification of a multiplicity of intentions. To transform man's "technical" thought into spiritual activity, it will therefore be necessary to refrain from presupposing the world as a condition of the mind. Every truth that implicitly contains the "thesis of the existence of objects" must thus be suspended. The philosopher denies himself the technical habits of the man he is, and who finds himself situated in the world each time he posits the existence of an object. What he then discovers is himself as a philosopher, and his consciousness as a consciousness that bestows a meaning upon things but does not "weigh" on them, and the truths themselves suspended as noemata of his thought, whose meaning and existence he envisages, without allowing himself to be lured into positing the latter. He discovers himself as a transcendental consciousness. The phenomenological reduction is thus an operation through which the mind suspends the validity of the natural thesis of existence, in order to study its meaning in the thought that has constituted it and that, for its part, is no longer a part of the world but is prior to the world. In thus returning to primary self-evidence in this manner, I recover at once the origin and the significance of all of my knowledge and the true meaning of my presence in the world.

But the phenomenological reduction is introduced in the *Ideas* by means of considerations in which we can distinguish two themes. First, the putting out of action or the putting between parenthesis of the thesis of the existence of the world is founded on the relativity of our knowledge of the world, and correlatively on the relativity of the very existence of this world. The self-evidence of the reality of the world is never complete. In perception there is always something anticipated, an infinite horizon of the anticipated, and, consequently, the world exists in such a way that it is never the guarantor of its own existence. The immanent perception of reflection, on the contrary, is in full possession of its object: the anticipated and the given overlap entirely. The self-evidence of the world is thus incomplete. Only the self-evidence of consciousness which thus finds itself fundamentally distinct from the world, and self-evidence which consequently reveals to us a consciousness which can only be transcendental, is certain. This whole development is extremely close to the theory of Cartesian doubt. One must return to the *cogito* which remains as the sole certainty, on the basis of which the world might then be appropriately reconstituted with certainty. This is the ideal universal science. In pursuit of this ideal of certainty, Husserl soon comes to raise the question of the certainty of phenomenological analysis itself—of the critique of critique.[88] The regression to infinity that the question seems to impose is resolved thanks to the idea of a return upon themselves, without vicious circle, of all the sciences of principles: the principles refer

to themselves, but not qua premises. To conform to a rule does not mean to use it as a premise."[89]

But there is yet another motif, and it is precisely the one that dictates that the reconstitution of the world, after the *epoché* that suspends our judgment about it, is something other than the deduction of the exterior world's reality carried out by Descartes. The world to be reconquered after the phenomenological reduction will be a world constituted by a thought: a synthesis of the noemata of the noesis, bringing to light the self-evidences from which the world draws its origin and of which it is the synthetic product. What the analysis pursues here is less the certainty of the objective world in the sense Descartes gives to this term, than the return to the freedom of self-evidence in which the resistant, foreign object appears as springing forth from the mind because it is understood by it. This is why after having suspended the position of the exterior world (the only one whose uncertainty and eternal incompletion Husserl describes), Husserl excludes from transcendental consciousness all the domains where thought, instead of keeping its freedom, is transformed into a simple technique operating on already constituted objects.[90]

This is why the "putting between parentheses" of the world is not a provisional procedure making possible a subsequent rejoining of reality with certainty; it is a definitive attitude. Here the reduction is an inner revolution rather than a search for certainties, a way for the mind to exist in conformity with its vocation, and, in sum, to be free vis-à-vis the world. Consciousness of everything—where everything figures as the noema of the noesis, in parentheses so to speak—is what remains after everything is excluded. It does not have an existence of the same kind as the excluded being. "The sense of these notions is separated by a veritable abyss."[91] Its mode of existing does not consist in operating on a constituted world and engaging itself in it, but in being conscious of it in self-evidence, that is, in freedom. In this deeper sense, and not merely in the Cartesian sense of the indubitable or the necessary, consciousness is an absolute existence. It is relative to nothing, for it is free. Its freedom is defined precisely by the situation of self-evidence which is positive, which is more and better than simple noninvolvement. It is free *qua* consciousness. The adequation of inner perception, which is the source of its absolute "certainty," is in reality founded on this absoluteness of consciousness. The total possession of self in reflection is but the other side of freedom.

The phenomenological reduction henceforth becomes a method of spiritual life. The phenomenology it makes possible is a discipline that, removing the naivete of the natural attitude, dissolves the opacity of the object, upon which we perform "intellectual operations," into

the self-evidences that constituted it. It follows the diverse categories of objects which serve it as guidelines to discover the acts that have constituted them in a process of synthesis. It embraces, in solving the problems of constitution that the objects pose, the entire field of the sciences of nature and the moral sciences.

But in making the very meaning in which they are intended intelligible by the elucidation of their constitution, in decomposing the very fact that they are given in self-evidences that make them appear as very determinate ways of issuing from the subject, phenomenology confers a new degree of intelligibility on all the sciences. They are elucidated from all points of view.[92] The irrationality of the very fact that their objects *are* is illuminated.

Thus phenomenology, as the authentic way for the mind to accomplish its mental destiny, rejoins the aspiration to a universal, absolute science that had always haunted Husserl. The two motifs that seemed so different merge.

Finally we must note that Husserl separates himself from certain traditions of German idealism in that for him the transcendental consciousness discovered by phenomenological reduction is not an abstraction, is not a *consciousness in general*. It is a concrete possibility in each one of us, more concrete, more intimate than our human nature, which is, after all, only a role we play and an external relation we maintain with ourselves, only a way of seeing ourselves as an object.

How this individuality of consciousness in general, divested of all the "facticity" of birth and death, can be individual—this is a problem Husserl does not deal with, at least in his published works. The analyses of the "ego" and the constitution of inner time remain analyses of constitution, that is, analyses of the power of the subject over it, even over its past. In this regard Heidegger's work is revolutionary. Unless, that is, we were to understand Husserl to take the ego itself as the moment of an impersonal event, to which the notions of activity and passivity no longer apply. We can find in the notion of the *Urimpression* [originary impression], which we will consider later, indications leading in this direction.

Intentionality, linked to the idea of self-evidence, which has too often been interpreted as an affirmation of the presence of man in the world, becomes in Husserl the very liberation of man vis-à-vis the world. *Sinngebung*, the fact of thinking and bestowing a meaning, intellection, is not an involvement like any other; it is freedom. Every involvement is, on the other hand, reducible in principle to a meaning, and through this—even before being the mind's subjection to beings—it is liberty and source.

11. The Ego, Time, and Freedom

The ties which link the notion of intentionality to that of self-evidence and, through this, to the freedom of self-evidence, appear in the theory of the transcendental ego, which is elaborated in the *Ideas*. In this work Husserl retracts the criticisms he had addressed to the notion of the "ego" in the *Logical Investigations*. He finds that the ego is ineluctable in the description of consciousness.

The *Logical Investigations* had in fact attacked the notion of an ego that acts as the support of psychological states.[93] In the *Ideas* the ego does not play this role. It is not graspable as a being. Nothing can be said of its nature or qualities. It is a way of living the intentions that relate to it in diverse ways. Only the way in which intentions relate to the ego, or rather, emanate from it, can be described. *The ego is a form and a way of being, and not an existence.* In the immanence of intentions it is a transcendence sui generis which cannot be compared to the transcendence of an object. It is not constituted, but constituting. What is constituted in the ego by its very history is its character and its habits. Through them it can resemble an object—albeit an object of a special structure—and become a person. The person is not identical with the transcendental "I" which is the source of every act. Voluntary practical activity constitutes a specification of it, and presupposes the pure activity of the ego. While it is the "wakeful ego" in attention, it also determines the passivity of nonattentive consciousness, implicit thought. The latter is related to the ego since this passivity bears a positive mark; it results from the fact that the ego is turned away from the thought that emanates from it.

But in what sense is the ego the source of all acts? Precisely in that it affirms itself, that is, marks this halt, this *position*, this thesis, which serves as the basis for every identification issuing in the synthetic constitution of an object in self-evidence. Here the initiative of the subject in self-evidence becomes apparent. The ego is the very freedom of consciousness, the *fiat* that it contains and of which self-evidence is but the expression. It is a ray of thought that comes from us, an *Ichstrahl* (Ego-ray). Thought is thus not simply a domain in which the ego manifests its freedom; the fact of having meaning—is the very manifestation of freedom. The opposition between activity and theory is eliminated by Husserl in his conception of self-evidence. This is the whole originality of his theory of intentionality and freedom. Intentionality is nothing but the very accomplishment of freedom.

If thought is the manifestation of the mind's freedom, it must also be free with regard to the self or thought of self. Thus, all thought directed upon an object is accompanied by the presence and self-evidence of this

thought to itself. Self-consciousness, therefore, determines the subject just as does intentionality. It, too, is intentionality, though of another type. Self-consciousness, better than being a simple acknowledgment of the exercise of intellection, *is* intellection, and consequently is light and freedom. It is carried out in the inner consciousness of time.

The analysis of the consciousness of time that *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* gives us merges with the description of self-consciousness that characterizes every act of consciousness. The constitution of the presence of consciousness's internal contents to themselves is their duration and succession, in which their moments are identified, recognized, and capable of being recalled. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* first takes its stand against the doctrine which makes time into a simple content, a quality like, for example, color (Brentano's theory).

The origin of all consciousness is a primary impression, an "*Urimpression.*" But this original passivity is at the same time an initial spontaneity. The primary intentionality in which it is constituted is the present. The present is the outflow of mind itself, its presence to itself. But it is a presence that does not bind it; the impression passes. The present is modified, loses some of its acuteness and actuality, and is only retained by a new present that replaces it, and that in turn moves away and remains attached, in a new retention, to a new present. This retention is also an intention. It thinks the moment, as it were, which it retains at the edge of the past into which it is about to sink, to be subsequently found again by memory, and it identifies that moment with self-evidence. Thus, duration, which is renewal and freedom in each of its instants, is constituted. The mind is already free vis-à-vis its outflow. It is open onto the future through a protention—as Husserl calls it. Thus, time is not a form which consciousness assumes and that comes from the outside. It is truly the secret of subjectivity itself, the condition for a free mind. Like intentionality directed upon a transcendent object, time expresses freedom itself.

Time is thus essentially constituted. Here constitution is not what it is in the constitution of an object. One cannot see behind time a deeper subject who contemplates and joins together its diverse instants. Time is engendered by the very moment of the subject's freedom, which Husserl calls the flux, and which is no longer constituted for anything else. It is already in reference to constituted notions and by analogy that the terms "flux," "flowing," etc., are applied to it.

Phenomenological time, which Husserl distinguishes from objective time (though this distinction does not parallel the Bergsonian distinction between pure duration and spatialized time), is thus not the form of a stream of consciousness, which would be like another being

facing the being of the world. The intentions and sensations which are immanent to the stream of consciousness are not a sort of psychological reality whose description would be furnished by phenomenology; they are implicated in the meaning of this deep subjectivity, about which one can no longer say that it is a being.

Let us note that the antinomy of spontaneity and passivity is eliminated in the mind grasped at the level of the *Urimpression*. The present with its retentions and protentions is at the same time as the first impression, the first outflow of the mind, in which it both posits and possesses itself, in which it is free. It is on the level sensation, and at the point where intentionality, directed toward an external object, itself appears as extended in time and consequently as "content"—in a domain in which empiricism is most at home—that Husserl discovers the manifestation of meaning.

Finally, this whole theory of time concerns the time of theoretical thought, a formal time, qualified solely by the contents which fill it and participate in its rhythm without creating it. Here also Husserl remains faithful to his fundamental metaphysical intentions: mind is the inwardness of a meaning to thought, the freedom of intellection. Time accomplishes this freedom; it does not exist prior to the mind, does not engage it in a history in which it could be overwhelmed. Historical time is constituted. History is explained by thought. If the meaning of the abstract world of science refers, for Husserl, to the world of "transcendental aesthetics," to the concrete, everyday world, invested with all the attributes of value, that world of culture and history is constituted in an immanent time that is the time of theory and freedom.

Such seem to us to be the principal teachings of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. It contributes very suggestive views on several topics. Its theory of images and of memory, and the concrete descriptions of the consciousness of time that it furnishes are of a rare subtlety. I especially have in mind the theory that makes time the very manifestation of freedom and spirituality.

12. Phenomenology and Knowledge

The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology underscores in a particularly clear way the theme of freedom conceived on the model of self-evidence, which seems to me to dominate Husserl's whole philosophy, and which I have detached from his theory of intentionality, time, and the phenomenological reduction.

This work justifies transcendental phenomenology through the evolution of science. The necessity for a phenomenological critique results from the very crises science goes through, crises in which it loses the meaning of the propositions that it establishes by transforming itself into an intellectual technique.[94]

These crises issue from the naivete inherent in all thought that directs itself onto a given object; a naivete that thought cannot overcome without accomplishing the revolution of the phenomenological *epoché*. Again we find, but expressed with unusual force, the opposition between the technical activity of thought and its spiritual function, which I have already emphasized. The thought that directs itself onto given objects is not pure thought; it is an intellectual technique, a vital practice.[95] Even ancient geometry is a *techne*;[96] it is susceptible to progress, but the meaning that animates it remains nonetheless obscure.[97] Such thought posits transcendent objects and operates with the help of more and more abstract, more and more derivative notions, which it derives from objects. It is not interested in the sense in which it posits its conclusions, and the sense in which they are true. Thus, those phenomena of the "displacement of meaning" and the "emptying of meaning" (*Sinnesverschiebung und Sinnesentleerung*)[98] occur, which only a radical change of attitude—one that would make evident the meaning of the accomplished intellectual actions—can remedy.[99] Such a change of attitude is thus commanded by science itself.

Science, in its original and authentic movement, is not a technique. The meaning of the truths it establishes is of importance to it; otherwise it would admit what is obscure and consequently impenetrable to reason—which Husserl identifies with self-evidence. And it cannot renounce self-evidence, for it originally proceeds from man's concern to constitute his own existence freely.[100] Self-evidence and reason are above all the manifestation of freedom itself. Husserl reminds us of the significance antiquity attributed to them: knowledge was a way of being free, of accepting only the reasonable for rule, that is, of accepting nothing foreign to oneself. And in a curious homage paid to the eighteenth-century cult of reason, Husserl likewise finds, beyond the simplistic mechanism and materialism of the Enlightenment, an aspiration to free oneself through reason. Knowledge is an instrument of liberation. "Philosophy as theory frees not only the theorist but all those who have a philosophical culture."[101]

But the bond between knowledge and freedom is closer still. Liberation is not only the result of science. Science is the very accomplishment of freedom, which consists in the power man possesses to confer on his being a reasonable meaning, to see the being of the world as reason which "bestows a meaning to things, values and ends."[102] A knowledge

which leaves nothing outside of reason, a *universal* knowledge, is the sole way for the mind to be itself, free vis-à-vis the world. This is why science is itself only to the extent that it remains a branch of universal science.[103] To detach it is to falsify it in its essential impulse.[104] Cartesianism's essential requirements are reaffirmed.

Husserl shows that there was an aspiration to universality at the basis of the science of antiquity. The primordial role of geometry derives from it, for space appeared as the universal form of reality. Galileo's revolution consisted in bringing scientific knowledge back to geometry. The impetus he thereby gave to physics has ever since determined the conception of all sciences on the model of physics.[105] Through a phenomenology of the notions that have made scientific progress possible, Husserl formulates the significance of these advances, but also brings out what is incomplete in these notions, and the crises they inevitably provoke the moment they are taken as absolutes. To overcome the crisis is precisely to place these notions back into the horizons of subjective life in which they were constituted.[106] Phenomenology is a method of grasping "everything that a thought implies as its own horizons."[107] It determines in what sense and to what extent each type of truth is intuitive.[108] It thus permits the reconstitution of the world such as it is in the freedom of self-evidence. A world compatible with freedom, one might say.

The crisis of science is thus the crisis of humanity in us. We are not ourselves in the brutish affirmation of the "I am." The "I am" is truly human only if it discovers itself as reason, that is, as a freedom. Man is his true self only "in the struggle for truth." The selfsame, if it is to be free, instead of brutishly registering the "I am," must be made explicit as a center of self-evidence, as meaning; the existence of the ego as spirit, as thought, is only authentic if it in turn is illuminated and understood. Philosophy, and more especially phenomenology, is "humanity struggling to understand itself,"[109] "the revelation of universal reason innate to humanity as such."[110]

Phenomenology is thus at once the bringing to completion of science and the authentic life of the mind. It is not simply a supplement to science. The spirit of philosophy is not defined by that of science. It is, on the contrary, as a function of the destiny of mind and of its mode of existence that science itself is born. Phenomenology is the manifestation of the dignity of mind, which is freedom.

13. The Mind Is a Monad

If Husserl presents phenomenology as motivated by the necessity of bringing every science back to absolute, certain principles, of considering

every object as a function of the absolute and indubitable being of consciousness, we should remember that the primary science which he thus seems to seek is primary in a new sense. For Husserl brings forth a new notion of scientific foundation, which amounts to situating science itself in the perspectives of a thought entirely master of itself, responsible to itself, and consequently free.

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl shows how, through his investigation of an absolutely certain science at the basis of all knowledge, phenomenology is close to Cartesianism. The doubt that mars knowledge of the world remains, as in the *Ideas*, the fundamental motive that induces us to suspend every judgment bearing on the world, and to reconstitute the sciences starting from the absolutely self-evident existence of the *cogito*. However, contrary to Descartes project, it is not a question of making the *cogito* play the role of the first axiom from which a strictly rational theology, cosmology, psychology and, eventually, a strictly rational science, would flow. Only the first two of Descartes's meditations count for phenomenology. Therefore it is necessary, according to Husserl, to take up the analysis of everything certain contained in the *cogito* anew. The object of each thought *as an object of thought* (Descartes's objective existence) belongs to the sphere of certainty. The world that Husserl rejoins after authenticating the *cogito* does not exceed this "objective" existence. The direction Descartes takes in the first two meditations—and from which he deviates starting with the third, when he identifies the *cogito* with the "soul" (that is, with an object located in the world) and deduces God and the "formal" existence of the world from it—finds, according to Husserl, its natural continuation in the phenomenology that pursues the constitution of the world as an "objective" existence. Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* precisely take up the task of outlining this constitution of the world in the sphere of absolute certainty of the *cogito*, pursuing to its end the Cartesian venture, which is linked to the very destiny of the human spirit.

Does this mean that in his aspiration to absolutely certain science Husserl would flatly deny the certainty of the world's "formal" existence and maintain that thought is riveted to Descartes's doubt, which would no longer be methodical but definitive? This would be to fail to recognize the significance of the problem of certainty and scientific foundation in Husserl. If Husserl saw in knowledge an ultimate fact, any further significance of which there would be no reason to seek, if certainty and uncertainty functioned as indices of propositions expressing this knowledge, we could say that for Husserl the world's "formal" existence could not be known with certainty.

But this was not his position. The *cogito*'s certainty characterizes the situation of a mind that, instead of behaving like a being among other

beings, finds itself at the moment when it neutralizes all of its relations with the outside. The *cogito* is a situation in which the mind exists as a beginning, as an origin. Its certainty is not the index of a knowledge, but of a situation—the situation called consciousness. According to Husserl's analyses, it consists in the perfect adequation of what is intended and what is attained by inner perception. But this adequation itself results from the mode of existence specific to consciousness[11]—an existence which in the present is master of itself. The freedom of consciousness in the present contains the deep reason for the absolute self-evidence of the *cogito*. Or, rather, the self-evident knowledge, contained in the *cogito*, is identified with the very accomplishment of this freedom of mind. Self-evidence and clarity appear as the mind's modes of existence. True knowledge, and knowledge of the truth, are freedom. And in this sense there exists no knowing but of oneself.

In what, on the other hand, does the uncertainty of the world consist? In the fact that the experience we have of it is never made up of pure self-evidence. The light of self-evidence does not illuminate the totality of what has been intended in perception. A thing shows itself in a multiplicity of aspects—an infinite multiplicity. In principle, each new aspect can contradict and thus destroy what seemed already acquired. The uncertainty of external perception thus is a consequence of the uncertainty of its present, of the essential subjection of this present to an absolutely open future. In positing the existence of a thing as an absolute, the mind commits itself beyond its possibilities. In some way it alienates its freedom. In its authentic existence, it must consider all transcendence through the immanence of its present. Nothing can *enter* it, everything comes from it.

In this sense Husserl posits the subject as a monad. In its inner recesses, the subject can account for the universe. Every relation with another thing is established in self-evidence, and consequently has its origin in the subject. The subject's coexistence with something other, before being a *commerce*, is a relation of intellection. The world can be interpreted in terms of its subjective experience; the ego controls all the levels of reality, all its forms, however remote from subjectivity they may be. For subjectivity, truth does not consist in naively contemplating that reality whose meaning it constitutes, and consequently in simply abandoning itself to that reality as a basis for its existence. Truth, a way of existing, consists in situating that reality within the configuration of the meaning it has for the subject which can account for it fully. To say that the subject is a monad is in sum to deny the existence of the irrational. Husserl's idealism, which is best expressed by this positing of the subject as monad, does not simply consist in saying that the world of our perception

is reduced to psychological contents, as Berkeley's idealism would have it. For Berkeley's idealism does not ultimately explain how psychological contents are more subjective than the external world, which reduces to them. Husserl's idealism tries to define the subject as an origin, the place where everything is answerable for itself. The subject is not absolute because it is indubitable; it is indubitable because it is always answerable for itself and to itself. This self-sufficiency characterizes its absoluteness. Phenomenology makes explicit this answering of the subject to itself. It puts into action the freedom within us.

According to Husserl, Descartes's *Meditations* thus find their completion in the lucidity of the monad, in which the meaning of all reality is constituted. And in the fifth chapter of the work Husserl devotes to Descartes's *Meditations*, he specifically outlines the constitution of complete objectivity starting from the monad's domain, which is rigorously "mine." Since the objective is that which has an intersubjective meaning, Husserl shows how intersubjectivity is constituted starting from the monad's solipsism. This solipsism does not deny the existence of others, but it does describe an existence that in principle can be considered as if it were alone.

We will neither summarize nor criticize Husserl's analyses which permit him to trace the constitution of the social relationship as the monad's meaning; the constitution of the complex relation of the presence of others for me; the meaning of my presence for others that it implies; and the constitution of the very notion of the objective, that is, of the universally valid in which reality, the sciences, and phenomenology itself are consequently constituted. Let us simply note the role of the body and of my specific relation to the body in all these analyses.

It is important, in conclusion to this survey of the *Cartesian Meditations*, to indicate Husserl's philosophical position, which this work helps to clarify. For Husserl there is no superior force that dominates thought prior to its exercise. Thought is an absolute autonomy. It is very difficult to take seriously the brief indications Husserl gives about God in the *Ideas*, seeking, in the marvelous success of the play of intentions constituting a coherent world, a teleological proof for the existence of God. The monad invites God himself to be constituted as meaning for a thought responsible to itself.

This original activity of the subject is an intentionality, that is, a thought having meaning. The social relationship—before being an involvement of the subject prior to thought, and consequently an exceptional situation of the mind—is the meaning of a thought. Commerce with the other is constituted in a play of intentions. I, myself, as a concrete, historical man, am a character in a drama that constitutes itself

for a thought. There is in me a possibility of solitude, despite my actual sociality and the world's presence for me. Precisely as a thought, I am a monad, an always possible monad in an always possible remove from my involvements. I am always in the process of going toward the whole in which I am, for I am always outside, entrenched in my thought.

Here we see all the difference that separates Husserl from Heidegger. For Heidegger, my life is not simply a game that in the final analysis is played for a thought. The way I am involved in existence has an original meaning, irreducible to that of a noema for a noesis; the concept of consciousness cannot give an account of it. For Heidegger this existence certainly has a meaning—and by affirming the meaning of existence, which does not have for him the opaqueness of a brute fact, Heidegger remains a phenomenologist—but this meaning no longer has the structure of a noema. The subject is neither free nor absolute; it is no longer entirely answerable for itself. It is dominated and overwhelmed by history, by its origin, about which it can do nothing, since it is thrown into the world and this abandonment marks all its projects and powers.

Conclusion

Husserl's phenomenology is, in the final analysis, a philosophy of freedom, a freedom that is accomplished as, and defined by, consciousness. This freedom does not merely characterize the activity of a being, but is placed prior to that being; it is that in relation to which that being constitutes itself. Thought itself as a reality, a temporal and historical fact, endowed with a density of being, constitutes itself in a synthesis. The categories valid for existence can be applied to the flux that constitutes time only in an analogical sense. In no sense can it be said that the external world—the world of essences and the world of thought itself—does not exist. They each have an appropriate mode of existence determined by their self-evident meaning. Detached from this meaning, they produce error, equivocation and nonbeing. Only then are they transformed into objects of a thought that is only thought (*vermeintliches Denken, bloßes Denken* [alleged thought, mere thought]).

This means that the real—things and thoughts—has meaning only in consciousness, which is the very mode of existence of meaning. It is achieved not in a knowledge that *explains* things, but in the phenomenology that takes account of their self-evident meaning. Explanation represents a derivative form of consciousness, whose true unfolding is clarity. The ideal of light, the intelligible sun, condition all existence. These

are the genuine Platonic motifs in Husserl's philosophy, rather than the realism of ideas by which he is generally linked to Plato.

Man, who through the phenomenological reduction is able to coincide absolutely with himself, also rediscovers his freedom through it. Phenomenology not only answers this need for an absolutely founded knowledge; this need is subordinated to the freedom that expresses the claim to be an ego and to be, with respect to being, origin. Hence, the knowledge that rests on self-evidences, keeping no secrets from themselves, acknowledging to themselves their weight and meaning, is the very mode of personal and free existence. The phenomenologist, by suspending the general thesis of the natural attitude, rediscovers a world and constituted persons, established, to be sure, by means of all the relations—thoughts, feelings, passions, and actions—that bind him to them in concrete life. But he now reaches them through his noeses; he deals with them as his own, even in their alien status. This is not solipsism, but the possibility of solipsism. It marks a way of being in which existence is its own starting point.

Therefore I do not think that Husserl's intentionality, that is, the phenomenon of meaning itself, can be interpreted as Heidegger's *In-der-Welt-sein* [being in the world], still less as the flight of mind outside itself.[112] Heidegger's *In-der-Welt-sein* affirms in the first instance that man, because of his existence, is always already overwhelmed. Intentionality, on the contrary, characterizes a monad; man retains the power to keep himself in reserve before the world, and thus remain free to accomplish the phenomenological reduction. In a certain sense intentionality is an *Ausser-der-Welt-sein* [being outside the world] rather than the *In-der-Welt-sein* of consciousness. We are not immediately in town, on the road, in the midst of things. Presence in the world is above all a certain meaning of our thought. In the first instance a relationship that, if not theoretical (for it can be affective or voluntary) is at least a relationship of intellection, is established between us and things. Before we behave with regard to things, we understand them. Behavior is a way of understanding, positing, and identifying. It is true that because understanding a meaning is not the simple absorption of an external object by an internal content, the life of the mind is something open, and all of man's involvements in the world form part of his mental life. But for Husserl the truth consists precisely in turning these involvements back into thoughts; not in reducing them to "ethereal" structures, which would then be more assimilable—nor to surmounting them as does Spinoza, by changing the kind of knowledge, but by discovering in them the spontaneity of a nonengaged mind and the play of self-evidence of which they are made. The phenomenological reduction has no other meaning.

One is right to see in intentionality a protest against an idealism that would absorb things into consciousness. The intention intends an external object. The transcendence of the object is exactly what it is in conformity with the inner meaning of the thought that intends that object, a meaning that is irreducible to any mathematical functions. The exteriority of objects proceeds from the absolute respect given to the interiority of its constitution.

We now add some brief indications concerning the links between Husserl and the philosophers who broke away from him.

The Platonic realism of the *Prolegomena* of the *Logical Investigations* and the first four Investigations of volume 2 appears as something new, not so much because of the rehabilitation of ideas it represented as because of the steps that led Husserl to it. These consisted in determining the nature of an idea in terms of the meaning of the thought that intended it. From that point on, the notion of meaning appeared broader than the notion of a representation of an individual object. Henceforth the possibility was opened of positing a mentation that, while having a meaning, could be neither objective nor a representation. Up until then the contents of thought that found no place in an objective world determined by representation could only be located in the subjective. The phenomenological method made it possible to escape this dilemma.

The phenomenological investigations of Husserl's first disciples concerned themselves with analyzing the different domains of reality in all the plenitude of their meaning, and with describing as structures of the world the traits which prior to Husserl were classified as traits of the subject. These subjective traits, henceforth endowed with meaning, were now found to contain elements which took their place in existence as secondary and even primary qualities. Scheler's investigations into the objective world of values proceed from the same inspiration. They start out from emotion as an experience of values—that is, as a thought about values. To speak of the objectivity of values is above all to designate them as nonsubjective. What was certainly the essential for Scheler was to affirm that the objectivity of values does not have the same significance as the objectivity of things; the former is accessible only to emotion, which is to say that the inner meaning of an emotion is what characterizes it.

It is in Heidegger's philosophy that the separation of the notion of meaning from that of objectivity is worked out in a particularly distinct way. In his view, to understand a meaning is not to tend, one way or another, toward an object. To understand is not to represent to oneself. Each situation of human existence constitutes a way of understanding; but that does not entail any objective apprehension.

The universality of the notion of meaning in the structure of the subject has both opened up the path to existential philosophy, and made it diverge profoundly from that of Husserl. The multiplicity of structures that meaning can present, and its irreducibility to the thought of the object, has enabled the philosophers of existence to find a meaning inherent in existence itself. But what sets them in contrast with Husserl is their conception of meaning itself. In Husserl, the phenomenon of meaning has never been determined by history. Time and consciousness remain in the final analysis the "passive synthesis" of an inner, deep constitution that is no longer a being.

For Heidegger, on the contrary, meaning is conditioned by something that already was. The intimate link between meaning and thought results from the accomplishment of meaning in history, that something extra that is one's existence. The introduction of history at the foundation of mental life undermines clarity and constitution as the mind's authentic modes of existence. Self-evidence is no longer the fundamental mode of intellection. The drama of existence, prior to light, is the essential part of spirituality.

But if Heidegger's existential philosophy inherits from afar its vision of existence and the affirmation that existence is irreducible to the light of self-evidence, that philosophy owes to Husserl the very means with which it renews the philosophy of existence.

What it contributes that is new, by comparison with pragmatism and the philosophies of life, and also by comparison with the biological philosophies like those of Spencer, which have an undeniable existential side to them, is an interpretation of existence in its least intellectual forms as a phenomenon of meaning and as acts of understanding. It does not philosophize from the *outside* about the significance of human existence the way one would judge symptoms. The significance of each human situation is immanent to that situation; it is at once the understanding and the realization of the situation. All this would be impossible without Husserl's conception of intentionality. It is through this notion—which at least de jure separated the meaning of an object from its representation, and made it possible to look at the object itself as determined in its nature and in its mode of existence by meaning—that Heidegger's philosophy—despite the abyss separating it from Husserl, despite its formulas, its feeling for reality and the novelty of its method, remains tributary to Husserlian phenomenology.

PART 2

LEVINAS'S HUSSERL

5

Reflections on Phenomenological "Technique"

Philosophy has not become a rigorous science, pursued by a team of investigators, arriving at definitive results. It is very likely that philosophy resists this mode of spiritual life. But some Husserlian hopes have been realized. *Phenomenology unites philosophers*, although not in the way in which Kantianism united Kantians or Spinozism Spinozans. Phenomenologists are not bound to the theses formulated by Husserl; they do not devote themselves exclusively to the exegesis or the history of his writings. It is a way of proceeding that they have in common. They agree on approaching questions in a certain way, rather than on adhering to a certain number of fixed propositions.

To present Husserlian phenomenology as a method would be to insist on the obvious. Such is not exactly our purpose. We simply want to point out some procedures, techniques almost, used quasispontaneously by those who have been shaped even partially by the Husserlian work. Phenomenology is a method in an eminent sense, for it is essentially open. It can be practiced in the most diverse domains, rather like the method of mathematical physics after Galileo and Descartes, dialectics after Hegel and especially Marx, or psychoanalysis after Freud. One can carry out a phenomenology of the sciences, of Kantianism, of socialism, as well as a phenomenology of phenomenology itself. But the way it has been practiced since the *Logical Investigations*, in which it was "tested in action," the style it has taken on, the refutations and confirmations to which it has subjected thought, do not always coincide with what Husserl understands strictly by method. On this point, his work does not seem to have exerted influence through the methodological considerations in which it abounds. Besides, most of the time those methodological considerations already express positions, responses to problems, rather than rules for the art of dealing with them.

I do not mean to say that these theses are not essential to the practice of the method. But the theories concerning intuition, ideas, reduction, and constituted and constituting intersubjectivity—without which, Husserl declares, phenomenological analysis would not rise to philosophical dignity—are in reality elements of a system, rather than a route leading to the discovery of a system. They count as method in the sense that all knowledge of being counts as method. If one takes them as rules of method they appear too formal.

The phenomenological reduction claims to open up, behind the naive vision of things, the field of a radical experience, allowing reality to appear in its ultimate structure. It would suffice, then, to receive it as it is given. Philosophers have never sought and promised anything but the vision of the truly real behind common and abstract experience. This field of transcendental facts that the seeing of essences or the phenomenological reduction claims to open up requires a way of being treated that constitutes the "lyric phrasing," as it were, of phenomenological research. Of this *way*, Husserl's work furnishes the prototype rather than the technology.

Despite the wealth of analyses and the profundity of views that so many remarkable works of phenomenology have produced in France, Germany, and elsewhere since the war, I would like, in all modesty, to mention some of those elementary movements of thought that have come from the Husserlian manner. Thus we are not concerned with judging systems by showing how they are put together, and even less with judging the Husserlian system—as it appears in the works published during his lifetime, and in its evolution through the posthumous works—by its technique. This historian's game of who is the cleverest, the historian or the author he is examining, is vain and unworthy. I would like simply to highlight a series of gestures that determine, for the outside observer, the physiognomy of one thinker, and lend a family resemblance to several others.

Our reflections, developed without systematizing intent, concern the notions of description, intentionality, sensibility, and subjectivity. I apologize for the disparate character of these reflections.

1. In phenomenology one no longer deduces, in the mathematical or logical sense of the word. Moreover, the facts which the phenomenological reduction opens up are not there to suggest or to confirm hypotheses. There is neither deduction nor induction. The facts of consciousness do not lead to any principle that explains them. The "becauses" which appear in the texts merely establish the primacy of one fact over another; they never rise above the phenomena. "Because" the synthesis of sensible perception is never completed, the existence of the exterior world is

relative and uncertain. But the relativity and uncertainty of the exterior world signify nothing other than the incomplete character of the synthesis or perception of the sensible. The abstract notions which the terms "relativity" and "uncertainty" express cannot be *separated* from the phenomena or from their unfolding which these terms summarize. Without these phenomena, these terms become abstract and equivocal.

The ideal of absolute existence, by contrast with which the existence of the world is posited as relative, is, in turn, taken from the description of the "fulfillment" of a "signitive" intention by an intuition. The conclusion does not (as in scholastic or Cartesian proofs) result in a truth superior to the facts that suggest it. Nor does it result in an intuition in Bergson's sense, which goes beyond description toward a truth expressed by the formula "everything happens as if."

The experience of the facts of consciousness is the origin of all the notions that can be legitimately employed. Description—and this is the exceptional claim in which it asserts its philosophical dignity—has recourse to no previously *separated* notion that would allegedly be necessary to description. Thus, in Descartes, the description of the *cogito*—in the imperfection of its doubt—eventually acknowledges its reference to the idea of the infinite and perfect: the idea of the perfect, given in advance, makes the description of finitude possible. Phenomenological description seeks the significance of the finite within the finite itself: hence the particular style of the description. Whenever a philosopher of the classical type insists on the imperfection of a phenomenon of knowledge, phenomenology, not content with the negation included in this imperfection, posits instead this negation as constitutive of the phenomenon. If feeling is an obscure fact of psychological life, phenomenological description will take this obscurity as a positive characteristic of feeling, and not conceive of it as a clarity simply diminished. If a remembering is always modified by the present wherein it returns, phenomenology will not speak of a falsified remembrance, but will make of this alteration the essential nature of remembering. A memory exact in itself and independent of the present that modifies it is an *abstraction*, a source of equivocation. The legitimate notion of remembering must be taken from the concrete situation of lived memory. Even for God, remembering has this structure which emerges from description. "Even for God"—the formula is remarkable. We do not need the idea of God—of the infinite and perfect—to become aware of the finitude of phenomena; the essence of the phenomenon such as it is manifested at the finite level is its essence in itself. Even for God—all the being of the object is in its truth, as we would say today.

This reversal into "positivity" and "essential structure" of what remained a setback, a lack, or an empirical contingency for a philosophy

that measured the given from the height of the ideal (but which Kant had already denounced as transcendental illusion), gives a decidedly dialectical character to these descriptions. What seemed at first a setback—the incompletion of a series of the thing's aspects—is a thing's mode of completion; what deforms memory is just what constitutes the sui generis reliability of the memory. Soon the doubts that traversed and shattered Kierkegaardian faith will be taken to authenticate this faith; the god who is hidden will be precisely, in his dissimulation, the god who is revealed. The contradictory ambiguity of notions (to be distinguished from the equivocation of words) will constitute their essence. Philosophies—very beautiful ones—of ambiguity will become possible. The immediate link between concepts will be symptomatic of oversights and abstractions, of the unauthentic. One will tread with extreme caution. A halting gait, and happily so! It will bring closest to its goal a way of thinking that wants above all to grasp itself without surpassing itself; for all surpassing, from the point of view of this way of thinking, proceeds most often from nonreflection, presumption, and opinion, from nonphilosophy.

There is in this independence of the finite with regard to the infinite the hallmark of a post-Kantian philosophy. All pre-Kantian idealism contained an essential role for reason, that of making it possible to survey and judge experience; or, if you will, it was still an idealism with the idea of infinity. Phenomenology is the paradox of an idealism without reason. Reason, for Husserl, does not signify a way to rise above the data directly; it is equivalent to experience, to its privileged moment of "*leibhaft*," presence of the object, presence of the object "in flesh and blood" so to speak.

2. Phenomenology is a destruction of representation and the theoretical object. It denounces contemplation of the object (which nevertheless it seems to have promoted) as an abstraction, a partial vision of being, a *forgetting* (as we might say in modern terms), *of its truth. To intend the object, to represent it to oneself, is already to forget the being of its truth.*

To do phenomenology is to denounce the direct vision of the object as naive. Husserl's phenomenology, which finds the leading thread of intentional analysis (which has often been denounced as logicism or objectivism) in the regions of the eidetic sciences, takes the object as its point of departure, but upstream from the current that constitutes it. It starts at the extreme limit of the abstraction that in naive realism (naive for just this reason) is taken for being itself.

This position is clear very early, as far back as in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*. It is said, to be sure, in a language very different, and with much less pathos. But our language only amplifies the expansion

of Husserl's phenomenology, which in its entirety proceeds from the *Logical Investigations*.

Going back to the things themselves signifies first of all not limiting oneself to words, which intend only an absent reality. Husserl recognizes this imperfection of the *signitive* aim in the equivocation that ineluctably slips into verbal thought. Equivocation, an apparently minor fault, which could be dispelled, or so it would appear, with a bit of clarity of thought, is now posited as inevitable, or as essential to a thought that limits itself to words. Equivocation is the child of the void or the rarified atmosphere of abstraction. But the recourse to intuitive thought, to *Erfüllung* [fulfillment] as opposed to *signitive* thought, does not put an end to equivocations, which threaten *every vision fixed on an object.* The return to the acts in which the intuitive presence of objects is unveiled is necessary in order to put an end to equivocation, that is, to abstraction and the partialness of the relationship with the object. *The true return to things is the return to the acts in which the intuitive presence of things is unveiled.* This is certainly the great shock given by the *Logical Investigations*—particularly since the first volume of this work, the *Prolegomena*, and all that is said in the second and third Investigations in favor of the object and its essence, blocked giving a psychologistic interpretation to this recourse to acts of consciousness. Thus, as early as in the *Logical Investigations* we find the affirmation of what appears to us to dominate the phenomenologists' way of proceeding: *access to the object is part of the object's being.*

It matters little that acts in which the object will appear in the guise of a simple transcendent pole continue to be described by Husserl as theoretical acts. What is distinctive to all these analyses is the regressive movement from the object to the concrete fulfilment of its constitution, in which sensibility will play the primary role.

It is evident that it was Kant who first worked in this way, when he deformalized the abstract idea of simultaneity (linking it to the idea of reciprocal action) and the idea of succession (subordinating it to physical causality). One idea calls forth another, which it does not contain analytically. But despite what some have said about Husserl's constitution, it will not play the role that it plays in Kant, as the common use of the term would suggest. For phenomenologists, the constitution of the object does not have as its goal the *justification of the use of concepts or categories*, or, as Kant calls it, their deduction. The Husserlian constitution is a reconstitution of the object's concrete being, a return to everything that has been forgotten in the attitude fixed on an object; the latter being not a thought but a technique. And this distinction between thought and technique, which reappears in the *Crisis*, was drawn very early by Husserl. Already according

to the *Prolegomena*[1] the scientist is not required to comprehend entirely what he does; he *acts* on his object. Theoretical thought is, in this sense, technique. In discovering the object, it ignores the paths that led to it, and that constitute the ontological locus of that object, the being of which it is but an abstraction. The phenomenological way consists in recovering these access routes, in recovering all the self-evidences traversed and forgotten. They make up the ontological weight of the object that seems to transcend them.

The being of an entity is the drama that—through remembrance and forgetfulness, constructions and ruins, falls and ascents—led to the abstraction, to the entity that claims to be outside this drama. In the next, post-Husserlian, stage of phenomenology, events charged with yet more pathos, and nothing less than the whole of European history, will be brought into this drama. The object of our theoretical life is but a fragment of a world that it dissimulates. The drama must be recovered by phenomenologists, for it determines the meaning of that abstract object, and because it is its truth.

Here the procedures of Husserlian phenomenology recall certain distinctions in Hegelian phenomenology: abstract thought—understanding—is that which aims at the in-itself. It must be made to relate to the absolute and to the concrete, to reason. Or was it, quite to the contrary, the Kantian distinction between the concept of the understanding and the idea of reason (the latter being separated from the sensible, but aiming for this very reason at a necessary illusion) that prepared the phenomenological notion of a thought that remains abstract despite its certitudes?

3. The laying bare, in the abstract object, of its ways of appearing, implies on the one hand that there is an essential correspondence between objects and the subjective acts necessary for their appearing. We shall speak of this now. On the other hand, phenomenology is characterized by the considerable and original role that sensibility plays for it in the work of truth; we will come back to this.

The notions examined by phenomenologists are no longer entities to which there are in principle a multiplicity of paths. The way a notion or an entity is accessible, the movements of the mind that conceive it, are not just (in the name of some arbitrary but coherent legislation) fixed for each notion. These movements performed to permit the manifestation of the notion to a mind—*are as it were the fundamental ontological event of that very notion.* The role that a given historical situation plays in Hegel, outside of which such and such idea or other is not even *thinkable,* is played in Husserl by the configuration of subjective procedures that for him is equally necessary and irreplaceable. The beloved, the implement,

or the work of art exist and are "substances," each in its own way. And the way cannot be separated from the "intentions" that sketch it out.

As early as in the *Logical Investigations* the revelation beings, in the form of logical entities, constitutes the very being of these entities. The being of beings lies in their truth: *the essence of beings is in the truth or the revelation of their essence.*

Thus, phenomenology as a revelation of beings is a *method of the revelation of their revelation.* Phenomenology is not just the fact of letting phenomena appear as they appear; this appearing, this phenomenology, is the essential event of being.

The being of objects being in their revelation, the very nature of the problems phenomenology deals with changes. It will no longer be a question of proofs of existence. *We are straightaway within being; we are ourselves part of its play;* we are partners in the revelation. It remains for us only to describe these modes of revelation which are modes of existence. Already ontology in the Heideggerian sense replaces metaphysics, for revelation is the principal event of being. Truth, as we would say today, is the very essence of being. Problems concerning reality consist in describing the way in which reality receives a meaning that clarifies or reveals it, or the way in which that meaning is given to it.

The fact that being is revelation, that the essence of being is its truth, is expressed in the notion of intentionality. Intentionality does not consist in affirming the correlation between subject and object. To affirm intentionality as a central theme of phenomenology is not even to conceive of the correlation between subject and object as a *kind* of intentionality. The representation of the object by a spectator whose gaze is fixed on it is realized at the price of manifold neglect and forgetting. Such a representation is abstract in the Hegelian sense. Because being consists in revealing itself, it is enacted as intentionality. The object, by contrast, is a way in which, par excellence, the being that reveals itself lets the history of its self-evidence be forgotten. The object, a correlate of theoretical consideration, produces the illusion that it signifies by itself. This is why, in Husserl, phenomenology begins with the object and Nature, the quintessence of objectivity, and then moves back toward their intentional implications.

4. It is characteristic of phenomenology's procedure to accord a primary place in constitution to sensibility. Even when Husserl affirms the ideality of concepts and of syntactic relations, he makes them rest on the sensible. There is the well-known text: "The idea of a pure intellect, interpreted as a faculty of pure thought (of categorial action), entirely cut off from a faculty of sensibility, could only have been conceived before the elementary analysis of knowledge."[2]

Sensibility is not considered as simple matter, crudely given, to which a spontaneous act of thought is applied, whether to give it form or to bring out relations from it by abstraction. It does not designate the element of receptivity in an objectifying spontaneity. It does not appear as a stammering thought that errs and falls into illusion, nor as the springboard for rational knowledge. The sensible is not an *Aufgabe* [task] in the neo-Kantian sense, nor an obscure thought in the Leibnizian sense. The new way of treating sensibility consists in conferring upon it, in its very obtuseness, and in its thickness, a signification and a wisdom of its own and a kind of intentionality. The senses make sense.

Every intellectual construction will receive from the sensible experience it claims to transcend the very style and dimension of its architecture. Sensibility does not simply record facts; it unfolds a world from which the highest works of spirit stem and from which they will not be able to escape. From the threads intertwined with the "content" of sensations are woven "forms" that—like space and time in Kant—mark every object that will subsequently be presented to thought.

A weave of intentionalities can be perceived in the hyletic data themselves. These intentionalities are not a simple repetition of the intentionality leading toward the non-ego, in which the localization, the weight of the ego, its *now*, are already forgotten. The relations that *Experience and Judgment* show us in the prepredicative sphere are not simple prefigurations. Sensibility marks the subjective character of the subject, the very movement back toward the point of departure of all receiving (in this sense, the principle), the movement back to the *here* and *now* from which everything happens for the first time. The *Urimpression* [primal impression] is the individuation of the subject. "The *Urimpression* is the absolute beginning, the primal source, that from which all the rest is engendered. It itself is not engendered, it does not arise through generation, but *genesi spontanea*, it is primal generation [*Urzeugung*] . . . it is primal creation [*Urschöpfung*]."[3]

Sensibility is thus intimately tied to time-consciousness: it is the present around which being is oriented. Time is not conceived as a form of the world, nor even as a form of psychological life, but as the articulation of subjectivity. Time is not a scansion of the interior life, but as it were the pattern of the primary and fundamental relations that tie the subject to being and cause it to arise out of the *now*. There is a dialectic of engagement and disengagement, through the execution of the *now*, in which Husserl discerns at once the passivity of the impression and the activity of the subject. But there, contrary to Hegel, a tearing away of the subject from any system and totality occurs, a retrogressive transcendence setting out from the immanence of the conscious state, a retro-cendence.

Time, the essential mark of sensibility in philosophy since Plato, becomes, as the existence of the subject, the source of all meaning. All the relations that structure consciousness as subjectivity are since Husserl described in terms of time as much as in terms of intentionality. The temporal structure—the mode of temporalization—of a notion replaces its definition.

Sensibility is thus not simply an amorphous content, a fact in the sense employed in empiricist psychology. It is "intentional" in that it *situates* all content, and is situated not in relation to objects but in relation *to itself*. It is the *zero* point of situation, the origin of the fact of being situated itself. Prepredicative or lived relations are established as initial attitudes taken from this zero point. The sensible is a modification of the *Urimpression*, which is the *here* and *now* par excellence. It is difficult not to see in this description of sensibility the sensible lived at the level of *one's own body* [*corps propre*] whose fundamental event lies in the feat of *self-adherence* [*se tenir*]—that is, of adhering to itself like the body that stands *itself* on its legs. This feat *coincides* with that of *orienting* oneself, that is, taking an attitude with regard to. . . . There is, here, a new characteristic of the subjective; the subjective does not retain the arbitrary meaning of the passive and the nonuniversal. It inaugurates the origin, the beginning, and, in a sense very different from cause or premise, the principle. This notion of sensibility is certainly caught sight of by Kant (perhaps it already presides over the transcendental aesthetic) when, in the famous article "Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren" ["What Is Orientation in Thinking?"], he attributes the possibility of orienting oneself in geometrical space to the distinction between the right hand and the left. He relates this distinction to *Gefühl*. *Gefühl*—sensibility—which implies an incarnate geometrician and not a simple reflection of that object-space that by convention is called the subject.

From the *Logical Investigations* and *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* to *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl's phenomenology inaugurates this new notion of sensibility and subjectivity. Historians are struck by the fact that the description of this sensible and passive consciousness is immediately overturned when it is put into relation with the activity of the subject of which it is supposed to be the fulfillment. In reality one may wonder whether this ambiguity is not essential to sensibility, whether the reference to the subject's activity does not confer upon sensibility precisely this role of subjectivity-origin. Indeed, it anticipates contemporary phenomenology's speculations on the role of the body in subjectivity. The ambiguity of passivity and activity in the description of sensibility captures in reality this new type of consciousness that will be

called one's own body, the body-subject. The subject as body and not as a simple parallel to the represented object.

It is to the degree that the concept of the subject is linked to sensibility, or that individuation coincides with the ambiguity of the *Urimpression*, in which activity and passivity meet, in which the *now* is prior to the historical manifold that it will constitute, that phenomenology preserves the person. The latter does not dissolve into the work constituted or conceived by it, but always remains transcendent, on the hither side. And in this sense I think that phenomenology is situated at the antipodes of the position maintained by Spinoza or Hegel, where thought absorbs the thinker, where the thinker is dissolved in the eternity of discourse. Because of sensibility, the "eternity" of ideas refers to a *head* that thinks, a subject that is temporally present. This is where the connection between being and time is effectuated in Husserl. Herein lies the profound kinship between phenomenology and Bergsonism.

The ego as *now* is not defined by anything other than itself; that is, it is not defined, it borders nothing, it remains outside of the system. This is why the entire analysis of prepredicative passivity is affirmed, in the last instance, as the activity of a subject. The latter is always a transcendence within immanence; it does not coincide with the heritage of its existence. The ego even precedes its sensible work. It is nowise a quality. Or, it is in a certain sense indeed a quality—but it is the possibility of apprehending itself once more in this quality. The dialectic of the sensible upon which Hegel's phenomenology of spirit opens does not apply to Husserl's sensible, which is absolutely subject. Universality is constituted from a subject that is not absorbed in it. To be sure this in no way indicates that the universal is a mode of existence wherein humanity is simply led astray. But it does indicate that when the universal is separated from the ego that constitutes it and that it does not exhaust, it is an abstract mode of existence.

In the final analysis, the phenomenological ego does not appear in the history it constitutes, but in consciousness. And thus it is torn from the totality. It can break with the past and is not, in this rupture with the past, in spite of itself, the continuator of that past, which a sociology or psychoanalysis will retrieve. It can break away, and consequently can speak.

5. Ancient metaphysics distinguished the appearance of phenomena from their signification. A notion was not measured by the meaning it had for consciousness; its relationship with consciousness was only one of the vicissitudes of its being. As if from the outside, one embraced both the notion and consciousness with a look respectful of the old logical norms derived from contemplative thought. Thus, for example, in Plato's

Parmenides, the *relation* between the absolute and the consciousness that thinks it compromises this very absolute, for an absolute in a relation is a self-contradictory notion. *In phenomenology the being of an entity is determined by its truth*—by its phosphorescence, by the meaning of the intentions that have access to it, and by the "intentional" history it concludes.

Henceforth one speaks of structures of being without referring right away to logical norms. Paradoxical notions are welcome, such as the much-discussed circle of understanding, in which the whole presupposes the parts but the parts refer to the whole; or the notion of the *Zeug* [gear] in which the structure of *in order to* is not bolstered by any category of substance; or the reference to nothingness in connection with anxiety, in violation of all the Eleatic principles; or, in Husserl himself, the essential incompleteness of the objective sphere, inexact concepts, and the ideality of essences.

Situations, the intention of which is not reducible to knowledge, can be posited as conditions of knowledge, without this positing taking on the appearance of an irrational decision. A fully phenomenological way of proceeding is to discover, for relations of knowledge, foundations that properly speaking lack the structure of knowledge, not because these foundations impose themselves without certainty, but because as anterior and conditioning they are more certain than certainty, more rational than reason.

To be sure, in Husserl's work itself, intentions that intend the object never rest on a nonobjectifying basis. But sensibility and passivity—the "hyletic data" jealously maintained at the basis of a consciousness whose movement toward the outside Husserl, better than anyone else, has shown—relieve his concept of subjectivity of the role of being the object's simple replica, and lead us to what lies on the hither side of the subject-object correlation and its privilege.

Similarly, the reduction to primordial egological knowledge, through which, in Husserl's fifth Cartesian Meditation, the constitution of intersubjectivity begins, does not end in self-evidence structured as objective knowledge (because of its monadological character). Yet this egological knowledge is a situation whose function it is to found objectivity.

Phenomenologists move with ease in these relations between the subject and being, which are not reducible to knowledge but which, nevertheless, as revelation of being, contain truth. The mode of being thus revealed is articulated in terms of the subjective intentions to which it reveals itself. Nothing is more characteristic of phenomenological reflection than the idea of intentional relations maintained with correlates that are not representations and do not exist as substances.

Here, too, Kant is among the precursors in his theory of the postulates of practical reason that makes use of "original *a priori* principles . . . that resist every possible intuition of theoretical reason."[4] There is truth without there being representation: "*Dieses Fürwahrhalten . . . dem Grade nach keinem Wissen nachsteht, ob es gleich der Art nach davon völlig verschieden ist.*" ["This assent . . . is in no degree inferior to cognition, even though it is wholly different in kind."][5]

6. The phenomenological reduction was a radical way of suspending the natural approach, which posits the world as an object, a radical struggle against the abstraction that the object epitomizes.

But it did not succeeded in putting the whole of the universe between parentheses on the side of the noemata. In much of contemporary phenomenological work, the reduction has become a laying out of realities, which for the natural attitude had been objects, in a perspective wherein they appear as *modes of apprehension.* The reduction becomes a *subjectivization* of being, an apperception of hitherto objects as *subjective* conditions of objects, origins of and principles for objects. We are now witnessing not merely an extraordinary subjectivization of the body and its physical organs; we discover the earth, the sky, the bridge, and the temple, as ways of access to being and as moments of subjectivity. As early as in the *Ideas,* sensory perception not only supplies a point of departure for scientific construction; it establishes the locus the constructed intelligible object will never leave. The object of science will have to be brought back to this locus in order for it to be grasped in its concrete being. It may be said that phenomenology lays claim to the irrevocable privilege of the world perceived by the concrete man who lives his life. It is surely this thesis from the *Ideas* that Heidegger takes up again, when he affirms that the place delineated by *building* contains geometrical space, which itself can contain nothing.

The subjectivization of what not so long ago were empirical realities does not consist in transforming them into *contents* of consciousness or into givens, but in discovering them as *containers* and *givers.* There are no definitively given qualities; every quality is a relation. Its intelligibility no longer depends on the reducibility of a notion to a principle or an end, or to the system in which it would have its place, but to its function in the transcendence of intentionality. Every given, even the earth, the body, and things, are moments of the work of *Sinngebung* [bestowal of meaning]. Whence a deformalization of objective, scientific reality. It is caught up in relations of the *object to its condition.* These relations are neither analytic, synthetic, nor dialectic, but intentional.

This new connection between givens and other givens that serve as their "subjective" condition gives the spectator who remains outside a new way of opening up concepts.

Discussion

LUCIEN GOLDMANN:[6] Monsieur Merlan, who unfortunately is not here, approaches the problem of the lived body and says, rightly, I believe, that it remains to be determined to what extent a phenomenologist can speak of that body in a phenomenological perspective. Because, after all, if we start out from consciousness, the body can be at best a privileged object, but remains an object. We know the body through our consciousness, in a way that shows perhaps certain differences, but still, as an object, just as we know lots of other objects. It holds a privileged place within the domain of objects, but it remains an object. And after all it must be constituted by the consciousness. It seems to me there is an important problem here. Monsieur Merlan poses it in saying that we have absolutely no right to put the body on the side of reality, to give it a reality equal to consciousness.

The second question I would like to address is that of the problem raised by two methods: the one I'm familiar with, and that of phenomenol- ogy. There is agreement on one, first point. When it is question of human beings, the important thing is the difference between appearance and essence. The point is always to move from the former to the latter. But the question is to know what procedure allows us to reach the essence. On this issue, I shall simply cite a passage from Marx and pose a problem. Marx, in a famous passage—this of course was written in the middle of the nineteenth century, at a time when blacks were either slaves in America or kings, tribal chiefs—says that if I see a black, I know only his appearance. He is abstract. (For Marx, empirical appearance is always abstract.) If I wish to know the essence of this black, one of the first things will be to find out whether he is a king or a slave. Now, to find that out, we must add many things that are not immediately given to consciousness. I have to know a whole series of sociological notions: the existence of tribes, the organization of America, where blacks came from, etc. And Marx continues as follows. I see a machine in front of me; the real essence of that machine is in its working, and it is also the fact of its being or not being capital. In order to know whether the working of this machine implies an exploitation of the workers, or whether, on the contrary, it is the instrument of a cooperative or a collectivity of another order, I have to know a host of elements not immediately given in the relation of consciousness with that machine. We are in total agreement on the fact that we must get from the appearance to the essence. I would even go so far as to say that our agreement goes further than that, and that we also concur that most of the categories that present themselves as purely objective must, in Marx's view, be subjectivized. That is what is at stake in his chapter on the fetishism of merchandise and economic phenomena.

The question is to know how we obtain a subjectivation that really and truly reaches the essence? Can we limit ourselves to consciousness, or must we go beyond it, to reach a conceptual knowledge of the interplay of material and economic realities? That is why the problem of the first step beyond consciousness in the lived body seems to me already the most important. From there, one can pose the following problem: Is the subject just me and my body, or is it a collectivity that acts?

LEVINAS: To be embodied is to be a *subject* in a way that differs from the subjectivity of the idealist analyses, and it is not just to have an object of an unusual structure, or to relate to it in a novel way.

GOLDMANN: I was not saying that is the way things are in themselves; I was speaking in favor of a phenomenological perspective. In what you have just said, it's obvious that the body is a privileged object. But if you go at it from the point of view of consciousness: I myself feel my hand, I feel myself walking. It is always to my consciousness that my body presents itself. That's what Monsieur Merlan says, and I think he's right. The body presents itself in a way entirely different from that lamp, I have no problem with that. That would thus be, to speak phenomenologically, a different way of constitution. But it is still a constitution by consciousness. On that score, I think Monsieur Merlan is right.

LEVINAS: Kant's article on "Orientation in Thought" already shows how the difference between left and right plays a role in constituting, and not just constituted, thought. Why do you think that phenomenology is exclusively a reflection on an empty consciousness, as if all there were left for analysis was to find like-objects? Consciousness is not just that indifferent apperception; it includes a prepredicative life, "torsions upon itself," that cannot always be reduced to the "subject-object" structure. That is the new level of being discovered by phenomenology. Until then, spiritualism's concern consisted in showing a consciousness stretches beyond the body; since phenomenology, one seeks to show that consciousness goes beyond the "simply thought" toward the body. The primordial experience of incarnation is not an experience of the objectifying type.

GOLDMANN: But what type is it?

LEVINAS: The type of ability through the body, for example, that which Merleau-Ponty would call the "I can."

STEVEN STRASSER:[7] I think the question that arises is this. To what extent, historically speaking in which phase, can we still conceive of Husserl's philosophy as a philosophy of consciousness in the Cartesian sense? I think this is an important question.

LEVINAS: In Husserl, when he conducts a prepredicative analysis, and abruptly affirms that all that prepredicative work is still the work of a subject, one is tempted to think of the Cartesian notion of consciousness

again; yet it is the simultaneity of these two affirmations that is the new Husserlian category of sensibility, the simultaneity of that activity and that passivity. It has the air of the purely verbal, since one associates two terms that contradict one another, but it is the experience of the body that furnishes its concrete accomplishment. That is what I was trying just now to show. In any case, there is also the fact that that's the direction phenomenology has taken, and it seems to be the prolongation of all the analyses of sensibility to which Husserl clings so obstinately, and are so weighty to him.

As for Monsieur Goldmann's second question, phenomenology has nothing to do with seeking the essence in the abstract. When I said that in Husserl it is the accesses to reality that constitute that reality, I was talking about the reality we know beforehand in a very concrete way, in that direct attitude toward the object.

The abstraction to be surmounted is the one that remains once you have said everything about it that its essence seemed to contain in the way of concreteness when you studied it directly.

GOLDMANN: The problem is the "directly." I don't know directly the organization of America in the case of blacks.

LEVINAS: But that is a matter of sociology. I do not at all believe that phenomenology wants to study the essences of the real in deriding the sciences. Phenomenology is not something that is done at first glance. Phenomenology has no intention of taking the place of science; it has never made that preposterous claim.

But it is in the modes of access to realities—even the most concrete ones—that Husserl sees the ultimate concretization, the ontological meaning of reality.

ALPHONSE DE WAEHLENS:[8] The few remarks I'd like to make are in no sense an objection. On the contrary, I feel in agreement with everything you said, and that is what makes it all the more surprising to me that you spoke, in connection with the doctrines you characterized, about idealism. Not that I would ask you to simply turn around and speak, without further ado, about realism. What seems to me to result from what you have said, on the contrary, is not really a question of idealism *or* realism. But if in fact, as I believe you have shown, the essence of phenomenology is to have brought about a renewal of all the philosophical problems, then it seems to me that you have to show that it succeeds in overcoming that idealism-realism dualism, which is considered to be fundamental in classical philosophy. Naturally that doesn't mean that everything in dualism is false. Maybe it means that to some degree it is possible to use realist or idealist language, either one, in presenting phenomenology. But maybe it is better to state one's

preference, and if you didn't do that expressly, let me ask you why, after all, if a preference must be given—which seems to me not to be the case—I don't know that you did that, maybe it was just incidental or accidental, but if you have a preference, I'd like to know why it should go in the direction of an idealist interpretation, which to me did not seem absolutely confirmed by your talk.

LEVINAS: My response will be very brief. I did talk about idealism right at the beginning, when I said phenomenology is an idealism without reason. That's just a convenient way of putting it. The question of knowing if the outside world exists or not has no meaning in phenomenology. The refutation of idealism is known: Kant wrote it. In Husserl I believe it goes exactly the same way. But Husserl continues to speak about idealism anyway. He didn't know it would greatly impede his students. In what sense does he speak about it? The meaning of the world is permeable to thought, as if it came from thought. But above all the subject is maintained with a special dignity. In no way is the subject involved with the reality it constitutes. It doesn't identify with its legacy or its work. It always stays behind. And it is for this reason that the subject can always speak: it is the possibility of rupture. What is speech, if not the power of detachment, in the sense in which Constant's "Adolphe" could not break off. If the subject didn't have this possibility of standing away from everything that happens to it, it would disappear into a totalitarianism. That's the sense in which idealism is valid in phenomenology—in the moral sense of the term.

THE REVEREND FATHER HERMAN L. VAN BREDA:[9] I would like to respond to a remark made by Monsieur Lucien Goldmann. I think that in the questions he asks he does not take sufficiently into account Husserl's fundamental methodological attitude. Husserl posits as a principle that one must begin with what is given such as it is given. Thereafter it will be one of phenomenology's primordial tasks to describe what is given, such as it is given. To make this given intelligible, Husserl will use neither a dialectic method nor even a deductive one. Phenomenological explicitation will be obtained, he believes, by an intentional analysis, that is, by a dis-implication of hidden or forgotten meanings contained in the datum under consideration. Even when in fact using a method reminiscent of Kantian-style research (the isolation of the conditions of possibility, for example), or containing reasoning of a deductive nature, he presents them in good faith as analyses, and he elaborates them in the reflective attitude and by means of description.

So it is with his analyses of the one's own body. To the extent that that given, specifically "one's own" in character, is studied, it is be studied through reflection on the intuitive givens that reveal it to us. And that

study is carried out by subjecting these data to an intentional analysis. In a final step, that analysis is integrated into intersubjective philosophical knowledge by a meticulous description of what reflection yields.

I also want to point out to Monsieur Goldmann that Husserl's already published works contain a whole series of concrete analyses of one's own body (*Ideen* II). The studies of Monsieur Merleau-Ponty and Monsieur de Waehlens, to mention only those two, offer for their part equally a highly elaborated phenomenology dedicated to the same theme.

GOLDMANN: I think there is a misunderstanding. You used terms such as "starting out from consciousness," "object-body," and "constitution of one's own body." Monsieur Merlan also says that, for the phenomenologist, one's own body is an object constituted by consciousness and as such, it falls back into the series of other objects. I only ask a question of principle, which is the following: Do we begin—I don't know a thing about it, I am asking you—from man as a first point of departure as consciousness and body, or do we start out from consciousness? For in the latter case, one's own body can no longer have any privilege except within the objects of consciousness. It seems to me that Levinas's position is not identical with van Breda's. That's my question.

LEVINAS: I don't want to make a pronouncement on Husserl's position on the basis of the unpublished manuscripts. I would like to pose a question on the level of principles. By what right do we identify the idea of "consciousness of" with the consciousness of a disembodied subject? Does my realization of the movement of my hand, with all the weight of my body, with all the kinetic consciousness my hand carries with it, present the same structure as the consciousness of the *ego–cogito–cogitatum*? Perhaps that structure "ego–cogito–cogitatum" is destroyed when we are dealing with this experience, which is just as legitimate, just as conscious as the Cartesian consciousness.

JEAN WAHL:[10] What I wanted to say is that we are, despite appearances, in the presence of a discussion between a classical mode of thought and a new mode of thought. I think Monsieur Goldmann belongs to the classical one. That is, there is on the one side the subject, and as soon as there is the "I," everything is object. I believe the phenomenologist thinks that there are many modes of consciousness. There is the mode of consciousness of the "I" as thinking subject. But when I feel a pain, there is a mode of consciousness that is different. Notice that I said Goldmann belongs to a classical mode of thought; but I, too, belong to a classical mode of thought, because the same Descartes with whom I can connect the thought of Goldmann has very well said: "I feel, I want, etc., is still I think." Thus it is before two interpretations of Descartes

that we find ourselves. And I think phenomenology, here, just offers us a larger spectrum of modes of immediate consciousness.

EUGÈNE MINKOWSKI:[11] First I would like to tell Monsieur Levinas how much I appreciated his lecture. However much one uses, or at least believes one is using, the "phenomenological technique," it is always instructive to hear a substantial exposition of the underlying principles. Certain points that were obscure become much less so in those circumstances. Yet some difficulties remain. They come from the terms used, which, often with multiple meanings because they are used at different levels or in different disciplines, may cause confusion. We don't always succeed in getting away from the current meaning of these terms in order to give them the one they have in phenomenology and in Husserl himself. It's easy to fall back into the first meaning. That is probably a general difficulty in philosophy. We have already touched on the word "consciousness" in connection with Monsieur Kuypers's lecture, and we referred to Henri Bergson's immediate givens of consciousness as well. Of course I'm not asking for a definition of consciousness, for the simple reason that I would be hard put to give one. In listening to Monsieur Levinas, it is especially the word "subject," and even more so "subjective" and "subjectivity"—I perceive a nuance between "subjective" and "subjectivity," and it seems to me to have a certain importance—especially where they are set in relationship to the phenomenon of time, these terms seem to me to require further exploration. The "subjective" easily evokes the image of something restrictive (as in "it is just subjective") and this is what I wanted to ask Monsieur Levinas if he could give me some clarification.

LEVINAS: Why would the subject as point of departure be restrictive? To return to the subject is to return to the principle and not to the arbitrary. I did not understand very well why you would give a restrictive sense to subjectivity as Husserl defines it, by attributing to the subject the sense of principle, of "that on the basis of which," of "that where it begins."

STRASSER: Perhaps it is necessary to make the question more precise and to define consciousness.

MINKOWSKI: I am not asking for a definition of consciousness; besides, you shouldn't ask your neighbor for something you yourself can't give. I'm only saying that in hearing the word "subjective"—and that's why I would have liked you to give me a definition from Husserl—for me all the same it has a restrictive meaning, in the sense that it is limited to my subject. Perhaps in the context of Husserl it is different, and that's the question I am asking you.

LEVINAS: It's not a question of words. What offends you in the word "subjective"? The fact that it means mine and not others'. It is

that egotistic element of the word "subjective" that bothers us. This isn't Husserl, but I don't think the subject is the last word either. But neither do I think the last word is the system into which the subject enters. The last word is the other person. And that's where we can get beyond what is offensive in the word "subject." I think that through the phenomenology of the other person—perhaps not quite in the sense in which it is carried out presently—there is a way to get outside the subject. What I have against the present way is that the other person is presented as a kinsman, a collaborator, or someone with whom I come to terms, that is, whose words I can interpret and who can interpret mine. What I have not seen is the other person whose alterity would consist in being "more" than me. Hence the other person whom I would meet in my subordination to him or her. The other is the other of moral consciousness, but moral consciousness has gotten very bad press in phenomenology since Heidegger. If the moral means that situation in which the other is more than me, in which, consequently, there is no pure and simple reciprocity in my relation with the other, I arrive at a notion in which "I," the subject, am founded on something that is not me, that is outside. And perhaps that is where everything that is offensive in the notion of subject will be overcome. But all this is not in Husserl's phenomenology.

RUDOLF BOEHM:[12] The question I want to ask is how Husserl would consider the account you have just given of a number of ideas indubitably Husserlian and indubitably very important, which have known a very fruitful development in current phenomenology, particularly in France.

Is it not the case that the elements you bring together in your account come almost entirely from that descriptive part of the *Crisis* that could be designated as phenomenology of the lifeworld? Now for Husserl himself, that entire description, even in the *Crisis*, served only as a motivation for the properly phenomenological method, that of the reduction. Perhaps it is no accident that the notion of reduction only appears at the very end of your paper, and in the formulation you gave it: "Basically, the reduction is the entirety of what I have just given an account of."[13] Thus it seems strange that a phenomenological philosophy should have emerged from Husserl's work, from the motivations Husserl himself conceived of for phenomenological philosophy. A very strange movement: what for Husserl was motivation for his transcendental philosophy became itself philosophy, so to speak.

On the subject, I would also like to ask Father van Breda a question. He stressed the descriptive character of Husserlian phenomenology. I

ask the following question: Can the phenomenological reduction itself be determined as a descriptive operation? Can one describe it that way?

According to Husserl—this is a different idea, but one that moves in the same direction—only the reduction allows us to discover what is a phenomenon. In this sense, Husserl admits that what is immediately given is not the phenomenon, without further ado, but that it transforms itself into the phenomenon (these are his own words) thanks to the operation of the phenomenological reduction. Therefore, in this sense—and Husserl asked himself about the same subject—the pure phenomenal givens that are the object of phenomenology are the fruit of an operation carried out by phenomenology and, Husserl adds, at a very late moment in the history of humanity, after the long developments of the work of the *Crisis*, with which you are all familiar. The Husserlian idea is that it is only thanks to a very special operation of the phenomenologist that the phenomena are discovered. This is similar to Heidegger's notion of the phenomenon in *Sein und Zeit*, in which he says that the "phenomenon," in the phenomenological sense, is at bottom that which does not manifest itself, does not show itself. Is this Husserlian idea compatible with an interpretation that would say that for Husserl being and appearing are identified without residue?

LEVINAS: I do not think the reduction is the most powerful idea, nor the richest in influence. In France, surely not. Husserl always complained that no one starts with the reduction. This seems to be the great failing of Heidegger too. The reduction, through the motivations that make it necessary and that occupy such an ample place in the Master's work, has always seemed to his most eminent disciples as an overly narrow methodism. But it has made possible the discovery of the intentional implications on the basis of which the abstract object regains a concrete meaning.

6

The Ruin of Representation

To meet a man is to be kept awake by an enigma. Upon meeting Husserl the enigma was always that of his work. Despite the relative simplicity of his welcome and the warmth found in his home, it was always Phenomenology one met in Husserl. These memories date back to my youth, when Husserl appeared already clothed in his myth; they contain only two semesters of personal contact. Discounting my respectful timidity, my excitement and the penchant of a twenty-year-old for mythology, I still believe that rarely has a man identified himself more with his work and separated this work more from himself. Referring no doubt to piles of his unpublished manuscripts slumbering in the bottom of some drawer and devoted to the phenomenology of retention, of the sensible or of the ego, he would say very simply: "*Wir haben schon darüber ganze Wissenschaften*" ["We already have whole sciences about that"]. And he sounded as if he had acquired rather than created these still unknown sciences. Even in private Husserl spoke of his own work only in the very terms of that work. It was a phenomenology of phenomenology, and, when I knew him, almost always a monologue one dared not interrupt. And so, for me, the debt to the man is inseparable from the debt to his work.[1]

Of a rather serious but affable demeanor, faultless in his personal appearance though oblivious to externalities, distant but not haughty, a little uncertain in his certainties, the man reinforced the physiognomy of the work: full of rigor yet open, audacious and ceaselessly recommencing like a permanent revolution; embracing forms one would have liked, in those days, to be less classical and didactic, and a language one would have preferred to be even less monotonous. A work whose truly new accents will never reverberate to any but the sensitive or the practiced ear, but—obligatorily—alert.

By contrast, Heidegger's philosophy presented itself brilliantly from the first. The confrontation of these two philosophies provided an important topic of meditation and discussion in Freiburg to a breed of students already dying out—those schooled by Husserl before knowing Heidegger.

Eugene Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe were among them. For those who arrived with Heidegger in the winter of 1928–29, Husserl, who had been retired since the end of the 1928–29 winter semester and had taught part-time during the transitional semester of the summer of 1928, was but a figure from the past. It is through the slant of these discussions that I myself entered phenomenology and was formed in its discipline. I shall attempt, in these pages, to evoke the themes which seemed to me decisive in Husserl's thought, from the angle in which they appeared in those bygone years. Do we retain in a philosophy that leaves its mark on us the truths of an "absolute knowledge," or certain gestures and "vocal inflections" that form for us the face of an interlocutor, necessary to all discourse, even interior?

I

Phenomenology is intentionality. What does this mean? The refusal of a sensationalism that identified consciousness with sensations-things? To be sure. But the sensible plays an important role in phenomenology and intentionality rehabilitates the sensible. A necessary correlation between subject and object? No doubt. But there was protest against the idea of a subject separated from its object before Husserl. If intentionality meant no more than that consciousness "bursts forth" toward an object, and that we are immediately in the presence of things, there would never have been phenomenology.

Instead we would possess a theory of knowledge for the naive life of representation that encounters permanent essences, snatched from every horizon—in this sense abstract—and offered in a present in which they are self-sufficient. Life's present is precisely an unsuspected but primordial form of abstraction, in which beings behave as if this were their beginning. Re-presentation deals with beings as if they were entirely self-supporting, as if they were substances. It has the power to disinterest itself—be it only for an instant, the instant of representation—from the condition of these beings. It triumphs over the vertigo of the infinite conditioning that true thought, and thought that is true, opens up in these beings. Without traversing the infinite series of the past to which my today nonetheless refers, I embrace this day, in all of its reality, and derive my very being from these fleeting moments. Kant, in showing that understanding can pursue its theoretical work without satisfying reason, has already brought to light the eternal essence of this "empirical reasoning" that dispenses with unconditioned principles.

Phenomenology, like all philosophy, teaches that *immediate* presence to things does not yet comprise the meaning of things, and consequently does not replace truth. But thanks to the way Husserl leads us to go beyond the immediate, we now possess new possibilities of philosophizing. Above all, Husserl contributes the idea of an analysis of intention capable of teaching us more about being (which these intentions were only supposed to grasp or reflect) than could a thinking that *entering* into these intentions. It is as if the fundamental ontological event, already lost in a grasped or reflected object, were more objective than objectivity—a transcendental movement. The renewal of the very concept of the *transcendental* that recourse to the term "constitution" may obfuscate, appears to us to be an essential contribution of phenomenology. Whence, at the level of what may be called "philosophical reasoning," a new way of moving from one idea to another. Whence a modification of the very concept of philosophy, which was identified with the absorption of every "Other" by the "Same," or with the deduction of every "Other" from the "Same" (that is, in the radical sense of the term, with idealism). Henceforth, a *relation* between the Same and the Other does not come to invert the philosophical eros. Lastly, in a more general way: a new style in philosophy arises. It has not become a rigorous science as a body of universally compelling doctrines. But phenomenology has inaugurated an analysis of consciousness in which the greatest care is devoted to structure, the way one movement of the soul is integrated into another, and the way it rests and overlaps and is embedded in the whole of a phenomenon. One can no longer analyze by enumerating the ingredients of a state of soul. The points of reference of these "formulas of structure" certainly depend on the ultimate presuppositions of the doctrine. But a new spirit of rigor has been established; penetration is not a question of touching the subtle or the infinitely small in the soul, but in not leaving these elements or their developments without structure. These are the points that seem to me essential to all post-Husserlian thought, and they constitute the benefit that I, for my small part, have derived from a long acquaintance with Husserl's works. They have influenced thought since the *Logical Investigations*, which defines phenomenology so badly, but proves it so well, for it does so as one proves movement—by walking.

II

Why would the logic that establishes the laws of ideas governing the empty forms of "thought" require, as its foundation, a description of the

procedures of intentional thought? This exegetical question became all the more disturbing as Husserl professed the ideality of logical forms and the impossibility of merging them with the "real contents" of consciousness, with the *acts* of representation or judgment, let alone with "primary contents" or sensations. This question arose before the publication of the *Ideas* worried an entire generation of disciples by its explicit formulation of a transcendental idealism, apparently maintained against the realism of formal and material essences. The latters' transcendence nevertheless incontestably constitutes the great theme of all Husserl's work, to which one rallied with the publication of the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*, the most convincing volume of philosophical literature.

Why this return to the description of consciousness? Would it be "interesting" or "instructive" to know, besides the ideal essences, the subjective acts that grasp them? But in what way would this supplementary and interesting investigation enable one to avoid certain confusions or ambiguities in pure logic, a science of mathematical nature, and not at all psychological? Among these confusions Husserl cites psychologism, as if since overthrown by the *Prolegomena* it would still justify new efforts. To be sure, with the introduction to the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl invokes the need to project the clarity of a theory of knowledge—which would also be a philosophical clarity—upon the notions of pure logic. The phenomenology of consciousness would discover "the sources whence the basic concepts and ideal laws of *pure* logic spring, and whither they must be led back, in order to give them the *clarity and distinctness* necessary to pure logic at the level of the theory of knowledge.[2] But the theory and critique of knowledge, in the sense that these disciplines have taken on since Kant, do determine the sources of scientific activity, and the limits of the legitimate usage of reason everywhere. It is not for them to clarify the concepts that science itself uses, nor in any case to revise the concepts of pure logic, which has been constituted in its perfection since Aristotle. The novelty of Husserl's phenomenology, in its gnoseological claims, lies in its having recourse to consciousness in order to clarify the concepts of a science and to preserve them against the inevitable ambiguities with which they would be burdened in a thought that, in the natural attitude, remains fixed on objects. "It is indispensable to the progress of this research" (of pure logic).[3] Finally, "the fact that the *in itself* of the object can be represented and, in knowledge, seized, that is, in the end become subjective,"[4] would strictly speaking be problematic in a philosophy that posits the subject as an imminent sphere, closed in itself. This problem is resolved beforehand with the idea of the intentionality of consciousness, since the presence of the subject to transcendent things is the very definition of consciousness.

But perhaps all the interest of the announced investigation, instead of having to do with the subject-object correlation that would define intentionality, follows from another dynamism animating intentionality. Its true enigma would consist not in the presence to things, but in the new meaning that intentionality permits being given to this presence.

If the analysis of consciousness is necessary for the elucidation of objects, it is because the intention directed to them does not grasp their meaning, but only an abstraction in an inevitable misunderstanding; it is because the intention in its "bursting forth toward the object" is also an ignorance and a failure to recognize the meaning of that object, since it is a forgetting of everything that intention only contains implicitly and that consciousness sees without seeing. Such is the answer to the difficulty I called to mind a moment ago. It is the answer Husserl gives in paragraph 20 of the *Cartesian Meditations*, in characterizing the originality of intentional analysis. "Its original operation" he says, "is to unveil the potentialities 'implied' in the actualities (actual states) of consciousness. And thus is realized, from the noematic point of view, the explication, the definition and the eventual elucidation of what is 'meant' by consciousness; that is, its objective sense."[5]

Intentionality thus designates a relation with the object, but a relation essentially bearing within itself an implicit meaning. Presence to things implies another presence that is unaware of itself, other horizons correlative to these implicit intentions, which the most attentive and scrupulous consideration of the given object in the naive attitude could not discover. "Every cogito as consciousness, is, in a very broad sense 'the meaning' of the thing it intends, but that 'meaning' *exceeds*, at each instant, that which at that very instant, is given as 'explicitly intended.' It exceeds it, that is, it is laden with a 'more' that stretches beyond. . . . *This exceeding of the intention in the intention itself*, which is inherent in all consciousness, must be considered as essential [*Wesensmoment*] to that consciousness."[6] "The fact that the structure of all intentionality implies a 'horizon' [*die Horizontstrucktur*] prescribes an absolutely new method to phenomenological analysis and description."[7]

The classical conception of the relationship between subject and object is a presence of the object and a presence near to the object. The relationship is understood in such a way that, in it, the present exhausts the being of the subject and of the object. The object is at every instant exactly what the subject currently thinks it to be. In other words, the subject-object relation is entirely conscious. Despite the time it may last, this relation eternally recommences the transparent and actual present and remains a re-presentation in the etymological sense of the word.

By contrast, intentionality bears within itself the innumerable horizons of its implications and thinks of infinitely more "things" than of the object upon which it is fixed. To affirm intentionality is to perceive thought as tied to the implicit, into which it does not accidentally fall, but in which it maintains itself by essence. Thus thought is no longer either a pure present or a pure representation. This discovery of the implicit, which is not a simple "deficiency" of or "fall" from the explicit, appears as a monstrosity or a marvel in a history of ideas in which the concept of actuality coincided with the absolute waking state, with the lucidity of the intellect. That this thought finds itself tributary to an anonymous and obscure life, to forgotten landscapes that must be restored to the very object that consciousness believes it fully holds, is incontestably akin to the modern conceptions of the unconscious and the depths. But it results not just in a new psychology. A new ontology begins: being is posited not only as correlative to a thought, but as already founding the very thought that nonetheless constitutes it.

We will return to this. Let us note for the moment that the conditioning of conscious actuality in potentiality compromises the sovereignty of representation much more radically than does the discovery in the life of feeling of a specific intentionality, irreducible to theoretical intentionality, and more radically than the affirmation of an active engagement in the world prior to contemplation. Husserl puts into question the sovereignty of representation with respect to the structures of pure logic, the pure forms of the "something in general," in which no feeling plays a role and where nothing presents itself to the will; and yet these structures and forms reveal their truth only when set back into their horizon. It is not an irrationalism of feeling or will that unsettles the concept of representation. A thought that forgets the implications of thought, which are invisible prior to reflection on this thought, *operates* on objects instead of thinking them. The phenomenological reduction stops the *operation* in order to get back to the truth, to show represented beings in their transcendental emergence.

The idea of a necessary implication that is absolutely imperceptible to the subject directed on the object, only discovered *after the fact* upon reflection, thus not produced in the present, that is, produced *unbeknownst to me*, puts an end to the ideal of representation and the subject's sovereignty, as well as to the idealism according to which nothing could enter into me surreptitiously. A deep-seated *passion* is thus revealed in thought. A passion which no longer has anything in common with the passivity of sensation, of the given—which was the starting point for empiricism and realism. Husserlian phenomenology has taught us neither to project states of consciousness into being, nor still less to

reduce objective structures to states of consciousness, but to have recourse to a "subjective" field "more objective than all objectivity." It discovered this new field. The pure ego is a "transcendence in immanence," itself somehow constituted in terms of this domain where the essential game is played.

III

To exceed the intention in the intention itself, to think more than one thinks, would be an absurdity if this exceeding of thought by thought were a movement of the same nature as that of representation, if the "potential" were only a diminished or slack form of the "actual" (or it would be the banality of degrees of consciousness). What Husserl illustrates through his concrete analyses is that the thought that goes toward its object envelopes thoughts that open onto noematic horizons, which already *support* the subject in its movement toward the object. Consequently, they bolster it in its work as a subject; *they play a transcendental role.* Sensibility and sensible qualities are not the stuff of which the categorial form or ideal essence is made, but the situation in which the subject already places itself in order to accomplish a categorial intention. My body is not only a perceived object, but a perceiving subject; the earth is not the base on which things appear, but the condition that the subject requires for their perception. The horizon implied in intentionality is thus not the still vaguely thought context of the object, but the *situation* of the subject. A subject in *situation* or, as Heidegger will say, in the world, is announced by this essential potentiality of an intention. The presence to things that intentionality expresses is a transcendence already having something like a history in the world it is only just entering. If Husserl reclaims full light on these implications he does so only in reflection. For Husserl, being does not reveal its truth in History rather than in consciousness, but it is no longer the sovereign consciousness of representation that grasps this truth.

The way is open for the philosophies of existence, which can leave the field of the pathetic and the religious, to which they hitherto confined themselves. The way is open for all Husserl's analyses of the sensible and the prepredictive that he so obstinately preferred, going back to the *Urimpression*, which is at once primary subject and primary object, giver and given. The way is open for the philosophy of the lived body, in which intentionality reveals its true nature, for its movement toward the represented is rooted there in all the implicit—nonrepresented—horizons of incarnate existence. Incarnate existence draws its being from

those horizons, which, nonetheless, in a certain sense, it constitutes (since it becomes conscious of them)—as if here constituted being conditioned its own constitution. This is a paradoxical structure, which Heidegger will make evident and put to work everywhere. He will show that subjectivity, the very dimension of the subjective, is as it were brought about by being, in order that what is inscribed in the revelation of being, in the splendor of the "*physis*" in which being is in truth, may be accomplished.

The presence near to things referring to initially and most frequently unsuspected horizons—horizons that nonetheless guide that very presence—indeed also announces the philosophy of being in Heidegger's sense. All thought that directs itself to *a being* already stands within the being of that being (which Heidegger shows to be irreducible to a being), as within the horizon and site that commands all position-taking, the light of a landscape, already guiding the initiative of the subject who wills, works, or judges. All Heidegger's work consists in opening and exploring this dimension, unknown in the history of ideas, to which he nonetheless gives the most well-known name of *Sein* [Being]. In relation to the most traditional model of objectivity, it is a subjective field—but subjectivism "more objective than all objectivity."

Transcendental activity is neither the fact of reflecting a content, nor the production of a conceived being. The constitution of the object is already sheltered by a prepredicative "world" that the subject nonetheless constitutes. Conversely, the sojourn in a world is only conceivable as the spontaneity of a constituting subject, failing which this sojourn would have been the simple belonging of a part to a whole, and the subject a simple product of a ground. The wavering between the disengagement of transcendental idealism and the engagement in a world, for which Husserl was reproached, is not his weakness but his strength. This simultaneity of freedom and belonging—without either of these terms being sacrificed—is perhaps *Sinngebung* itself, the act of bestowing a meaning that runs through and sustains the whole of being. In any case, transcendental activity receives this new orientation in phenomenology. The world is not only constituted but also constituting. The subject is no longer pure subject; the object no longer pure object. The phenomenon is at once what is revealed and what reveals, being and access to being. Without bringing to light what reveals—the phenomenon as access—what is revealed—being—remains an abstraction. The new accent and the brilliance of certain phenomenological analyses—this impression they give of deformalizing notions and things—derives from this double perspective within which entities are placed. Objects are uprooted from their dull fixity to sparkle in the play of rays that come and go between the giver and the given. In this coming and going man constitutes the

world to which he already belongs. The analysis resembles a harping upon an eternal tautology: space presupposes space, that is, represented space presupposes a certain implantation in space, which in turn is only possible as the *project* of space. In this apparent tautology the essence—the being of the entity—shines forth. Space becomes the experience of space. It is no longer separated from its revelation, from its truth, in which it is no longer merely prolonged, but is rather fulfilled. Phenomenology itself is this reversal in which being creates the act that projects it; in which the present of the act—or its actuality—turns into the past, but in which the being of the object is at once *perfected* in the attitude that is taken with respect to it and in which the anteriority of being is again placed in a future. Phenomenology is itself this reversal in which human behavior is interpreted as original experience and not as the fruit of an experience. It leads us outside the subject-object categories and topples the sovereignty of representation. Subject and object are only the poles of this intentional life. The phenomenological reduction has never seemed to me to justify itself by the apodicticity of the imminent sphere, but by the opening of this play of intentionality, by the renouncing of the fixed object that is the simple result of and the dissimulation of this play. Intentionality means that all consciousness is consciousness of something, but above all that *every object calls forth and as it were gives rise to the consciousness through which its being shines and, in doing so, appears.*

Sensuous experience is privileged, because within it that ambiguity of constitution, whereby the noema conditions and shelters the noesis that constitutes it, is played out. There is the same predilection in phenomenology for the cultural attributes that thought constitutes, but from which it is already nourished in constitution. The cultural world, in appearance a latecomer but the very being of which consists in bestowing meaning, sustains, in phenomenological analyses, all that seems simply contained and given in things and notions.

The notions that up until this point remained on the level of the object from now on form a series whose terms are not connected to one another either analytically or synthetically. They do not mutually complete one another like the pieces of a puzzle, but condition one another transcendentally. The connection between the situation and the object that refers to that situation, as well as the link between the phenomena that constitute the unity of a situation (revealed in reflexive description), are as necessary as the connections of deduction. Phenomenology brings them together despite their strictly objective isolation. It produces rapprochements that until then only poets and prophets allowed themselves, through metaphor and "vision," and accumulated by languages in their etymologies. Earth and sky, hand and tool, body and other, condition

knowledge and being in an a priori way. Failure to recognize this conditioning leads to the production of abstractions, equivocations, and gaps in thought. It is perhaps through this caveat directed against clear thought, forgetful of its constituent horizons, that Husserl's work was most immediately useful to all theoreticians, particularly to all those who imagine they spiritualize theological, moral, or political thought by their failure to recognize the concrete and in a sense carnal conditions from which the ostensibly purer notions derive their true meaning.

IV

But the fact that thought is essentially implicit, that the ideal of a total actuality can only come from an abstract view, abstracted from thought itself, marks, perhaps, the end of an entire philosophical orientation. Philosophy arose in opposition to opinion, and led to wisdom as the moment of full self-possession in which nothing foreign or other any longer comes to limit the glorious identification of the Same in thought. Advancing toward the truth consisted in discovering a totality in which the diverse found itself identical again, that is, deducible on the same level, or on the level of the Same. This explains the importance of deduction that derived the totality from partial experience (whether this deduction were analytical, mechanical, or dialectical). The thought that made explicit what was implicit in the *represented* was in principle this power of total actualization, the pure act itself.

And so it is that thought directed upon the object in all the sincerity of its intention does not touch being in its naive sincerity; it thinks more than it thinks and otherwise than it thinks at the moment and, in this sense, is itself not immanent, even if by its look it holds the object it intends "in flesh and blood"! We are beyond idealism and realism, since being is neither inside nor outside thought, but thought itself is outside itself. A second act and second thoughts are necessary in order to consider hidden horizons that are no longer the context of this object, but the transcendental givers of its meaning. More than the instant or the eternity of self-evidence is necessary to hold the world and truth.

That Husserl himself conceived these second thoughts in the form of objectifying and completely actual acts of reflection (in virtue of what privilege?) may not have been decisive for the influence his work has had. This life that bestows meaning may reveal itself otherwise, and presuppose for its revelation relations between the Same and the Other that are no longer objectification, but society. The condition of truth may be sought

in ethics. Is it only by chance that Husserl had the idea of philosophy as teamwork?

To put an end to the conception that thought and the subject-object relation are coextensive, is to offer a glimpse of a relationship with the other that is neither an intolerable limitation of the thinker, nor a simple absorption of this other into an ego, in the form of a content. Where all *Sinngebung* was the work of a sovereign ego, the other could in fact only be absorbed in a representation. But in a phenomenology where the activity of totalizing and totalitarian representation is already exceeded in its own intention, where representation already finds itself placed within horizons that it somehow had not willed, but with which it cannot dispense, an ethical *Sinngebung* becomes possible, that is, a *Sinngebung* essentially respectful of the Other. In Husserl himself, in the constitution of intersubjectivity, undertaken on the basis of objectifying acts, social relations, irreducible to the objectifying constitution that meant to cradle them in its rhythm, are abruptly awakened.

7

Intentionality and Metaphysics

1. In its struggle against psychologism, Husserl's phenomenology invited us not to confuse psychic life with its "intentional object." The laws that govern being—individual or ideal—are not derived from the nature of thought; the structures of thought must not be passed off as the structures of things. To do phenomenology would thus amount to trusting the testimony of consciousness, which, entirely intentionality, touches being in the original. Consciousness, whatever psychologism may have said about it, does not project its own states outward, or constitute, through the interplay of these states, the very exteriority of the outside. Phenomenology would thus become a metaphysical method, where the word "metaphysical," as in Platonic realism, evokes relations with being in itself in opposition to a subjective knowledge of phenomena. On the other hand, in this perspective, phenomenology declares itself on the transcendence of that being. Transcendence would be produced as the objectivity of an object. Despite the fact that phenomenology has gone beyond scientistic positivism, such a notion of transcendence confines being, whether it be an essence or a value, to the status of a scientific object, to the status of a *fact* which resists and shocks the subject, and in that shock adjusts to the a priori of the subject and gives itself to the subject. Metaphysics—the relationship with being—henceforth freed of all critical scruples, would be reducible to this movement toward an object.

But straightaway Husserlian phenomenology means the opposite of this: a distrust concerning the naivete of that intentional movement that brings us into the presence of things. The whole phenomenological enterprise—infinite program of investigations—expresses this untiring distrust. The reason is that for Husserl the movement of consciousness toward its object conceals another movement, which one is tempted to call subjective, since it does not end in objects. It cannot be so named, however, for it is not just an eddy within the psychic "mass" but remains intentional and concerns that sphere, *other* than the selfsameness of the subject where Husserl in the end situates objects. It takes shape as the

horizon of objects or as their background. These terms, however, are inappropriate, for to designate as "horizon" or "background" the plane at which the intentional movement, dissimulated by objectification, ends, is to subordinate this movement to objectification, and to find no other truth for it than that of the object's transcendental condition. It would still maintain the metaphysical primacy of objectivity, as if being were a superlative degree of the object, as if the relationship with an object and the relation between objects (for example, causality) were alone susceptible to *truth*, and as if the logical forms in which these relations are drawn were the framework of being. In fact, the transcendental movement Husserl discovers in intentionality, concealed by the naive vision of the object, accomplishes metaphysical, ontologically irreducible, original or ultimate relations. Although they do not obey the logic that governs the relations between objects or the relation between subject and object—although they are manifested as paradoxes—they are nonetheless true with a certainty independent of objective certainty, but a certainty not reducible to the that of faith, feeling, practice, or opinion, either. These latter forms of certainty still revolve around objective truth. They criticize it as the fox criticizes the grapes beyond his reach. They still belong to the metaphysics of the transcendent. Phenomenology heralds a metaphysics of the transcendental.

Kantianism, in which truth does not open upon exteriority, even though it abides in the necessary, was interrupted before Heidegger substituted a metaphysical interpretation for it. Husserl was the first to free himself from Kantianism, by showing, behind objectifying intentionality, a concrete life that is also intentional. His departure from Kantianism was not produced by the theory called "categorial intuition." That theory blurs the special dignity of the transcendental: synthesis, which according to Kant is the *condition* of objectivity, becomes in Husserl's theory the simple intuition of an object, an intuition—even though of the secondary degree—is founded on a sensible intuition. But Kantianism is confirmed when the transcendental is maintained by the discovery of mental operations inevitably inherent in the movement that goes naively toward objectivity. It is renewed when this movement is revealed to be intentional. *Whence the idea of an exteriority that is not objective.* Transcendental operations constitute an outside, but they do not constitute that outside (or that *other than me*) by a movement that is like that of the eye that perceives its object: the Other guides the transcendental movement without presenting itself to vision, which would precisely always be left behind by the very transcendental movement it was supposed to define. The transcendental movement henceforth receives a structure entirely different from the subject-object polarization, which characterizes intuition. The

great contribution of Husserlian phenomenology lies in this idea that intentionality, or the relation with alterity, does not congeal in polarizing as a subject-object relationship.

To be sure, the way Husserl himself interprets and analyzes this outstripping of objectifying intentionality by a transcendental intentionality consists in reducing the latter to other intuitions, "little perceptions" as it were. But the reduction never comes to an end; each of these "little perceptions" leads to a transcendental horizon, and this to another indefinitely. Kant refuses to interpret transcendental activity as intuitive. Even though this refusal confines the transcendental to the interiority of the subject that does not aim at anything *other*, Kant maintains the transcendental outside of the objective. That the *other* of the transcendental activity arises through the effect of a binding or synthesis instead of being polarized like an object of vision is of considerable importance, since it enables us to foresee the end of the universal domination of representation and of objects. Here Kant is bolder than Husserl.

2. But there is in Husserl's work another way of interpreting this movement that, without intending an object, does not consist in the subject's marking time in its inward sphere. This movement is produced in the transcendental function of sensibility. The relation to the object is characterized by a certain equality between the intention of the thought and the intuition of what it is to encounter. In analyzing the relation to an object in the original, Husserl has shown how the encounter with the object confirms or disappoints an empty intention that precedes the encounter. His analysis, undertaken to show the difference between empty and intuitive thought, also shows that thought that makes contact with its object necessarily covers over a thought that intends it, that the experience of an object always *fulfills* a thought, and hence that realty never fazes thought. Thinking thus conserves a sort of immobility in that objective intentionality, as if, like a monad closed within itself, it reflected the entire universe within itself. By contrast, the sensible, the hyletic *datum*, is an absolute datum. Intentions animate it, to be sure, to make it an experience of an object, but the sensible is given immediately, before being sought. Before thinking or perceiving objects, the subject is steeped in it. In the sensible Husserl does indeed once again distinguish between sensing and sensed, but at this level the sensed is not the quality of an object, answering an empty intuition, fulfilling or disappointing that empty intuition as does an object. Here the sensing of the sensed does not consist in equaling an anticipation. "Horizons" take form without the subject having sketched them out as "projects." But on the other hand sensing seems in sensation to be at once consciousness of the sensed and coincidence with it—which again distinguishes this situation from the

subject-object correlation. Husserl's analysis of the time of consciousness and the consciousness of time brings in an intentionality of protention and of retention. This intentionality is not already an objectifying intention, like memory or hope. The instant is nowise retained or pro-tained in thought. The "retaining" and the "protaining" do not remain immobile as in objectifying intentionality; they *follow* that toward which they transcend themselves, are determined by what they retain and pro-tain.

Nonetheless, a pure and simple return to the sensationalism of the statue which becomes the smell of a rose does not occur in Husserl,[1] for the idea of intentionality dominates all of his analyses of sensibility. The coinciding of sensing with the sensed is a *relationship* between self and self, even though this relationship does not connect a thought with that which it thinks. The subject is able to withdraw from the involvement that transports it.

3. But the intentionality of the sensible does not consist solely in the sensing remaining in the given in which it is engaged, rather than in contemplating. In Husserl the whole of the sensible is essentially kinaesthetic. The sense organs, open to the sensible, move. This reference of the sensible to the sense organ and to its movement is not something added to the essence of the sensible because of man's empirical nature; it is the way sensing senses the sensed. The movement of a sense organ constitutes the intentionality of sensing, accomplishes its very transitivity.

In 1940, Alfred Schütz, one of Husserl's disciples and most fervent admirers, published some of Husserl's notes on the constitution of space (several pages out of the tens of thousands of unpublished pages of which the Husserl Archives in Louvain are taking such remarkable care) in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.[2] These notes, which like so many other of Husserl's unpublished pages represent a record of his thought in its daily groping, date from 1934, and thus reflect his last work. Husserl starts with the perception of movement, and proceeds to the constitution of space. The perception of movement begins at the level of the sensible, still prior to the perception of *objects*—which already presuppose place. However, place and the configuration of places—space—are the *idealization* of a transcendental life that they mask, and that is played out in intentions of another type than that idealization—that is played out in *kinaestheses*. Husserl's analysis seeks to show precisely "how, by dint of idealizing I arrive at absolute and identical local points in infinite space."[3]

Kinaestheses are the sensations of the body's movement. All movements perceived in the world outside the body have their origin in these kinaesthetic sensations. "All movements and objects of experience refer, in an intentional sense, to my *doing*, my kinaesthetic *holding still*."[4]

One must see in what sense kinaesthesis is sensation. Husserl speaks of kinaestheses that constitute "the activity of holding still" ("*Aktivität des Stillhaltens*"). The kinaesthesis of repose is not the repose of kinaesthesis. As a sensation, it is also an activity. And we must note that the zero point of subjectivity, from which the movement of things, their places, and space are constituted, is already a conjunction of kinaestheses and movements. This conjunction is linked to the fundamental intentionality of the very incarnation of consciousness—the passage from the Ego to the *here*. "All that . . . starts from the ego, the body, or, more exactly from here. The question arises: How does this Here come to coincide with my body without it being possible to indicate seriously . . . the point of this coincidence."[5] Therefore we observe the constitution of space out of the different modes of corporeity: visual space, ocular-motor space, space constituted in the kinaestheses of head movements (*capital* space), combining with tactile space received through finger and hand movement, through all the kinaestheses of touch. Finally we have the space constituted by the movements of the human body, which moves, and moves in relation to the earth, on which it is placed and which it treads. Here is an original intentionality[6] which has to be distinguished from simple contact.

This phenomenology of kinaesthetic sensibility brings out intentions that are not at all objectifying, and reference points that do not function as objects: walking, pushing, throwing, the solid earth, resistance, the far-off, earth and sky.[7] The subject no longer remains locked in the immobility of the idealist subject, but finds itself drawn into situations that cannot be broken down into the representations it could make for itself of these situations.

The idea of intentionality, accompanied by such analyses, forbids us to believe we are still in the era of integral empiricism, constituting exteriority out of the unextended, purely qualitative elements of sensation. Kinaesthesis is not the qualitative equivalent of movement, is not a recording, a knowledge, or a reflection of movement in an immobile being, a motor image. Here sensation is the moving itself. *Here moving is the intentionality of kinaesthesis and not its "intentum."* The relation with an *other* than oneself is only possible as an entering into that other than oneself, transitivity. The ego does not remain in itself, absorbing every *other* in representation; it truly transcends itself. Here intentionality, in the strong and perhaps original sense of the term, is an act and a transitivity, the act and transitivity par excellence, that which first makes any act possible. Intentionality is here the union of body and soul. Not an apperception of that union in which body and soul, like two objects, are *conceived* of as united, but like an incarnation. It is precisely the heterogeneity of the terms that are united that brings out the truth of this transcendence, this transitive intentionality. The Cartesian separation between soul and body which cannot touch one another merely allows formulating the radical discontinuity transcendence must cross. A leap, in the spatial sense of the term, interrupts the continuity of a line traced on the ground, but in space, where all points touch, there is no discontinuity. The leap of transcendence which goes from the soul to the body is absolute. At "a certain moment" the leaper is truly nowhere. Transcendence is produced through the kinesthesis in which thought goes beyond itself not by encountering an objective reality, but by accomplishing a corporeal movement.

4. Perhaps the conception of consciousness as a kinaesthetic transitivity marks the end of idealism, without taking us back to realism. The latter opposes the notion of the being in itself of an object to its constitution by consciousness, but like idealism it identifies being and the object. Once this identification is admitted, idealism returns triumphant, for the appearance of the object, representation, is always in proportion to consciousness. It is the adequation between ego and non-ego, Same and Other. Once represented, the Other equals the Same, though it may seem to contrast with it. Descartes expresses this essential equality when he affirms that by itself the ego can account for all things, and that there is no more perfection in the heavens and in the sun than there is in the ego. In Berkeley, the sensible is the very congruence of consciousness with its object. Consciousness will always remain the source of meaning, for in the meaning that characterizes the object, the strangeness or the heterogeneity of being takes on the measure of consciousness. In its relationship with itself, the idealist consciousness repeats this equality. Subjectivity is a reflection of the self in itself—which Husserl himself teaches in his theory of the perfect adequation that characterizes the perception called "internal." Hence idealism imposes itself like a tautology: what appears as being—appears, and consequently is found directly or indirectly within the limits of consciousness. What exceeds the limits of consciousness is absolutely nothing for that consciousness.

Intentionality as an act and as transitivity, as the union of the soul with the body, that is, as the *inequality between the ego and the other*, means a radical step beyond the objectifying intentionality that sustains idealism. The discovery of intentionality in praxis, emotion, and valuation, which was seen to constitute the newness of phenomenology, in fact derives its metaphysical strength solely from the transitive intentionality of incarnation.

To be sure, before beginning the phenomenology of kinaestheses and the body—intentionality par excellence—Husserl in his notes on

space makes the mental reservation characteristic of his whole philosophy when dealing with the concrete. He returns, for a moment, to the pure Ego of the Reduction. The incarnate ego is the pure ego that has a perceived itself in a relationship with the body. "Ego, in the ego attitude [*Ich in der Ich-Einstellung*], I grasp 'myself' in my corporeity, as moving myself. . . . I grasp myself in the kinaesthetic function . . . as the basis of . . . etc."[8] Yet we are entitled to ask how, in the final analysis, Husserl understands the way in which the ego grasps *itself* as . . . Is this *grasping as* a purely theoretical act of a disincarnate being? In the obsession of the Reduction, in this unsurmountable temptation to seek the intention of a pure ego behind the intentionality of incarnation, I think what is at stake is a positive possibility, constitutive of kinaesthesis, of the *memory of its origin in interiority*. Without this positive possibility, kinesthesis, as a relation observed in the world and not enacted out of an Ego, would be confused with a psychic *image* or a physical movement. This possibility of seeking oneself, perhaps in vain and *after the fact*, belongs to the essence of the transcendence realized by sensibility. Man wholly masters his destiny only in memory, in the remembrance of things past. In the philosophy of commitment and action toward which Husserl's phenomenology points, the problem of the self's recovery must necessarily reappear. The concern for the "*epoché*" testifies to this, even if other avenues may present themselves to Husserl's successors, for the resolution of this problem.

5. To affirm intentionality as "the union of the soul and the body" is to place the spirituality of consciousness in the movement in which it exceeds its interiority. This tendency is opposed to the one that animates Bergsonism, which, in keeping with traditional spiritualism in this regard, seeks mind as freed from the body. One of the conclusions of Bergsonism is the affirmation of the soul's independence from the body, and the confirmation—perhaps hasty—of the promises of the religions.

To be sure, the body of which Bergson speaks is the body visible from outside, the object-body as seen by the biologist, an image among other images, whereas for Husserl the body is a system of kinestheses, an experience of the body, but an experience of the body experienced by this very body of which there is experience. But this new way of understanding the body presupposes that the ultimate event in consciousness is not produced as a sort of an objectifying intentionality, and that other forms of *transcendence toward being* (or of truth) are produced without being interpretable in terms of the logic of objects. Bergson himself discovered this transcendence, which makes the Same go out toward the Other, absolutely other, in the renewal of duration . But he separated the transcendence he announced from the land of men.[9] The generation that followed this spiritualism of pure duration, with whom Bergson's

contemporary, Husserl, was able to communicate, is perhaps marked by the tendency to use the word "spiritualism" in a pejorative sense. This does not signify a preference for what is base in the world, but an attempt to free oneself from the alleged sovereignty of objectifying thought, which in fact imprisons the thinker within himself and his categories and, placing him beneath the jurisdiction of objectivity and nature, mocks the metaphysical adventures of saints, prophets, poets,[10] and, quite simply, living men and women, as mere childishness.

8

The Permanent and the Human in Husserl

A nostalgia for the Permanent, a nostalgia for Substance is deep in man. Perhaps it contradicts the equally obsessive dream of freedom, renewal, and spring. It does not issue solely from an "embourgeoising" of souls.

The idealists have taught us a world permeable to thought. Advances in the exact sciences have given credence to the equality of the Real and the calculations of humankind. The universe, mastered through the intermediary of mathematics, nonetheless revealed an eternal order encompassing thinkers and thought. The soul that believed it had discovered mathematical ideas in its interiority, learned in Plato that the Ideas were its native land. But a participation in the impersonal eternity of Ideas dulls the savor of the absolute that humans find in their bite into perishable existence, their involvement in experience, in the particular, the historical, the "human, only human," their participation in society, the State, and the times. When science penetrates this human world, it pulverizes it into atoms the better to mathematize it, suffocates it the better to eternize it. It reduces cultural values to a superficial layer that has, in the absolute, no more relief than our mountain chains seen from Sirius.

A new idealism, born of Hegel, conquered—under a variety of banners—the thought and even the sensibility of the West. It affirmed the entry of the absolute into the becoming of concrete events. Events would no longer dissimulate but would manifest the Absolute; they would consummate its designs. In any case, they assumed primordial importance for man. Ever since then, the intelligibility of the world is read in the imprint left on it by the work of mortals, in the perspectives opened up by cities and empires. We acquired the conviction that we cannot encounter—or think—anything within the real in the wild state. Everything is already

formed, transformed, or reflected by man—even nature, sky, and forest. The elementary forces touch us only through a civilization, a language, a literature, an industry, or an art. *Thus what is human is not only the eye that perceives the image of the world, but also the light that illuminates it.* The understanding of the world refers to duration, and not to an enduring order. The coordinates of being are turned over to a mobile history. Being appears—that is, shines with intelligible light—in history, and not in consciousness, which not so very long ago was still able to penetrate the circumstances of its concrete situation, breaking its chains, leaving the cave. The power of vision that once carried the mortal's gaze as high as the sphere of the fixed stars is now considered but the consoling dream of a being reduced to inaction. Contemplative knowledge and its clarity are the residue of an act that has missed its mark or fizzled out en route. The value of truth is replaced by that of authenticity. Art, love, and action take precedence over theory, and talent over wisdom. It is a matter of awaiting the perishable but unique hour, of measuring up to our era, of divining, in extreme self-awareness, its call to us. To respond to the call of the times, this is what dominates the good and the moral.

Modern man recognizes himself in this philosophy without eternity. Oh, the freshness of springtimes in a becoming that hastens toward death, the beauty of the gratuitous act, the "tender shoots of spring," that Ivan Karamazov loves "in spite of logic," but also the nobility of hopeless ventures and of perseverance in the face of failure, the warmth of the "land of men"!

Is this complacency in mortality (or in historical consciousness) exempt from bitterness? The crisis of the modern world perhaps lies herein. Is not belonging to an eternal order that exceeds the human (be it matter, even) essential to the human? One of the most significant aspects of Husserl's phenomenology has been precisely its reuniting these two motifs of contemporary consciousness, namely its quest for the essential and its certainty of the importance of the concrete world in which life unfolds, and which cannot be relegated to appearances.

No one combatted the dehumanization of the Real better than Husserl, the dehumanization which is produced when one extends the categories proper to mathematized matter to the totality of our experience, when one elevates scientism to absolute knowledge. His critique of psychologism in logic, with which the *Logical Investigations* (1901) began, showed that the terms of physicomathematical science, when applied to the human, ruin that science itself. Husserl's phenomenology has furnished the principal intellectual means for substituting a human world for the world as physicomathematical science represents it. It is within the former that science builds its abstract universes. Dilthey, the subtle

analyst of the historical, praised Husserl's early work, which appeared to him as "perhaps the most important since Hegel." In it he discerned contributions valuable to his own project. Phenomenology has not only permitted the "de-thingifying," the "de-reifying" of the human being, but also the humanizing of things.

The apparently trite proposition, all consciousness is consciousness of something—the famous intentionality of consciousness—lent itself to an investigation of a new kind: phenomenology. It promised to formulate the relation between man and world in new terms. For to affirm intentionality does not reduce to giving another name to the relation between subject and object. Intentionality does indeed indicate, in the first instance, the opening of the human upon the world. Man is not juxtaposed to the things that fill the universe, as though he were the simple result of natural causality. But intentionality indicates more. General ideas, relation-ideas, do not flow on like dreams in the depths of a blind soul; they blaze paths that open onto being; they have an ontological import. Henceforth, contrary to all positivisms, ideal structures determine the real world. The intentionality that runs through our affective and active lives confers the dignity of objective experience upon all our concrete engagements; values belong to the real just as do ideal structures. The real is human and inhabitable. But above all, Husserl has shown that the intention of consciousness that intends an object belongs in fact to a context of thoughts that at once exceed the theme intended and confer a meaning on it. Their latent presence is indispensable to the intention that forgets them but that they subtend. These "thoughts" keep open a horizon in which our perceptual, scientific, and even affective and active life is already situated. These "thoughts" are not necessarily judgments or perceptions in their turn; they are prepredicative engagements of movements that necessarily precede our experience of the outer world, but that cannot be considered to be physical events, for they, too, are "intentional." The fact of having a hand, tensing one's muscles, walking, settling on a land, the sedimentation of a certain history in the thinking Ego, were necessary in order for the representation of a space, a time, and a physical causality even to be formed. Thus we would be wrong in placing this prepredicative work into representation, for which it is a condition, and from which the thinking subject is already nourished before representing the world to itself. Intentionality indicates not only a direct relation between reason and things, but the horizon in which the flow of things supports and carries along legislative reason itself.

Thus the idea of intentionality, more profoundly even than reflection on the mathematical sciences, leads to a humanization of the

universe and reason. Being springs forth from the history in which the human is fashioned, without needing any foundation, any solidity.

But Husserl's philosophy, which has made possible this being which is engulfed in time, resolutely puts a limit to all this historicity. Its watchword was to leave images, symbols, and systems behind, and to get back to reality in the original and in the things themselves. As a rule of method, this principle was already at work in Husserl's way of writing. His texts, poor in proper names, disdaining etymologies (which had not yet come to be taken as proofs!), confine themselves to common nouns and abound in neologisms. This parsimony of historical references is contrary to academic writing. The latter is not only guided by the facilities of erudition, but precisely by historical consciousness, which makes naivete impossible. Husserl contributed a *naivete* which attested to a new experience of being. Things are once again informative in themselves, without owing their meaning to the literature in which they have been reflected, the hand that made them, or the works that have depicted the sites in which they should be placed or those in which they are unsuitable. Things signify through their own clarity, independent of every historical evocation. Husserl's phenomenology sees them again indeed immersed in culture, but the light that illuminates them is independent of that culture. Their newness gleams from their eternal essence with more brilliance than could be borrowed from a reference to the past. The return to things means vision of essence—*Wesenschau*. The Real sets the vigorous structures of its solidity against the faint movements of history. Truth is not a work of the subject.[2]

The evolution of Husserl's thought, as it delineated the human world, the lifeworld, seemed to have sacrificed this superhuman permanence of the Real. But something of it remained, to the great disappointment of so many excellent minds—some seduced by the boldness of the possibilities that phenomenology brought out for the historical comprehension of the universe, others dazzled by the plainly realist perspectives of early phenomenology. I allude to the famous theory of Transcendental Reduction.

The world constituted in historical references includes an ultimate reference to an absolute subject, disengaged from history, and in this sense a subject that is no longer human. The entire life of historical man must be put in parentheses in order to be *reduced* to the life of this subject, which Husserl calls *Pure Consciousness* or *Transcendental Ego*. Philosophers would not reach final lucidity until they returned to that source of all signification. And Husserl did not hesitate to expect from it the answer to the problems that "the collapse of the entire modern era" pose for us; nor did he hesitate, in a letter of 1936, to attribute the

philosophy of existence and *historical relativism* to "the lamentable abdication of a humanity without vigor."

That return to a consciousness that is extrahuman and extramundane, but that each one of us must find again within ourselves—is it possible? Do human beings not find themselves involved in the historical world even in the course of their operation of disengagement? The recovery of the self from the history and the world in which the ego is engaged is perhaps but a task to be recommenced indefinitely, forevermore fixing the philosopher at the level of beginning philosopher, and defining philosophy as a perpetual recommencement. In any case, this recovery of the self is only possible "after the fact," as a reminiscence, an *anamnesis*. If this is so, then the search for the essential and the permanent would itself become a historical task. But at least it would thus recall the nostalgia for the Eternal as an inextinguishable ardor. And perhaps there remains, for Husserl's disciples, another path than that of the Reduction to take in response to that nostalgia.

As for Husserl, he thinks he has a guarantee for the possibility of this movement of disengagement. It lies in the *irreducible and privileged character of theory*, which is one with man's freedom vis-à-vis the world. Husserl never adopted the thesis that vision, cognition, knowledge, and theory are but a residue of action. He always maintained the contrary opinion: every positing of being by consciousness, every thesis, whether it proceeds from the will or from feeling, contains a theoretical modality, a *doxa*, as Husserl calls it. This modality can be disengaged. "*Every (mental) act or every correlate of a mental act explicitly or implicitly harbors the logical.*"[3] Like Descartes, Husserl sees within the "I doubt," "I will," "I feel"—an "I think," a theoretical attitude, consequently already free vis-à-vis the world in which it is involved; or, more precisely, a possibility of withdrawing from engagement, of disengaging oneself from history, in which consciousness is nonetheless at once situated.

9

Intentionality and Sensation

1. The New Idea of Intentionality

The idea of intentionality appeared as a liberation. The unprecedented way of positing the *act of intending* as the essence of psychic being, which no avatar of this being could reduce, the audacious way of positing the being of consciousness as being played out outside the limits of its real being in the strict sense, dissipated the obsessive appearance of a thought functioning like a cog of a universal mechanism, and confirmed thought in its vocation and its right to obey nothing but reasons. Psychologism, which the new manner of perceiving opposed, was, in a word, but one of the essential forms of the confusion between the act of consciousness and the object it intends, between psychic reality and what it intends (*meint*); a confusion by which the Soul imprisoned itself within itself, whatever the thoughts stirring it might be. If Kantianism distinguished the felt given from the unity of the "I think" that establishes it as an object, its quality remained no less subjective, *transforming* itself into the objective, without the thought having to *go out*. Intentionality contributed the new idea of a going out from the self, a primordial event conditioning all others, and not capable of being interpreted by some deeper but internal movement of the Soul. This transcendence was more important even than self-consciousness, which is itself ineluctable in a faithful description. But what counted for Husserl in the first contact was only this opening, this presence to the world "in the street and on the road," and this disclosure that would soon be much discussed.

The other decisive view of phenomenology—which Husserl himself will recognize as such[1]—consisted in perceiving a rigorous correlation between the object's structures and the processes of the thought that intends it or has self-evidence of it: *the approaches to Being are prescribed by the Being identified from these approaches*. This is a vision that bestows on intentionality the allure of an idealizing identification. I will return to it.

The correlation between thoughts and the ideal object that they "intend" (*meinen*) and identify through their multiplicity is not the accomplishment of a "thinking substance" that would order itself according some "eidetic necessities" of a "contingent *a priori*,"[2] as is the case with the matter of other regions of being. Here it is the essence of intentionality that commands the eidetic necessities of the correlation; the latter express, above all, the solidarity between the object and its modes of appearance. God Himself will perceive the material object, for example, only in a forever incomplete series of "sketches" that coalesce. The knowledge of an object thus can in no way be compared to its production—somehow—by a "spiritual energy," or to its being apprehended by a thought capable of grasping any object in the same way, like a polyvalent instrument. The "intentional" presence of the object in consciousness presupposes a correspondence of an original sort between the ways of "making appear" and the "appearing meaning" that does not resemble a simple state of fact. This is not because "human beings such as they are" are perceivers who will never finish going through the series of "sketches" in which the thing takes form. Even with more perfection in the subject's look and thought, the series could not be completed. *To perceive "otherwise" is to perceive something else.* The sui generis necessity that connects the object to the thought processes that present it—or represent it—to consciousness, appears as the most convincing of the "material eidetic" necessities.

Phenomenological idealism is strongly committed to this correlation between the structures of *meanings* that are thought and the *thoughts*—noeses—that think them, and that thus *rationally* follow from one another. To put into question the relationship between being and the accesses to being one would have to posit, in a typically realist move, another being behind the one that is identified in the various thoughts. One would have to bestow upon being an identity other than that which is correlative to the diverse acts of approach. Indeed, God could have approached that identity by ways other than through human experience! But that would precisely amount to reducing intentionality to some peculiarity of conscious life, to interpreting it no longer as the initial event of transcendence that of itself makes possible the very idea of transcendence.

But if idealism is already in intentionality, it is because the latter has been conceived from the outset as intending an ideal object. For Husserl, the object, even in cases where it is sensible and individual, will always be what is identified through a multiplicity of intentions. To say that all consciousness is consciousness of something is to affirm that across these correlative terms of a multiplicity of subjective thoughts, and thus transcending them, an identity is maintained and affirmed. The

intentional object has an ideal existence in relation to the temporal event and spatial position of consciousness. This is what Husserl expresses, as early as in the *Logical Investigations*: the object of consciousness is not a *real* part of consciousness. Through the multiplicity of instants in which consciousness unfolds as a "lapse of time," an aspect of the object is identified and maintained in its identity—as is also maintained, through the multiplicity of these aspects, an identical and ideal objective pole. Thus it is for an ideal or abstract object; it is the same for a table or a pencil. This process of identification of the ideal will continue beyond the egological sphere, with the constitution of intersubjectivity. Husserl's transcendental idealism is announced in this idealizing character of intentionality—the real constituted as an ideal identity, confirmed or crossed out or corrected through the evolution of subjective or intersubjective life. The discovery of an ideal identity in naive thought's claim to have reached a "real identity" is idealist, not because it would consist in substituting a "consciousness of identity" for an identity, as Berkeley substitutes a sensation of color for the color of naive realism, but because identity as such would be inconceivable without the work of identification, whose ideal pole it remains. To be an ideal unity in a temporal plurality is to be ideal in a sense that is entirely different from that invoked by Berkeley to reduce color to sensation. It is from the outset an idealizing thought, already a synthesis of identification at the level of a still entirely predicative sensible experience—and not a "content of consciousness," as little *thought* as its correlate—that matches the reality of sensible experience.

This said, the very project of phenomenology is comprehensible. Intentional analysis follows from the original idealism of identifying intentionality. The work of synthesis, only the result of which fascinates naive and scientific thought, must be retrieved. The identity-result is the abstraction that fixes a petrified thought that has already forgotten its life and the horizons from which it uprooted itself, by a series of perhaps fortunate but unconsidered and irresponsible movements, in order to hasten toward this result. Phenomenology is then the "reactivation" of all these forgotten horizons and of the horizon of all these horizons.[3] They are the context of the abstract significations, and permit an escape from the abstraction that satisfies the naive way of looking at things. One could even confer a fundamental ontological role to the phenomenological enterprise. Restored to their horizons, significations would not only be more complete. A new, more original meaning would ground the very alterations that it undergoes and is unaware of, and that are at the source of many of the conflicts or paradoxes from which the sciences suffer. Despite all their critical spirit, they do not turn toward the lost horizons of the identifications on which they live. Contrary to the neo-Kantian

method, which reconstitutes the transcendental from the logical and the scientific, and through this very process forgets the horizons which are lost precisely because scientific results can only be purchased at the price of the forgetting of these infinite horizons—phenomenology, which does turn toward them, makes possible the expression and the perfecting of the logical itself.[4]

The specific structure of the intentionality of consciousness seemed not merely to open the empiricist sensation, which was closed in upon itself, onto a sensed correlative; it already posited this sensed as an ideality, the identification of multiple thoughts. Furthermore, intentionality, intending beyond its point of origin, seemed able to constitute the *essence* of consciousness only if it were transparent. Would it assume the rank of an event extending itself in time like a new "mental object," that, between subjectivity and being, serves as an image or screen? But did not the rediscovery of the intentionality of consciousness, and the radicalization of its conception, announce the disappearance of this mythical "mental object"?

2. Intentionality and Sensation

Despite the coherence of the above-mentioned themes surrounding the central idea of a consciousness open upon the world which is, for this consciousness, all that can be, Husserl holds on to a notion from which the message of intentionality should, it would seem, have freed him: the notion of sensation. Hyletic data are found at the basis of intentionality. Sensation, far from playing within the system the role of a residue that would progressively be removed, occupies a more and more important role in Husserlian meditation.

Intentions directed toward and identifying the transcendent are already not pure openings, simple windows, but *contents* filling a duration. Acts are extended in time, and of that temporal reality of the intention there is once again consciousness. Consciousness renders objects present to us and is present to itself, felt and lived.[5] The term "to live" designates the prereflexive relation of a content to itself. It can become transitive (to live a spring), but it is reflexive beforehand (without it being a matter of explicit reflection); consciousness that is consciousness of the object is nonobjectifying consciousness of itself. It lives itself; it is *Erlebnis*. The intention is *Erlebnis*. But this term is also applied to contents that are not acts, to nonintentional contents, in which we recognize the sensations of empiricism. Thus, just as at the high point of sensationalist empiricism,

there exist states of consciousness that are not consciousness of anything! This is an existence that Husserl forthwith declares to be nonindependent of intentionality—though too often analyzed and presented as autonomous. It is assigned the function of assuring the intuitive fullness of the real object as early as in the *Logical Investigations*.

Consciousness, at the same as being presence near to things, is a temporal flux of a sensuous "matter" that includes real parts and is a lived presence. "Hyletic" contents, elements of psychic matter, are distinguished from the qualities of objects that are intended or attained by a transcendent intention. Husserl ceaselessly affirms this. But on the other hand texts to which readers have paid less attention until now—very numerous and very clear texts—maintain the idea of a *resemblance* between sensations and objective qualities, as if resemblance and analogy did not already presuppose a constituted objective level. "The visual field can be lived as a sensation divisible into parts that are real, but distinct from the objects that are intended."[6] Is the distinction radical, since sensations "portray" or "represent" (*darstellen*) qualities as profiles or adumbrations (*Abshattungen*) of objective qualities? The *Abschattung* is not an aspect already objectified of the thing, but an immanent content, lived, and yet an adumbration of the objective. Intentionality, the opening of consciousness onto being, henceforth plays the role of an apprehension (*Auffassung*) with regard to those contents upon which it bestows an objective meaning and which it animates (*beseelt*) or inspires (*durchgeistigt*). The sensation becomes the *analagon* of objects to the point of guaranteeing to intuitive acts—that reach the "original," the "being in person," the "being in flesh and blood"—that exceptional presence of being. Even though the novelty of the notion of an intuitive act seemed to result from its intention or its "claim" to present being "in the original" (from its *Meinung*), it now turns out that a sensible content is necessary in order for such a meaning to be thought. The presence of the object is not thought as such; it results from the materiality of sensations, from the nonthought that is lived. "By presentative or intuitively re-presentative contents, we understand the contents of intuitive acts that, by means of purely imaginative or perceptual apprehensions of which they are the bearers, refer unequivocally to the contents of the object that correspond to them in a determined way and present them to us in the manner of imaginative and perceptual sketches, etc."[7] Similarly, later on: "In an intuitive representation, diverse degrees of intuitive fullness are possible. This expression 'diverse degrees,' refers, as we have already explained, to the possible series of fulfillment; as we progress in these series we get to know the object ever better by means of a presentative content *that ever more resembles*[8] the object and apprehends it in a manner ever more lively

and complete."[9] The intuitive act is at once intention thinking a presence and the indispensable presence of a content in the subject. The relation between the content and the quality of which it is the adumbration is constantly affirmed. Intention transcends life in order to intend an object, but the object is only represented owing to a lived content that is *similar* to the object. Changes in the sensation correspond to the change in the presentation of the object, which is identical in perception.[10] The *Fülle*, the sensuous intuition of fullness, includes the "*Farbenabschattungen*" and a "foreshortening" (*perspectivische Verkürzung*) of the object. Husserl emphasizes that "something in the phenomenological content corresponds" to such ways of speaking.[11] There is thus an analogy between the lived content and what "is reflected" in it, even if Husserl immediately adds that "the manner of this representation by analogy varies in function of the apprehension." The terms "*Interpretieren*" and "*Deuten*" are added to "*Auffassen*," "*Beseelen*," and "*Durchgeistigen*," which we have already noted; all of which are designed to express the relation that exists between intention and sensation. They are borrowed from the activity of judgment that already bears upon a world of constituted objects, but that a Lagneau or an Alain,[12] by extrapolating from the logical to the transcendental, situate at the origin. This is a position difficult to attribute to Husserl. Would intentionality be similar to a synthesis of the understanding that shapes the sensible given, as in Kant? The terms "apprehension," "apperception," and "interpretation" would then be suitable. But to admit that in Husserl the intentional object is a judicative construction using sensible material contradicts the most certain Husserlian ideas. Sensation in Husserl is not found on the objective side, as an embryonic object or as a brute fact requiring interpretation. One may divest the transcendent object of its forms, or approach it in an immediate way, but one will not find it at the level of the lived. Apperception, interpretation, and apprehension, which Husserl seems to identify with the work of intentionality, are not judgments. Judgment is a kind of intentionality; intentionality is not a form of judgment.

3. Sensation and Time

But sensible content in Husserl soon receives an interpretation whereby it reveals another sense of intentionality besides its role of being matter, offered to the activity of intentional apperception and contradicting the very message of intentionality. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, appearing soon after the *Logical Investigations*, and whose

themes are deepened throughout the entire Husserlian reflection, insists in the first instance on the impressional sources of all consciousness. "The proto-impression [*Urimpression*], the absolutely non-modified, is the source of all consciousness and all being."[13] Already the transcendent object, which is a harmony of identification through confirmations and erasures, and an always revocable harmony, an always "until something new comes along," can be reduced to impression, with the disappearance of the world. This is the original character of Husserlian idealism. In order to have recognized with an unequaled force the irreducibility of transcendence and consequently of the ideal, it will not succumb to the temptation of subordination to the logic that is revealed in this ideal order, the living individuality to whom this order is manifest. Consciousness will not become "consciousness in general," reconstructed starting with the syntheses that it will have effected in the object sphere. It is individual unique life; its "living present" is the source of intentionality.[14] A bond exists between impressional consciousness where spontaneity and passivity merge,[15] and the intentionality that intends identifiable idealities. Husserl's sensationalism does not serve solely to deceive the philosophical hopes to which the idea of intentionality gave rise. It will permit us to deepen the meaning of the latter, and will restore to the empiricism of sensations what may be of permanent value. This is at least what Heidegger suggests in his brief editor's preface to *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*.

> What is described in this work is the highlighting of the intentional character of consciousness and, in a general way, the clarity that intentionality receives in its principle. Leaving aside the particular content of the detailed analyses, this already suffices to make the following studies an indispensable complement to the elucidation of intentionality that was undertaken for the first time on the ground of principles, in the *Logical Investigations*. Even today, "intentionality" is not an all-explanatory word, but the title of a central problem.[16]

Given the book's theme, Heidegger's allusion can only urge us to investigate the original significance of intentionality in the way in which sensation is lived and in the dimension of time wherein it is lived.

The thread of time is a rectilinear multiplicity, a continuity of instants exterior to one another, without Bergsonian interpenetration. Inner time—the foundation of objective time and coextensive with it.[17] Sensation that endures is spread out in this flow, but if it is felt as an identifiable unity in this multiplicity of instants that exclude one another, it is because from each instant—thanks to an immanent and specific

intentionality—the whole of the sensation is retained in *adumbration.* Sensation is *Abschattung,* but gives itself in the immanence in which it is lived, through *Abschattungen.*[18] The intentionality of feeling that "lives the sensation" would thus operate, initially, in the mode of idealizing identification, like a transcendent intentionality.

But each intention—which starting out from each instant retains or anticipates (pro-tains) the identity of the sensation already in part elapsed and in part still to come—is for Husserl just the very consciousness of time. Time is not only the form that houses sensations and lures them into a becoming, it is the sensing of sensation, which is not a simple coincidence of sensing with the sensed, but an intentionality and consequently a minimal distance between the sensing and the sensed—precisely a temporal distance. An accentuated, living, absolutely new instant—the proto-impression—already deviates from that needlepoint where it matures absolutely *present,* and through this deviation *presents itself,* retained, *to* a new punctual present, sensed in advance in a protention departing from the first proto-impression, and including in this presentiment the imminence of its own retreat into the immediate past of retention. Quite curiously, it is the present's acute and separated punctuality that constitutes its life; to it retention and protention, through which the lived flux is consciousness of time, attach their moorings.

Retention and protention are indeed intentionalities, but here *the intending and the event coincide.* Intentionality is the production of that primordial state in existence that is called modification: this "is no longer" is also a "still there," that is, a "presence for . . . ," and this "not yet" is an "already there," that is, in another sense, also "presence for . . ." Here knowledge and event are *modification* and not negation. Consciousness is not negativity; "knowledge" does not let go of the event that time does not destroy. When the modification of "transition" and "passage" goes far enough to tear it away from the reach of retention, memory finds it again in representation. This passage from retentional intentionality to transcendent intentionality indicates the temporal meaning of all transcendence. I will return to it.

Time and consciousness of time neither arise from a timeless point nor appear against the background of a preexisting time. The whole meaning of the critique Husserl addresses to Brentano at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* consists in refusing the deduction or construction of time starting out from an atemporal gaze embracing the proto-impression and its pale modifications. Time does not arise out of an immobile eternity for a disengaged subject. Moreover, when, in his descriptions of the constitution of time, Husserl uses expressions already having a temporal signification,[19] he is not affirming

a time behind time. One must recognize here a folding of time upon itself, a fundamental *iteration.* Consciousness of the permanence of flux, for example, is an effectuation of permanence in flux, "identical in its form."[20] The "already past" and the "just past" are the very divergence of a proto-impression modifying itself in relation to a completely new proto-impression. Event and consciousness are on the same level. The divergence of the *Urimpression* is the event, in itself primary, of the divergence of dephasing, which is not ascertained in relation to another time but in relation to another proto-impression that is itself "in on it." The look that ascertains the divergence is that very divergence. Consciousness of time is not a reflection upon time, but temporalization itself; the *after-the-fact* of realization is the *after* of time itself. Retention and protention are not contents constituted, in turn, as ideal identities in the flux of diversity; they are *the very manner* of the flux: retaining or protaining ("thought") and "being-at-a-distance" (event) coincide. Consciousness of . . . is the flux here. Consciousness is a constituting event and not merely, as in idealism, a constituting thought. Husserl calls the flux that is the sensing of sensation itself "absolute subjectivity," which is deeper than objectifying intentionality and prior to language.[21] Behind this original flux there is no other consciousness that ascertains this thought or event. The flux in which the duality of consciousness and event is surmounted no longer has any constitution; it conditions all constitution and idealization. Divergence is retention and retention is divergence; the consciousness of time is the time of consciousness.

4. Intentionality and Time

Is not this primary intentionality, which coincides with the very work of time, distinguished from the objective and idealizing intentionality that is freed from all temporality, on the way that leads from immanence to transcendence? Or is the object here still be anterior to the intending that fixes it? To be sure, retentional modification, continuing to the point of the impression's lapse into the past, turns into a memory that—already objectifying and idealizing intention—is the first transcendence. I have already touched on this point. But should one think that all intentionality is to some extent memory? Or, more exactly, is not the object of intention already older than the intention? Is there diachrony within intentionality? This is the peculiar question Husserl asks himself in appendix 5 of the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,* a question that one could believe to have been inspired by experimental psychology. Four points of view are

successively taken up. (1) That of the natural attitude, in which objective time is common to perception and the perceived: the star is anterior to the gaze that contemplates it because of the speed of light and the subject's reaction time. (2) In the phenomenological attitude one would expect a simultaneity between the subjective processes of the object's constitution and the object constituting itself in immanence. There is nothing of the sort. The object is possible only if an intention animates a sensation that must have minimally elapsed for the intention to inspire it.[22] The act is thus posterior to the material of the constituted object; not in the realistic sense, to be sure, but for the structure of the conscious act this thesis is quite significant. Consciousness is delayed in relation to itself—a way of lingering over a past. (3) In reflection, of course, the object precedes perception. (4) This leaves the proto-impression, significantly termed "internal consciousness," which by extension may be called perception: here, perceived and perceiver are simultaneous. Appendix 12 presents it as the indistinction of object and perception, and it is described in a way that contrasts sharply with that of intention. It is perhaps necessary to return to the main thesis: every distinction between perception and perceived, every idealizing intention rests on time, on the dephasing between the *aiming* and the *aimed at*. The proto-impression alone is pure of all ideality. It is the current form, the *now*, for which, to be sure, the unity of the sensation, identical in the flux, is constituted through the interlocking of retentions and protentions. But the flux is only the modification of the proto-impression that ceases to coincide with itself, in order to be presented in the adumbrations of the *Abschattung*, for only noncoincidence with itself—transition—is perceptual consciousness in the strict sense. The unity of the ever-evolving sensation is both older and younger than the instant of the proto-impression to which the retentions and protentions constituting this unity are tethered. The intentionality of the retentions starts from the proto-impression, the new point of the present that is absolute and without distinction between matter and form. It is neither movement nor rest, like the instant of the third hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. But the proto-impression is nonideality par excellence. The unforeseeable novelty of contents that arise in this source of all consciousness and being is original creation (*Urzeugung*), a passage from nothingness to being (to a being that will be modified in being-for-consciousness, but that will never be lost), a creation that deserves the name of absolute activity, of *genesis spontanea*.[23] But it is at the same time fulfilled beyond all conjecture, all expectation, all germination, and all continuity, and consequently is wholly passivity, receptivity of an "other" penetrating the "same," life and not "thought." An "internal consciousness," it will become consciousness through the temporal

modification of retention, designating perhaps the essence of all thought as the reserve of a fullness that escapes. The mystery of intentionality[24] lies in the divergence from . . . or in the modification of the temporal flux. Consciousness is senescence and remembrance of things past.

5. Intentionality and Movement

But the role of sensation in consciousness will permit an enlarging of the subjectivity of the subject in yet another sense. Here again the heritage of empiricism is, initially, taken up. But whereas, for the latter, consciousness is reduced to a conglomerate of sensations, and the sensations reduced to the psychological reverberations of corporeal modifications understood in a rigorously naturalist sense, the description of sensation by Husserl deprives the physico-physiological categories of the privilege of making the ultimate meaning of the body, consciousness, and the relation that exists between them, comprehensible. Sensation is not an *effect* of the body. It introduces, into a relation that is maintained as a subject-object polarity, a belongingness of the subject to the object. This occurs neither as a causal effect in the objective order, nor as an integrating part within this order, nor by including the object in the subject through the mediation of "subjective sensations" into which the object would be dissolved in the manner of Berkeleyan idealism. It is a matter of a new configuration: the subject faces the object and is *in complicity with it*; the corporeity of consciousness is in exact proportion to this participation of consciousness in the world it constitutes, but this corporeity is *produced* in sensation. Sensation is described as what is sensed "on" and "in" the body, and as that through which, in all sensible experience, "the body is implicated" (*mit dabei*). The object's warmth is felt in the hand, the surrounding cold in the feet, raised relief "at one's fingertips." These states, which in *Ideen* II Husserl calls *Empfindnisse*,[25] obliterate, through their very indetermination, the sensing-sensed, subject-object structure that the word "*Empfindung*" still suggests. The extension of these *Empfindnisse*, which refer at once to the body and to objects, differs from spatial extension. But this specific extension makes sensible experience not only the experience of space, but, by a kind of immediate *iteration*, an experience in space. This is characteristic of the hyletic datum; only intentionality is lived as indifferent to space and continues to accredit a subject immutable in its absoluteness.

> The whole of the consciousness of a man is bound in a certain way through this hyletic stratum to his body, while the intentional *Erlebnisse* themselves

> are no longer, properly speaking, localized in a direct manner; they do not constitute a stratum in the body. Perception as groping apprehension [*tastendes Auffassen*] of form, does not have its seat in the finger that gropes and in which tactile sensation is localized; thought is not really in the head, in an intuitive way, as are the *Empfindnisse* of tension, etc.[26]

Through sensation the relation with the object is incarnate: one can assert that the hand touches, the tongue tastes and the eye sees, before these banalities having been witnessed by an external perception, and without having this assertion indicate the physiological truth of thought's recourse (perhaps accidental, for a spiritualist metaphysics) to the sense organs. But neither does this assertion convey an introspective given, presupposing an attitude in which interiority stands opposed to exteriority. The analysis of sensations as *Empfindnisse* signifies precisely the explosion of this schema and opposition. Is this not the very meaning of the neutrality of reduced consciousness, if one means to take seriously the importance Husserl attaches to the reduction: the discovery of a screen upon which all signification susceptible of appearing, all phenomena, are outlined, and on which, consequently—without contradicting itself—the rupture with the subject-object, inside-outside schema can reveal itself? The body reveals itself there as the central point, the zero point of all experience, and as already dovetailed into that experience, as it were, by a type of fundamental *iteration*, the very event of which is sensation. It is not simply in memory of empiricism that sensation (but also the cultural attribute—both essentially iterative), with all its ambivalence in relation to the clear-cut structures of Cartesian dualism, constitutes the concreteness of perception, which is ineluctable and unforgettable for all philosophical comprehension. Philosophy begins in the "transcendental aesthetic" of the *Crisis*. Spatial and geometric nature, the *res extensa* of science, is the only abstract aspect of the world.

But the body is not only the depository and subject of *Empfindnisse*; it is the organ of free movement, the subject and seat of kinaesthetic sensations. Intentions animate these sensations, bringing them a meaning in relation to the transcendent; not to figure "object qualities," nor even to describe, as the *Empfindnisse* permit, the sphere (here original) of what a Cartesian would call the union of soul and body, but to confer a mobility on the subject *as subject*, and to confer on perceived reality an *essential* relativity with regard to this mobility. The *Empfindnisse* are constitutive of objective qualities; the kinaesthetic sensations, animated by intentions, are "motivation." The world is not constituted as a static entity, directly delivered over to experience; it refers to "points of view" freely adopted by a subject who, essentially, walks and possesses mobile

organs. If there is such and such a movement of the eye . . . then there will be such and such a modification of what is seen; if such and such an inclination of the head . . . then such and such a change in the spectacle; if such and such a movement of the groping hand . . . then such and such a novelty in the raised relief, etc.[27] Kinaesthetic sensation is not a sensed content *signalling* these modifications, *it is entirely modal*. The conditioning is in sensing itself. "The function of spontaneity belongs to all perception. The processes [*Verläufe*] of kinaesthetic sensations are free and this freedom in the consciousness of the flow of sensations (*diese Freiheit im Ablaufsbewußtsein*) is an essential part of the constitution of space."[28] Representation is directly relative to the subject's movements and to their positive possibility in kinaesthesis. The subject is not the eye of an immobile camera for which all movement is an object. Space as the field of organic movements and the whole body's gait already bears the representation of space. The subject moves in the very space it is going to constitute. The subject does not stay in the immobility of the absolute where the idealist subject is installed; it finds itself swept long into situations that cannot be broken down into representations that it could make for itself of these situations.

The evocation of kinaestheses does not serve, as in the period of full-scale empiricism, to build an exteriority starting from unextended, purely qualitative elements of sensation. How typical this is of the destiny of Husserlian thought, this reversal of the meaning of the notions it appears to retain of its own time, and even of those notions it has brought to it! The attention paid to psychophysical and psychophysiological investigations ends up discovering a corporeal sphere refractory to the subject-object schema that is iterative with an original iteration. It ends up discovering a Spirituality (of which one cannot even say that it is incarnate, for from the outset and in its *purity* it is *mixed*) inseparable from localization, from the recourse to organs through which alone organs are constituted, and inseparable from the gait, through which a space in which the gait is possible is constituted. Kinaesthesis is not the psychic equivalent of corporeal movement recorded or reflected by a subject, itself immobile (with the idealist immobility that no empirical matter could equal) and that, in the Hegelian way, ends by belonging to the world that it thinks and by forming a structure with the things of the world. Kinaesthesis in Husserl is the subject's original mobility. *Movement and gait are in the very subjectivity of the subject.* To be sure, intention is not in space, and the idealist illusion is understandable. But what is intention without sensation? If Husserl had eliminated sensation from his "system," the transcendence of intentionality would not have taken on the strong sense of "presence to the world." Through *Empfindnisse* and *kinaesthesis* the

subject walks *in* this world without the preposition *in* signifying a purely represented relation and without the presence to the world crystallizing into a *structure.* The philosophy that contributed the idea of eidetic structures, ends up also in radically denouncing the idea of structural fixity—its undephasible simultaneity—by introducing movement into the subjectivity of the subject and conditional motivation into its very presence.

Kinaestheses do not receive representative intentions but "an apprehension of an entirely different kind," that places every representative apprehension in the conditioning of "if . . . then." Of course this motivation is not the representation of a reason, even prepredicative or implicit. It is of the order of possible movement, beginning with the eye that sweeps the horizon, the head that turns left and right, the foot that here and now treads the ground, rather than of the order of contemplation evaluating possibilities at a distance. Should we not understand transcendence in the etymological sense of the term, as a passing over, an overstepping, a gait, rather than as a representation, without thereby destroying the essential of the metaphorical sense of this term? Transcendence is produced by kinaesthesis: thought goes beyond itself not by encountering an objective reality, but by entering into this allegedly distant world. The body, zero point of representation, is beyond this zero, already within the world it constitutes, "side by side" while placing itself "in front of . . . ," forming that composite that Merleau-Ponty will call "fundamental historicity." But *in* this world, also *facing* the world, and *prior* to the world, it resists structural contemporaneity. It is a walking in the space of the subject constituting space, like the becoming of the constitution of time stating with the proto-impression: "that which temporalizes [*das Zeitigende*] is already temporalized [*ist gezeitigt*]."[29] Original iteration—the final secret of the subject's historicity! A diachrony stronger than structural synchronism.

Through the motivating signification of kinaesthesia, transcendence is "consciousness of the possible," which is neither the simple absence of contradictions for an objectifying thought, nor even the consciousness of that "I can" that is presumed to accompany every ray of thought leaving the pure Ego and manifesting itself in the freedom of attention. It is now a matter of a superlatively concrete and quasimuscular "I think." It consists not in gauging, in terms of effort, the world's resistance to the will, but in disposing of all the resources of a will thus placed *as will* in a world of "if . . . then." In this sense, for Husserl, the body is the power of the will. Kinaestheses are the concretely free will, capable of moving and "turning about" in being. The body is not an accident that has happened to a contemplation fallen from of the empyrean heights, but the organ of a truly free contemplation transforming itself into power,

an organ of transcendence par excellence, passing from intention to act, and transgressing the predelineated limits of structure.

6. Sensation and Phenomenology

"One can imagine that one knows, when one doesn't." This is, according to the *Sophist,*[30] the worst kind of ignorance. But people remain within that ignorance, stating acceptable and technically effective propositions. The intent of the being, absorbed in the being it imagines it grasps, assures a culture functioning in a satisfactory way. But, ignorant of its ignorance, that culture is thoughtless and irresponsible. Open to all interpretations and without defense, it can be swindled. Psychologism, the critique of which occasioned the birth of phenomenology, represents the prototype of this alienation: the suspicion of accomplishing something completely different from what it claimed began to hover over logical thought. Beyond logic, this suspicion hovers over all cultural formations. Whatever has meaning—art, religion, morality, the state, even science—may not, it is thought, have the significance it claims to have; it is suspect of distorted meanings in a teeming of forms that overlap and molt infinitely. Is one not duped by social and subconscious influences? Who is pulling the strings? Husserlian phenomenology investigates the source of all meaning by unraveling the threads of the intentional tangle. Its effort consists solely in determining what one does not know when one believes one knows, and in measuring the essential alienation of culture. "Our epoch," Husserl writes on the brink of the 1914 war, "is a great epoch. Only it suffers from the skepticism that has dissolved the old unclarified ideals."[31] Husserl counters the lazy skepticism denouncing the illusions of an unexamined culture with the work of an optimistic critique, a search for the original movements of intention, of which we know only the indistinct sedimentation and thick alluvium. To combat the alienation into which a thought dissimulating its origins thrusts us, to pierce the secret of the hidden diversions of significations, to overcome the inevitable naivete of spontaneity—such is the very purpose of Husserlian phenomenology.

Thus the climb back to transcendental consciousness is not one more idealism, but the climb back to the Phenomenon, to what makes a meaning shine forth, an interruption of that proliferation of meaning whose origin is unknown and wherein we are immersed. For this it does not suffice to find some psychic interiority, that, as psychic and as interiority, itself belongs to those significations to be clarified. We need to find an original and neutral ground, which for Husserl lies in the depths

of intersubjectivity, where every meaning—that of interiority, exteriority, corporeity, spirituality, etc.—shines with its first glimmer of meaning, with a light it cannot have borrowed from any other. And nothing can put this original light in question without already having been illuminated by it—a privilege perhaps claimed by Descartes's simple natures. Husserl does not doubt that such a ground exists. His first certainty is that *an origin exists.*[32]

This origin, without which thought remains exiled (and that means: without foundation, without a priori) is for Husserl neither the First Cause nor the Principle from which everything proceeds. It is the proto-impression. How can the a priori be an experience? Experience has always been understood as essentially uncertain of its claims and, in this sense, as leading thought astray. The novelty of phenomenology consists in reducing "experience-laying-claim-to-a-truth" to a conjuncture having a signification by itself, that is to say, to the source of a transcendental work starting from which the very notion of truth will only begin to have a meaning. These significations are the original clarity. In Husserlian language, this turning around is called the Transcendental Reduction. The contemporaries who do not accomplish this according to the rules of the art defined by Husserl nonetheless place themselves on this ground. For them, experience is the source of significations. *It is illuminating before being probative.*

Does reduced consciousness meet this demand for a first and neutral ground? Essentially "impressional," is it not possessed by the non-ego, by the other, by "facticity"? Is sensation not the very negation of the transcendental work and of the evident presence that coincides with the origin? Through his theory of the sensible, Husserl restores to the impressional event its transcendental function. In its mass that fills time he discovers a first intentional thought that is time itself, a presence-to-self across the first divergence, an intention in the first *lapse* of time and the first dispersion. He perceives a corporeity in the depths of sensation, that is, a liberation of the subject vis-à-vis the very petrification of the subject, a gait, a freedom that demolishes structure.

PART 3

BEYOND HUSSERL

10

From Consciousness to Wakefulness

I sleep but my heart wakes.

—*Song of Songs* 5:2

1. The Insecurity of Reason

Husserlian phenomenology intervenes at the level of the human, where reason signifies the manifestation of beings to a true knowledge, careful of their *presence* in the original, their *presence* in their identity as beings, or their presence qua being. That beings may appear without remaining in their being—that there could be, through signs or words, beings appearing without their being—that, in images, beings should present only their resemblance instead of their identity—that images should cover them over or peel off them like skins—that there may be resemblance and therefore semblance—that in all the orders of appearing, mere appearance is the ever-possible underside; all this was taken to mean, from philosophy's first steps, an insecurity in the rational. Reason, as a modality of knowledge, should be distrustful of certain games that enchant it. It would have to be vigilant to avoid illusions. One must not sleep; one must philosophize.[1]

The idea that these enchanting games might be played within reason itself, and without disrupting its rational movement, unbeknownst to it, so to speak—that against lucidity itself, there might consequently be a need for an exercise of reason *other* than its spontaneous and unforewarned variety—that there might be a need for vigilance against self-evidence and against its daydreams; in other words, that there should be a need for a philosophy *distinct from* "*common sense*" and scientific research: this is what is new in criticism. Kantianism, in which there is some agreement in seeing the "beginning of the end" of philosophy,

was perhaps the decisive moment of this call for a philosophy different from science. A moment that was characterized by the denunciation of the transcendental *illusion*—radical malice in good faith, or in a reason innocent of any sophism, and which Husserl, paradoxically, will call naivete. It is as if rationality, that is, according to the Western meaning of this term, the absorption of knowledge by being, were still intoxication; as though, standing upright in lucid vigilance, the reason that identifies being sleeping on its feet, or sleepwalking and still dreaming; as though, in its sobriety, it were still sleeping off some mysterious wine.

And this vigilance, and this dogmatism, continue to be interpreted as fields of knowledge—more extensive, clearer, more adequate. The fact that reason could be naive and still insufficiently awakened, that it would have to distrust its assurance, is in fact shown in Kant, in the theoretical adventure in which reason, as always in the West, is invested with the mission of truth and seeks to discover being; an adventure in which, consequently, being is exhibited qua being in or through reason. In Kant, it is the presence of being qua being or the lucidity of re-presentation that still gives the measure of sobriety, clearheadedness or vigilance. This vigilance is in turn interpreted as an activity, that is, as a remaining-the-same or a returning-to-its-identity under every affection (as an immanence), and thus as an invulnerability, a nonfissionability, an in-dividuality beneath the blows of affection: an invulnerability in submitting that is called the unity of the "I think," a solidity that will signify "I will," but immediately construed as a grasping, a "transcendental apperception"—the passivity of the wound received turning into an assumption, a synthesis, and thus into a synoptic simultaneity of presence. The limit of rationality—or of vigilance—is understood as a limit of activity. And, in Kant, the vigilance of the rational surpasses this limit in ethics, which is full vigilance, full rationality and full—that is, free—activity. It is remarkable, however, that the notion of the rational, initially reserved in its meaning for the order of knowledge, and consequently bound to the problem of being qua being, in Kant abruptly takes on a meaning in an order other than that of knowledge; even if, from this adventure, which in the Western tradition was essential to the human, reason retains (despite the passivity to which it will not fail to attest in the form of the categorical imperative) its pretension to activity, that is, its initial or ultimate belongingness to the category of the Same. Reason is the identity that posits itself as Ego; identity that identifies itself, returns to itself, through the force of its form. Which is precisely what happens in the form of self-consciousness: an act of identification or identification in act. A force that returns to itself by an itinerary that can only be blazed across the world, and the history of humanity. The rationality of reason would thus leave nothing in the form

of consciousness outside. The energy of identification's return to self—this *vis formae*—is the activity in every act, and, if a sobering, a sobering within the Same, a return-to-self.

2. Adequation and Life

Husserlian phenomenology—preoccupied with reason as presence of being in the original, and invoking intuition as the principle of principles, the rationality of reason—has nonetheless been the most rigorous critique of self-evidence; questioning even the self-evidence of logico-mathematical concatenations (which phenomenology nevertheless protected from all psychologization, to the point establishing itself, especially after the *Prolegomena*, as its supreme guarantor). Without ever contesting knowledge's privilege of holding the key to the origin of meaning, phenomenology ceaselessly seeks, behind the lucidity of the subject and the self-evidence with which it contents itself, a kind of surplus of rationality. This surplus would not consist in a return to the unconditional principle of a deduction, nor to some manner of intensification of light, nor to the enlargement of the objective horizon of appearances, which would have to "suppress" the partial character of the given by restoring the part of being that is manifested to the gaze of knowledge to the totality of the universe that it announces.

Sometimes in the Husserlian work recourse to the subjective takes on the appearance of such a concern for the totality that the subjective, in the form of the psychological, belongs to the totality of the world and of being. Thus, in his *Phenomenological Psychology*,[2] the subjective modes of the appearance of the world and of nature, the *Erscheinungsweisen*, the aspects of the real that vary according to the orientations and movements of the body, still belong to being and are still part of the world—as are, and even more profoundly, the hyletic layer of the lived, in its role of adumbrations and "silhouettes" (*Abschattungen*) constituting the "subjective aspects" of objects (and even the hyletic layer stripped of this role and considered as lived for itself) and, no doubt, on the hither side of these subjective orientations, the social conditions for research and for the identification of the true (which Husserl does not discuss).[3] To ignore this subjective part of being is not only to fall back into abstractions; it is to falsify knowledge, making it content with a truncated reality. And yet this psychic side does not constitute a "region" of being integrated in the world or associated with nature dialectically to "make a system" with it, since the phenomenological description of it is a privileged path toward the

reduction, that is, toward the "absolute" of consciousness, whose meaning no longer owes anything to the existence of the world. The "globe of the world floats in the subjective," according to a picturesque formulation from the *Phenomenological Psychology*. The element in which the world floats does not have the status of this world; it does not have any status at all, since it is by it alone that the very equilibrium of all status—the identification of the Same—is ensured.

A surplus of rationality, beyond what is contained in self-evidence, is obtained in phenomenology by a change of levels, a deepening, brought about in precisely the following way. In a subject absorbed in full lucidity by its object, a life that self-evidence absorbed and caused to be forgotten or anonymous must be awakened. In more general terms, it is a question of descending from the entity illuminated in self-evidence toward the subject that is extinguished rather than announced in it.

The necessity of going toward the subject and reflecting on consciousness and the intentional life, in which the world and objects are "noematically" present, is, to be sure, motivated in various ways at various moments of the presentation in the Husserlian work, whereas the motivated move is always the same.

In the *Logical Investigations* (first edition), phenomenology, in the form of a descriptive psychology, is supposed to make possible the avoidance of certain ambiguities that slip into the data by reason of the confusion between the subjective and the objective.[4] This requires a theory of knowledge that makes possible "certain and final determinations, if not of all objective distinctions and self-evidences, at least of most of them."[5] But shifts of meaning are also produced through language and symbolism, against which objective self-evidence is defenseless.

> Even if it is ideal analysis and not the phenomenological analysis of concrete, lived experiences that are part of the original domain of pure logic proper, this domain nonetheless remains indispensable for the advancement of the former. . . . What is logical is first given to us in an imperfect form; the concept appears to us as a more or less fluctuating verbal signification, the law as a no less fluctuating assertion, because they are constructed from concepts. It is true that we are not lacking in logical self-evidence. We apprehend the pure law with self-evidence and know that it is founded on pure forms of thought. But this self-evidence is bound up with word meanings that were alive in the effectuation of the act of judgment stating the law. Because of an ambiguity that passes unnoticed, other concepts can slip in after the fact beneath these words, and for the propositional meanings that have been modified, we may appeal, wrongly, to previously experienced self-evidence. Conversely, that misinterpretation issued from an equivocation can also distort the meaning of propositions of pure logic (turning it into the meaning of empirico-psychological propositions, for example), and lead us to abandon the self-evidence experienced earlier, and the unique signification of pure logic.
>
> This way of being given for logical ideas and the pure laws that are constituted from them therefore do not suffice. Whence arises the great task of *bringing to clarity and distinctness*—according to the exigencies of the *theory of knowledge*—*logical ideas*, concepts and laws.
>
> This is where phenomenological analysis comes in.[6]

Similarly, a little later Husserl says: "But the most complete self-evidence can become confused, can be falsely interpreted; what it discloses in all certainty can be rejected."[7] Thirty years later, the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* continued to emphasize these misunderstandings that are not due to the awkwardness of the logicians.

The logic that the logician-mathematician can bring to completion without being concerned about psychic acts in which his theory is lived requires a "descriptive psychology" that reflects on this lived experience. Obscurities might mar either the mathematician's gaze or his language, or slip into the results of his calculation while they lay peacefully deposited as something acquired in some writing, but outside of thought. A reflection would be needed to verify the intuitive purity *unaltered by the look turned toward the objective*. Everything takes place as though the lucidity of the *Anschauung* turned toward the object were not sufficiently lucid, and remained in a mind insufficiently awakened. It is only by reflection on what is lived in consciousness that the objective terms are maintained in a self-evidence that, by itself, without transparency to itself, is first awakened to itself only in reflection.

The motivation of phenomenology by the instability of self-evidence, in which the objects of the world or the logico-mathematical relations appear when one leaves that self-evidence to itself, is connected to the motives that invite one to the theory of knowledge whose problem is formulated in different ways in the first pages of the *Logical Investigations*. "How is one to understand that the *in itself* of objectivity attains *representation*, thus in a sense becoming once again subjective?"[8]

This formulation of the theory of knowledge does, it is true, refer us back to the study of the general structure of knowledge and consequently to the analysis of consciousness, and to the meaning of the objectivity of objects (which, in the perspective of the *Logical Investigations*, had to be distinguished from *acts* of consciousness and preserved from all confusion with those acts). But between the two motivations—the instability of the self-evidences left to themselves, and the referral back to the

general problematic of the theory of knowledge—the bond is established, practically, in the de facto exercise of phenomenology.

In *Ideas* I, the passage to phenomenology is called the *Transcendental Reduction.* It is accomplished along Cartesian lines; beginning with the inadequation of self-evidence concerning the world and the things in it—through the suspension of belief in the existence of that world and those objects that are affirmed despite the uncertainty—toward the search for certainty or the adequate self-evidence of reflection on the *cogitation* to which that very belief belongs—in order to measure the degree of its uncertainty or its certainty. Or *to elucidate the meaning or the modality of naive self-evidence*! Here there is an alternative that, in the *Ideas,* is an ambiguity. Must we conserve, in the form of an ideal of certainty, the certainty of the intuition that fully espouses the claim thought makes, and measure all certainty by this standard? Phenomenology would then have as its goal to return to reduced consciousness, to put into question over and over again the alleged sufficiency of the world given in the naive self-evidence of man-in-the-world, or of being, given as world, after having discovered that, in the intuition directed upon the world, or on a consciousness integrated in the world in the form of psychological consciousness, thought is never fulfilled by the presence of what it intends, but opens upon a process of infinite "fulfilling." The apodicticity of internal intuition, in which internal intuition can be judged and circumscribed, would be the finality of the transcendental turn. But one can also say that meaningful thought has to be liberated from the norms of adequation. This would be to liberate it from obedience to *being* understood as the event of identification of the identical, an event of identification that is possible only as an assembling into a theme, as representation and presence. If it is this liberation that is the essential, the reduction would be not a discovery of uncertainties that compromise certainty, but an awakening of the spirit beyond certainty or uncertainty, modalities of the knowledge of being. The reduction would be an awakening in which a rationality of thought—the signifying of meaning—is profiled, contrasting against the norms that command the identity of the Same; and perhaps (beyond the horizons that Husserl's texts explicitly open and in which his express thought is firmly contained) a rationality of the spirit that is translated neither into fields of knowledge nor certainties, and is what is designated by the irreducible term: awakening. In *Ideas* I itself, the first term of the alternative we have just formulated incontestably prevails. To be sure the reduction does make possible, beyond the critique leveled against the *certainty* of self-evidences, the description of self-evidences in which uncertainties enter as traits that characterize new modalities of self-evidence (and consequently new modes of being). But in any case, in

Ideas I, the passage to a deeper rationality is still a passage from a less perfect knowledge to another more perfect knowledge—the passage from an order in which the overlapping of the intended and the seen is impossible to the order of adequate identification, which would be the order of the apodictic.

But in the *Cartesian Meditations,* this apodictic rationality is interpreted differently. It no longer depends on the "adequation" between intuition and the "signitive" act that the intuition fulfills. The intuition of the internal sense is, in turn, incapable of fulfilling the "signitive intention." Beyond a kernel of "living presence" of the ego to itself "there extends only an indeterminate horizon of a vague generality, a horizon of what in reality is not the immediate object of experience, but only the object of thoughts that necessarily accompany it. To this horizon belongs the past of the ego, almost always totally obscure."[9] But the limit between the apodictic and the nonapodictic is not reducible to what separates the "core" from its horizons—a limit that nothing indicates or brings out in the texts (§§ 6–9) that Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* devotes to apodicticity. Thus, in the "living presence of the Ego to itself" the adequation of the "intended" and the "seen" is not the essential. "Apodicticity can, according to the case, belong to inadequate self-evidences. It possesses an absolute indubitability of a special and well determined order, that which the scientist attributes to all principles."[10] The positive determination of apodicticity, which does not always go "hand in hand with adequation," is missing in these embarrassed pages in which, on several occasions, the difficulties attaching to the "provisionally neglected" notion of apodicticity are admitted.[11]

Must it not be admitted that the specific and exceptional indubitability of the apodictic is related to—and cannot be abstracted from—the unique situation of the *Cogito-Sum*? This situation would define apodicticity, and there is no criterion exterior to this conjuncture that would make it apodictic. "To deny the apodicticity of the *I am* is possible only if one limits oneself to those arguments" (sc., to arguments in favor of the doubt returning in the evidence of the I am) "in a quite external way."[12] And yet the necessity of submitting the apodicticity of the transcendental experience to a critique (also apodictic),[13] in a reflection on reflection, is not contested. We are even told that it would not lead to an infinite regression.[14] Now, one cannot expect some adequate intuition to stop this regression. Only the evidence of an "idea in the Kantian sense of the term" could make this infinite critique thinkable. The apodictic of the transcendental reduction will then be a reflection on reflection gathering only in an "idea in the Kantian sense of the term" a process of critique of critique that cannot he brought to a close. The apodicticity of

the *Cogito-Sum* rests on the infinity of the "iteration."[15] The apodictically indubitable comes from no new trait of evidence that would ensure it a better openness upon being or a better approach. It is due only to the deepening of evidence, to a change of level, where, from the evidence that illuminates it, subject awakens as from a "dogmatic slumber." In the "living presence of the Ego to itself,"[16] does not the adjective "living" designate that wakefulness that is possible only as an incessant awakening? In "living presence" and "living evidence" the adjective "living" is added *emphatically* to the titles that are appropriate to evidence as the essence of truth, to make the *Cogito-Sum* be understood as a modality of the *living* itself, identifying itself in its immanence, but awakening from that immanence in the form of an ego-that-stands-at-a-distance-from-itself, wrested from the state of soul of which it is a part. Does not the adjective "living" express the apodicticity of the subjective, which is not only a degree of certainty but the life mode—the *liveliness*[17] of life? Does not this adjective reveal the importance, from the beginning of the Husserlian discourse, of the word "*Erlebnis*," which designates the subjectivity of the subjective? The lived, and life, would thus be described not by the ecstasis of intentionality, not by the *outside-oneself* of being in the world, nor even as in the *Phenomenological Psychology*—where life is lived before the *hyle* of the sensible takes on the function of *Abschattung*[18] and seems to exhaust itself in self-identification—by the gathering, in the passive synthesis of time, into a "presence to self," a perfect knowledge of self-consciousness, a perfect immanence. Presence to self, as a living presence to self in its very innocence, casts its center of gravity outside: always the presence of self to self *awakens* from its identity as a state and presents itself to an ego that is "transcendent in immanence."

3. Vigilance as Ego

At the level of the Ego, where subjectivity is at the liveliest of its life, Husserl introduces the very terms of sleep and waking. While belonging to immanence, the Ego is situated outside of it, as "transcendence in immanence." This must mean a *difference* with respect to the "staying-the-same" or the "finding-itself-again-the-same" which is the duration (or temporalization, as we now say) of immanent time, or the flux of the lived; but a difference other than that which separates the intentional object from this flux. What can be meant by this exteriority rending the core of the intimate, this "soul within the soul," this alterity, there where everything is coincidence with self or retrieval of self,[19] this unreality in

the heart of the lived? What can be meant by this exteriority that is not intentional ecstasis? A retro-cendence: that which identifies itself in immanence and overlaps there with itself detaches itself from itself or sobers up, as at the moment when sleep gives way and when, in waking up, what was hitherto lived fades into a dream that was and is only remembered. Transcendence in immanence, the strange structure (or *depth*) of the psychic as a soul within the soul, is the ever-recommencing awakening in wakefulness itself; the *Same* infinitely brought back in its most intimate identity to the *Other*. It would be absurd to isolate this other from this infinite relation and preserve it as the ultimate, that is, as the same in its turn, in an impenitent attachment to the rationalism of the Same.[20] In the awakening, between the Same and the Other, a relation irreducible to adversity and conciliation, alienation and assimilation appears. Here, the Other, instead of alienating the uniqueness of the Same which it disturbs and holds, only calls it up from the depths of itself to what is deeper than itself, whither nothing and no one can replace it. Would this already be responsibility for the other person? The Other calling the Same in the deepest part of itself! A heteronomy of freedom that the Greeks did not teach us.[21] Transcendence in immanence—it is precisely the Ego's not belonging to the tissue of the states of consciousness, which thus do not stiffen by themselves in their immanence.

The awakening is the ego sleeping and not sleeping, *for whom* everything that happens in immanence itself happens:[22] a heart awake, a nonbeing, nonstate in the depths of the soul's states, slumbering in their identity, an insomnia or heartbeat in the ultimate retreat of the subjective atom.

Granted, this vigilance of the ego coming from the depths of subjectivity that transcends its immanence, this *de profundis* of the spirit, this explosion at the heart of substance, this insomnia, are described in Husserl as intentionality. The watchful ego, on the alert for the object, remains an objectifying activity, even in its axiological or practical life. Here, the sobering of the awakening depends on the alterity of the object, the collision with the real. The affection undergone, the stimulation received, comes from the object, from what "emerges" (*sich abhebt*) in immanence. The awakening still responds to an alterity that is to be assimilated by the ego. It is this assimilation that is expressed by the optical metaphor of the *ray*, which, coming from the awakened ego, directs itself toward the object that awakened it—directs itself toward it in the guise of knowledge, the mind assimilating what strikes it. This is all true.

Yet, while in *Ideas* I the division of intentional consciousness into "actualities" and "potentialities" already presupposed the fact of intentionality, so that intentionality was not, from the outset, equivalent to

the radiation of the Ego, and the Ego characterized only the active intentionality manifested in attention—in *Experience and Judgment* and *Phenomenological Psychology*,[23] it is intentionality as such that coincides with the vigilance of the Ego affected and already awakening. This Ego is *never torpid to the point of absence*. Even in the passivity of consciousness, where one cannot yet properly speak of knowledge, the ego wakes. Even if this virtual intentionality is destined to expand into knowledge and evidences, making the underlying life of the ego to be forgotten, or putting that life into a state of sleep, the *possibility of awakening* already makes the heart of the ego—of the troubled, living inside, "transcendent in immanence"—beat. "Sleep, carefully considered, has meaning only in relation to waking, and bears within itself the potentiality of awakening."[24]

Must not the analysis then be pushed beyond the letter of Husserl's text? In the identity of the state of consciousness present to itself, in this silent tautology of the prereflexive, *wakes* a difference between the same and the same, never in sync, which identity cannot clasp: precisely the *insomnia* that cannot be said otherwise than by these words, of *categorial* meaning. A scission of identity, *insomnia* or *waking*—otherwise than being—belong to "logical" categories no less august than those that sustain or found being, just as, for example, dialectical negativity, to which insomnia is not reducible, belongs to them. An irreducible category of difference *at the heart* of the Same, that pierces the structure of being in animating or inspiring it. Husserl compares the Ego to the unity of transcendental apperception in Kant,[25] and there is indeed reason to do so, but the identity of this identical is rent by the difference of insomnia opening a void that is always recreated not by detachment from everything acquired, but by resistance, so to speak, of any condensation of this very void that overcomes me like drowsiness (or like the being of beings). Insomnia as denucleation of the very atomicity of the one (of which the unity of the transcendental apperception, synthesizing the given, still avails itself), or as the dis-appointment of its very punctuality.

An insomnia or severing that is not the finitude of a being incapable of rejoining itself and "remaining at rest" in the form of a state of mind, but transcendence rending or inspiring the immanence that, initially, envelops it, as if there could be an idea of the Infinite, that is, as if God could fit inside me.[26] A waking without intentionality, but only awakened unceasingly from its very state of waking, sobering out of its identity into what is deeper than itself. Subjectivity is a susception of the Infinite, a submission to a God that is both inner and transcendent. *In itself*, liberation *from* itself. Freedom of the awaking, freer than the freedom of the beginning, which fixes itself in a principle.[27] It resembles the freedom that bursts forth in the proximity of the neighbor, in

responsibility for the other person, in which, however, as uniqueness of the noninterchangeable, condition or uncondition of a hostage, I am unique and chosen. Is there here an analogy with the proximity of the other person, or the necessary antecedent to an awakening? Without intentionality, otherwise than being is not *waking* already a substitution of oneself for the other? It is in any case on the basis of the Other that Husserl describes transcendental subjectivity wresting the Ego from its isolation in itself. But the unity of transcendental apperception and the lucidity of knowledge recognized as the subject are not without phenomenological justification. They are necessary for the awakening. The Ego is in itself, and in itself it is *here*, and here it is in the world. It must be uprooted from that rootedness. Husserl's transcendental reduction has as its vocation to rouse it from torpor, to reanimate its life and its horizons lost in anonymity. The intersubjective reduction, based on the other, wrests the ego from its coincidence with itself and with the center of the world—even if Husserl continues to conceive the relationship between the ego and the other in terms of knowledge.

4. The Reduction as Awakening

The exposition of apodicticity, of indubitability sui generis, ends in section 9 of the *Cartesian Meditations* with the admission of difficulties connected to the problems it raises. Presence to oneself calls for a meaning that can no longer be described by adequation, as it is not destroyed by the inadequation between the intended and the seen.[28] The path leading to the reduction from a phenomenological psychology of perception is, if we are to believe the *Crisis*, better than the path followed in *Ideas* I and in the *Cartesian Meditations*, starting out from Descartes. The subjective life reveals its transcendental dignity in its antecedence with respect to the real, which identifies itself in it, but which assimilates and reduces that life to anonymity. It is as if, in knowledge itself, bearing on an identical and identifiable object, the opening were also a closing! As if the thought that identifies a world or inhabits it were immediately obstructed or "embourgeoised" by that very world! Hence it is as if the adventure of knowledge were not all the spirituality of thought, but the dozing of a wakefulness! An opening stopped up by what appears in it, not to bring about a dialectic of the part and the whole—as if the part necessary to the knowledge of the whole not only absorbed the look (reason fallen to the level of understanding) but induced forgetfulness of the indigence of the part, taken for a whole, and thus dissimulated the whole instead of revealing

it—but as if the broadening, beneath a greater light, of the objective horizon in which the object shows itself, alongside other objects that it dissimulates, were not yet the clearing away of the naivete of the look turned toward its theme. It is the life underlying the look that Husserl's phenomenology awakens. It is not a matter of adding an inner theme to the outer one, but of reanimating—or of reactivating—life, in order to reach, under the appellation of indubitable being, living presence. *It is a matter of rediscovering life again in presence.* As if consciousness, in its identification of the Same, fell asleep in "awakening" to things, as if the object contemplated were the one that, Medusa-like, petrifies life into knowledge.

Reduction is above all the procedure that shows and reawakens, beneath the *repose in itself* in which the autoreferential Real is accomplished, the life against which thematized being has already balked, so to speak, in its smugness. A life that is, it is true, conveniently called absolute existence, but its absoluteness will be the ab-solution or sobering, or awakening or being on the alert, in the exposition of the "reduced" for new reductions, undoing the dogmatism remaining or recurring under the name of ideal identities, reactivating intentions that have lost their attentiveness, opening forgotten horizons, importuning the Same at the heart of its identity, there where watching turns itself into a *state* of soul; importuning the state of wakefulness, which already owes its repose to the Same, in which it still or already basks at ease.

For the ego that is awakening itself, but an ego that finds itself again the same—the intersubjective reduction! This reduction is not only directed against the solipsism of the "primordial sphere" and the relativism of truth that results from it, in order to ensure the objectivity of knowledge in the form of an agreement between multiple subjectivities. The constitution or the explication of the meaning of an Ego other than me, setting out from the *analogy between animated bodies*—a passive synthesis accomplished in the primordial ego—tears the ego away from its hypostasis, from the *here*, which its sleepwalking does not suffice to separate from the center of the world. The spatial interchangeability of the *here* and the *there* do not only constitute the homogeneity of space. Through the interchangeability of the here and the there, the Ego, despite its being so obviously *primordial* and hegemonous in its *hic et nunc* and in its identification, becomes *secondary*, sees itself as other, exposes itself to the other, already has to give an account of itself. Does not the counternatural aspect or the "wonder" of reflection on the self, as practiced in the egological reduction, owe its eventually successful intersubjective tearing away from the primordial to the ego's reduction to its antecedent and forgotten secondariness? The secondariness in

which, beneath the look of the other, the primordial sphere loses its priority, its privileges and its smugness is an awakening in which the egological—egoism and egotism—flee like dreams. This secondariness is, in Husserl, tempered or even equilibrated by the reciprocity of the intersubjective relations, as a result of a tenacious tradition in which the mind is equivalent to knowing, and freedom to beginning, and in which the subject, though denucleated, persists as the unity of transcendental apperception.

But does the antecedent exposure of the primordial sphere in its identity and "natural pride" to the Other mean enslavement? Is the look of the other from the first an objectification and a reification? In the exposure of the primordial to the other, is not the Same, dedicated from the outset to the other, not chosen, and, in its responsibility, irreplaceable and unique? Vigilance—awakening rising up within awakening—awakening that awakens the state into which wakefulness itself falls and congeals—is vocation—and concretely responsibility for the Other.

As opposed to the simple abstraction that starts with individual consciousness and rises to "consciousness in general" by the ecstatic or angelic omission of its terrestrial weight, by the intoxication or the idealism of a magical sublimation, Husserl's theory of intersubjective reduction describes the surprising possibility of a sobering in which the ego frees itself from itself, awakens from dogmatic slumber.[29] The reduction as an explosion of the Other in the Same, toward absolute insomnia, is a category under which the subject loses the atomic consistency of transcendental apperception.

Husserl, to the end, formulates it as a passage from a knowledge to a better knowledge. The apodicticity of the Reduction remains characterized as indubitable knowledge, as the living presence of the *Ego Cogito. Life*, it is true, cannot enter into the philosophical discourse except as *presence* to a reflection. But Husserl does not separate the liveliness of life from presence, the condition for philosophical discourse. With him the very spirituality of the spirit always remains knowledge. And this necessity for philosophy to remain, as knowledge, knowledge of *presence* and of being, cannot in Husserl, any more than in the whole of Western philosophy, not signify the ultimate figure of the meaningful; or, which amounts to the same thing, this necessity cannot not signify that the meaningful has its meaning in the ultimate, the fundamental, the Same. The mind remains founded on the presence of being; it is the event of that presence. Sense, which cannot, when it shows itself, not show itself in consciousness, will not separate from the adventure of consciousness, which is ontological. Never will the philosophy that sets out from the presence of being awaken from it, or express awakening in words other

than those of knowledge; never will it reduce ontology's knowledge to one of the modalities of awakening, in which already *deeper* modalities arise; never will it think wakefulness—and the awakening from which wakefulness lives—as Reason without understanding it in knowledge, without reducing its very signifyingness to a *manifestation* of sense. To awaken from presence and from being will signify for philosophy an adventure of the spirit only in the sense of a profusion of free-floating images, poetry or dreams, intoxication or sleep.

5. Wakefulness

Is the *liveliness* of life not excession—a rupture of the container by the noncontainable that precisely thus animates or inspires? Is not wakefulness an inspiration? These are irreducible terms. The *liveliness* of life is an incessant bursting of identification. As if, dazzling or burning, life were, beyond *seeing*, already the pain of the eye overwhelmed by light; beyond contact, already the igniting of the skin that touches—but does not touch—the ungraspable. The Same disturbed by the Other that exalts it. To live is not an ecstasis; it is an enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is not intoxication; it is a sobering. A sobering ever still to be sobered, a wakefulness on the verge of a new awakening, the Same always awakening from itself—Reason. Should the *otherwise*—nonrepose or nonperdurance in the Same, nonstate—that thus un-says itself from being, be called creature? Perhaps. But on condition that we do not understand it as a lesser being, or as some kind of a modification or derivative of being. For the priority or ultimacy of the Same—as well as consciousness and knowledge and thematization and being—are being put into question. Here the framework of ontology breaks, the subject passing from the Same—excluding or assimilating the other—to the awakening of the Same by the Other, and sobering from its intoxication with its identity and its being.

We have described elsewhere the denucleation of the *subject-substance*, in which, setting out from the responsibility for the Other, as substitution for him, on the order of the Infinite, and in which the Infinite—neither theme nor interlocutor—awakens me to vigilance, to watch over my neighbor.[30]

An awakening irreducible to knowledge, a Reason not confined to lucidity. But knowing constitutes a privileged modality of it, justified to the extent that *responsibility for the other*, and the condition—or the uncondition—of hostage that this responsibility signifies, cannot, before a third party, do without comparison—applies itself therefore to

the comparison of incomparables, to objectification, consciousness, and philosophical knowledge itself.[31]

The question that these pages have raised consists in asking whether intelligence and signifyingness are invariably figures of the Same, of knowledge and of being, or whether, on the contrary, signification espouses these figures only at a certain level of vigilance—when, in the repose of identity, intelligibility already becomes drowsy, becomes "embourgeoised" in presence satisfied with its place.

An "embourgeoising" or smugness, a strange "alteration" of the Same by itself, eventhough it should be preserved from such an alteration by its identity and its power to assimilate the other; alienation, "fattening," that denies alterity by balking, in its integrity, against what transcends it and yet still affects it.[32]

I ask whether reason, always reduced to the search for repose, appeasement, conciliation—always implying the ultimacy or the priority of the Same—does not thereby already depart from living reason. Not that reason would be the equivalent to the *quest* for an equality with oneself—and adequation with oneself—that would be *better* than the adequation already attained. Against this outdated and unjustifiable romanticism, as against the romanticism that prefers war to peace, the classicism of plenitude is beautiful in its lucidity. But I inquire whether lucidity, the perfection of knowledge, is the most awakened wakefulness—even if it were necessary to admit that vigilance itself has to be recognized with lucidity. I ask whether the *watchful* is a nostalgia of the equal and not a patience for the Infinite; I ask, then, whether reason, as vigilance and watchfulness, is not the inassimilable disturbance of the Same by the Other—an awakening that shakes the waking state—a disturbance of the Same by the Other in difference, which, precisely non-in-difference, does not lend itself to the adversities and reconciliations in which the community—however formal—sets off the dialectical movement. Here difference remains without any community whatsoever, and nonindifference, the unique relationship of awakening, is not reducible to anything. Anxiety, a deepening or rocking of all foundation, and thus of presence or of simultaneity (by which origin and ultimacy are fixed in time) in diachrony; exposure to the other in the guise of wound and vulnerability. Not the passivity of inertia or of the effect, but sensibility: the pain of dazzling light and burning. More light in the eye than its state can receive, more contact than skin can touch: the Same kept awake by the other. A relation between the Same and the Other that, for the philosophy of the Same, can only be provisional.

But is this not the description of transcendence? A relation between the Same and the Other that cannot be interpreted as a state, not even as

the state of lucidity, a relation that must be granted to vigilance, which, as anxiety, does not rest in its theme, in representation, in presence, in Being. Vigilance—awakening within wakefulness—signifies de-fection of the identity, which is not its extinction but its substitution for the neighbor. An order, or disorder, in which reason is no longer knowledge or action but in which, unseated by the Other from its state—unseated from the Same and from being—it is ethical relation with the other person, proximity of the neighbor.

These questions concern the ultimate and even the possibility or impossibility of the ultimate. Must we think that the identification of the Same, in which being answers for its presence, is reason in its vigilance of mind, but that, failing in each of its epochs, it requires the whole of human history to regain its assurance, and from then on accomplishes itself dialectically through ruptures and recoveries of identity until the final triumph of *identification* in the Absolute Idea, the identity of this rational movement and of being? Must we not fear, on the contrary—in the identity of the Same and in its return itself, in which reason qua identification claims its triumph, in the identity of the Same to which thought itself aspires as to a rest—a stupor, a petrification, a fattening, or an indolence? The dilemma can be put yet another way: Does the other, who eludes identification, pass abusively—or only for a time for the adversary of the Same, in a diabolical game that only a knowledge impatient to conclude and that refuses the methodology of history fears—a game in which the mind in its patience of the concept, assured of being able to deal with the other in its good time, emerges undaunted? Or must not the other be understood also in quite another way, in the sense of an alterity—some of the characteristics of which I have already delineated—as an incessant putting into question, without ultimacy, of the priority and quietude of the Same, like the burning without consumption of an inextinguishable flame? A susception more passive than all passivity, not even leaving any ashes; but a susception in which meaning transpires: the more in the less, or one for the other—susception of transcendence, an awakening in the midst of wakefulness itself, an ever more profound sobering, an insomnia more vigilant than the lucidity of self-evidence in which the Same rests—still and already—dreaming in its present; beyond the dialectic, which, despite its anxiety, remains consciousness of the Same in its completion or, more simply still, remains the very idea of completion and of the ultimate.

11

Philosophy and Awakening

1. The independence or exteriority of being in relation to the knowledge that it commands in truth, and the possibility of this exteriority's being "internalized" in knowledge, which is equally the *place* of truth, is the fact of the world, where the agreement between thought and being is produced. This agreement is not some mysterious adequation of the incomparable; it is not an absurd equality of the "psychic fact" and the spatial and "physical fact," which obviously have no common measure. It is the feat of perception: the original union of the open and the graspable in the world, the given and the apprehended—or the comprehended. Hence the ideas of knowledge and being are correlative and refer back to the world. To think being and to think knowledge is to think on the basis of the world. Furthermore, being and consciousness are bound to presence and representation, to the graspable solid that is the originary thing, to some *thing*, to the identical to be identified through its multiple aspects or, as one could say, to the Same. This is the ontic wisdom of perception, the wisdom of everyday life and the wisdom of nations, guaranteeing universality to the science born of perception—the wisdom of truth and of the world.

Philosophy has maintained—in the way it is taught, but already in the forms of its direct discourse—an ontic style. It seems to bear on the *being*. Even when it wants to be ontological. To be sure, the being of the being will no longer be a "something," since one cannot say that it *is*; the temptation remains nonetheless (and it is not the effect of some clumsiness or superficiality on the part of the writer) to speak about the truth of this verb-being and of the disclosure in which it manifests itself. Does it suffice to reduce this ontic style to the logic of a certain language that would have to be surpassed? Does it signify the truth of Kantianism: the impossibility of an intelligible thought that would not somehow be reducible to a given, to the representation of being, to the presence of being, to the world? In another Kantian register, does it signify a new transcendental appearance? There have been frequent denunciations

of this language of representation in philosophy, in which truths are stated as if they were the truths of some sublime perception or some sublimated sensibility, in which they are understood as are those of the natural sciences or historical narrative, and as if, in their scholarly and even sophisticated texture, they still referred to the arrangement of some piece of being's delicate clockwork. For example, Jeanne Delhomme's[1] effort from *Pensée Interrogative* through *La Pensée et le Réel* to *Impossible Interrogation*, consists in finding in the language of philosophers another significance than that of an ontic or even ontological speech, in separating philosophy and ontology, and even, in a certain sense, in separating philosophy and truth. Which is not to say, let us add in passing, that philosophy is the reign of the lie, no more than this would be true of art.

But taken as ontic knowledge, and compared to the coherent, communicable, and universal results of scientific knowledge, philosophy today has lost all credence. For a long time it had already been compromised due to disagreement among philosophers. This disagreement is deplored in the *Discourse on Method*; it is one of the motivations of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of Husserl's phenomenological research, as it was justified in 1910 in the well-known article "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science." But, beneath the theme of the end of metaphysics, that depreciation of philosophy means in our time, perhaps most clearly, an awareness of the misconception perpetuated by a philosophy bogged down in its language, and which hypostasizes, in the form of worlds-behind-the-world, the meaning of its thoughts, for which it is unable to find a meaning other than ontic. The rearguard work of this philosophy in retreat consists in de-constructing this so-called metaphysical language, which, for all its onticality, is neither perception nor science, and in which one would like to discover, through a psychoanalysis of deconstructed materials, at least the meaning of symptoms of some ideology.

2. Even before today's crisis, Hegel's philosophy appears to be acquainted with the *hubris* of philosophy speaking the language of perception or expressing the arrangement of the cosmic order or the connection of historical events. Philosophical truth would not be an opening *on* something, but the intrinsic rule of a discourse, the logic of its logos. Perception, science, narration, in their ontic structure of correlation between a subject and an object to which the subject conforms, are no longer the model of truth; they constitute determined moments, vicissitudes of the dialectic. But discourse as logos is not, for its part, a discourse *on* being, but the very being of beings, or, if you will, their being qua being. Hegel's philosophy is coherent even to the point of already having broken with the realist prototype of truth in the statement of this rupture. It is already dialectical discourse when it is only on the verge

of adopting dialectical discourse. It never uses metalanguage; properly speaking, it reveals itself without prefaces, although philosophers, while denouncing a particular language, still speak the language they are in the process of condemning. It is a philosophy that retrieves the "truths" of the history of philosophy, despite their reciprocal contradictions and their apparent exclusivism. The truths of *Representation* occupy, in determinate moments of the dialectical discourse, or in the movement of being qua being, the place that is logically theirs, but the process of thought and of being and its truth no longer fall within the province of *Representation*. Rationality consists in being able to pass from *Representation* to the *Concept*, which is no longer a modality of *Representation*.

Nonetheless, Hegel's philosophy preserves one element from representation that marks the rationality of our philosophical tradition, and that still belongs to the wisdom of perception and the narrative tending toward what is graspable. To accede to the rational is to grasp. Knowledge is no longer *perception*, but it is still *concept*. The rational is syn-thesis, synchronization of the historical, that is, presence; that is, being: world and presence. The thought of reasonable animality is accomplished in the *Idea* in which history presents itself. It is toward the idea that the dialect tends, the dialectic in which diachronically traversed moments are recovered, that is, identified, sublimated, and conserved. A philosophy of Presence, of Being, of the Same. The conciliation of contradictions, the identity of the identical and the nonidentical! It is still the philosophy of the intelligibility of the Same, beyond the tension of the Same and the Other.

The dialectical unfolding of rationality and the process of being as the logic of logos, in their Hegelian and neo-Hegelian form, doubtlessly remain even today a possibility (perhaps the ultimate possibility) of a proud philosophy that does not, in the face of the sciences, apologize for philosophizing—the possibility of a mature humanity, that is, one that does not yet or no longer forgets its past. But these memories can disregard neither the aftermath of the Hegelian system, nor the crises that have marked the attempts, derived from this system, to transform the world; nor the paling of its rationality before the one that triumphs and is communicated to everyone in the development of the so-called "exact" sciences and the techniques they inspire; nor the new disagreements between philosophers that the Hegelian message could not prevent; nor the discovery of the social and subconscious conditioning of human knowledge. Husserl's harsh judgment on the arbitrariness of speculative constructions, in his "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science"—a critique disseminated throughout his work—is directed against Hegel. While remaining totally external to the Hegelian work in the detail of its execution, this critique testifies to an entire epoch's profoundly felt

disaffection, which has not been dispelled during the sixty-six years—two-thirds of a century—that separate us from this Husserlian text. The influence of the phenomenology of the *Logical Investigations*, returning "to the things themselves," to the truth of self-evidence in which things "show themselves in the original," attests not only to the difficulties of naturalist positivism, but to a distrust of dialectical discourse and also of language itself.

But did not the new promises of a scientific philosophy, Husserl's promises, prove to be just as fallacious? Untenable in the effort to return naively, in the straightforwardness of spontaneous consciousness, to truth qua opening, to truth qua self-evidence-of-being-given, to being "in flesh and blood" right down to and including its categorial forms, Husserlian phenomenology corrected itself with a transcendental teaching in which being-given-in-the-original is constituted in immanence. The "beyond language" promised by the *Logical Investigations* does not spare those investigations themselves from stressing the irreducible role played by linguistic signs in the constitution of meaning; in the *Ideas* I, Husserl affirms that doxic theses underlie all conscious life, which then is apophantic in its most intimate structure, at the point of becoming discourse in its mental articulation—though this discourse would reject the dialectic. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the reference, uninterrupted in Husserl, of consciousness to an identified being; consciousness as thought of the Same. The prepredicative toward which the analysis proceeds, as if to put logical thought into question, knots itself right away around *substrata* which are the support for all of the formal modifications of the logical. And thus the substantive, the nameable, the being and the Same—so essential to the structure of re-presentation and of truth as the truth of presence—remain the privileged and originary terms of consciousness. But above all, phenomenology itself isolates these structures by a reflection that is an inner perception and in which the descriptive process "synchronizes" the flux of consciousness into knowledge. Phenomenology, in its philosophical act of ultimate *Nachdenken*, ["thinking back" or reflection], thus remains faithful to the ontic model of truth. Perception, grasping, in its relation with the present, with the Same, with the being, remains both the first movement of the naive soul in its prepredicative experience (precisely insofar as it is experience) and the ultimate gesture of the reflecting philosopher.

3. Nonetheless, I think that phenomenology, despite its gnoseological expression—ontic and ontological—calls attention to a sense of philosophy in which the latter is not reduced to a reflection on the relation between thought and the world, a relation that sustains the notions of being and the world. Husserlian phenomenology made it possible to

show the importance of thought for reasons other than the elucidation of experience. The latter is always the experience of being or presence in the world; it is a thinking that, even if begun in wonder, remains an adequation of the given to the "signitive"; a thinking on the scale of the subject, and that, precisely as such, is experience, the act of a conscious subject, the act of a unity fixed in a firm position, such as the unity of *transcendental apperception*, in which the diverse comes to be unified under a stable rule. Now, this is not the only nor even the initial modality of the subjective in Husserl's analyses, which are always more surprising than the "system" and the programmatic discourse.

Although Husserlian phenomenology appeals to intuition as to the principle of principles, in which being presents itself in the original and in its identity, and in which we are vouchsafed a glance at the origin of the notions of Being and of the Same, and although it refers to this presence in self-evidence, and to the horizons of the Same in which this presence shows itself (or to the nostalgia for this presence) as the rationality of reason, it nonetheless *puts into question* even the very same formal logical-mathematical chains of reasoning whose objectivity the "Prolegomena" to the *Logical Investigations* had already secured against all psychologism. The appearance of presence is certainly not deceptive, but it is at the same time the obturation, as it were, of living thought. Signs borrowed from language and from the opinions it vehicles, while useful in operations of calculation, replace the significations of living thought. The latter, in their objective essence, are displaced, and they do so under the open eye of the thinker, without his or her knowledge. Acquired knowledge, the result deposited in writings separated from living thought—and even the knowledge given in the theme of a thought absorbed by what it thinks and forgetting itself in the object—does not maintain itself in the plenitude of its meaning. Shifts and displacements of meaning (*Sinnesverschiebungen*), enchanting or enchanted games, are played out at the heart of objectifying consciousness—good, clear and distinct consciousness—without, however, in the least jarring its spontaneous, naive, and rational gait. But everything happens as if, in its lucidity, the reason identifying being were moving forward like a sleepwalker or daydreamer, as if despite its lucidity for the objective order it were sleeping off, in broad daylight, the effects of some mysterious wine. The full intelligence of the undistorted, objective gaze remains defenseless against meaning's delinquencies. Nonetheless, naivete continues to guide scientific inquiry in its objectifying rectitude, according to common sense, which is the most evenly shared thing in the world. It is as if the self-evidence of the world as a state in which reason is contained paralyzed medusa-like and petrified the reasonable life that *lives* that self-evidence! It is as if the naive look, in its ontic intention,

found itself obstructed by its very object, and spontaneously underwent an inversion or somehow "embourgeoised" in its condition or, to use an expression from *Deuteronomy, waxed fat.*[2] Consequently it is as if the adventure of knowledge—which is knowledge of the world—were not only the spirituality and rationality of self-evidence, were not only light, but a drowsiness of the mind. It is as if the adventure of the mind required a rationality in another sense. It is not a matter of overcoming some limitation of the *seen*, of enlarging the horizons belonging to the level in which the seen—the thematized—appears; thus it is not a matter of being prompted to recover, through some dialectic, the totality from one of its parts. Thoroughly examining the objective horizon of the given within the theme in which it is presented would still be a naive procedure. There is a radical heterogeneity—a difference that blocks the dialectic—between the vision of the world and the life underlying this vision. One must change levels. But it is not a matter of adding an inner experience to outer experience. We must return from the world to life, which has already been betrayed by knowledge. The latter delights in its theme and is absorbed in the object to the point of losing its soul and its name and of becoming mute and anonymous. By a movement against nature—because against the world—we must return to a psychism other than that of the knowledge of the world. This is the revolution of the phenomenological reduction—permanent revolution. The reduction will reanimate or reactivate that life, forgotten or become anemic in knowledge; Life henceforth termed absolute or apodictically known, as Husserl will say, thinking in terms of knowledge. Beneath the resting-within-itself of the Real which refers to itself in identification, beneath its presence, the reduction raises up a life against which thematized being, in its smugness, has already kicked, and which it has repressed by its appearing. Drowsy intentions awakened to life will reopen vanished horizons, ever new, disturbing the theme in its identity qua result, awakening subjectivity from the identity in which it rests in its experience. The subject as intuitive reason in harmony, in the World, with being—reason in the adequation of knowledge—thus finds itself put into question. And the very style of Husserlian phenomenology—multiplying the gestures of reduction and tirelessly erasing every trace of subordination to the worldly in consciousness in order to lay bare what he calls pure consciousness—does not this style call attention to what is discovered *behind* the consciousness that is subject to its ontic destiny in the thought of the Same?

The reduction signifies the passage from the natural to the transcendental attitude. The comparison with the Kantian position that this language recalls is well known. And yet it is also just as well known that for Husserl it is less a matter of fixing the subjective conditions

for the validity of the science of the world, or of laying bare its logical presuppositions, than of bringing out, in all its scope, the subjective life forgotten by the thought turned toward the world. What is the particular interest of this transcendental life, and what rationality does it add to the rationality of natural consciousness focused on the world? The passage to transcendental life, first carried out along the so-called Cartesian route, seems to seek certitude. This route leads back from the inadequate self-evidence of experience of the world to reflection upon the cogitations from which this experience is made, in order to measure its degree of certitude or incertitude. We are still in a philosophy of knowledge—of being and the Same—an epistemology. But one can also say that the reduction, upheld by the certitude of reflection, frees reasonable thought from the world itself, from the norms of adequation, from obedience to the completed work of identification, from the being that can only be as a complete gathering into a theme, as the re-presentation of presence. Thus the transcendental reduction would not be a simple retreat back to the certitude of the *cogito*, as the standard of all true meaning in its self-evidence, adequate to thought, but the teaching of a meaning *despite* the incompleteness of knowledge and identification, an incompleteness which contrasts with the norms that the identity of the Same commands. Nevertheless, if the reduction does not complete the incompleteness of perception and of science bearing on the world, where the overlapping of the sought and the seen is impossible, it recognizes and measures this nonadequation in an adequate way and is thus called apodictic. Thus, in the adequation of reflection, there is the completion and closing in upon itself of a knowledge that is both knowledge and nonknowledge, but still a reasonable psychism.

4. And now we see that in the *Cartesian Meditations* (paragraphs 6 and 9), this apodictic rationality of reflection upon reduced consciousness is no longer the fact of the adequation of intuition with the signitive it fulfills. Apodicticity is lodged in an inadequate intuition. The indubitable or principial character of the apodictic is not due to any new trait of the self-evidence or to any new light. It is due to a limited portion, a nucleus of the field of the consciousness called "properly adequate." And it is here that there appear, with an emphatic accent on the word "*living*", expressions such as "this nucleus is the living presence of the ego to itself" (*die lebendige Selbstgegenwart*), and then "the living self-evidence of the "*I am*" (*während der lebendigen Gegenwart des 'Ich bin'*). Does the living character of this self-evidence or this present reduce to an adequate overlapping? (One may well ask whether the exception of the Cartesian *cogito* itself is truly due, as Descartes says, to the clarity and distinction of his knowledge) Must the liveliness of life be interpreted on the basis of consciousness?

Is it, under the label *erleben* [mental living] just a confused or obscure consciousness, merely something preparatory to the distinction between subject and object, a prethematization, a preknowledge? Must we not affirm our psychism otherwise? Does not the adjective "*living*", from the beginning of the Husserlian discourse, underscore the importance of the word "*Erlebnis*" as expressing the way of the subject? The ego's prereflective experience, designated by the term "*Erlebnis*"—the lived—is not just a moment of pre-objectification, like the *hyle* prior to the *Auffassen* [apprehending]. Living—one knows the importance this term took on in the Husserlian manuscripts on time. Its explosive and surprising character, similar to that of the present in the Bergsonian duration, is expressed in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* as the *proto-impression.* Unforeseeable, it is in no way prepared in some germ that would bear the past. The absolute traumatism that is inseparable from the spontaneity of its upsurge is of as much importance as the sensible quality that it offers to the adequation of knowledge. The living present of the *cogito-sum* occurs not only on the model of self-consciousness, absolute knowledge; it is the rupture of the equanimity of the "equanimous soul," the rupture of the Same of immanence; awakening and life.

In the *Phenomenological Psychology*,[3] sensibility is lived prior to the *hyle*'s taking on the function of *Abschattung* [adumbration]. Its immanence is the gathering of a presence to self within the passive synthesis of time. But this presence to self is produced in keeping with a certain rupture insofar as the lived is lived for an ego that, in the inwardness of immanence, distinguishes itself from it, and that, as early as *Ideas* I, is recognized as "transcendence in immanence." In the identity of presence to self, in the silent tautology of the prereflexive, a difference between the same and the same takes shape—a dephasing, a difference at the heart of interiority. Difference irreducible to adversity, which remains open to reconciliation and is surmountable by assimilation. Here the alleged self-consciousness is also a rupture, the Other fissures the same of consciousness which is thus lived; the other that calls it deeper than itself. *Waches ich*—myself in wakefulness. The slumbering selfsame sleeps toward . . . without blending into . . . Transcendent in immanence, the heart keeps watch without blending into what solicits it. "Sleep, on close inspection," Husserl writes, "has meaning only in relation to wakefulness, and in itself bears the potentiality for awakening."[4]

5. But the ego that emerges and breaks up the identification of *hyle* with itself to differentiate itself from this immanence, is it not once again an identification of the Same? I think that the reduction reveals its true meaning, and the meaning of the subjective that it allows to be signified, in its final phase, which is the intersubjective reduction. In it, the

subjectivity of the subject shows itself in the traumatism of wakefulness, despite the gnoseological interpretation that, for Husserl, characterizes the element of mind to the very end.

The intersubjective reduction is not leveled solely against the "solipsism" of the "primordial sphere" and the relativism of truth which would result from it, in order to ensure the objectivity of knowledge, which depends on agreement between multiple subjectivities. The explication of the meaning that an ego other than me has *for me*—primordial me—describes the way in which the Other wrenches me from my hypostasis, from the *here*, at the heart of being or the center of the world where, privileged, and in this sense primordial, I posit myself. But the ultimate meaning of my "mineness" is revealed in this wrenching. In conferring the meaning of "me" on to the other, and also in my alterity to myself through which I can confer onto the other the meaning of me, the *here* and the *there* come to be inverted into one another. It is not the homogenization of space that is thus constituted: I am the one—I so obviously primordial and hegemonic, so identical to myself, within my "own," ever so comfortably installed in my body, in my *hic et nunc*—who moves into the background. Me, I see myself from the other's vantage point; I expose myself to the other; I have to render account.

It is this relation with the other ego, in which the ego is wrenched from its primordiality, that constitutes the nongnoseological event necessary to reflection itself understood as knowledge, and consequently necessary to the egological reduction itself. In the "secondariness" in which, facing the face of the other (and all the expressivity of the other body of which Husserl speaks is the openness and ethical exigency of the face), the primordial sphere loses its priority, subjectivity awakens from the egological—from egoism and from egotism.

Against the simple abstraction that, setting out from "the individual consciousness" rises to "consciousness in general," as a result of an ecstatic or angelic omission of its terrestrial weight and in the intoxication or idealism of a quasimagical sublimation, the Husserlian theory of the intersubjective reduction describes the astonishing or traumatizing—trauma not thauma—possibility of a sobering up in which the ego, facing the Other, is freed from itself, and awakens from dogmatic slumber. The reduction, repeating as it were the disturbance of the Same by the Other who is not absorbed into the Same—and who does not escape from the other—describes the awakening, beyond knowledge, to an insomnia or watchfulness (*Wachen*) of which knowledge is but one modality. Fission of the subject, not shielded by the atomic consistency of the unity of transcendental apperception. Wakefulness starting from the other—the Other person—that ceaselessly puts the priority of the same into question.

Wakefulness as a sobering, beyond the sobriety of the simple lucidity which, despite the anxiety and the movements of a possible dialectic, still remains consciousness of the Same—identity of the identical and the nonidentical—in its completion and repose. Wakefulness and sobering by the Other who does not leave the same alone, and through which the Same, as living, and through its slumber, is at once overtaxed. It is not an *experience* of nonequanimity posited within the theme of a knowledge, it is the very event of *transcendence* as life. It is the psychism of responsibility for the Other, which is the lineament of this transcendence and which is psychism *tout court*. Transcendence in which, perhaps, the distinction between transcendence toward the other man and transcendence toward God should not be made too quickly.

6. But all this is no longer in Husserl. To him, the reduction remained to the last a passage from a less perfect to a more perfect knowledge. The reduction which the philosopher miraculously decided to perform was motivated solely by contradictions arising in naive knowledge. The psychism of the soul or the intellectuality of the mind remains knowledge—the crisis of the European spirit is a crisis of Western science. Never will the philosophy that begins with the presence of being—equality of the mind with itself, the gathering of the diverse into the Same—express its revolutions or its awakenings in terms other than those of knowledge. It remains the case, however, that in Husserl, beyond the critique of technique, which comes from science, there is a critique of knowledge as knowledge, a critique of the civilization of science in the broad sense. The intelligibility of knowledge is found alienated through its very identity. The necessity for a Reduction in Husserl's philosophy attests to a sort of closure at the heart of the opening onto the given, a drowsiness within spontaneous truth. This is what I have called "embourgeoising," rebelling against the anxiety of transcendence, a self-complacency. In the identity of the Same, in its return to itself, in which identifiable Reason claims its fulfillment, in the identity of the Same to which thought itself aspires as to a repose, one should beware of a stupefaction, a petrification or a laziness. Is not the most reasonable reason the most awakened wakefulness, the awakening at the heart of the wakeful state, at the heart of wakefulness as a state? And is not the ethical relation to the other that event in which this permanent revolution of sobering up is concrete life? Is not the liveliness of life an excession, the rupture of the container by the uncontainable, form ceasing to be its own content, already offering itself in the guise of experience? An awakening to consciousness, the truth of which is not the consciousness of awakening? A first movement toward the other person, the traumatism of which the intersubjective reduction reveals, a traumatism secretly striking the

very subjectivity of the subject? Transcendence. This term is used without any theological presupposition. It is, to the contrary, the excession of life that is presupposed by all theology. Transcendence like the dazzling about which Descartes speaks at the end of the third Meditation (French text).[5] It is the suffering of the eye overtaxed by light, the Same disturbed and held in wakefulness by the other who exalts it. If *on the basis of this transcendence of life*, one thinks the idea of God, one can say that life is enthusiasm and that enthusiasm is not a drunkenness but a sobering. Sobering always in need of further sobering; a wakefulness on the eve of a new awakening. Ethics.

That this questioning of the Same by the Other, and what we have called "wakefulness" or "life," is, outside of knowledge, a part of philosophy, is not only verified by certain articulations of Husserlian thought that we have just shown, but appears at the summits of various philosophies. It is the beyond being in Plato; the entrance through the door of the agent intellect in Aristotle; the idea of God in us, going beyond our capacity as finite beings; the exaltation of theoretical reason in practical reason in Kant; the search for recognition by the Other in Hegel himself; the renewal of duration in Bergson; the sobering up of lucid reason in Heidegger—from whom the very notion of sobering up used in this essay is borrowed.

It is not as knowledge of the world, or of some world-behind-the-world, or as a *Weltanschauung* that we have tried to articulate the transcendence—wakefulness and sobering up—whence philosophies speak. Philosophies: permanent revolutions, and also necessary to knowledge, concerned with reducing the naivete of its consciousness or extending itself into epistemology, interrogating itself about the meaning of the results. A transcendence that cannot be reduced to an experience of transcendence, for it is a seizure prior to every *position* of subject and to every perceived or assimilated content. Transcendence or wakefulness that is the very life of the human, already troubled by the Infinite. Whence philosophy: a language of transcendence and not the tale of experience: a language in which the teller is part of the tale, thus a necessarily personal language, to be understood beyond what it says, that is, to be interpreted. Philosophy is the philosophers in their intersubjective "plot," which no one unravels but in which no one is allowed a relaxation of attention or a lack of rigor. This is not the place to delve into the perspectives which then open up, from the point of view of the ethical significance of keeping watch and transcending, particularly on time and its diachrony in connection with the Uncontainable.

Notes

Introduction

1. Emmanuel Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, trans. Andre Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973; with new preface by Richard A. Cohen, 1995).

2. Emmanuel Levinas, *En decouvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: Vrin, 1949; 2d expanded ed., 1967, 1974).

3. See "From Ethics to Exegesis," in Emmanuel Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 109–13.

4. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this introduction are to chapter 4, hence page numbers will be omitted.

5. Cf., Emmanuel Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, trans. by Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

6. *Totalité et infini* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 199; *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 223.

7. *Difficult Freedom* is the title of a collection of Jewish writings by Levinas, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

8. See chapter 7, below.

9. *La transcendance de l'ego* had been published three years earlier in 1937; *Being and Nothingness* would be published three years later in 1943, making no mention of Levinas's Husserl studies. Heidegger, for his part, never responded or even mentioned Levinas's Husserl studies, his ethical metaphysics, or his radical critique of Heideggerian thought.

10. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 170.

11. See, e.g., "Diachonry and Representation" (1982) and "The Old and the New" (1980), in Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 97–138.

12. From "Judaism and Kenosis," in Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, 121.

13. Ibid., 115.

1. On *Ideas*

1. The subsection numbers (§) refer to this article.

2. See Husserl's article, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" (*PW*); "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," in PCP, 71–147.

3. The term "eidetic" comes from the Greek word *eidos* which, to avoid ambiguity, Husserl distinguishes from the concept of "idea." See § 22.

4. *ID*, 40; ID, 80.

5. See especially *LU* II, second Investigation; LI, 335–432.

6. *ID*, 9; ID, 7–8.

7. See especially *LU* III; LI, 661–869.

8. *ID*, 22; ID, 21.

9. *ID*, 27; ID, 27.

10. *LU* I, *LU* II, second Investigation; LI 43–247, 335–432.

11. *LU* I; LI, 43–247.

12. Ibid.

13. *ID*, 43; ID, 44.

14. "Phenomenology" does not mean science restricted to the study of phenomena as a result of the inaccessibility of "things in themselves." Phenomenon here means what "shows" itself, what is given prior to all presuppositions, as opposed to a hypothetical superstructure.

One could say that phenomenology is a "science of the immediate data." My § 10 shows why, according to Husserl, the study of "immediate data" requires the study of consciousness.

15. *ID*, 74; ID, 87.

16. This apparent antinomy between the multiplicity of sensuous moments which represent the object and the identical unity of the object itself does not, therefore, necessarily imply the Bergsonian thesis that the identical object is a distortion of consciousness: it allows for a resolution through the distinction between the act and the object of consciousness.

17. It is true that the object of physics, which serves to explain the world of qualities, is often construed as the true object of our knowledge, and the world of qualities as the image or symbol of this sovereignly real object, which a God could perceive directly. But this is a false description of our knowledge. For our knowledge is truly directed toward the world of qualities. It is the world of qualities that must be determined, and it in no way plays the role of "image" or "sign" of an object which would transcend it. The object of physics is only, *by essence*, a superstructure motivated by the sensuous representations which it serves to explain. It can consequently only be given with sensuous qualities; it would be to mythologize to suppose that it has an independent existence. Even a divine physics could not perceive it immediately with sensuous perception, "any more than a divine omnipotence can bring it to pass that elliptic functions are played on the violin" (*ID*, 102; ID, 123).

18. *Sum igitur . . . res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio* [I am therefore . . . a thinking thing, that is, mind, or soul, or intellect, or reason]. Descartes, *Meditations*, second Meditation.

19. *ID*, 132; ID, 160.

20. Through the discovery of the inexact essence, as opposed to the exact essence of mathematics, we move beyond the alternative before which Bergson

placed us: either consciousness must be studied like space, grasped by the intellect in well-defined concepts, or it must not be studied by the intellect. With Husserl there is a third possibility. Intelligence does not work solely with the help of geometrical concepts—there can be essence without there being immobility and death in it. The spirit of finesse and the spirit of geometry are not the only possible ones: knowledge knows other paths.

21. In these theses Husserl often encounters Bergson, whose work was unknown to him as his thought was developing. See the work by Husserl which has just been published, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (*ZB*; PITC).

22. See Heidegger, "Being and Time," *Jahrbuch* 8, 38, and 47 in notes. [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 62, and 73 n. 2]

23. Intentionality is a scholastic term. The scholastics knew that a "mental" object belongs necessarily to consciousness, even if the real object is destroyed. But this same attitude, precisely because it separates the mental object from the real object, does not permit one to reduce the study of the relationship of consciousness to the real object to the study of noetic-noematic structures. Husserl's discovery was that it is the so-called real object itself that in reflection is given as a mental object. For nothing justifies the conception that opposes the mental object to the real object. It is to the *real object itself* that we are directed in the natural attitude, and we do not find a double that would serve to know it.

Furthermore, this double, if it did exist, would have had to be known with the help of another double, and so on to infinity—which is absurd.

24. *ID*, 306; ID, 352.

25. This term comes from late nineteenth-century German empirical psychology, and designates the act through which we know the conscious life of other people.

2. Freiburg, Husserl, and Phenomenology

1. See my book, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, translated by Andre Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973; 1995).

2. Let us point out that Husserl did not blindly accept the privileged role of the individual and the concrete, and that Martin Heidegger was able to show masterfully how the analysis of "actual human existence" leads us into the philosophical dimension par excellence that Aristotle had glimpsed when formulating the problem of "being as being." There is no *mysticism of the concrete* in Freiburg.

3. Victor Delbos (1862–1916) wrote numerous studies in the history of philosophy, especially on Kant. Levinas refers here to Delbos's lecture of 1911, given at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, in Paris, on the first volume of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, entitled "Husserl: His Critique of Psychologism and his Conception of a Pure Logic" (in French); it was published in the *Revue de metaphysique et de morale* 19.—TRANS.

3. Phenomenology

1. Directed by Edmund Husserl, published by Max Niemayer, Halle, 570 pages.

2. Eugen Fink (1905–75) was a close and trusted student of Husserl, and studied under Heidegger as well. He wrote several penetrating studies of phenomenology, the most celebrated of which is probably his 1933 article comparing Husserl and Kant, which appeared with a preface by Husserl in *Kantstudien* 39, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism," which can be found in English translation in *The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings*, ed., trans. R. O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 73–147. He also wrote several philosophical studies of his own.

3. See n. 4, chapter 2, above.

4. Oskar Becker (1889–64), was a student of Husserl and Heidegger, once serving as coeditor of Husserl's *Jahrbuch*. His article "The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," originally published in *Kantstudien* 38, in 1933, can be found in *The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings*, 40–72.

4. The Work of Edmund Husserl

1. "There is only one philosophy, one actual and genuine science; and particular genuine sciences are only non-selfsufficient members [*unselbständige Glieder*] within it" (*FT*, 240; FT, 272).

2. *LU* I, 219–20; LI, 218–19.

3. See also *LU* II, 11–12, and *LU* III, 7; LI, 256–57, 671–72.

4. See *FT*, 249; FT, 282. The possibilities of error that characterize sensuous experience constitute a *positive* characteristic of this experience. The being that it reveals is precisely such that its existence can at each instant be "corrected." It can be grasped adequately only through sensuous experience.

5. "The whole of phenomenology is nothing but . . . a scientific self-realization on the part of the transcendental subjectivity. . . . The ultimate grounding of all truth is an element of the universal self-realization" (Husserl, *FT*, 241–42; FT, 273–74.)

6. See, e.g., Husserl, *ID*, 124; ID, 151.

7. *FT*, 157; FT, 176–77.

8. *FT*, 76; FT, 86–87.

9. *LU* I, preface, vii; LI, 42–43. See also *LU* I, 59; LI 96–97, for the affirmation of the necessary relationship between logic and psychology, while in full struggle against psychologism.

10. *LU* I, 71; LI, 106.

11. I have already noted this in my book, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, trans. Andre Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, 1995). It is obvious, however, that on certain points the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* does employ formulas which are too rigid and in a way one-sided. One can show, nonetheless—it would be too long to do here—that there is never a radical contradiction between this work and certain theses of the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. When, for example, in § 27, 91ff. of the first volume of *Logische Untersuchungen* [LI, 121ff.], Husserl fights all attempts to reduce the principle of contradiction to the psychological impossibility of maintaining two contradictory judgments, he is not, as one might think, in disagreement with the theses of the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. The latter takes up the constitution of this principle in transcendental consciousness and not in our psychological *nature*; moreover, it seeks its subjective meaning, which remains to be established, after having recognized and taken seriously the objective signification of this principle. This is a new philosophical step, which takes away nothing of the objectivity of this principle, alone at issue in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*.

12. See the masterful summary, "Husserl: Sa critique du psychologisme," that Victor Delbos has written of this work in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* (1911).

13. *LU* I, 110, and *LU* I, 160–61; LI, 135, 172–73.

14. "*Was Wissenschaft zur Wissenschaft macht . . .*," *LU* I, 228, 242 and passim; "[W]hat makes science science . . .," LI, 225, 236, and passim.

15. *LU* I, 67; LI, 104.

16. *LU* I, 60; LI, 97.

17. *LU* I, 70, 73, and passim; LI, 105, 107, and passim.

18. *LU* II, 4, 93ff.; LI, 250–51, 323ff.

19. *LU* I, 19; LI, 65.

20. *LU* I, 22; LI, 67–68.

21. One already finds this distinction in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*.

22. *LU* I, 30–50 (the whole of chap. 2), 140, 164–65, and passim; LI, 74–89, 157, 175–76, and passim.

23. *LU* I, 162; LI, 173–74.

24. *LU* I, 252; LI, 243–42.

25. *LU* I, 248ff. (§ 70), 241–43; LI, 241ff., 235–37.

26. *LU* I, 165; LI, 175–76.

27. *LU* I, 347ff., 382, 385, and passim; LI, 536ff., 565, 567–68, and passim.

28. On this subject, see the critique of nominalism in *LU* II, esp. 144–46; LI, 337–432, esp. 368–71.

29. *LU* II, 146; LI, 370–71.

30. *LU* I, 227; LI, 224.

31. *LU* II, 6; LI, 252.

32. *LU* II, 7; LI, 253.

33. *FT*, 158; FT, 177–78.

34. *LU* II, 6; LI, 252.

35. *LU* II, 3 (this text appears only in the 2d edition of *Logical Investigations*); LI, 249.

36. *LU* II, 120; LI, 348–49. The interesting texts are introduced in the 2d edition.

37. *FT*, 157; FT, 177.

38. *LU* II, 5; LI, 251. See also *LU* II, 7, and *FT*, passim; LI, 253, and FT, passim.

39. *LU* II, 21, 120; LI, 264–65, 348–49.

40. *Der bloße Hinblick . . . auf seine eigentliche Meinung . . .* " (*LU* I, 64); "*nach seinem echten Sinn*" (69); "*Ist das wirklich gemeint, wenn die Logiker sagen . . .* " (83), etc. One could very easily give more of these quotations. ["A mere glance . . . at its real meaning . . ." (LI 100); "according to its true sense" (LI, 104); "Is that what logicians really mean when they say . . ." (LI, 115), etc.]

41. *LU* I, 61; LI, 98–99.

42. *LU* I, 62; LI, 99.

43. *LU* I, 143; LI, 159.

44. *LU* I, 190; LI, 194

45. *LU* II, 101; LI, 330.

46. *LU* II, 107, 131, 140, 172, 187, etc.; LI, 337–38, 357–58, 365–66, 391–92.

47. *LU* II, 130; LI, 356–57.

48. *LU* II, 110; LI, 340–41.

49. *LU* II, 136; LI, 361.

50. *LU* II, 136; LI, 362.

51. *LU* II, 144–45; LI, 368–70.

52. *LU* II, 156; LI, 378. See also *LU* II, 111–12; LI, 341–42.

53. *LU* II, 125; LI, 352–53.

54. *LU* II, 124; LI, 352.

55. *LU* I, 129; LI, 149. See esp. *LU* II, 108 (chap. 1, § 1), and 198; LI, 339, 412.

56. *LU* II, 131, 148–49, 171–72; LI, 358, 372–73, 390–92.

57. *LU* II, 103; LI, 331–32.

58. *LU* II, 234; LI, 441–42.

59. *LU* II, 279; LI, 477–78.

60. *LU* II, 228; LI, 437–38.

61. Which does not mean ideal, since they are the individual elements of an individual object; see *LU* II, 216; LI, 426.

62. *LU* II, 390; LI, 571.

63. *LU* II, 165; LI, 385.

64. *LU* II, 23; LI, 269.

65. *LU* II, 29; LI, 273–74.

66. See my conclusion.

67. *LU* II, 388, 367, 386, and passim; LI, 569–70, 554–55, 568.

68. *LU* II, 390; LI, 571.

69. *LU* II, 396; LI, 575.

70. *LU* I, 187 (§ 49), 189–90; LI, 187–88; 194–95.

71. *LU* I, 12–19, "*[S]oweit Evidenz reicht, reicht auch der Begriff des Wissens*" (14); LI, 60–65, "As far as self-evidence extends, so far does the concept of knowledge extend" (61).

72. See below, section 11.

73. *LU* II, 146, 184; LI, 370–71, 401.

74. *LU* II, 380–81; LI, 564.

75. *LU* I, 182; LI, 189.

76. *LU* III, 142; LI, 785.

77. *LU* II, 166; LI, 386.

78. *LU* II, 109; LI, 339–40.

79. *ID*, 97–102; already indicated in *LU* I, 72; ID, 117–24; already indicated in LI, 106–7.

80. See Ludwig Landgrebe, "*Husserls Phänomenologie,*" *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (15 January 1939), 280–89. Published in Brussels.

81. *LU* II, 399; LI, 577–78.

82. *LU* II, 75; LI, 310.

83. *LU* II, 383; LI, 566.

84. *LU* II, 365, n.; LI, 553 n. 2.

85. This idea is found in Husserl's critique of Locke's theory of abstraction; *LU* II, 134; LI, 359–60.

86. No reference given.—TRANS.

87. *LU* I, 9–10; see *FT*; LI, 58–59; see FT.

88. *FT*, 255; FT, 289.

89. *LU* I, 58; see also 161, 166–67; LI, 95; see also 176–77.

90. This idea of technical activity, as opposed to the consciousness of the principles governing it, is introduced by Husserl at an early point; see *LU* I, 9–10; LI, 58–59.

91. *ID*, 93; ID, 111.

92. *LU* II, 22; LI, 265.

93. *LU* II, 354, 361; LI, 541–42.

94. *KR*, 134; CR, 58.

95. *KR*, 118, and esp. 121ff.; CR, 43, and esp. 46ff.

96. *KR*, 124; CR, 49.

97. *KR*, 131; CR, 56.

98. *KR*, 126–27; CR, 46–47.

99. *KR*, 126–27; CR, 52.

100. *KR*, 8; CR, 8.

101. *KR*, 8; CR, 8.

102. *KR*, 12; CR, 12.

103. *KR*, 8; CR, 8.

104. *KR*, 12–13; CR, 12–13.

105. *KR*, 137ff.; CR, 63ff.

106. *KR*, 128; CR, 53.

107. *KR*, 118–21; CR, 43–47.

108. *KR*, 121; CR, 47.

109. *KR*, 14; CR, 15.

110. *KR*, 16; CR, 15–16.

111. *ID*, 80; ID, 85–86: "*Nur fur Ich und Erlebnisstrom in Beziehung auf Sich selbt besteht diese ausgezeichnete Sachlage, nur hier giebt es so etwas wie immanente*

Wahrnehmung, und muß es das geben." *ID* 93–94; ID, 101: "Only for an Ego, or a stream of mental processes, in relation to itself, does this distinctive state of affairs exist; here alone there is, and here there must be, such a thing as immanent perception." [Kersten's translation of "*immanente Wahrnehmung*" as "perception of something immanent" has been changed to "immanent perception," following W. R. B. Gibson's translation on this point.—TRANS.]

112. See Jean-Paul Sartre's article in the *Nouvelle Revue Française* of 1939 ["Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology," trans. Joseph P. Fell, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 1, no. 2 (May 1970), 4–5]. He interprets intentionality as the characteristic of consciousness to be outside of itself. However, in the movement of the intention toward the outside, there is no flight from self, no predilection for the outside because it is outside. It is entirely conceived on the model of the meaning of thought. It goes outward to the extent that it thinks, but also inward to the extent that, in the thought, meaning is apprehended and understood. Intentionality permits understanding "how the in-itself of objectivity can be represented, apprehended in consciousness and finally become subjective again" (*LU* II, 8; LI, 254).

5. Reflections on Phenomenological "Technique"

1. LU, 9–10; LI, 58–59.
2. LU III, 183; LI, 818.
3. *ZB*, 451; PITC, 131.
4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason.*
5. *Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren* ["What is Orientation in Thinking"], ed. E. Cassirer (Berlin), 360.
6. Lucien Goldmann, whose doctoral thesis, *Le Dieu caché* (*The Hidden God*) (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), appeared the year of this discussion, has published numerous works of Marxist literary criticism, many of which have been translated into English.—TRANS.
7. Steven Strasser, born in Austria, professor at the University of Nijmegen, Netherlands, editor of the posthumous German version of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* (HU, vol. 1), was author of several works of phenomenology, including: *The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology* (1953; English trans. 1957); *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences: A Contribution to a New Scientific Ideal* (1961); English trans. 1963); *Phenomenological Psychology: Selected Papers* (1966); and *The Idea of Dialogical Phenomenology* (1969).—Trans.
8. Alphonse de Waehlens (1911–81) taught philosophy at the University of Louvain. He wrote the first major study of Merleau-Ponty, *Une philosophie de l'ambiguité: L'Existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (*A Philosophy of Ambiguity: The Existentialism of Merleau-Ponty*) (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1951), and was a personal friend of Levinas's. Levinas provides a portrait of this figure in his *Outside the Subject* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 104–7.—TRANS.
9. Father Herman L. Van Breda, a Franciscan, was one of the founders and served as the first director of the Husserl Archives at the University of Louvain,

Belgium. He is author of numerous articles and editor of several collections on Husserlian phenomenology.—TRANS.

10. Jean Wahl (1888–1974), professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne from 1936 to his death, was an important expositor of existential philosophies, as well as a historian of philosophy. In addition, he was mentor and friend of Levinas. Levinas writes of him in *Proper Names*, trans. Michael B. Smith (London: Athlone, 1995).—TRANS.

11. Eugene Minkowski, born in Poland, emigrated to France after WWI, and wrote some early French phenomenological works, *Lived Time* (1933; English trans. 1970) and a collection entitled *Vers une Cosmologie* (1936).—TRANS.

12. Rudolf Boehm, Van Breda's assistant at the Husserl Archives in Louvain, is the author of *Von Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie* [*On the Viewpoint of Phenomenology*] (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), and numerous articles on Husserlian phenomenology—TRANS.

13. This specific statement, which Boehm attributes to Levinas, does not appear in the 1959 published version of the lecture or discussion.—TRANS.

6. The Ruin of Representation

1. Others will supply interesting anecdotes about personal relations with Husserl. I would like to enter just three items. (1) During the two semesters of my stay in Freiburg (summer, 1928, winter 1928–29), Mrs. Husserl, pretexting her next trip to Paris, took lessons from me to perfect her French. Their purpose was really to add to a student's funds rather than to enrich the vocabulary of the eminent pupil. These gestures of dissimulated goodness were frequent in the Husserl household and had illustrious beneficiaries. (2) At the end of July 1928, I read a paper in Husserl's seminar. It was the last session of the last seminar of his career. There was of course no mention of this paper in the farewell speech that followed; Husserl said that philosophical problems finally appeared to him in all their clarity, now that age had given him time to resolve them. (3) The last item I would hesitate to recount, did not the problem, recently raised, of Husserl's Judaism prompt me to add it to the dossier. Husserl and his wife, as is generally known, were Jews converted to Protestantism. The last photographs of the master accentuate the Jewish traits of his physiognomy (one is perhaps mistaken in saying his face began to resemble that of the prophets, since after all no one possesses a portrait of Jeremiah or Habakkuk). Mrs. Husserl spoke to me of the Jews strictly in the third person, not even in the second. Husserl never spoke to me of them. Except once. His wife would be passing through Strasbourg, and would use the occasion to make a very important purchase. Upon returning from the errands she had done in the company of Mrs. Hering, the mother of the Strasbourg theologian and philosopher, she announced in my presence: "We found a serious business firm. *Die Leute obleich Juden, sind sehr zuverlässig.*" ["The people, though Jews, are very dependable."] I did not hide the hurt I felt. Husserl then said: "Let it pass, Mr. Levinas, I myself come from a family of merchants and . . ." He did not continue. Jews are hard on one another,

although they do not tolerate the "Jewish stories" that non-Jews tell them; just as clerics hate anticlerical jokes coming from lay people, but cannot keep from telling them to one another. Husserl's reflection calmed me.

2. See LI, 249–50.—TRANS.
3. See LI, 251.—TRANS.
4. See LI, 254.—TRANS.
5. *MC*, 40; CM, 46.—TRANS.
6. *MC*, 40; CM, 46.
7. *MC*, 42; CM, 48.

7. Intentionality and Metaphysics

1. Condillac hypothesizes a human being in the form of a statue, adding one sense at a time, the first being that of smell. "*It is, in relation to itself, only the odors that it smells.* If we present it with a rose, to us it will be a statue that smells a rose; but to itself, it will be the smell itself of this flower." (*Philosophical Writings of Etienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac*, trans. F. Philip and H. Lane [New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1982], 175).—TRANS.

2. Edmund Husserl, "*Notizen zur Raumkonstitution*," ed. Alfred Schütz, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (1940), 21–37, 217–26.
3. Ibid., 23.
4. Ibid., 24.
5. Ibid., 25.
6. Ibid., 217.
7. Ibid., 218–19.
8. Ibid., 25.
9. *Terre des hommes* is the title of a book by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, published in 1939. It has been translated into English as *Wind, Sand, and Stars*.—TRANS.
10. Without the idea of intentionality understood in a more originative sense than in objectification, without intentionality removed from the logic of objectification because it traces out truly transitive relations, all the contemporary philosophy of art would have been impossible or incomprehensible. To speak only of its most remarkable manifestation, the critical work of Maurice Blanchot, in which literature is neither an approach to ideal Beauty, nor one of the ornaments of our life, nor the testimony of the times, nor the translation of its economic conflicts, but the ultimate relation with being in a quasi-impossible anticipation of what no longer is being—that work is inconceivable without the radical idea of intentionality. Without it, how would the following language be possible? "The story is movement towards a point not merely unknown, ignored or foreign, but such that, in advance and outside this movement, it seems to have no sort of reality; a point so imperious however that it is from it alone that the story derives its attraction, so that it cannot even "begin" before having reached it; yet it is only the story and its unpredictable movement that provide the space

in which the point becomes real, powerful and attractive" (Maurice Blanchot, *Le livre à venir* [Paris: Gallimard, 1959], 13).

So also for Henry Duméry's already quite important theological work. The fact that certain realities cannot be revealed except through formulations that would be absurd for an objectifying thought, but inevitable for anyone desirous of establishing true contact with these realities; and that, conversely, certain absurd formulations should be merely paths that must be followed if one wishes to seize these realities—this cannot be thought or expressed without the phenomenological conception of intentionality, distinct from that of objectification.

[Henry Duméry published several works on the philosophy of religion prior to Levinas's publication of the present article (1959): *Critique and Religion* (1957); *The Problem of God in Philosophy of Religion* (1957), English translation by Charles Courtney (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964); *Philosophy of Religion* (1957); *Phenomenology and Religion* (1958), English translation by P. Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and *The Faith is Not a Cry* (1959).—TRANS.]

8. The Permanent and the Human in Husserl

1. See above, chapter 7, n. 9.—TRANS.
2. Perhaps this pathos commands the phenomenological movement right up to Heidegger's late philosophy, in which the human is elicited, called, instituted by the "Being of beings," whose event consists in shining (even if Being's call to mortal man is, for Heidegger, history itself).
3. *ID*, 244; ID, 282.

9. Intentionality and Sensation

1. See, e.g., *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, the posthumous publication of a course taught in the summer of 1925, in *HU*, vol. 9, 24–25.
2. *FT*, 25–26; on the material a priori, see the remarkable analyses of Mikel Dufrenne in *The Notion of the A Priori*, trans. E. S. Casey (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
3. See de Waelhens, *La philosophie et les expériences naturelles* (*Phaenomenologica*, vol. 9, 110).
4. See *FT*, 3–4.
5. In *Erfahrung und Urteil*, for example, the modality of the temporal presence of the act is described. See particularly 118, 122. But similar texts are numerous in works of various periods.
6. *LU* II, 369. The theme of sensations animated by intentional apprehension and thus becoming qualities is constant and never abandoned. See, e.g., *Erfahrung und Urteil*, 116ff.

7. *RL*, vol. 3, 100; LI, 730. I have put "in the manner of" [*à la façon de*] and not "by means of" [*au moyen de*]. The sketches are not the *means* at the disposal of consciousness for representing the object to itself. The relation between object and lived content is a relation between the thing and its shadow; the thing is *in the manner* or the mode of the sketch.

8. My italics.

9. *RL*, vol. 3, 122.

10. *RL*, vol. 2, 383.

11. *RL*, vol. 2, 383.

12. French idealists: Jules Lagneau (1851–94) and Emile Chartier ("Alain") (1868–1951)—TRANS.

13. *ZB*, 423; PITC, 92.

14. The notion of life is associated with that of the proto-impression's "now" as early as 1905. See *ZB*, 386.

15. *ZB*, 451.

16. PITC, 15.

17. *ZB*, 427.

18. *ZB*, 445.

19. For example, *ZB*, 424 (90 of the French translation): "an *always* new originary being has its source *at the same time* in the now," etc. My italics. There are countless examples.

20. *ZB*, 466–67.

21. A necessary task would be to establish the place, in relation to this notion of subjectivity, held by the notion of the pure Ego—transcendence in immanence, source of activity in the strong sense of the term, bearer of habitus and of the whole sedimentation of the past.

22. Once more we see how faithful Husserl remains to the empiricist schema and to the equivocal position of sensation, which belongs to the sphere of the lived and at the same time figures the "thought."

23. *ZB*, 451; PITC, 131.

24. See, for the whole problem of time and intentionality, the penetrating study that appeared in *Deucalion* 1 in 1947—Yvonne Picard's Master's thesis, which must date back to the first years of the Occupation. This text particularly elaborates on the importance of appendix 5 of PITC. It is one of the first essays, already prefiguring the manner of Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and Derrida, to rethink vigorously the minute analyses of Husserl, along the way opened by Jean Wahl. One finds there a confrontation between Husserl and Heidegger, and Heidegger does not always have the last word. Yvonne Picard died in deportation for having participated in the Resistance, without her origin having been able to be the cause of her martyrdom. We take it up here to render a pious homage—imprescriptible—by evoking her thought and thus moving the lips of the dead.

25. One dares not create a neologism to translate this notion, but the term "feelant" ["*sentance*"] might express the diffuse nature of the notion.

26. *Ideen* II, 153.

27. *Ideen* II, 57–58.

28. *Ideen* II, 58.

29. See Gerd Brand, *Welt, Ich und Zeit*, 75, for a remarkable text excerpted from an unpublished manuscript.

30. Plato, *Sophist*, 229c.

31. "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," in PCP, 145.

32. In 1939, in this same journal (*Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, Brussels), Eugen Fink expressed fundamental and definitive ideas on the importance of the idea of origin in Husserl. I take this occasion of Fink's 60th birthday to express my salutations to the man I admired in 1928–29 at the side of the Master whose assistant he was, and whom he also assisted at the hour of all the desertions, and who—a very remarkable philosopher—never "gave Greek names to things barbarian."

10. From Consciousness to Wakefulness

1. Is not to speak of the *insecurity of reason* to admit implicitly a reason in the guise of lucidity being exercised in the light of being, but threatened by the possible flimsiness of the being that is manifested—threatened by illusion? Yet in this present essay we are precisely contesting this ontological interpretation of reason, in order to lead to a reason understood as watchfulness, in which objectivity and objectification arise only at a certain depth, at which sleep in not yet dissipated. The language of contestation here utilized does indeed itself remain ontological in structure. But this means that the level of lucidity that the awakening reaches is not indifferent, and that it is indispensable for the awakening. This will have to be shown below.

2. *HU*, vol. 9, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, §§ 27ff., pp. 147ff.

3. To the point of being prolonged into the research institutions, laboratories, and the lecture halls of universities, which orient these "orientations." These "conditions" for the appearing of "being in its truth" are evidently part of being and of the world, and justify the recuperation of the psychic by objectivity and the extension of science to psychology.

4. By virtue of a "nowise fortuitous" inclination. I quote from *RL*, vol. 2, part 1, 10; LI, 253. The notes and annexes of *RL*, vol. 2 provide the variants that distinguish the first, 1901 edition of the German text from the second.

5. *RL*, vol. 2, 264; LI, 253. [Findlay's translation, based on the 2d ed. of the German, shows substantial differences.—TRANS.]

6. *RL*, vol. 2, 7–8. The beginning of this quotation is given according to the 1st edition of *Logical Investigations*. See *RL*, vol. 2, 263 ("Notes Annexes"); LI, 251.

7. *RL*, vol. 2., 10; LI, 253.

8. *RL*, vol. 2., 11, 264 ("Notes Annexes"); LI, 254. [Levinas's quote is from the first (1900) German edition (*RL*, vol. 2, 264), and Findlay's translation from the second (1913) one.—TRANS.]

9. *MC*, 19; CM, 23; *HU*, vol. 1, 62.

10. *MC*, 13; CM, 15; *HU*, vol. 1, 15.
11. *MC*, 20; CM, 23; *HU*, vol. 1, 63.
12. *MC*, 19; CM, 22; *HU*, vol. 1, 62.
13. *MC*, 25, 129; CM, 29, 153; *HU*, vol. 1, 67, 179.
14. *MC*, 130; CM, 152; *HU*, vol. 1, 178.
15. See my *TI*, 65ff.; TI, 92ff.
16. *MC*, 19; CM, 22; *HU*, vol. 1, 62.
17. The original (1974) version has "la vivacité de la vie" (the liveliness of life, or the vivacity of life); the 1982 version (in *De Dieu qui vient à l'idée*), has "le *vivre* de la vie" (the *to live* of life, or the *living* of life), all four instances of the occurrence of the expression. In substituting the later expression, Levinas is tapping a resource of the French language, the nominalization of the infinitive form, in order to minimize the substantive (e.g., ontological) effect. We have chosen to revert to the earlier version of the text in this instance because it makes Levinas's point more sharply.—TRANS.
18. *HU*, vol. 9, 166ff.
19. Such, at least, as Husserl continued to conceive of that immanence in 1925—where the immanent remained apodictic and adequately perceived. See *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, § 34 in *HU*, vol. 9, 171ff.: The lived experience is always different, but, perceived adequately, it is real, without any element of "unreal" presence, without any ideality. The objective Same is an ideality, perceived through the lived experience, and always inadequately. But the diversity of lived experience constitutes a coherence, a whole. It is not chaotic.
20. And no doubt the attachment to the Same is impenitent. And one can justify this impenitence by the reawakening itself, which, as a responsibility for the Other, has need of justice, comparison, lucidity, knowledge, presence, being, ontology. See my *AE*, 200ff.; *OB*, 157ff. The infinite will ceaselessly be reduced to the Same awakened by this *ceaselessly*.
21. That is, unless they have suggested it to us both in the Daemon of Socrates and in the entry *through the door* of the agent intellect in Aristotle.
22. In *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl shows *in the ego asleep*—indifferent to what "emerges" (*sich abhebt*) in consciousness but does not yet "affect" it with the necessary intensity for awakening—the distinction between the "proximity" and the "distance" of objects. Likewise in annex 24 of the *Phenomenological Psychology* of 1925:

> The directing-oneself-toward . . . is an intentional modification of the non-yet-directing-oneself-toward. . . . The non-accomplishment of the (intentional) act still has different modes: affecting the ego (awakening an interest, furnishing motives to the Ego to take up positions, inciting and eventually furnishing an incitement entering into competition with other incitements—from all this modal differences result), not affecting and yet remaining conscious in the living present with an "absence of interest," which is a modality in the ego that relates to it; the ego *sleeps with respect to* that, and that is, in this sense, unconscious. . . . Through all the lived of consciousness and through all the modifications of the lived, through the unconscious, procedes the synthesis of the identity of the ego. (*HU*, vol. 9, 479–80)

And in the same annex 24: "Properly speaking, everything belongs to the waking ego as continuously thematizing, accomplishing acts, functioning as a living Ego of presence, but functioning also in passive works, in the associations and syntheses of passive constitution" (*HU*, vol. 9, 481). See also, in *HU*, vol 9, 313, *Amsterdamer Vorträge*.
23. See preceding note.
24. *HU*, vol. 9, 209.
25. *HU*, vol. 9, 208.
26. "As if"—not the uncertainty or simple probability of the philosophies of the "*als ob*." These, despite their empiricist prudence, remain attached to truth qua result, to the ideal identity of the objective, and more generally, to the univocity of presence and of being. I understand in the "as though" the equivocal or the enigma of the nonphenomenon, the nonrepresentable. A testimony—from before the thematization attesting to a "more" awakening a "less," which it disturbs or inspires—to the "idea of infinity," to "God in me." And *then* the non-sense of an indecipherable trace, the bustling of the *there is*. A nonsynchronizable diachrony, an enigmatic signifying, and, only thus, signifying beyond being, or God. The notion of insomnia, as distinguished from that of consciousness, took form for me in my little book of 1947 entitled *Existence and Existents*, precisely in its moments of non-sense. I then wrote:

> We are, thus, introducing into the impersonal event of the *there is* not the notion of consciousness, but of wakefulness, in which consciousness participates, affirming itself as a consciousness because it only participates in it. Consciousness is a part of wakefulness, which means that it has already torn into it. It contains a shelter from that being with which, depersonalizing us, we reach in insomnia, that being which is not to be lost nor duped nor forgotten, which is, if we may hazard the expression, completely sobered up. (*De l'existence à l'existant*, 111; *Existence and Existents*, 66)

27. The Hebrew Bible, to designate the religious awakening of Samson, says: "The spirit of the Eternal began to stir him at Mahanch-Dan" (*Judges* 13:25). For "stir," it uses the term "*vatipaem*," a word with the same root as the word "*paamon*"—bell. The spirit stirring like the beating or the percussion with which the ringing of a bell resonates or vibrates.
28. Has the presence to self in the *Cogito* ever been convincing because of the *type* of evidence alleged? Has Descartes ever convinced us, in the *Discourse on Method*, that the certainty of the *Cogito* taught us "that the things that we conceive most clearly and distinctly are all true"?
29. Paradoxically, human corporeity here offers not an obstacle but a way.
30. See *AE*, passim, esp. chap. 4, 125; OB, 99.

31. If awakening takes on its concrete figure in responsibility for the other, then representation, identity, and equality are justified on the basis of justice. Equality is dependent on equity, for which knowledge is necessary, just as a civilization of knowledge, a *presence* to consciousness and the philosophical statement are necessary for the spirituality of awakening. But philosophy, as an extreme lucidity, still correlative with being and expressed in a language that Derrida calls logocentric, is already unsaying itself. In its said, the paths that lead to knowledge and presentation, on the one hand, are distinguished from the path that—otherwise than being or before the *essence of being*—signifies the Infinitity of the other. A distinction that remains an enigma and dia-chrony. See my *AE*, 195–218ff.; OB, 153–75ff.

32. "Waxed fat, he kicked" (*Deuteronomy* 32:15). A loss of sensitivity that is not the equivalent of ideology; for in the midst of the repose of the Same, which reason legitimately grants itself, it is a sleep untouched by the influence of any drive, any desire. But it is a torpor that certainly opens reason to ideologies.

11. Philosophy and Awakening

1. Levinas has written an article on Delhomme, "Penelope or Modal Thought," in *Proper Names*, trans. Michael B. Smith (England: Athlone, 1996).—TRANS.

2. *Deuteronomy* 32:15, "waxed fat, he kicked"; cf. chapter 10, above.—TRANS.

3. See *Phänomenologishe Psychologie*, in *HU*, vol. 9, 24–25.—TRANS.

4. *HU*, vol. 9, 209.

5. Descartes's *Meditations* were first published in Latin in 1641. A second revised Latin edition appeared in 1642. In the same year the latter was translated into French by the Duc de Luynes, a translation which met with Descartes's full approval. Indeed, Descartes himself later had the French version republished. The pertinent passage, clearly the penultimate paragraph of the third Meditation, is as follows: "But before examining this matter more carefully, and going on to consider other truths to be drawn from it, it seems to me very appropriate to pause for a moment to contemplate that all perfect God, to weigh His marvelous attributes at leisure, to consider, admire and adore the incomparable beauty of that immense light, at least to the degree that the power of my mind, which remains as it were dazzled by it, enables me to do so" (Descartes, *Meditations métaphysiques* [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970], 79–80).—TRANS.

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